

The United Nations Command and the Sending States

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Abstract

The United Nations Command is the oldest and most distinguished of the four theater-level commands in the Republic of Korea. Authorized by the nascent United Nations Security Council, established by the United States Government, and initially commanded by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, the United Nations Command had over 930,000 servicemen and women at the time the Armistice Agreement was signed. Sixteen UN member states sent combat forces and five provided humanitarian assistance to support the Republic of Korea in repelling North Korea's attack. Over time, other commands and organizations assumed responsibilities from the United Nations Command, to include the defense of the Republic of Korea. The North Korean government has frequently demanded the command's dissolution, and many within the United Nations question whether the command is a relic of the Cold War. This paper examines the United Nations Command, reviewing the establishment of the command and its subordinate organizations. The next section describes the changes that occurred as a result of the establishment of the Combined Forces Command in 1978, as well as the implications of removing South Korean troops from the United Nations Command's operational control in 1994. The paper concludes with an overview of recent efforts to revitalize the United Nations Command, with a focus on the command's relationship with the Sending States.

Keywords: United States, Republic of Korea, United Nations, Security Council, Sending States, United Nations Command, Military Armistice Commission, United Nations Command-Rear, U.S. Forces Korea, Combined Forces Command, Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff, Canadian Forces Initiative, revitalization

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States Army, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

Introduction

Crossing the border between South and North Korea on Christmas Eve in 1993, United Nations (UN) Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali remarked that he didn't authorize flying the UN Flag at Panmunjom.¹ In a letter to the North Korean Foreign Minister six months later, the Secretary General further distanced his organization from the command bearing its name, noting that UN Security Council Resolution 84 "did not establish the unified command as a subsidiary organ under its control, but merely recommended the creation of a command, specifying that it be under the authority of the United States."²

The Secretary General's comments highlighted the many misunderstandings about the United Nations Command (UNC). Of the four theater-level commands in the Republic of Korea (ROK)—U.S. Forces Korea, the Combined (ROK-U.S.) Forces Command, the UNC, and the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff—none has the legacy of the UNC. Established during the darkest hours of the Korean War, the UNC had over 930,000 troops from 17 nations at the time the Armistice Agreement was signed.³ Over time, the UNC's mission and structure changed, particularly following the establishment of the CFC. However, there has been a renewed interest in the UNC due to recent North Korean provocations.

This paper examines the UNC, reviewing the establishment of the command and its subordinate organizations. The next section describes the changes to the UNC resulting from the establishment of the CFC in 1978, as well as the implications of removing South Korean troops from the UNC's operational control in 1978. The paper concludes with an overview of recent efforts to revitalize the UNC, with a focus on the command's relationship with the Sending States.

Origins of the United Nations Command

Following North Korea's surprise invasion of the South, the UN Security Council adopted a series of resolutions that led to the establishment of the UNC. Security Council Resolution 82 determined a breach of peace occurred, called for a cessation of hostilities, and branded the North as the aggressor. Security Council Resolution 83 called on UN member states to "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."⁴ While Washington and its allies pursued passage of Security Council Resolution 83, the U.S. dispatched air and naval forces to support the ROK. Other UN member states joined the U.S.

following the passage of Security Council Resolution 83, with the United Kingdom and Australia offering forces to the U.S. on June 28 and July 2, respectively.⁵

Despite these commitments, the situation in South Korea was grave. The government fled the capital following the ROK Army's collapse. On July 3, the UN Secretary General proposed that UN member states place their forces under a unified command to synchronize and control UN support.⁶ At that time, several UN member states' air and naval forces operated under the control of the American-led Far East Command (FECOM). On July 7, 1950, the Security Council adopted Resolution 84, requesting a unified command under American leadership. The key paragraphs of the resolution are listed below:

Recommends that all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States of America;

Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces;

Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating;

Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command.⁷

The U.S. Government rapidly accepted the responsibility to lead the UN's first collective security mission. President Harry Truman appointed General of the Army Douglas MacArthur commander of the unified command on July 8.⁸ In addition to serving as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), the military government for occupied Japan, General MacArthur was the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) FECOM. In June 1950, FECOM consisted of the General Headquarters (GHQ) staff, the Military Government of the Ryukyu Islands, a geographical component (Philippines) and Army, Naval, and Air Force components.


UN member states initially committed forces through the U.S. Government to FECOM. After Security Council Resolution 84 was adopted, member states continued to commit forces to the U.S. Government, which placed them under a unified command it was creating. FECOM continued to prosecute the war, as well as integrate UN member state forces.

The largest contribution to the UNC came from a country that wasn't a UN member. In a letter dated July 14, 1950, President Syngman Rhee notified General MacArthur that he was transferring operational command of the ROK Armed Forces to the American commander.⁹ It is widely recognized that President Rhee—through a combination of an error in translation, lack of familiarity in military affairs, and the pressing nature of the time—intended to transfer “operational control (less operational command)” instead of “operational command.” Regardless, President Rhee formally codified the contents of his July 14 letter in an order to the ROK Army Chief of Staff on July 22, 1950. “Assignment of Command Authority over all Korean Forces to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur” remained in effect throughout the war.¹⁰

General Mac Arthur established the UNC on July 24, 1950.¹¹ The UNC's command lines extended through the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chief's of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense, and culminated with the U.S. President. The Department of the Army was designated as UNC's executive agent. The UNC didn't have a direct communication channel with the UN. Instead, the UNC reported to the Department of the Army or Joint Staff, onward to the Department of Defense, and then to the Department of State, which communicated to the UN via the U.S. Mission to the UN.

General MacArthur leveraged FECOM's force structure to perform the UNC's mission. He appointed the majority of the FECOM staff to similar positions on the UNC staff. Similarly, he appointed two of the three FECOM service component commanders as UNC component commanders. In place of Army Forces Far East (AFFE), FECOM's Army component, General MacArthur designated Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) to serve in this role in Korea.¹² The UNC also included the Japan Logistics Command. Figure 1 depicts the organization of the UNC at the end of August 1950.


Figure 1: United Nations Command, August 31, 1950



Source: Created by the author from multiple sources.

Thus, while the UNC was created to prosecute the conflict on the Korean Peninsula, FECOM did so under a new title. However, the UNC created a Liaison Section on September 16, 1950 for national delegations from UN member states.¹³ This Sending State Liaison Section was later re-designated as the Liaison Group, a title it retains today. Figure 2 depicts the UNC GHQ organization in September 1950:

**Figure 2: General Headquarters, United Nations Command,
September 15, 1950**



**Source: Adapted by the author from UNC General Order 14,
October 11, 1950**

When the UNC was established, GHQ FECOM and SCAP were exclusively American headquarters that represented American interests in the Far East and the occupation of Japan, respectively. The British Commonwealth Occupation Forces served as the headquarters for

Australian, British, Indian and New Zealand military forces occupying Japan.¹⁴ GHQ FECOM was “essentially an Army headquarters, staffed almost entirely by Army personnel, and resembling the structure of General MacArthur’s World War II headquarters.”¹⁵ The official U.S. Army history notes the challenges in differentiating the roles and functions among the three collocated commands and staffs:

“Although these three commands (*UNC, FEC & SCAP*) were organized for different purposes, their operations were all conducted by a single commander-in-chief through a joint headquarters and staff, and the activities of the three commands were so interdependent that they can not logically be separated for historical purposes.”¹⁶

This arrangement continued until SCAP was dissolved in 1952. Two additional changes in 1952-1953 timeframe shaped the composition of UNC/FECOM. First, the UNC staff lost its distinctly American character when the United Kingdom assigned a general officer as the deputy chief of staff for operations in the summer of 1952.¹⁷ In January 1953, the UNC/FECOM headquarters was reorganized to include navy and air force officers. However, the U.S. Army filled the majority of positions on the UNC/FECOM staff.¹⁸ The UNC/FECOM co-command continued until FECOM was disestablished in 1957.

Seventeen countries provided combat forces to the UNC and five nations provided non-combat forces. Of these 22 nations, 20 are considered Sending States. Neither the ROK nor the U.S. are considered Sending States: the former received forces and latter established the unified command.¹⁹ Table 1 lists the UNC combat force troop strength at the time of the Armistice Agreement.

Table 1: UNC Troop Strength by County – July 27, 1953

Country	Troop Strength
Republic of Korea	590,911
United States	302,483
United Kingdom	14,198
Canada	6,146
Turkey	5,453
Australia	2,282
Philippines	1,496
New Zealand	1,385
Ethiopia	1,271
Greece	1,263
Thailand	1,204
France	1,119
Columbia	1,068
Belgium	900
South Africa	826
The Netherlands	819
Luxembourg	44

Source: U.S. Forces Korea

Additionally, Denmark, India, Italy, Norway and Sweden contributed humanitarian aid in the form of medical assistance. Denmark provided a hospital ship, India dispatched a Field Ambulance and Surgical Unit, and Norway sent a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital. All three countries were UN member states and flew the UN flag throughout their service in Korea. Italy and Sweden operated hospitals under the auspices of their national Red Cross societies. Each of the countries that contributed combat troops or humanitarian aid maintained a representative within the UNC Liaison Group, with the exception of India, Sweden and the ROK.

The UNC later selected Sweden and Switzerland to represent the command in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC). The KPA and CPV recommended Poland and Czechoslovakia as its sponsored members. The NNSC was established to conduct the reciprocal supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation functions stipulated in the Armistice Agreement.²⁰

Sixty-six days after the Armistice Agreement was implemented, Washington and Seoul concluded a Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). The ROK National Assembly and the U.S. Senate ratified the MDT on January 15 and 26, 1954, respectively.²¹ The MDT serves as the foundation for the bilateral security relationship and provides the ROK Government the legal justification for stationing of American forces in Korea.

Although both countries ratified the MDT in January 1954, it did not enter into force until November 17, 1954 due to concerns raised within the U.S. Senate during the ratification debate. Following ratification, an exchange of notes occurred to clarify Article III. A July 1954 summit led both parties to conclude the “Agreed Minutes Relating to Continued Cooperation in Economic and Military Matters” on November 17, 1954. The Agreed Minutes not only clarified key articles of the MDT, but also codified the UNC’s operational control of the ROK Armed Forces.

Military Armistice Commission

The Armistice Agreement established a MAC to “supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.”²² The Armistice Agreement defined the composition of the MAC as

. . . composed of ten (10) senior officers, five of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and five (5) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Of the ten members, three (3) from each side shall be of general or flag rank. The two (2) remaining members on each side may be major generals, brigadier generals, colonels, or their equivalents.²³

The U.S. and North Korea appointed senior members to lead their respective sides. The United Kingdom posted a brigadier general to the ROK, who led its UNC Liaison Group in addition to serving as the Commonwealth representative to the MAC. The UNC rotated senior members from the UNC Liaison Group every six months to serve on the MAC. China appointed a major general to the MAC. However, his influence declined following the withdrawal of CPV forces from North

Korea in 1958. Internal politics and periodic disputes between Beijing and Pyongyang led to frequent CPV absences from MAC meetings, the longest being from 1966-1971.²⁴

In addition to MAC members using personal staff assistants, a Secretariat supported the Commission. Each side posted a colonel to serve as its Secretary. Each Secretary assisted their MAC delegation in “record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it.”²⁵ Secretariat meetings were routinely held to set the agenda for MAC meetings and handle day-to-day business. Figure 3 depicts the composition of the MAC from 1953 to 1991:

Figure 3: Military Armistice Commission, 1953-1991

United Nations Command	Korean People’s Army / Chinese People’s Volunteers
Major General, U.S. Senior Member	Lieutenant General*, DPRK Senior Member
Major General, ROK Member	Lieutenant General*, DPRK Member
Brigadier General, ROK Member	Lieutenant General*, CPV Member
Brigadier General, U.K. Member	Senior Colonel*, DPRK Member
Colonel, UNC Sending State Member	Senior Colonel*, DPRK Member

* The KPA and CPV Officer rank titles differ from those held by the UNC-affiliated nations. However, they are equivalent grades.

Source: Created by the author from multiple sources.

The equally divided MAC had no means of arbitration or methods to break deadlocks other than through negotiation, an always difficult process. Nonetheless, the MAC and its staff elements often dealt successfully with difficult and highly sensitive issues while maintaining a valuable channel of communication between the parties where no other official government-to-government dialogue conduits existed.

United Nations Command – Rear

At the time General MacArthur established GHQ UNC in Tokyo, he leveraged his authority as SCAP to use Allied bases within occupied Japan to support the UNC's operations in and around Korea. General MacArthur's successor, General Matthew B. Ridgway, continued this practice.

Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida and Secretary of State Dean Acheson addressed the UNC's continued use of the bases in Japan in an Exchange of Notes at the signing of the Treaty of San Francisco on September 8, 1951. In the Notes, Japan agreed to permit the continued use of facilities supporting forces engaged in UN action in the Far East. When the Treaty of San Francisco came into force on April 28, 1952, Japan regained its sovereignty and SCAP was dissolved. GHQ-UNC continued to operate from UN-designated bases in Japan to support the UN actions authorized by UN Security Council Resolutions 83 and 84.

The Notes were the basis for the "Agreement regarding the Status of United Nations Forces in Japan" more commonly referred to as the UN-GOJ SOFA. Representatives of the Government of Japan, the Government of the U.S. acting on behalf of the Unified Command, and Governments of the States sending forces to Korea pursuant to the United Nations Resolutions signed the Agreement in Tokyo on February 19, 1954. The Agreement defined a 'Sending State' as "any State which has sent or may hereafter send forces to Korea pursuant to the United Nations Resolutions and whose Government is a Party to this Agreement as the Government of a State sending forces to Korea pursuant to United Nations Resolutions." The United Kingdom, South Africa, Australia, the Philippines, France, Italy, Canada, New Zealand, and Thailand signed the Agreement.²⁶

The UNC-GOJ SOFA permitted vessels and aircraft operated by UN forces—defined as the "land, sea or air armed services of the Sending States"—to access designated ports and airports in Japan.²⁷ The UNC-GOJ SOFA established a two-member Joint Board, one representing the GOJ and one representing the other parties. The Joint Board determined which facilities UN forces could use, including those used by American forces under the U.S.-Japan Security.²⁸ The UN-GOJ SOFA not only provides the signatories base access, but serves as the legal basis for their armed forces to operate in and through Japan. The SOFA specifies the privileges and immunities the GOJ grants to those service members while in Japan.²⁹

When UNC HQ moved to Korea in 1957, the GOJ agreed that it would continue to support the UN-GOJ SOFA if UNC complied with the following:

- 1) The UNC must maintain a presence in Japan
- 2) UNC Rear must be multinational
- 3) The U.S. and Japan must mutually designate U.S. bases for co-use by UNC Sending States
- 4) The designated UN bases must fly the UN flag
- 5) UNC must exercise the use of those bases by UN-GOJ SOFA signatories³⁰

At the time, the Joint Board designated five bases for UNC use: Yokosuka Naval Base; Sasebo Naval Base; Tachikawa Air Base, Fuchu Air Station, and Camp Zama. A small headquarters element was established at Camp Zama to serve as caretaker of the UN bases. The headquarters was later designated UNC-Rear.³¹

Sending State Disinterest

By the end of 1956, the majority of the Sending States had withdrawn their combat forces from the Korean Peninsula. The United Kingdom was one of the last countries to maintain a sizable contingent of combat forces, keeping a battalion battle group in the ROK until in 1957.³² Thereafter, four Sending States kept company-sized units in Korea. Turkey, Ethiopia and France withdrew their units in the 1960s followed by Thailand in 1971.³³

Sending State interest in the UNC waned following the withdrawal of combat forces. Although they maintained resident ambassadors and small liaison delegations to demonstrate their commitment to the command, some Sending States concluded their interests were no longer served by remaining active in a military command whose primary mission ended with the signing of the Armistice Agreement. Beginning in the 1960s, many of the original Sending States began to withdraw their liaison delegations, ceasing active participation in the UNC. By January 1975, only six Sending States—Australia, Canada, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom—retained accredited liaison groups in Korea.

The last Sending State military forces were withdrawn from Japan in 1976 when Thailand's aviation detachment left the country. When the

aircraft departed, only a caretaker headquarters remained at UNC-Rear.³⁴ Eight Sending States—Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom—retained accredited liaison groups in Japan through the UNC Rear.³⁵ The low-point in Sending State involvement occurred in 1978, when Turkey withdrew its Liaison from the UNC HQ and France withdrew its liaison from UNC-Rear.³⁶

In the UN General Assembly, the rise of the post-colonial, non-aligned movement led countries to pressure the U.S. to disestablish the UNC. In 1975, Washington even proposed to the KPA and CPV, through the UN Security Council, to transfer the UNC's Armistice responsibilities to the U.S. and ROK as "successors in command." The KPA refused the American proposal.³⁷

Changes to the U.S. Command Structure in Korea

Over the next four decades, changes to the American and South Korean security relationship, particularly the command structure on the Korean Peninsula, would significantly influence UNC missions, roles, structure, and manning. The establishment of USFK and relocation of the UNC to South Korea increased the command's influence with the ROK Government. The bilateral CFC significantly changed the UNC's mission on the Korean Peninsula. This has led many to question whether the UNC is still necessary.

Reorganization of the Far East and the Establishment of U.S. Forces Korea

In 1957, American defense planners realigned military forces across the globe, establishing functional, regional and sub-regional commands.³⁸ The U.S. Pacific Command assumed FECOM's responsibilities. HQ FECOM was disestablished. Two subordinate unified commands were created within USPACOM, USFK and U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ). HQ UNC moved from Tokyo to Seoul, completing a fundamental realignment within the Indo-Pacific region.³⁹

HQ UNC acted as the operational theater headquarters for American, South Korean and Sending State forces on the Korean Peninsula; the command also enforced friendly force compliance to the terms of the Armistice Agreement. USFK focused on administrative and logistical issues to support to American forces.⁴⁰ While legally distinct commands,

the UNC and USFK headquarters were collocated, shared much of the same staff, and operated under the command of a four-star Army general.

Establishment of ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command

Beginning in the latter half of the 1960s, the U.S. and ROK Governments embarked on a series of independent yet ultimately iterative efforts that fundamentally reshaped the bilateral security relationship. The two allies' efforts ranged from combined planning forums such as the ROK / U.S. Operational Planning Staff and the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), a senior consultative body co-chaired by the American Secretary of Defense and the South Korean Minister of National Defense. By 1968, the ROK JCS assumed responsibility for the counter-infiltration mission. In 1975, the ROK JCS's mobilization exercise (Ulchi) was merged with the UNC's command post exercise (Focus Lens).⁴¹ Commanders experimented with combined units and staffs, including the I Corps (ROK/U.S.) Group, as well as developing a Combined Battle Staff test concept as part of the newly merged Ulchi Focus Lens exercises.⁴²

At the 10th Security Consultative Meeting, the U.S. and ROK agreed to formally establish a Military Committee to address security and military relationship issues between the two allies.⁴³ On July 27, 1978, the American and South Korean civilian defense leaders signed the *Terms of Reference for the Military Committee and ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command*. The *Terms of Reference* directed the establishment of a combined military headquarters and provided guidance to the Military Committee and the to-be-formed combined command. The next day, the Military Committee met for the first time and issued Strategic Directive Number 1, tasking the CFC commander with the defense of the ROK and providing him standing orders and guidance.⁴⁴

CFC was established on November 7, 1978, assuming responsibility for the defense of the ROK from the UNC.⁴⁵ The ROK Government paralleled this action by transferring operational control of South Korean forces to the CFC.⁴⁶ While these Korean forces moved from UNC to CFC control, American forces did not follow. Instead, U.S. forces forward stationed in the ROK were placed under varying degrees of control under USFK.⁴⁷

The CINC UNC, who also commanded USFK and EUSA, was appointed CINC CFC and CFC's ground component commander. About two-thirds of the UNC designated staff, which also functioned as the USFK and EUSA staff, was reassigned to the CFC as the U.S. contribution

to the combined staff. The remaining Americans largely focused on USFK and EUSA matters.⁴⁸ Despite the lack of a dedicated staff, CINC UNC maintained separate subordinate commands and organizations to fulfill his UNC duties. These included the UNC MAC Delegation, UNC MAC Secretariat, the Sending State Liaison Group, the UNC Rear Headquarters, the UNC Honor Guard, and the Joint Security Area forces vicinity Panmunjom. Additionally, the UNC would continue to lead the response to North Korean aggression under certain situations that required concurrence from the U.S. and the ROK Governments. At such times, the UNC would be temporarily granted an operational, supported command role, to include operational control over additional, select forces.

Although there was no formal UNC staff, senior military leaders recognized the need to ensure that UNC's interests were addressed within the CFC staff.⁴⁹ Shortly after the establishment of CFC, nine members of the CFC staff were selected to advise CINC UNC on UNC issues. The original post-1978 staff cadre included three ROK officers: the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, and the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans.⁵⁰ These nine officers weren't assigned to specific "U-staff" positions, but were considered a pool of experts. They were authorized to use the CFC staff to assist the CINC UNC in fulfilling his Armistice and unified command duties.

As envisioned, the UNC's Armistice affairs would be synchronized with CFC plans and operations. In practice, there was little interest by the staff in the UNC after CFC was established. For the most part, UNC "work" was assigned to the UNC MAC's supporting Secretariat, with appointed UNC headquarters staff members focused almost exclusively on their CFC duties.⁵¹

Successive UNC Commanders recognized the UNC mission and functions lacked focus and resources. In February 1979, the 1978 staff appointment letter that created the pool of experts assigned the Judge Advocate, Special Advisor, Executive Officers, and Aide-de-Camp to the UNC Staff; all personnel had been working for CINC UNC and CFC in his role as the SUSMOAK.⁵² The 1987 UNC staff appointment letter revision added one officer to the UNC staff and formally codified the 1979 addition of the SUSMOAK's personal staff.⁵³ The 1992 UNC staff appointment letter revision, for the first time, added officers whose primary duties were with the USFK staff - the USFK Deputy Commander and the USFK Deputy Chief of Staff.⁵⁴

In 1999, General John H. Tilelli, Jr. appointed officers from the CFC and USFK staffs to specific positions within the UNC Staff to perform specific staff functions; e.g., U-1 (Personnel), U-2, (Intelligence), U-3 (Operations), etc. This change increased the UNC's staff to 27 appointed officers.⁵⁵ In 2004, UNC Commander⁵⁶ General Leon J. LaPorte increased the size of the UNC staff by assigning 128 members of the CFC and USFK staffs to additional duties within the UNC Staff. This included 47 ROK military personnel assigned to CFC and two South Korean civil servants working for the U.S. military at CFC and USFK.⁵⁷

The composition of the MAC fundamentally changed in March 1991 when CINCUNC appointed a ROK Army major general as the UNC delegation's senior member. The KPA delegates took offense and refused to attend formal MAC meetings. Although the ten-member MAC never met again after 1991, the two sides continued to hold Secretariat-level meetings. In 1994, the KPA disbanded its component of the MAC and replaced it with the "KPA Mission to Panmunjom", consisting of former KPAMAC personnel who continued to meet with the UNCMAC staff on a routine basis to discuss a variety of issues. Shortly afterwards, the PRC withdrew the CPV component of MAC from Panmunjom, but also continued to meet informally with UNCMAC, utilizing former CPV personnel serving in the Defense Attaché Office at the PRC embassy in Seoul. Despite the self-removal of the five KPA/CPV members of the MAC, the UNC and KPA agreed to establish a separate, senior-level consultative forum to handle Armistice Agreement-related issues in 1998. The UNC-KPA General Officer Talks were similar in form and function to the original MAC. Although there are fewer members, each has a speaking role. Figure 4 depicts the composition of the General Officer Talks:

Figure 4: UNC-KPA General Officer Dialogue, 1998-Present

United Nations Command	Korean People's Army
Major General, U.S. Head of Delegation	Lieutenant General, *DPRK Head of Delegation
Brigadier General, ROK Member	Major General, * DPRK Member
Brigadier General, U.K Member	Senior Colonel*, DPRK Member
Colonel, UNC Sending State Member	Not Filled

* The KPA Officer rank titles differ from those held by the UNC-affiliated nations. However, they are equivalent grades.

Source: Created by the author from multiple sources.⁵⁸

Renewed Sending State Interest and UNC Revitalization

Sending State interest in UNC matters has grown appreciably since the late 1990s. Concurrent with the expansion of its headquarters staff in 2004, the UNC opened 16 positions within the UNC MAC Secretariat for Sending States, as well as the ROK. By 2006, four Sending States were supporting the UNC MAC Secretariat.⁵⁹ The ROK Ministry of National Defense approved arrangements to staff the UNC MAC Secretariat, but appointed officers already serving on the CFC Staff to additional duties with the secretariat.⁶⁰

While the 2004 efforts to bolster UNC were viewed positively, the absence of Sending State personnel within the core staff was viewed as a major shortcoming. In 2010, Australia posted a senior field grade officer to command the UNC Rear in Japan, the first instance of a Sending State officer posted to a command position within UNC Rear since its founding in 1957.⁶¹ Additionally, the Canadian Armed Forces assigned three officers to the UNC Headquarters staff and one officer into the UNC Rear Headquarters detachment in a 2011 pilot program known as the Canadian Force Initiative (CFI).⁶² The CFI was the first time that Sending State

personnel served on the UNC Staff since the United Kingdom's departure in 1956.

Based on the success of the CFI, Australia and the United Kingdom assigned officers to the UNC Headquarters staff.⁶³

Regardless, the UNC's "work" remained limited in scope. UNC Headquarters staff appointed from the CFC's rolls tended to focus on their CFC duties and were often described by those serving in the command at the time as having little interest in UNC issues. For the most part, the UNC MAC Secretariat continued to play an outsized role in UNC affairs. The UNC Headquarters staff periodically became energized on its Armistice responsibilities during crisis. The UNC Headquarters staff also assisted with multinational integration during CFC exercises when those events exceeded the Secretariat's capacity.⁶⁴

By 2014, U.S. leaders elected to pursue a more formal multinational staffing arrangement for augmenting the UNC headquarters staff. The Sending States' renewed interest in the UNC has led to an American-led effort to better integrate international military support to the ROK and the U.S.-ROK Alliance. Successive UNC commanders recognized the Sending States' latent, niche military capabilities, as well as their diplomatic, informational and economic influence. Leveraging this resource could significantly influence the outcome of a major crisis, prove invaluable in a conflict, and support post-conflict resolution. To this end, UNC commanders have incorporated Sending States' armed forces into CFC military exercises, including Exercises Key Resolve, Ulchi Freedom Guardian, and Foal Eagle.

Parallel efforts occurred at the UNC-Rear. In 2009, the UNC Commander proposed assigning an Australian officer as commander of the UNC-Rear Headquarters.⁶⁵ Although Australian, Canadian, Thai and Philippine officers rotated through the staff, Americans had commanded the UNC-Rear Headquarters since 1957.⁶⁶ Beginning in 2010, a Royal Australian Air Force group captain has commanded the UNC-Rear Headquarters at Yokota Air Base.⁶⁷ Separately, Sending States that are a party to the UN-GOJ SOFA have rotated forces on a more frequent basis through the seven designated UN bases in Japan.⁶⁸


UNC Revitalization

In 2015, General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, UNC commander, initiated a deliberate effort to "revitalize" the UNC.⁶⁹ The UNC Commander's initiative followed several years in which the UNC's primary staff was

increasingly used in to perform UNC headquarters functions.⁷⁰ Prior to this, the UNC MAC Secretariat performed most UNC headquarters functions and staffing actions, with some support by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Policies, U-5. The American-led effort sought to reestablish the UNC's primary staff as a supporting, but independent staff among the other theater-level headquarters. In addition to demonstrating the relevancy of the UNC staff, a primary objective of revitalization was to better harness and leverage the command's potential during crisis and should active hostilities resume.

As a result, the Assistant Chiefs of Staff for Operations and Logistics, the U-3 and U-4, took on greater roles within the UNC Staff after 2015. A particularly important feature of recent years was the organizational energy dedicated to bolstering the Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC) within the U-3. Prior to the revitalization initiative, the MNCC was organized under the USFK J3. While the MNCC was traditionally active during exercise periods, it has become a key facilitator of multinational planning and coordination for UNC outside of exercises. Figure 5 shows the UNC Command and Staff Organization as organized in 2016, to include the MNCC.

Figure 5: UNC Command and Staff Organization (Armistice), 2016



Source: Adapted by the author from the *UNC Organization and Functions Manual (Final Draft)*, July 6, 2017

The UNC staff assumed many of the staff functions previously performed by the UNC MAC Secretariat. Table 2 depicts the staff functions transferred to the UNC staff.

Table 2: Functions Transferred from the UNC MAC Secretariat to the UNC Staff

UNC Staff Section	Functions
Commander's Initiatives Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNC Commander-Ambassador Roundtable • Operations and Intelligence Updates to UNC Liaison Group
Secretary Joint Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Distinguished Visitors
U-1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liaison accreditation, identification cards, mail
U-3 MNCC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sending State exercise planning and coordination • UNC Liaison Group Staff Coordination Office in UNC HQ
U-4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sending State Logistical Support and Accreditation, tours of UNC Rear by ROK personnel
U-5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liaison accreditation

Source: Compiled by the author from multiple sources⁷¹

On January 16, 2018, the Canadian and American governments co-hosted 18 Foreign Ministers at the Vancouver Foreign Ministers' Meeting on Security and Stability on the Korean Peninsula.⁷² Among the foreign ministers, only India was not presently affiliated with the UNC.⁷³ In addition to Canada, fifteen active Sending States participated; Sweden represented the NNSC. The U.S., ROK, and Japan attended as the countries establishing the command (and co-host), the host-nation for UNC forces, and the host-nation for the UNC-Rear, respectively.⁷⁴ The meeting marked the first time that affiliation with the UNC became the basis for diplomatic consultation at the ministerial level since the end of the Korean War.

In May 2018, the UNC designated a Canadian Lieutenant General to serve as the UNC Deputy Commander under a USFK-sponsored, U.S. DoD Defense Personnel Exchange Program (DPEP) agreement. The appointment marked the first time the Deputy Commander position would

be held by a non-American officer, and the fifth foreign general officer since 1952 formally appointed to the UNC staff. Canada also announced that it would increase the number of officers assigned to the UNC from six to 15.⁷⁵

These developments notwithstanding, there remain obstacles to greater integration of Sending State capabilities into the UNC's plans and operations. From the command's perspective, no Sending State is known to have offered a standing commitment of forces to the UNC in the event of crisis or a resumption of hostilities. Additionally, information sharing restrictions between the bilateral U.S.-ROK Alliance and the multinational UNC remain a barrier to the Sending States having a greater role in the command. Likewise, the revitalization efforts were unable to address Sending States' two major concerns: First, unilateral American control over the command instead of the UN; and second, the United States bilateral commitment to the U.S.-ROK Alliance that relegated the UNC to a role of being a multi-national force provider to the bilateral combatant command. In effect, the UNC has become a "coalition in support of an Alliance."⁷⁶

South Korean Reactions to Revitalization

Despite being the apparent beneficiary of the "revitalization" initiative, the ROK government officials were circumspect about the effort. South Korea's lukewarm response to revitalization can be traced to widespread concerns about national sovereignty, perceptions of the command's ineffectiveness, and negative associations of the term, "revitalization."

Foremost, the South Korean public is highly sensitive to issues perceived to impact their sovereignty. Although the UNC was critical in young nation's survival, elements of the public view UNC as a symbol of foreign control over Korean domestic and foreign affairs. Some progressive South Korean politicians exploit this belief for political gain, even disparaging the 1978 UNC to CFC transition as an incomplete step forward for the Korean people. They stir nationalist sentiments that the nation is not fully sovereign as it continues to rely on the U.S. and other nations for its security. More than any other issue, passionate historical and domestic political factors explain why ROK Government officials are sensitive to any discussions they perceive as potential back-sliding in the advances they've made in the security domain since 1978.

Second, Alliance managers have reported the ROK Government's position toward UNC hardened following the March 2010 sinking of the *ROKS Choenan*, and further worsened following the November 2010 artillery bombardment of Yeongpyeong Island.⁷⁷ The South Korean media fueled this reaction through its near constant coverage of these attacks, along with detailed exposés on the victims, the families' grief, and succession of funerals.⁷⁸ Citizens, aided by government officials, pointed fingers specifically at the UNC, erroneously accusing the command of hampering an effective military response. In fact, the UNC had no role in defending the islands or in directing a retaliatory response, but many ROK citizens incorrectly believed the UNC was somehow responsible for the tepid reaction to the attacks and that the UNC had limited the ROK government's freedom of action in the hours and days following the attacks. By early 2011, public opinion about the UNC was decidedly negative. Since then, ROK Government officials showed little enthusiasm toward the command or requests by the U.S. to discuss increase roles or responsibilities for UNC.

Third, "revitalization" is a pejorative in South Korea, as the term has been associated with the Korean word *yusin*. While *yusin* has connections to the seventh century Silla Dynasty with a "deep meaning in the 'creation of new history'," its contemporary usage is associated with darker chapters in Korean history.⁷⁹ *Yusin* is the Korean translation of the Japanese *iishin* or "revitalization," the same word used to describe the Meiji Restoration, which ultimately led to Japan's dominance of the Korean Peninsula from 1895 to 1945.⁸⁰ President Park's "*Yusin* Reforms" were inspired by the Japanese Meiji Restoration in 1868 and Park is often referred to as a "Meiji Revolutionary." American officers use of this term for the UNC initiative possibly evoked deeply held emotions among some ROK Government officials.

Conclusion

Established at the onset of the Korean War, the UNC continues to serve as the headquarters responsible for marshalling military support from UN member states. Sixteen of the 20 UN member states that provided combat and humanitarian forces during the Korean War are presently active in the UNC. These Sending States continue to accredit personnel to the UNC Liaison Group in South Korea and rotate their senior member to perform duties on the UNC MAC delegation. Sending States that are a

party to the UN-GOJ SOFA also maintain accredited liaisons with the UNC-Rear Headquarters in Japan.

While the UN Resolutions authorizing the UNC remain in effect, changes the American and South Korean command structure on the Korean Peninsula significantly affected the missions, roles, structure, and manning of the UNC. Dissolving FECOM and establishing U.S. Forces Korea USFK in 1957 changed the UNC's relationship with the organizations that provided most of the UNC's the staff. The CFC assumed the UNC's missions and assigned forces in 1978. The 1994 ROK withdrawal of peacetime OPCON from the CFC to the ROK JCS led many to question the need for the UNC.

Successive UNC Commanders, who concurrently commanded the CFC and USFK, recognized the UNC mission and functions lacked focus and resources. Beginning in late 1978, UNC Commanders started appointing select officers from the CFC staff to perform UNC duties; they added officers from the USFK staff beginning in 1992.

Sending State interest in UNC waned following the departure of combat forces from the Korean Peninsula. By the mid-1970s, only six Sending States participated in the UNC in Korea and eight in the UNC-Rear in Japan. However, by the early 2000s, the majority of the Sending States had returned to actively participating in the command. Beginning in 2004, the Sending States augmented the UNC MAC Secretariat. The 2011 CFI led to officers from Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom serving on the UNC Headquarters Staff.

In 2015, the UNC Commander initiated a campaign to "revitalize" the UNC. This effort led to more clearly defined duties within the UNC staff, creation of a MNCC under the U-3, and the assignment of staff officers to the UNC from Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. UNC affiliation was the basis for a January 2018 meeting of 20 foreign ministers united in their efforts to curb North Korea's nuclear program. In May 2018, the UNC appointed a Canadian lieutenant general to serve as Deputy Commander.

Yet "revitalization" highlighted issues important to South Koreans, including beliefs the UNC adversely affects sovereignty and the command has been ineffective in responding to North Korean aggression. The fact that the term "revitalization" is associated by some with Imperial Japan and the darkest days of the Park Chung-hee era further limited the effectiveness of the campaign.

These concerns notwithstanding, the greatest obstacle to “revitalizing” the UNC is a reluctance of the Sending States to commit forces to the command in the event of a crisis or resumption of hostilities. While the UNC will continue to maintain friendly compliance with the Armistice Agreement and serve as the means to receive and integrate international support, the command’s effectiveness will ultimately be determined by the Sending States willingness to dispatch military power should the security situation degrade significantly. Should this occur, the ROK Government’s must be also be willing to accept the international contributions and the attendant challenges of managing public perceptions in issues related to sovereignty and military effectiveness.

Notes:

¹ UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was correct in his assertion that he, as the Secretary General, did not personally authorize the UNC’s flying of the UN flag. However, the UN Security Council, on July 7, 1950, as part of Security Council Resolution 84, bestowed the authority to the United States for UNC to fly the UN’s flag during the course of its operations. Moreover, the Secretary General’s 1950 predecessor, Trygve Lie, presented a UN flag to the U.S. representative to the UN, Warren R. Austin, when Resolution 84 was passed. U.S. Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins delivered this flag to General MacArthur on July 14, 1950. Later, on July 17, 1950, the UN Secretary General’s personal representative to the unified command, Colonel Alfred G. Katzin of South Africa, presented a UN flag to the U.S. Eighth Army Commander, which had taken operational control of the ground fight in Korea. Both actions reinforced that the UN leadership knowingly bestowed the UN flag to the unified command and the action in Security Council Resolution 84 was not a mistake or an oversight. While the contemporary UN leadership might have misgivings about the 1950 actions, the fact remains the UNC is authorized to use the UN flag. The Secretary General’s sensitivity to the use of the UN flag by the United States in Korea has been recorded as early as 1963 when some UN elements in South Korea took offense to the UN flag at U.S. bases flying at half-mast following the death of President John F. Kennedy. United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) Thai Representative Chan Ansuchote letter to members of the Committee of UNCURK, Seoul, Korea, December 13, 1963. Lastly, while the UNC is authorized to use the UN flag, the United States Government is sensitive to misgivings by elements within the UN community and elects to sparingly use the flag. United States Ambassador to the UN Daniel P. Moynihan letter (S/11830) to the UN Security Council President, New York, NY, September 22, 1975.

² UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali letter to North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam, New York, NY, June 24, 1994, 2; The Associated Press, “North Korea envoy to United Nations Command: Get out of South Korea,” *Syracuse University News*, June 21, 2013.

http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2013/06/north_korea_envoy_to_united_na.html (accessed April 6, 2018).

³ USFK Homepage, UNC Tab, <http://www.usfk.mil/About/United-Nations-Command/> (accessed April 6, 2018); Associated Press, “North Korea envoy to the United Nations Command: Get out of South Korea.”

⁴ “UN Security Council Resolution 82 & 83, Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea, S/RES/84,” June 25 & 27, 1950, Lake Placid, NY, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/82\(1950\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/82(1950)) (accessed January 10, 2017).

⁵ James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1950-1951, The Korean War, Part One*, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff series, Volume III (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1998), p. 44.

⁶ Korea Institute of Military History, *The Korean War, Volume I*, (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), p. 342.

⁷ “UN Security Council Resolution 84, Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea, S/RES/84,” July 7, 1950, Lake Placid, NY, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/84\(1950\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/84(1950)) (accessed January 10, 2017).

⁸ Harry S. Truman, “Statement by the President Announcing the Designation of General MacArthur To Lead the Allied Military Forces in Korea,” July 8, 1950, linked from Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13555> (accessed March 13, 2017). The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff dispatched the official appointment orders following the President’s public designation on July 10, 1950. U.S. JCS message 85370 to CINCFE (MacArthur), Washington, DC, July 10, 1950; Schnabel and Watson, *JCS and National Policy 1950-1951*, p. 57.

⁹ Harry S. Truman, “Statement by the President Announcing the Designation of General MacArthur to Lead the Allied Military Forces in Korea,” July 8, 1950, linked from Gerhard Peters and John T. Wooley, *The American Presidency Project*,

¹⁰ ROK President Syngman Rhee, “Assignment of Command Authority over all Korean Forces to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur,” memorandum for Chief of Staff, Korean Army through the Minister of Defense, Pusan, ROK, 22 July 1950; Walter Simmons, “Letter by Rhee Only Contract with 8th Army,” *Chicago Tribune*, June 24, 1953, <http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1953/06/24/page/3/article/letter-by-rhee-only-contract-with-8th-army> (accessed March 13, 2017).

¹¹ General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, UNC Commander-in-Chief, “UNC General Order No.1,” Tokyo, Japan, GHQ UNC, July 24, 1950.

¹² When GHQ UNC was established in July 1950, FECOM maintained a ground component, the Army Forces Far East (AFFE). While GHQ FECOM and AFFE were separate commands on paper, in reality they were one uniform staff performing both command’s duties - General MacArthur retained command of AFFE and appointed members from his GHQ FECOM staff to duties within the AFFE to serve in an Army component capacity. Thomas A. Cardwell III, *Command Structure for Theater Warfare, The Quest for Unity of Command*, Strategy Research Project (Maxwell AFB, AL: U.S. Air Force Air University Press, 1984), pp. 13-17. AFFE (GHQ FECOM) initially

provided operational guidance and direction to the Army operational commands (Eighth Army) originally deployed to the Korean peninsula at the start of the conflict. However, when UNC was established Eighth Army became the UNC ground component command in Korea, while AFFE acted as the Army component for the rest of the FECOM AOR. UNC General Order 1 established UNC as a unified command on July 24, 1950, but it wasn't until August 27, 1950 that the component were designated. MG Edward M. Almond, UNC Chief of Staff, "UNC General Order 4: Designation of Component Commands," Tokyo, Japan, General Headquarters UNC, August 27, 1950. UNC General Order 4 was rescinded and replaced by a broader more encompassing UNC General Order (14) on October 11, 1950, which codified past documented and undocumented decisions regarding the UNC staff and component command arrangements. MG Doyle O. Hickey, UNC Chief of Staff, "UNC General Order 14: Designation of Component Commands and Establishment of Staff Sections," Tokyo, Japan, General Headquarters UNC, October, 11, 1950.

¹³ Hickey, "UNC General Order 14," October 11, 1950; GHQ UNC Policy Letter AG 091.711 "Policy for Integration of Forces into the United Nations Command," September 7, 1950, Tokyo, Japan. UNC Policy Letter AG 091.711 was updated on September 26, 1950; revised on December 23, 1950; again revised on August 27, 1951, and amended on October 2, 1951.

¹⁴ Robert F. Kemp, *Combined Operations in the Korean War*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 24, 1989), 19-20; James Woods, "The Australian Military Contribution to the Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952," linked from *Australian War Memorial Home Page* at "BCOF History," https://www.awm.gov.au/sites/default/files/BCOF_history.pdf (accessed February 27, 2016), pp. 66-67.

¹⁵ Spencer D. Bakich, *Success and Failure in Limited War: Information and Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf and Iraq Wars*, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2014), p. 70 and James F. Schnabel, *United States Army in the Korean War – Policy and Direction: The First Year*, (Washington DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1972), pp. 46-48.

¹⁶ HQ AFFE / 8A (Rear), *The Far East Command, 1947-1957*, p. iii and pp. 36-37.

¹⁷ Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent to Fighting Front*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1992) 321-324; Richard Baxter, *Humanizing the Laws of War: Selected Writings of Richard Baxter* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 83; "British Deputy in Korea," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, August 02, 1952, <http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1952/08/02/#page/8/article/a-british-deputy-in-korea> (accessed 20160204); Chester Wilmot, "Military Consultations Handicapped," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, August 12, 1952, <http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/18277178> (accessed 20160204); UNC Staff Officer LtCol Slepicka, "UNC Fact Sheet," command-internal historical background and current status of the command memorandum, Yongsan, ROK, January 30, 1975, Tab A-2.

¹⁸ In the early days, prior to the joint reorganization that occurred in the FECOM and UNC in 1953: "Although a lack of balanced representation from the three services keeps GHQ, FEC from being classified as a joint headquarters in the common accepted sense, certain joint features do exist...." "The Far East Command is a unified rather than a joint command with command lines following straight service seniority channels as opposed to

command responsibilities on a joint basis by geographical area.” The 1953 reorganization modified the composition of the staff from largely Army-based to one with joint representation; a review of the headquarters line-wire diagram (page 68) shows that the FECOM / UNC J-4 and J-5 were officers sourced by the U.S. Navy, whereas prior to 1953 those positions were staffed by Army officers. Ney, *Evolution of Theater of Operations HQ, 1941-1967*, pp. 55-73.

¹⁹ “Sending State” is the contemporary, generally accepted, naming convention used by UNC to identify the UN member states (and non-UN member states) that contributed combat, combat support, and combat service support forces to the UNC between 1950 through 1953 pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 84. Sending States have also been referred to as “contributing nations”, “member nations” or “member states” throughout the UNC history. The earliest documented use of the term “Sending State” found is a February 19, 1954 reference in the "Agreement Regarding the Status of United Nations Forces in Japan," also known as the United Nations – Government of Japan Status of Forces Agreement (UN-GOJ SOFA). While UN Security Council Resolution 84 (and 82 and 83 as well) called on “UN member states” to provide assistance, Italy, a non-UN member state at the time, offered and then after UNC (U.S.) accepted, provided non-combat, humanitarian support to UNC. Prior to the aforementioned 1954 use of the term “Sending State, the most common reference used was “United Nations Forces.”

²⁰ Korean Armistice Agreement. Sub-paragraph 13(c) stipulates that both sides will cease the introduction of reinforcing military personnel into Korea except for those rotated to replace the forces currently in place; all rotational forces were required to enter/depart through designated ports of entry, to be monitored by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Sub-paragraph 13(d) stipulates that both sides are prohibited from introducing (reinforcing) additional / new aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons or ammunition except for those requiring replacement on a piece-for-piece basis. Paragraph 28 stipulated that the Military Armistice Commission as a body or a Military Armistice Commission Senior Member could request the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct investigations at locations outside the Demilitarized Zone and outside the designated ports of entry. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission performed its functions outside of the Demilitarized Zone and reported violations and issued its reports to the Military Armistice Commission; the Military Armistice Commission was solely responsible for the “supervise, observe, inspect and investigate” functions within the Demilitarized Zone.

²¹ U.S. Department of State Bureau of East Asian Affairs, “U.S. Relations with South Korea Fact Sheet,” October 17, 2016, *U.S. Department of State Homepage*, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm> (accessed November 4, 2016).

²² Korean Armistice Agreement, Article II, Paragraph 19.

²³ *Ibid*, Article II, Paragraph 20.

²⁴ The CPV attended MAC Meeting 228 on August 5, 1966, which interestingly coincided with the August 8, 1966 passing of the "Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," by the PRC's Central Committee. The CPV did not return to a MAC forum until they returned for MAC Meeting 318 on July 9, 1971. UNC MAC Secretariat, “318th Meeting of the Military Armistice Commission: MG Felix M. Rogers (UNC) and MG Yong Ok Han (KPA) co-presiding,” July 9, 1971, Panmunjom, Korean DMZ; UNC MAC Secretary COL M.E. Jessup, “Summary 318th Military

Armistice Commission Meeting,” cable to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Seoul, ROK, July 10, 1971.

²⁵ Korean Armistice Agreement, Article II, Paragraph 22.

²⁶ Agreement regarding the Status of the United Nations Forces in Japan (together with related Protocol and Agreed Official Minutes), February 19, 1954, Treaty Series No. 10 (1957), (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1957); Degville, “UN Forces in North East Asia, pp. 43-44.

²⁷ UN-GOJ SOFA, Article I, Section (e), and Article IV, Paragraph 1.

²⁸ Ibid, Article XX, and Article V, Paragraphs 1 and 2.

²⁹ Counselor Embassy of the United States, on behalf of the Unified Command, J.

Graham Parsons and Special Assistant to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Koto Matsudaira, “Record of Meeting of October 23, 1953 for the Negotiations to Conclude a Protocol on the Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction over United Nations Forces in Japan,” Tokyo, Japan, October 23, 1953; UNC Rear Commander Colonel Roger H.C. Donlon, “UNC Rear Briefing Sheets,” Camp Zama, Japan, 1984, Tab A; Degville, “UN Forces in North East Asia, pp. 45-46.

³⁰ Vessey, *HQ UNC / USFK / 8A Annual Historical Report, 1978*, 31; UNC Rear HQ, “Fact Sheet,” 2; Degville, “UN Forces in North East Asia, p. 47.

³¹ MG Albert Pierson, FECOM and Eighth Army (Rear) Chief of Staff, “Headquarters U.S. Army Forces Far East and Eighth United States Army (Rear) General Order No 76”, Tokyo, Japan, HQ FECOM and Eighth Army (Rear), June 21, 1957.

³² The British Commonwealth Division was reduced to a Brigade (Group) in 1955, and from 1956-57 a reinforced Battalion. After 1955, the Commonwealth force was largely provided by the United Kingdom with only token representation by the other partners. Jeffrey Grey, *The Commonwealth armies and the Korean War: An alliance study*, (New York, NY: Manchester University Press, 1988), pp. 183-184.

³³ Turkey retained a brigade-sized force in Korea until 1960, but maintained a company-sized (261 soldier) expeditionary force until 1966 and representation in the UNC Honor Guard until 1971. Ethiopian forces departed Korea in January 1965. France reduced its contingent to 50, and later further reduced it to 15 personnel, with the last soldier departing in June 1965. Gordon L. Rottman, *Korean War Order of Battle: United States, United Nations and Communist Ground, Naval and Air Forces, 1950-1953*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 118; MacArthur Memorial Homepage, “Under One Banner: The United Nations Command in Korea” tab, <http://www.macarthurmemorial.org/DocumentCenter/View/522> (accessed August 10, 2017); GEN John W. Vessey Jr., *Headquarters United Nations Command / United States Forces Korea / Eighth United States Army Annual Historical Report, 1978*, (Yongsan Garrison, ROK: Command Historian Office), 25 and 46-47. As a data point, Thailand retained a company sized element (147 soldiers) with the U.S. 7th Infantry Division as of 1966, ultimately withdrawing the last of their forces from Korea by 1971. Eighth Army Historian Office, *Eighth Army Quarterly Historical Summary, April 1 – June, 30 1966*, (Yongsan Garrison, ROK: Command Historian Office), pp. 22-24.

³⁴ Vessey, *HQ UNC / USFK / 8A Annual Historical Report, 1978*, pp. 46-47

³⁵ GEN Richard G. Stilwell, *Headquarters United Nations Command / United States Forces Korea / Eighth United States Army Annual Historical Report, 1975*, (Yongsan Garrison, ROK: Command Historian Office), p. 18.

³⁶ Vessey, *HQ UNC / USFK / 8A Annual Historical Report, 1977*, 33; Vessey, *HQ UNC / USFK / 8A Annual Historical Report, 1978*, p. 47.

³⁷ U.S. Representative to the UN John Scali, "USG offer to Terminate the UNC," letter to the President of the UNSC dated June 27, 1975; National Security Council Advisor Henry A. Kissinger, "National Security Decision Memorandum 251, Termination of the U.N. Command in Korea," memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of State, and the Director Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, DC, March 29, 1974.

³⁸ The contemporary term for a "regional command" is "Geographic Combatant Command."

³⁹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint History Office, "History of the Unified Command Plan: 1946-2012." (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), p. 18-20; GEN Lyman L. Lemnitzer, CINCUNC, "UNC General Order No 15, Outline Plan for the Disestablishment of the Far East Command and Movement of United Nations Command to Korea," Tokyo, Japan, June 30, 1957.

⁴⁰ GEN John W. Vessey Jr., *Headquarters United Nations Command / United States Forces Korea / Eighth United States Army Annual Historical Report, 1976*, (Yongsan Garrison, ROK: Command Historian Office), p. 1.

⁴¹ Katz, "US Military Presence in Korea" memo, 5; Vessey, *HQ UNC / USFK / 8A Annual Historical Report, 1978*, 7; "Ulchi-Focus Lens," *Global Security.org Home Page*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/ulchi-focus-lens.htm> (accessed March 19, 2016); Robert Collins, "A Brief History of the US-ROK Combined Military Exercises," February 26, 2014, linked from the *John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, U.S.-Korea Institute Home Page* at "38 North.org," http://38north.org/2014/02/rcollins022714/#_ftn4 (accessed March 19, 2016).

⁴² *Ibid.* It was after this first May 1975 test UNCHI FOCUS LENS iteration that the UNC/USFK Commander recommended these two exercises remain combined, and also that the U.S. and ROK Governments pursue a "joint Korean-American command structure." Thereafter the combined ULCHI-FOCUS LENS served as a vehicle to test out concepts envisioned for the future CFC.

⁴³ ROK MND, *The History of the ROK-US Alliance*, 125-128 and 171; Kwang Sub Kwak, *The US-ROK Alliance, 1953-2004: Alliance Institutionalization* (Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest Books, 2006), pp. 132-134 and pp. 136-139; Donald A. Timm, "Chapter IX, Visiting Forces in Korea," in *The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces*, ed. Dieter Fleck (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 447; Jeongwon Yoon, "Recalibrating the US-ROK Alliance, Chapter 6, Alliance Activities: Meetings, Exercises and CFC's Roles," May 2003, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB53.pdf> (accessed January 18, 2016), pp. 91-92.

⁴⁴ ROK MND, *The History of the ROK-US Alliance*, pp. 165-166.

⁴⁵ USFK Homepage, Combined Forces Command Tab, <http://www.usfk.mil/About/Combined-Forces-Command/> (accessed April 16, 2018).

⁴⁶ Shawn P. Creamer, *Answering the Korea Question: U.S. Government Policy toward the Unified Command and the Korea Armistice Agreement*, Civilian Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 24, 2017), 18 and 72-74; LtCol Mel T. S. Han and Maj Dong Hyun Yoon CFC Historical Branch, *Headquarters ROK /*

US Combined Forces Command Historical Summary, November 7, 1978 – December 31, 1979, (Yongsan Garrison, ROK: Command Historian Office), pp. 1-2.

⁴⁷ U.S. Army units operated under the operational control of Eighth Army and its higher headquarters, USFK. There were no Navy or U.S. Marine Corps units stationed in Korea. U.S. Air Force units operating in Korea remained under the control of Pacific Air Force in Hawaii, with some nominal authorities delegated to USFK.

⁴⁸ The UNC headquarters staff in the late 1960s and 1970s was less than 300 personnel, and roughly 200 went on to serve on the CFC staff. While a majority of the tri-command (UNC / USFK / EUSA) staff were triple hatted to all three commands prior to 1978, USFK and EUSA did maintain dedicated personnel with no ties to UNC. Creamer, *Answering the Korea Question*, pp. 72-73.

⁴⁹ Deputy Commander UNC, USFK and Chief of Staff CFC LtGen Charles A. Gabriel, “Letter of Instruction No 2-1, Composition of the UNC Staff,” memorandum for the UNC, CFC and USFK staffs, February 22, 1979; Glenn Rice, “CFC and UNC Command Relationship Orientation,” briefing slides and scripted commentary, Yongsan, ROK, U.S. / ROK CFC and UNC, July 1, 1993, p. 6.

⁵⁰ Despite the recommendation of the Joint Activation Committee, the CFC / UNC staff relationship was not codified officially in the activation agreements. Therefore, in order to address the emerging personnel gap for the UNC, the UNC Commander in collaboration with the new CFC Commander (they were the same individual) appointed a nominal UNC staff. Commander CFC GEN John J. Vessey, “Designation of Certain CFC Staff Members to Serve on UNC Staff” memorandum to the CFC Staff, Yongsan, ROK, November 7, 1978. In early 1979 an exchange of letters occurred between the members of the Military Committee Permanent Session that legitimized the November 1978 appointment of CFC staff members to perform UNC duties, and for those appointed officers to utilize CFC staff members in the course of their duties. Commander CFC GEN John J. Vessey, “Designation of Certain CFC Staff Members to Serve on UNC Staff” letter for ROK CJCS GEN Jong-Hwan Kim, Yongsan, ROK, January 16, 1979; ROK CJCS GEN Jong-Hwan Kim, “Letter concerning the ‘Designation of Certain CFC Staff Members to Serve on UNC Staff,’” letter for Commander CFC GEN John J. Vessey, Yongsan, ROK, January 19, 1979.

⁵¹ The UNC MAC Secretariat assumed many duties previously performed by the UNC staff after 1978. The UNC Commander initiated a revitalization initiative in 2015, which resulted in the UNC MAC Secretariat transferring many of the duties they assumed post-1978 back to the UNC staff. UNC Commander Curtis M. Scaparrotti, “Revitalizing the United Nations Command,” letter to the UNC Sending State Ambassadors, Seoul, ROK, April 9, 2015; UNC Deputy Chief of Staff MajGen James C. Slife, “DCoS Decisions from UNC Revitalization OPT Outbrief on 26 April 2016”, memorandum for record, Seoul, ROK, May 4, 2016; HQ UNC, *Headquarters United Nations Command Organization and Functions Manual – Final Draft*, (Yongsan, ROK: United Nations Command, July 6, 2017).

⁵² Gabriel, “Letter of Instruction No 2-1,” Memo.

⁵³ Commander UNC GEN William J. Livsey, “UNC Staff Members,” memorandum for the UNC Staff regarding the reappointment and new appointment of staff members to the UNC staff, June 19, 1987.

⁵⁴ Commander UNC GEN Robert W. Riscassi, “UNC Staff Organization,” memorandum to CFC and USFK staff appointing officers to the UNC staff, September 28, 1992. GEN Riscassi did not materially alter the CFC staff members designated or their functional assignments on the UNC staff.

⁵⁵ Commander UNC GEN John H. Tilelli, “UNC Staff Organization,” memorandum to CFC and USFK staff appointing officers to the UNC staff, March 11, 1999; HQ UNC and CFC, “UNC Operational Staff,” undated (provided by the UNC Command Historian Office).

⁵⁶ U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld issued a memorandum on October 24, 2002 forbidding the title “Commander-in-Chief” or acronym CINC for U.S. military leaders, asserting that the President is the only U.S. official who will use it. Jim Garamone, “‘CINC is Sunk,’” October 25, 2002, *American Forces Press Service*, <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=42568> (accessed April 17, 2018)

⁵⁷ Commander UNC GEN Leon J. LaPorte, Designation of UNC Staff,” memorandum to CFC and USFK staff appointing officers to the UNC staff, dated April 17, 2004. The purported driver of the UNC staff expansion in 2004 was stated in an internal UNC memorandum available in the UNC Command Historian’s office, which asserted the expansion was required primarily to ensure the transportation corridor operations between the ROK and DPRK adhered to the Armistice. Additional considerations at the time warranting expansion included the necessity to ensure that the UNC staff remained “aware of the Armistice maintenance implications of actions taken by either CFC or USFK,” to maintain the “existing system that allows use of UNC designated bases in Japan,” and to provide a “structure and mechanism for the efficient integration of UNC Member Nations forces.” Identification of “certain billets” served two purposes: First, designation of specific positions as “being responsible for considering the UNC implications of any action.” Secondly, designating these positions provided “points of contact below the General Officer level that are responsible for UNC mission related actions.” UNC U5 Policy Mr. Glenn Rice, “HQ UNC Staff Requirements,” memorandum for the UNC staff, Yongsan, ROK, undated (provided by the UNC Command Historian Office). The 1999-era “UNC Staff Organization” memorandum signed by GEN Tilelli was attached.

⁵⁸ Ibid. See also Endnote 35.

⁵⁹ The first four Sending States to augment the UNC MAC Secretariat were Australia, France, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Commander UNC GEN B.B. Bell, letter to the Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff GEN R.J. Hillier, Seoul, ROK, May 11, 2006.

⁶⁰ UNC Deputy Chief of Staff MajGen Mark C. Dillon and UNC MAC Senior Member MG Hyung-suk Suh (ROK Army), “ROK officers assigned to UNC MAC Secretariat,” Memorandum of Understanding Between UNC and the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, Seoul, ROK, April 22, 2014. The ROK Ministry of National Defense last affirmed their continued support for the appointment of CFC staff members to perform UNC staff duties in 2015 via an exchange of letters with UNC leadership. ROK MND Policy Planning Director MG Kyung Soo Jang, “UNC Staff organization procedure between ROK MND and UNC,” letter to UNC Deputy Chief of Staff MajGen Dillon, April 21, 2015; UNC Deputy Chief of Staff MajGen Dillon, “UNC Staff organization procedure between ROK MND and UNC,” response letter to ROK MND Policy Planning Director MG Kyung Soo Jang, May 29, 2015.

⁶¹ Australia provides one officer to command the UNC Rear headquarters detachment; Australia has provided the UNC Rear headquarters detachment commander since 2010 based on a U.S. proposal via an exchange of letters (previously it had always been a U.S. Officer). UNC Commander Walter L. Sharp letter to Australian Chief of the Defence Force Air Chief Marshall Angus Houston, Yongsan, ROK, undated; Australian Chief of the Defence Force Air Chief Marshall Angus Houston response letter to UNC Commander Walter L. Sharp, Canberra, AUS, October 29, 2009.

⁶² CFI was initiated by the request of the Canadian Chief of Defense Staff to expand the 2004-era UNC initiated program to embed Sending State Liaison Group personnel directly into the UNC MAC Secretariat. CFI was designed to embed non-Liaison Group Canadian personnel directly onto the UNC headquarters staff, and ultimately was implemented with the posting of three Canadian officers on two- to three-year tours into the UNC headquarters (one each to the U2, the U3 MNCC and the U5) and one officer to the UNC Rear headquarters in Japan. Commander UNC GEN Walter L. Sharp, letter to the Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff GEN W.J. Natynczak, Seoul, ROK, February 24, 2011; Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff GEN W.J. Natynczak, letter to Commander UNC GEN James D. Thurman, Ottawa, Canada, July 28, 2011; Commander UNC GEN James D. Thurman, letter to the Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff GEN W.J. Natynczak, Seoul, ROK, September 8, 2011.

⁶³ Under a U.S. Department of Defense FEO program, Australia has provided an O7 GO/FO to the UNC Staff since early 2015, while the United Kingdom has embedded two senior field grade officers into the staff since early 2016.

⁶⁴ Robert Collins, former Chief of Strategy, J5/C5/U5, United States Forces Korea, with duty to Combined Forces Command and United Nations Command, email exchange with author, October 4, 2017.

⁶⁵ UNC Commander Walter L. Sharp letter to Australian Chief of the Defence Force Air Chief Marshall Angus Houston, Yongsan, ROK, undated; Australian Chief of the Defence Force Air Chief Marshall Angus Houston response letter to UNC Commander Walter L. Sharp, Canberra, AUS, October 29, 2009.

⁶⁶ UN - GOJ SOFA members provide a multinational UNC Rear Force Representative to the staff. Historical UNC Rear Force Representatives are: Thailand (1957-1976), United Kingdom (1976-1978), Philippines (1978-2002), Australia (2006), United Kingdom (2006-2007), Thailand (2008), Australia (2009), Turkey (2009-2011), and Canada (2011-present). UNC Rear headquarters Commander Group Captain Michael W. Jansen (RAAF), email message to author containing internal UNC Rear document "UNC-R Historical Leadership," December 18, 2016.

⁶⁷ "United Nations Command (Rear) change of command ceremony," February 8, 2010, *Yokota AB Homepage*, <http://www.yokota.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/2053/Article/412004/united-nations-command-rear-change-of-command-ceremony.aspx> (accessed March 13, 2017).

⁶⁸ The seven UN bases in Japan are Sasebo Naval Base, Camp Zama, Yokota Air Base, Yokosuka Naval Base, Kadema Air Base, White Beach Naval Facility, and Futenma Marine Corps Air Station. The UNC-Rear Headquarters moved to Yokota Air Base in 2007. UNC Rear Headquarters, "Fact Sheet," *Yokota Air Base Homepage*, <http://www.yokota.af.mil/Portals/44/Documents/Units/AFD-150924-004.pdf> (accessed March 11, 2017), 1; "Relocation of the United Nations Command (Rear) from Camp

Zama to Yokota Air Base,” October 26, 2007, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Homepage*, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2007/10/1176845_836.html (accessed August 15, 2017).

⁶⁹ UNC Commander Curtis M. Scaparrotti, “Revitalizing the United Nations Command,” letter to the UNC Sending State Ambassadors, Seoul, ROK, April 9, 2015.

⁷⁰ UNC Deputy Chief of Staff MajGen James C. Slife, “DCoS Decisions from UNC Revitalization OPT Outbrief on 26 April 2016”, memorandum for record, Seoul, ROK, May 4, 2016; HQ UNC, *Headquarters United Nations Command Organization and Functions Manual – Final Draft*, (Yongsan, ROK: United Nations Command, July 6, 2017).

⁷¹ *Ibid.* The UNC MAC Secretariat assumed many duties previously performed by the UNC staff after 1978. The UNC Commander initiated a revitalization initiative in 2015, which resulted in the UNC MAC Secretariat transferring many of the duties they assumed post-1978 back to the UNC staff.

⁷² “Foreign Minister’s Meeting on Security and Stability on the Korean Peninsula,” *Government of Canada Homepage*, January 16, 2018, http://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/crisis-crisis/korea-coree.aspx?lang=eng (accessed May 30, 2018).

⁷³ India did contribute non-combat forces to the UNC under the umbrella of the British Commonwealth during the war, and deployed a 6,000 soldier custodial force for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) as part of the Armistice Agreement. However, India has never maintained a liaison delegation with the UNC or maintained active status with the UNC as the other contributing nations have during or after the war.

⁷⁴ Michael Bosack, “Relevance Despite Obscurity: Japan and the UN Command,” *Tokyo Review*, February 1, 2018, <http://www.tokyoreview.net/2018/02/relevance-despite-obscurity-japan-un-command/> (accessed May 29, 2018).

⁷⁵ “CAF General to be Appointed Deputy Commander – United Nations Command Korea,” *Canadian Defence Review*, May 14, 2018, <http://www.canadiandefencereview.com/news?news/2490>

(accessed May 29, 2018). U.S. DoD DPEPs are governed by U.S. Department of Defense, *Visits and Assignment of Foreign Nationals*, DoD Directive 5230.20, (Washington DC: DoD Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P), June 22, 2005). The UK sourced the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations position sequentially with two Majors Generals from 1952-1956, and Australia sourced the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Policy with an Air Commodore (2015-2018) and a Commodore (2018-Present). ROK officer appointed to UNC are conducted through an informal exchange of letters by military commanders and not through recognized DPEP agreements.

⁷⁶ Mr. Michael Keefe, International Relations Analyst, C5 Policy, United States Forces Korea with duty to Combined Forces Command, email exchange with author, September 29, 2017.

⁷⁷ Mr. Carl McGowan, International Relations Officer, U5 Policy, United Nations Command, email exchange with author, October 10, 2017.

⁷⁸ Chico Harlan, “Yeonpyeong attack raised South Korea’s resolve, *The Japan Times* as reported in *The Washington Post*, April 16, 2013,

<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/04/16/asia-pacific/yeonpyeong-attack-raised-south-koreas-resolve/#.WHkPgMsZw-4> (accessed January 13, 2017); Tania Branigan and Ewen MacAskill, "South Korean defense minister quits over response to North Korean attack," *The Guardian*, November 25, 2010, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/25/south-korea-defence-minister-quits> (accessed January 13, 2017); CNN Wire Staff, South Korea warns of 'firm' response to future attacks," *CNN*, November 28, 2010, <http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/11/28/koreas.crisis/> (accessed January 13, 2017); Sang-ho Song, "Defense Chief stresses swift Self-Defense," *The Korea Herald*, December 07, 2010, <http://v.media.daum.net/v/20101207190423709> (accessed January 13, 2017); Bruce Klingner, "The Cheonan: a retrospective Assessment," *The Heritage Foundation*, March 25, 2011, <http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/03/the-cheonan-a-retrospective-assessment> (accessed January 13, 2017).

⁷⁹ Robert Oppenheim, *Kyongju Things: Assembling Place* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2008), 47. "Yusin" is the term former President Chung Hee Park used to describe a series of despotic reforms in late 1971 and 1972, leading to a virtual military dictatorship under the "Yusin" Constitution promulgated in November 1972.

⁸⁰ Keith Pratt, *Everlasting Flower: A History of Korea* (London, UK, Reaktion Books, 2006), 266; Hyung Baeg Im, "The Origins of the Yushin Regime: Machiavelli Unveiled," in *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, ed. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011) 234. The Meiji Restoration, or Meiji "Ishin" is translated or known by multiple names in English, including "renovation," "revolution," "reform," "renewal," and "revitalization."