American Missionaries and the Korean Independence Movement in the Early 20th Century

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Abstract

This article investigates the intersection of militancy with Korean Christianity in the early twentieth century. Despite the dominant historiography of Korean Christianity as non-violent, pacifist, and apolitical, militancy was a surprising—and in many circles, an unwanted—outgrowth of the developing Protestant faith as it was disseminated by Protestant missionaries starting in 1884. The Protestant missionaries, caught between Japanese authorities, who legally permitted their work and Korean people to whom they served, insisted on maintaining an apolitical position, preferring to focus on spiritual and religious activities. However, a handful of American missionaries defied not only their home government and church mission board but also the Japanese government by openly challenging the legitimacy of the Japanese occupation of Korea. Furthermore, their open support for militant and nationalistic activism complicate the dominant narrative by illustrating a fermenting underground movement for independence outside its purview.

Keywords: Protestant missionaries in Korea, Japan, Colonial Korea, Homer Hulbert, Henry G. Appenzeller, Korean nationalism, Korean Christianity, Independence movement in Korea
A student poll at an elite college in Seoul revealed surprising results in 1997. It asked students at Korea University to select any person in world history whom they would most like to clone; students overwhelmingly voted for Kim Ku (1876-1949), the renowned Korean nationalist and independence fighter. He received 113 votes, followed by Mother Teresa with seven. A militant insurrectionist during Korea’s colonial period, Kim did not hesitate to use violence to achieve his goals: Kim killed a Japanese army lieutenant in 1896; orchestrated two bombing in 1932 that killed a number of Japanese high officials, and even attempted to take the life of the Japanese Emperor.

While Kim Ku is known primarily as a heroic militant crusader for Korean independence, the relationship between his Christian faith and hawkish militarism remains something of an enigma and contradiction, especially when facing the widely-held perception of pacifism among Korean Christian leaders. The Christians’ reputation for non-violent activism was solidified during the March 1, 1919 Movement, a nationwide protest that the Japanese colonial government brutally suppressed. Although many Koreans called for an armed insurrection against the Japanese, Korean Christian leaders convinced fellow Koreans to stand down and, instead, stage a peaceful demonstration.

The pacifist reputation of Korean church leaders remained the dominant historiography of Korean Christianity during the colonial period, but militant Christians like Kim Ku and many others, challenge the widely-held view. Little known are Korean pastors and evangelists such as Yi Tonghui and Yeo Eunhyeong, who “played the leading role in organizing” the Koryo Communist Party and the Korean Communist Party. In 1922, Kim Kyusik and Yeo Eunhyeong attended, as representatives of the League of Korean Christians, the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East in Moscow. Another puzzling figure is the founder of North Korea, Kim Il Sung, who came from a militant Christian background: his father married the daughter of a “prominent” local Presbyterian family; both parents were Christians; and both parents participated in “Christian-led nationalist groups” that engaged in anti-Japanese activities.

The diverging narrative of militant Christians who accepted violence and insurrection against a colonial power as a means to achieve independence placed them outside the prevailing historiography regarding Korean Christian leaders. The militant insurrectionists, or terrorists in the Japanese point of view, were not “gradualist-pacifists,”
“cultural nationalists,” or “self-reconstruction nationalists”— characterizations made by scholars about Korean Christian leaders of this period. While Kim Ku and others received wide recognition for their heroic militarism from Korean society at large, they remain as a distant footnote in the prevailing narrative that emphasizes spiritual, cultural and diplomatic responses to colonialism. The complicated relationship between militant Koreans and their Christian faith was one of the reasons for their absence in the scholarly literature. Chung-shin Park, in *Protestantism and Politics in Korea*, affirmed this point when he wrote, “For some reason the Christian background of these individuals is not mentioned at all, or only tangentially, in the literature.”

Within the context of the emerging Korean Christian intellect, American missionaries had a prominent role as the leaders of the Protestant church in Korea. They were the ecclesiastical gatekeepers who exerted great influence on the Protestant Christian community but their influence was not confined to spiritual topics as it also extended to cultural, social and political matters. Their close relationship with Korean church leaders underscored the crucial role they played in shaping their followers’ thinking. A great deal of effort went into creating a new Christian ethos based on acceptance, non-interference, and non-violence that would become prescriptive of the Korean Protestant church. But this had its dissenting voices. A handful of renegade missionaries defiantly criticized Japan’s imperialistic intentions to the chagrin of the Japanese and also their home government and mission board. Under pressure from authorities, most missionaries, however, did publicly endorse the colonial discourse and the political sentiments to which everyone living under Japanese colonialism was supposed to pay obeisance.

“No Political Involvement”: The Missionaries’ Position in Korea

Less than two weeks after Horace N. Allen, the first resident Protestant missionary, arrived in Korea in 1884, Seoul was thrown into a political crisis as a radical group of radical modernizers, named the Enlightenment Party, staged a failed coup d'état called the Gapsin Coup. The Coup lasted only three days, but the event symbolized Korea’s bleak political context of political and social upheaval in the late nineteenth century. Handicapped by domestic riots and unrest, the enfeebled Korean government struggled to remain autonomous as foreign imperialists crowded in from the outside.
While China, Russia, and Japan vied for influence over Korea, the United States remained on the sidelines of the political battle and advised its citizens in Korea, especially American missionaries, to refrain from interfering in Korea’s political affairs. As early as 1897, John Sill, the U.S. Minister to Korea, warned missionaries in Korea to restrict themselves “to their legitimate avocations.” In a letter sent to every U.S. citizen in Korea and published in The Independent on May 15, 1897, Sill advised missionaries “to strictly refrain from any expression of opinion or from giving advice concerning the internal management of the country, or from intermeddling in its political questions. If they do so, it is at their own risk and peril.”

The message sent by the U.S. Foreign Mission Boards, the governing church body that sent and supervised the missionaries, was also unequivocal: abstain from political matters. The work of missionaries was strictly and clearly limited to spiritual questions and the Board was wary of missionaries and lay Christians stepping outside of their boundaries. Arthur Judson Brown, who served as Administrative Secretary and later as General Secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions (1895-1929), learned from European governments that “persistently and notoriously sought to advance their national interest through their missionaries.” Brown was especially critical of the effect of political participation on the local people. The result of politically-active missionaries, according to Brown, was that the “average Chinese official regards all missionaries as political agents [of foreign governments] who are to be watched and feared.”

By abstaining from political involvement, the missionaries avoided any perception of a political threat to the governments under which they legally operated. Brown further extended and reinforced the non-political position to the lay Christians. In Korea, where the people experienced political upheaval, Brown advised lay Christians to eschew conflict and accept their new government. In 1902 Brown wrote, “The missionaries strongly believe, with the Boards at home, that . . . it is better for Disciples of Christ to patiently endure some injustice than to carry Christianity in antagonism to the government under which they labor.”

In the aftermath of the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1910 that completed the Japanese annexation of Korea, the missionaries helped cool the public’s anger by urging a peaceful transition through “law-abiding [acceptance] and without reproach than for evil-doing.” One
missionary wrote, “It is one of the cardinal principles of Protestant missionary societies that their missionaries must not engage in political disputes or take sides in national controversies in the lands where they labor. Almost without exception the foreign missionaries adhere to this principle, even at the risk of being greatly misunderstood by their native friends and converts.”\textsuperscript{15}

Missionaries attempted to remain apolitical: neutral and in-between the incoming Japanese government and the Korean people whom they served. The eminent Korean church historian, L. George Paik noted missionary efforts to steer clear of political controversy, such as those of Wade Koons who assured Koreans “that their duty was to obey the Japanese and to do so with a ‘sweet mind’ and not to work for independence.”\textsuperscript{16} Koons continued, “I have spent hours explaining to the church officers and teaching men advantages of Japanese rule, and I cannot think of one who has been kept from it.”\textsuperscript{17}

As one of the few associations permitted to operate in Korea, the church also attracted the attention of revolutionaries who had little interest in spiritual goals. To shield the church from unwanted political involvement, church leaders determined those that focused on political and social issues were “unfit for the church.”\textsuperscript{18} After Japan annexed Korea, Arthur Judson Brown concluded that the missionaries “used their great influence to induce the Koreans to acquiesce in Japanese rule.”\textsuperscript{19} According to Kim San, a Korean Christian in the early twentieth century, the message was clear: the church was not “a place to discuss issues of society, labor, peace, or international affairs.”\textsuperscript{20} As the missionaries adopted a standard position, so did Korean pastors seek to avoid political controversy. The Rev. Chae Chongmin, a leading pastor in the northwestern region, was one who emphasized the division between spiritual and secular pursuits, reinforced with biblical language. In 1936, Chae wrote,

My Lord and Savior, Jesus, did not make His church as institution for production. . . . He did not order His church to create a secular movement. Then, why do church ministers today try to make stones into bread? Do today’s churches desire to be institutions for production? The day when the church becomes an institution for production, it will be a den of robbers.\textsuperscript{21}

When the ranks of Korean insurrectionist forces, known as the ‘Righteous Army,’ swelled in the aftermath of Japanese colonization,
Charles Allen Clark condemned militant action and prevented his church members from joining the movement. In 1908, Clark wrote, “Our position has been that the church is a spiritual organization and as such is not concerned with politics either for or against the present or any other government . . . We set ourselves rigidly against it [i.e. joining the Righteous Army] and we have held our church and almost to a man our members rigidly from going into it.”

Missionaries were well aware of their persuasiveness over their followers: they could fan nationalistic and militant flames or douse them. Their influence alarmed the Japanese who were cognizant of the potential damage to their rule over Korea with the masses ready to strike on command. Despite the missionaries’ commitment to refrain from “any public utterance on the Japanese occupation of Korea,” missionaries remained under constant suspicion as the Japanese viewed them as outside of Japan’s authority and control. For example, when a Korean assassinated Ito Hirobumi in 1909, Japanese newspapers blamed Horace G. Underwood for inciting anti-Japanese sentiment.

According to one missionary in 1910, Japan would have had a “tenfold more difficult task in Korea” if missionaries had encouraged armed retaliation against the Japanese. Brown wrote, “Indeed it has often been said that if it had not been for the missionaries, a revolution would have broken out when Korea was annexed to Japan.” Missionaries convinced the renowned Korean church leader, Kil Seon-ju, to pacify the battle-ready Koreans in the north, Koreans who were ready to stage a bloody attack upon the Japanese after the Korean Emperor’s abdication in 1907. According to another missionary, Kil “pressed home on the [Korean] people that ‘the powers that be are ordained of God,’ and with the assistance of the Christian church he turned the fury of the whole north, and delivered Korea from tremendous bloodshed.”

Some Korean Christians began to distance themselves from missionaries as they detected their unwillingness to assist the Koreans in the cause for independence. One missionary reported that his “inability to give definite help has often interpreted itself to the Korean mind as lack of interest in them, or feebleness of love, causing many to split off, at time, and seek other affiliations.”

**Defiant Missionaries**

Although the non-violent representation of Korean Christianity, most notably represented by pacifist missionaries and Korean church leaders,
dominates the historiography of the issue, less well known are the missionaries who openly challenged Japanese rule over Korea and nurtured a growing interest in political and nationalistic issues among the Korean people. In 1897, the editors of The Japan Times criticized a “certain class” of missionaries who openly advocated Korean independence. Homer B. Hulbert, Henry G. Appenzeller and George H. Jones wrote in The Korean Repository, “We are evidently spotted; our names are in the black-book, guilty of very grave offences.”

The editors of The Japan Times accused the missionaries of crossing the line—engaging in political affairs when they should abstain. According to the Japanese editorial, “Heedless of the repeated admonitions of their government at home, and in lamentable disregard of the duty they owe to a higher authority, they have debased themselves by meddling in the political intrigues of the peninsular kingdom.” With their inexcusable involvement in Korean politics, these missionaries were, in the words of the editors of The Japan Times “mingling with the servants of the Devil.”

Hulbert, Appenzeller, and Jones had at first welcomed Japanese influence in Korea. They had initially been encouraged by the modernizing changes Japan introduced; they “always believed in the reforms inaugurated by Japan.” However, the Japanese assassination of Korea’s Queen Min in 1895 and the “duplicity of her minister” in the aftermath raised serious questions about their intentions. Hulbert, in particular, viewed the introduction of Japanese civilization as “retrograde,” a “degrading” moral experience that equated modern civilization with “a finer method of getting what one wants without paying for it.”

In response to the accusation that they were colluding with “the servants of the Devil,” Hulbert, Appenzeller, and Jones said, “The murder of a queen, in her own private apartments, in the grey of the morning, we readily grant would be likely to place any one in an ‘exceptional position,’ and if any missionary, and especially an American, was guilty of ‘mingling with the servants of the Devil’ on that morning let us have his name, so that we may help to drive him from the country.” Marking their allegiance, Hulbert, Appenzeller, and Jones, in the same editorial, addressed the Koreans: “We are with you.”

Perhaps the most impassioned demonstration of support for Korean independence by a missionary occurred when Hulbert advocated freedom for Korea through his trips abroad as an emissary of the kingdom.
1905, Emperor Gojong sent Hulbert to Washington D.C. as his emissary in a futile attempt to dissuade President Theodore Roosevelt, American law-makers and media of supporting the Japanese takeover of Korea. However, with Roosevelt’s firm and vocal support of Japan, Hulbert found no politicians in the Capitol willing to stand up against the president. He also discovered that media outlets refused to publish his pro-Korean articles “unless previously approved by Washington.”

After Korea became Japan’s protectorate in 1905 without the Emperor’s consent and Tokyo took over major organs of the government, Hulbert urged Emperor Gojong to bring Korea’s case before the international tribunal in 1907 at The Hague. After “selling all his possessions” to raise funds for the trip, Hulbert secretly led a Korean delegation to Hague by rendezvousing with the Korean members in Valdivostok and crossing Russia into Europe. Although they reached The Hague in time, they were refused entry to the conference since Korea was now a Japanese protectorate and no longer a sovereign nation. However, they managed to circulate “to all of the delegates [at the conference] except Japan a summary of Korea’s case . . . which was largely a restatement of the Emperor’s original note.” In addition, the Emperor’s document was also “published in full” in the Courrier de la Conference, “a daily journal published in The Hague and devoted entirely to Conference affairs.”

The Hague Incident, as it was later called, brought world-wide embarrassment to Japan, and, as a consequence, Emperor Gojong was forced to abdicate in favor of his imbecile son in 1907. For his treasonous actions, Japan expelled Hulbert from Korea in 1907. In the United States, Hulbert continued his campaign for Korean independence and was finally able to return to Korea in 1949 where he died and was buried.

A close associate of Hulbert’s was Henry G. Appenzeller, a missionary who collaborated with Hulbert on many projects. Before his untimely death in 1902, Appenzeller cultivated an ethos of militaristic preparation, political activism, and intellectual engagement at Pai Chai Academy, a high school that he founded. In a stark contrast to Korea’s traditional schools which reinforced the classics through recitation and memorization, Appenzeller introduced formal military training and exercise among his Korean students. He also enlisted the assistance of a sergeant from the U.S. Marines who came “over every afternoon” to Pai Chai to train them.
The Pai Chai students displayed their militaristic prowess when they performed “an exhibition drill” during the 1897 Commencement Exercises. Instruction in military drills greatly inspired the Koreans, and, as a result, many mission schools, both for boys and girls, adopted military drills as a part of their academic training. For example, during the 1906 “Field Day” at Pyongyang where lower school boys demonstrated their various skills, the boys performed military drills. A missionary who witnessed the drills noted that the boys were “trained by Koreans entirely.”

The military drill exercises were not an ancillary program; they were, according to E.M. Cable, a fixture in the school curriculum in 1906. Cable observed that the non-Christian Korean parents became so enthusiastic over the military drill exercises that they purchased “all the necessary equipments for military drill.”

Another characteristic of the Pai Chai Academy was the combative and engaging tone that fostered political and social activism. Under the tutelage of Seo Jae Pil, one of Korea’s greatest nationalists who served as a faculty member at Pai Chai, students started Hyeop Seonghoe (or Mutual Friendship Society) in 1896, a student’s version of the Independence Club. The student society “which had only 13 members in 1896, grew to some 200 members within a year.” During the 1897 commencement exercises at Pai Chai, members of the Hyeop Seonghoe debated whether the “Orient [should] accept, in the main, the civilization of the Occident.” Those attending commencement observed that “logic, wit, sarcasm and appeal were used with the skill of clever debaters and the large audience frequently interrupted the speakers with vigorous applause as they made their various points.” After two members of each side finished presenting their arguments, “a popular vote was then taken [from the audience] and the question [whether or not Korea should accept Western civilization] carried overwhelmingly in the affirmative.”

During the school year, the Hyeop Seonghoe met every Saturday to discuss and debate important topics of the day, including “Korean writing in mixed script, educating wives, sisters, and daughters, freeing slaves, making roadside speeches to the public, and refraining from getting married until the age of twenty.” In contrast to Confucian learning that emphasized the rote memorization of the Confucian classics, young students at Pai Chai learned to formulate their ideas, articulate them in public speeches, debated and defended their ideas against the opposition. In addition to the Pai Chai Academy, the art of
public speaking and debating, according to Chung-shin Park, “were practiced in all churches and mission schools at that time.”55 In other words, Korean Christians as a group fostered teamwork, the development of leaders, communication skills and organizational leadership to a higher standard than their non-Christian contemporaries. The full spectrum of Korean Christian leadership would be seen later during the preparation, organization, and execution of the great March First 1919 movement.

Christian Nationalism

While touring Korea in 1897 as a representative of the Board of Foreign Missions, Robert E. Speer remarked that Korean patriotism was “one of the most interesting and striking features of the Korean Church.”56 Patriotism was proudly displayed on bamboo poles where small Korean flags flew to mark “the residences of Christians or were flying over churches.”57 The appearance of Korean Christian nationalism surprised Speer who noted that it developed “without missionary pressure.”58 The close association of Christianity with Korean nationalism prompted some Koreans to convert to Christianity. A Korean Christian activist wrote, “We accepted Christianity for we hoped [the way of] independence lay in the church. It is only through Christ’s intervention that an opportunity at hand is before us. This is an order, rarely given, which no one under the sun can afford to disobey.”59

In 1910, when Japan colonized Korea, less than two percent of the Korean population was Christian, an estimated 200,000 Christians out of thirteen million Koreans.60 Although Korean Christians were a tiny minority, their political leadership was, nevertheless, significant in at least three ways: first, because of the experience and training of Christians in earlier political organizations; second, because of the prominence of Christian nationalists involved in nationalistic movements; and, third, because the church became the de facto center for nationalistic education and political maneuvering. Korean church leaders, through their close association with the church and mission schools, found themselves well placed to make important contributions to advance the cause of Korean independence. The Korean church was one of a few organizations in which hundreds of Koreans could safely and regularly gather. Park wrote, “Because there were virtually no civic organizations for reform endeavors and also because many reform activists were members of the religious community, enlightenment ideas spread naturally throughout churches, church-operated schools, and other
Institutions affiliated with the church.  

In many ways, Korean church leaders were the driving force behind the independence movement as they formed a web of operatives that connected pockets of resistance groups in Korea. As the single-largest organization in Korea, the Korean church built an extensive network that proved conducive to the transmission of underground messages. For example, the Rev. Soon Hyun’s position as the Superintendent of all Methodist Sunday Schools throughout Korea, enabled him to “travel unnoticed” across Korea by the Japanese police across the Korean provinces. Working undercover as an agent of the nationalist movement, Hyun was “chosen to cross the country from church to church organizing and alerting the people to the planned uprising [i.e. March First Movement].” The Epworth League, an inter-church youth organization in the Methodist church, was later disbanded by the missionaries after the Epworth League evolved into an independent and powerful organization with political agendas. In her autobiography, Louise Yim, as a high school student, first learned about Korea’s independence movement from Pastor Kim who secretly informed Yim about the guerilla forces in the mountains, the preparation and plans to wage war against Japan, and the work of the provisional Korean government in Shanghai. The knowledge of independence stoked the flames of patriotism among the girls at Yim’s mission school. After learning about the bravery of Korean patriots, Yim said, “I suddenly felt that my dreams were not just those of a child and I knew that I had a place in the scheme of [Korean] liberation.”

As Japan covered Korea with a heavy blanket of censorship, Korean ministers used the pulpit as a weapon against tyranny by evoking biblical narratives to illustrate the fight against the tyrannical forces of evil. When Rev. Soon Hyun preached a salvific message, calling upon the people to “Follow Jesus, for He shall make you free”, the Korean audience understood clearly the double meaning of freedom that underscored the sense of loss that all Koreans experienced.

Listening to a powerful sermon by a Korean preacher in 1907, W.L. Swallen, a missionary in Korea, observed how the preacher used the biblical allusion of Egypt and the slavery of Israel as an unmistakable voice for Korean freedom. Swallen wrote, “Egypt is the shadow of the power of sin just as Japan represented a symbol of evil in their situation. Just as the people of Israel got acquainted with the power of evil and sin, the Korean people are learning about the nature of evil.”
Rich with references of war, God-inspired victories and triumphs, overcoming adversity, colonization by foreigners, and successful uprisings against foreign rule, the Bible gave ample ammunition to Korean ministers to empower Koreans and to preach a message of national salvation without overtly saying it. The empowering Christian teachings also provided a buffer against the deprecating information delivered by their colonial rulers who depicted Koreans as “an inferior race” that needed the “guidance of a superior race to bring about ‘civilization and enlightenment.’”

A Korean who as a youth, attended Sungin Commercial High School in Pyongyang, an institution founded by the Protestant nationalist Cho Mansik, described how his Christian school raised the students’ “awareness of and pride in being Korean and fostered a sense of active resistance against the Japanese.” During his weekly speeches to students, Cho “could not come out and say that the Japanese were our unwelcome masters and we should resist, but in the form of a sermon from the Bible, he said those things. . . . We did not mistake his message.” As a result of their nationalist activism, the Japanese authorities gradually closed down many of the Christian schools, calling them “strongholds of actual or potential anti-Japanese sentiment.”

L. George Paik, who lived through the colonial period, described how Korean preachers used Biblical language to disguise their nationalistic rhetoric:

When one looks at the language and deeds of Christians, they profess that the people of Israel under the oppression of Egypt succeeded in their exodus for national independence and liberation under God’s help and under the leadership of Moses. They teach the biblical story that during the war with another nation the people of Israel were vindicated by David, the Apostle of Justice who destroyed the giant Goliath. And whenever they congregate together, they sing hymns, ‘Believers are like soldiers of the Army!’ and ‘The Army of the Cross,’ This language was easily construed to be rebellion oriented, as Christian leaders now saw.

Conclusion
In 1904, Lillias H. Underwood wrote, “The missionaries, one and all, whether from a wish to uphold Japanese rule, or a desire to save useless bloodshed, are unanimous in using all their influence to quiet the
[Korean] Christians and to induce them to prevent uprisings and revolts.”

Contrary to Underwood’s observation, the missionary community was not “one and all” or “unanimous.” In fact, some missionaries did the opposite: they sowed seeds of insurgency that took root and blossomed in widening sectors of the population. Beneath the gaze of missionaries, a wide network of insurgency developed across Korea with the church and Korean pastors as the centerpiece of the movement. The full extent of the network was revealed during the March 1, 1919 movement, a non-violent protest that reached every corner of the country—to the great surprise of the Japanese police.

Given the fact that a large number of missionaries acquiesced to Japanese rule over Korea, vociferous missionaries like Homer Hulbert and Henry G. Appenzeller stepped forward and started to come together under the banner of resistance and freedom. Their urgent plea for Korean independence provided an alternative voice to the dominant narrative that focused on separating the spiritual from the secular, godly from the worldly, and peaceful from militant. Often in the forefront of political activism in the early twentieth century, politically-active missionaries and nationalistic Korean Christians remained a vital link—yet also a mystery—to our understanding of Korean Christianity. Their activism is a reminder of the integral link that has existed—and continues to exist—between religious devotion and political reformation.

Notes:


2 The non-militant approach to the March First Movement left many Koreans, including Christians, disillusioned with the church. The failure of the church’s approach to independence “revealed the church’s naivete, fragility, and limited capacities in the real world.” Chung-shin Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), 150.

3 During the Japanese colonial period, “the main current in the [Korean] Protestant church community was opposed to political involvement.” Ibid., 147.

4 Ibid., 143.

5 Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Rev. Wade Koons wrote a letter under date of February 4, 1908, as quoted in L. George Paik, *The History of Protestant Missions in Korea*, 415.

Ibid.


Quoted in ibid.

23 Horace G. Underwood “has only recently returned to Seoul, and the story is therefore wholly without foundation, as printed in Japanese papers, that he has had anything to do with stirring up anti-Japanese sentiment or is in the most remote way responsible for the assassination of Marquis Ito. Dr. Underwood is a Christian statesman; and, with the other missionaries, is busied with the spiritual regeneration of the Koreans, and does not interfere in the political affairs.” Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Arthur Judson Brown, The Mastery of the Far East, 574. “The Japanese fully appreciate this; but they are restive under a situation in which foreigners apparently have power to make or unmake a revolution among their own subjects.”

26 Northern Presbyterian Report for 1908, 269, as quoted in L. George Paik, The History of Protestant Missions in Korea, 416.

27 Ibid., 351.


29 Ibid., 275. Appenzeller and Jones were the co-editors of The Korean Repository. Hulbert was the manager of The Korean Repository.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.


33 Ibid.

34 Hulbert continued, “What with her morphia, her swarming prostitutes, her lawless traders, her partial officials and her utter contempt of the better side of the Korean, Japan has been degrading Korea rather than lifting her up.” Homer B. Hulbert, “Japanese and Missionaries in Korea,” The Missionary Review of the World 31:3 (March 1908), 208.

35 “Unnecessary Anxiety,” The Korean Repository 4 (July 1897), 275.

36 Ibid.


38 Ibid., 47.

Homer Hulbert, *History of Korea*, 53.

Ibid., 52.


For example, Hulbert and Appenzeller worked together to develop the Trilingual Press, a Western-style printing press that became the primary source for many journals, magazines, books, and newspapers.

“Pai Chai” is not romanized in the Revised Romanization of Korean because the original Pai Chai schools in Korea continue to use to spell their schools as ‘Pai Chai.’ If rendered in the Revised Romanization of Korean, it would be spelled “Baejae.”

The *Korean Repository* 3 (June 1896), 260.


Seo Jae Pil founded the newspaper, *The Independent*, as well as the Independence Club, an open public forum designed to engage the public and stimulate debate on a number of social, political and religious issues.

Chung-shin Park, *Protestantism and Politics in Korea*, 123.

“The Closing Exercises of Pai Chai,” *The Korean Repository* 4 (July 1897), 273. The closing exercises at Pai Chai went very long, from 3p.m. to 8p.m.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Chung-shin Park, *Protestantism and Politics in Korea*, 123.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.