

South Korean Defense Budgets 2017-2019: Paying More Despite a Reduced Threat?

Major Todd B. Boese, U.S. Marine Corps

Abstract

This article analyzes the defense budgets of the Republic of Korea for 2018, 2019, and 2020 in order to determine if the requirements and objectives articulated in government policy rhetoric are receiving increased fiscal resources. Funding for programs associated with policy objectives indicates the political importance of those objectives. Determination of funding levels for budget programs is based on analysis of documents published by the ROK National Assembly, while identification of defense requirements and objectives is based on a review of statements made by the South Korean government. This research concludes that increases to the defense budget are not driven by changes in the security environment or security policy, but rather are a function of government expansionary fiscal policy. However, increased funding for aircraft programs in conjunction with decreased funding for maneuver and firepower programs does reflect the government's objective to build a more balanced military force.

Keywords: Republic of Korea, defense budget, Mid-term Defense Program, Force Improvement Program, Defense Reform 2.0, OPCON Transition

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

Introduction

Since Moon Jae-in's election as the President of the Republic of Korea (ROK) on May 9, 2017, South Korea's security environment has transformed dramatically. Moon entered office during a period in which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was conducting increasingly provocative missile tests, antagonizing the ROK, its U.S. ally, and other states in the region while raising the specter of war on the

peninsula. Over the next two years, however, the DPRK stopped testing long-range ballistic missiles, and the heads of state of the ROK, the DPRK, and the U.S. engaged in a series of diplomatic summits that eased military tensions. Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong-un raised their clasped hands together on the summit of *Baekdusan*, mythical birthplace of the Korean nation, on September 20, 2018, giving hope that a permanent peace on the peninsula might finally be possible after 65 years of armistice conditions.

Following these rounds of seemingly successful diplomacy, President Moon's administration released a new National Security Strategy at the close of 2018, prompting the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) to also update many of its policy documents. Compared with the previous administration's policy statements, the Moon administration's policy rhetoric placed less emphasis on the security threat to South Korea from the DPRK and shifted the military's focus from preparing for a conflict with the regime in Pyongyang to building readiness for a broader, but less specific, range of security threats.¹

Although the security threat to South Korea from the DPRK seemed to subside after President Moon's election through the end of 2019, the ROK's defense budgets during the same span of time rose dramatically. Prior to Moon's election, the ROK National Assembly had approved a defense budget for 2017 measuring 40.3 trillion won. Only three years later, the defense budget for 2020 (approved in December 2019) had grown by nearly 25 percent from its 2017 level to surpass 50 trillion won. ROK government policy rhetoric, or at least the headlines regarding the government's policy rhetoric, emphasized a reduced security threat, but the ROK government invested more in its defense than ever before.

A popular expression usually attributed to James Frick says, "Don't tell me where your priorities are. Show me where you spend your money and I'll tell you what they are."² The apparent divergence between ROK policy rhetoric concerning a reduced security threat and sharply rising defense budgets during the period of 2017 to 2019 suggests that the priorities that the ROK government has articulated publicly may not be aligned with the priorities in which the government is actually investing its fiscal resources.

This study will survey the official policy rhetoric of the ROK government from President Moon Jae-in's election in 2017 through the end of 2019 in order to identify objectives and themes of ROK security strategy. The study will then analyze the defense budgets approved by the National Assembly since President Moon's election in order to assess

whether or not the ROK government is investing its fiscal resources in accordance with the priorities that it articulates in policy rhetoric. The study concludes that the significant increases to the defense budget under President Moon's administration are not due to changing dynamics in the security environment or changing defense policy objectives, but rather are indicative of the Moon administration's expansionary fiscal policy: since at least 2005, the ROK defense budget has hovered around 10 percent of the ROK's total government budget regardless of changes in the security environment and changing political administrations. However, while changes in the size of the defense budget are not driven by changes in the security environment or changes in policy, there are changes in the composition of the defense budget that reflect the administration's policy objectives. Specifically, the increased share of defense spending allocated towards aircraft programs along with concurrent decreases in funding towards firepower and maneuver programs reflects the administration's policy objective of building a more balanced military force. Based on these conclusions, this study will close by offering a few recommendations relevant to the maintenance of the ROK-U.S. alliance.

Themes of ROK Security Strategy

ROK policy rhetoric concerning the nation's security strategy during the Moon administration, as articulated in the 2018 National Security Strategy, statements regarding Defense Reform 2.0 (DR 2.0), the *2018 Defense White Paper*, and other government statements, has emphasized multiple themes that are relevant when analyzing the ROK defense budget. These themes include increased ROK autonomy within the security environment, the use of technology to mitigate the reduction of available military manpower, the establishment of a more balanced military force, and engagement with international partners to advance security interests.

The ROK's 2018 National Security Strategy emphasizes that the ROK must take a leading role in assuring its own security rather than allowing its fate to be decided by other powers. The emphasis on increased autonomy is most explicit in the tenet of "taking the initiative for a peaceful and prosperous Korean Peninsula," but it is also apparent in statements such as, "On the basis of close ROK-U.S. cooperation, through collaboration with regional states, we will lead the resolution of the Korean Peninsula's problems."³ The need for the ROK military to assume a leading role on the peninsula is also heavily emphasized, with the

National Security Strategy invoking the language of “our military’s leadership of the ROK-U.S. combined defense” at least five times.⁴

Although the ROK MND does not release public versions of its National Defense Policy (NDP) or Joint Military Strategy (JMS), the descriptions of those documents in the *2018 Defense White Paper* also stress the importance of increased ROK autonomy. The NDP specifies a vision that includes “acquiring an ROK-led war capability” and “countering enemy provocations through ROK-led defense capabilities.”⁵ The operating concept described in the JMS includes “the ability to take the initiative in deterring and responding to omnidirectional threats upon the robust foothold of (*sic*) ROK-U.S. alliance,” and then goes on to state that “the ROK Armed Forces will build the ability to lead and carry out combined operations.”⁶ This emphasis on increased autonomy is also apparent in DR 2.0. In the MND’s public statements regarding DR 2.0’s reform initiatives, the first initiative described is the reorganization of the ROK military command structure in association with the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) authorities.⁷

While these strategic documents clearly emphasize a goal of increased autonomy for the ROK, the statements above also often include a caveat that the ROK’s increased leadership role includes continued cooperation in the ROK-U.S. alliance. As described by these strategic documents, increased ROK autonomy does not entail the decline of the ROK-U.S. alliance; rather, increased ROK autonomy would make the ROK a more equal partner within the alliance and enable the alliance’s transformation “in a mutually reinforcing and forward-looking manner to effectively manage common security threats and to extend the Alliance’s contribution to peace and prosperity of not only the Korean Peninsula but also the region and the world.”⁸

A second theme of importance in the strategic documents is the use of technology to mitigate the reduction of available military manpower. The “demographic cliff” associated with the continuously declining birth rate in South Korea, in conjunction with the reduction of conscription periods to as short as 18 months, necessitates a smaller force: with the pool of eligible conscripts growing smaller and those conscripts staying in the military for a shorter period of time, it is inevitable that the number of active military members must decline as well.⁹ During the National Assembly National Defense Committee’s review of the 2020 defense budget request in late 2019, the committee examined the MND’s plan for reorganizing manpower structure, which included a reduction in the

number of active servicemembers from 579,000 in 2019 to 500,000 by 2022. This drop includes reductions of 83,000 conscripts and 4,000 officers, although there is also an addition of 8,000 non-commissioned officers.¹⁰

The National Security Strategy and DR 2.0 both envision technology as a key element in maintaining the readiness of the ROK military despite the reduction in forces. In its description of how the ROK will respond to changes in the security environment, the National Security Strategy states, “In order to be able to respond to simultaneous omnidirectional security threats, we will apply technologies of the 4th industrial revolution to all areas of national defense and develop military force structure on the basis of advanced technology.”¹¹ DR 2.0 is more explicit, including the use of “scientific and technological advancements of the Fourth Industrial Revolution to overcome resource shortage and adapt to future battlefields” as one of its tenets.¹² Several reform initiatives in the reform categories of “reorganizing to a force structure centered on advanced technology capabilities” and “develop military capabilities and a management system of the 4th industrial revolution” support this tenet. Specific initiatives include developing military applications of virtual reality and artificial intelligence technologies, as well as establishing strategic deterrence through the use of unmanned systems in conjunction with precision weapons.¹³

The 2018 National Security Strategy and DR 2.0 also underscore the importance of developing the ROK military into a more joint force with “balance” across the services. The National Security Strategy argues that several military structure changes are required in order to prepare for “diversified security threats” even as military tensions between the DPRK and ROK have subsided.¹⁴ The National Security Strategy continues, “Specifically, we will reorganize the command structure [of the military] in order to actually strengthen jointness by simultaneously promoting the balanced development of the Army, Navy, and Air Force along with our military’s leadership of the ROK-U.S. combined defense in conjunction with wartime OPCON transition.”¹⁵ The existing force structure is insufficient for responding to the variety of potential security threats that the National Security Strategy anticipates.

DR 2.0, which also explicitly advocates “balanced growth between branches and specialties,” includes several reform initiatives that promote the development of the Navy and Air Force at the relative expense of the Army.¹⁶ DR 2.0’s initiative to “Organize the Balance of the Military

Services and Joint Units in Order to Strengthen Jointness” entails that colonel and general officer positions within the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) will be filled by the Army, Navy, and Air Force at a ratio of 1:1:1, rather than the existing ratio of 2:1:1 dominated by the Army.¹⁷ DR 2.0’s force reduction initiative and its target of reducing the size of the ROK active duty military to 500,000 by 2022, discussed above, also promotes balance among the services by eliminating positions almost exclusively from the Army. When the MND gave its first public description of DR 2.0’s reform initiatives in the summer of 2018, it stated that the military would shrink from its 2018 size of 618,000 troops down to 500,000 active troops by eliminating 118,000 positions from the Army.¹⁸ A month after making that announcement on DR 2.0, the MND announced its 2019 budget request and clarified that 117,000 of the 118,000 positions to be eliminated were conscripts, although that plan was later modified slightly to eliminate additional officer positions and recruit more non-commissioned officers.¹⁹

Diminishing the ROK Army’s presence within the JCS and reducing the sheer size of the ROK Army are two methods to promote “balance” among the services of the ROK military, but DR 2.0’s initiative to “Adjust the Quota of General Officers” also reduces the influence of the ROK Army relative to the Navy and Air Force.²⁰ The plan includes reducing the number of general officers in the entire military from 436 in 2017 to only 360 by 2022, with 76 positions eliminated through unit consolidation (such as the First ROK Army and Third ROK Army’s merger into Ground Operations Command) and the conversion of some general officer positions to civilian public servants.²¹ Additionally, the MND has stated that 66 of the 76 eliminated positions are from the Army, while the Navy and Air Force are each losing only five general officers.²² Both the reduction of total troops and the reduction of general officers focus principally on reductions within the Army.

The Army is by far the largest service in the ROK military, measuring 464,000 troops at the end of 2018 compared to only 70,000 within the Navy and Marine Corps and 65,000 in the Air Force.²³ Even after DR 2.0’s reduction of Army conscripts, the Army will still compose the preponderance of manpower within the ROK military. However, the various DR 2.0 reform initiatives cumulatively illustrate the focus of President Moon’s administration on creating a more balanced joint force that is somewhat less dominated by the Army.

Engagement with international partners is also a prominent theme in the 2018 National Security Strategy, the NDP, and the JMS. The National Security Strategy explicitly identifies the ROK as a middle power working to further its national interests through proactive engagement in the international community: “We will actively seek a role as a responsible middle power through expanding contributions to efforts to resolve global security issues that are facing the international community.”²⁴ The National Security Strategy also prescribes that the ROK must expand its efforts to engage international partners, and in a section titled “Expanding the International Role of a Middle Power” it goes on to state, “While we will strengthen our status by expanding appointments of chairpersons and memberships in international institutions, we will also strengthen our influence by actively supporting our citizens’ entry into international institutions.”²⁵

The NDP and JMS, as described in the *2018 Defense White Paper*, make clear that the ROK military also has a role in supporting South Korea’s middle power engagement with international partners. When describing how the military will support the NDP’s objective of contributing to regional stability and world peace, the White Paper states that the ROK Armed Forces will promote “amicable and cooperative relationships with the surrounding nations, and by proactively participating in international peacekeeping operations as well as defense cooperative exchange.”²⁶ Furthermore, the NDP calls for an increase in such engagement, stating that the ROK military will “expand the overseas dispatch of Korean troops to shape a more favorable strategic environment for the ROK.”²⁷ The White Paper’s description of the JMS echoes the same theme: “The ROK Armed Forces will work closely with the (*sic*) regional partners during peacetime to shape a favorable strategic environment.”²⁸

The ROK Defense Budget

The defense budgets requested by President Moon’s administration and approved by the National Assembly in 2017, 2018, and 2019 (for execution in 2018, 2019, and 2020, respectively) have grown by larger margins than the budgets of preceding years (see Table 1 and Figure 1). The annual increases of 7.0 percent, 8.4 percent, and 7.2 percent during this period have resulted in an approved defense budget for 2020 of over ₩50 trillion. While this amount may pale in comparison to the U.S. defense budget, it represents a major portion of the ROK’s economic

capacity: in 2018 the ROK’s defense budget amounted to 2.38 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP).²⁹ As a point of reference, that is a higher percentage of GDP going to defense spending than any member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization except the United States.³⁰


During this period of larger increases to the defense budget, the composition of the budget has also shifted with an increased emphasis on Force Improvement Projects (FIP) that fund “the purchasing and research and development, including new development, improvement of performance, etc., of weapons systems for enhancing military force, and the installation, etc. of facilities incidental thereto.”³¹ The force operating costs budget, also sometimes referred to as the operations and maintenance (O&M) budget, continues to make up a majority of the defense budget, but the portion of the budget allocated to FIP has steadily grown in the budgets leading up to 2020. After hovering around 30 percent of defense spending through 2017, the FIP budget has garnered a larger share each year, reaching over 33 percent of the 2020 defense budget. While both O&M and FIP continue to grow in absolute terms, an increasing share of defense spending is being allocated to the development and procurement of weapons systems through the FIP budget.

Table 1: Approved Defense Budgets (in ₩1,000,000)

Year	National Assembly Confirmed Defense Budget	O&M Budget, including Payroll	O&M Budget (%)	FIP Budget (in ₩1000)	FIP Budget (%)
2013	34,345,275	24,228,972	70.55	10,116,303	29.45
2014	35,705,619	25,195,966	70.57	10,509,653	29.43
2015	37,455,991	26,442,028	70.59	11,013,963	29.41
2016	38,799,549	27,159,740	70.00	11,639,809	30.00
2017	40,334,649	28,137,698	69.76	12,196,951	30.24
2018	43,158,119	29,637,827	68.67	13,520,292	31.33
2019	46,697,085	31,323,761	67.08	15,373,324	32.92
2020	50,152,700	33,472,258	66.74	16,680,442	33.26

Source: Developed by the author from the annual Government Transfer Reports published by the ROK National Assembly.³²

Figure 1: Annual Change to Approved Defense Budgets



Source: Developed by the author from the annual Government Transfer Reports published by the ROK National Assembly.³³

The Influence of Strategic Objectives in the Defense Budget

In its official statements regarding defense budgets, the ROK MND has emphasized that the increases to the defense budgets for 2018, 2019, and 2020 (approved by the ROK National Assembly in 2017, 2018, and 2019) are significantly larger than the annual increases for the defense budgets from 2010 to 2017. Furthermore, the MND has asserted that these increases are required due to changes in the security environment and for the achievement of government policy objectives. In an MND statement in August of 2017 describing the administration’s defense budget request for 2018, the MND noted that a large increase to the defense budget was necessary “due to the severe security situation, such as heightened tension among regional states and North Korean nuclear and missile threats.”³⁴ The Director General of MND’s Programming and Budgeting Bureau, in a description of the Midterm Defense Plan published in 2019 that projects continued growth of the defense budget, also characterized significant budget increases as a “strategic move” required by “uncertain security environments.”³⁵

The growth of the ROK defense budget during this three-year period certainly is significant in scope, rising by at least 7.0 percent annually. The increases are even more striking when compared against the annual increases to the defense budgets for 2010 to 2017, which averaged only 4.4 percent. The increases to defense spending in the budgets for 2018, 2019, and 2020, along with the MND's explanations of those annual increases, give the impression that the ROK government is placing a greater emphasis on the achievement of its security objectives.

While the MND's statements regarding defense budgets during this three-year period associate defense budget increases with government strategic objectives and changes in the security environment, government statements rarely discuss the defense budget in relation to the total government budget. When the defense budget is considered as only one portion of overall government spending, a much different picture emerges regarding the government's emphasis on defense spending and the degree to which the defense budget is influenced by changes in the security environment and ROK strategic objectives. Since at least 2005, defense spending has closely hovered around 10 percent of total government spending, as depicted in Table 2. These figures give the impression of a defense budget that is impervious to changing strategic priorities and simply composes around 10 percent of the government budget regardless of changes in the security environment. Through this lens, annual increases to the defense budget are not an indication of the government's emphasis on defense; instead, annual increases to the defense budget simply reflect increases to overall government spending with the defense budget maintaining its 10 percent share of the total.

Table 2: ROK Defense Budgets in relation to Total Government Spending (in ₩1,000,000,000)

Year	National Assembly Confirmed Government Expenditures	Approved Defense Budget	Share of Government Spending to Defense (%)
2005	209,600	21,103	10.16
2006	224,100	22,513	10.17
2007	237,100	24,497	10.34
2008	262,800	26,649	10.36
2009	301,800	28,533	10.03
2010	290,800	29,563	10.10
2011	309,100	31,403	10.16
2012	325,400	32,958	10.13
2013	349,000	34,345	10.04
2014	355,800	35,706	10.04
2015	384,700	37,456	9.98
2016	398,500	38,800	10.04
2017	410,100	40,335	10.07
2018	432,700	43,158	10.06
2019	469,600	46,697	9.94
2020	512,300	50,153	9.79

Source: Developed by the author from ROK National Assembly Budget Office data³⁶

The trend of defense budgets composing roughly 10 percent of total government expenditures has been steady since at least 2005, regardless of shifting political agendas associated with changes in the ROK President and the ROK National Assembly. Objectives such as expediting OPCON transition, implementing defense reform, or other political priorities have not significantly impacted the size of the defense budget. Instead, changes in the size of the defense budget are better explained by the government’s fiscal policy: the defense budget has grown by greater margins when ROK administrations have promoted significant growth in total government expenditures. Likewise, when ROK administrations have pursued less growth in total government expenditures, the defense budget has grown by a smaller margin. Defense spending’s piece of the pie, however, has not significantly changed. Larger increases to the defense budget under liberal administrations may initially be “puzzling” because they seem at odds with those same administrations’ efforts at rapprochement with the

DPRK, but large increases to the defense budget merely coincide with large increases to total government expenditures.³⁷

The regular growth of the ROK defense budget, in which it maintains a roughly 10 percent share of total government expenditures, appears unaffected not only by changing security strategy objectives but also by changes in the security environment. DPRK actions that might have prompted the ROK government to re-evaluate the portion of its budget allocated to defense include the DPRK's first nuclear test in October 2006, the DPRK sinking of the *ROKS Cheonan* in March 2010, and the DPRK artillery bombardment of Yeonpyeong island in November 2010.³⁸ Even after those events, however, the defense budget did not deviate significantly from a 10 percent share of the total government budget. The 7.0 percent increase to the defense budget for 2018 (up from the 4.0 percent increase to the defense budget for 2017) is not a reflection of ROK anxieties over the possibility of "fire and fury" on the peninsula amidst heightened tension between the U.S. and the DPRK in 2017. Conversely, the 8.2 percent increase to the defense budget for 2019 that was approved even as President Trump, President Moon, and Chairman Kim conducted a series of summits in 2018 is not particularly puzzling. In both cases, the defense budget grew roughly in proportion with the overall government budget, with the size of the defense budget unaffected by changes in the security environment.

While the security environment and security strategy objectives do not significantly affect the size of the defense budget, it would be premature to conclude that security strategy objectives do not influence ROK defense spending. As discussed above, the composition of the defense budget is also changing with a larger proportion of spending going towards FIP. Increasing the share of defense spending going towards FIP has long been a priority stated by the MND in its Midterm Defense Plans (MDP), but only under President Moon's administration has the share of the defense budget appropriated towards FIP actually started to grow above 30 percent (see Table 3). The 2008 MDP, projecting defense spending for the period 2009 to 2013, anticipated raising FIP to 38.63 percent of the 2013 defense budget, but as 2013 approached the projection was adjusted downwards in successive MDPs until the 2013 budget was approved with 29.45 percent of defense spending going towards FIP. A similar pattern emerged for the MDP budget projections for 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017: projections for those target years made in the MDPs four or five years beforehand (35.31 percent, 37.12 percent, 32.86 percent, and 33.41 percent, respectively) all

declined towards 30 percent as the target year approached, and then the approved budget allocated close to 30 percent for FIP spending. That pattern did not change until the 2018 budget's approval after Moon's election, when the portion of the defense budget allocated to FIP rose to 31.33 percent. FIP's share of the budget rose again in 2019, and in 2020 the FIP portion of the budget reached 33.26 percent (actually exceeding the projection set four years earlier in the 2016 MDP).

The rising share of defense spending going to FIP in order to enable the development and acquisition of new weapons systems, which the MND had long projected but never achieved, suggests that there are substantive changes taking place within the composition of the defense budget. While the size of the defense budget appears to grow independently of changes in the security environment or ROK strategic objectives, changes within the composition of the defense budget may follow from new perceptions of the security environment and the strategic objectives of President Moon's administration.

Table 3: MDP Forecasts of O&M and FIP Spending Compared with Approved Defense Budgets, 2013 to 2020 (in ₩1,000,000)

	Approved Budget	Planned in 2018	Planned in 2016	Planned in 2014	Planned in 2012	Planned in 2010	Planned in 2008
2013	Total	34,345,275			35,400,000	35,100,000	40,900,000
	O&M	24,228,972			24,400,000	23,100,000	25,100,000
	FIP	10,116,303			11,000,000	12,000,000	15,800,000
2014	Total	35,706,619			37,500,000	37,100,000	
	O&M	25,195,966			25,700,000	24,000,000	
	FIP	10,509,653			11,800,000	13,100,000	
2015	Total	37,455,991		38,500,000	39,600,000	39,600,000	
	O&M	26,442,028		26,800,000	27,000,000	27,000,000	
	FIP	11,013,963		11,700,000	12,500,000	14,700,000	
2016	Total	38,799,549		41,500,000	42,300,000		
	O&M	27,159,740		28,400,000	28,400,000		
	FIP	11,639,809		13,100,000	13,900,000		
2017	Total	40,334,649	41,000,000	44,600,000	44,900,000		
	O&M	28,137,698	28,300,000	30,100,000	29,900,000		
	FIP	12,196,951	12,700,000	14,500,000	15,000,000		
2018	Total	43,158,119	43,200,000	47,600,000			
	O&M	29,637,827	29,500,000	31,600,000			
	FIP	13,520,292	13,700,000	16,000,000			
2019	Total	46,697,085	46,700,000	50,600,000			
	O&M	31,323,761	31,300,000	33,200,000			
	FIP	15,373,324	15,400,000	17,400,000			
2020	Total	50,152,700	50,300,000				
	O&M	33,472,258	33,300,000				
	FIP	16,680,442	17,000,000				

Source: Developed by the author from multiple documents published by the ROK National Assembly³⁹

Given the increasing share of defense spending going to the development and acquisition of new weapons systems through the budget for FIP, an analysis of the types of systems that are being developed and acquired may yield insight into the alignment (or misalignment) between the ROK's security strategy objectives and its defense spending. The analysis below discusses trends in spending for aircraft systems and spending on programs that are associated with international engagement. The fiscal resources that the ROK is allocating towards these efforts provides a richer understanding of the ROK's implementation of its security strategy than simply reading the ROK's policy rhetoric.

The portion of the defense budget devoted to FIP, as formulated in the administration's budget requests to the National Assembly, has been categorized into eight separate categories since 2018: command and control and reconnaissance programs, maneuver and firepower programs, naval programs, aircraft programs, guided weapons programs, defense program policy support, defense program administration support, and internal government transfers to other ministries within the government. See Table 4 and Figure 2 for a breakdown of defense spending towards each major category since 2013.

The data presented in Table 4 and Figure 2 shows that the defense budgets for 2018, 2019, and 2020 under the Moon administration have allocated significantly increased proportions of the FIP budget towards aircraft programs relative to the budgets of 2013 through 2017. Whereas spending on aircraft programs hovered between 22 percent and 24 percent of the FIP budget from 2013 to 2017, it grew to 25.5 percent in 2018 and reached 37.9 percent of the FIP budget in 2020. The increasing share of the FIP budget going to aircraft programs, along with the growth in the FIP budget generally, has resulted in the aircraft programs budget more than doubling in absolute terms in only three years, going from 2.9 trillion won in 2017 to 6.3 trillion won in 2020.

While the increasing share of the FIP budget allocated to aircraft programs is particularly striking, it is not the only significant trend to emerge under President Moon's administration. The portion of the FIP budget allocated to maneuver and firepower programs hovered between 18 percent and 22 percent from 2013 to 2017, but then in 2018 it dropped to 17.6 percent and continued to fall through 2019 before reaching only 10.8 percent of the FIP budget in 2020. Not only has the budget for maneuver and firepower programs fallen in terms of the percentage of the FIP budget, but it has also fallen in absolute terms: in 2017 maneuver and


firepower programs were appropriated 2.3 trillion won, but in 2020 only 1.8 trillion won was appropriated for this category of programs.

Table 4: Distribution of Force Improvement Plan Spending Across Program Categories, 2013-2020 (in ₩1,000,000,000)

	2013		2014		2015		2016	
FIP Total	10,116		10,510		11,014		11,640	
C2 & Recon	1,099	10.9%	829	7.9%	793	7.2%	1,328	11.4%
Maneuver & Firepower	1,956	10.3%	2,346	22.3%	2,301	20.9%	2,199	18.9%
Naval	1,682	16.6%	1,784	17.0%	1,850	16.8%	1,665	14.3%
Aircraft	2,427	24.1%	2,340	22.3%	2,555	22.9%	2,588	22.2%
Guided Weapons	1,640	16.2%	1,726	16.4%	2,038	18.5%	2,329	20.0%
Policy Support	1,209	12.0%	1,360	12.9%	1,421	12.9%	1,416	12.2%
Admin Support	98	1.0%	116	1.1%	99	0.9%	107	0.9%
Internal Transfers	5	0.0%	6	0.1%	11	0.1%	8	0.1%
	2017		2018		2019		2020	
FIP Total	12,197		13,520		15,373		16,680	
C2 & Recon	1,126	9.2%	1,313	9.7%	1,292	8.4%	1,102	6.6%
Maneuver & Firepower	2,280	18.7%	2,379	17.6%	2,175	14.2%	1,803	10.8%
Naval	1,912	15.7%	2,173	16.1%	2,259	14.7%	2,834	17.0%
Aircraft	2,908	23.8%	3,450	25.5%	5,218	33.9%	6,329	37.9%
Guided Weapons	2,408	19.7%	2,556	18.9%	2,700	17.6%	2,592	15.5%
Policy Support	1,444	11.8%	1,534	11.3%	1,605	10.4%	1,856	11.1%
Admin Support	110	0.9%	108	0.8%	116	0.8%	157	0.9%
Internal Transfers	8	0.1%	8	0.1%	8	0.1%	9	0.1%

Source: Developed by the author from multiple documents published by the ROK National Assembly.⁴⁰

Figure 2: Distribution of FIP Spending Across Program Categories, 2013-2020



Source: Developed by the author from multiple documents published by the ROK National Assembly ⁴¹

The specific programs in the category of maneuver and firepower are primarily weapons and systems principally employed by the ROK Army, to include tanks, several types of vehicles, and artillery. The increased funding for aircraft programs in conjunction with the decreased funding for maneuver and firepower programs is consistent with the Moon administration’s policy objective of creating a more balanced or joint military force. However, it is important to note that the aircraft programs category includes several platforms employed by the ROK Army, to include continued production of the Korea Utility Helicopter and research and development of a small armed helicopter. Additionally, there are several munitions programs in the guided weapons category that are used by the ROK Army and continue to receive significant funding, such as the anti-tank Medium-range Infantry Missile, upgrades to *Cheolmae-II* Surface-to-Air missile systems, and upgrades for Patriot systems along with more capable Patriot interceptor munitions. Therefore, it would be an oversimplification to simply state that the ROK government is improving the ROK Air Force at the expense of the ROK Army on the basis of these trends. Nonetheless, the increased funding for aircraft programs in

conjunction with the decreased funding for maneuver and firepower programs is consistent with the policy objective of building a more balanced military force.

Major acquisition programs, such as aircraft and naval platforms, obviously do not materialize overnight with a change in political administrations. It might be supposed that the increased proportions of the FIP budget being allocated towards aircraft programs in the budgets for 2018, 2019, and 2020 are simply the results of programmatic actions that began before the Moon administration entered government in 2017. However, programmatic actions preceding the Moon administration are insufficient explanations of the trend of increased portions of the FIP budget going towards aircraft programs in conjunction with decreased portions of the FIP budget going towards maneuver and firepower programs. As shown in Table 3, the FIP budgets approved for 2019 and 2020 exceeded the amounts that had been projected in the 2016 MDP (developed under the Park administration) by 573 billion won and 980 billion won, respectively. The FIP budgets for 2019 and 2020 were larger than the Park administration anticipated, rendering programmatic actions initiated during the Park administration an incomplete explanation of the distribution of FIP spending across the various FIP program categories, as shown in Figure 2.

ROK strategic policy documents also emphasize the importance of engaging with international partners to address security concerns. Within the O&M portion of the defense budget, there are multiple programs associated with international engagement activities: international military education, multinational deployments and defense cooperative exchanges, peacekeeping operations deployments, and military attaché activities. Additionally, the budget program for operational conditions exercises contains sub-programs for military exercises conducted both within South Korea and overseas combined exercises, although budget documents usually do not specify the funding levels for those sub-programs. Changes to the funding levels of these programs relative to the overall defense budget may reveal whether the rhetoric of engaging with international partners is associated with increased funding for activities that support such engagement.

President Moon's administration inherited a defense budget that for 2017 measured just over 40 trillion won. In the three budgets drafted by the current administration and approved by the National Assembly, the defense budget has grown by a cumulative 24.34 percent and reached over

50 trillion won. In the defense budgets for 2018, 2019, and 2020, the programs for peacekeeping operations and military attaché activities have grown by roughly the same magnitude (see Table 5). Over the same period, however, funding for the international military education program and the multinational deployments and defense cooperative exchanges program have remained essentially static, only growing by a cumulative 1.66 percent and 0.35 percent, respectively.

Data on funding for the sub-program of overseas combined exercises is only available for the 2019 and 2020 budgets, thanks to a summary of overseas military training activities in the ROK National Assembly's 2020 *Nyeondo Gukbangwiwonhoe Sogwan Yesanan Yebisimsabogoseo* [2020 National Defense Committee Planned Budget Preliminary Review Report].⁴² According to that report, funding for overseas combined exercises in 2019 had measured ₩6,662,000,000 but the government was proposing to raise funding in 2020 to ₩15,949,000,000 (a 139 percent increase). However, it is difficult to discern if that significant increase to overseas combined exercise funding represents a new emphasis on overseas exercises or if it simply restores funding to a level that had previously existed prior to 2019. Funding for the entire operational conditions exercises program had ranged between ₩23 million and ₩29 million during the period of 2016 to 2018 before sharply dropping in 2019, so the proposed 139 percent increase to the overseas combined exercises sub-program in 2020 may have simply restored funding to its previous level or it may have dramatically increased the sub-program's funding.

Table 5: Funding for Programs related to International Engagement, 2013-2020 (in ₩1,000,000,000)

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Defense Budget	34,345	35,706	37,456	38,800	40,345	43,158	46,697	50,153
Cumulative Increase (Decrease) since 2017					0.0	7.0%	15.8%	24.3%
International Military Education	13.38	15.83	14.60	14.93	14.71	17.47	14.43	14.95
Cumulative Increase/ (Decrease) since 2017					0.0	(1.6%)	(1.9%)	1.7%
Multinational Deployments & Defense Cooperative Exchanges	31.09	54.40	25.78	22.53	23.12	20.90	22.61	23.20
Cumulative Increase (Decrease) since 2017					0.0	(9.6%)	(2.2%)	0.4%
Peacekeeping Operations Deployments	32.59	32.54	25.03	23.86	21.44	23.43	24.04	26.60
Cumulative Increase (Decrease) since 2017					0.0	9.3%	12.2%	24.1%
Military Attaché Activities	10.15	10.44	10.89	11.23	11.87	11.81	12.27	13.96
Cumulative Increase since 2017 (%)					0.0	5.6%	9.7%	24.8%

Source: Developed by the author from multiple documents published by the ROK National Assembly⁴³

While funding increases to the programs for peacekeeping operations and military attaché activities have kept pace with increases to the total defense budget, funding increases for the international military education program and the multinational deployments and defense cooperative exchanges program have not kept pace with increases to the defense budget in spite of the emphasis that strategic policy documents have placed on engagement with international partners. The 139 percent increase to funding for overseas military exercises from 2019 to 2020 seems to reflect an increased emphasis on engaging with international partners, but the lack of funding data for that sub-program in the years prior to 2019 makes it difficult to draw a conclusion on the significance of that 139 percent increase.

While ROK strategic policy documents have emphasized the importance of engaging with international partners, some of the programs within the defense budget that are associated with such engagement have not grown in proportion with total defense spending. Increased international engagement may be occurring by means of activities that are not immediately obvious when reviewing the defense budget, but

constrained fiscal resources for programs directly related to international engagement may hamper broader and more comprehensive ROK efforts to engage with the international community as a “middle power” to address its security interests.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The analysis presented in this study demonstrates that the priorities articulated in ROK policy rhetoric do not influence the overall size of the defense budget, but some security strategy objectives in policy rhetoric do align with aspects of the composition of the ROK defense budgets approved in 2017, 2018, and 2019. Since at least 2005, the defense budget has hovered around 10 percent of the total government budget regardless of changing dynamics in the security environment or shifting security strategy objectives. Policy rhetoric may assert that uncertainty in the security environment is increasing and that larger defense budgets are required in order to defend South Korea, but the increases to the defense budgets for 2018, 2019, and 2020 have simply maintained a roughly 10 percent share of the total government budget.

While changes in the size of the ROK defense budget are not driven by the priorities and objectives of ROK security and defense policy documents, some of the changes within the composition of the ROK defense budget from 2017 to 2019 are aligned with the Moon administration’s security strategy objectives. Five-year projections of future defense budgets in the MDPs going back to 2008 had forecast increases to the share of the budget allocated to FIP in order to develop and acquire new military capabilities, but those projected increases have only materialized under President Moon’s administration as FIP spending has grown to over 33 percent of the defense budget. As the FIP budget has been growing both in absolute terms and in its relation to the total defense budget, a greater portion of the FIP budget has been allocated to aircraft programs while the portion of the FIP budget allocated to maneuver and firepower programs has declined. The increased funding for aircraft programs (principally, but not exclusively, used by the ROK Air Force) in conjunction with decreased funding for maneuver and firepower programs (principally, but not exclusively, used by the ROK Army) aligns with the Moon administration’s policy objective of building a military that is more balanced across the services.

Trends in defense spending from 2017 to 2019 clearly reflect the current administration’s objective of building a more balanced military

force, but budget trends associated with the policy objective of engaging with international partners are more ambiguous. Budgets for programs that support peacekeeping operations and military attaché activities have increased at roughly the same rate as the total defense budget from 2017 through 2019, but funding for the international military education program and the multinational deployments and defense cooperative exchanges program has remained essentially static. Funding for overseas combined exercises more than doubled from 2019 to 2020, but the lack of funding information for overseas combined exercises in the years prior to 2019 render it difficult to assess the significance of that funding increase. Security and defense policy documents highlight the importance of ROK military engagement with international partners in support of the ROK's role as a middle power on the world stage, but some of the budget programs that directly support that objective have not been allocated increased funding.

Three principal recommendations for organizations involved in the maintenance of the ROK-U.S. alliance follow from the conclusions drawn above regarding the alignment between ROK security strategy objectives and defense spending. The first recommendation is that changes in the size of the ROK defense budget should not be interpreted as signals of ROK policy changes, ROK perceptions of the security environment, or ROK commitment towards the ROK-U.S. alliance. If the ROK government continues the practice of spending 10 percent of the total government budget on defense, changes in defense spending will reflect changes in the government's general fiscal policy rather than changes in defense policy. Defense budgets would grow by smaller increments under an administration with a more conservative fiscal policy than the Moon administration. Those smaller increments of increases to the defense budget would be due to smaller growth of total government spending, rather than an indication of the government assigning less importance to national defense or attempting to free-ride on U.S. security commitments. Similarly, defense budgets would grow by even larger increments under a government with a more expansionary fiscal policy, and those large increases in defense spending would not be indicative of increased ROK concerns about the security environment or ROK efforts to build military capabilities as a hedge against U.S. abandonment. As long as the defense budget continues to hover around 10 percent of the government's total budget, the size of the defense budget should not be used as a metric for assessing ROK security or defense policies.

The second recommendation is that a re-examination of the U.S. military capabilities stationed on the Korean Peninsula is prudent given the ROK military's fielding of advanced weapons systems as part of its efforts to build a more balanced military force. As the ROK adds new military capabilities that contribute to the combined capabilities of the ROK-U.S. alliance, such as F-35 stealth fighters, AEGIS-equipped destroyers, and indigenously developed air defense systems, the U.S. military should also consider adjusting the capabilities that it is currently stationing in South Korea. Adjustment of those U.S. forces could potentially further both U.S. interests and ROK-U.S. alliance interests on the Korean Peninsula and across Northeast Asia. ROK and U.S. officials would need to carefully discuss the timing and the substance of any changes to U.S. military capabilities on the Korean Peninsula in order to ensure that those changes are furthering the interests of the ROK-U.S. alliance and to ensure that the change in U.S. capabilities is not perceived, either by the ROK or other regional actors, as a reduction in the U.S. commitment towards the ROK-U.S. alliance.

Finally, the third recommendation of this study is that the United States should actively encourage greater ROK military engagement with like-minded partners throughout the Pacific and globally. President Moon's administration has stated the importance of greater international engagement in its policy rhetoric, and the ROK military has developed and acquired several military platforms suitable for operations away from the Korean Peninsula. Defense budgets for the international military education program and the multinational deployments and defense cooperative exchanges have not grown accordingly, however. U.S. encouragement of ROK international engagement is not only a matter of U.S. officials working with their ROK counterparts, but also a matter of U.S. engagement with other allies and partners to encourage those allies and partners to pursue greater defense and military cooperation with the ROK. ROK military engagement with like-minded partners, even when conducted in a setting where the U.S. military is not a participant, generally furthers U.S. interests by reinforcing international norms of military behavior, maintaining and strengthening access to the global commons, and promoting interoperability among military partners of both the ROK and the United States.

Notes:

¹ Yoo Kang-moon, “Defense Ministry’s latest white paper omits language describing N. Korea as ‘the enemy,’ ” *Hankyoreh*, January 26, 2019, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/878629.html.

² B.J. Gallagher, *Why Don't I Do the Things I Know are Good for Me?* (New York: Penguin, 2009), 164.

³ ROK Office of National Security, *Gukgaanbojeollyak* [국가안보전략; National Security Strategy] (Seoul: The Blue House, December 2018), 27, <https://www1.president.go.kr/dn/5c1b2e9a52b8e>.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 72-76.

⁵ *2018 Defense White Paper* (Seoul: MND, 2019), 43, http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mndEN/upload/pblicitn/PBLICTNEBOOK_201908070153390840.pdf.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 47.

⁷ ROK MND, *Gukbangaehyeok 2.0* [국방개혁 2.0; Defense Reform 2.0] (Seoul: MND, 2019), 26, http://www.mnd.go.kr/mbshome/mbs/reform/images/contents/reform_EBOOK.pdf; ROK MND, “Moon Jae-in Jeongbuui Gukbangaehyeok 2.0” [문재인 정부의 국방개혁 2.0; Moon Jae-in Administration’s Defense Reform 2.0] July 27, 2018, 5, http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/newsInFileDown.action?siteId=mnd&newsSeq=I_11131&num=1.

⁸ ROK MND, *2018 Defense White Paper*, 175.

⁹ ROK MND, “18.10.1 Jeonyeokjabuteo Byeong Bongmugigan Danchuk Sihaeng” [‘18.10.1 전역자부터 병 복무기간 단축 시행; Implementation of Reduced Service Periods for Conscripts Beginning with those Discharged on October 1, 2018], July 27, 2018, http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/newsInFileDown.action?siteId=mnd&newsSeq=I_11126&num=1.

¹⁰ ROK National Assembly, *2020 Nyeondo Gukbangwiwonhoe Sogwan Yesanan Yebisimsabogoseo* [2020년도 국방위원회 소관 예산안 예비심사보고서; 2020 National Defense Committee Planned Budget Preliminary Review Report] November 7, 2019, 55, http://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/billDetail.do?billId=PRC_H1N9P0R9U0G3H0B9B4J1U2M9Z1G1Q0.

¹¹ ROK Office of National Security, *Gukgaanbojeollyak* [국가안보전략; National Security Strategy] 71.

¹² ROK MND, *Gukbangaehyeok 2.0* [국방개혁 2.0; Defense Reform 2.0] 21; ROK MND, *2018 Defense White Paper*, 50-51.

¹³ ROK MND, *Gukbangaehyeok 2.0* [국방개혁 2.0; Defense Reform 2.0] 30, 38.

¹⁴ ROK Office of National Security, *Gukgaanbojeollyak* [국가안보전략; National Security Strategy] 70.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 71.

¹⁶ ROK MND, *Gukbangaehyeok 2.0* [국방개혁 2.0; Defense Reform 2.0] 21; ROK MND, *2018 Defense White Paper*, 50.

- ¹⁷ ROK MND, “Yuk.Hae.Gong Dongilbiyul Pyeonseong, Dongilgun Yeonsokbojik Geumji” [육.해.공 동일비를 편성, 동일군 연속보직 금지; Establishment of Equal Ratios for Army, Navy, Air Force, Prohibition of Consecutive Tours at the Same Force] July 24, 2018, 2, http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/newsInFileDown.action?siteId=mnd&newsSeq=I_11127&num=1; ROK MND, *Gukbanggaehyeok 2.0* [국방개혁 2.0; Defense Reform 2.0] 37.
- ¹⁸ ROK MND, “Moon Jae-in Jeongbuui Gukbanggaehyeok 2.0” [문재인 정부의 국방개혁 2.0; Moon Jae-in Administration’s Defense Reform 2.0] 6.
- ¹⁹ Ibid., 7; ROK National Assembly, *2020 Nyeondo Gukbangwiwonhoe Sogwan Yesanan Yebisimsabogoseo* [2020년도 국방위원회 소관 예산안 예비심사보고서; 2020 National Defense Committee Planned Budget Preliminary Review Report] 55.
- ²⁰ ROK MND, *Gukbanggaehyeok 2.0* [국방개혁 2.0; Defense Reform 2.0] 37.
- ²¹ Ibid., 18; ROK MND, “Moon Jae-in Jeongbuui Gukbanggaehyeok 2.0” [문재인 정부의 국방개혁 2.0; Moon Jae-in Administration’s Defense Reform 2.0] 7.
- ²² “Gukbanggaehyeok 2.0 4 Dae Gwaje - Janggun Su Gamchuk” [국방개혁 2.0 4 대 과제 - 장군 수 감축; Defense Reform 2.0’s 4 Large Tasks – Reduction in Number of Generals] *Gukbank TV*, July 30, 2018, video, https://youtu.be/Fe6r_qpbDB0.
- ²³ ROK MND, *2018 Defense White Paper*, 55-58.
- ²⁴ ROK Office of National Security, *Gukgaanbojeollyak* [국가안보전략; National Security Strategy] 26.
- ²⁵ Ibid., 95.
- ²⁶ ROK MND, *2018 Defense White Paper*, 43.
- ²⁷ Ibid., 45.
- ²⁸ Ibid., 47.
- ²⁹ Ibid., 157.
- ³⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2012-2019)” (Brussels: NATO, 2019), 3, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_06/20190625_PR2019-069-EN.pdf.
- ³¹ Defense Acquisition Program Act, (2006) art. 3, para. 1 (Republic of Korea), http://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=46900&lang=ENG. The Korean term “Bangwiryeokgaeseon” [방위력개선] is translated as Force Improvement in the English translation of the legislation noted above; however, the ROK MND White Papers often translate the term as Force Enhancement.
- ³² Data is adapted from the National Assembly’s “Jeongbuisongjeongbo” [정부이송정보; Government Transfer Report] that is published on its website after each annual budget is approved.
- ³³ Data is adapted from the National Assembly’s “Jeongbuisongjeongbo” [정부이송정보; Government Transfer Report] that is published on its website after each annual budget is approved.
- ³⁴ ROK MND, “Sinjeongbu Cheot Hae, Gukbangyesan 6.9% Jeungaekdoen 43.1 Jowon” [신정부 첫 해, 국방예산 6.9% 증액된 43.1 조원; New Government’s First Year, Defense Budget Increased 6.9% to 43.1 Trillion Won] August 28, 2017, 3,

http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/newsInFileDown.action?siteId=mnd&newsSeq=I_10486&num=1.

³⁵ Lee Young-bin, “A Quantum Leap toward a Military Power, the Dawn of an ‘Era of 50 Trillion Won Defense Budget,’ ” *ROK Angle: Korea’s Defense Policy*, no. 215 (February 17, 2020): 3,

<http://www.kida.re.kr/fri/board/friPerBoard.do?searchCondition=&searchKeyword=&pageIndex=1&depth=3&sidx=366>.

³⁶ Data on total government expenditures from 2005 to 2019 is adapted from the ROK National Assembly Budget Office, *Public Finance of Korea 2019 (partially extracted)* (Seoul: National Assembly, 2019), 22,

<http://korea.nabo.go.kr/publi/publications.php?ptype=view&idx=6640&page=2&code=publications&category=104>; data for total government expenditures approved for 2020 is from Yonhap News Agency, “National Assembly passes 512.3 tln-won budget bill,” December 10, 2019, <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20191210009552315>; data for approved defense budgets from 2005 to 2012 is adapted from ROK MND, *2014 Defense White Paper* (Seoul: MND, 2015), 298,

http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mndEN/upload/pblictN/PBLICTNEBOOK_201704260250138940.pdf; data for approved defense budgets from 2013 to 2020 is from the National Assembly’s “Jeongbuisongjeongbo” [정부이송정보; Government Transfer Report] that is published after each annual budget is approved.

³⁷ Jae-Jung Suh, “Allied to Race? The U.S.-Korea Alliance and Arms Race,” *Asian Perspective* 33, no. 4 (2009): 105.

³⁸ “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms Control Association, accessed April 2020, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron>.

³⁹ Data for approved defense budgets, to include the allocations towards O&M and FIP, from 2013 to 2020 is adapted from the National Assembly’s “Jeongbuisongjeongbo” [정부이송정보; Government Transfer Report]. Data for the 2008 MDP is adapted from ROK MND, *Defense White Paper 2008* (Seoul: MND, 2009), 208,

http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mnd/upload/pblictN/PBLICTNEBOOK_201505220949411120.pdf; data for the 2010 MDP is adapted from ROK MND, *2010 Defense White Paper* (Seoul: MND, 2011), 227,

http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mnd/upload/pblictN/PBLICTNEBOOK_201304110724185440.pdf; data for the 2012 MDP is adapted from ROK MND, *2012 Defense White Paper* (Seoul: MND, 2012), 225,

http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mnd/upload/pblictN/PBLICTNEBOOK_201308060946041630.pdf; data for the 2014 MDP is adapted from ROK MND, *2014 Defense White Paper*, 177; data for the 2016 MDP is adapted from ROK MND, *2016 Defense White Paper* (Seoul: MND, 2017), 129,

http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mndEN/upload/pblictN/PBLICTNEBOOK_201705180357180050.pdf; data for the 2018 MDP is adapted from ROK MND, *2018 Defense White Paper*, 162.

⁴⁰ In the table, budget programs are grouped according to the categories in which they are listed in the 2018, 2019, and 2020 budgets. Prior to 2018, the categories of the FIP budget were structured differently. For programs that prior to 2018 had been listed under

a previous category that no longer appears in the FIP portion of the budget, the author has included them in the appropriate category based on the nature of each program and the categorization of that program or its related programs (follow-on upgrades or subsequent versions) in the budgets of 2018 and later. Data for 2013 and 2014 is adapted from the combined totals of program funding in the National Assembly's *Seipsechuryesanansaeopbyeol Seolmyeongseo* Vol. 2 [세입세출예산사업별 설명서 II; Explanation of Tax Revenue and Tax Expenditure Planned Budget Programs Vol. 2] and the National Assembly's *Yesanan Simsabogoseo* [예산안 심사보고서; Planned Budget Examination Report]. Data for 2015 through 2020 is adapted from the combined totals of program funding in the National Assembly's *Seipsechuryesanansaeopbyeol Seolmyeongseo* Vol. 2 [세입세출예산사업별 설명서 II; Explanation of Tax Revenue and Tax Expenditure Planned Budget Programs Vol. 2] and the National Assembly's *Yesanane Daehan Sujeongan* [예산안에 대한 수정안; Amendment Regarding the Planned Budget]. All documents are published on the ROK National Assembly website.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² ROK National Assembly, *2020 Nyeondo Gukbangwiwonhoe Sogwan Yesanan Yebisimsabogoseo* [2020년도 국방위원회 소관 예산안 예비심사보고; 2020 National Defense Committee Planned Budget Preliminary Review Report] 171-8.

⁴³ Data is adapted from the *Seipsechuryesansaeopbyeol Seolmyeongseo* [세입세출예산사업별 설명서; Explanation of Tax Revenue and Tax Expenditure Budget Programs] submitted by the ROK government to the National Assembly and the National Assembly's *Yesanane Daehan Sujeongan* [예산안에 대한 수정안; Amendment Regarding the Planned Budget] that details modifications made by the National Assembly to the government's budget request.