A Window of Vulnerability: Rethinking the Defense of the Korean Peninsula
Authors: Patrick M. Cronin and Moon-young Kim Jun
A confluence of factors is elevating the risk of renewed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, and is creating a sense of urgency in dealing with the North Korean military threat. On the one hand, the continuing collapse of the economy, the weakening of the North Korean state, and Kim Jong Un’s tenuous grip on power is increasing the instability and unpredictability of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. On the other hand, Pyongyang’s recent advancement of its asymmetric capabilities is expanding the potential damage that it could inflict on both South Korea and the United States. The convergence of these developments is destabilizing the Korean Peninsula and increasing the probability of a provocation or a sudden change scenario escalating into a larger conflict. In the face of these challenges, Seoul and Washington have designed strategic plans to appropriately respond to another provocation and have agreed to modest long-term acquisition projects to defend and deter against the North Korean threat.
(Pages 1 – 25)
Be Careful What You Wish For – Security and Stability on the Korean Peninsula
Author: Major Bernard J. Brister
This article argues that the primary objective of international relations on the Korean peninsula is the enhancement of regional and therefore global political stability rather than de-nuclearization of the peninsula or the re-unification of the Republic of Korea (ROK) with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as is frequently argued. While some may contend that de-nuclearization and re-unification will result in greater regional stability, this article argues that depending upon the timing and methods used, either of these events or both in concert could in fact decrease the stability of the region and even precipitate open conflict amongst the various stakeholders. The best approach to achieving the goal of stability in the region is a process of relatively slow and gradual change that will originate from within the DPRK resulting in the disintegration of the regime rather than its collapse, a process that ideally will be contained by the other states in the region in cooperation with each other.
(Pages 26 – 52)
Proliferation and Illegal Foreign Sales: Ensuring Regime Survival
Author: Gordon G. Chang
In the past, North Korea’s Kim rulers ensured regime survival by selling dangerous weapons. These exports earned large sums for the ruling group, of course. More important, weapons proliferation furthered Chinese foreign policy goals, thereby earning Pyongyang favor in Beijing. In recent years, however, China’s officials apparently have been changing their attitude toward this deadly trade. If they have also changed their policies —and it is not clear that they have done this yet— continued proliferation by Pyongyang may worsen already difficult ties with its most important sponsor. In any event, Kim Jong Un, the North’s current ruler, is trying to find other backers, most notably Japan and Russia. If he is successful, he will have more latitude to ignore Beijing’s wishes, thereby permitting him to continue proliferation without fear of China’s views on this matter.
(Pages 53 – 79)
Competition and Countervailing Power in the Imperialist Marketplace: The Case of Korea
Author: C. H. Pak
The purpose of this essay is to propose that both direct competition and Galbraith’s notion of countervailing power were at work during two wars involving Korea, along with the war termination negotiations, as a way to curb the economic and/or political power of one or more strong states who presented as a hegemonic threat in the region of Korea. The Moscow Decision was the result of US-Russian competition for influence in the Korean peninsula. However, after the internationalization of the Korean War, several nations, many of them considered “weak sellers,” organized to countervail Chinese and Russian hegemonic power in Korea. Two failed attempts at generating countervailing power occurred during the armistice negotiations towards the end of the Korean War, both by Syngman Rhee on behalf of Korea: a) sabotage of hostage release negotiations; b) refusal to sign the armistice agreement. Although Galbraith’s model was initially applied to the American marketplace, it may be applied to cases in which the US was involved in Korean affairs because America’s leaders were also native to the capitalist system that Galbraith described, which may have similarly influenced the behavior of other players in the imperialist market.
(Pages 80 – 99)
US Strategic Interests and Future Role in the Peaceful Unification of the Korean Peninsula
Author: Sue Mi Terry
The United States has tried numerous approaches to dealing with the North Korean threat in recent decades. Neither negotiations nor economic aid have weaned the North Korean state away from building nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles or from ratcheting up tensions periodically with South Korea, Japan, and the United States to extract concessions from the West. All other policies having failed, it is incumbent on the United States to try the only policy with any conceivable chance of success: a policy of encouraging the peaceful demise of the North Korean regime followed by the unification of the Korean peninsula into a single democratic, free-market state. Admittedly US leverage to achieve this outcome is limited, but further sanctions on North Korea, especially on its finances, can help. So, too, would greater efforts both internationally and within North Korea to call attention to North Korean human rights abuses.
(Pages 100 – 120)
North Korea’s Revolutionary Unification Policy
Author: Sung-Yoon Lee
Some scholars consider that North Korea’s provocative actions are responsive to the activities of its adversaries, namely South Korea and the United States. This article counters that line of thinking, arguing that North Korea acts in a more purposeful manor to achieve its short- and long-term objectives, the most important of which is its aim of revolutionary unification. In order to achieve this, North Korea employs a pattern of following hostile provocations with peaceful offensives, using its own version of carrots and sticks to garner concessions from its adversaries. North Korea also exhibits a long history of engaging in strategic deception that if better understood can help interpret the North’s actions and intentions going forward.
(Pages 121 – 137)
Korean Reunification in the Context of Changing Triangular Relations
Author: Gilbert Rozman
Three triangles are featured in recent analyses of the changing diplomacy centered on the Korean Peninsula. While Russia is taking the initiative in trying to shift the northern triangle, and Japan is trying a new approach straining the alliance triangle, China and South Korea are preparing for the long run as each keeps close watch on the United States within the triangle that matters most. The US strategy—misleadingly belittled as strategic patience—endorses South Korea’s approach and welcomes China’s increasing pressure on North Korea and priority for South Korea, but it is wary of China’s primary objectives when a new stage will be reached with the potential to lead toward reunification. The focus has shifted from restarting the Six-Party Talks or deterring provocations by North Korea to maneuvering within triangles to shape the geopolitical environment when the North Korean leadership decides to move in one direction or another.
(Pages 138 – 152)
China’s Strategic Interests and Future Role
Author: Roy D. Kamphausen
China has two longstanding security interests in North Korea which are supported by a separately ruled North Korea on China’s northeastern border: strategic interests related to the regime’s value in helping Beijing manage important bilateral relationships and the assurance of China’s “core interests”. With a new Chinese leader, and ever more provocative actions by North Korea, China’s calculations about its support for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are under reassessment. This article finds that Chinese support for the DPRK and stability on China’s northeastern periphery is the best available choice for achieving Chinese security goals, and high costs would be entailed with any adjustment to this support. However, if sudden change were to occur in North Korea, China would have to adjust.
(Pages 153 – 177)
Dean Acheson’s Role in the Sino-U.S. Clash over Korea Revisited: Mistaken Beliefs and Sinister Purpose
Author: Taifa Yu
Clash with the Chinese “volunteers” during the Korean War culminated in “one of the most terrific disasters” for the Truman administration, observed Secretary of State Dean Acheson. This article argues that this debilitating clash could have been averted if Acheson, who played a dominant role during the entire decision-making process up to the moment of the military fiasco, wanted to foil it. Instead, he wanted the clash and even the setback to serve his “sinister purpose”: breaking Truman’s resistance to increasing military expenditures to a level commensurate with the NSC68 that would enable the U.S. to wage the Cold War from a “position of strength” against the Soviet Union.
(Pages 178 – 215)
