Chinese Perspectives on the Origins of the Korean War: 
An Assessment at Sixty

Steven M. Goldstein
Smith College

ABSTRACT

A discussion of the evolution and present state of Chinese research concerning the origins of the Korean War, with particular emphasis on the impact of the strategic aims of Joseph Stalin on the options open to China in the spring of 1950.

Keywords: Korean War Origins. Mao Zedong. Joseph Stalin. Sino-Soviet Relations. Taiwan.
Introduction

“Just how one views the Korean War depends upon where one stands in geographic space, cultural time, and Cold War historiography.” -- Allan R. Millet

As we mark the sixtieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, Millet’s contention certainly applies to Chinese views of the origins of that conflict. Indeed, during the last decade there has been vigorous discussion on this issue, shaped not only by the changing political environment in China, but also by the dramatic revelations that have become available from archival sources as well as from the work of international scholars. What has emerged by no means can be labeled a consensus. Still, there are dominant interpretations as well as common themes and unanswered questions that emerge in Chinese writings.

Before developing this argument, let me begin on a personal note. In 1986, I was fortunate to be a member of the American delegation to the first Sino-American conference on the Cold War, hosted by Professor Yuan Ming at Beijing University. Before the conference began, we were warned that there were certain sensitive topics that should be treated with care. Prominent among these was the Korean War—and especially its origins. Today, almost twenty-five years later, I think it is safe to say that the issue of the origins (qiyuan or qiyin) of the war has become one of the more hotly and widely discussed topics in recent Chinese scholarship.

The Evolving Chinese View

In 1998, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences published a volume entitled Dangdai Zhong-Han guanxi (Contemporary Chinese-Korean Relations). This study provides a useful starting point for our discussion as it not only traces the evolution of Chinese views of the war’s origins since 1950, but it also begins to probe some of the issues that would dominate the next twelve years of Chinese scholarship.

The volume's discussion of the Korean War begins by posing the question: “Who started this war?” In the aftermath of the war, the authors note, each side blamed the other for having begun the conflict, with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea still holding the view that the initiators were the United States and the Republic of Korea. 2

The American view is depicted as more complex, with at least four schools of thought: The traditional view (the war was launched by Stalin, whereas Kim Il-sung was an instrument of Soviet aggression); the
“revisionist” school (the United States and its “henchman” Syngman Rhee attacked the North or lured the North to attack the South); the post-traditional view (Stalin was opposed at first and sought Mao’s opinion. Mao approved in principle); and the post-revisionist view (the causes of the war were primarily domestic in nature).³

Although not as complex, the Chinese view (as of 1998) was said to have evolved from an initial view that was identical to that of North Korea, to one in the 1980s that avoided the question of blame altogether by simply stating that the Korean War “broke out” (baofa). After the end of the Cold War, the authors argue, discussions of the causes of the war were avoided until most recently (1998) when a “comparatively objective description” developed, contending that

the Korean War was a complicated issue produced in complex circumstances and cannot be understood by simple judgments. Viewed from the inside, it was the necessary result due to the continued accumulation of contradictions between the North and the South. Viewed from the outside, the roots lay in the policies and Cold War confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States which created spheres of influence and divided a single Korea into two. One should say that without the division of Korea there would have been no Korean War and without the Cold War Korea would not have been divided.⁴

Finally, the authors state that under these circumstances it is difficult to place responsibility for the conflict on either side, noting that although in theory one might distinguish between the attacker and defender, it is difficult to do so in practice.

Yet even as they avoid addressing the issue of how the war began, the authors of this study note that issues were being raised and new answers were being provided by the recently available Russian archives. As was the case with Western scholarship, the availability of new documents from the archives stimulated a surge in Chinese scholarship on the Korean War, providing the basis to address a number of questions, many of which had been taboo. In this volume, however, such issues are simply raised without providing much elaboration.

Among these questions was the issue of who attacked whom. Noting that Western scholarship “generally (putong) recognized that North Korea launched the attack that started the war,” the authors maintain in a remarkably understated manner that the Russian archives seem to
This unelaborated assertion is followed by a number of other controversial issues that are raised or briefly addressed. Why did Stalin, after long resisting Kim’s requests to attack, suddenly change his mind in early 1950? What exactly did Mao know about Kim’s plans? Mao complained that he had to read about the invasion in a French newspaper and yet Korean troops were transferred from China on the eve of the invasion. Did China’s leaders actively or passively agree to support North Korea’s attack? Was Mao pressured to agree? And finally, somewhat pointedly, how accurate are the conclusions drawn from the Russian archives when the Chinese and North Korean archives are not yet available?

Today, as the sixtieth anniversary of the Korean War approaches, many of these questions have been addressed and answered by Chinese scholars, although the two archives still remain closed. The discussion that follows draws on journal articles, book chapters, and monographs to introduce the dimensions of the current Chinese narrative on the origins of the Korean War.

**Cold War Division and Civil War**

As reflected in the excerpt cited earlier, by the end of the 1990s, Chinese scholarship was beginning to come to grips with one of the central issues in Western historiography on the Korean War—comprehensive understanding of its causes based on an integration of international and domestic factors.

Introducing international forces into a discussion of the origins of the Korean War potentially posed a problem for Chinese commentators. The position taken by China since the summer of 1950 was that the United States had intervened in its civil war and by doing so had changed the nature of the conflict. Nonetheless, as is the case with Western analyses, the impact of Soviet-American policy to create the potential for conflict on the peninsula is an integral part of Chinese discussions on the war.

It has been generally acknowledged that the division of the nation frustrated the aspirations of the Korean people, creating two regimes that reflected the interests and ideology of the creator of the division and two regimes that were determined to unify the country. For this reason, more than one commentator depicts the conflict as “inevitable.” However, this argument has not eliminated the emphasis of human agency in Chinese discussions. In a manner similar to Western studies, even as the importance of the international context is acknowledged, very different
positions are taken on the immediate causes of the conflict as well as the
nature and motivations of the combatants.

Although a certain amount of pluralism remains in Chinese
discussions, there has been a general evolution of Chinese views over the
last decade. Chinese discussions of the origins of the war have gradually
come to emphasize the importance of human agency, while treating the
international environment as contextual. Moreover, in regard to agency,
the view has become a mirror image of what it was in the 1950s and
1960s. In other words, the prime movers of the conflict are no longer the
United States and its client regime in the South. Rather, the origins of
the war are traced to the policies of the Soviet Union and its client state
in North Korea.

Of course, there are those who hold to earlier orthodoxies. For
example, writing in the authoritative Communist Party journal Dangde
wenxian in 2001, Zhang Min criticizes as un-Marxist any view that seeks
the origins of the war in the division of Korea at the 38th parallel. The
division, for which the Soviet Union bore only secondary responsibility,
simply created a border. The United States, he argues, must “take
principal responsibility for the outbreak of the war” due to its closing the
door to reunification and its support of the “Rhee clique’s” policy of
armed unification.8

To take another example of lingering orthodoxy, on the fiftieth
anniversary of the war, General Meng Zhaohui, a Korean War veteran
and research fellow at the Academy of Military Sciences, took a position
akin to earlier views and criticized those who attempt to revise it.
Acknowledging that Korea’s domestic politics were shaped by
international political divisions, he depicts a Manichean image of the
“progressive” North which sought “true freedom and independence” and
a reactionary South that was “a vermin (yipu) that obeyed imperialism.”
American support for the establishment of the Republic of Korea (ROK)
settled the division of the country and created the conditions for war. By
1950, the North was forced to abandon its policy of peaceful unification
and war became unavoidable. On June 25, the South attacked and the
North counterattacked. Such a version of the conflict was published in
China as late as 2009.9

Although these two views on the causes of the war are far more
nuanced than earlier depictions of American-inspired aggression, they
share an emphasis on Washington’s creation of the environment on the
peninsula as well as its provocation of the actual conflict. In this respect,
in their approach to the Korean War these articles represent a variety of neo-orthodoxy. Although I have only been able to sample a relatively small number of papers and books published during the early part of the twenty-first century, my sense is that the dominant approaches to the origins of the Korean War, especially those published by official organizations, tended toward either this approach or the more neutral one of dispersing blame by emphasizing the impact of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States as the causal factor in the division that created the conditions for the conflict.  

In this vein, one commentator notes that after the post-Mao reforms, Chinese scholars have examined the impact of the Cold War and have regarded Soviet-American rivalry as an “importance cause of the outbreak of the war.” Still, this assessment of the impact of the reform movement is too modest. As in so many other areas, Chinese scholarship was globalized during the 1990s. This is evident in the citations to Western works as well as to summaries of the different approaches to the Korean War in other countries.  

However, as was the case in the West, it was the availability of the Russian archives that had the most profound impact on Chinese scholarship. One of the earliest indications that the archives would challenge the prevailing orthodoxy came in Shen Zhihua’s report of a 1995 Georgetown University conference published in the party history journal, Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu. Noting that the study of the Korean War had seen two waves of scholarship—beginning with the publication of the U.S. foreign relations series in the 1970s and followed in the 1980s and the 1990s with the publication of new materials in China—Shen argues that with the release of the Russian archives (which he describes in great detail) “the Korean War once again became a hot issue in discussions by international scholars.”

Shen goes on to summarize the views of a number of foreign scholars on central questions pertaining to the war and in the process cites his own view on its origins:

… against the background of the Cold War, recognizing that both the North and the South intended to use force to realize their own ideals, authority, and system on the entire Korean peninsula and thus to realize national unity.

The difference was that the North’s conception and plan was approved and supported by the Soviet Union, whereas it did not
have the support and approval of the United States.14

What follows is a summary of the different views held by the participants at the Georgetown conference regarding such essential (but previously largely ignored in China) questions on the extent of Chinese participation in the plans for the war; Stalin’s reasons for agreeing to Kim Il-sung’s plans for war; and the various versions of Mao’s telegram to Stalin in October 1950.

The publication of this conference summary, with its extensive citation of materials from the Russian archives as well its introduction of materials from the Cold War International History Project in an authoritative party history journal, is surely significant.15 Earlier works by Shen Zhishua and others that used the Russian archives to delve into unchartered historical waters could only be published in Hong Kong.16 Now, it seemed the authorities had given a green light to yet a third “wave.”

The Korean War at Sixty: Stalin Approves, Mao Accedes—but China Loses

Chinese scholarship on the origins of the Korean War after the opening and academic digestion of the Russian archives parallels in important respects the path taken by Western scholars.17 By 2010, the dominant view among Chinese commentators is an elaboration of Shen Zhishua’s perspective. The facts of the Cold War represent the background to the origins of the war as it divided Korea and involved both the United States and the Soviet Union as sponsors of their respective surrogate regimes. However, the responsibility for the actual outbreak of the war is placed squarely on the shoulders of Stalin who, unlike those in the Truman administration, was willing to unleash his impatient and aggressive Korean client.

Moreover, again in a manner that parallels international historiography on the war, Chinese scholars have sought to establish the precise role that Mao played before the outbreak of the war.18 This is a topic that goes beyond mere historical accuracy; it touches on the Chairman’s place in history. Chinese discussions of the Korean War routinely emphasize the accomplishments of the military in confronting a technologically superior enemy and the subsequent rise in Chinese global prestige. However, the conflict is also associated with the diversion of resources for economic reconstruction as well as loss of life and, perhaps most damaging of all, the failure of the Communist Party to complete the
reunification of the country by defeating the Guomindang (Kuomintang) regime on Taiwan.

Before the 1990s, the Chinese role in the planning and initiation of the war was not a topic addressed by Chinese historians. The Chinese leaders were said to have focused on the domestic issues of reunification and economic reconstruction, only to be diverted from those tasks first by the dispatch of the Seventh Fleet and then by the advance of American forces above the 38th parallel. The war was thus forced upon China by Washington. After the 1990s, and more intensely in the first decade of the twenty-first century, a new dimension was added as Stalin became not only the key actor in the initiation of the war, but, more importantly from the Chinese perspective, a silent co-conspirator with Washington in denying the Chinese Communist Party closure in the civil war against the Nationalists.

The bitterness regarding Stalin’s role would become public after the Russian archives became available in China. However, it seems that this had been a topic in the Sino-Soviet dispute of the 1960s. Yang Kuisong reports the following dispute between Nikita Khrushchev and Peng Zhen during the summer of 1960:

Khrushchev: Since we are in this small meeting, we can say that the North Koreans started the Korean War and that the Soviet Union and China agreed (tongyi le).

Peng Zhen: That’s not right, we didn’t agree. I participated in the Politburo meetings and know something about this.

Khrushchev: I have seen the documents. Mao agreed.

Peng Zhen: There are two points that need clarification. First, we had no prior knowledge….

Khrushchev: …The Korean War was launched as the result of a joint decision (gongtong jueding) by both Stalin and Mao Zedong.

Peng Zhen: What you say is not right. Mao Zedong opposed the attack (fandui da de)…

In the eyes of most Chinese commentators, the Russian archives have now resolved this controversy. In the most recent narrative, Stalin is
depicted as “selfish” and hypocritical in remaining aloof from the war and giving the impression of pursuing a “peace-loving” policy. This was despite the fact that the Soviet Union was “a most important factor among the many international elements in regard to the genesis, outbreak, and development of the war.” Without Soviet approval, as well as material and spiritual support, there would have been no invasion by the North. Very simply, the Soviet Union under Stalin provided the “catalyst” (cuihua) for the conflict.

More specifically, in the prevailing Chinese view Stalin is seen as primarily responsible for agreeing to Kim’s war plans, with Mao playing a decidedly secondary and reluctant role. In a comprehensive examination of the prelude to the war, a scholar at the Institute of Modern History of the Chinese Academy of the Social Sciences examines the hypothesis of a “conspiracy theory among the three countries” based on the Russian archives. Extrapolating from Mao’s consistent opposition to a North Korean attack throughout 1949, he concludes that when Mao met with Stalin in Moscow, he “pursued a strategy of forestalling an attack,” while noting that later he would tell Soviet ambassador Pavel Yudin that he had not received any reports of a plan for the Korean War at that meeting.

When Kim Il-sung arrived in Beijing in mid-May 1950 to inform Mao that Stalin had approved a strategy of armed unification pending approval from Mao, we are told that Mao, who sought three to five years of peace after completing the invasion of Taiwan, was “forced to change his mind,” in part because the decision had already been made. Citing the Soviet ambassador’s contrast of a happy Kim and a “gloomy” Mao, the author concludes the discussion of Mao’s role in the launching of the war as follows:

From this we can see that Mao did agree to the use of armed force to resolve the Korean question, but this agreement certainly cannot be the basis for a “conspiracy theory among three countries.” The reason is that Mao did not take part in the planning for the Korean War; he only expressed agreement with the plan drawn up by the Soviets and Koreans and did not give Korea any material aid…. In sum, Mao Zedong not only did not agree to a Korean attack during his visit to Moscow, but at the beginning of May 1950, on the matter of an attack by the North on the South, he either opposed it or was passive.

Other authors have taken similar positions, arguing that Mao was a “limited participant” before the war, “forced” (bei po) to accept a fait
accompli and, according to Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen, “kept in the dark” (meng zai guli) during the planning phase.²⁵ As one commentator notes, agreeing in principle to the attack is quite different from planning it.²⁶ Thus, explaining the reasons for the outbreak of the Korean War has become very much a matter of understanding the motivations of Joseph Stalin—for, in the Chinese view, without his approval and material support, Kim Il-sung could not have launched the war.

In the above general discussion of the Chinese role, the reader will notice that a number of different sources are cited. As I will note in the conclusion, part of the reason for this is to demonstrate that the prevailing narrative of the origins of the war has been diffused within China and appears in relatively obscure journals. However, once we get to the topic of understanding Stalin’s motivations and the role of Mao, there are clearly two Chinese scholars (with somewhat different views) who dominate the discourse—Shen Zhihua and Yang Kuisong. The discussion that follows will largely focus on their work.

After the political environment in China became more permissive, it was primarily Shen Zhihua who was responsible for the introduction of the Russian archives to Chinese scholars, and who, since the late 1990s, has led the way in their use.²⁷ Although his earlier book on Sino-Soviet relations and the Korean War was only published in Hong Kong, his later work, Mao Zedong, Sidalin yu Chaoxian zhanzheng (Mao Zedong, Stalin, and the Korean War), has gone through two editions and has had an enormous influence on Chinese scholarship on the Korean War. Indeed, its influence is seen in many of the articles cited above as well as in Western interpretations of the war.²⁸

The essential elements in Shen’s argument were published in English in 2000, so there is no need here to review them in great detail.²⁹ The basic question that Shen addresses is why Stalin, after putting off Kim Il-sung’s pleads to launch an attack on the South throughout 1949, changed his mind in March-April 1950 and not only gave his approval, but also accelerated aid to Pyongyang at the expense of Chinese preparations to attack Taiwan.³⁰ Although the Russian archives and Chinese published materials provide much material on the meetings that took place during this period, there is no direct evidence of what actually caused the shift in the spring of 1950. Shen is left to try to interpret Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinskii’s cryptic comment that due to a “changed international situation,” Stalin was ready to support Kim’s plans.³¹ “What,” Shen asks, “caused Stalin to suddenly to change his mind?”

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The Chinese revolutionary victory and the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty were instrumental in bringing about the change in Stalin’s Korean and Far East policy. But it is not, as some scholars consider, because the Soviet Union felt that its power had been strengthened in Asia so that it could contend with the United States in Korea and be victorious. … It was just the opposite, it was only because the Chinese victory and the new Sino-Soviet Treaty led Stalin to feel that the interests of the Soviet Union in the Far East were threatened or completely lost…. Therefore we can determine that the motive behind Stalin’s change of policy in Korea was to maintain and guarantee the political and economic power of the Soviet Union in Asia, and particularly in the Far East region. This is the crux of the matter.32

Reluctantly, Stalin renegotiated the 1945 treaty with China and pledged eventually to give up its privileges in Northeast Asia that had been historic Russian aspirations—especially a warm-water port in the Pacific. If the attack succeeded, Korean ports and railroad lines would be available for Soviet use. Stalin’s decision to support Kim’s plans was thus not a product of his revolutionary commitment, but a product of his impulses as a “great Russian chauvinist.”33

Finally, implicit in Shen’s analysis is the assumption of Stalin’s misgivings about the Soviet Union’s new ally. In the Soviet leader’s mind, revolutionary China was a rival for influence in Asia. It was this concern that led Stalin not to include Mao in the planning for the war and not support Chinese efforts to take Taiwan (to be discussed below). Shen concludes:

The Korean War was the greatest international question that China faced after the establishment of the Sino-Soviet alliance, and it was also the alliance’s greatest test. Stalin’s management of this issue reflected his lack of faith in Mao, while at the same time reflected a latent rift (yinhai liehen) in the alliance.34

As Shen acknowledges, the argument that Stalin supported the launching of the North Korean attack in order to regain traditional Russian geopolitical goals lost in the treaty with China runs counter to interpretations by American and Russian scholars. Other commentators, he writes, cite such developments as the American failure in China and the Communist victory; the Acheson and Truman speeches of January
1950; and the successful Soviet test of an atomic bomb the previous summer.35

One such commentator is Yang Kuisong, who teaches at East China Normal University and who is also a highly regarded historian of the Chinese Communist Party and the international communist movement.36 Yang, like Shen, links Stalin’s decision to approve the invasion of the South to the Chinese revolution and the Sino-Soviet treaty. However, he presents a very different picture of Stalin’s motives and of the Soviet leader’s perception of the impact of the Chinese revolution in Asia. Yang is doubtful that Stalin saw the war as a way to secure a warm-water port in Asia. What, he asks, if Kim lost the war or if he won and denied the Soviet Union access?

Like Shen, Yang argues that initially Stalin was cautious in dealing with the United States and protective of the Yalta agreement. And like Shen, he sees a decisive change in the spring of 1950. However, Yang’s finds a different reason for the change. He ascribes the change to Stalin’s perception of a shift in the balance of power in Asia that was favorable to the spread of revolution and to confronting American power.

If we examine this change, we see that initially Stalin had no intention of starting a conflict with the United States in Korea. It was only because of the unexpected success of the Chinese revolution and then the Sino-Soviet treaty that Stalin changed his consistently cautious thinking with respect to policy in Asia.37

Unlike Shen, however, Yang’s analysis shows Stalin more favorably disposed to the growth of Chinese influence in Asia. Stalin, Yang argues, was not only ready to cede a leadership role to China in Asia, but had “basically accepted Mao Zedong’s revolutionary outlook of ‘the armed seizure of power and war to resolve problems’ (wuzhuang duochu zhengquan, zhanzheng jiejue wenti) and because of this he changed his view of postwar political trends.” Stalin, we are told, “once again raised the flag of violent revolution” in support of application of the Chinese model, not only in Korea, but throughout Asia.38 In this respect, Stalin had the full support of China.

It is this commitment to the idea of violent revolution that leads Yang to argue that China played an important, but indirect, role in launching the invasion of the South:

… Although Mao Zedong and the central leadership of the Chinese Communist Party were not able to take part in the actual
process of cooking up the outbreak of the Korean War, the victory of the Chinese revolution was undoubtedly a catalyst for the outbreak of the war. What’s more, the Chinese revolution was the most important determining factor for Moscow and Pyongyang to initiate military action. Although the Chinese Communist leaders could not take part in the process of the decision making and planning for the war’s outbreak, they clearly supported it. If they had taken part, the war still would have occurred.  

Thus Yang sees the impact of the victory of the Chinese Communist Party and of the model of armed revolution as central factors in explaining why Stalin launched the Korean War. Moreover, although he acknowledges that the Soviet leader might have withheld the specifics of the planning from Mao because of the latter’s preoccupation with the invasion of Taiwan, Yang believes that reasons of secrecy and the belief that Korea was in the Soviet sphere were also factors.

However, Yang Kuisong’s depiction of Mao’s attitude toward the outbreak of the war is even more provocative and inconsistent with that of Shen Zhihua. Yang argues that the Chinese leader was not left completely in the dark. Mao generally knew that the Koreans would use armed force to resolve the situation on the peninsula and was supportive of it. This was in spite of the fact that he had hoped that China could complete the invasion of Taiwan in advance of a resolution of the Korean question. Thus, Mao’s subsequent anger for being excluded from the detailed planning was derived from the fact that Mao assumed that Kim’s May 13, 1950 visit to Beijing for approval to launch the war was to engage in the actual planning that would draw on Mao’s military advice. Instead, the Chinese leader learned that the planning had already been carried out exclusively by North Korea and the Soviet Union. He was expected simply to approve. What angered Mao was their failure to consider the Chinese experience as well as the fact that China was eventually dragged into the war due to the failure of that plan.

Still, according to Yang, Mao did give Kim some advice. Even more significantly, he discussed China’s response should the United States intervene.

… If American troops enter the war, he [Mao] thought that China could send troops to support North Korea because at that time, it was not convenient (bu fangbian) for the Soviet Union to
send troops due to the limitations of an agreement signed with
the United States [likely the Yalta agreement], but China was not
limited by this kind of agreement….

And then he added:

We cannot know what is in their [the imperialists’] hearts. But
we must be prepared. We plan to station three armies on the
Yalu River. If the imperialists don’t intervene, there is no need
to act. If they intervene, but don’t cross the 38th parallel, we also
don’t care (ye buguan). If they cross the 38th parallel we will
certainly act.41

Thus, Yang’s picture of the Chinese role in the planning for the
Korean War is multi-dimensional. Mao is supportive of pursuing armed
revolution in Asia and is not unaware of Stalin and Kim’s plans. Chinese
influence is thus exercised not as a result of taking part in the planning,
but more indirectly through the influence of its example. Mao is angered
by the decision largely because he was expected only to give his
approval and not to have any direct input in the actual planning.
Moreover, Mao is depicted as having thought through the possibility of
an American intervention and the conditions under which China might
respond.

However, Mao had another—even greater—concern about an
American response. He had always hoped to invade Taiwan before a
Korean conflict and he had made this clear to both Stalin and Kim. As
Yang reports, Mao’s “greatest worry obviously was that as soon as the
Korean War broke out, no matter if there were victory or defeat, the
American government would change its policy toward Taiwan and that
his plans for liberation would face great difficulty.” Two days after the
invasion, this fear was realized. It was obvious to the Chinese leadership
that it could not prevail in the face of American intervention and that an
invasion of Taiwan would have to be put off.42

Yang reports that less than one month later, Zhou Enlai met with the
Soviet ambassador in Beijing and expressed the “puzzlement” (yihuo) of
the Chinese leaders at the timing of the invasion. As if this were not
clear enough, he handed the ambassador a Chinese intelligence report in
which a British reporter speculates that “the goal of the Soviet Union in
launching the war is none other than to prevent the Chinese People’s
Republic from taking Taiwan.”43
As noted above, most Chinese histories celebrate the Chinese intervention in the Korean War as one of the finest moments in the nation’s history. Despite the heavy cost, China stood up to the most powerful imperialist country in the world. However, this victory was obtained at a very high price: China’s inability to complete the civil war (or in its words, to reunify all of China). Although American intervention in the Strait area came well before China’s entry into the Korean conflict, this outcome is clearly considered to be a most—or the most—regrettable result of the Korean War. Despite his commitment to revolution in Asia, reunification was clearly a more important priority for Mao and yet the invasion of the South proceeded, resulting in the consequences that he had feared. Yang concludes:

After Stalin’s death, Mao more than once grumbled about Stalin regarding this issue. He firmly said: Stalin’s decision in regard to this war was a “huge mistake,” was “a 100 percent mistake.” What was most on Mao’s mind was that if at the beginning Stalin had not rashly supported action in Korea, not only would there not have been such a mistake, but the Taiwan issue would not have become bogged down in difficulty.  

As Niu Jun argues, when the war broke out, Chinese attention initially was focused on the dispatch of the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan area and not on the conflict in the Korean peninsula. Like Mao, subsequent Chinese commentators have invariably linked the two events, acknowledging that U.S. intervention and the consequent frustration of Chinese ambitions were occasioned by the war. Chinese discussions of the origins of the war inevitably touch on two additional questions: the extent to which the war can be seen as the reason for American action, and whether Stalin intended such an outcome, as asserted in the British report.

Thus, as one might expect, the evolution of American Taiwan policy is a subject of intense interest to Chinese researchers. With respect to the Korean War, the period between the January speeches by President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson and the decision to order the fleet into the Strait are of particular interest. Why the apparent reversal of policy toward Taiwan and the Chinese civil war in the intervening period?

What most Chinese accounts share is the conclusion that during these six months, American policy underwent a change that resulted from political divisions within the Truman administration and a shift to
confrontation with the Soviet Union and the socialist camp. Thus, NSC-68 committed Washington to a policy of containment of the Soviet bloc, whereas opposition to the policy of ceding Taiwan to the Communists grew within the military and the State Department. Driven in part by the Sino-Soviet treaty that put China within the Soviet bloc, this changed American strategic vision prompted the dispatch of the Seventh Fleet and the renewed relationship with the KMT. As one commentary puts it, “on the eve of the Korean War, American policy toward Taiwan was already in the process of changing, and the outbreak of the Korean War conveniently provided the opportunity for the change in policy toward Taiwan.”

However, although the American intervention conclusively foreclosed the possibility of taking Taiwan, the campaign had already encountered problems. From the time Anastas Mikoyan visited China at the beginning of 1949, the CCP had been requesting aid from the Soviet Union to build its air force and navy. After the disastrous attempt to invade Quemoy later that year, it was obvious that the more ambitious campaign would require extensive Soviet assistance, so Mao raised the issue of support during his visit to Moscow.

Thus Stalin was faced with the choice of supporting the Chinese or supporting the North Koreans. In Yang Kuisong’s view, Stalin chose to support Kim Il-sung:

This was because Japan had always been a hidden danger for the Russians. Taiwan carried very little weight as far as Soviet security was concerned. But Korea’s unification could greatly solidify the Soviet Union’s Far Eastern frontier defense and allow Soviet intimidation of Japan. This, one might say, was Stalin’s long sought-after goal.

This strategic calculation, as well as the fact that assistance to Korea would be less likely to cause a Soviet-American confrontation because it did not require the participation of Soviet forces, meant that the invasion of Taiwan would have to follow Korean unification.

Shen Zhihua presents a more complex interpretation of the relationship between the Korean War, the Taiwan issue, American policy, and Sino-Soviet relations that tightly weaves all four factors together in a conspiratorial but inevitable web. In his effort to understand the choice that Stalin made between support for the unification of Korea or support for China, Shen concurs with Yang that Stalin chose to support Korea
because it required only material assistance, a factor that would minimize the danger of conflict with the United States. Despite Chinese requests for aid to resolve the Taiwan issue, Stalin accelerated assistance to Korea and kept the planning with Kim secret from the Chinese until the very last minute, when Mao had no choice but to sign off.

However, for Shen, Stalin’s calculations involved the choice of a less dangerous venue to confront the West. The decision to launch the Korean War was shaped by Stalin’s perception of Sino-Soviet relations that went beyond the concessions contained in the treaty. First, “Korea’s actions could be kept under control and although the Soviet Union and China had a treaty, Stalin did not trust Mao and was uncomfortable with him.” Second, although Stalin considered a united Korean peninsula to be consistent with the strategic goals of the Soviet Union, he was concerned about the potential rise of China’s status in Asia after a successful invasion of Taiwan. “Stalin could not control Mao’s future actions and perhaps China would become a latent danger to the Soviet Union.”

Thus Shen maintains that Stalin believed that a Korean War would not only further alienate China from the United States, but would serve to increase Soviet leverage over China. The war

… could serve to make Mao Zedong’s behavior conform to the needs of the Soviet Union to realize its strategic goals. That was Stalin’s basic thinking at the time to solve the contradiction between Moscow and Beijing. In fact, the results of the Korean War fulfilled that purpose: on the one hand it stopped Mao from launching the Taiwan campaign; on the other, it placed China’s strength and actions within the Soviet strategic orbit (zhanlüe guidao).

In sum, Shen Zhihua regards the treaty with the Soviet Union as a mixed blessing for China, just as the victory of the Chinese revolution was to Stalin. To be sure, the new Chinese regime had gained a powerful ally and the promise of important economic support. However, unbeknownst to Mao, behind Stalin’s apparent acquiescence to his wishes for a treaty was a more sinister plot that would deny the CCP completion of its revolution and involve it in a costly war with the United States on the Korean peninsula. In his exploration of the causes for the war, Shen thus focuses on Stalin’s perception of the opportunities present in the Korean situation, as viewed through the lens not simply of
Soviet geostrategic interests in Asia, but the need to bring his new ally to heel.

Yet Shen’s analysis ends with an irony. In an exhaustive study based on documentation from American archival materials, Shen meticulously outlines the nature of the changing view of the Taiwan issue within the United States government during spring 1950 after the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty. Shen concludes that even before the Korean War it was a foregone conclusion in the Truman administration that Washington would deny Taiwan to the new regime. As Shen notes, if it were not the Korean War, it would have been something else, such as Chinese aid to the Vietnamese Communists.

The outbreak of the Korean War only provided an opportunity and pretext for the White House to announce its already decided position that “the status of Taiwan was not determined” and to directly intervene in the Chinese civil war. The Korean War conveniently became the straw that broke the camel’s back. Even if Kim had not launched the Korean War, as soon as the Chinese Communists launched the Taiwan campaign, the United States would have announced its policy and would not have allowed the Communist troops to set foot on the island. Therefore, what truly stopped the Chinese Communists from occupying the island was not the Seventh Fleet, but the Sino-Soviet Treaty.52

So, once again, the Sino-Soviet treaty changed the course of the Cold War in Asia, this time placing the closure of the Chinese revolution beyond the reach of a frustrated and angered Mao Zedong.

Conclusion

What, then, can we conclude regarding Chinese perceptions of the origins of the Korean War as that conflict reaches its sixtieth anniversary? The first point to make is how far Chinese scholarship on this issue has come since the 1953 truce. The initial narrative of a situation of confrontation on the peninsula resulting from Washington’s divisive policy that frustrated Korean aspirations for unity and promoted the warlike ambitions of the South has been replaced by a view that apportions responsibility for the international context and the resultant domestic tensions on both the Soviet Union and the United States. However, more significantly, it places blame for the initiation of the
conflict squarely on Joseph Stalin and Kim Il-sung for initiating the conflict.

What is striking is the manner in which this narrative has permeated Korean War scholarship in China. As the reader will see from the end notes, the broad outlines of the revisionist Chinese approach can be found both in national journals as well as those published by local colleges and universities. This is not to say that there is a total consensus. As noted, one can still find expressions of the neo-orthodox position that mirrors the former sharply anti-American narrative, but these are becoming increasingly rare.

As several authors have noted, such openness about the Korean War is linked to the post-1978 change in the intellectual environment in China: Deng Xiaoping’s exhortation to “seek truth from facts.” However, the impact of the relatively more open environment has been considerably increased by trends in international scholarship on the Korean War. The Chinese approach to the origins of the war, with its focus on Stalin’s motives and the consideration of agency against the background of international divisions, is consistent with views outside of China.

This should not be surprising. The citations found in Chinese discussions include the most notable Western writings on the subject as well as documents from the Cold War International History Project. Regarding this latter source, it seems clear that its availability, including the Russian documents it has published, has played a major role in changing the dominant Chinese view and has become the basis for Shen Zhihua’s and Yang Kuisong’s positions as leading scholars in the field of Korean War studies in particular and Sino-Soviet relations in general.

Still, as Chinese scholars will acknowledge, what is missing in their study of the war is access to the Chinese archives. Although some scholars may have limited access, for the most part Chinese scholarship draws on foreign sources and materials (biographies, memoirs, chronologies, and so forth) that are cleared for publication in China. As Chinese commentators have noted, the full story will not be known until the Chinese documents are publicly released.53

The availability of the Chinese archives is, of course, a political issue. The Korean War touches on the reputation of Chinese leaders, as well as on Chinese relations with other countries. For example, the candid publication by the Academy of Social Sciences cited above may well have been related to the improvement in relations with South Korea, while the rumor in China that there is an agreement with North Korea
that the Chinese archives on the war will remain closed seems credible, given the likely picture of the North Korean regime that might emerge.

However, it appears that the most important political consideration for the Chinese is protection of Mao Zedong’s reputation. For most Chinese commentators, the war in Korea was a “war of necessity” forced upon the nation by American aggression: first by intervening in the last stages of the Chinese civil war and then by directly threatening China by moving beyond the 38th parallel. The result was to divert the new regime’s priorities from pressing domestic tasks to a necessary and glorious war of self-defense during which China paid a heavy cost not simply in blood and treasure but in damage to national dignity due to its failure to “liberate” Taiwan. In sum, the essential element in this narrative is of an unwanted war forced upon Mao Zedong, who then provided the leadership that restored China to a respected position in the international system.

This article has explored the Chinese perspective on the narrow question of the causes of the Korean War. It is obvious, however, that despite the sharply revisionist picture that now dominates, the view of Mao reacting to actions beyond his control remains. He is depicted as consistently seeking to prioritize the invasion of Taiwan ahead of the invasion of South Korea. Mao is skeptical about the readiness of the North Korean army and wary of American intentions. Most importantly, he is forced into a position whereby he has no choice but to approve a plan for war in which he did not participate and he is pulled along by the unfolding of the events. Mao thus bears little responsibility for the war that engulfed China, even as he is praised for his bold management of it.

Similarly, Mao seems not to be responsible for the most humiliating and long-lasting result of the war—the failure to take Taiwan. At the most basic level, Mao is absolved of blame if one assumes that the American intervention in Taiwan was simply the result of the launch of a war for which he bears little responsibility. However, if one assumes, as the current narrative does, that the Chinese effort was hobbled by Stalin’s decision to throw Soviet support behind Kim and was even the victim of the Soviet leader’s Machiavellian tactics, Mao’s responsibility for the Taiwan debacle is even more diminished. And finally, if one assumes that the Korean War was only a pretext for implementing an American policy that was already settled, then the war and Mao’s responsibility recede even further into the background.

And this is where the issue of the archives becomes important. This
article focuses on Mao’s role during the run-up to the Korean conflict. As is well known, in the intervention, conflict, and truce negotiations, the Chinese leader was intimately involved. Thus, one would expect that a full opening of the archives would expose errors as well as differences over military and diplomatic strategy. To take but one example, the opening of the archives regarding the October 2, 1950 correspondence with Moscow would illuminate an important juncture in the war. Moreover, as Chinese and American scholars have noted, even during the brief, but important period covered in this paper, there are several crucial questions that are only partially answer by second-hand reports by Soviet officials. These will be further illuminated if the Chinese archives become available. For example, was Korea actually discussed at length during Mao’s Moscow meetings with Stalin? Did Mao know that an attack was imminent when he approved the transfer of units that had fought in the civil war, or was the move driven by domestic considerations, as is the present consensus among Chinese scholars? What exactly was the content of the conversation between Mao and Kim in May 1950? And what did the Chinese leadership know and not know on the eve of the attack on the South?

In short, by the sixtieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, Chinese scholarship has significantly, but not entirely, broken out of the bonds of political orthodoxy and has joined the international scholarly community in expanding knowledge of what was once “the forgotten war.” One can only hope that the intense Chinese academic interest and widely disseminated scholarship that has become evident over the last decade will further enhance our understanding as we move toward the seventieth anniversary of the Korean War.54

Notes:


3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., p. 19. The work cited is entitled Guoji guanxi shi (A History of International Relations). No publication details are provided.

5 Liu Jinzhi, et al., Dangdai Zhong Han guanxi, p. 20.
For China, commemoration of the Korean War is focused on the October 1950 intervention of the Chinese People’s Volunteers in what came to be known as the “Resist America, Aid Korea War” (KangMei yuanChao zhanzheng).

See, for example, Song Xiaoqin “Sulian yu Chaoxian zhanzheng” (The Soviet Union and the Korean War), Eluosi yanjiu, no. 3 (September 2006), p. 66.


Meng Zhaohui, “Chaoxian zhanzheng zenyang daqilai” (How Did the Korean War Break Out), Gaoxiao lilun zhanxian, no. 10 (2000). This is a shortened and revised version of a speech given in 2000 at the Marxism-Leninism Study Center. See Yang Fengan, et al., eds., Women jianzhen zhenxiang (We Witnessed the True Situation) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2009), pp. 2-33 for another version of his position and a critique of Yang Kuishong’s revisionist view.

Ge Zhaofu, “Guanyu Chaoxian zhanzheng jige zhongyang wenti yanjiu zongshu” (A Summary of Research on Several Important Questions regarding the Korean War), Qingdao daxue shifan xueyuan xuebao, 18, no. 4 (December 2001), p. 29 and Chen Yu, “KangMei yuanChao zhanzheng ruogan wenti yanjiu zongshu” (A Summary of Research on Several Questions on the Resist America, Aid Korea War), Nanjing shehui kexue, no. 2 (2001), pp. 56-57.

See, for example, Ge Zhaofu, “Guanyu Chaoxian zhanzheng jige zhongyang wenti yanjiu zongshu,” which reviews the state of scholarship in South Korea, Russia, and the United States.

For convenient overviews of recent Chinese scholarship on the Korean War, see Ji Dexue and Guo Zhigang, “KangMei yuanChao zhanzheng yanjiu shuping” (A Review of Research on the War to Resist America and Aid Korea,” Dangdai Zhongguo shi yanjiu, 14, no. 6 (2007), pp. 6-12 and Dong Ligong, “Chaoxian zhanzheng ruogan wenti yanjiu” (A Summary of Research on Certain Questions about the Korean War), Yuncheng xueyuan xuebao (December 2005), pp. 37-40.


Ibid., p. 88.
15 At about the same time, based on the archives Shen published a substantive article based on the archives on the Chinese decision to send troops to Korea; Shen Zhihua, “Zhong Su liammeng yu Zhongguo chu bing Chaoxian de juece: Dui Zhongguo he Eguo wenxian ziliao de bijiao yanjiu” (The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China’s Decision to Dispatch Troops to Korea: A Comparative Study of Chinese and Russian Materials), Dangdai Zhongguo shi yanjiu, no. 5 (1996), pp. 26-39.

16 Most prominent is Shen Zhihua’s book Chaoxian zhanzheng jiemi (Secrets of the Korean War Revealed) (Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu youxian gongsi, 1995).

17 As one scholar puts it “… the documents [from the Russian archives] are clear that it was Stalin who made the decision about whether or not to invade Korea.” Kathryn Weathersby, “The Soviet Role in the Korean War,” in William Stueck, ed., The Korean War in World History (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 65. See also her discussion of a similar view held by scholars in the West, pp. 66-67.

18 Of course, Chinese scholars have also used these archives to understand Mao’s role during the course of the war and the decision to accept the armistice agreement. However, these topics are beyond the scope of this paper.


20 See, for example, Huang Chuanrong, “Chaoxian zhanzheng baofa zhong de Sulian yinsu” (The Soviet Factor in the Outbreak of the War), Daqing shifan daxue bao, 29, no. 4 (July 2009), pp. 121-24; Song Xiaqin, “Sulian yu Chaoxian zhanzheng”; Xu Gangyan, “Cong jujue chubing kan Chaoxian zhanzheng zhong de Sulian” (Looking at the Soviet Union from the Perspective of its Refusal to Send Troops during the Korean War) Liaoning jiaoyu xincheng xueyuan xuebao, 23, no. 7 (July 2006), pp. 3-4; and Wang Xiuli, “Shi en Eguo de dongfang zhanlue yu Chaoxian zhanzheng,” (Seeking to Analyze Russian Strategy in the Far East and the Korean War), Changchun shifan xueyuan xuebao, 24, no. 4 (July 2005), pp. 74-76.

21 Ibid., p. 76.

22 However, Yang Kuisong argues that Khrushchev was right in the sense that without Mao’s approval, Stalin would not have launched the war. Yang Kuisong, “Sidalin weishenma zhichi Chaoxian zhanzheng?”

24 Ibid., p. 113.


26 Wang Jun, “Chaoxian qian de Mei, Su, Chao, Zhong” (The United States, the Soviet Union, Korea, and China before the Korean War), Yan’an jiaoyuyuan xuebao, 17, no. 3 (September 2003), p. 28.


30 Shen Zhihua, Mao Zedong, Sidalin yu Chaoxian zhanzheng, p. 143

31 Ibid., pp. 131-32.
32 Ibid., p. 143.
33 Ibid., p. 146.
34 Ibid., p. 158.
36 In a recent review article Shen’s and Yang’s views are contrasted. See Yang Ming, “Dui Zhong-Su tongmeng zai Chaoxian zhanzheng baofa guocheng zhong suoqi zuoyong de renshi: Du Shen Zhihua ‘Mao Zedong, Sidalin yu Chaoxian zhanzheng’” (Understanding the Role of the Sino-Soviet Treaty in the Course of the Outbreak of the Korean War: Reading Shen Zhihua’s “Mao Zedong, Stalin, and the Korean War”), Jizhe guancha, no. 2 (2009), p. 48.
37 Yang Kuisong, “Sidalin weishenma zhichi Chaoxian zhanzheng?”
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.


Yang Kuisong, “Chaoxian zhushi riqu jinzhang, Zhong-Su lizhu bimian chongtu.”

Shen Zhihua, Mao Zedong, Sidalin yu Chaoxian zhanzheng, pp. 150-51.

Shen Zhihua, “Zhonggong jingong Taiwan zhanyi de juece bianhua jiqi jiyue yinsu” (The Change in the Decision of the Chinese Communist Party to Attack Taiwan and its Inhibiting Conditions), Shehui kexue yanjiu (March 2009), pp. 35-53.

See, for example, Ji Dexue and Guo Zhigang, “KangMei yuanChao zhanzheng yanjiu shuping.”