

# **The Role of Official News Releases of the Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism in the Success of the Korean Wave**

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## **Abstract**

This study investigates the South Korean government's role in the success of the *Hallyu* [Korean Wave] and the growing global interest in Korean popular culture by examining official news releases on *Hallyu* issued by the Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism from 2007 to 2017. The author argues that the domestic news releases had a supporting role for artists and cultural products in South Korea; they didn't directly contribute to Korean industrial economic growth. In contrast, the international news releases tended to play a leading role in promoting Korea's positive image; they contributed to Korea's industrial economic growth by means of cultural diplomacy and soft power. Statistical analyses were conducted to determine whether a significant relationship exists between domestic news releases and industrial economic growth. To provide evidence of the Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism's leading role in promoting artists and cultural products abroad, the author examined and qualitatively analyzed English, Chinese, and Japanese language news releases. The findings revealed that the number of releases had no significant relationship with increased annual economic growth, which seems to come from the power of *Hallyu* itself, not the government's support. The qualitative analysis shows that international releases were used as a tool to achieve foreign policy goals and advance a positive national image. This study contributes to the growing literature on *Hallyu* by discussing the dual role of official news releases.

**Keywords:** *Hallyu*, Korean Wave, Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, official news, cultural diplomacy, soft power

## **Introduction**

Over the last few decades, interest in Korean popular culture has increased throughout the world.<sup>1</sup> Evidence of this phenomenon has been seen in the increasing popularity of various Korean cultural products, such as television dramas, films, popular dance music (K-pop), B-boys, and, to

a lesser extent, video games, food, fashion, tourism, and the Korean language.<sup>2</sup> *Hallyu* [Korean Wave] is the Chinese term referring to this growing global interest in Korean popular culture.<sup>3</sup> As *Hallyu* became an international phenomenon, the Korean government began to pay attention to it. From the government point of view, *Hallyu* could serve as useful resource for promoting cultural diplomacy in support of foreign policy objectives.<sup>4</sup>

In explaining the rise of *Hallyu*, Nye and Kim (2013) claim that the Korean government was the driving force behind the phenomenon, recognizing its potential for effective cultural diplomacy.<sup>5</sup> Their argument, somewhat flawed as will be discussed later in this article, indicates that the Korean government has used popular culture for soft power diplomacy and thus treated *Hallyu* as a critical component of its foreign policy.<sup>6</sup> Soft power, according to Nye (2004), is a means by which a country can achieve its diplomatic goals through attracting other nations and building international relationships using its cultural assets—i.e., artists and cultural products—rather than coercion or payments. Seen in light of Nye’s definition of soft power, the Korean government uses *Hallyu* as an effective tool to establish a positive public opinion and credibility among other nations to advance Korea’s political and economic goals. In other words, the Korean Wave facilitates cultural exchange and transcultural collaboration.

The Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism (KMCST) is instrumental in achieving the government’s foreign policy objectives. The KMCST is a central agency whose main goals are to promote tourism as a national strategic industry, accelerate the growth of the sports industry, and improve Korea’s reputation as a global cultural power.<sup>7</sup> Among the various responsibilities of the KMCST are organizing conferences that promote *Hallyu* and networking with other countries to encourage investment in Korean popular cultural products. One of the most important roles of the KMCST is publishing and disseminating news that promote Korean cultural events, artists, and products.

A preliminary review of KMCST’s *Hallyu*-related official news releases from 2007 to 2017 showed that some items were intended for a domestic audience and others for international readers. Given such a division, this study attempts to determine whether the two groups of news releases differed in purpose. The author first reviewed Korean language news releases to examine their impact on the continued growth of *Hallyu*. The author argues that the KMCST domestic news releases didn’t serve as

the main force behind *Hallyu's* rise, but performed an indirect, supporting role. To prove that the domestic news releases weren't designed to achieve economic outcomes as Nye and Kim (2013) argued, the author conducted a statistical analysis on the relationship between the KMCST news releases and economic growth in culture-related industries, including television, music, film, gaming, and tourism.

To determine whether the domestic and the international news releases differ in their purpose and effect on *Hallyu*, the author investigated English, Chinese, and Japanese news items. Based on a qualitative analysis of the international news releases from 2007 to 2018, the author argues that news releases for international readers played a leading role in promoting a positive national image, as well as economic growth through cultural diplomacy and soft power.

### **The Emergence of *Hallyu***

According to Rouse-Marquet (2013), Koreans were exposed to Western culture on a large scale during the Korean War (1950-53) and the Vietnam War (1955-75). This exposure, coupled with Korea's rapid economic growth in the 1960s, led to the emergence of modern culture-related industries. In 1993, the Korean government established a Cultural Industry Bureau to develop a media sector and encourage investments in film and media, which later became the foundation for *Hallyu*.<sup>8</sup>

In the early 2000s, *Hallyu* emerged through television dramas. *Winter Sonata*, produced in 2002, was the first Korean drama to achieve popular success in Japan.<sup>9</sup> Other television dramas, such as *Dae Jang Geum* (2003) and *Full House* (2004) were broadcast in China and other Asian countries.<sup>10</sup>

Following K-drama, K-pop artists became widely popular in Asia.<sup>11</sup> Korean boy groups and girl groups have continued to find global audiences.<sup>12</sup> With Psy's 2012 music video, "Gangnam Style," K-pop music entered the U.S. market.<sup>13</sup> In 2016, *Forbes* published articles that reported the significant economic impact of global K-pop celebrities.<sup>14</sup> The popularity of Korean entertainment and other cultural products has continued to spread throughout the world, largely due to the increasing access to social media.<sup>15</sup>

The impact of *Hallyu* is evident in the sales of cultural products related to the Korean Wave. For example, the tourism industry has experienced rapid growth in recent years. In 2013, more than 12 million people, including 6 million from China, visited Korea.<sup>16</sup> The market for Korean

cosmetic products has also expanded globally, with the largest market being China.<sup>17</sup> Due to their reasonable prices and suitability for Asian skin, Korean skincare and other cosmetic products have been profitable in places such as Sri Lanka, Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Japan, among others.<sup>18</sup>

### ***Hallyu* as a Tool for Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power**

According to Cho (2005), the Korean government's serious interest in popular culture grew out of the necessity to explore new export markets in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis.<sup>19</sup> Prior to the early 1990s, Korea promoted its cultural products through state- or privately funded autonomous agencies.<sup>20</sup> In the last three decades, however, a ministry within the Korean government has been dedicated to overseeing the growth of the nation's cultural industries and promoting events designed to strengthen Korea's diplomatic relations with other countries.

Beginning with the administration of Kim Young-sam (1992-97), the policy toward cultural industries shifted from regulation to promotion.<sup>21</sup> With the onset of the financial crisis in the late 1990s, Korean policy makers strove to transform *Hallyu* into a sustainable source of revenue.<sup>22</sup> Since the early 2000s, when Korean popular culture began to spread overseas, the government's cultural policies have focused on promoting Korea's role as both an economic and cultural powerhouse to advance business and diplomacy.<sup>23</sup> To this end the central government established the KMCST in 2008.

To support the Korean Wave, the KMCST allocated 319 billion won (280 million USD) for promotional activities in 2013. This investment resulted in an annual 10 percent increase in cultural exports.<sup>24</sup> Kwon and Kim's (2014) examination of Korea's cultural policies over two decades (1990s-2000s) confirmed that the government played a vital role in invigorating the cultural industries.<sup>25</sup>

To investigate the government's use of *Hallyu*, it is important to understand the concepts of cultural diplomacy and soft power. Scholars defined these concepts in diverse ways. According to Kozymka (2014), cultural diplomacy is the use of a nation's culture to support its foreign policy goals, combat stereotyping, develop mutual understanding, and advance national reputation and relationships across the border.<sup>26</sup> Kozymka's definition of cultural diplomacy is applicable to *Hallyu*, which by demonstrating the power of popular culture, has played a crucial role in Korea's foreign policy, especially in nation branding.<sup>27</sup>

In his approach to cultural diplomacy, Feigenbaum (2001) emphasizes soft power, which he defines as using cultural resources as a sociopolitical influence to promote a nation's positive image and as an effective tool to foster the nation's economic growth through international cooperation and trade in the global markets. He explains that the soft power of any nation is based on three sources: the attractiveness of its culture; its political values, when it lives up to them at home and abroad; and its foreign policies, when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority.<sup>28</sup>

In examining the use of *Hallyu*, Jang and Paik (2012) treated it as a soft power. They concluded that it had had a positive influence on and great potential for the nation's cultural diplomacy.<sup>29</sup> As evidence, the researchers provided examples of how *Hallyu* helped Korea build positive relationships with other nations. A good case is Taiwan with whom Korea broke up its diplomatic relations in 1992 (Sung, 2010).<sup>30</sup> Jang and Paik also demonstrated how *Hallyu* had promoted increasing cross-cultural ties with other countries such as Malaysia (Cho, 2010).<sup>31</sup>

As mentioned, Nye (2004) sees soft power as a way to induce an active change in people's preferences and thereby a change in their actions so that a nation can achieve its political and diplomatic goals without a confrontational method.<sup>32</sup> Nye's idea underscores the potential of *Hallyu*'s soft power to have a wide impact on cultural diplomacy, tourism, commercial trade, education, and other national interests. Nye and Kim (2013) further argued that the Korean government used *Hallyu* as soft power for diplomacy and international collaborations.<sup>33</sup> According to Nye and Kim, the government largely drove the success of *Hallyu* as an effective tool of diplomacy.

As previously stated, the author argues that the government can only serve as a secondary agent that promotes *Hallyu* inside and outside of Korea by releasing news and providing resources to further its advance; e.g., financial assistance, cultural exchange opportunities, and venues. This study shows that artists and cultural products have been the primary driving force behind *Hallyu*.

The author's claim is partly supported by Lee (2009), who considers *Hallyu* as one of Korea's many soft resources, not soft power as is pointed out by Feigenbaum (2001).<sup>34</sup> Lee asserts that the Korean government needs effective strategies to convert its soft resources into soft power in order to use them to advance the nation's political and economic objectives. While recognizing the importance of the government in this process, Lee stresses the government "should not take a forefront role in the promotion

of its Korean Wave” but rather “like a free market economy, let the culture spread itself naturally.”<sup>35</sup> The author agrees with Lee on *Hallyu* being one of many soft resources. However, while Lee suggests the government actively harnessed *Hallyu*’s power, the author argues that the government has a limited, secondary role in spreading the Korean Wave.

As Elfving-Hwang (2013) pointed out, the Korean government has used *Hallyu* as a tool for cultural diplomacy, but each administration’s priorities and policies differed in certain respects.<sup>36</sup> Through their analysis of presidential speeches between 1998 and 2014, Kim and Jin (2016) investigated how each administration has understood and used *Hallyu*.<sup>37</sup> Their findings demonstrated that Korean presidents focused on either the economic or soft power potential of *Hallyu*. The liberal administrations (1998 to 2008) interpreted *Hallyu* mainly as a way to pursue economic benefits, whereas the conservative ones (2008 to 2017) approached *Hallyu* as a means of soft power to raise Korea’s international leverage through exports and an affirmative image.<sup>38</sup> In this context, it is notable that President Moon Jae-in’s administration related *Hallyu* to the fourth industrial revolution: “The size of this industry is immense, so the government needs to give it systematic and institutional support, especially as the industry is expected to have a bigger role in the fourth industrial revolution.”<sup>39</sup>

## Methodology

To investigate the Korean government’s role in the spread of *Hallyu* through KMCST official news releases, this study first determined the number of the news releases in Korean from 2007 to 2017. The KMCST website, where all the news releases were archived for the years reviewed in this study, contained a total of 7869 official news releases. Using the search word “*Hallyu*,” the author identified a total of 846 KMCST news releases on *Hallyu* written in the Korean language.

To provide evidence of the author’s assertion that the KMCST plays only a supportive role in *Hallyu*, the number of *Hallyu* news releases before and after the rise of *Hallyu* were compared. Psy’s 2012 arrival on the international music market as a milestone in the development of *Hallyu*. Statistical analyses, including t-test, simple regression, and multiple regression, were conducted to determine the impact of Psy’s success on the official news coverage by the KMCST. In the T-test and simple regression, the years from 2007 to 2017 functioned as the independent variable, while the KMCST news releases served as the dependent variable.

In the multiple regression, to examine more closely Psy's impact in 2012, the independent variable (2007 to 2017) was grouped into three distinct variables: 2007 to 2011, 2012, and 2013 to 2017.

Furthermore, the author conducted a correlation analysis to determine whether the Korean government was in the forefront of the success of *Hallyu*. Its purpose was to investigate whether the KMCST news releases or *Hallyu* itself statistically influenced the economic growth of culture-related industries. A 2016 report issued by the Korea Trade Investment Promotion Authority (KOTRA) was used as the source of data for the period from 2011 to 2015.

In addition to the above analyses, the author performed a qualitative analysis of the KMCST news releases in the three foreign languages to determine the main focus of their contents. Although the author's original research plan focused only on domestic news releases, the research was expanded to investigate whether the releases in English, Chinese, and Japanese differed from the domestic new releases in their purpose and their effects on *Hallyu*.

While the quantitative analyses of the domestic releases covered the period from January 2007 to December 2017, the qualitative analysis focusing on international releases included data through October 2018. There were 2294 news items available in English, Chinese, and Japanese on the KMCST website.

After selecting all articles that stated or implied content relevant to *Hallyu*, the author scanned the articles for evidence that the KMCST international news releases played a leading role in *Hallyu*'s promotion of Korea's positive image and increase of economic growth through cultural diplomacy and soft power.

## **Results**

### ***Domestic News Releases***

The initial review of the domestic news releases on the KMCST website revealed that they were classified into the following categories: KMCST planning, organization, and support; Culture and art policy; Annual reports; Public relations; International and national perspectives; Ownership; Media policy; Tourism policy; Sports; Bureau for Asia culture-centered city; Pyeongchang Olympic support; and others. Only 846 of the 7869 domestic news releases (11 percent) were related to *Hallyu*. This small percentage among the wide range of categories mentioned above shows that the majority of domestic news releases have been for

various administrative purposes. These include annual government reports and discussions of domestic issues; e.g., improvements in transportation and public facilities.

Domestic news releases related to *Hallyu* generally provided the public with information concerning cultural activities and the government’s support for Korean artists and cultural products. For example, one item titled “Culture of Korea's Global Diffusion Strategy” discussed the government’s goal of establishing domestic and overseas bases for the international expansion of Korean culture and for cooperation between related organizations. Other typical domestic releases highlighted the international recognition of an individual Korean artist or informed Korean readers about the growth of *Hallyu* infrastructure. One such release, “The Largest Video Production Infrastructure Facility in Korea,” described the nation’s largest film studio complex with state-of-the-art equipment.<sup>40</sup>

In order to investigate whether KMCST domestic news releases played a primary or secondary role in the success of *Hallyu*, this study examined *Hallyu*-related releases from 2007 to 2017. As shown in Table 1, the KMCST increased the number of *Hallyu*-related news releases beginning in 2012. Prior to 2012, the annual number of the news releases ranged from 23 to 48; this increased to 143 in 2012, likely reflecting the enormous popularity of Psy’s “Gangnam Style. The dramatic increase in the number of *Hallyu*-related domestic news releases supports this article’s hypothesis that the KMCST played a supporting role, rather than a leading role, in the promotion of *Hallyu*.

**Table 1: Number of KMCST News Releases Related to the Korean Wave (2007 to 2017)**

Year	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
News Releases	48	26	23	36	103	143*	107	63	104	137**	56

\* = the year in which the cultural phenomenon occurred due to the success of Korean artist Psy.

\*\* = the year in which the cultural phenomenon occurred due to the success of Korean group BTS.

To further examine the impact of KMCST news releases on *Hallyu*, a T-Test was performed to evaluate whether any statistically significant changes occurred in the number of the KMCST news releases before and after Psy’s 2012 breakthrough. The results showed a statistically

significant difference in means. As shown in Table 2, the mean of the KMCST official news releases from 2007 to 2011 was 53.25. The mean from 2013 to 2017 was 81.67, revealing a statistically significant difference of 28.42 at  $p < .05$ . This finding indicates that the KMCST produced significantly more news releases related to *Hallyu* immediately after Psy's initial success in 2012.

**Table 2: T-Test Results Comparing the Means of KMCST News Releases Related to the Korean Wave before and after 2012**

	2007 to 2011			2013 to 2017			Diff	Pooled SD <i>s.e.</i>	Test Statistics <i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>P</i>
	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>					
News Releases	4	53.25	17.18	6	81.67	16.98	28.42	17.06 (11.06)	2.58**	8	.03

*M* = Mean, *SD* = Standard Deviation, Pooled *SD* = Pooled Standard Deviation. *s.e.* = Standard error. \*\*  $P < .05$ .

Additional analyses were performed to provide further evidence of KMCST's supporting role in domestic news releases. The statistically significant results of the simple linear regression analysis showed that the KMCST was likely to increase its emphasis of *Hallyu* in news releases year by year (see Appendix 1). Furthermore, the results of the multiple regression analysis of the number of the KMCST domestic news releases related to *Hallyu* from 2007 to 2017 indicated that the number of such releases statistically and significantly increased only in 2012 (see Appendix 2).

Separately, a correlation analysis was performed to investigate whether the KMCST's *Hallyu*-related domestic news releases or *Hallyu* itself statistically influenced the economic growth of such industries as television, music, film, and tourism. The aforementioned 2016 KOTRA Annual Report was used as the basis for this analysis. It should be noted that, despite the mixed results reported for these years, considerable economic growth occurred in certain culture-related industries, such as the gaming and automotive industries in 2011 to 12 and the television broadcast, music, gaming, food, and cosmetics industries in 2014 to 15. More specifically, as shown in Table 3, some culture-related industries, especially the television broadcast and music industries, experienced a marked increase in their profits in 2013, which could be attributed to Psy's 2012 success.

**Table 3: Economic Impact of Korean Wave on Culture-related Industries (U.S. \$ in Billions)**

Industry	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Television	4.50	4.82	6.19	6.35	8.34
Music	3.65	4.44	5.10	4.23	6.72
Film Industry	.34	.44	.79	.77	1.74
Animation/Character	4.32	4.57	4.67	5.29	6.23
Gaming	19.30	21.78	21.78	22.48	27.19
Publishing	1.917	1.627	2.068	1.648	1.478
TOTAL	34.03	38.30	40.98	42.13	51.70
Food	17.09	18.78	18.09	18.98	20.88
Cosmetics	3.36	4.03	5.64	8.42	14.36
Clothing	5.88	6.34	6.81	6.90	6.98
Accessories	1.11	1.55	1.18	1.19	1.19
Kitchenware	10.75	11.30	12.56	12.06	11.25
Cellphone	8.191	7.93	8.38	7.67	6.92
Automotive	11.93	23.40	23.87	23.21	22.67
Tourism	18.88	19.05	20.99	22.36	20.18
TOTAL	77.19	92.30	97.34	100.79	104.43

**Source: KOTRA Annual Report (2016)**

Table 4 shows the economic impact of the Korean Wave as measured by the number of jobs created in the culture-related industries. The biggest increases occurred in the gaming, food, and tourism industries.

**Table 4: Impact of Korean Wave on Job Creation in South Korea  
(Number of New Jobs)**

Industry	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Television	2,761	2,953	3,797	3,890	4,775
Music	4,961	6,047	6,932	6,262	8,530
Film Industry	327	423	756	739	1,557
Animation/Character	4,141	4,696	4778	5,058	5,573
Gaming	20,876	24,504	24,405	24,830	27,450
Publishing	1,644	1,395	1,774	1,414	1,383
TOTAL	34,710	39,006	41,129	41,412	49,068
Food	15,744	16,539	16,004	16,758	18,131
Cosmetics	1,601	1,919	2,683	4,201	6,526
Clothing	4,113	4,251	4,252	4,235	4,309
Accessories	814	1,110	828	822	806
Kitchenware	4,076	4,277	4,757	4,498	4,181
Cellphone	2,656	2,741	3,060	2,874	2,806
Automotive	4,122	7,928	8,052	7,585	7,290
Tourism	21,976	20,875	22,637	23,673	20,987
TOTAL	55,102	58,430	60,947	62,825	63,638

**Source: KOTRA Annual Report (2016)**

The results of the correlation analysis on economic growth using the KOTRA data (Tables 3 and 4) are shown in Appendix 1. As indicated, a statistically significant correlation was found between the impact of the success of *Hallyu* and the annual economic growth in many industries, including television, film, animation/character, gaming, food, cosmetics, kitchenware, automotive, and tourism. The highest correlation coefficient (.956,  $p < .05$ ) was found for the television industry. The second highest correlation coefficient (.937\*,  $p < .05$ ) was found for the animation/character industry. However, no statistically significant relationships were found between the KMCST news releases and the annual economic growth of any of the industries.

The results of the correlation analysis for job creation are shown in Appendix 2. As indicated, a statistically significant correlation was found between the impact of the success of *Hallyu* and job creation in many industries, including television, film, animation/character, gaming, food, cosmetics, kitchenware, automotive, and tourism. Interestingly, the highest correlation coefficient (.974,  $p < .01$ ) was found for the

animation/character industry, while the second highest correlation coefficient (.970\*,  $p < .01$ ) was found for the television industry. However, no statistically significant relationships were found between the KMCST news releases and job creation in any of the industries.

### ***International News Releases***

A qualitative analysis of the English, Chinese, and Japanese language KMCST news releases was performed to investigate whether their main focus was related to the three sources of soft power (attractiveness of its culture, political values, and foreign policies) or cultural diplomacy described by Feigenbaum (2001). Articles relevant to *Hallyu* were identified and scanned to confirm the author's assertion about the role of the KMCST international news releases.

This analysis showed the Korean government used the international news releases as a tool to promote *Hallyu* as an important source of cultural diplomacy, with its soft-power resources. The results showed that the international news releases tended to use cultural resources (soft-power) as a sociopolitical influence to advance a positive national image and foster the nation's economic growth through international cooperation and trade in the global markets. Like Nye (2004) and Lee (2009), the author recognizes the influence of the government's use of international news releases on developing and maintaining cultural diplomacy. However, the author's hypothesis is more in line with Lee's idea that *Hallyu* is only one of Korea's many soft sources of cultural diplomacy, which is in stark contrast to Nye's idea that *Hallyu* is the primary source of Korea's soft power. Further, as the author hypothesizes, *Hallyu* is promoted by the Korean government through the KMCST international releases, but the government's role is secondary to that of Korea's artists and cultural products that drive *Hallyu*.

Some international news items aimed to introduce and promote artists' overseas performances. For example, "Korean music captivates crowds in Paris," described the Korea-France Friendship Concert held in Paris on October 14, 2018 attended by President Moon Jae-in and First Lady Kim Jung-sook. Performers included a K-pop boy band BTS and the Franco-Korean fusion group Moon Gogo. Another news release, "Artists showcase Korean art overseas," reported the 2018 Traveling Korean Arts program, for which the KMCST and the Korean Foundation for International Cultural Exchange selected 11 artist groups to present their art to audiences in 18 countries, including Hungary, the U.K., Egypt, South

Africa, and Brazil. This type of news release could lead to cultural cooperation and collaboration between Korea and other countries, as well as having an important influence on the economic growth of culture-related industries in Korea such as music and tourism.<sup>41</sup>

International news releases were also aimed to promote Korea's positive national image and foster transcultural understanding. A release titled "Korean, Chinese cultural figures gather at joint forum" reported on the Korea-China Cultural Exchange Forum held in China on September 13, 2018. Major cultural figures and distinguished scholars from the two countries participated as panelists. One of the panelists, Dr. Lee Kwangho, a professor at Yonsei University, was quoted as saying, "Admitting each other's uniqueness, within the same cultural sphere, is an essential task that is needed for people in both Korea and China." Such news reveals the Korean government's efforts to use *Hallyu's* soft power as a cultural diplomacy strategy.

Introducing Korean culture-related industries to other countries is also a common topic of the KMCST international news releases. For example, one news release, "Korean Food – Banchan," was written in response to a question raised by a Nigerian about Korean food: "Korean food looks delicious. Please teach me how to make any Korean dish." The release describes Korean food, focusing specifically on *banchan* [Korean side dishes]. This type of news release is expected to promote not only Korean food, but the tourism industry as well.

Diplomacy and cooperation between Korea and other nations was found to be a common theme of KMCST international news releases. For instance, the item "Korea, UK top diplomats hold strategic dialogue" described the Korea-U.K. foreign ministerial strategic dialogue in London on July 18, 2018. In the dialogue, Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha and the U.K.'s Foreign Secretary, Jeremy Hunt, discussed the ongoing political situation on the Korean Peninsula, along with their economic relationship and cooperation. This dialogue, reported in the KMCST news release, was a serious effort by the Korean government to use *Hallyu* to promote bilateral friendship and cooperation on trade and investment. This cooperation opens the door to further cultural exchange, showcasing popular Korean artists and cultural products.

## **Conclusion and Recommendations**

This study examined the South Korean government's role in the success of the Korean Wave by examining *Hallyu*-related official news

releases issued by the KMCST from 2007 to 2017. The results indicate that domestic news releases had a supporting role in the success of artists and cultural products in South Korea; they didn't directly contribute to Korean industrial economic growth. In contrast, the international news releases played a leading role in promoting Korea's positive image; they contributed to Korea's industrial economic growth by means of cultural diplomacy and soft power.

Based on the findings of this study, there are a few areas in which the government can further its support of *Hallyu*. The results of the KMCST's activities indicate that the government should consider more concrete ways of assistance to enhance *Hallyu*'s economic impact on cultural industries. For example, it can build larger and state-of-the-art performance facilities, to include arenas and concert halls, to enable Korean artists to perform for larger audiences. Prominent artists such as BTS, which has a world-wide fandom, regularly perform in large arenas or stadiums during their international tours. Surprisingly, despite being the capital of *Hallyu*, Seoul is one of the few cities of its size that lacks such an arena. This shortcoming was noted out by Jeung Chi-young, who participated in a forum on *Hallyu* held by the Knowledge Cooperative Good Governance on July 18, 2018. As Director of the Live Performance Department of YG Entertainment, one of the largest entertainment companies in South Korea, Jeung stated that the most valuable form of support that the government can provide for the Korean Wave would be constructing a large arena in Korea.<sup>42</sup>

By riding the Korean Wave, the government can also strengthen international cooperation and trade. With more effective and influential news releases by the KMCST, the government can also increase the positive impact of *Hallyu* on Korea's branding. To this end, full-scale research on the KMCST's foreign language news releases may be able to offer insight into the diverse ramifications of the international popularity of Korean artists and related products.

This study has further implications for future research on *Hallyu*. For instance, Kim and Jin's (2016) study of the presidential speeches can be expanded to specific aspects of the policies that the liberal and conservative administrations established and implemented in relation to *Hallyu*. The differences between the two political camps can be discussed in depth from an ideological point of view.

Researchers can also explore differences in the impact of specific artists and cultural products. For example, a comparative analysis of Psy's

and BTS's achievements can further an understanding of the evolution of the *Hallyu* phenomenon and the unique strengths of individual artists. Also, well-designed research on popular cultural products can help measure their long- and short-term influence on the future directions of culture-related industries themselves in Korea.

## Appendix 1 - Correlation Analysis: Korean Wave and the KMCST News Releases Impacts on Industrial Economic Growth, 2011 to 2015

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1																	
2	-.435																
3	.956*	-.337															
4	.796	.087	.905*														
5	.894*	-.197	.979**	.949*													
6	.937*	-.334	.951*	.839	.953*												
7	.903*	-.079	.938*	.938*	.963**	.959**											
8	-.567	.006	-.491	-.460	-.547	-.723	-.707										
9	.948*	-.195	.980**	.936*	.980**	.966**	.987*	-.618									
10	.883*	-.055	.870	.862	.893*	.940*	.979*	-.819	.948								
11	.933*	-.345	.969**	.861	.972**	.995**	.954*	-.660	.971**	.916							
12	.942	-.402	.860*	.860*	.709	.755*	.768*	.771	-.353	.840*	.748						
13	-.180	-.704	-.302	-.302	-.062	-.254	-.189	-.001	-.363	-.118	.149	-.103					
14	.388*	-.332	.264	.264	.129*	.091**	.045*	.071*	.360	.188	.035*	.667*	-.086				
15	-.780	.187	-.791*	-.791*	-.724	-.842*	-.938	-.897	.893	-.854*	-.923	-.541	.017	.262*			
16	.661*	.036	.514**	.514**	.517*	.424	.442*	.562*	-.324	.578**	.610*	.822*	.441	.694**	-.287*		
17	.648*	-.794	.475*	.475*	.130	.288*	.392	.260*	-.029	.380*	.260	.769*	-.331	.782*	-.149	.551*	
18	.938*	-.264	.843*	.843*	.741*	.761**	.794**	.828*	-.499	.865*	.835*	.978*	.082	.574*	-.620*	.880**	.671*

*Note.* \*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .001$ . 1 = Year, 2 = KMCST News Releases related to the Korean Wave, 3 = Television Broadcast Industry, 4 = Music Industry, 5 = Film Industry, 6 = Animation/Character Industry, 7 = Gaming Industry, 8 = Publishing Industry, and 9 = Total (industries 3-8). 10 = Food Industry, 11 = Cosmetics Industry, 12 = Clothing Industry, 13 = Accessories Industry, 14 = Kitchenware Industry, 15 = Cellphone Industry, 16 = Automotive Industry, 17 = Tourism Industry, and 18 = Total (industries 10-17).

## Appendix 2 - Correlation Analysis: Korean Wave and the KMCST News Releases Impacts on Job Creation, 2011 to 2015

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1																	
2	-.453																
3	.970**	-.389															
4	.883*	-.034	.934*														
5	.907*	-.216	.964**	.958*													
6	.974**	-.236	.938*	.924*	.918*												
7	.910*	-.038	.871	.930*	.864	.974**											
8	-.449	.005	-.288	-.298	-.349	-.561	-.550										
9	.944*	-.149	.958*	.980**	.972**	.977**	.957*	-.446									
10	.850	-.093	.824	.848	.895*	.924*	.890	-.724	.920								
11	.949*	-.397	.952*	.873	.959**	.940*	.848*	-.512	.942*	.928							
12	.823	.097	.782**	.891*	.761*	.901**	.973	-.448	.887**	.772*	.710*						
13	-.367	.738	-.487	-.233	-.420	-.184	.005	-.364	-.245	-.099	-.436	.140					
14	-.250**	-.241	.227	.175*	.007**	.149*	.199**	.446	.109	-.238*	-.045**	.341**	-.111				
15	.448*	-.254	.472*	.433	.285*	.350*	.385*	.430	.353*	-.021	.194*	.496*	-.272	.952*			
16	.580*	.099	.479**	.571*	.363	.629*	.744*	-.266	.557**	.382*	.335	.859*	.342	.667**	.679*		
17	.111**	-.832	.043*	-.266*	-.201*	-.098	-.219**	.314	-.205*	-.363*	-.060*	-.233**	-.507	.600*	.487*	.050*	
18	.976*	-.429	.921	.837*	.815	.942**	.903*	-.394	.889	.751*	.857	.857*	-.283	.433	.587*	.719	.215*

*Note.* \*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .001$ . 1 = Year, 2 = KMCST News Releases related to the Korean Wave, 3 = Television Broadcast Industry, 4 = Music Industry, 5 = Film Industry, 6 = Animation/Character Industry, 7 = Gaming Industry, 8 = Publishing Industry, and 9 = Total (industries 3-8). 10 = Food Industry, 11 = Cosmetics Industry, 12 = Clothing Industry, 13 = Accessories Industry, 14 = Kitchenware Industry, 15 = Cellphone Industry, 16 = Automotive Industry, 17 = Tourism Industry, and 18 = Total (industries 10-17).

**Appendix 3 – Results of Simple Regression Analysis: KMCST News Releases Related to the Korean Wave from 2007 to 2017**

Model Variables	B	B	<i>s.e.</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>p</i>
Predictor variables (constant)	-14281.455*		7384.230	-1.934	.085
Year from 2007 to 2017	7.136*	.544	3.670	1.944	.084
<i>df</i>					10
<i>F</i>				3.781*	
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>				.296	
Adjusted <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>				.218	

\*  $p < .1$ , \*\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

Note. *s.e.* = Standard error. B = Unstandardized Coefficients.  $\beta$  = Standardized Coefficients.

**Appendix 4 – Results of Multiple Regression Analysis: KMCST News Releases Related to the Korean Wave (2007 to 2011), (2012), and (2013 to 2017)**

Variables	B	$\beta$	$R^2$ (Adjusted $R^2$ )	$R^2$ change
Year (2007 to 2011)	12.00	.580	.337 (.116)	-
Year (Including 2012)	54.47**	.654	.427 (.364)	+ .090
Year (2013 to 2017)	30.23	.363	.132 (.035)	- .295

\*  $p < .1$ , \*\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

Note. *s.e.* = Standard error. B = Unstandardized Coefficients.  $\beta$  = Standardized Coefficients.

## Notes:

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