

The Role and Responsibilities of China and the Former Soviet Union in the Korean War

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ABSTRACT

The Korean War decision on the communist side was made through careful and thorough consultations and conducted in partnership by the former Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. Stalin approved Kim Il Sung's plan to invade South Korea under the condition that China also agreed to his plan. Stalin stressed that the Soviet Union would provide armaments while China should send troops, if the Americans intervened in the war. China made the decision to enter the war immediately after the South Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel, but sent the troops to Korea soon after the UN troops captured Pyongyang. The Chinese People's Volunteers exercised operational control over the North Korean army and engaged in more than five major campaigns. Disagreements between China and North Korea over war aims occurred, but were resolved by Stalin. After the fifth campaign, China's war aim was a speedy armistice. It sought to play a leading role in negotiations, and to persuade Stalin to change his rigid position over the armistice issues. One important lesson of the war is that peaceful means may be the only way to achieve Korean reunification.

Keywords: Sino-Soviet-North Korea relations, Soviet Cold-War policy, North-South conflict, Sino-U.S. conflict

Introduction

Along with the publication of the former Soviet Union's archives on the Korean War, numerous scholarly works on the Korean War have led us to reconsider previous notions about decision making on the communist side, thereby improving our understanding of the issue. In exploring the war issue in more detail, we still have some limits mainly because the PRC has not released its official documents. Since the mid-1990s, scholars have been fortunate to find out, by way of secret cables in the Soviet archives, Mao Zedong's and Chinese leaders' positions when dealing with their Soviet counterparts. This article attempts to explore Soviet and Chinese roles in making the Korean War decision, and in conducting and ending the war. The analytical focus is on how the Soviet Union and China consulted and cooperated in the Korean War; the role differentiation and conflict between Moscow and Beijing, particularly with regard to aid for North Korea and in dealing with the United States; and the way both countries managed their disagreements over various issues related to the war. The article concludes with some lessons learned from the Korean War for a peaceful Korea in the future.

Consultations for the Korean War Decision

In conversation with Stalin on March 7, 1949, Kim Il Sung for the first time officially asked for his permission to attack South Korea. But Stalin denied Kim's offer, raising three problems: (1) the North Korea army did not have an overwhelming superiority over the troops of the South; (2) in the South, there were still American troops, which would interfere in case of hostilities; (3) the agreement for the 38th parallel was in effect between the USSR and the United States. The agreement would not be broken by our side, Stalin said. He asked Kim Il Sung if he could have a good opportunity to launch a counter attack in response to the Southern attack.¹ In May 1949, Mao Zedong also advised Kim Il, a member of the Central Committee of the North Korea Labor Party and Chief of the Political Department of the North Korean Army, that North Korea reserve decisive action on the Korean issue for a more suitable situation and until China achieved complete control over China. Mao even said that he would take action only after Stalin's approval.²

But in August 1949, soon after withdrawal of the U.S. troops in Korea, Kim Il Sung expressed views different from Stalin's, arguing that the demarcation line along the 38th parallel had some meaning as long as American troops were stationed in the South and that they had left the

Korean peninsula. The obstacle to agreement on the 38th parallel had been, in fact, removed, Kim said. Why should the line be in place and still be observed? North Korean leaders noted that during numerous previous skirmishes along the border, the Korean People's Army (KPA) had demonstrated a clear advantage over the troops of South Korea, and that the Northerners had created a liberated zone in the area of the coal mines in Samchok in Kangwondo, adjacent to the 38th parallel.³

Stalin worried about Kim's desire to unify Korea by force, and ordered the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang to gather relevant information on the situation on Korea. On September 15, 1949, the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang sent Stalin a lengthy and detailed report, noting that if the Northern army invaded the South, Americans would interfere in this situation and they would actively support Southerners, and the size of the KPA and its material level at the present time did not guarantee the full defeat of the Southern army and occupation of South Korea. Nevertheless, the analysis of the embassy stressed: "A local operation to take over the Ongjin peninsula and the area with the city, Kaesong can be conducted under favorable conditions. For this purpose, one can use provocations of the Southerners at the 38th parallel. In order to punish them for violating the 38th parallel, the Ongjin peninsula and the area with Kaesong city can be taken over and the front line will be shortened." The report continued that Kim Il Sung and Park Hon Yong refused to allow the thought that Korea should remain divided for an uncertain time. He didn't exclude that Kim Il Sung, to launch an offensive against the South, hoped to receive assistance both from the USSR and the Chinese Communist Party. Kim Il Sung, perhaps, thought that "Koreans must be helped by Chinese" because of the Koreans' participation in the fighting against the Guomindang (KMT) troops.⁴

It is against this backdrop that the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) passed a decision on the Korea issue, barring a Northern attack on the South. An order on September 24, 1949 asked Ambassador Shtykov to meet with Kim Il Sung and Park Hon Young to emphasize Moscow's decision. The decision stressed: An offensive for which North Korea was not adequately prepared could turn into a prolonged military operation. Politically, very little had been done in order to arouse the South Korean masses to embrace active struggle so as to develop the guerrilla movement throughout South Korea. Besides, the decision added, the military action of North Korea might give the Americans a pretext for all

kinds of interference in Korean affairs. The decision concluded that unification of Korea should demand preparation for a national armed uprising in South Korea and decisive strengthening of the KPA.⁵

By the end of 1949, the North Korean leader witnessed the full victory of the Communists in China. Via the Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang, Kim Il Sung presented his reunification idea. Stalin faced resumed pressure from Pyongyang about the green light for Kim Il Sung's adventure against the South. Stalin had to control Kim's adventurism, sending the long-awaited instruction to ambassador in Pyongyang to tell Kim Il Sung the following: "... I understand the unhappiness of comrade Kim Il Sung, that ... such a big step regarding South Korea requires thorough preparation ... then I will always be ready to receive him and talk to him."⁶ In January 1950 Stalin, during his talks with Mao Zedong, who was still in Moscow, discussed the necessity and possibilities to help North Korea to raise its military potential and defense capabilities.⁷

During Kim's stay in Moscow from the March 30 to April 25, 1950, Stalin began to expand his roles as approver, coordinator, and helper with regard to the coming war in Korea. Stalin confirmed to Kim Il Sung that the international environment has sufficiently changed to permit a more active stance on the unification of Korea. Stalin pointed out the improved international environment due to the Chinese Communist victory over the Guomindang. China, he said, would no longer be busy with internal fighting and could devote its attention and energy to the assistance of Korea. China had signed a treaty of alliance with the USSR, making the Americans ever more hesitant to challenge the Communists in Asia. In addition, information concerning the Dean Acheson's announcement of the U.S. hands-off policy toward Korea on January 12, 1950, together with the fact that the Soviet Union possessed the atomic bomb, might reinforce Stalin's perception that the U.S. would not intervene.

Stalin gave Kim Il Sung a green light to launch a war against the South under four conditions: the need for careful evaluation of Americans' interference; the Chinese leadership's endorsement before the war started; the awareness that the Koreans should not count on direct Soviet participation in the war (Stalin again urged Kim Il Sung to consult with Mao Zedong); and the Northerners' thorough preparation for war. Stalin also requested that Kim Il Sung draw up a detailed plan of the offensive that would have three basic stages: first, troops would be

concentrated in the designated area close to the 38th parallel; second, the highest bodies of power in North Korea would make fresh proposals for peaceful unification; third, the KPA would engage the adversary in the Ongjin peninsula, and then enlarge the front. The war should be quick and speedy. Southerners and Americans should not have time to put up a strong resistance and to mobilize international support. Stalin and Kim Il Sung agreed that the North Korean Army would be fully mobilized by the summer of 1950 and by that time the North Korean general staff, with the assistance of Soviet advisers, would draw up a concrete plan for the offensive. Stalin repeated that the USSR was not ready to get involved in Korean affairs directly, even if Americans did venture to send troops to Korea.⁸

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) consulted with a North Korean Labor Party member, Kim Il, on the issue of transferring Korean divisions in the Chinese army in May 1949. But the CCP Central Committee response was not positive, mainly because the civil war in China was not yet over. In January 1950, North Korea again raised this matter with the Beijing leadership, which approved repatriating 14,000 Korean nationality People's Liberation Army soldiers to Korea with their equipment in the spring of 1950.⁹

On May 15, 1950, without being informed of the recent consultation between Stalin and Kim Il Sung in Moscow, Mao met secretly with the North Korean leaders, Kim Il Sung and Park Hon Young, and approved completely Kim's plan for invasion of the South which Stalin and Kim had agreed upon earlier in Moscow. Mao made a number of recommendations on the forthcoming operation. Among others, Mao underlined that the Northern army must act swiftly, go around big cities without wasting time on their takeover, and concentrate their efforts on destroying the armed forces of the adversary. Mao said that Japanese would hardly interfere in the war. And if Americans took part in the combat activities, then China would help North Korea with troops. Mao even made a comment on the Soviet situation, according to Park Hon Young's account, by noting that the Soviet Union's participation in combat operations was not convenient because it was tied up by the agreement with America on demarcation along the 38th parallel. For Kim Il Sung, China's approval on his plan was required mainly due to Stalin's instruction that the final decision on the invasion plan had to "be made jointly by Chinese and Korean comrades."¹⁰ Kim Il Sung did not ask Mao for military aid, because all of his requests had been satisfied in

Moscow.¹¹

The division of responsibility between Moscow and Beijing is clear: the USSR would support North Korea with military equipment, and the PRC with troops, if Americans intervened in the Korean conflict. But why did Stalin ask Kim to get Mao's approval for this invasion plan, and why did Mao accept such a heavy obligation? Stalin intended to make China responsible for the outcome in case of Kim's catastrophic failure. Stalin even intended to lead China and the U.S. into conflict, thereby dispelling the specter of Sino-U.S. rapprochement and also making China lean closer to Moscow. Stalin's intention was reinforced in the actions regarding the Soviet withdrawal from the United Nation Security Council in January 1950 as well as its absence in July 1950 when the UNSC discussed the Korean situation. The Soviet abstention and consequent failure to exercise its veto enabled the UNSC to approve deployment of a UN force to Korea, which was considered a diplomatic victory for the Western powers. In a letter to Czechoslovakia's President Klement Gottward on August 27, 1950, Stalin revealed that the Soviet Union abstained in order to gain a couple of objectives: to give the U.S. "a free hand" in the Security Council to make "more mistakes," and to lead China to get involved in the conflict, thereby swinging the global balance of power in the Moscow's favor.¹²

Mao probably also accepted the Soviet decision because at the time he was preoccupied with liberation of Taiwan and he needed Stalin's assistance on the basis of a stable Sino-Soviet treaty. It was in late April that Premier Zhou Enlai asked Soviet foreign minister Nikolai Bulganin to speed up the delivery of naval requisitions such as ships, airplanes, and coastal artillery.¹³ Mao was also so prudent that he informed Soviet ambassador Roshin that he proposed, after Korean unification, to sign a treaty of friendship with North Korea, an alliance and mutual assistance agreement similar to the Soviet-Chinese treaty under the condition that Stalin would express his opinion. Stalin, on May 16, knowing of Mao's approval of Kim's plan, sent a cable to Mao expressing his support of the Beijing-Pyongyang alliance treaty by saying that as soon as the big cause of liberation and unification of Korea could be completed, it would be signed.¹⁴

Moscow's Role for War Preparation

Throughout the initial stage of the Korean War, the Soviet leadership was clearly in charge. It made the decision when to start the conflict, directed Kim Il Sung on how to fight and organize his command structure, and instructed the Korean command on its every move. Before and after the Stalin-Kim Il Sung talks in Moscow in April 1950, the war preparation were begun by the two sides jointly and actively. On May 1, 1949, Kim Il Sung asked Stalin for additional weapons for North Korea. A long list of required arms and ammunition was compiled to form various military units, including an air-force division, which Stalin satisfied up to 90 percent.¹⁵ In June 1949, a special protocol was signed between the USSR and DPRK in which Moscow agreed to satisfy completely the request of the North Korean government on the supply of arms and military-technical equipment. The lengthy procurement lists included air force equipment and armored vehicles.¹⁶ Kim Il Sung continued to demand additional armament in early 1950. In February 1950, Kim Il Sung asked Soviet Ambassador Shtykov to help him get permission from Stalin, stressing that the North Korean army should have three additional ground divisions in order to raise the size of the total armed forces to ten divisions. Stalin agreed and emphasized that the divisions be elitist, staffed with experienced officers, well-trained soldiers, and modern armament.¹⁷ North Korea promised to pay for these items on credit. Kim Il Sung devoted himself, up to the last minute before the war started, to requesting Moscow's provision of landing sea transports.¹⁸

So far as the operational plan is concerned, Soviet military leaders drafted it without consultation with North Korean military leaders, and sent it for Stalin's approval. Initially Postnikov, one of the Soviet military advisers, was not satisfied with a combat order drafted by North Korea's Operational Directorate, arguing that the Korean operation plan was much too defensive in focusing on "counterattack." The draft in Russian was entitled, "Preemptive Strike Operation Plan." It was criticized by North Korea's military leaders, who said the plan was drafted with no knowledge of terrain and thus the drafters made a lot of mistakes.¹⁹ Two of the original war plans had to be changed. One was the date to start war. The Soviet military advisers did not agree with Kim Il Sung, and preferred July rather than June, because only by that time would the armed forces be fully equipped and prepared. But they had no choice but to accept the June deadline due to the weather factor.

Kim Il Sung persisted that to advance during the rainy season be too risky.²⁰ The other change is that the original plan of the offensive had to be adjusted mainly because of the developing situation. According to radio broadcast interception and intelligence sources, the South Koreans had learned details of the forthcoming advance of the North Korean army. Instead of a local operation at Ongjin Peninsula as a prelude to the general offensive, the Soviet military advisers asked Stalin to approve an overall attack on June 25 along the whole front, as Kim Il Sung had suggested.²¹

Even with the operational plan, the North Korea military, prior to June 25 when it started war, was not well prepared for the control of operations and the organizational structure of control. Kim Il Sung had been instructed by General Vasiliev that the North Korean army “create two army groups headed by Military Councils, consisting of the Commander-in-Chief, member of the Military Council, and Chief of Staff.” He also urged that it “create the front command headed by the front commander, Chief of Staff, and member of the front military council, and [that] the Ministry of National Defense be responsible for providing military forces in action with all the necessities (food, fuel, transport, armament, etc.). Kim Il Sung was also advised on the question of the composition of the command that he be appointed as the Command-in-Chief of the Korean armed forces, with Kang Keun as Chief of the General Staff.”²²

Having seen the U.N. forces’ successful landing at Incheon and its aftermath, Stalin raised the issue of strategic and tactical instructions with his critics on the mistakes of the Soviet military advisers and the front command. On September 27, 1950, Stalin, according to a directive approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, criticized Soviet military advisers for their failures in intelligence—ignoring the serious warnings of the UN forces landing at Incheon, and displaying poor performance in helping the North Koreans in communications, troop control, organization of intelligence, and combat activities. Stalin sent the directive to the head of Soviet military advisers, Vasiliev, with the task of an orderly withdrawal of the main forces from the Southeast and quick organization of a new defensive front to the east, south, and north of Seoul.²³

After Seoul was recaptured by the UN forces, the situation became threatening; the North Korean leadership could not help but ask for Moscow’s special assistance. On September 29, 1950, Kim Il Sung and

Park Hon Young jointly sent a letter, noting that “at the moment that the enemy troops cross the 38th parallel we will be in dire need of direct military assistance from the Soviet Union, and if for some reasons it is not possible, then provide us the assistance to create international volunteer units in China and in other democratic people’s countries to provide military aid to our struggle.”²⁴ On September 30 and October 5, 1950, the Politburo in Moscow made two decisions. They included four directives in addition to the fifth directive on China: (1) tactical advice on North Korean withdrawal from the encirclement is of paramount importance; (2) withdrawal of Soviet representatives, including all Soviet air command personnel and families of Soviet military advisers; (3) evacuation of Kim Il Sung’s regime to China and/or the USSR; (4) training of North Korean troops, particularly to form six divisions for the future revanchism.²⁵

Consultations for China’s Decision and the Aftermath

Mao and China’s leaders confronted profound challenges at home and abroad when they made the decision to intervene in the conflict in Korea. Of particular importance is the fact that Mao had to overcome opposition within the Central Committee of the CCP at the same time that he strained to cope with Stalin’s and Kim Il Sung’s demands.

On October 1, the North Korean leadership sent off an emergency letter to Mao Zedong, formally asking the Chinese to send troops to Korea. Park Hon Young flew to Beijing on the evening of October 1 to deliver the letter by hand.²⁶ On that day, Stalin sent a cable to the Soviet ambassador in China for immediate delivery to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. The cable stressed:

... The situation of the Korean comrades is becoming desperate ... I believe that if you, in the present situation, consider it possible to send troops to aid the Koreans, then you should without delay move them to the 38th parallel, at least 5 and 6 divisions in order to give Korean comrades a chance to organize, under protection of your troops, military reserve to the north from the 38th parallel. *Chinese divisions could figure as volunteers*, to be sure, with the Chinese command above them (italics added).²⁷

At 3:00 PM., October 2, the Politburo in Beijing held the first of a series of enlarged meetings to formulate China’s rejoinder. It passed a

resolution to send troops under the name of volunteers to cross into Korea to fight the troops of the United States, and set October 15 as the date for the move. Mao felt obliged to inform Stalin of the action, and he cabled him that day.²⁸ It is worth noting, however, that the content of Mao's cable to Stalin was entirely different from the Politburo's resolution of October 2. On October 3, 1950, Soviet ambassador Roschin forwarded to Stalin the reply that the Chinese initially planned to deploy several volunteer divisions to North Korea to extend aid to Korean comrades, but after thoroughly thinking it over, "it is better now to persevere; don't engage, prepare forces." The reply said that no final decision had been adopted yet on this issue and if Stalin would agree, the Chinese government was ready to immediately send Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao to the place of his vacation.²⁹

Why was the Chinese leadership cautious in sending its troops to Korea and changed its earlier decision? It is highly probable that there was no unanimous decision within the Politburo on the Korean issue. Mao's reply even suggested that many comrades in the Central Committee had required prudence to be displayed.³⁰ Important Politburo members such as Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, and Lin Biao expressed reservations about the decision to enter the war. They apparently argued that priority should be given to peaceful construction at home, and worried that there was no guarantee of the success of the military operation against American troops.³¹ Beijing leaders were in no hurry to inform Moscow of their decision, since Moscow had not promised to assist Chinese troops with air cover. On the part of the PRC, Mao's letter to Stalin seemed to be a pretext for buying time to mobilize consensus within the Party and to use negotiations as leverage with Stalin. The Politburo meetings on October 4 and 5 indicated that Mao had led the participants to reach a consensus on the decision on October 2, with an enlightened emperor's way of dealing with different opinions in traditional Chinese political culture (*na jian zhidao*).³² After the meeting Mao again stressed: Chinese troops should enter by October 15 and Zhou Enlai flew to the Soviet Union to finalize details of Soviet air support for Chinese land forces.³³

On October 8, one day after the U.S. First Cavalry Division crossed the 38th parallel and the UN General Assembly approved the establishment of the UN Commission of the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, Mao formally issued the order to send Chinese troops to Korea.³⁴ The order included the establishment of the Chinese

People's Volunteers (CPVs) with Peng Dehuai as the commander and complete preparations to begin military operations. Even though Mao informed Kim Il Sung of the decision the same evening, Stalin was not informed of it. On October 10 and 11, Zhou Enlai in the Soviet Union did not tell Stalin about the Chinese decision. Zhou was trying to bargain with Stalin in order to get Soviet air cover and substantial military support. Stalin probably learned of the decision, but was said to inform Kim Il Sung, on October 12, that "the Chinese have again refused to send troops and that you must evacuate Korea and retreat in the northern direction in the shortest possible period."³⁵

It is apparent that although Stalin had a hard time inducing China to finalize the decision to enter the war, he demonstrated his determination not to face American forces in Korea, even if the North Korea regime were destroyed. He also persisted in taking a tough position on the issue of air cover, arguing that the Soviet Union provide China with air defense for major Chinese cities only after the Chinese troops moved into Korea.³⁶ On October 18, despite the lack of Moscow's assurance of air cover over the Chinese troops in Korea, the Beijing leadership finally ordered Chinese troops to cross the Yalu on October 19.

The Chinese decision to enter the war was an arduous one. It was made after careful analysis of their perceived threats, especially from the United States, as well as fulfillment of a communist obligation to help the Pyongyang regime's survival and the need to consolidate communist rule at home.³⁷ Mao was less concerned about Stalin's pressure than about Soviet air cover for the CPVs in Korea.

Coordination and Cooperation of the Communist Bloc in Major Campaigns

When the CPV entered the war, they conducted five major campaigns until the armistic agreement was signed on July 27, 1953. In accordance with the previous understanding between Moscow and Beijing, the Chinese provided troops and played a primary role in the major campaigns, and Moscow assisted the Chinese and North Korea troops with armament and ammunition. The North Korean army was under the operational control of the CPV command in Korea, in close consultation with Soviet military advisers in Korea.

On December 8, 1950, the CPV-KPA combined command (*lianhe zhihuibu*) was established. Peng Dehuai was appointed as commander and political commissar and Kim Woong as deputy commander, with

Pak Il Woo as deputy commissar. The CPV-KPA combined command had authority for unity of command over all the regular and irregular units of CPV and KPA in Korea, but also controlled military administration related to logistics, railroads, ports, and airfields.³⁸ The Beijing leadership, in consultation with Moscow, allowed North Korea to move its army divisions to Manchuria for restructure and training purposes. By October 30 and early November, nine divisions crossed the border and deployed in the Northeastern and Yangtse River areas, where a pilot school was planned to open for 2,600 pilots.³⁹ During the Korean War, China's Northeast was a very crucial rear area for the CPV as well as for the KPA. The CPV successfully conducted the third campaign and Seoul fell to the Communist troops on January 4, 1951. Peng Dehuai was ordered to push the offensive into one to end the war by a total victory. With their supply lines extended and casualties increasing, however, the CPV offensive gradually bogged down. Peng then ordered the Communist forces to halt offensive operations and consolidate their gains. The decision angered Kim Il Sung and caused a serious dispute between Chinese field commanders and North Korean leaders.⁴⁰

Just before Peng's fourth major campaign from January to April, 1951, Mao set up three groups of CPV troops which could conduct military actions on the basis of rotation to take turns fighting the UN forces. The first group composed of nine corps (thirty divisions) fought in Korea, while the second group in Korea was prepared to replace the first. The third group (ten corps, thirty divisions) stationed in the Northeast of China was prepared for battles in Korea.⁴¹ The three-group system was derived from the experience of battles in January-February 1951, which had caused losses of 100,000, showed the need for reserves for consecutive battles to maintain superiority in ground forces against the UN forces. Although the CPV took a primary role in the major campaigns, Stalin continued to be informed of the campaign plans, and even instructed through Soviet military advisers in Korea the tactics to be followed by the CPV and KPA. Stalin instructed the KPA to cut the number of divisions and army administration after the end of the third campaign. On January 30, 1951, Stalin sent a cable to Kim Il Sung, with a copy to Mao Zedong, proposing that both leaders should pay attention to restructuring the army divisions. He stressed that present Korean divisions had less fighting capacity than that of ten older divisions the previous summer. The Koreans had 28 divisions, of which 19 divisions were at the front, and 9 divisions were in Manchuria. The KPA divisions

did not have an adequate number of officers. That was why Korean divisions would be diluted, unstable, and inefficient. The Korean army should be reduced to 23 divisions, and the officer corps of the reduced five divisions could be used to strengthen the remaining weak divisions. Stalin further stressed that the Korean armed forces should not set up corps administration; it would be better to organize 5 army administrations, with 4 divisions in each army, and that in such a case they could have 5 armies, for a total of 20 divisions.⁴² Peng Dehuai agreed with Stalin's proposal, advised Kim Il Sung to reduce eight corps to six corps, and to have five brigades to guard the seashore and main cities.⁴³

Stalin even asked his ambassador in Pyongyang to give him information about Kim Il Sung's reaction to his proposal. The Soviet embassy in Pyongyang responded to Stalin, saying that Kim Il Sung agreed to Stalin's view, and that reduction of army divisions and administrations would begin after the arrival of three army administrations and divisions and continued after the next operation starting from February 1951. The embassy cable added: "Neither the Chinese nor the Koreans want to do anything about the sea defense and navy bases"; "not only is the navy affected by gigantic mania, but all other military services as well are trying to copy us."⁴⁴ North Korean navy brigades were also advised to defend the bases and the coasts and implement a drastic reduction of the navy administration, naval schools, and the staff of the fleet commander.⁴⁵

In conducting war in Korea, Mao and Stalin were compelled to consult closely on the operational issue and on Soviet air assistance for airfields in China and North Korea. Some of these matters were agreed upon, but the disagreements were resolved in Stalin's favor. Stalin disagreed with Mao's proposal to Peng Dehuai that in fighting superior Anglo-America forces in weapons and combat spirit after the January-February battles, different tactics should be employed by South Korean and Anglo-American forces. Mao thought it possible to conduct a number of small-scale operations against Anglo-American troops while conducting large-scale operations against South Korean troops. Mao even preferred to lure the American troops deep into North Korean territory, though not beyond the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. Stalin said that the lessons learned in the civil war of the Chinese Communists against Chiang Kai-shek could not be employed in the campaigns in Korea because the Anglo-Americans were not as stupid as Chiang.

Moreover, since the tactics were too risky, due to the fact that if Pyongyang would be surrendered to the adversary once again, it could not only lead to the collapse of Koreans' confidence and their troop morale, but also boost the morale of the adversary. Stalin asked to have prepared a very big and serious operation, not for local maneuvers, but for a serious assault on the Anglo-American troops.⁴⁶ Peng Dehuai was also in a position, based on Mao's idea, to develop small-scale warfare in the adversary's rear to defeat the adversary, and to turn slowly to the mass-scale defeat of the adversary.⁴⁷

So far as air defense in the war is concerned, both the Soviet Union and the PRC carefully coordinated a number of problems concerned with the scope of the Soviet fighters' mission, construction of airfields, and replacement of old fighters with new ones. From the beginning of Chinese engagement in the war, the Chinese leadership repeatedly requested that Moscow provide air cover. Stalin in March 1951 agreed to transfer two Soviet fighter divisions under Soviet general Belov to Korea, and also agreed to deploy an additional fighter division to Antung in order that two Chinese fighter divisions could be sent to the front in Korea. On August 11, 1951, however, Mao informed Stalin that the previous plan of simultaneous transfer to Korea of Chinese and Soviet air units should be postponed, mainly because of the delay of work to construct air fields in Korea that had been destroyed by American bombing. Stalin only sent, on the pretext of the lack of air fields in Korea, two anti-air divisions composed of anti-air artillery to cover only the main big facilities in North Korea.⁴⁸

Rather than send fighter divisions to cover the CPV in the Korean front, Stalin seemed to encourage the Communists troops and determined to replace MIG-9s with MIG-15s. Stalin was even outspoken in recognizing the mistake, saying that air battle on the border between Manchuria and North Korea had completely convinced him that MIG-9s were no match for the American jet fighters. Stalin promised Mao to supply China with 372 MIG-15s free of charge, with payment only for transportation from the USSR to China, and to keep MIG-9s for training pilots.⁴⁹ Stalin was primarily concerned about the defense of the China-North Korea border by fighters with Soviet pilots, but he was not interested in reinforcing air defense of the Beijing, Shanghai, and Canton areas. That is why Stalin declined to meet the requests by Mao to provide three fighter divisions and three aviation technical battalions, with equipment to train three Chinese fighter divisions and six groups of

technical personnel for MIG-9s.⁵⁰ All these requests, as viewed by Stalin, meant that China would be able to modernize its air forces beyond the needs of fighting in Korea. Stalin politely refused Mao's request, saying that "we do not produce MIG-9s any more and we do not have them," and "if you still need to use our flying personnel for training Chinese fliers of MIG, you can use for three months the instructors from the Soviet fighter divisions deployed in China."⁵¹

The Soviet Union was reluctant to accept the program of arming all sixty divisions of China, and also Mao's requests that Soviet military advisers be sent to the headquarters of CPV troops (in total ten persons), to armies (in total 10 persons), and to twenty-one corps (in total 63 persons).⁵² In anticipation of concluding an armistice agreement in Korea, and in order to prevent Chinese military modernization, Stalin postponed the program to arm sixty divisions to the end of 1954, pretending that the Chinese had changed their requests from armament for 30 divisions to 60 divisions, and he also changed the repayment schedule on credit.⁵³ In particular, Stalin informed Kim Il Sung of the fact that out of the armament for 30 Chinese divisions, Beijing was supposed to provide weapons for 3 Korean divisions.⁵⁴ Stalin appointed five-star general Zakhazov as the chief military adviser. He informed Mao about sending only 5 military advisers to the main headquarters of the CPV in Korea in early October 1951, and refused to send military advisers to the armies and corps.⁵⁵ Stalin pointed out that Soviet military advisers, learning responsibility for the combat activities, would invariably try to substitute for the commanders of the formations.⁵⁶ It seems highly probable that the reason behind Stalin's decision to send only five advisers out of 83 that Mao requested was that Stalin had been suspicious of the Soviet military advisers who would have been exploited by their Chinese counterpart, especially at the time of Chinese requests for weapons and equipments. Mao had often included a phrase, "after consultations with Soviet (chief) military advisers," whenever he would propose military assistance to Moscow.

China's Lead in Armistice Negotiations

Armistice negotiations in 1951 were directed by Mao Zedong personally. He regularly informed Stalin of the proceedings and occasionally asked for his advice on the most important issues. Stalin intervened in the truce negotiations as adviser or coordinator, but did not dictate decisions at the talks. Kim Il Sung played only a secondary role

in the negotiations and expressed his views only to Mao, who then chose to forward them to Stalin or not.

The Communist defeat in the fifth campaign from April 22 to June 10, 1951 forced Mao and Chinese leaders to reconsider their aims to unify the Korea. The CCP leadership decided at the end of May that China would adopt a new strategy, one keyed to “fighting while at the same time negotiating,” and China’s operational aims would now be redefined as pursuing an armistice by restoring the prewar status in Korea.⁵⁷ Kim Il Sung, however, was unwilling to accept the Chinese position. Stalin intervened in coordinating both sides of China and North Korea to reach the conclusion that “an armistice is now advantageous.”⁵⁸

At the beginning of the negotiation at Kaesong, the Communist side tried to put on the agenda the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and the question of the 38th parallel as the military disengagement line. All these were preferred by Stalin. As viewed from Mao and Communist negotiators, the question of foreign troop withdrawal could not be solved in the negotiations. On July 20, 1951, Mao Zedong told Stalin that concerning the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, the UN side, considering it as political issue, was resolutely against putting it on the agenda, and that it was better to stop raising the question of withdrawal than trying to solve it by conducting long military actions without hope for success.⁵⁹ The Chinese, with Stalin’s consent, determined to drop the demand for withdrawal of foreign troops.

Nevertheless, negotiations at the next stage were even more arduous. The Communist side proposed that the demarcation line would be based on the 38th parallel. The UN side, however, countered with a line running basically between Pyongyang and Wonsan, about 20-30 kilometers north of the existing front line between the Communist and UN forces. Having examined the military situation in Korea, the general international situation, and the fact that North Korea could not carry on the war, Chinese leaders came to believe that it would be better to consider the possibility of ceasing military actions along the existing front line than to fight for the 38th parallel and bring the conference to the breaking point.⁶⁰ The Beijing leadership probably allowed North Korea to address publicly the General Assembly and Security Council on the following demands: an immediate cessation of military actions in Korea; withdrawal of troops from the front line and creation of a 2-kilometer demilitarized zone; and prosecuting culprits for dragging on the war in Korea.⁶¹ This action would have not been approved by Stalin, who had considered such

an appeal under conditions of blackmail by the Americans “a sign of weakness” of the Sino-Korea side and “politically disadvantageous.”

A week before fixing the demarcation line as the actual line of contact between the two sides was agreed upon by the Communist and the US-UN sides, Stalin sent the Politburo’s decision to Mao, complaining that “though the Americans are delaying negotiations, they are in a bigger need of their speedy conclusion,” and that it is advisable for the Chinese-Korean side to “continue flexible tactics at the negotiations without showing any hurry and displaying an interest in the speedy completion of the negotiations. ... The adversary needs peace much more than we do.”⁶²

The prisoner of war issue caused another big rift. The negotiations for solving the POW issue began on December 11, 1951, and would not be resolved for approximately one and a half years. Both sides disputed the number of POWs in the other side’s custody and the conditions for voluntary repatriation of POWs, meaning that those refusing to return home would be released. The Communist side rejected this proposal, demanding all-for-all exchange and denouncing voluntary repatriation. In late April, 1952, the US-UN side introduced a “final” package proposal, confirming that the POWs would not be repatriated forcibly and that only 70,000 Communist prisoners, instead of the earlier agreed number of 116,000 would be returned.⁶³ The POW issue led the Beijing leadership to give up any illusion of a quick end to the war, and to carry out tit-for-tat struggles with the Americans both in the political sphere and on the battlefield. The issue also led Chinese leaders to closely cooperate with Stalin, mainly because of receiving Moscow’s advice and more armament for continuing the war.

In a meeting with Stalin on August 20, 1952, Zhou Enlai asked Stalin whether or not North Korea engaged in strategic or tactical assaults in order to counter American bombing in the North. Zhou also requested advice on the POW issue (which was in deadlock) and on continuing the war. Stalin preferred attrition to war, stressing that the Americans could not defeat a small war, because all their strength was in air raids and in the atomic bomb, and that firmness was requested in dealing with America. If America did not lose this war, then the Chinese would never get Taiwan.⁶⁴ Stalin seemed to consider the prolonged war as a means to shake up Truman’s regime in America and downgrade the military prestige of Anglo-American troops.⁶⁵ But the leadership in Moscow needed to pay for a prolonged war by providing the Chinese-

North Korean troops with huge amounts of ammunition and artillery, in addition to continuously supplying 20 army divisions of China in order to strengthen the Communist position at the negotiation table.⁶⁶

Stalin also advised that the Communist side should take three steps in dealing with Americans on the POW issue, one of which did contribute to new China's proposal on the issue. According to the third stage Stalin suggested, the prisoners who did not want to return might be temporarily sent to a neutral third country, and then after determining their intentions, they would either be released or returned.⁶⁷ The Communist side, on June 4, 1953, in fact agreed with the principle of voluntary repatriation, under the condition that the prisoners unwilling to return would be transferred to neutral states that would guarantee reasonable treatment of them.

On June 18, ROK President Syngman Rhee released more than 25,000 anti-Communist North Korean prisoners held in the custody of South Korean forces. This action could neither stop nor delay a final agreement for an armistice, although it would put Washington under heavy pressure at home and abroad. President Rhee gained a security pact with the United States, expansion of his army to twenty divisions, \$200 million dollars in economic aid, and commitments regarding the political conference to follow the armistice.⁶⁸ The Chinese perceived that the main player in the Korean War was the Americans, and for the sake of their own interests, they would at a certain moment exert pressure on Syngman Rhee to agree on signing the armistice agreement. In this case, Chinese deputy foreign minister Wu Xueqian was said to make a joke that "we are facing a paradoxical situation when the U.S.A. and China stand in a way together against Syngman Rhee."⁶⁹

Concluding Remarks

The findings in this article challenge previous arguments that the decision to go to war in Korea "came in bits and pieces and was never coordinated or even thoroughly scrutinized by the three states," and that "it was reckless war making of the worst kind."⁷⁰ In contrast, there is considerable evidence that the Soviet Union, the PRC, and North Korea did carefully calculate the military balance between North and South and seriously evaluated the possibility of U.S. intervention. Moscow and Beijing even coordinated their roles in the event of U.S. intervention.

If it is true that Stalin not only predicted but actually wanted U.S. intervention in the Korean War, we should reconsider the widely

accepted notion that Dean Acheson's remarks on the defense perimeter caused Stalin's misperception.⁷¹ Stalin might have viewed U.S. intervention in terms of a "sweet and bitter" perspective. If the U.S. did not intervene, the Communist bloc would achieve a speedy victory. If the U.S. did not enter the war, Stalin expected that it might lead the U.S. and China into military conflict, thereby swinging the global balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union. Moscow and Beijing assured Pyongyang of helping North Korea with armament and with troops respectively in the worst-case scenario that the U.S. would intervene.

Moscow and Pyongyang cooperated in making the operation plan. Stalin deeply intervened in restructuring the North Korean army, and closely coordinated with Mao on the tactics of the campaigns. The CPV commanded the North Korean army, and launched several major campaigns. Chinese negotiators played a lead role during the period of armistice talks. Mao even persuaded Stalin to comply with his views to exclude on the agenda the withdrawal of foreign troops and the 38th parallel as the demarcation line. There were some disagreements, for instance over air cover and a couple of armistice negotiation issues, but these were resolved. Cooperation in the Communist bloc in general was maintained to the extent that the combined command and solidified leadership among the three Communist states could work successfully in conducting and ending the war, arguably in favor of them. Nationalism negatively affected their partnership to a certain extent, but did not significantly harm it.

Ideology, image, and a desire to swing the global balance of power in the Communists' favor prompted the three states to take a calculated risk in Korea. Without the approval and assistance of the two giant Communist powers, Kim Il Sung could not have determined to reunify the divided country by force. Moscow and Beijing were also responsible for a prolonged war that lasted more than three years, including two years after the armistice talks started.

One of the important lessons the Communist bloc, together with the United States, learned from the Korean War is that peaceful means, not force, should be employed for the unification of the divided country in the future. Beijing and Moscow have since wanted peace and stability on the Korean peninsula; but they have not been in a position to deter North Korea's provocations and insurgency toward South Korea, or able to persuade North Korea to be a responsible state in international society. Since the armistice in Korea, only an unstable and armed peace has

prevailed. The Beijing and Moscow leaderships should make every effort to promote a stable peace in Korea. This is the rationale and obligation that the states responsible for the Korean War should have.

Notes:

¹ Conversation between Stalin and Kim Il Sung, March 7, 1949; *Archives of the President of Russia*, cited in Anatoly Torkunov, *The War in Korea 1950-1953: Its Origin, Bloodshed and Conclusion* (Tokyo: ICF Publishers, 2000), p. 31.

² Cable of the Soviet representative in China, Kovalev, to Stalin, May 18, 1949, *Archives of the President of Russia*, pp. 1-3, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, pp. 55-56.

³ Memorandum of Ambassador Shtykov's conversation with Kim Il Sung and Park Hon Young, August 12, 1949; *Archives of the President of Russia*, pp. 5-7, cited in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, pp. 28-29.

⁴ Embassy's analysis of the political and economic situation on South and North Korea, September 15, 1949; *Archives of the President of Russia*, pp. 1-21, cited in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, pp. 36-41.

⁵ Decision of the Politburo of the C. C. of All-Union Communist Party(Bolshevik), No. p.71/191, Question N191, September 24, 1949, cited in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, pp. 41-42.

⁶ Stalin's cable to Ambassador Shtykov, January 30, 1950, *Archives of the President of Russia*, cited in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 47.

⁷ Stalin's cable to Shtykov, February 2, 1950, *Archives of the President of Russia*, cited in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 48. The Chinese sources also suggest that Stalin had asked Chairman Mao's opinion about Kim's plan, especially if he thought that the Americans would intervene. Mao said: The Americans might not come in because this is Korea's internal affairs. Concerning the account of Mao's interpreter, Shi Zhe, see Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 87-88.

⁸ Report on Kim Il Sung's visit to the USSR, March 30-April 25, 1950, prepared by the International Department of the C C of All-Union Communist Party(Bolshevik), *Archives of the President of Russia*, cited in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, pp. 51-53.

⁹ Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War*, p. 88.

¹⁰ Roshin's cable to Stalin, May 14, 1950 and Roshin's cable to Stalin, May 16, 1950, *Archives of the President of Russia*, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 62.

¹¹ Shtykov's cable to Stalin, May 19, 1950, *Archives of the President of Russia*, pp. 3-4, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 60.

¹² A cable of Stalin to Soviet Ambassador, Prague, August, 27, 1950, RGA sp I, Fort, 558, opis, 11, Delo. 62, Listy, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, pp. 71-2.

¹³ Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Lita, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 144-145, 149.

¹⁴ A cable form Stalin to Roshin for Mao Zedong, May 16, 1950, *Archives of the President of Russia*, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 62.

¹⁵ A letter from Kim Il Sung to Stalin, April 28, 1949, *Archives of the President of Russia*, and Shtykov's cable to Stalin, May 1, 1949, *Archives of the President of Russia*, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 63.

¹⁶ *Archives of the President of Russia*, Fund 6, list 9. p.57, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p.64.

¹⁷ Shtykov's cable to Stalin, February 4, 1950, *Archives of the President of Russia*, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 49.

¹⁸ Shtykov's cable to Stalin, June 20, 1950, *Archives of the President of Russia*, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 67.

¹⁹ Goncharov et al., *Uncertain Partners*, p. 150.

²⁰ Shtykov's cable to Stalin, May 29, 1950, *Archives of the President of Russia*, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 66.

²¹ Shtykov's cable to Stalin, June 21, 1950, *Archives of the President of Russia*, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 68.

²² Coded message N.405840, July 4, 1950, the 8th Directorate of the General Staff, Soviet Armed Forces, from Pyongyang, pp.1-3, cited in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p.66. In addition, Mu-jung was to head the left-flank as the Deputy Defense Minister in charge of artillery; Kim Woong would head the right-flank group as Deputy Chief of Staff; and Kim Chaek would be head front commander as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

²³ Politburo of the C C of All-Union Communist Party(Bolshevik), Decision of September 27, NP 78/73, Extract from the minutes N 78. of Politburo meeting, 73. Questions of Korea, p.1, cited in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, pp. 80-82.

²⁴ Coded message N 600308/sh. September 30, 1950, cited in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, pp. 85-86.

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- ²⁵ Decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party(Bolshevik), NP 78/118, September 30, 1950; The Politburo of the Central Committee of the AUCP(B), NP 78/168, October 5, 1950. 1304/sh, N 18909, cited in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, pp. 87-88.
- ²⁶ Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War*, p.172.
- ²⁷ Stalin's cable to Beijing, October 1, 1950, *State Archives*, pp.97-98. Coded message. N 4581, cited in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, pp. 102-103.
- ²⁸ For the Chinese version of the Mao's telegram to Stalin on the decision to send troops to Korea, October 2, 1950, see *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC]*, pp. 539-41. The full text appeared in Goncharov, et al., *Uncertain Partners* p. 275, and Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War*, pp. 175-177.
- ²⁹ Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, pp. 103-104.
- ³⁰ Ibid.
- ³¹ Goncharov, et al., *Uncertain Partners*, pp. 179-183.
- ³² Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War*, pp. 181-185.
- ³³ Ibid.
- ³⁴ *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung*, vol. V (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), p. 43.
- ³⁵ Stalin's cable to Kim Il Sung, October 12, 1950 in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 106.
- ³⁶ Goncharov, et al., *Uncertain Partners*, pp. 194-195.
- ³⁷ For China's motives and objectives in terms of domestic and foreign-policy interaction, see Melvin Gurtov and Byong Moo Hwang, *China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), pp. 56-62.
- ³⁸ *Zhou Enlai Junshi Wen Xuan* (Collected Military Writings of Zhou Enlai), vol.4 (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1997), pp. 122-123.
- ³⁹ Coded message N 600584/sh, October 31, 1950, the 8th Directorate of the General Staff, Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, pp. 2-3, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 110.
- ⁴⁰ Chen Jian, "Chinese Intervention and 'Communist Bloc' Cooperation in the Korean War," in Byong Moo Hwang et al., eds, *Pursuing Peace beyond the*

Korean War (Seoul: Research Institute on National Security Affairs, Korea National Defense University, 2000), pp. 59-60.

⁴¹ *Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan*, pp. 152-153, 158-161.

⁴² Coded message N651, January 30, 1951, the 8th Directorate of the General Staff, Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 120.

⁴³ Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 124.

⁴⁴ Coded message N10031, February 3, 1951, Stalin to the Embassy in Pyongyang, coded message N50031/sh, January 31, 1951, from the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang to Stalin, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, pp. 121-122.

⁴⁵ Coded message N652, January 30, 1951, the 8th Directorate of the General Staff, Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 120.

⁴⁶ Coded message N3282, the 8th Directorate of the General Staff, Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, *Archives of the President of Russia*, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, pp. 127-128.

⁴⁷ Coded message N 20412, June 4, 1951, A cable from Mao to Stalin, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, pp. 129-130.

⁴⁸ Coded message N17834, March 18, 1951, Mao to Stalin, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 126; coded message N21646, July 18, 1951, Mao to Stalin, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 141.

⁴⁹ Coded message N1713, May 23, 1951, Stalin to Mao, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 127.

⁵⁰ Coded message N25187, October 24, 1951, The Second Chief Directorate, General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, pp.141-142, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 146.

⁵¹ Coded message N6648, November 14, 1951, Stalin to Mao through Krasovsky (Chief Soviet Military Adviser). in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 147.

⁵² Coded message N 23703, September 8, 1951, the Second Chief Directorate, General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, pp.98-99, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, pp. 142-144.

⁵³ Coded message N2332, October 7, 1951, Stalin to Mao, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 145.

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- ⁵⁴ Coded message N102522, November 13, 1951, Stalin to Kim Il Sung, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 146.
- ⁵⁵ Coded message N5542, September 26, 1951, Stalin to Mao, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 144.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid.
- ⁵⁷ Chen Jian, "Chinese Intervention," p. 63.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 64.
- ⁵⁹ Coded message N22054, July 20, 1951, Mao to Stalin, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, pp. 168-169.
- ⁶⁰ Coded message N22834, August 13, 1951, The Second Chief Directorate, the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, *Archives of the President of Russia*, pp. 56-58, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 170.
- ⁶¹ Politburo decision NP84/422, November 19, 1951, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 172.
- ⁶² Politburo decision NP84/421, November 19, 1951, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, p. 173.
- ⁶³ Chen Jian, "Chinese Intervention," pp. 70-71.
- ⁶⁴ Memorandum of Stalin-Zhou Conversation on August 20, 1952, written by A. Vyshinsky and N. Fedosenko. *Russian State Archives*, pp.54-72, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, pp. 177-178.
- ⁶⁵ Coded message N3410, June 5, 1951, *Archives of the President of Russia*, pp. 17-18, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, pp. 167-168.
- ⁶⁶ As for the Chinese request for various weapons, see A Report to Stalin, N738343, January 12, 1953. *Archives of the President of Russia*, pp.1-2, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*, pp.181-183.
- ⁶⁷ As for the three steps Stalin suggested on the prisoner issue, see Chen Jian, "Chinese Intervention," p. 76.
- ⁶⁸ Dean Acheson, *The Korean War* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), p. 150.
- ⁶⁹ Coded message N17286, July 3, 1953, Soviet Embassy to the Kremlin, in Torkunov, *The War in Korea*.
- ⁷⁰ Goncharov, *Uncertain Partners*, p. 214.

⁷¹ Byong Moo Hwang, “Misperception and the Causes of the Korean War,” *Revue Internationale d’Histoire Militaire*, No. 70 (1988), pp. 198-210, esp. pp. 204-208.

