The United States and the Origins of the Korean War: The Failure of Deterrence
Author: William Stueck
The North Korean attack on South Korea on June 25, 1950 and the subsequent US intervention to contain it represent the beginning of the Korean War as we know it. One key to its origins is the division of Korea at the end of World War II into Soviet and American occupation zones. Another is the creation by the occupying powers in 1948 of two hostile, competing governments on the peninsula, both of which wanted to use force to reunify the country.
(Pages 1 – 18)
The Causes of the Korean War, 1950-1953
Author: Ohn Chang-Il
The causes of the Korean War (1950-1953) can be examined in two categories, ideological and political. Ideologically, the communist side, including the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea, desired to secure the Korean peninsula and incorporate it in a communist bloc. Politically, the Soviet Union considered the Korean peninsula in the light of Poland in Eastern Europe—as a springboard to attack Russia—and asserted that the Korean government should be “loyal” to the Soviet Union. Because of this policy and strategic posture, the Soviet military government in North Korea (1945-48) rejected any idea of establishing one Korean government under the guidance of the United Nations. The two Korean governments, instead of one, were thus established, one in South Korea under the blessing of the United Nations and the other in the north under the direction of the Soviet Union.
(Pages 19 – 44)
Chinese Perspectives on the Origins of the Korean War: An Assessment at Sixty
Author: Steven M. Goldstein
As we mark the sixtieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, Millet’s contention certainly applies to Chinese views of the origins of that conflict. Indeed, during the last decade there has been vigorous discussion on this issue, shaped not only by the changing political environment in China, but also by the dramatic revelations that have become available from archival sources as well as from the work of international scholars. What has emerged by no means can be labeled a consensus. Still, there are dominant interpretations as well as common themes and unanswered questions that emerge in Chinese writings.
(Pages 45 – 70)
The Role and Responsibilities of the United States in the Korean War: Critical Foreign Policy Decisions by the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations
Author: Doug Bandow
The Korean War was not inevitable. Neither was its scope and impact. Decisions by the U.S. government, and particularly the administration of Harry S Truman, made both division and war likely on the Korean peninsula. Had the U.S. reacted differently during the conflict, combat would have ended much earlier or expanded more widely. As always, hindsight clarifies. Some adverse consequences were more predictable than others. Policymakers operating in real time with limited information will always face a difficult challenge. However, several decisions surrounding the Korean War were based on a deeply flawed understanding of the facts or an equally flawed prediction of the consequences of particular actions. This article considers the merits of ten of the most consequential decisions made by U.S. policymakers affecting the onset and course of the Korean War.
(Pages 71 – 100)
The Role and Responsibilities of China and the Former Soviet Union in the Korean War
Author: Byong Moo Hwang
The Korean War decision on the communist side was made through careful and thorough consultations and conducted in partnership by the former Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. Stalin approved Kim Il Sung’s plan to invade South Korea under the condition that China also agreed to his plan. Stalin stressed that the Soviet Union would provide armaments while China should send troops, if the Americans intervened in the war. China made the decision to enter the war immediately after the South Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel, but sent the troops to Korea soon after the UN troops captured Pyongyang. The Chinese People’s Volunteers exercised operational control over the North Korean army and engaged in more than five major campaigns. Disagreements between China and North Korea over war aims occurred, but were resolved by Stalin. After the fifth campaign, China’s war aim was a speedy armistice.
(Pages 101 – 126)
From Korea to Vietnam: The Evolution of U.S. Interventionism in Asia
Author: Mel Gurtov
The wars in Korea and Vietnam were of a piece, directly related by virtue of U.S. global strategy and China’s security concerns. This article, focusing mainly on the U.S. side in these wars, argues that three characteristics of American policy had enduring meaning for the rest of the Cold War and even beyond: the official mindsets that led to U.S. involvement, the centrality of the China threat in American decision making, and the common legacy of intervention against nationalism and in support of authoritarian regimes.
(Pages 127 – 146)
The Korean Position on Alliance Formation and the Change of Public Trust between Korea and the United States: The Cheonan Incident and the OPCON Issue
Author: Taewoo Kim
In macroscopic perspective, the ROK-U.S. alliance has evolved toward a desirable future-oriented one and public trust has been generally robust. Most South Koreans remember it as an unmatched blessing for their security and prosperity. In microscopic perspective, however, the alliance was not without ordeals and tribulations, and the public trust not without dangerous vicissitudes. Today, many South Koreans regard the 2007 OPCON (Operational Control) agreement as a strange decision made in a strange time, thus representing the era of ordeals. The sinking of the Cheonan on March 26, 2010, sheds new light on the OPCON issue. For those South Koreans who think that 2012 is the worst time for the OPCON transfer and dismantlement of the CFC, the bloody North Korean provocation reminds us of the Korean War sixty years ago, distinguishes once again friends from foes, and opportunely rekindles the OPCON issue. They believe that an indefinite postponement of the OPCON transfer is what the two nations should do to sustain a more future-oriented alliance and public trust toward it.
(Pages 147 – 160)
The Impact of the Korean War on the Political-Economic System of North Korea
Authors: Scott A. Snyder and Joyce Lee
The impact of the Korean War on North Korean politics, economy, foreign policy, and relations with the United States has been significant. The unsuccessful conclusion of war brought about dramatic changes in North Korea’s political economic system by ending direct Soviet control, providing a basis for the consolidation of Kim Il Sung’s power within the Korean Workers’ Party, and feeding a desire on the part of Kim Il Sung to impose political and economic control as the self-actualized “center.” Kim Il Sung’s ability to eliminate political rivals and establish and lead a totalitarian political system requiring loyalty to himself and his son, Kim Jong Il, the initial success of North Korea’s centrally-planned economic system and mass mobilization policies that marked the height of North Korea’s economic success in the 1950s and 1960s, a complex relationship between the Soviet Union and China that Kim Il Sung was able to manipulate to North Korea’s advantage, and the enduring legacy of enmity between the United States and North Korea despite dramatic changes in the international system are factors that have clear influence on post-war North Korea.
(Pages 161 – 182)
