Will China Allow North Korea to Collapse?
Author: Gordon G. Chang
Relations between China and North Korea have deteriorated during the last year, but Beijing has not fundamentally changed its approach toward its neighbor because that approach serves vital Chinese interests. If the regime of Kim Jong Un should look like it might fail—and there are several reasons why it could—Beijing’s leaders will undoubtedly do all they can to effect a rescue. The Chinese state, however, is not as stable or as capable as it appears, and it may not be in a position to lend needed assistance.
(Pages 1 – 26)
U.S.-Korea Economic Relations and the Next U.S. Administration
Author: Troy Stangarone
When the next United States president is inaugurated on January 20, 2017, he or she may face one of the more challenging domestic political environments for international trade in the modern political era; at that time, the U.S. will need to make significant decisions regarding its economic relationship with East Asia, including South Korea. The most significant decision facing the next administration will be handling the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). While there is still time for the U.S. Congress to pass the TPP prior to the next administration taking office, it is increasingly likely that the next administration will have to grapple with either passing or renegotiating the Asia-Pacific-wide agreement, as well as determining how to bring South Korea into the region wide agreement. Bringing Korea into the TPP will further solidify the U.S.’ economic relationship with South Korea, enhancing efforts to move toward a free trade area within the Asia-Pacific.
(Pages 27 – 51)
Strength and Consistency: A Key to North Korean Nuclear Sanctions
Author: Kim Taewoo
Pyongyang’s fourth nuclear test on January 6, 2016, the February 2 test launch of the Kwangmyongsong-4 satellite (which in fact was a long-range missile), and other provocative activities amply reminded the international community of the reasons for strong and consistent sanctions. Such activities again proved the Kim Family Regime (KFR) will not accept voluntary changes or engage in denuclearization dialogue. Instead, the regime declared de facto “Nuclear-First Politics,” thus ruling out the possibility of denuclearization. If the KFR is allowed to continue unhampered nuclear weapons development, it will become a nuclear power with over 50 nuclear weapons within a decade. Its weapons will include atomic bombs, boosted fission bombs, and hydrogen bombs. The KFR will also possess increasingly formidable delivery vehicles, such as Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. This situation must be a nightmare particularly to South Korea.
(Pages 52 – 71)
The ROK–U.S. Alliance and the Third Offset Strategy
Authors: Patrick M. Cronin and Seongwon Lee
The United States relies on its ability to project military power far forward of its shores in defense of national and allied interests. Yet the diffusion of technology, especially long-range and precision-guided munitions, poses profound challenges to this core assumption undergirding U.S. extended deterrence and alliance contingency response. The U.S. Department of Defense is seeking technological and operational innovations to deal with these unfavorable trends, largely through military modernization programs that are designed to preserve the United States’ capacity to deter aggression, dissuade adventurism, reassure allies, and defend allied and national interests in the event of conflict. Most analysis of America’s so-called “Third Offset Strategy” has focused on deploying leading-edge technologies to overcome China’s military modernization programs. Almost nothing has been written about a Third Offset Strategy through the prism of the Korean Peninsula. Yet the Third Offset Strategy can bolster the alliance’s response to North Korea, reinforce deterrence, and support regional security.
(Pages 72 – 97)
North Korea’s Fourth Nuclear Test and the U.S.-ROK Alliance
Author: Yonho Kim
North Korea’s nuclear tests in 2016 rekindled a stronger voice for independent nuclear armament among South Korean conservatives. It is noteworthy that the pro-nuclear view is mainly driven by feelings of profound frustration and helplessness over North Korea’s growing nuclear threat. To assuage concerns, Washington should start seeking new methods of reassuring its partner of its intention to honor its security commitments. The challenges to the U.S.-ROK alliance sparked by North Korea’s nuclear test also came from the liberals’ fierce criticism of the Park government’s decision to start talks with Washington on THAAD deployment. Opponents of THAAD emphasized potential “security anxiety” associated with THAAD deployment, which they argued would escalate regional tensions and introduce a new Cold War, endangering peace on the Korean Peninsula.
(Pages 98 – 121)
Analyzing Japan’s Role in Korean Security within the Framework of the Quasi-Alliance Model
Author: James F. Durand
This paper assesses Japan’s role in Korean security using the quasialliance model. Developed by Professor Victor Cha, the quasi-alliance model to analyze the security relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea, “two states that remain unallied despite sharing a common ally.” Cha defined the quasi-alliance model as “the triangular relationship between two states that are not allied, but share a third party as a common ally.” A key assumption is that the third state serves as the “great-power protector of the two states, and therefore exit opportunities for the two are limited.” While historical issues affected relations between Tokyo and Seoul, American security policies were the primary determinant of cooperation between Japan and Korea. American policy changes produced distinct “abandonment” or “entrapment” responses within the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK security alliances: shared perceptions yielded cooperation, while differing views produced friction.
(Pages 122 – 148)
The North Korean Economic System: Challenges and Issues
Author: Bradley O. Babson
The North Korean economic system is the product of a variety of influences that have shaped its evolution. To understand this system and its challenges today, it is necessary to appreciate North Korea’s unique history and dynamics of change, both internally and externally. These factors have shaped national economic policies and behavior of state and non-state actors in ways that are different than has been the case in other transition economies following the collapse of the Soviet Union. This paper reviews the evolution of the North Korean economic system under the terms of its three leaders; assesses the impacts of recent developments on the system, including UN Security Council Resolution 2270, closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and Seventh Party Congress; and discusses the fundamental challenges facing the economic system today and implications for future engagement policies by the international community.
(Pages 149 – 175)
