

Korean Newspapers, Korean Sovereignty over Dokdo and Ulleungdo, and Early Japanese Intrusions

Kyu-hyun Jo, Ph.D.
Yonsei University

Abstract

Contrary to the Japanese Foreign Ministry's claim that Koreans never demonstrated any clear basis for its claims that it had taken effective control over Dokdo (Takeshima) before 1905, the Ministry ignores the critical role of the Korean media, especially major Korean newspapers such as the *Hwangsŏng Newspaper* and *Dongnip Sinmun (Independent)*, in publicizing and mobilizing Korean nationalism through a sustained assertion of Korean sovereignty over Dokdo. By publishing articles which officially denounced Japanese intrusion into Dokdo or the Japanese government's feigned ignorance and disregard for such an act, or articles which explicitly discussed the long history of Korea's recognition of Dokdo and Ulleungdo as her nascent territories, Korean newspapers not only expressed Korean nationalism by incorporating anti-Japanese sentiment. They also emphasized Korea's ancient consciousness of national unity by clearly declaring that at the heart of such nationalism and rhetoric was a strong identification of Dokdo and Ulleungdo as Korea's historic territories. Korean newspapers were instrumental in publicizing Korean consciousness about Dokdo and Ulleungdo by not only reporting on Japanese intrusions into Dokdo, educating the Korean public on the ancient history of Dokdo and Ulleungdo, but also serve as crucial evidence proving that Japan willfully ignored Korea's national sovereignty and judicial authority to wrest away Korean sovereignty over Dokdo and Ulleungdo.

Keywords: Newspapers; Dokdo; Korea; Intrusion; Japan; Sovereignty

"According to a report by Mr. Pae Kye-chu, former Magistrate of Ulleungdo, Yoshio Mantaro, a Japanese citizen, was found to be responsible for the disappearance of 32 trees from the island, and Mr. Pae went to Oki Island and found the trees after a trial—a fact which had been

reported by on an earlier occasion—whereupon Pae was rewarded for his efforts. However, in October, Pae was in Japan again, for Fukuma Hyonosuke of Matsue stole 95 samples of veneer wood, whereupon Pae sued Fukuma twice at Matsue Prefectural Court and had Fukuma's properties confiscated.. since the 95 samples are precious properties of the Korean state and could not be used in a libertine fashion, Pae was to be rewarded again for his effort to defend Korea's sovereignty and must be respected as are these samples of veneer wood."¹

Introduction

The article presented above is from *Hwangŏng Sinmun* (*Hwangŏng Newspaper*), one of Korea's first newspapers to be circulated nation-wide. This article, written just a little over a year before the Korean Empire officially declared Dokdo to be under Korean jurisdiction on October 25, 1900, notably demonstrates three key facts. First, Ulleungdo, and by extension, Dokdo, was already under effective Korean administration before the 20th century, and second, the Korean government had to make painstaking efforts to assure that Japanese intrusions into Ulleungdo and Dokdo were serious causes of concern such that not only did Japanese citizens try to illegally steal Korean public property, but such blatant violations of Korean laws were conceived so alarming that the Korean government considered the violations as an encroachment of Korean national sovereignty.

Most importantly, the article demonstrates the complexities of territorial and national sovereignty such that Koreans considered territorial sovereignty as an essential marker of national sovereignty and deemed the two notions inseparable from each other. Japanese intrusions into Ulleungdo, as the article reports, were deemed not only to be a serious attempt to infringe the Korean government's right to administer a lone island, but a grave affront to the entirety of Korean national sovereignty. The article also crucially tells us that Japan has been mistaken in assuming that Koreans did not formulate a relationship between territorial sovereignty and national sovereignty. Despite these facts, with regard to Dokdo or as the Japanese call the island, "Takeshima," the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) officially opines that the Republic of Korea has "never demonstrated any clear basis for its claims that it had taken effective control over Takeshima prior to Japan's effective control

over Takeshima and reaffirmation of its territorial sovereignty in 1905."² Yet, MOFA also admits that because the Republic of Korea maintains an effective military control over Dokdo, Japan is currently unable to demand Korea's participation in a session at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to settle the dispute because the Korean government has continuously refused to settle it.³

Using articles published in major Korean newspapers such as the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, *Dongnip Sinmun*, and *Maeil Sinmun*, I will argue that the Japanese MOFA is wrong to assert that Koreans had no consciousness of Dokdo (Ulleungdo) as Korean territory before 1905. On the contrary, Korean newspapers had consistently maintained an active spirit of protest against Japanese intrusions into Dokdo before 1905 and Japan's subsequent attempt to illegally incorporate Dokdo under Shimane Prefecture's administration, which, as Korea's Northeast Asian History Foundation accurately puts it, "signaled the beginning of Japan's plundering of the entire Korean Peninsula."⁴ By making this argument through an analysis of Korean newspaper articles, I demonstrate that the Korean press not only reported on numerous instances of Japanese intrusion into Dokdo, published articles aimed at educating the Korean public about the geography and history of Dokdo, but also, by 1903, served as a crucial body of evidence proving that prior to Shimane Prefecture's forced incorporation of Dokdo, the Japanese liberally lived and made their livelihoods from Dokdo without seeking any permission from the Korean government because Japan already considered Dokdo as an outpost of a colonized Korea. I aim to essentially show that Koreans had a firm consciousness of Dokdo (and Ulleungdo's) existence before 1905 and of the fact that Dokdo (Ulleungdo) was Korea's national territory.

In short, as sociologist Malcolm Willey would argue, Korean newspapers not only performed their "news function," or "brought fresh accounts of contemporary events and disseminated information on timely events," their "editorial function," by commenting on events on Dokdo and Ulleungdo and providing opinions on contemporary matters, but also their "backgrounding function" by supplementing or enriching the understanding of news events on Dokdo by providing historical information on Dokdo to encourage nationalism and emphasize Korean sovereignty over Dokdo.⁵ Since the Korean press's such functions arose from a strong reflection of public consciousness of Dokdo as Korea's nascent territory before Japan's "reaffirmation" of sovereignty, the Korean

press also serves as a considerable body of evidence that Korea had asserted sovereignty over Dokdo before Japan's intrusions.

More specifically, Korean newspapers published articles proving that Dokdo is Korean territory because, as Anna Stolz would argue, their articles demonstrated four features of the "legitimate state theory": 1) Korean laws regulated property on Ulleungdo, the island which makes Dokdo a *de facto* livable space, 2) Korea had historical claims to Dokdo long before the 19th century, 3) Korea sought to protect the basic rights of Koreans in Ulleungdo by prohibiting Japanese people from illegally residing at Ulleungdo and engaging in illegal logging, and 4) Japan, not Korea, was the prime usurper of Ulleungdo.⁶ Therefore, contrary to the Japanese Foreign Ministry's claim, not only was Korean public consciousness that Dokdo is Korean territory well alive across the late 19th and early 20th century, but Korean newspapers were the principal agents in shaping and preserving that consciousness by issuing a consistent protest against Japanese intrusions and illegal engagement in logging and commercial activities in Dokdo.

In addition, as I have demonstrated through my analysis of the newspaper article mentioned earlier, the Japanese MOFA seems to have forgotten an important link between the its two statements and omits a crucial question. What is the source of the Korean government's confidence in practicing such effective control of Dokdo and her refusal to go to the ICJ? While a government has the liberty to assert claims which advance its case for nationalism and sovereignty, absolute expressions never address a truth absolutely. The Japanese Foreign Ministry's claim undermines the power of the newspaper as the main vehicle for expressing and reflecting a nation's public opinion and is mistaken for asserting that a nation can reaffirm territorial sovereignty; a nation innately has sovereignty over a territory based on historical legitimacy or it does not. If a nation is reaffirming sovereignty over a territory, or as political scientist Robert Jackson defines it, an authority supreme in relation to all other authorities in a territorial jurisdiction which is independent from foreign authorities, then it suggests that the territory had actually been under another nation's sovereignty because that nation had maintained an effective practice of sovereignty over the territory.⁷

Therefore, it follows that it is impossible for Korea to not have a clear basis for her effective control before 1905 because since the proclamation of the Korean Empire in 1897, and despite frequent Japanese intrusions into Dokdo before 1905, Koreans have maintained a conscious recognition

of Dokdo as Korean territory by issuing public protests through Korean newspapers such as the *Hwangsong Sinmun* and the *Dongnip Sinmun* after the announcement of Ordinance No. 41 of the Korean Empire, which unequivocally argued that Dokdo would be under the direct administration of the Korean government. In short, the Japanese Foreign Ministry's claim blatantly ignores the legally binding power of Ordinance No. 41 and the resilience of the Korean press in defending Korean sovereignty over Dokdo before Japan's illicit and illegal occupation of Dokdo.

A Review of the Scholarly Literature on the Popular Press, Dokdo, and Korean Nationalism

The popular press has been a principal engine behind the cultivation and fervent expression of nationalist sentiment and this relationship has been a subject of inquiry since the late 1930s, when O. Riegel identified a principal positive effect of media upon nationalist sentiment as providing currency to "symbols of nationalism as least common denominators of mass appeal" and a principal negative effect as the media's potential disregard for truth due to a fear that this may alienate readers.⁸ Ethno-nationalism, or as sociologist Anthony Smith defines it, "a sentiment of belonging to a historic territory, sharing a common culture, economy, customs, and legal rights and duties for all members," was a tool with which a newspaper could succeed in reading the mood of a particular era.⁹

Yet, should a newspaper be too carried away with keeping up with the times, there was a grave danger of neglecting uncomfortable facets of an issue at the expense of delivering only what the public wanted to hear, rendering the newspaper into nothing more than a tool for public propaganda. However, it was not until about four decades later, after the rise of decolonization movements in Africa that media's relationship with specifically anti-imperialistic nationalism began to receive serious academic attention. In the early 1970s, scholars such as Yaw Tuwasi, Fred Omu, and James Scotton examined the role of newspapers in the formation of nationalistic and anti-imperialistic discourse in Africa and demonstrated that the news media spearheaded the rise of anti-British and anti-colonial nationalism in Nigeria, East Africa, and Ghana. In their articles, newspapers primarily reflected political grievances against British discrimination towards Africans, bemoaned a rapid influx of Indian laborers to Africa, which intensified competition within African labor markets, or demanded outright independence to actualize the will to return Africa to Africans.¹⁰ Newspapers were the central intellectual engines

behind the spread of discourses concerning decolonization, which in turn, influenced the rise of nationalism and national consciousness within the African public sphere and laid the roots of the modern African nation-state.

If scholarship from the 1970s concentrated on the regional impact of news media in the formation of nationalism, since the 1980s, the literature began to display a more generalized and global outlook. Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*, which argued that the rise of the printing press and the widespread dissemination of newspapers principally engineered the spread of nationalism, and restructured the perception of time as a shared communal experience, is one of the most notable works which first attempted to explore a general and global connection between nationalism and popular media.¹¹ The book was not without faults. Its main thesis assumed a simplistic equation of a spread of mass media with the spread of national consciousness, was unable to account for different societal and political contexts in which nationalism arises, and confined nationalism strictly as a product of lingual communication.¹² Nevertheless, the book was instrumental in inspiring a continued interest in the role of media in publicizing nationalistic sentiment in diverse countries such as Indonesia, Ireland, and China. Moreover, on Korea, Andre Schmidt has also highlighted the importance of newspapers such as Chang Chi-yon's *Hwangsong Sinmun* in conceptualizing modern nationalist discourse surrounding Korea as an ethnically unified and distinct nation from China and Japan.¹³

On Dokdo, the scholarly debate has centered on discussions of Korean-Japanese diplomatic relations since the Cold War, especially highlighting the importance of post-colonial history, the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and protests from Korean civil interest groups against Japan's claims of sovereignty over Dokdo.¹⁴ It has also discussed the centrality of Dokdo to Shinzo Abe's attempt to encourage Right-wing nationalism in Japan, which includes an attempt to change Article 9 of the Japanese constitution and assert Japanese sovereignty over Dokdo in textbooks.¹⁵ Finally, it has also suggested the Aland Model as a method to "solve" the dispute between Korea and Japan, which, if implemented into a policy, would translate into the two countries "sharing" Dokdo, an outcome, which in my view, would not prove to be satisfactory for Korea.¹⁶

However, as much as the existing literature has critically and importantly analyzed newspapers and the media as a crucial vehicle for mobilizing public opinion and debate on nationalism and modernity across

diverse societies, its primary focus has chiefly been on the role of media in the formation of colonial nationalism and modernity as a byproduct of newspaper circulation because colonial nationalism precluded the existence of a nation-state. The literature on Dokdo nicely captures the importance of the territory in contemporary Korea-Japan relations, but it largely ignores the role of Korean newspapers in the late 19th to early 20th century in shaping Korean public consciousness about Japan's intrusions on Dokdo and Ulleungdo and Korea's ancient history behind her claim of sovereignty over these territories. In general, both bodies of scholarly literature have yet to explain how media could become a tool to promote societal unity by appealing to nationalism rather than a means to create nationalism as a new and original construct.

Korean newspapers' appeal to nationalism in connection to territorial sovereignty regarding Dokdo was possible because Korea's nationalism was a product of an ancient consciousness of Korea as a unified nation. It was the historicity of such consciousness which informed the Korean newspaper as a tool to express nationalism by protesting Japanese encroachments on Dokdo. Even Schmid's work, while concentrating on the formation of modern nationalist discourse in Korea, does not lay particular emphasis on newspapers but is a general survey of how nationalist discourse acquired modernity across the late 19th and 20th centuries. It has yet to explore the newspaper and public media's function in the cultivation of historical nationalism and resistance against foreign attempts at territorial encroachment within Korea, a country where the rise of modern nationalism did not coincide with the founding of a nation-state because her history of national unity can be traced back to 668, when the Silla Dynasty first unified Korea by putting an end to the Three Kingdoms' Period. In particular, since the scholarly literature on media and nationalism has largely confined its understanding of the newspaper's role to establishing nationalism as an original idea rather than as a historical sentiment which was strictly a reaction to foreign intrusions to a national territory, it has yet to consider how, in countries such as Korea, the newspaper became an important medium in the development of pre-colonial nationalism as a mechanism to resist the arrival of "modernity" in the form of territorial aggression and quasi-imperialism.

Japanese Intrusions into Dokdo and Ulleungdo and Korean Newspapers as Evidence of Korean Consciousness of Territorial Sovereignty

Japanese intrusions into Dokdo and Ulleungdo, if we consider territory as a livable space which has the four characteristics identified by Anna Stilz (2011), was markedly frequent since Japan's victory in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). Despite the fact that only a fifth of all residents on Ulleungdo were Japanese, Korean residents on Ulleungdo were increasingly becoming frustrated and irritated with Japanese attempts to hamper and restrict Korean economic activities on the island by demanding that the Korean government regularly send inspectors to issue warnings about Japanese residents' engagement in illegal logging and discrimination against Koreans. Newspapers such as *Dongnip Sinmun*, founded by Seo Jae-pil in 1896 as the first modern Korean newspaper, and *Hwangseong Sinmun*, founded by Jang Ji-yeon, a journalist and a fierce critic of Japanese imperialism, and were especially notable for their leadership in demanding the expulsion of illegal Japanese migrants who resided on Ulleungdo without any authorization from the Korean government.

Dongnip Sinmun (Independent Newspaper) first officially published an article in 1897 about the Korean government's effort to declare Dokdo its territory. Since Dokdo is an inhabitable rock and Ulleungdo is where the majority of Korean economic activities occur, the Korean government accordingly issued a decree to appoint a magistrate on the island in 1895 who would be "responsible for assuring that no harm would be done to the people," and despite being "a province located far from Seoul," the magistrate had to "ascertain that every person and speck of dirt from the island had to be within the regal domain." Finally, because the land was "annually known for producing a poor harvest because of the misfortunes which birds, mice, and wind bring" to the people, the royal decree urged the magistrate to assuage the island's residents and make every effort to help them lead comfortable lives." In short, at least a decade before Japan illegally annexed Dokdo, the Korean government had made a clear and a considerable effort to officially bring Dokdo under Korean jurisdiction and the Independent's decision to publicize the effort suggests that the Korean public was aware that the Korean government had decisively moved to practice *de jure* control over Dokdo prior to Japanese attempts to encroach Korean sovereignty over Dokdo.¹⁷

Furthermore, an increasing frequency of Japanese engagement in the illegal use of natural resources became a major cause which stimulated a strong sense of Korean sovereignty over Dokdo. Korean newspapers played an active role in confirming that logging was a crime for which no

Korean or Japanese person could be spared and reported extensively on the severity of the Japanese engagement in logging to directly protest Japan's apparent violation of Korea's territorial sovereignty. On April 8, 1897, the *Dongnip Shinmun* reported that a Korean named Bae Chong-chun was brutally stoned by Dokdo's 1,134 Korean residents after Bae declared himself the "Prefect of Dokdo," "collected money from newcomers and enslaved people who could not pay fees" and "illegally sold zelkova trees and Chinese juniper trees to foreigners."¹⁸ Moreover, when Matsutani Yasuichiro of Tottori Prefecture and Kanda Kenkichi of Oita Prefecture sought to illegally sell Zelkova trees and engaged in "heinous acts by wildly brandishing swords when Dokdo's residents tried to restrain them by calling the patrol officers," Magistrate Bae reported that the Japanese loggers had to be "extensively punished by legal means."¹⁹ Similarly, *Dongnip Shinmun* and *Maeil Shinmun* (*Daily News*) reported Bae to have urged the Korean government to prohibit logging done by Koreans and foreigners alike, for planting trees was an act prohibited by the government, and if foreigners were to liberally "cut down every good specimen of a tree and sell them to Ulleungdo's residents," it was akin to "letting pigeons live in nests which magpies had built." Should there be no governmental restrictions, there was no way to prohibit such actions, which would force the Korean people "to endure immeasurable hardship." The Korean government finally ordered Bae to "conduct a serious investigation into the causes and circumstances behind such illegal logging and thoroughly report on its details."²⁰

In other words, the Korean press reflected the Korean government's awareness that monitoring and measuring illegal use of natural resources was a significant and urgent task because the Japanese were keen on robbing and abusing Korea's "territorial capital," or as Roswitha Ruidisch puts it, "the basis for endogenous growth based on the comparative advantage of an area's territorial potential."²¹ Indeed, when Magistrate Bae finally went through the trouble of filing a complaint directly to the Tottori Prefectural Court to assure a thorough punishment of Japanese civilians who engaged in unsolicited and illegal logging, the *Maeil Shinmun* and the *Hwangseong Shinmun* eagerly reported such incidents and delivered the Korean government's view that protecting Dokdo's forestry was akin to defending Korea's authority as an independent nation.²²

By June 1899, *Hwangseong Shinmun* officially confirmed that logging was prohibited through the announcement of a series of legal stipulations demanding that "all cases of discomfort suffered by Ulleungdo's residents

be reported along with regular investigations of the census," "all cases of logging and the profits incurred from such activity be immediately recovered, and criminals had to be reported as soon as possible." In addition, all foreigners residing in ports closed for trade had to be investigated and reported," and all "residents who plot with foreigners to engage clandestinely in devious activities" or "locals and foreigners who engage in logging to build ships had to be gravely punished."²³ When the Korean government heard of the alarming news that Japanese citizens were planning to engage in logging around areas near the Tumen and Yalu Rivers and Ulleungdo, which the Korean government had leased to a Russian company, the Korean government decided that it had heard enough cases of foreign attempts to harm Korea's forestry, and therefore, proceeded to establish a Forestry Protection Act, which instructed officials in the provinces to mend the damage done to areas affected by logging and prevent future occurrences of foreign intrusions into Korean forests.²⁴ In short, not only did the Korean press actively reflect and promote the Korean government's will to curb illegal logging and damages inflicted upon Ulleungdo's residents, but the press was also instrumental in publicizing the Korean government's urge to exercise direct and legal control over Dokdo.

However, the Korean press did not merely record the Korean government's legislations enacted against cases of foreign intrusions which happened after the occurrence of such intrusions but also recorded the government's proactive measures to legislate restrictions against foreign encroachment of Ulleungdo in advance, which included Japan's decision to station soldiers on Ulleungdo, after a skirmish between two Japanese civilians living in Ulleungdo had to wait for a Japanese court to settle the dispute.²⁵ Moreover, against the increasing frequency and magnitude of the threat that Japanese intrusions on Ulleungdo posed for the Korean government, the Korean press delivered news about the Korean government's demand to the Japanese government that it must repatriate Japanese citizens who were "selfishly engaging in riotous behavior, liberally wielding swords and spears, creating numerous disturbances which constantly puts our [Korean] residents at unease," whereupon the Japanese Consul to Korea promised to comply with the demand for reparation after receiving pressure from the Russian consulate that Tokyo ought to listen to Seoul's request.²⁶

In short, the Korean press was a prime means through which the Korean government maintained an active communication with the Korean

public about its major policies toward Japanese attempts to intrude upon Dokdo, which in turn, means that the Korean press serves as a decisive body of proof showing that Japanese intrusions into Dokdo were not only frequent before 1905, but also showing that the Korean press served as a main medium through which the government and the public were able to share the sentiment that securing and protecting Dokdo from Japan was synonymous with protecting Korea's national sovereignty.

In addition to reporting on cases of Japanese intrusions on Dokdo, the Korean press also played an active role in informing the Korean public about Dokdo's ancient history and geography. The press was also instrumental in educating the public about the economic historical legitimacy behind Korea's exercise of sovereignty over Ulleungdo and Dokdo by publishing articles which concisely summarized the history and economic conditions of Ulleungdo under the premise that Usando (Dokdo) was a constituent of Ulleungdo. Since Ulleungdo was effectively the only habitable island, the Korean Press considered reporting on Ulleungdo akin to reporting on Dokdo. Newspapers such as the Hwangseong Sinmun reported that Ulleungdo was "formerly known as Usando in ancient times, had many seals, and various tropical plants such as "Sök-nam and Tŭngch'o," as well as Zelkova and juniper trees. Ulleungdo had limited trade with the Korean Peninsula, and most of the 300 or so inhabitants were "farmers, merchants, or sailors who lived off the land harvesting potatoes, beans, barley, and wheat." Rice was "hard to harvest due to the rough terrain" but various species of fruit trees yielded much produce and diverse species of trees supplied the island with abundant lumber and firewood. Trade with Japanese merchants was mostly conducted by bartering, with Japanese merchants selling salt, rice, sake, and guns, and oil in exchange for Ulleungdo's local products.²⁷ In short, even before Shimane Prefecture's incorporation of the Dokdo and Ulleungdo in 1905, Koreans had maintained a largely self-sufficient economy and had already fulfilled a significant degree of what John Agnew calls "territoriality," or the use of territory for an economic end, which is a hallmark of an exclusive jurisdiction of state sovereignty.²⁸

In addition, the *Hwangsong Sinmun* used the ancient historical origins of Ulleungdo and Dokdo to enlighten Koreans of the need to overcome their ignorance about international affairs. The newspaper recounted Silla's subjugation of Usando under the leadership of General and historian Yi Sa-pu and emphasized that Usando's residents were "simply duped by 100 lions made of wood and painted in gold."²⁹ The newspaper

warned that should the Korean people display their ignorance in the manner of Usando's inhabitants, Korea could meet "the fate of Poland or China," which, despite being "great powers," had been partitioned and trampled by Prussia, Russia, and Austria, in the case of the former, and in the case of the latter, been defeated by the (Eight-Power) Alliance."³⁰ These instances "served as irrefutable evidence that if a people should remain ignorant, a nation is destined to meet her doom." Moreover, since Korea is currently "confronting numerous wooden lions," Korea ought to quickly teach her people "to distinguish fact from fiction, truth from lies and deception."³¹

In short, newspapers such as the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* were not only aiming to inform the Korean public about how Koreans were managing their lives on Ulleungdo and Dokdo, but also through an invocation of history, urging the Korean public to be open to accepting knowledge about the world outside Korea's borders by learning the importance of not falling victim to cunning and deception, for it would lead the country to ruin. Korean territorial sovereignty over Dokdo and Ulleungdo not only came from a direct proof of effective control and occupancy, but also through the nation's will to defend the territories by encouraging the public to understand that Korea's suffering from Japanese intrusion could only be overcome through the Korean public's willingness to learn about the world at large and the constant political changes which spelled doom for other nations. The fortune of escaping ruin at the hands of other nations could only come from the courage and boldness to learn about the wider world.

Yet, despite the Korean government's frequent request for reparation of Japanese inhabitants to Japan to curb an increasing frequency of illegal logging and "public disturbances" which often resulted in Korean residents either being killed or expelled by their Japanese counterparts, and the Korean press's efforts to publicize the fact that Ulleungdo and Dokdo were Korean territories, it was of no avail and fell deaf to Japanese ears. By 1900, Japan finally decided not to implement the reparation of Japanese citizens living in Ulleungdo, given that "very few Japanese citizens actually cared to listen to this order and continued to engage in logging in a libertine fashion," and according to the Japanese Consulate, because "many decades had passed since Japanese people inhabited Ulleungdo, it was difficult to order a sudden reparation, and therefore, it was better to collect taxes from the Japanese citizens and preserve the status quo."³² However, as years passed by, the status quo worsened for the Korean government. On October 25, 1900, the Korean government's

issue of Imperial Decree No. 41, which and in effect, declared Dokdo as Korean territory, elevated Ulleungdo to a county, and allowed the central government to appoint a County Magistrate, thereby placing Ulleungdo and Dokdo clearly under Korean administration and jurisdiction. Decree No. 41 inculcated that Dokdo became Korea's territory through the Korean state's action, and that Dokdo existed because the Korean state already existed. Moreover, since the Korean state was now able to directly appoint a Magistrate for Ulleungdo and Dokdo, it now declared that Korean power and authority were vested with Dokdo.³³ However, despite such clarity, the decree had little impact, since Japanese citizens continued to intrude and reside in Ulleungdo. Moreover, as *Hwangseong Sinmun* reported a few months before the announcement of Imperial Decree No. 41, the Japanese Consulate informed the Korean government that Japanese citizens' illegal and unauthorized residence in Ulleungdo was justified, since "there were already many foreigners residing near ports which Korea had prohibited trade," and therefore, it was "overly harsh" to demand that only the Japanese ought to depart from the island. Only when the Korean government would ask other foreigners to leave would the Japanese follow suit.

The *Hwangseong Sinmun*'s report decisively proves two key contradictions. First, despite the Japanese citizens' assumption that "intrusions" were justifiable as "occupation" because Korea was already under Japanese influence, it was already customary for the Korean press to associate Dokdo with Ulleungdo, because Ulleungdo, as the only inhabitable island among the two, could provide evidence that Korea exercised effective legal jurisdiction and territorial sovereignty over both islands. Second, the Japanese Consulate had already admitted years before Shimane Prefecture's incorporation of Dokdo that the Japanese were already residing in a foreign territory, since the Consulate had protested against the Korean government to demand the equal right of Japanese citizens to live in Ulleungdo *because other foreigners* were already residing in Korea, not because the Japanese government actually considered Ulleungdo and Dokdo as Japanese territories. If Japan had already considered Dokdo as her territory, for which Ulleungdo alone could serve as proof of effective occupancy, then the Consulate would have no reason to call Korea's request to repatriate Japanese citizens as a "harsh demand" and label the request a demand by virtue of comparing Korea's treatment of other foreigners. If Dokdo or Ulleungdo were actually Japanese territories, the Consulate would have used terms such as

an “offense to Japan.”³⁴ In short, even before Shimane Prefecture “officially incorporated” Dokdo as Japanese territory, the Japanese were fully aware that they were intruding Korea’s territory and encroaching Korea’s national sovereignty.

The Japanese Consulate’s refusal to recommend any policies to the Japanese government with the aim of relocating Japanese residents in Ulleungdo rapidly translated into more violence and Japanese condescension and contempt for Korean sovereignty over Dokdo. For the next three years following the official announcement of Imperial Decree No. 41, Korean newspapers increasingly became a main body of clear and undeniable evidence proving Japan’s continued attempts to intrude on Dokdo. Even after a year since the announcement of the Decree, the Japanese government, assuming that it already exercised complete legal jurisdiction over Korea, which was why, as *Hwangseong Sinmun* decried, “only Japanese officials were authorized to inspect Japanese passports, the latter of which was declared to be “non-essential” by the Japanese government, a decision which proved that Japan already viewed “the Japanese mainland and Korea as one country, and therefore, Japanese citizens could enjoy extraterritoriality.”³⁵ Moreover, because “scoundrels and businessmen from Japan swarmed over to Dokdo *en masse*, which was benefiting Japan at the expense of Korea’s internal security,” it was a right affirmed by international law that a country was entitled to restrict immigration from another country if such immigration sought to harm the interest and public safety of the former’s citizens.”³⁶ Finally, because it was evident that “Japan was more powerful and Koreans usually had much faith in reconciliation, the Japanese were “constantly inclined to offend Koreans,” the proof of which was evident through the fact that “Japan’s monopolistic theft of Korea’s precious fisheries produced constant complaints from Koreans.”³⁷

Despite promises to repatriate Japanese citizens from Ulleungdo, no Japanese citizen has been ordered to repatriate, but rather more Japanese citizens had entered the island and prohibited Koreans from “picking a single root of grass or log away a single tree,” and Japanese officials had begun to prohibit Koreans from gathering ginseng in Dokdo.”³⁸ In short, the newspaper criticized that the Japanese were already illegally practicing extraterritoriality in Ulleungdo and Dokdo despite having no evidence of Korea’s agreement to grant it. Therefore, the newspaper urged that Korea had to restrict Japanese immigration to Dokdo because the Japanese were already hypocritically scheming to monopolize all the resources for

themselves while restricting Korean access to the same resources, despite the apparent truth that Dokdo and Ulleungdo were still under Korean jurisdiction.

Hwangsoŋ Sinmun was especially consistent in producing proof for why such a drastic restriction on Japanese immigration might be necessary. Across 1901-1902, Japanese ships illegally entered Ulleungdo and Dokdo's waters and extensively engaged in whaling, capturing at least 20 whales in one expedition. *Hwangsoŋ Sinmun* further complained in an article published on January 31, 1902 that the "Japanese were recently prone to condescend and show contempt towards Koreans, and Japanese officials were frequently inclined to cover up for other Japanese citizens while unjustly letting their arms bend inwards and exaggerating even the most minor of causes, which in turn, ignites conflicts between Koreans and Japanese."³⁹ In addition, the newspaper criticized Ulleungdo's Japanese residents' libertine disregard for Korean laws, "farming fish without any legal permit, engage in illegal actions without any remorse," and although Japanese officials "outwardly promise to prohibit such behavior, there is no efficacy in any of their restrictions, which is no different than encouraging it."⁴⁰ By the end of February, the Japanese government took one big step further towards considering Ulleungdo and Dokdo as Japanese territories by ordering the establishment of a Japanese police station on Ulleungdo and "deployed Chief Nishimura of the Busan Police station and three policemen to reside and patrol Ulleungdo."⁴¹

In other words, the newspaper decried that there was almost no possibility to expect any credible actions to arise from either Japanese residents of Ulleungdo or Japanese officials, since both groups habitually displayed ill will and committed illegal activities out of a blatant disrespect for Korean laws and national sovereignty. What made the situation worse was that instead of issuing an apology for an unauthorized use of another nation's territory, the Japanese were unabashedly trying to assert de facto control over Ulleungdo and Dokdo by directly installing a major state apparatus to monitor and police them as Japanese territory, giving Koreans the impression that such a measure was a precursor to colonizing Korea.

Most importantly, because there were repeated instances of illegal misconduct from Japanese residents and there was no considerable effort on part of Japanese officials to clearly restrict such misconduct, the Korean newspaper was reflecting the resentment that the Japanese government was in effect a significant accomplice to Japanese residents of Ulleungdo, for it too, had little interest in respecting Korean legal customs or dignity

as an independent nation. The Japanese government's decision to deploy Japanese police officers to Ulleungdo only served to reinforce the impression that the Japanese were attempting to demonstrate to Koreans that Japan exercised *de jure* and *de facto* control over Ulleungdo and Dokdo.

Hwangsŏng Shinmun also noted that Japanese residents on Ulleungdo fully used the presence of the Japanese police on the island to such an extent that there were already 550 Japanese residents on Ulleungdo by the Spring of 1902, and two competing Japanese factions effectively partitioned the island and divided control over the island's forestry amongst themselves, and "should a Korean engage in logging, there awaited a huge fine, whereas the Japanese engage in logging without any authorization documents, export or import goods without any taxes, and only offered a small quantity of rice, salt, and wine as bribes." Although Korean officials wished to "investigate four or five Japanese coastal villages on the island, because there were restrictions imposed on the officials," it became "impossible to determine exactly how many Japanese houses were in the villages."⁴² As F. J. Smith, the foreign customs adviser at Hae-gwan, Busan, reported to the Korean government, the Japanese not only "ignored Korean legal customs, but also, because the Korean Prefect of Ulleungdo could be rarely seen, some Japanese residents pretended to be officials and issued bulletins," an act which Smith decried as "utter hypocrisy."⁴³ The greatest irony in Smith's eyes was that although "3,000 Koreans and 550 Japanese lived on Ulleungdo, the latter were severely restricting the activities of the former, and Koreans were expected to "cede all rights and privileges, stoop, and forced to pay all monetary compensations."⁴⁴

In other words, as Stephen Krasner would argue, Japan was engaging in "organized hypocrisy," violating Korea's territorial sovereignty and legal jurisdiction, while prohibiting Koreans from challenging Japanese authority.⁴⁵ Such a view was specifically rooted in Japan's view that she had greater power than Korea; Korean domestic norms were different and incompatible with Japan's, which implied for Japanese residents in Ulleungdo that Korean legal customs did not have to be followed. Finally, reflecting on the fact that the Japanese Consulate had complained about Korea allowing other foreigners to live near ports closed for trade while denying Japan the same right, the Japanese were already assuming that Korea and Japan had entered the realm of international relations, where it is "unclear what rules should apply." There is no authority structure to

determine such rules, meaning that Japan had no interest in following Korea's authority structure because Japan believed that Korea had yet to explain why Korean legal rules had to decisively apply without any neutral international authorization.⁴⁶

Hence, even though two years had passed since the Korean government officially declared Ulleungdo and Dokdo as Korean territories, the declaration was virtually ignored by the Japanese on Ulleungdo, and the Japanese practically considered Ulleungdo to already be a colony of Japan, with the Japanese minority already pretending to have formed a separate government on the island and ruling over the Korean majority in any way that the Japanese deemed appropriate to advance their own interest at the expense of the Koreans'. What was especially alarming, according to an article printed in *Hwangseong Shinmun* barely a year later, was that the Japanese dominance over the peninsula was increasing at such an alarming rate that the phenomenon in Ulleungdo proved to be only the tip of an iceberg. In the outskirts of the Japanese concession in Ulleungdo, there were already 290 Japanese residents, and across Kyongsang Province, Pusan, Kaesung, Hae-chu, "there was not a region which the footprints of the Japanese were unobservable."⁴⁷ The newspaper ended the article in despair, worrying about what was to come in a matter of years.

The newspaper's despair was to a considerable extent, justified. Although the new Korean Prefect of Ulleungdo tried to plead with Japanese police officers to enforce law and order by repatriating Japanese residents back to Japan, the only reply the prefect received was that it was beyond the authority of the police to enforce such an order, as "there had been no legal measures taken either from the Korean government or the Russian consulate and logging had been going on for many years."⁴⁸ Furthermore, although Ulleungdo's Prefect continuously requested repatriation of Ulleungdo's Japanese residents until August 1903, he was unable to receive a clear reply, while Japanese residents continued to restrict logging to Koreans, prohibited Koreans from opening fisheries, and fishing, even though the Japanese continued to build warehouses, manage the forestry and private lands, and even resorted to force by deploying warships if the Korean government tried to intervene and solve the problem.⁴⁹

In other words, Japanese residency in Ulleungdo ignited a proliferation of the Japanese population across the entire Korean Peninsula, which, as the article decried, served as a signal to the inevitable beginning of what historian Jun Uchida as called "settler colonialism" in Korea.

Furthermore, the inability of the Korean government to put an effective curb to Japanese settlement in Ulleungdo either through reparations or an imposition of restrictions on immigration, the increasing number of Japanese settlers on Ulleungdo also served as clear evidence of how severely Korean diplomatic and executive authority had been weakened under the weight of Japanese pressure.

In essence, Korean newspapers assumed three different major functions throughout the late 19th to the early 20th century, as Japan intruded into Dokdo and proceeded to treat Dokdo as a colony of Japan. Korean newspapers, particularly the *Hwangsong Sinmun*, not only served to report on Japanese attempts to intrude into Dokdo and Ulleungdo, but also sought to revive and maintain Korean national consciousness about Dokdo and Ulleungdo as Korea's historic national territories by educating the Korean public about Dokdo and Ulleungdo's ancient history, but most importantly, became irrefutable evidence proving that the Japanese government had the full intention to annex Dokdo as Japanese territory before Shimane Prefecture's announcement about incorporating Dokdo in 1905, and Japanese residents reflected their national government's such intention by denying Korean residents of Ulleungdo the freedom to engage in the principal commercial activities which had been their chief sources of livelihood. Not only was the Korean public made fully aware of Dokdo and Ulleungdo as nascent Korean territories through the presence of nationalistic newspapers, but it was also through such newspapers that the Korean public became cognizant of Japan's clear and undeniable intent to begin and establish settler colonialism as a precursor to an eventual colonization of the entire Korean Peninsula.

Conclusion

In principle, the media cannot make up or fabricate pre-existing sentiments or facts, but merely emphasize or report them to solidify facts as truths. Korea's historical consciousness about Dokdo as Korean territory was well alive during the early 20th century, and the media, or precisely, newspapers, were the primary means with which Koreans preserved and publicized this consciousness to protest against Japanese encroachments against Dokdo and Ulleungdo. A noticeable feature of the newspapers' identification of Dokdo and Ulleungdo as Korean territories was their clear linkage of Dokdo and Ulleungdo as symbols of Korea's unwavering and ancient nationalism and territorial sovereignty. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' claim that Koreans had no awareness

of Dokdo as their national territory is an erroneous claim which ignores the consistent and persistent demand from Korean newspapers to restore Korea's political independence and dignity as a sovereign nation by preventing illegal Japanese logging and residence on Dokdo. The Korean media's persistent appeal to nationalism and territorial sovereignty constitutes undeniable evidence that Koreans already had sufficient awareness of Dokdo as Korea's territory. Korean newspapers, especially the *Hwangsoŋ Sinmun* exerted great influence upon the Korean public by reporting early Japanese attempts to intrude into Dokdo during the late 19th century and the early 20th century, educated the Korean public about Dokdo and Ulleungdo's ancient history and stressed the importance of learning from nations which were once great but had weakened due to the ignorance of the ordinary masses.

Finally, Korean newspapers serve as clear evidence that Japan willingly ignored Korea's judicial authority and national sovereignty, and even before Shimane Prefecture's illegal incorporation of Dokdo, sought to definitively put Dokdo and Ulleungdo under Japan's sphere of influence. By encouraging Japanese residents of Ulleungdo to engage in illegal logging, establishing a police station and deploying Japanese police officers to Ulleungdo, and demanding a permit from Koreans to engage in fishing or other commercial activities, Japan unabashedly made it clear that she wished to wrest territorial sovereignty over Dokdo completely from the Korean government through illegal and coercive measures.

Therefore, in consideration of the Korean newspapers' three central functions of reporting Japanese intrusions on Dokdo, educating the Korean public about Dokdo and Ulleungdo's history, and serving as decisive evidence that Japan sought to put Dokdo completely under Japanese control through measures which bordered on extortion, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs must acknowledge that its claim about Korea's lack of knowledge about Dokdo and Ulleungdo as Korean territories is not only false but is also a claim stemming from Japan's disregard of Korean newspapers, especially the central role of the *Hwangsoŋ Sinmun* in emphasizing that Dokdo indisputably is Korean territory and leaving clearly documented evidence of Japan's attempts to illegally occupy and bring Dokdo under Japanese control.

Leading Korean newspapers were fully reflective of a general Korean consciousness that Dokdo was Korean territory well before Japan's illegal incorporation of Dokdo, which proves that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' assertion that Koreans lacked consciousness about Dokdo

before 1905 is incorrect because the claim fundamentally ignores the painstaking and sustained efforts by Korean newspapers to keep Korean nationalism and territorial sovereignty over Dokdo and Ulleungdo alive. It was precisely thanks to such efforts that the Korean public was made aware of the danger of Dokdo and Ulleungdo becoming the first victims of Japanese imperialism and the need to prevent such an outcome using all available diplomatic means. It is also thanks to the preservation of such invaluable Korean evidence of Korean national sovereignty over Dokdo and Ulleungdo that the Korean government currently enjoys clear historical legitimacy behind the effective occupation and control over Dokdo and Ulleungdo and Koreans were clearly aware of Dokdo and Ulleungdo as Korean territories before 1905.

Notes:

¹ *Hwangsŏng Sinmun (Hwang-sŏng Newspaper)*, May 16, 1899 in Jung Young-mi ed., *Il-cheŭi Dokdo, Ulleungdo Ch'imtal Charyochip (4): Sinmun Kisa (1897-1910)* (*Primary Sources on Japan's Intrusion on Dokdo, Vol. 4: Newspaper Articles (1897-1910)*) (Seoul, Korea: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2020), 44-45. *Primary Sources on Japan's Intrusion on Dokdo* will be abbreviated as *PSJID, Vol. 4* hereafter.

² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) (<https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/index.html>)

³ MOFA (https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/takeshima/page1we_000065.html)

⁴ Northeast Asian History Foundation ed., *Thirty Images and Documents on Japan's Invasion of Korea* (Seoul, Korea: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2020), 14-15.

⁵ Malcolm Willey, "The Functions of the Newspaper," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 219, (January, 1942), 19.

⁶ Anna Stilz, "Nations, States, and Territory," *Ethics*, Vol. 121, No. 3 (April, 2011), 574.

⁷ Robert Jackson, *Sovereignty* (Polity, 2007), 10.

⁸ O. Riegel, "Nationalism in Press, Radio, and Cinema," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (August, 1938), 513.

⁹ Anthony Smith, *The Antiquity of Nations* (Polity, 2004), 76.

¹⁰ Fred Omu, "Journalism and the Rise of Nigerian Nationalism: John Payne Jackson, 1848-1915," *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (December, 1974), 521-539; Yaw Tuwasi, "Press Freedom and Nationalism under Colonial Rule in the Gold Coast (Ghana)," *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (December, 1974), 499-520; James Scotton, "Tanganyika's African Press, 1937-1960," *African Studies Review*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (April, 1978), 1-18; James Scotton, "The First African Press in East Africa: Protest and Nationalism in Uganda in the 1920s," *The International Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1973), 211-228.

¹¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London, England: Verso, 1991).

- ¹² James Hagen, "Read All About It': The Press and the Rise of National Consciousness in Early Twentieth Century Dutch East Indies Society," *Anthropological Quarterly*, Vol. 70, No. 3 (July, 1997), 108; Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World* (London, England: Zed Books, 1986); Akhil Gupta, "Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the Imagined State," *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1995), 375-402.
- ¹³ Hagen, "'Read All About It'"; Marie-Louise Legg, *Newspapers and Nationalism: The Irish Provincial Press, 1850-1892* (Dublin, Ireland: Four Courts Press, 1999); Henrietta Harrison, "Newspapers and Nationalism in Rural China, 1890-1929," *Past and Present*, No. 166 (February, 2000), 181-204; Andre Schmid, *Korea Between Empires, 1895-1919* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
- ¹⁴ Chinsoo Bae, "Territorial Issue in the Context of Colonial History and International Politics: The Dokdo Issue between Korea and Japan," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Spring/ Summer, 2012), 19-51; Sung-jae Choi, "The Politics of the Dokdo Issue," *Journal of East Asian Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September-December, 2005), 465-494; Sungbae Kim, "Understanding the Dokdo Issue: A Critical Review of the Liberalist Approach," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall/Winter, 2010), 1-27; Seok-woo Lee, "Dokdo: The San Francisco Peace Treaty, International Law on Territorial Disputes, and Historical Criticism," *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (July-September, 2011), 361-380.
- ¹⁵ Edward Kwon and Liza Benham, "Shinzo Abe's Scheme of Staking Territorial Claims to Korea's Dokdo," *The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (January, 2016), 47-64.
- ¹⁶ Masako Ikegami, "Solving the Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute: Searching for Common Ground through the Aland Model," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Spring/Summer, 2009), 1-22.
- ¹⁷ *Dongnip Sinmun (Independent Newspaper)*, April 6, 1897, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 29
- ¹⁸ *Dongnip Sinmun*, April 8, 1897, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 32-33.
- ¹⁹ *Dongnip Sinmun*, February 10, 1898, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 35.
- ²⁰ *Maeil Sinmun (Daily News)*, January 24, 1899, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 37-38.
- ²¹ Roswitha Ruidisch, "Territorial Cohesion and Border Areas," in Arnaud Lechevalier and Jan Wielgohs eds., *Borders and Border Regions in Europe: Changes, Challenges, and Chances* (Transcript Verlag, 2013), 100.
- ²² *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, February 6, 1899, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 39.
- ²³ *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, June 15, 1899, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 48-49.
- ²⁴ *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, August 15, 1899, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 50.
- ²⁵ *Dongnip Sinmun*, September 13, 1899, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 53.
- ²⁶ *Cheuk Sinmun (Imperial Newspaper)*, October 26, 1899, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 68.
- ²⁷ *Dongnip Sinmun*, October 31, 1899, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 69-70.
- ²⁸ John Agnew, "Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 95, No. 2 (June, 2005), 437.
- ²⁹ *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, April 24, 1901, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 128-129.
- ³⁰ *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, April 24, 1901, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 129.
- ³¹ *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, April 24, 1901, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 129.

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- ³² *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, June 18, 1900, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 103; *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, July 7, 1900, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 111; *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, September 8, 1900, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 113.
- ³³ *Ch'ik-ryŏng Je 41 Ho (Imperial Decree No. 41 of the Korean Empire)* in *Hwangseong Sinmun*, October 29, 1900, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 119; N. Brenner and S. Elden, "Henri Lefebvre on State, Space, Territory," *International Political Sociology*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (2009), 353-377; David Storey, "States, Territory, and Sovereignty," *Geography*, Vol. 102, No. 3 (Autumn, 2017), 117.
- ³⁴ *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, September 18, 1900, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 115.
- ³⁵ *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, October 14, 1901, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 144.
- ³⁶ *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, October 14, 1901, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 144.
- ³⁷ *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, October 14, 1901, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 145.
- ³⁸ *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, October 14, 1901, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 145.
- ³⁹ *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, January 23, 1902, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 148.
- ⁴⁰ *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, January 31, 1902, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 152.
- ⁴¹ *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, February 28, 1902, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 156.
- ⁴² *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, April 29, 1902, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 163-164.
- ⁴³ *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, May 1, 1902, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 166.
- ⁴⁴ *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, May 1, 1902, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 166.
- ⁴⁵ N. Brunsson, *The Organization of Hypocrisy: Talk, Decisions, and Actions in Organization* (Chichester, England: John Wiley, 1989); Stephen Krasner, "Organized Hypocrisy in Nineteenth-Century East Asia," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2001), 173.
- ⁴⁶ Krasner, "Organized Hypocrisy in Nineteenth-Century East Asia," 174.
- ⁴⁷ *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, March 30, 1903, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 176.
- ⁴⁸ *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, August 19, 1903, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 215.
- ⁴⁹ *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, August 19, 1903, *PSJID*, Vol. 4, 215.