

# **Party-Military Relations in North Korea and the Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula**

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## **Abstract**

Party-military relations in North Korea are complex with overlapping party control mechanisms over Korean People's Army (KPA) unit commanders. The Korean Workers' Party (KWP) chain of control parallels the KPA chain of command. The KWP employs five political organizations and a security agency dedicated to the KPA to execute its political control over the military: the KWP Central Military Committee, the KPA Party Committee, the General Political Bureau, the KWP Propaganda and Agitation Department, the KWP Organization and Guidance Department, and the KPA Military Security Command. Every KPA commander at every level down to battalion and frontline companies has a political officer, a propaganda officer and a security officer sitting shoulder-to-shoulder with him to monitor his activities and consistency in implementing party policy and adherence to supreme leader directives. In addition, every unit maintains a KWP party committee in each unit that oversees all activities of the unit.

Key words: Party-military relations, Korean Workers' Party, Korean People's Army, Central Military Committee, General Political Bureau, Organization and Guidance Department, Military Security Command. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.

## **Introduction**

The current security situation on the Korean Peninsula holds both continuity in terms of antithetical systems in the South and North and change in terms of kinetic capabilities and alliance structuring on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone's Military Demarcation Line. The fear among those that work on peninsula security issues is that someday a crisis, whether due to provocations, escalated hostilities, or regime

collapse, will bring about massive casualties and property destruction to both Koreas.


Power and influence in North Korea, whether political or kinetic, is not dominated exclusively by one institution or another. Indeed, because the North Korean military is so powerful, the Kim Regime leadership requires strict party supervision of the military institution to diffuse any political threat emanating from the Korean People's Army (KPA). The security services also play a major role in balancing power through the execution of their primary mission of protecting the regime. This mix of politics, military and security has a direct impact on how the Kim Regime deals with internal and external challenges alike.

North Korea's methods for dealing with crisis are not generally clear but they are known to be heavily influenced by the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) oversight of all agencies due to its ubiquitous presence throughout the North Korean political-military structure. Discerning who and what agencies influence North Korean crisis decision-making is a challenging task for any analyst, regardless of which side of the Republic of Korea (ROK)-United States (U.S.) Alliance one serves. During crisis, analysts must look beyond the military capabilities, readiness conditions, and force posture in North Korea; they must consider the heavy influence of the party on military decisions in order to provide assessment that aids in de-escalating such situation.

Party-military relations in North Korea are very complicated in structure and function but they are clearly designed to enforce party control over the military at every echelon within the KPA. Stated another way, the Kim Regime emphasizes the concept of control over the concept of command to maintain its supremacy over the military. This is consistent with the KWP approach to controlling all other agencies in North Korea's political-economic structure as well as every aspect of North Korean society. Of course, effectiveness of control is impacted by corruption, cronyism, lack of resources and internal competition but the structures and functions of control remain effective operationally and results-oriented in execution. This is distinctly demonstrated by Kim Jong-un's recurrent replacement of senior leaders, particularly in the military.

The chart below is illustrative of the Kim Regime's political control of the North Korean military.<sup>1</sup>

**Figure 1: The Kim Regime's Political Control of the North Korean Military**



Article 46 of the KWP charter states that the KPA is the revolutionary force created by supreme leader, Kim Il-sung, in the spirit of the anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle and that the KPA carries out all political activities under the leadership of the party. Article 48 of the KWP charter stipulates that the KPA will instill the Juche ideology throughout the military and carry out all tasks relevant to that end, to include protecting the party and the supreme leader to the death. In this manner, all soldiers must become human explosives that protect the motherland and the people to their last breath.<sup>2</sup> Kim Jong-il made party supremacy over the military quite clear when he instructed

the party is the staff of the Korean revolution and the right vehicle for our people's road to victory. All society and political organizations must follow the leadership of the party and the military cannot operate outside this concept. The Korean People's Army must follow the party and the supreme leader.<sup>3</sup>

The KWP chain of control parallels the KPA chain of command. The KWP employs five political organizations and a security agency dedicated to the KPA to execute its political control over the military: the KWP Central Military Committee (CMC), the KPA Party Committee, the General Political Bureau (GPB), the KWP Propaganda and Agitation Department (PAD), the KWP Organization and Guidance Department (OGD), and the KPA Military Security Command (MSC). An overall analysis of party-military relations reveals that the KWP has six methods of controlling the KPA.

- The KWP CMC provides overall leadership on military policy.
- A KWP committee exists at every level of the military. The KPA Party Committee reports directly to the KWP Central Committee.
- The GPB controls commanders and unit members through deployment of political officers at every level down to battalion, as well as down to company level for units along the Demilitarized Zone. The GPB director serves as the Secretary of KPA Party Committee.
- The KWP OGD controls all personnel matters for KPA elite, reviews all military policy for compliance with supreme leader guidance, receives and reviews all reports from the KPA Party Committee, and oversees surveillance of KPA leaders and their families.
- Propaganda officers from the GPB, all trained by the KWP PAD, provide political propaganda training for all KPA personnel at every level. These officers take their instructional material from the KWP PAD and indoctrinate military personnel based on those materials.
- The KPA MSC is responsible for anti-coup and counterintelligence within the KPA but focuses on regime leadership security through assessing KPA leadership loyalty to

the supreme leader. Its reporting is channeled through the KWP OGD.

It is not in the party charter, but based on the party structure, party authority goes from the First Secretary to a party secretary to a director to a first vice-director to a vice director to a section chief to a deputy section chief to a responsible secretary to a guidance officer to a party worker, and reporting goes in the opposite direction.<sup>4</sup>

### **Role of the KWP Central Military Committee**

The authority and influence of the KWP CMC has constantly varied over the decades depending on the personal ruling style of each of the Kim Regime leaders. At the 5<sup>th</sup> Session of the 4<sup>th</sup> KWP Central Committee (CC) meeting in December 1962, the KWP CC ratified sweeping military policy by approving the four military lines of arming the entire populace, turning the entire country into a fortress, converting the entire army into cadre, and modernizing the entire army. The KWP CC also established the KWP Military Committee to carry out those four lines. The Military Committee was re-designated by the KWP CC as the Central Military Committee in November 1982.<sup>5</sup>

CMC members include CMC Chairman Kim Jong-un (KWP First Secretary) and CMC Vice-Chairman General Hwang Byong-so (GPB Director). Members include Vice Marshal Kim Yong-chun (former Minister of People's Armed Forces and current Director of the KWP Military Department), General Kim Kyong-ok (first Vice-Director in KWP OGD in charge of regional parties), General Kim Won-hong (Minister of State Security, formerly the State Security Department), General Ri Pyong-chol (KWP OGD First Vice-Director for Military Affairs), Major General Choe Bu-il (Minister of People's Security), General Kim Yong-chol (Director of the KPA Reconnaissance General Bureau), Colonel General Yun Jong-rin (Commander, Guards Command), Chu Kyu-chang (Director, KWP Machine Industries Department), Colonel General Choe Kyong-song (Commander, KPA 11<sup>th</sup> Corps), Vice Marshal Hyon Chol-hae (Director, Ministry of People's Armed Forces [MPAF] Rear Services Bureau), Lieutenant General Kim Rak-gyom (Commander, Strategic Rocket Forces), General Ri Yong-gil (KPA Chief of General Staff), and Colonel General Chang Jong-nam (Commander, KPA 5<sup>th</sup> Corps). Former CMC members Jang Song-taek was executed and General Kim Kyok-sik was recently deceased. Vice-

Marshal Choe Ryong-hae (KWP Secretary for Social Organizations) was formerly the CMC Vice-Chairman, but his current status on the CMC is not clear.

Kim Jong-il significantly marginalized the CMC and the Politburo and emphasized the National Defense Commission (NDC). However, in terms of its authority and influence, Kim Jong-il significantly upgraded the CMC at the Third Party Delegates Conference on September 28, 2010, through changes to the KWP charter and reorganization of CMC structure. This was done presumably in preparation for Kim Jong-un's succession. At this conference, Kim Jong-il emphasized the authority of the KWP General Secretary position, the authority of the KWP over the rest of the North Korean ruling structure, and the authority of the CMC and the GPB. Under the rule of Kim Jong-il, the CMC was more a non-standing committee for cooperation; however, through the changes at the Third Delegates Conference and the KWP Charter, the CMC role changed to one of a standing military policy decision organization between party congresses, as well as becoming an organization that guided all military affairs.<sup>6</sup>

### **Role of the KPA Party Committee**

Article 47 of the KWP charter states that a party organization is integrated into every level of the KPA. The KPA Party Committee was officially established in 1958, although the need for stronger party representation was officially identified in October 1950. In 1961, at the KWP's 4<sup>th</sup> Party Congress, the party charter clearly stipulated that party organizations within the KPA would operate according to party regulation. The KPA Party Committee operates under the direct supervision of the KWP Central Committee and a party committee is established at the KPA battalion-level and above, with party cells being established at the company and platoon levels. These committees and cells are responsible for political education of unit soldiers and ensuring the KWP's political and military policies are carried out and monitors the efforts to do so.<sup>7</sup>

While the KWP OGD handles all personnel affairs, including promotions and assignments of all senior colonels and above, the KPA Party Committee Secretariat handles those issues for colonels and lieutenant colonels. This secretariat is made up of the Chief of the KPA General Staff, the Minister of People's Armed Forces, the KPA Operations Officer, and the KPA Cadre Bureau chief. The KPA Party

Committee secretary is the Director of the GPB. The Commander of the KPA MSC participates when appropriate. Each corps party committee secretariat handles promotions for major and below.<sup>8</sup>

Kim Jong-il instructed the mission of every party committee organization department to be as follows: first, they must struggle against misapplications and misinterpretations of the monolithic ideology system and the monolithic guidance system; second, they must grasp all tasks of the party committee and each element, each interest must focus on grasping party policy direction; third, they must establish, in an orderly fashion, a party life guidance system and focus on party life guidance of cadre and party members; fourth, through collaboration with the KWP PAD, they must prepare evaluation report on cadre party life; fifth, they must concentrate on an effective reporting system to the party center (in other words, the supreme leader); sixth, the OGD and PAD and their lower echelon equivalents must conduct collaborative operations and basic elements and economic elements must cooperate; seventh, every document, from implementation committee and secretariat meeting that are sent to lower echelons should have prior review, guidance team visits, meetings and lectures. These steps all apply to the KPA.

The KPA Party Committee channels its reports to the KWP OGD whose mission is to ensure all organizations, personnel and policies pay strict adherence to the regime's monolithic guidance system and the monolithic ideology system. Both systems exist to ensure loyalty to the "*suryong*," or supreme leader, and are the guiding dictatorial principles of the Kim Family Regime.

The KPA Party Committee is structured as follows: The KPA Party Committee is headed by a "responsible secretary" who is also the KPA Party Committee Politburo Chief. He oversees the work of the Organizational Secretary, the Propaganda Secretary, and the Workers' Organization Secretary. The Organizational Secretary leads the Organization Department, which is manned by the Party Member Registration Section Chief with two subordinate guidance officers; Internal Affairs Section Chief with one subordinate guidance officer; a Lower Unit Affairs Section Chief with one subordinate guidance officer; an Information Officer and a Reports Officer. The Organization Department Chief also supervises a Cadre Department Chief who oversees a Deputy Department Chief, an Organization Department Cadre Chief with three subordinate guidance officers, a Cadre Registration Section Chief with two subordinate guidance officers, and a Training

Guidance Officer. The Organization Department Chief is also the Inspection Committee Chair. The Propaganda Secretary is concurrently the Propaganda Department Chief and supervises a Lower Unit Deputy Section Chief with five to seven subordinate guidance officers, a Research Room Chief with one subordinate guidance officer, and a Deputy Lecture Section Chief with one subordinate analyst. The Workers' Organization Secretary oversees the chiefs of departments under his supervision: the Education Department, the Administration Department, the Red Guard Department, the General Affairs Department, the Industry Department, the Agriculture Department and the Finance Department, as well as one guidance officer in each of those departments.<sup>9</sup>

### **Role of the General Political Bureau**

The KPA Party Committee's implementation element is the GPB. The GPB is the party's most effective control mechanism over the KPA and is the KPA's highest political policy-making body through its service as the KPA Party Committee's Implementation Department.<sup>10</sup> The GPB Director is responsible for transmitting party directives and policy guidelines to the KPA, as well as monitoring and controlling the KPA politically. This does not mean the military does not have political influence. To the contrary, it is because of this influence that the GPB is needed.<sup>11</sup>

Beginning in 1977, supervision of the GPB fell under the KWP OGD.<sup>12</sup> Article 49 of the party charter states the GPB is supervised by the KWP Central Committee; however, the OGD serves as the staff of the Central Committee and performs all of its administrative functions, including supervision of the GPB through the OGD Military Directorate. The OGD Military Directorate first vice-director is technically the overseer of the GPB and plays a counter-balance role to the GPB Director. However, Vice Marshal Hwang Byong-so, Director of the GPB, works hand-in-hand with General Ri Pyong-chol, OGD 1<sup>st</sup> Vice-Director of the OGD Military Directorate, on supervising GPB tasks.

The GPB:


- Arms the entire military with the Juche Ideology.
- Establishes the monolithic ideology system within the military.
- Organizes and guides party life activities for military cadre and party members.



- Carries out education on party ideology.
- In the military carries out organization and ideology education for party and Socialist Labor Youth League members.
- Manages all activities on the red flag competition of the three revolutionary teams.
- Promotes military morale.
- Manages all military officer recruitment, assignment, transfer, promotion, and discharge issues.
- All the above periodically reported to KWP Central Committee.<sup>13</sup>

The GPB is organized as follows:<sup>14</sup>

**Figure 2: Organization Structure of the GPB**



- The Organizational Planning Department plans and implements all organizational tasks for the GPB.

- The Party Organization Department oversees the expansion, guidance, and inspection of all organizational tasks.
- The Youth League Guidance Department organizes, guides and supervises all Youth League tasks within the military.
- The Propaganda and Education Department organizes and guides political ideology and propaganda tasks throughout the military.
- The Cultural Liaison Department is in charge of tactical psychological operations within the military.
- The Cadre Department is in charge of all personnel matters regarding political officers within the military.
- The Information Affairs Department organizes and implements public information tasks within the military.
- The Accounting Department mission is to collect, store and prepare all accounting materials within the military that are related to political tasks.
- The KPA Publishing Company oversees the publishing and printing of all print materials within the military including the military information paper, *Korean People's Army*.
- The April 25<sup>th</sup> Art Movie Studio produces movies related to the military and delivers them to each military component and their lower echelon units.
- The April 25<sup>th</sup> Athletic Group organizes and trains a professional athletic team that performs at every major function in North Korea.
- The KPA Symphony is an entertainment troupe that performs morale performances for the military.
- The Inspection Department inspects all party matters within the military.
- The Enemy Suppression Department is generally referred to as the 563<sup>rd</sup> Unit. Its mission is to recruit or kidnap South Korean soldiers or get them to defect. During peacetime, the unit also conducts propaganda broadcasts and distributes propaganda leaflets. During wartime, it vets the population of occupied territory for “reactionary elements” and gauges the population’s capacity for support to North Korea.<sup>15</sup>

The GPB assigns a political section at every level from the KPA General Staff Department and MPAF down to regiment and political officers down to battalion and frontline companies. GPB political

officers (aka political commissars) staff these political sections.<sup>16</sup> This is mandated by Article 50 of the KWP charter. KPA commanders have no authority over personnel assignments, including staff positions at any level. This responsibility lies with the GPB political officer at each level; however, that does not mean the commander's opinion is disregarded. The commander provides recommendations only on these matters. The GPB political officer must sign off on all orders to be valid. The commander cannot forward training plans to higher headquarters without the political officer's signature as it would not be accepted by higher headquarters without that signature. Thirdly, both the political commissar and the security officer each prepare and forward a weekly assessment of the commander and his professional and political performance for that period.<sup>17</sup>

At each unit level, the GPB political officer is also the unit party committee secretary or vice-secretary. A GPB officer is always the organization secretary who reports all matters straight to the GPB section of the OGD. Every military unit includes a political commander (GPB) in addition to the unit commander. As the unit political commander, the GPB officer reports to the senior unit's political commander through a reporting system that is unique, duplicative of the command reporting system, and totally subordinate to the unit above. The purpose is to prevent political challenges from the military and to maintain the absolute authority of the KWP.<sup>18</sup> The GPB staffs a political section with GPB political officers at regiment and above and political guidance officers at battalion and below.<sup>19</sup> It is the responsibility of the GPB political officer to politically control the unit commander's activities and to report those activities to the KWP CC through the KWP OGD. From 1969 on, the political officer was required to sign off on training plans and orders along with the unit commander, thus increasing the power and influence of the GPB political officer within the KPA ranks. This creates an unavoidable friction between the political officer and the unit commander.<sup>20</sup>

The unit political officer may be symbolically lower than the unit commanders, but his level of responsibility is the same. Within the unit, if there is a small problem with the party's monolithic ideology system, the political officer must struggle through disagreement.<sup>21</sup> If a commander gives a questionable order, the GPB has the authority to judge that order. Kim Jong-il instructed that political officers are the party's representatives in their assigned units. The military commander

commands military issues, while the political officer is responsible for political and party issues in the unit.<sup>22</sup>

The GPB's control of the military includes political ideology control, surveillance of the daily lives of the senior military leaders, control of KPA personnel matters, and control of military administration. Political ideology control is the core function of controlling the character of the KPA. In this vein, the GPB instructs all soldiers on the supreme leader's monolithic ideology system. Surveillance of the unit elite and authority over all personnel matters are the primary tools of the GPB political officers in their efforts to control unit personnel. However, the GPB's control lays less in ideology and personnel issues than it does in party lines and policy guidance, which are core values in party-military relations. The GPB's instructions on this matter are established by the KWP Central Committee and channeled through the OGD.<sup>23</sup>

### **Role of the KWP Organization and Guidance Department**

The KWP OGD is the most powerful political organization in North Korea during the Kim Jong-il era, rivaling the KWP Political Committee (predecessor to the KWP Politburo) and personal secretariat of party General Secretary, Kim Il-sung, during his rule. As developed by Kim Jong-il while he was the KWP Secretary for Organization and OGD Director (two different party positions), the OGD attained a level of influence that remains today under Kim Jong-un. Generally, the OGD carries out the leadership and control of the entire North Korean society. Specifically, the OGD's purpose is to control the KWP writ large and all of its members to ensure KWP committees at all levels control every agency within the North Korean political-administrative system, including the KPA and North Korea's military-industrial complex. Even during the rise of military-first politics, the OGD retained its power. In essence, the OGD is the right hand of the Party First Secretary. It is not an exaggeration to say that through the OGD, the Party General Secretary is able to control all of North Korea.<sup>24</sup>

The mission of the OGD is to establish the supreme leader's monolithic guidance system throughout the entire party and the entire society and to control the party life of all cadre, party members and North Korean citizens. Of note, the OGD manages all party cadre as well as the party rank and file. The OGD oversees the party membership selection, appointments and dismissals of party politburo members and candidate members, party central committee members, candidate

members, and semi-candidate members as well as state agency and government administration cadre, central party and regional party cadre.<sup>25</sup>

Prior to September 1973, KWP policy decisions were made in the KWP Political Committee under Kim Il-sung's direction. But when Kim Jong-il, then the Director for both the OGD and the Propaganda and Agitation Department, was secretly designated Kim Il-sung's successor at the 8<sup>th</sup> Session of the 5<sup>th</sup> Central Committee Meeting in February 1974, Kim Jong-il began transferring policy-decision power to the KWP Secretariat generally and policy review to the OGD specifically.<sup>26</sup> After the mid-1980's, each element of the KWP Secretariat shaped party and state policy and individual responsible secretaries would present policy recommendations through the OGD to Kim Jong-il for approval. The review by the OGD was for compliance with supreme leader directives, not technical content. This policy-making move from the KWP Political Committee to the KWP Secretariat and its channeling through the KWP OGD enabled the Kim Jong-il to control specific functions by societal area through specific departments of the KWP Secretariat and gave great power to the OGD.<sup>27</sup>

The OGD dominates five areas of influence within the Kim Regime's political system:

- Exclusive authority to select and assign personnel to positions of department director and above—this includes every KPA general and frontline regimental commander<sup>28</sup>
- Authority to oversee party guidance, which allows the OGD to interfere in any administrative (or military) matter<sup>29</sup>
- Oversight of all surveillance powers which allows it to monitor even the most senior level official, including the most senior military officers<sup>30</sup>
- Authority to ratify all policies for presentation to the supreme leader<sup>31</sup>
- Authority to supervise the protection of the Kim Family.<sup>32</sup>

Kim Il-sung appointed his son Kim Jong-il as the KWP Secretary for Organization in 1973. From this position, Kim Jong-il specifically began shaping policy and personnel actions through the OGD for the purpose of gaining control of decision-making and securing his succession as the KWP General Secretary and as North Korea's "*suryong*," or supreme

leader, under which all party doctrine is focused. Up to this point, the KWP Cadre Department was responsible for all party personnel actions. After Kim Jong-il became the OGD Director, the OGD Cadre Section handled all leadership positions.

After becoming the designated successor, Kim Jong-il completely overhauled the following key tasks of the OGD:

- Party organization system – reshaped the party's roles and functions.
- Party task system – reshaped how these tasks were assigned, performed and evaluated.
- Party life guidance system – reshaped how each party member was evaluated and by what criteria.
- Cadre task system – reshaped how each party, government and military cadre was to perform tasks and how it was evaluated.
- Guidance inspection system – reshaped inspection criteria to be in line with the “Ten Great Principles of Monolithic Leadership.”
- Propaganda and agitation task system – reshaped how the party indoctrinated every North Korean from grade school to retirement age.<sup>33</sup>

The OGD has an estimated 1,000 to 1,300 personnel. The OGD has one director, four first vice-directors and 10 vice-directors.<sup>34</sup> After Kim Jong-il was officially appointed the Party Secretary for Organization and simultaneously the Director of the OGD, no other person has ever been officially designated to either of those two positions.<sup>35</sup> Based on the testimony of former KWP CC member, Shin Kyong-wan, OGD vice-directors and above were chosen from among Kim Jong-il's friends and as ever, they are comprised of those from the highest socio-politically-rated families, loyalty, and ability.<sup>36</sup> That selection system has continued under Kim Jong-un.

KWP OGD first vice-directors serve at the top of North Korea's political chain. Historically, there have been four OGD first vice-directors: party headquarters, regional parties, military and administration. The positions of the OGD first vice-directors are the most influential positions in North Korea below the supreme leader. Although technically outranked by party secretaries in the KWP Secretariat and Central Committee, these officials bow personally to those four OGD

first vice-directors due to their unprecedented access to, and ability to influence, the supreme leader. They are assisted by ten vice-directors and 30 section chiefs. OGD vice directors, after properly researching ways to correct military party responsible secretaries' and organizational secretaries' mistakes, reach down to the lower levels to ensure the implementation of corrective measures.<sup>37</sup> This process gives the OGD complete control over KPA party committee responsible secretaries and organization secretaries.

The OGD has four main directorates: party headquarters, regional parties, military and administration.

The Party Headquarters Committee (PHQC)<sup>38</sup> leads organizational life in all party organizations under the KWP Central Committee, such as the Propaganda and Agitation Department, the International Department, the Machine Industry Department, and the Cadre Department and down to party cells in all of these departments. Under the PHQC, first vice-director (who also serves as the PHQC responsible secretary) are three vice-directors:

- Vice-Director (who also serves as the headquarters organizational secretary) for the Party Life Guidance Section, the Inspection Section, the Petitions Section, and Office 10 (issues related to the Kim Family).
- Vice-Director for the Cadre Section, Party Personnel Registration Section, the Reporting Section, the General Affairs Section, and the Finance Section. This position is also known as the Internal Vice-Director.
- Vice-Director for the Propaganda and Agitation Section. This person also serves as the PHQC Propaganda Secretary.<sup>39</sup>

The Regional Parties Directorate<sup>40</sup> directly manages the party organizational life of the government cabinet's party committee and each ministry's party committee. There are three vice-directors under the Regional Parties first vice-director:

- Vice-Director for Supreme People's Assembly Standing Committee (Presidium).
- Vice-Director for provincial, city, and county party committees.

- Vice-Director for party committees of local factories and enterprises.<sup>41</sup>

The OGD directly manages the party committees of the cabinet and its subordinate agencies step-by-step. These cabinet and below party committees improve their work through party inspections. Party secretaries are responsible for committee operations, organization, party life guidance, cadre investigations, and reporting.<sup>42</sup> Higher-level organizational secretaries must visit lower-level organizations and participate in their meetings. Organization divisions of local party committees and elements must do the same tasks as the OGD.<sup>43</sup>

Through the GPB, the OGD Military Directorate<sup>44</sup> controls and supervises the organizational life of party elements of the KPA General Staff Department, Ministry of People's Armed Forces, Military Security Command, and the General Logistics Mobilization Bureau. One of the ROK's senior think tanks, the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), assesses that under the OGD Military Directorate first vice-director, there are five vice-directors:

- Vice-director for the GPB which is the implementation element of the KPA party committee of the KPA General Staff and MPAF;
- Vice-director for the Political Section of the Military Security Command
- Vice-director for the Political Section of the Military Logistics Mobilization General Bureau
- Vice-director for KPA special operations forces
- Vice-director for reserve forces of the Workers Peasants Red Guard and Training Mobilization Units.<sup>45</sup>

The OGD does not provide or exercise expertise within any professional-technical area such as the military, science, education (except for political), or economics. The OGD's power over the KPA lies not in knowledge of operational strategy or military expertise, but in controlling the personal and party life of every officer within the KPA.<sup>46</sup> Each officer is held to a political standard evaluated by the OGD which, through the GPB, controls the selection, promotion, demotion, assignment, training, family housing, children schooling, food security, and privileges of each KPA general and frontline regimental commander,



no exception.<sup>47</sup> Every KPA officer must become a KWP member immediately after commissioning; otherwise they cannot continue to be an officer. Some non-commissioned officers are KWP members as well.<sup>48</sup>

The OGD Administration Directorate (AD)<sup>49</sup> was actually transferred out of the OGD in 2007 and placed directly under the KWP Central Committee. After returning from his second “revolutionization” experience in that same year,<sup>50</sup> Chang Song-taek was rewarded by his brother-in-law, Kim Jong-il, with an appointment as Director of the very influential AD and its separation out of the OGD. The AD was responsible for political supervision of the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Public Security, and all elements of the North Korea court system including judges, prosecutors and lawyers. The AD’s separation from the KWP OGD created natural barriers between the two organizations.

After Chang was executed, the AD purging process expanded immediately after the ceremonies observing the 2<sup>nd</sup> anniversary of Kim Jong-il’s death. “Purification teams” were established to clean up the remnants of Chang’s impact on the party and the government. This effort was led by the OGD. All of the KWP AD senior personnel were replaced by cadre from other party organizations, primarily from the OGD.<sup>51</sup> Prior to Chang’s execution, the AD had three vice-directors: one for the Ministry of State Security, one for the Ministry of Public Security, and one for the court system.

Recognized by KWP defectors as the “party within the party,”<sup>52</sup> the OGD specifically controls all party, military, government, social organization, and economic enterprise leaders through consistent professional evaluation of each leader’s political performance and OGD-directed surveillance by North Korea’s internal security agencies.<sup>53</sup> The OGD controls the party life of each and every party member, particularly leaders in every field including the military, and that party life focuses on daily demonstration of loyalty to the supreme leader, not technical or professional expertise. It evaluates the party life of each KWP member and his/her demonstrated loyalty to the supreme leader on a consistent basis, particularly as to whether each leader complies with party policy and supreme leader directives. Loyalty to the supreme leader is the coin of the realm when it comes to success within the Kim Regime and this is core to evaluations. Policy recommendations from each agency, including the military, are screened in this manner.

In Kim Jong-il's writings, because the Party Life Guidance Section is the most important section in the OGD due to its being responsible for cabinet and central government agency party life guidance sections and local party organizations, the party life guidance sections are allocated whatever personnel they need. In the military, the GPB political commissars at every level of the KPA perform this function.

The OGD Party Life Guidance Section is divided into numerous sub-sections, each monitoring the party life of leaders in a specific area of the political-administrative structure. The OGD's Party Life Guidance Section duly records this information on every section leader within the party, KPA general and frontline regimental commander through reports from the GPB, and the equivalent within the government, economic and social organization structures.<sup>54</sup>

Other sub-sections of the OGD's Party Life Guidance Section focus on different organizational leaders. Sub-section 13 of the OGD Party Life Guidance Section is responsible for assessing military leaders' adherence to party guidance. It politically guides and controls KPA Party Committee tasks and GPB tasks. Sub-section 13 ensures the military follows supreme leader ideology and leadership and that the military follows the party lead. Sub-section 13 conducts inspections to this effect. The KPA Party Committee and the GPB must coordinate with Sub-section 13 prior to political task execution. An OGD vice-director leads sub-section 13. Sub-section 13 and the GPB maintain an office in the MPAF building for preparing KPA Party Committee meetings and Sub-section 13 participates in all important political meetings of the KPA Party Committee.<sup>55</sup>

Furthermore, Sub-section 13 of the OGD Party Life Guidance Section leads a 15-day indoctrination session every year for all KPA generals, independent regimental commanders and their political officers, brigade commanders and their political officers, as well as division commanders and their political officers and above. This indoctrination session frequently leads to the purging of those senior leaders found wanting.<sup>56</sup>

The criteria for the OGD Party Life Guidance Section's assessment of each individual are beyond professional-technical expertise. There are specific political functions and participation by which this loyalty is measured. Daily self-critique sessions, party doctrine study sessions, and KWP committee meeting attendance. Collectively, these functions are designated "party life." However, foremost among the issues of personal

evaluation is leader loyalty to the supreme leader based on the “Ten Great Principles of Monolithic Leadership.” These ten principles are the dominant dogma of the party by which every single North Korean is evaluated. Focus is on loyalty to the supreme leader at the sacrifice of the self. Societal leaders of all areas are judged in their strict observance of these principles. Kim Jong-il officially announced these principles in 1974. They are:

- We must give our all in the struggle to unify the entire society with the revolutionary ideology of the Great Leader Kim Il-sung.
- We must honor the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung with all our loyalty.
- We must make absolute the authority of the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung.
- We must make the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung revolutionary ideology our faith and make his instructions our creed.
- We must adhere strictly to the principle of unconditional obedience in carrying out the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung's instructions.
- We must strengthen the entire party's ideology and willpower and revolutionary unity, centering on the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung.
- We must learn from the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung and adopt the communist look, revolutionary work methods and people-oriented work style.
- We must value the political life we were given by the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung, and loyally repay his great political trust and thoughtfulness with heightened political awareness and skill.
- We must establish strong organizational regulations so that the entire party, nation and military move as one under the one and only leadership of the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung.
- We must pass down the great achievement of the revolution by the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung from generation to generation, inheriting and completing it to the end.<sup>57</sup>

Each individual is judged by his or her compliance with the “ten principles.” These, and the words of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il,<sup>58</sup> are

the law of the Kim Regime and therefore the land--not the constitution, not even the KWP charter. These “ten principles” dominate the lives of every North Korean, regardless of rank or position. The principles are intended by the regime to secure loyalty to the leader and adherence to these principles serves as the basis for evaluation reports for all North Korean supervisors.

To support compliance with supreme leader directives and the validity of individual loyalty, the OGD employs its Inspection Section and the internal security services to monitor relevant activities of every leader it is responsible for assessing.<sup>59</sup> The OGD has the authority to inspect the KPA and this inspection is the most feared of all inspections.<sup>60</sup>

The process just described is probably the least understood and least appreciated aspect of KPA leadership outside of North Korea. However, it is the reality of every leader, regardless of agency, as testified to by every North Korean defector who was a KPA officer or KWP member.

The 4<sup>th</sup> Sub-section of the OGD’s Cadre Section holds final authority over all military personnel matters regarding commanders and political officers of regiment and above, as well as all military attaches overseas. The OGD must ratify all one-star and above personnel decisions. This decision is then forwarded to the KPA supreme commander to issue the appropriate orders.<sup>61</sup>

This is a breakdown of the personnel appointment structure in the OGD Cadre Section:


- Sub-sections 1 and 2 for central cadres
- Sub-section 3 for provincial cadres
- Sub-section 4 for military appointments
- Sub-section 5 for Guards Command (protection of Kim family)
- Sub-section 6 for Ministry of State Security
- Sub-section 7 for Ministry of People’s Security
- Sub-section 8 for the judiciary
- Sub-section 9 for government
- Sub-section 11 for inter-Korean related personnel

In this way, every single appointment that matters is routed through the OGD.<sup>62</sup>

The OGD serves as the staff for the KWP Central Military Committee as well as the KWP Politburo the KWP Inspection

Committee, and the KWP Central Committee--the who's who of North Korea. It maintains political control over the internal security agencies<sup>63</sup> and inspects all organizations on their dedication to the supreme leader, which is the foremost task of regime security. No agency outside of the supreme leader can call the OGD to task. Those agencies that demonstrate poor performance on regime security are quickly punished due to OGD recommendations. Chang Song-taek's execution and the subsequent gutting of the KWP Administration Department reinforced this standard, but not the precedence for this type of ruthless effectiveness.

**Figure 3: Organizational Chart for the KWP Organization and Guidance Department<sup>64</sup>**



At every party committee level from the national level to the county party committee, including the military, the Organization Division (OD) of the local committee has enormous power, which has side effects. At every level of party committee, OD cadre (GPB political officers in the

military) abuse their power or do not coordinate with the local propaganda and agitation secretary on new guidance from the party. Sometimes the OD cadre tells the propaganda and agitation cadre what their work is and how to do it. In particular, a party committee OD guidance officer places the OD's interests first due to their enormous power within their jurisdiction. They do whatever they want regardless of how other sections do their work.<sup>65</sup>

### **Role of the Military Security Command**

The MSC is the primary security agency within the North Korean military-industrial complex. It assigns MSC officers at every level of KPA and the Ministry of People's Armed Forces, as well as supporting military industries. The MSC carries out the mission of surveillance and personal movement control of the entire military for the purpose of actualizing the monolithic guidance system of the supreme leader. Throughout the history of the MSC, it has gained in trust and decisiveness in protecting Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. After the MSC rooted out the anti-regime groups of the Frundze Academy and the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps in the 1990s, Kim Jong-il's trust in the MSC soared. In December 1995, the MSC was expanded and reorganized. Accordingly, the MSC was elevated to the same level of national security as the then State Security Department (now Ministry of State Security), and the Ministry of People's Security. The MSC is a centralized and stove-piped command and is deployed at every level in the KPA. The offices of the MSC are in Pyongyang.

The MSC is organized in the military separately and the MSC Commander takes his orders directly from the supreme leader. This mission is as follows:


- Detects and arrests anti-Party, anti-revolution and anti-state elements.
- Actively and independently carry out anti-espionage missions.
- Responsible for security of the supreme leader when he visits military units
- Conducts resident registration in the military. Resident registration is originally a mission conducted by the national police, the Ministry of People's Security (MPS). All North Korean residents are registered and relevant information includes date of birth, marriage status, family background, residence

movement, and employment. Information collection is coordinated with the MPS.

- Responsible for guarding the border and coastline. (This mission was formally carried out by the Ministry of State Security’s Guard Bureau but subsequently transferred to the MSC. That mission is now the responsibility of the Border Guard Headquarters.
- Detects and deals with ordinary crime.

The MSC’s basic missions are carried out by 13 different sections. Missions are carried out in the name of the MSC Commander but at the same time the GPB Director controls him. The party life of MSC personnel is controlled by MSC political section.<sup>66</sup>

**Figure 4: Organizational structure of Military Security Command<sup>67</sup>**



**Kim Jong-un and Political Control of the North Korean Military**

Kim Jong-un attended Kim Il-sung Military Academy after returning from Switzerland, where he attended middle school and high school. After completing the three-year course, he stayed on to attend graduate school for two years where his study thesis concerned engineering.


Upon graduation, Kim Jong-un was assigned to the GPB section of the OGD military division.<sup>68</sup> He served as the GPB party Committee Secretary in the MPAF Headquarters building. He also served in the GPB Reports Section, where he handled the personnel documents of all senior KPA personnel, one-star and above, including their personnel evaluation reports. He also handled party guidance matters for senior KPA personnel who were responsible for carrying out “military-first politics.” Kim Jong-un handled these documents for Kim Jong-il’s final decisions on personnel issues. Though serving in the GPB, Kim Jong-un did not wear a uniform. Kim Jong-chol, Kim Jong-il’s second son, served in the KWP OGD as the Chief, Party Life Guidance Section. He was therefore formally treated at the Central Committee vice-director level.<sup>69</sup>

According to the ROK Ministry of Unification, Kim Jong-un, who was born on January 8 of 1982, 1983, or 1984, was designated a KPA General, the KWP CMC Vice Chairman, and a member of the KWP Central Committee in September 2010 at the Third KWP Delegates Conference. On December 30, 2011, he was elected the Supreme Commander of the KPA by the KWP Politburo shortly after his father’s death on December 17. While reporting on the Fourth KWP Delegates Conference in April 2012, North Korea’s primary external broadcast media, the Korea Central News Agency, reported that on April 11, 2012, Kim Jong-un had become “the supreme leader the KWP and People of the DPRK.” At this conference, Kim was also elected the KWP First Secretary, a member of the KWP Politburo Standing Committee, and Chairman of the KWP CMC. At the Supreme People’s Assembly session on April 13, 2012, Kim Jong-un was elected the Chairman of the National Defense Commission.<sup>70</sup> Election to these positions gives Kim Jong-un supervisory authority over all elements of KWP control over the KPA. The KWP OGD, GPB and the MSC all report directly to Kim. The KPA Party Committee and the KWP PAD report through the KWP OGD. Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il created the above positions and their overlapping authorities in order to have absolute political control of the military. As a result, KPA commanders do not hold the type of command authority within their units that western militaries, as well as the ROK military, enjoy as singular authority. In some respects, one could assess that KPA commanders are basically glorified operations officers. Each commander is flanked in his authority by the assignment of a GPB political officer and an MSC security officer to his staff.



Independent from the unit commander, each of these two officers reports on unit matters through their own stove-piped chain of command through the KWP OGD to the supreme leader. This leaves very little, if any, flexibility for the unit commander. The issue is that on the battlefield, the KPA commander will lack the initiative to adjust to battlefield conditions due to inflexibility based on orders that are subject to political approval, not subject to situational assessments (see chart below).<sup>71</sup>

**Figure 5: KPA Control and Command Chart**



North Korea's crisis reporting procedures for all elements of North Korean military structure are funneled through command echelons (KPA commanders), the KWP (the General Political Bureau), and the Military Security Command. All of these reports go through the KWP OGD, where the first vice-director of the military directorate Ri Pyongchol takes reports and forms spot reports for Kim Jong-un. During times of crisis and shortened decision time frames, this reporting procedure likely obscures reality for an already inexperienced national leader in Pyongyang due to variances in situation descriptions and advice during decision-making. The point is that in any provocation scenario that quickly escalates in a North Korean provocation, the North Korean

leadership will not base decisions on military expertise, but on domestic political considerations. This unique aspect of North Korean decision-making will likely lead to miscalculation by North Korea because of this single point of failure.

## Conclusion

The most seriously misunderstood issue concerning the Korean People's Army is party-military relations. Misunderstanding of this issue impairs perspective of military-first policy, a term not used by the North Koreans.<sup>72</sup> The term does not mean the military enjoys a position above the Korean Workers' Party. Since the Korean War, the Kim Regime has built in a political control system that is integrated into every level of the KPA from battalion and above, including frontline companies along the DMZ. This is rarely taken into account during intelligence analysis by any level or type of agency in the ROK-U.S. Alliance when discussing peninsular crisis or North Korean decision-making.

Given the younger Kim's lack of leadership experience, it is likely the KWP OGD first vice-directors are Kim's key advisors who have every reason to preserve the Kim Family Regime the way it is. Singular power by Kim Jong-un is not likely, given the power of the party, the military and the security agencies; however, given his positions of authority, Kim may be able to offset challenges to his authority as his father did so well. The support of OGD is a method of power consolidation but the rapid succession of military senior officers demonstrates a key weakness within the Kim Jong-n regime's consolidation process.

Due to the potential, and even likely, weaknesses in the Kim Regime's crisis decision-making under the political control system within the North Korean military as described above, it is imperative that the ROK-U.S. Alliance establish a declaratory policy that conveys to the North Korean leadership at all levels the exact intent of the alliance when responding to North Korean provocations.

## Notes:

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<sup>1</sup> Report Research Service, “북한정치론] 김정은 후계체계 구축과 조선인민군 총정치국의 역할 (North Korean Political Theory – Kim Jong-un Regime Construction and Korean People's Army General Political Bureau's Role),” *HappyCampus.com*, September 30, 2011. URL: <http://www.mustget.co.kr/dview/543175>.

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<sup>2</sup> Article 46 and 48 of the Korean Workers' Party Charter, 2010. URL: <http://world.moleg.go.kr/KP/law/24980?astSeq=580>.

<sup>3</sup> Kim Jong-il, “인민군대 당조직과 정치기관들의 역할을 높일데 대하여 (On Elevating the Role of the Korean People's Army Party Organizations and Political Organizations),” Kim Jong-il Collective Works, Vol.1, January 19, 1969; as cited in Research Report Service, “북한의 권력기관과 파워 엘리트 분석: 당중앙위원회 조직지도부의 위상. 역할과 후계 문제 (Analysis of North Korea's Authority Organizations and Power Elite: Rise of the Central Committee's Organization and Guidance Department, Role and Succession Issues),” *HappyCampus.com*, December 18, 2011, p.30. URL: [http://www.happycampus.com/doc/11391037/?agent\\_type=naver](http://www.happycampus.com/doc/11391037/?agent_type=naver).

<sup>4</sup> Hyun Seong-il, p.28.

<sup>5</sup> The KWP CMC should not be confused with the former government Military Committee, the predecessor to the National Defense Commission. With the beginning of the Korean War, the state and party maintained a more equal footing politically. On June 26, 1950, the day after the Korean War started, the Presidium of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly established the Military Affairs Committee, appointed Kim Il-sung as the chairman, and ordered all North Korean entities to support the committee's war efforts. See Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, *Communism in Korea* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); p.411.

<sup>6</sup> See Chong Seong-chang, “북한의 노동당 규약 개정과 후계문제 및 권력체계 변동 (North Korea's Korean Workers' Party Charter Changes and the Succession Issue and Changes to the Power System),” Sejong Institute, *정세와 정책* (Situation and Policy), March 2011 issue, pp. 9-12. URL: [www.sejong.org/Pub\\_ci\\_view.php?in\\_ser=179](http://www.sejong.org/Pub_ci_view.php?in_ser=179).

<sup>7</sup> Naver.com, “북한의 군사조직과 기구 (),” Naver Digital Encyclopedia, July 5, 2006. URL: [http://kin.naver.com/open100/detail.nhn?d1id=6&dirId=60402&docId=374806&qb=7LSd7KCV7LmY6rWt7J2YIOyhsOyngQ==&enc=utf8&section=kin&rank=5&search\\_sort=0&spq=0](http://kin.naver.com/open100/detail.nhn?d1id=6&dirId=60402&docId=374806&qb=7LSd7KCV7LmY6rWt7J2YIOyhsOyngQ==&enc=utf8&section=kin&rank=5&search_sort=0&spq=0).

<sup>8</sup> Naver Encyclopedia, “North Korea's Party-Military Relations,” Naver.com, March 31, 2008. URL: <http://kin.naver.com/open100/detail.nhn?d1id=6&dirId=604&docId=762366&qb=7LSd7KCV7LmY6rWt&enc=utf8&section=kin&rank=5&sort=0&spq=0&pid=gumFdwoi5U4ssw5dDwsss--150156&sid=TChnQ-tkKEwAAAwJPgc>.

<sup>9</sup> KPA Party Committee Chart Source: ROK Defense Intelligence Command, North Korea Organization Reference Book; as cited in Lee Kyo-dok, Kim Kuk-sin, Cho Chong-ah, Pak Yong-ja, “북한체제의 행위자와 상호작용 (Actors and Mutual Interaction in the North Korean Regime),” Korean Institute of National Unification, 2009; p.79.

<sup>10</sup> Yi Dae Keun, *북한군 총정치국* (North Korean Military's General Political Bureau), in *북한의 군사* (North Korea's Military) (Seoul: Kyongin Munhwa Publishing, 2006); p.169.

<sup>11</sup> Yi Dae Keun, *북한 군부는 왜 쿠데타를 하지않나* (Why Doesn't The Korean People's Army Make A Coup) (Seoul: Hanul Academy, 2003, p.144.

<sup>12</sup> Kim Jong-il, “당과 수령에게 끝없이 충실한 일꾼이 되자 (Let's Become Workers

Who Are Endlessly Faithful of the Party and the Great Leader),” an August 20, 1977 speech cited in Kim Chong-il Collected Works, Vol.5, 1995, pp.457 and 463-4; as cited in Jae-Cheon Lim, *Kim Jong Il's Leadership of North Korea* (New York: Routledge, 2009), p.70.

<sup>13</sup> Naver Encyclopedia, “Organizational Structure of the General Political Bureau,” February 27, 2012. Accessed September 20, 2012. URL: <http://blog.naver.com/heewoool?Redirect=Log&logNo=150132750873>.

<sup>14</sup> Naver Encyclopedia, “Organizational Structure of the General Political Bureau,” February 27, 2012. Accessed September 20, 2012. URL: <http://blog.naver.com/heewoool?Redirect=Log&logNo=150132750873>.

<sup>15</sup> Naver Encyclopedia, “Organizational Structure of the General Political Bureau,” February 27, 2012. Accessed September 20, 2012. URL: <http://blog.naver.com/heewoool?Redirect=Log&logNo=150132750873>.

<sup>16</sup> Yi Dae Keun, 북한군 총정치국 (North Korean Military's General Political Bureau), in 북한의 군사 (North Korea's Military) (Seoul: Kyongin Munhwa Publishing, 2006); pp.172-76.

<sup>17</sup> Yi Dae Keun, 북한군 총정치국 (North Korean Military's General Political Bureau), in 북한의 군사 (North Korea's Military) (Seoul: Kyongin Munhwa Publishing, 2006); pp.178-80.

<sup>18</sup> Ko Jae-hong, *Establishment and Status of the North Korean Military's General Political Bureau During the Korean War*. Kunsu (Military History), No. 53, December 2004, p.144-145.

<sup>19</sup> Chong Yong-su, “북한 사흘 연속 군 수뇌 인사] 최용해의 총정치국 ‘군대의 당’ 핵심조직 (North Korea Carries Out Senior Military Personnel Moves Four Days In a Row, Choi Yong-hae's General Political Bureau – the Military's Party and Core Organization),” Joongang Daily News, July 19, 2012. [http://blog.joinsmsn.com/media/folderlistslide.asp?uid=nkys&folder=2&list\\_id=12863373](http://blog.joinsmsn.com/media/folderlistslide.asp?uid=nkys&folder=2&list_id=12863373).

<sup>20</sup> Naver.com, “북한의 군사조직과 기구 (North Korea's Military Organization and Agencies),” Naver Digital Encyclopedia, July 5, 2006 [http://kin.naver.com/open100/detail.nhn?d1id=6&dirId=60402&docId=374806&qb=7LSd7KCV7LmY6rWt7J2YIOyhsOyngQ==&enc=utf8&section=kin&rank=5&search\\_sort=0&spq=0](http://kin.naver.com/open100/detail.nhn?d1id=6&dirId=60402&docId=374806&qb=7LSd7KCV7LmY6rWt7J2YIOyhsOyngQ==&enc=utf8&section=kin&rank=5&search_sort=0&spq=0).

<sup>21</sup> Kim Jong-il, “The Mission of the Unit Political Officer,” Kim Jong-il Collected Works, Volume 2, Korean Workers' Party Publishing Company, 1992; p. 463.

<sup>22</sup> Kim Jong-il, “당과 수령에게 끝없이 충실한 일꾼이 되자 (Let's Become Workers Who Are Endlessly Faithful of the Party and the Great Leader),” an August 20, 1977 speech cited in Kim Jong-il Collected Works, Vol.5, 1995, pp.457 and 463-4; and Kim Jong-il, “인민군대 당조직과 정치기관들의 역할을 높일데 대하여 (On Elevating the Role of the Korean People's Army Party Organizations and Political Organizations),” Kim Jong-il Collective Works, Vol.1, January 19, 1969; as cited in Research Report Service, “북한의 권력기관과 파워 엘리트 분석: 당중앙위원회 조직지도부의 위상, 역할과 후계 문제 (Analysis of North Korea's Authority Organizations and Power Elite: Rise of the Central Committee's Organization and Guidance Department, Role and

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<sup>23</sup> Yi Dae Keun, *북한군 총정치국* (North Korean Military’s General Political Bureau), in *북한의 군사* (North Korea’s Military) (Seoul: Kyongin Munhwa Publishing, 2006); p.169.

<sup>24</sup> The average North Korean has no idea what the OGD is because they do not have access to those levels of North Korean leadership. However, all of the high-ranking defectors and, in particular, defecting KWP party members, do. Most of the latter are now employed at the Republic of Korea National Intelligence Service’s Institute for National Security Strategy due to those specific defectors’ understanding of the inner circles of the Kim Regime. See Hyun Seong-il, *한국의 국가 전략과 파워엘리트: 간부 정책을 중심으로* (North Korean National Strategy and Power Elite: Focus on Cadre Policy),” (Seoul: Seoin Publishers, 2007), in Korean; Lee Young-hun, *북한을 움직이는 힘, 군부의 패권경쟁* (*The Strength That Moves North Korea, Competition For Supremacy in the Military*) (Seoul: Sallim Publishing Company, 2012) in Korean; Cheong Seong-chang, *북한군 총정치국의 위상 및 역할과 권력승계 문제* (*Issues on the Rise of the North Korean Military’s General Political Bureau and Its Role and Authority Succession*) (Seoul: Sejong Institute, Policy Research 2013-8, 2013), in Korean; Jang Jin-sung, *Dear Leader* (New York: Atria Books, 2014); Hwang Jang-yop, *I Have Seen the Truth of History* (Seoul: Sidae Chongshin Publishing, 2006); author interviews with former KWP members, Mr. Ri, Mr. H, Mr. Kim, Dr. Y, Diplomat C., Ms. H, and Colonel Choi. See also Pak Hyeong-Jung, Lee Kyo-Duk, Chong Chang-hyun, Lee Ki-dong, “김정일 시대 북한의 정치체제 (North Korean Political System in the Kim Jong-il Era),” Korea Institute of National Unification, 2004, p.76-77. URL: [http://www.kinu.or.kr/report/report\\_01\\_01.jsp?topage=2&field=&text=&order=&dir=&mode=view&bid=DATA02&ses=&category=6&page=37&num=512&toname=](http://www.kinu.or.kr/report/report_01_01.jsp?topage=2&field=&text=&order=&dir=&mode=view&bid=DATA02&ses=&category=6&page=37&num=512&toname=).

<sup>25</sup> Pak Hyeong-Jung, Lee Kyo-Duk, Chong Chang-hyun, Lee Ki-dong, “김정일 시대 북한의 정치체제 (North Korean Political System in the Kim Jong-il Era),” Korea Institute of National Unification, 2004, p.76-77. URL: [http://www.kinu.or.kr/report/report\\_01\\_01.jsp?topage=2&field=&text=&order=&dir=&mode=view&bid=DATA02&ses=&category=6&page=37&num=512&toname=](http://www.kinu.or.kr/report/report_01_01.jsp?topage=2&field=&text=&order=&dir=&mode=view&bid=DATA02&ses=&category=6&page=37&num=512&toname=).

<sup>26</sup> Hyun Seong-il, Pukhanui Kukka Chonryak kwa Pawo Elite: Kanbu Chongchaekul Chungshimuro (North Korean National Strategy and Power Elite: Focus on Cadre Policy),” (Seoul: Seoin Publishers, 2007), p.281; (in Korean).

<sup>27</sup> Jung Young-tae, Kim Jin-mu, An Chan-il, Lee Young-jong, Lee Yun-kol, Im Ul-chul, and Hyun In-hae, Joint Studies in North Korea’s Organizational Situation By Level, and Changes in Organizational Culture: Focus on The Party Organizational Situation By Element – Party, Government, Military, Economy, Society,” Korea Institute of National Unification (Seoul: 2007); p.21; (in Korean).

<sup>28</sup> Jung Young-tae, Kim Jin-mu, An Chan-il, Lee Young-jong, Lee Yun-kol, Im Ul-chul, and Hyun In-hae, *북한의 부문별 조직 실태 및 조직문화 변화 종합연구: 당·정·군 및 경제·사회부문 기간조직 내의 당 기관 실태를 중심으로* (*Joint Studies in North Korea’s Organizational Situation By Level, and Changes in Organizational Culture: Focus on Party Organizational Situation By Element – Party, Government, Military,*

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*Economy, Society*) (Seoul: Korean Institute of National Unification, 2007); p.21.

<sup>29</sup> Hyun Seong-il, Pukhanui Kukka Chonryak kwa Pawo Elite: Kanbu Chongchaekul Chungshimuro (North Korean National Strategy and Power Elite: Focus on Cadre Policy,” (Seoul: Seoin Publishers, 2007), p.401-402; (in Korean).

<sup>30</sup> Cheong Seong-chang, *The Contemporary North Korean Politics: History, Ideology and Power System* (Seoul: Hanul Publishing, 2011), p.310-1.

<sup>31</sup> Hyun Seong-il, *P북한의 국가 전략과 파워엘리트: 간부 정책을 중심으로* (*North Korean National Strategy and Power Elite: Focus on Cadre Policy*,” (Seoul: Seoin Publishers, 2007), pp.401, in Korean

<sup>32</sup> Jang Jin-sung, *Dear Leader* (New York: Atria Books, 2014), p.134-5; Hyun Seong-il, “북한 사회에 대한 노동당의 통제체제 (Korean Workers’ Party Control System for North Korean Society),” North Korea Research Institute, North Korea Research Studies, August 1998; p.9.

<sup>33</sup> Hyun Seong-il, p.119.

<sup>34</sup> Jung Young-tae, et al; p.30; (in Korean).

<sup>35</sup> Assessments by every leading ROK think tank is that Kim Jong-il never wanted to share the power inherent in the OGD as he reorganized it. Therefore, he maintained that position exclusively for himself. Since Kim Jong-il’s death in December 2011, there has been media reporting that his sister, Kim Kyong-hui, his second son Kim Jong-chol, and his daughter, Kim Yo-jong, may have taken that role. However, there has been no official party or state message stating such an appointment has been made.

<sup>36</sup> Pak Hyeong-Jung, Lee Kyo-Duk, Chong Chang-hyun, Lee Ki-dong, “김정일 시대 북한의 정치체제 (North Korean Political System in the Kim Jong-il Era),” Korea Institute of National Unification, 2004, p.77. URL: [http://www.kinu.or.kr/report/report\\_01\\_01.jsp?topage=2&field=&text=&order=&dir=&mode=view&bid=DATA02&ses=&category=6&page=37&num=512&toname=](http://www.kinu.or.kr/report/report_01_01.jsp?topage=2&field=&text=&order=&dir=&mode=view&bid=DATA02&ses=&category=6&page=37&num=512&toname=).

<sup>37</sup> Kim Jong-il, “(On a Few Issues on Planning the Party’s Economic Policy),” in *Collected Works of Kim Jong-il*, Vol. 5, Korean Workers’ Party Publishing Company, Pyongyang, 1995; in a speech delivered on August 11, 1976, to a OGD and PAD responsible workers; (in Korean).

<sup>38</sup> The PHQC is comprised of approximately 300 personnel. Jung Young-tae, et al; p.37; (in Korean).

<sup>39</sup> Jung Young-tae, et al; p.35; (in Korean).

<sup>40</sup> The Regional Parties Department is comprised of approximately 200 personnel. Jung Young-tae, et al; p.37; (in Korean).

<sup>41</sup> Jung Young-tae, et al; p.35; (in Korean).

<sup>42</sup> Jung Young-tae, et al; p.35-6; (in Korean).

<sup>43</sup> Kim Jong-il, “On Improving and Strengthening the Tasks of the State Administrative Council’s Party Committee and Subordinate Agency Party Organizations,” in *Collected Works of Kim Jong-il*, Vol. 4, Korean Workers’ Party Publishing Company, Pyongyang, 1994; in a speech delivered on June 10, 1974, to State Administration Council Party Committee Responsible Workers’ Conference; (in Korean).

<sup>44</sup> Kim Jong-il, “On a Few Issues in Internal Party Tasks,” in *Collected Works of Kim Jong-il*, Vol. 4, Korean Workers’ Party Publishing Company, Pyongyang, 1994; in a speech delivered on June 22, 1974, to a conference attended by OGD vice-directors,

provincial committee organizational secretaries, and party secretaries, and party secretaries of cabinet and government departments; (in Korean).

<sup>44</sup> The OGD Military Directorate is comprised of approximately 300 personnel. Jung Young-tae, et al; p.37; (in Korean).

<sup>44</sup> Jung Young-tae, et al; p.35; (in Korean).

<sup>45</sup> Jung Young-tae, Kim Jin-mu, An Chan-il, Lee Young-jong, Lee Yun-kol, Im Ul-chul, and Hyun In-hae, *북한의 부문별 조직 실태 및 조직문화 변화 종합연구: 당·정·군 및 경제·사회부문 기간조직 내의 당 기관 실태를 중심으로* (Joint Studies in North Korea's Organizational Situation By Level, and Changes in Organizational Culture: Focus on Party Organizational Situation By Element – Party, Government, Military, Economy, Society) (Seoul: Korean Institute of National Unification, 2007); p.36; (in Korean).

<sup>46</sup> It maintains the same influence over leaders of all domestic, foreign and security policy conforms to supreme leader guidance. Every KWP secretary, government minister, military general, regional leader or equivalent is controlled in this manner.

<sup>47</sup> Hyun Seong-il, *P 북한의 국가 전략과 파워엘리트: 간부 정책을 중심으로* (North Korean National Strategy and Power Elite: Focus on Cadre Policy), (Seoul: Seoin Publishers, 2007), in Korean; Lee Young-hun, *북한을 움직이는 힘, 군부의 패권경쟁* (The Strength That Moves North Korea, Competition For Supremacy in the Military) (Seoul: Sallim Publishing Company, 2012) in Korean; Cheong Seong-chang, *북한군 총정치국의 위상 및 역할과 권력승계 문제* (Issues on the Rise of the North Korean Military's General Political Bureau and Its Role and Authority Succession) (Seoul: Sejong Institute, Policy Research 2013-8, 2013), in Korean; author interviews with former KWP members, Mr. Ri, Mr. Hyun, and Colonel Choi.

<sup>48</sup> Report Research Service, “북한정치론 – 조선로동당 중앙위원회 조직지도부 (North Korean Political Theory – Korean Workers' Party Central Committee Organization and Guidance Department),” Accessed April 20, 2012. URL: <http://www.reportshop.co.kr/dview/455102>.

<sup>49</sup> The OGD Military Department is comprised of approximately 150 personnel. Jung Young-tae, et al; p.37; (in Korean).

<sup>50</sup> Revolutionary reeducation is the party term for punishment in the form of hard labor on a farm or in a factory to learn the error of their ways for some political, personal or procedural transgression.

<sup>51</sup> North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity,

“장성택이 관할하던 당행정부 포함 기관들 완전 물갈이, 기능 대폭 축소 (Organizations That Jang Song-thaek Supervised, Including the Party's Administration Department, Will Be Changed And Their Functions Reduced),” December 31, 2013,

<http://www.nkis.kr/board.php?board=nkisb201&config=&command=body&no=490&>

<sup>52</sup> National Intelligence Service “Pukhan Nodongdangui haekshim Puso (North Korea's Korean Workers' Party Core Department),” 2006. Accessed March 25, 2012. [http://www.nis.go.kr/app/board/view?sc\\_param=M03180000&midArr=M03180000&fileIdArr=&keyWord=&page=1&startDate=&endDate=&dataNo=23452&hcode=39077402012879299424981&viewNo=201\\_](http://www.nis.go.kr/app/board/view?sc_param=M03180000&midArr=M03180000&fileIdArr=&keyWord=&page=1&startDate=&endDate=&dataNo=23452&hcode=39077402012879299424981&viewNo=201_)

<sup>53</sup> Yi Dae Keun, *북한군 총정치국* (North Korean Military's General Political Bureau), in *북한의 군사* (North Korea's Military) (Seoul: Kyongin Munhwa Publishing, 2006), p. 169.

<sup>54</sup> Report Research Service, “북한의 권력기관과 파워 엘리트 분석: 당중앙위원회

조직지도부의 위상. 역할과 후계 문제 (Analysis of North Korea’s Authority Organizations and Power Elite: Rise of the Central Committee’s Organization and Guidance Department, Role and Succession Issues),” *HappyCampus.com*, December 18, 2011; pp.28-37, [http://www.happycampus.com/doc/11391037/?agent\\_type=naver](http://www.happycampus.com/doc/11391037/?agent_type=naver).

<sup>55</sup> Naver Encyclopedia, “North Korea’s Party-Military Relations,” Naver.com, March 31, 2008.

<http://kin.naver.com/open100/detail.nhn?d1id=6&dirId=604&docId=762366&qb=7LSd7KCV7LmY6rWt&enc=utf8&section=kin&rank=5&sort=0&spq=0&pid=gumFdwoi5U4ssw5dDwsss--150156&sid=TChnQ-tkKEwAAAJPgc>.

<sup>56</sup> Naver Encyclopedia, “North Korea’s Party-Military Relations,” Naver.com, March 31, 2008.

<http://kin.naver.com/open100/detail.nhn?d1id=6&dirId=604&docId=762366&qb=7LSd7KCV7LmY6rWt&enc=utf8&section=kin&rank=5&sort=0&spq=0&pid=gumFdwoi5U4ssw5dDwsss--150156&sid=TChnQ-tkKEwAAAJPgc>.

<sup>57</sup> See “Prisoners of Their Own Country: North Korea in the Eyes of the Witnesses,” Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, 2004. pp.39-44. <http://eng.nkhumanrights.or.kr/main.htm>.

<sup>58</sup> Hyun Seong-il, *P북한의 국가 전략과 파워엘리트: 간부 정책을 중심으로* (*North Korean National Strategy and Power Elite: Focus on Cadre Policy*), (Seoul: Seoin Publishers, 2007), in Korean; Lee Young-hun, *북한을 움직이는 힘, 군부의 패권경쟁* (*The Strength That Moves North Korea, Competition For Supremacy in the Military*) (Seoul: Sallim Publishing Company, 2012) in Korean; Cheong Seong-chang, *북한군 총정치국의 위상 및 역할과 권력승계 문제* (*Issues on the Rise of the North Korean Military’s General Political Bureau and Its Role and Authority Succession*) (Seoul: Sejong Institute, Policy Research 2013-8, 2013), in Korean; author interviews with former KWP members, Mr. Ri, Mr. Hyun, and Colonel Choi.

<sup>59</sup> See Jae-Cheon Lim, *Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea* (New York: Routledge, 2009), p.70; and

Jang Jin-sung, “This is it: North Korea’s hidden power system, *News Focus International*, December 31, 2013. URL: <http://newfocusintl.com/north-koreas-hidden-power-system/>.

<sup>60</sup> Naver Encyclopedia, “North Korea’s Party-Military Relations,” Naver.com, March 31, 2008.

<http://kin.naver.com/open100/detail.nhn?d1id=6&dirId=604&docId=762366&qb=7LSd7KCV7LmY6rWt&enc=utf8&section=kin&rank=5&sort=0&spq=0&pid=gumFdwoi5U4ssw5dDwsss--150156&sid=TChnQ-tkKEwAAAJPgc>.

<sup>61</sup> Naver Encyclopedia, “North Korea’s Party-Military Relations,” Naver.com, March 31, 2008.

<http://kin.naver.com/open100/detail.nhn?d1id=6&dirId=604&docId=762366&qb=7LSd7KCV7LmY6rWt&enc=utf8&section=kin&rank=5&sort=0&spq=0&pid=gumFdwoi5U4ssw5dDwsss--150156&sid=TChnQ-tkKEwAAAJPgc>.

<sup>62</sup> Jang Jin-sung, “This is it: North Korea’s hidden power system, *News Focus International*, December 31, 2013. URL: <http://newfocusintl.com/north-koreas-hidden-power-system/>.



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<sup>63</sup> Cheong Seong-chang, *The Contemporary North Korean Politics: History, Ideology and Power System* (Seoul: Hanul Publishing, 2011), p.310-1.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Kim Jong-il, “Chojikbuwa Sonjonsongdongbu (On Effective Combined Operations Between Organization Divisions and Propaganda and Agitation Divisions),” in *Collected Works of Kim Jong-il*, Vol. 7, Korean Workers’ Party Publishing Company, Pyongyang, 2011, pages 406-423; in a speech at a OGD and PAD Vice-Director Collaboration Conference on February 6, 1976; (in Korean).

<sup>67</sup> Chart is author’s rendition of organization structure explained in Choi Chu-hwal, “Pukhan Inmingun Powuisaryongbuui Chejemit Hwaldong (Korean People’s Army Military Security Command’s Organization and Activities),” *North Korea Research Studies*, Issue 1, Vol.1, 1997.

<sup>68</sup> Pak Bong-kwon, Song Sung-hun, and Son Il-son, *Kim Jong-un Era* (Seoul: Maeil Kyongje Shinmunsa, 2012).

<sup>69</sup> “Kim Jong-un, “Chongjongchikuk Pisoro Kun Changak (Kim Jong-un Secures Control of Military As Secretary in the General Political Bureau),” *Daily NK*, June 8, 2010. <http://www.dailynk.com/korean/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=72493>. Reporter has the same name as the North Korean leader.

<sup>70</sup> Republic of Korea Ministry of Unification, *북한주요인사: 인물정보 (North Korea’s Key Personnel: Personal Information)*, 2013, [www.unikorea.go.kr](http://www.unikorea.go.kr); and Curtis Melvin, “Korean Worker’ Party 4<sup>th</sup> Delegates Conference,” *nkeconwatch.com* quoting KCNA, April 11-21, 2014. URL: /2012/04/11/4<sup>th</sup>-delegates-conference-announced/

<sup>71</sup> Author rendition of political chain of command paralleling the standard military chain of command, using several references, including Yi Dae Keun, *북한 군부는 왜 쿠데타를 하지않나 (Why Doesn’t The Korean People’s Army Make A Coup)* (Seoul: Hanul Academy, 2003, p.146.

<sup>72</sup> The North Korean regime employs the term military-first politics (선군정치), not the term military-first policy (선군정책). The latter term was mistranslated and perpetuated by the media and mistakenly adopted by U.S. government agencies.