Nuclear Strategy, Political Succession and the Survival of the Kim Regime

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Abstract

The article addresses an evolution of the North Korean nuclear strategy vis-à-vis the United States and its alliance partners of South Korea and Japan over the years. It also discusses the Kims’ dynastic political succession, via a father-son hereditary succession formula, for the vital role played by the nuclear strategy in the Kim regime’s survival and continuity. North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, since his deteriorating health problem in August 2008, has chosen his third son, Kim Jong Un, as heir apparent and the next leader of North Korea. While the six party talks process, multilateral diplomacy for the DPRK’s nuclear dismantlement, has been stalled since 2008, Pyongyang has gone ahead to reactivate its nuclear reactor program at its Yongbyon nuclear complex. It has also revealed the existence of the new sophisticated uranium enrichment program, on top of plutonium, that enhances regional tension and security dynamics in Northeast Asia.

Keywords: nuclear strategy, nuclear deterrence, the Kim regime survival, hereditary succession, the “military first” policy, National Defense Commission, the six party talks (SPT) diplomacy, socio-economic reform tradeoffs, regional peace and stability, U.S. – ROK security alliance, extended deterrence, nuclear breakout, nuclear free-zone, nuclear nationalism.
This is “the first time in a socialist republic’s history that three generations of the same family have tried to rule a nation.” Moreover, North Korea is the only country in the world today “where a twenty-seven year old man with no military experience becomes a four-star general in a single day,” not to speak of the fact that “a leader’s sister became a four-star general together with her niece on the same day.”

Pyongyang’s nuclear strategy and regime survival are closely intertwined as opposite sides of the same coin. The success of the nuclear strategy vis-à-vis the external powers of the U.S. and its security partner, the ROK, may positively reinforce Kim’s supreme goal of a smooth political transition by anointing his third son, Kim Jong Un, as his successor. Whether, and how, such a scheme of hereditary succession from father-to-son will succeed, however, remains to be seen.

The focus of this article will address how developing nuclear weapons has been exploited and manipulated by Kim Jong Il for regime survival, not so much in “the Land of the Morning Calm” as in what may be aptly called the Socialist “Hermit Kingdom.” This article will proceed in three steps: the first section is an analysis of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program and its strategy vis-à-vis the outside world, especially the U.S. and South Korea; second is a discussion of the dynamics of the Kim regime’s survival strategy via a hereditary succession formula; third is the possible future of the Kim Jong Un regime, its survivability together with an assessment of the nuclear deterrence and socio-economic reform tradeoffs in the North under the new Kim regime.

**North Korea’s Nuclear Strategy**

North Korea became embroiled with nuclear politics during the Korean War (1950-53). Even if nuclear weapons were never used, North Korea was threatened by their possible use by the United States. Pyongyang’s subsequent nuclear weapons program, not surprisingly, has been significantly shaped by the perceived external U.S. nuclear threat in Northeast Asia. Pyongyang’s nuclear breakout strategy, more specifically, and its deterrence policy vis-à-vis the U.S. have also evolved over the years.

The 1994 U.S.-DPRK nuclear accord and an effort by the KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) to implement the terms of the Geneva Agreed Framework can be considered, in retrospect, as initial manifestations of Pyongyang’s successful nuclear breakout
strategy vis-à-vis the US. The multilateral forum of the six-party talks, launched in 2003, has been stalemated since August 2008, after undergoing a protracted diplomatic give and take in the bargaining process. Pyongyang’s nuclear breakout strategy has been promoted consistently, however, as “portending a quest for a self-reliance existential nuclear deterrent for the DPRK.”

Since the mid-1990s the Korean People’s Army (KPA) has gained its power and influence in state affairs under the leadership of Kim Jong Il, despite the fact that the DPRK Constitution stipulates, in Chapter 1, Article 11, that the DPRK “conducts all activities under the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP).” North Korea’s military doctrine has been affected by Kim Jong Il’s “military first politics,” introduced to coincide with a September 1998 constitutional revision that formalized the country’s dynastic succession.

Following the elder Kim’s death in 1994, the country faced extraordinary economic deprivation and a famine that killed hundreds of thousands. With the capacity of the state and party in steep decline, Kim Jong Il increasingly turned to the military to manage state affairs. He reportedly has viewed “military first politics” as the “savior for our style of socialism,” and many North Koreans apparently support the idea that the country is “standing alone in the face of imperialist aggression from the United States.” The KWP, according to its by-laws, is still committed to “achieving a complete socialist victory in the northern half of the republic and to completing a people’s revolution to liberate all Korean people throughout the nation.” Pyongyang is thus nominally committed to unifying Korea, but the DPRK leadership is presently preoccupied with the survival of the state. Under these circumstances, the Kim family regime is unlikely to provoke war that they know they would lose.

The KPA’s war-fighting doctrine is based on two main objectives: achieving a swift victory through overwhelming offensive attacks and deterring the U.S. from intervening effectively. North Korea would certainly use its ballistic missiles and possibly its chemical or nuclear weapons to achieve these objectives, even if there were no guarantee of success. Pyongyang continues to blame Washington’s “hostile policy aimed at strangling the DPRK.” In May 2009, state media began to describe the Obama administration as continuing the “hostile policy” of its predecessor but “in a more cunning manner.”
The DPRK media cite this supposed U.S. hostility and threat as a justification for Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal. Given North Korea’s overall weakness, its leadership feels that there is no choice but to strengthen the country’s military capabilities. Still, their conventional options are limited. They acknowledge the North cannot compete with Washington in an arms race, so DPRK military planners have come to believe that they must have asymmetric capability for nuclear deterrence.

**Pyongyang’s Nuclear Testing**

In 1958 the U.S. deployed nuclear weapons to South Korea for the first time, and the weapons remained there until 1991. Despite this change in U.S. deployment policy, initiated during the George W. Bush Administration, Pyongyang still claims today that the U.S. has about 1,000 nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea.

North Korea, which is rumored to have enough fissionable material for approximately ten weapons, has conducted two separate nuclear weapons tests. The first test came on October 9, 2006. Since it did not produce a significant yield, with less than one kiloton, the test indicated the technical hurdles to overcome before Pyongyang had a usable warhead. In reaction to the test, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1718, placing sanctions on North Korea. The second test was nineteen months in the future. In the meantime, in the context of the six-party talks process, aimed at ending Pyongyang’s nuclear program, North Korea agreed, in 2007, to disable its nuclear facilities and give a complete account of all its nuclear programs. As a result, in June 2008, Pyongyang destroyed the cooling tower in its Yongbyon reactor. The George W. Bush Administration, in response, moved toward lifting some sanctions on Pyongyang and removed the DPRK from the list of states sponsoring terrorism on October 11, 2008.

North Korea conducted its second nuclear test, on May 25, 2009. Initial estimates showed the test, located close to the site of the first nuclear test in 2006, caused seismic activity equivalent to a magnitude of 4.7 on the Richter scale. Early estimates pointed to a possible yield for the test of between two and eight kilotons, with about four being most likely. While this yield was stronger than the first test, some analysts still question the viability of Pyongyang’s nuclear warhead design, although others see it as evidence that the North has been working toward a low-yield weapon all along.
Why Go Nuclear? Kim Jong II’s Nuclear Deterrence Policy

The famine of the mid-1990s coincided with Kim Jong Il’s official rise to power. Shortages in the food supply led the North Korean leadership increasingly to rely on the military to manage government affairs through a “military first” posture, beginning in 1998. Because economic woes have made it difficult to compete with neighboring countries in conventional military forces, Pyongyang has had a strong incentive “to retain and expand its asymmetric capabilities” in the form of its nuclear weapons program and nuclear deterrence strategy. Moreover, as already indicated, North Korea has maintained that it needs the weapons to protect itself against attack by the U.S. This is certainly one possible motivation.

Economic considerations and domestic politics have also come into play in its decision to go nuclear. Additional considerations have included a need to give its powerful military what it wants: the promotion of national unity as its economy continues to stagnate, and the internal succession dynamics of Kim Jong Il’s desire to seek as his heir one of his three sons. Not surprisingly, Kim Jong Il decided to choose his third son immediately after the May 2009 nuclear testing.

In terms of nuclear policy, Pyongyang has repeatedly declared, since 2001, its right to counter the U.S. nuclear threat with a strong physical deterrent, a nuclear deterrent and nuclear weapons. Initially, statements vaguely referred to a “physical deterrent or nuclear deterrent,” but on February 10, 2005, the DPRK Foreign Ministry declared Pyongyang had “manufactured nukes and was compelled to bolster its nuclear weapons arsenal.” On October 9, 2006, North Korea “conducted its first nuclear test to bolster its nuclear deterrent”. Subsequently, North Korean officials and media boasted of the country’s nuclear achievement. On May 25, 2009, a second nuclear test was carried out.

A key concern from the U.S. and its allies is whether North Korea has mastered the technology to put a weapon on a ballistic missile. This is a complex and sophisticated process, involving a small and durable weapon that could withstand the rigors of flight. Some intelligence agencies believe that the North possesses such weapons, while others are more skeptical. Yet, from the standpoint of technology transfer and trade in nuclear and missile technology, it is likely that North Korea has made some headway in building a useable weapon.

On December 10, 2008, Pyongyang’s KCNA (Korean Central News Agency) reported that “the United States had officially recognized the
DPRK as a nuclear weapons state for the first time.” Pyongyang cited a report by the U.S. Joint Forces Command that included North Korea, along with China, India, Pakistan and Russia, as nuclear powers on the rim of Asia. While the North Korean media was congratulating the DPRK on its “new status,” U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates published an article in Foreign Affairs, asserting that “North Korea has built several nuclear bombs.” The Rodong Sinmun also declared “the U.S. announcement that the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state reflects the stark reality.”

Efficacy of Nuclear Deterrence?

Pyongyang’s claim that it has been recognized as a nuclear power has ramifications across three broad dimensions: international security and deterrence planning, international law, politics and diplomacy; and domestic politics in Northeast Asian nations.”

First, from a security policy and deterrence planning perspective, a new factor has been added. Deterrence is a strategic concept that requires the capability to inflict unacceptable damage on an adversary. Deterrence is only robust and credible if your enemy believes you have the ability to strike back. Pyongyang has thus succeeded, in other words, in convincing its adversaries to believe that its military can retaliate with nuclear warheads, and therefore will be deterred from attacking North Korea.

The London-based IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies), in its “Military Balance 2011 Report,” ranks North Korea fourth after China, the U.S., and India in terms of nuclear, chemical and cyber warfare capabilities and the number of ground troops. The DPRK is believed to possess enough plutonium to make four to eight nuclear warheads for missiles, a 2,500 to 5,000 ton stockpile of chemical weapons, enhanced cyber warfare capabilities to paralyze the enemy command structure by destroying the computer systems, and a massive number of troops.

Second, in terms of international law and diplomacy, North Korea’s nuclear weapons status is completely unacceptable because of its claim that it is no longer bound by the NPT (Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty). Pyongyang’s withdrawal from this treaty, in January 2003, was totally unacceptable to the U.S. and its allies because it is illegal to divert previously safeguarded materials and to use previously safeguarded facilities for the production of nuclear weapons. Moreover,
if any state or international agency were to recognize North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, this would be a dangerous precedent to other NPT members that may be considering a nuclear breakout.\textsuperscript{19}

According to one press report, the DPRK had up to six nukes by the beginning of 2010. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in a speech on nuclear nonproliferation at the University of Louisville, on February 12, 1910, that “the countries that we know have actively pursued nuclear weapons that are still doing so today – North Korea, which we know has somewhere between one and six nuclear weapons . . . and that’s why we’re emphasizing so much international efforts to try to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.”\textsuperscript{20}

Third, from a domestic politics point of view, Kim Jong Il’s North Korea has succeeded in acquiring significant payoffs as a result of its nuclear development policy. The symbolic and prestige value of nuclear weapons within North Korea should not be underestimated. Nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles for North Korea are important symbols of the “military first” policy and the success in the state’s promotion of science and technology, defense and security, and national unification. Both South Korea and Japan, with advanced nuclear power industries and technologies, are also affected by North Korea’s newly acquired nuclear weapons status. Although for legal, political, economic and diplomatic reasons, Seoul and Tokyo are unlikely to develop nuclear weapons; their recognition of a nuclear North Korea would increase public pressure for a possible nuclear response.

\textbf{Will the Kim Regime Abandon Nuclear Weapons?}

Despite an earlier signing of a “Statement of Principles” as part of the six-party talks, the likelihood of Pyongyang’s abandoning its nuclear card looks not promising at this time. The six-party talks were established in August 2003 to seek a diplomatic solution to the problem of North Korea’s nuclear program. The six parties (China, the DPRK, Japan, the ROK, Russia and the U.S.) signed a “Statement of Principles” on September 19, 2005, whereby Pyongyang agreed to abandon that program in exchange for a package of security assurances and economic and political incentives. This process was divided into three steps: a freeze, disablement and dismantlement. The disablement phase was nearly complete before North Korea announced its withdrawal from the talks in April 2009, but complete denuclearization would have taken several more years.\textsuperscript{21}
Skeptics doubt Pyongyang will ever give up its nuclear ambitions. “Pyongyang will never abandon its nuclear development program,” according to former secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea Hwang Jang Yop, who defected to the South in 1997 but is now deceased. He also added: “Pyongyang is often threatening [other countries], saying that it will soon start a war. But it will not use nuclear weapons.” The defector went on to say, “the DPRK regime is in no danger of collapsing for the time being because Kim Jong Il has consolidated his power by promoting only those who show unconditional loyalty to him.” “The degree of dictatorship has become 10 times stronger than that in the era of his father (Kim Il Sung).” According to Hwang, “20 percent of the country’s revenues become ruling party funds that can be used freely by Kim,” while “fifty percent is used in the military, and the remaining 30 percent is offered for the lives of the people.”

The Hereditary Succession and Survival of the Kim Dynasty

An important book on North Korea’s founding of the Kim dynasty, authored by Soviet Koreans who had earlier served in North Korea with the Soviet occupation forces from 1945-48, first appeared in Japanese language version in Tokyo in April 1982. Published by Jiyusha, it was subsequently translated into English as The Founding of a Dynasty in North Korea: An Authentic Biography of Kim Il-song, by Lim Un. This book, billed as “confessions by a communist who once was active at the core of the Kim Il Sung regime but now living in exile in the Soviet Union,” contains valuable primary source data with photos on North Korea’s communist leadership and first hand observations of the creation of Kim Il Sung’s personality cult along with his “sanctified family.” A prototype of the Stalinist dictatorial regime, already on the rise in the northern half of divided Korea, exalted its political leader as “the Sun of Socialist Revolution and Construction.”

Table One below is an outline of the DPRK regime survival and maintenance strategy, as practiced by the Kim family over the years, during the lifespan of each of the three generations of leadership. This table displays each of the six dimensions of the Kim dynasty political succession: (1) leadership and the number of years in power; (2) legitimacy: its sources and the Weberian typology; (3) enabling factors of internal dynamics; (4) internal sources of political support; (5) external sources of support; and, (6) inter-Korean relations dynamics.
### Table One: The DPRK Regime Survival and Maintenance Strategy via Dynastic Succession

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<td>1</td>
<td>Leadership &amp; its reign of years</td>
<td>Kim Il Sung (46 years) 1949-1994</td>
<td>Kim Jong Il (18 years plus) 1994-2012?</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Legitimacy It’s Source (Max Weberian types)</td>
<td>Elected as a founder Charismatic</td>
<td>Anointed as Successor/Traditional</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Enabling Factors</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>External Source of Support</td>
<td>Marxism, Leninism, Stalinism, Comintern Maoism</td>
<td>Three Revolutions Movement (TRT) China as Enabler Role (Hu Yaobang)</td>
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### Institutionalizing Political Succession

The cult of personality, so pervasive in Kim’s Korean dynasty, has extended beyond the founding leader, Kim Il Sung, to encompass his son, Jong Il. North Koreans take the birthdays of their leaders seriously,
perhaps a reflection of Confucian cultural legacy. Kim Il Sung’s birthday was declared a national holiday in 1972, when he became sixty; the period from February 16, Kim Jong Il’s birthday, to April 15, his father’s birthday, was subsequently designated as the “Loyalty Festival Period” in 1976.25

Although Kim Jong Il’s emergence as leader was officially proclaimed during the Sixth KWP Congress in 1980, in 1983 Kim Jong-Il became the undisputed de facto leader in charge of the day-to-day administration of the party and the state, and his portraits appeared in public buildings and schools together with his father’s. The younger Kim also initiated a series of “on-the-spot guidance” tours, a technique his father had used frequently as a means of control and inspection.


**Kim Jong Il’s hereditary succession**

Although the outlines of Kim Jong Il’s biography are well known, it might be helpful to review them especially in light of the manner in which he prepared for his son’s succession. Kim Jong Il was born February 16, 1941, in the village of Vyatskoye outside Khabarosk in the Soviet Union, where his father was stationed as the 1st battalion commander of the Soviet 88th Brigade. He was the first son of Kim Il Sung and his first wife, Kim Jong-suk.27 His childhood Russian name was Yura. Kim Jong Il attended the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School, set up to educate the descendants of Kim Il Sung’s comrades in arms during the anti-Japanese guerrilla years and to train political leaders in North Korea. He also attended a primary school in Jilin, China, from 1950 to 1952 during the war. Kim graduated from Namsan Middle-High School in Pyongyang in 1958, and then attended the Air Academy in East Germany from 1960 until he transferred to Kim Il Sung University in 1962. In 1963 he graduated from that university with a major in political economy.

In 1964, Kim Jong Il began his career in the KWP Secretariat Organization and Guidance Department under the tutelage of his father
and his uncle, Kim Yong-ju, who was then in charge of the office. Kim Jong Il rapidly climbed the ladder of the party hierarchy, and, in 1970, became director of the Culture and Art Department of the KWP Secretariat. In that capacity Kim was credited with having directed the production of five major operas, including “The Flower Selling Maiden” and “The Song of Paradise.”

By 1973, Kim Jong Il had organized and directed the Three Revolutions Teams (TRT) movement as preparatory work for political succession to his father. His birthday, February 16, was designated as a holiday in North Korea in 1975. The code word, “Party Center,” began to appear in an effort to keep the identity of Kim Jong Il secret. Kim junior also acquired such honorific titles as “beloved leader,” “leading star,” and “the sun of communist future.” Although little was known of his family life, he was believed to have had two children at the time. This information was inadvertently revealed by Kim Il Sung to a visiting dignitary, the chairman of Japan’s Socialist Party.28

Under the pretext of assuring the continuation of the revolutionary task “generation after generation,” the North Korean elite adopted an ingenious device of assuring the orderly transition of political power. The Sixth Congress of the KWP elected Kim Jong Il—then thirty-nine years old—as a ranking member of the newly established five-member Presidium of the Politburo during its October 1980 session. He was also elected at that time to join the party’s five-member Military Commission as the third-ranking member, next to his father and his father’s defense minister, General O Jin-u. In the early summer of 1981, Kim Jong Il was made the second-ranking member of the presidium, with his father as the first.29

The elevation of Jong Il to a position of leadership in North Korea was a carefully planned and executed act, prepared long before its official announcement at the KWP’s Sixth Congress in 1980. In pursuing this path, the North Korean elite was undoubtedly motivated by the failure of a smooth political transition in the former Soviet Union after Stalin’s death in 1953 and in the PRC after Mao’s death in 1976. North Korea was determined not to repeat the errors made by other socialist countries in addressing the question of political succession.30

Yet, questions must be raised. Why did the North Korean elite choose this particular method of father-son succession? Does this unusual method have a realistic possibility of being implemented successfully when Kim Jong Il dies? An answer to these questions
necessitates an analysis of the preparatory work done prior to the 1980 announcement of Kim Jong Il as designated heir. By that time the plan for father-son succession in North Korea had been in progress for a long time, possibly since 1973. In October 1980, Kim junior was already in firm control of party affairs. As director of the Organization and Guidance Department of the KWP since the mid-1970s, he ranked second in the ten-member secretariat, next to his father, as general secretary.

**The Cult of Personality and Hereditary Succession**

The charisma of President Kim Il Sung was used to justify the legitimacy of Kim Jong Il as successor. In view of the loyalty and affection that Kim Il Sung apparently commanded in North Korea, the communist leadership planned to allow Kim junior a period of political apprenticeship and learning under the direction of his father. This political tutorial was undoubtedly intended to assure stability and to prevent any possible breakdown of law and order in socialist Korea after Kim Il Sung’s death. A widespread campaign continued to glorify the immortality of the “revolutionary family” of Kim Il Sung, and to praise the “genius” and “artistic talents” as well as the “absolute loyalty” of Kim junior.

The question today, however, is whether this same process can be used a second time. As with any well-laid plans, unforeseen circumstances are potentially destructive. Much will depend on how well the present and subsequent North Korean leadership handles the pressing issues of domestic and foreign policy. On announcing the choice of Kim Jong Il as Kim Il Sung’s successor, the KWP spokesman presented a set of five formal explanations, which seem to be rather self-serving and subjective.31

First, the revolutionary cause of the Great Leader could not be completed in a single generation. “It is the historical task that can be completed only through the efforts of succeeding generations.” Second, the leader’s successor had to emerge from the new generation, not from the old one. Third, it was deemed necessary for a successor to the Great Leader to go through a preparatory period of learning and absorbing lessons from the leader himself. Fourth, the successor had to be a man who was boundlessly loyal to the leader; and fifth, he had to embody the leader’s ideology and leadership qualities.32
Applying the preceding guidelines, the choice of Kim Jong Il’s successor was easy and self-evident. Only one person in North Korea could meet all of these criteria. That was the Great Leader’s eldest son, Kim Jong-II! The younger Kim’s loyalty to the Great Leader was said to be beyond question. Kim junior not only “embodied” (ch’ehyon) all the lofty virtues and leadership abilities of his father, but, more importantly, personally “formalized” (chongsikhwa) the idea of the Great Leader into Kimilsungism.”

Moreover, Kim Jong Il was said to be genius with artistic talents and with an impressive record of achievements in the cultural, theoretical, and political fields.

In addition to Kim Jong Il’s alleged “intellectual brilliance” and “artistic talents,” the North Korean media promoted Kim’s “absolute loyalty” and “boundless benevolence.” He was also said to possess “bright wisdom, deep insight, a strong sense of revolutionary principles of strong will.” In spite of these claims, the fact remains that the Kim Il Sung could find no one other than his son to trust as his successor.

The Kim Il Sung regime was preoccupied during its tenure with institutionalizing KWP work beyond the life span of its Great Leader. Ever since the KWP was molded as an instrument of personal rule by its Great Leader, Kim Il Sung and his associates were concerned about preserving and perpetuating his rule beyond his lifetime. With all its boastful accomplishments in socialist revolution and construction, and in the transformation the “Land of Kim Il Sung” into “Paradise on Earth,” the ruling circle in North Korea could not rest assured of the continuity of the political system after Kim’s death. This was why the virtue of “loyalty and dedication” to the Great Leader was extolled and demanded of the North Korean masses.

The issues of political succession and generational change in North Korea reflect the law of political dynamics and the transformation of the communist system over time. Tension has inevitably arisen between the revolutionary tradition and the heritage of the past, on the one hand, and the newly emerging forces of the post revolutionary era, on the other. This tension between old and new generations has been and continues to be reflected in the political succession issue.

The first-generation revolutionaries, to which Kim Il Sung belonged, were not at ease with many changes in society. Kim Il Sung and his close associates, as first-generation revolutionaries, had been molded by their previous experiences as anti-Japanese guerrilla fighters and influenced by the practical experience of carrying out the revolution and
building socialism in North Korea. His generation was eager to leave the tradition and heritage of revolutionary struggle to the succeeding generation. This led to Kim Jong II’s being certified by the Great Leader and his revolutionary comrades as the only acceptable candidate to continue the revolutionary work.

Initially, Kim Il Sung appears to have selected his younger brother as his successor, but the gradual rise and sudden demise of Kim Yong-ju in the KWP hierarchy indicated Kim’s subsequent abandonment of that plan. In July 1972, Kim Yong-ju was appointed co-chairman of the North-South Coordinating Committee, as a counterpart to South Korea’s KCIA director, Lee Hu-rak. Sometime in 1973, however, and possibly timed with the emergence of Kim Jong II, Kim Yong-ju suddenly dropped out of the picture.  

The rise and fall of Kim Yong-ju epitomizes the dilemma of the North Korean approach to the succession issue. Kim Yong-ju, initially judged to be a suitable successor to Kim Il Sung, was subsequently disqualified. This reversal demonstrates that the “immortal revolutionary family” can sometimes be wrong in judgment, and that the assigning of political legitimacy based on criteria other than suitability as a political successor is incompatible with administration of modern government, whether in North Korea or elsewhere.

Another relevant historical experiment in political succession came from China. During the change of political leadership occasioned by the demise of Hua Guofeng—Mao Zedong’s designated successor—and the rise of Deng Xiaoping, who carried out the de-Maoization campaign, the People’s Daily carried an article entitled “The Leader and the People,” on September 18-19, 1980. Although addressed to a Chinese audience, it had broad implications for communist politics, including North Korea’s.

The author of this article, which was not reprinted or reported in North Korea, contended that the relationship was one of equality rather than personal dependency: “The people can select the leader but the leader cannot select the people.” The leader’s practices of “lifelong tenure” and “designating his own successor” are remnants of feudalism, a practice that even bourgeois societies have done away with and that is unacceptable in socialist countries where the people are the master, the People’s Daily claimed. For a socialist system to rely on passing the mantle of political leadership through father-son succession, therefore, seemed unheard of in the annals of international communism. For this
reason, the rise of Kim Jong Il earlier and now Kim Jong Un today, so laboriously and painstakingly managed, may very well prove to be the Archilles’ heel of the North Korean socialist state.

Hereditary political succession, historically, has been the dominant way of preserving dynasties and monarchies. Yet this method has also become popular in modern days, in order to perpetuate republic-style dictatorships throughout the world. In a recent study by Jason Brownlee, the author identifies a total of 258 post-World War II non-monarchical autocracies, so as to test Gordon Tullock’s hypothesis that “hereditary succession appeals to the ruler and to non-familial elites who are wary of a leadership struggle” in domestic politics. Among twenty-two cases of potential hereditary succession, this study found that “variations in institutional history account for seventy-seven percent of succession outcomes.” The Kim dynasty and its successor regime clearly belong to this sample of twenty-two cases. Among them, North Korea is the only case of an effort at a three generational dynastic succession, and there also seems to be a variation between an earlier and subsequent regime change (that is, between the first case of regime change from the founding leader Kim Il Sung to his son Kim Jong Il and the second case of from an incumbent Kim Jong Il to his son Kim Jong Un, as announced).

An important point of this study is that “where the ruler preceded the political party, five rulers in seven cases groomed their sons and all five sons took office” without failing. On the other hand, in contrast, “where the political party predated the ruler, incumbents successfully installed their sons in only three of fifteen cases.”

There are, according to one recent source, seven long ruling dictatorships in the world. These are, as of 2011, Congo (14 years), followed by Azerbaijan (18 years), Syria (40 years), Gabon (44 years), Togo (44 years), Cuba (52 years), and North Korea (63 years). Additionally, Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe has ruled for 32 years, by celebrating his 85th birthday in 2009, and so is Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi with 42 years of dictatorial rule, with one of his seven children slated to succeed him. The Kim dynasty in North Korea prides itself as the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), a republic style dictatorship of father-son political succession. The possibility of a third-generation hereditary succession is unprecedented, making the DPRK the only country in the world where power may be handed down for three generations.
The Anointment of Kim Jung Un as the Successor

North Korea today clearly faces the perilous and uncertain future of a third Kim dynasty regime. Included in the list of these challenges are not only the health of the incumbent leader Kim Jong Il, but also the very welfare and well-being of its population of twenty-two million in terms of the economy, food shortages, and currency policy failures.

North Korea faces not only the political succession dilemma but an accomplishment of the “building of the Kangsong Taeguk” (Strong and Prosperous North Korea) on time for 2012, occasioned by the centennial birthday of Kim Il Sung and an installation of Kim Jong Un as a new leader by 2012.

Kim Jong Il’s two-month disappearance from the public scene in the summer of 2008 raised all kinds of rumors. To this point no official succession plan seems to have been made, unlike the case of the succession from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jung Il. Kim Jong Il reportedly had never been as meticulous in preparing for his own political succession as his father, but a detailed plan has now been put in place. Kim’s third son, Kim Jong Un, is apparently to succeed his father, and, for this purpose, he has been assigned a position within the hierarchy of the National Defense Commission, in order to assume political power. The fact remains that Kim Jong Un, in his late 20s, is inexperienced and too young to have established his own political coalition of supporters. This means that the longer his father stays alive, the better his chances for taking political control.40

Kim’s North Korea also experimented with institutional changes, including constitutional revision and an expansion of the National Defense Commission membership in April 2009, but Kim Jong Il’s illness has apparently led to North Korea’s changing governance style and its aggressive behavior vis-à-vis South Korea since 2009. The DPRK’s aggressive and provocative actions toward South Korea, including the West Sea armed clashes in 2009, the sinking of South Korean Chonanho, and the shelling of the Yonpyong Islands in 2010, have doubtless had something to do with Kim Jong Il’s illness and the looming crisis of political succession in the Kim dynasty in North Korea.41

In March 2009, elections were held for the Supreme People’s Assembly, the 687-seat unicameral legislature, which has done little more than rubber stamp Kim Jong Il’s directives. One month after the elections, the SPA amended the Korean constitution to elevate and
institutionalize Kim Jong Il’s ideology of *songun* (“military first”) as a national guiding principle on par with his father’s *juche* (or, “self-reliance”). It did not, however, change Kim’s long-term efforts to centralize power in himself and “to directly control core organs of the Party, the Military, and the State, often bypassing the party.”

Kim Jong Il also wanted to divide and rule the party and military apparatus in order to prevent a particular organ from becoming too powerful. The KWP’s Department of Guidance and Organization, traditionally the most powerful organ in socialist countries, was not as powerful as it had been during the era of Kim Il Sung. Also, powerful leaders (such as Li Jae-kang and Li Yong-Chul) of the Department were eliminated under mysterious circumstances (e.g., car accident) in the spring of 2010. Important in explaining its lessened power was transferring the Secret Police and Prosecutors’ Office to the newly created Department of Administration. There, it was under the leadership of Chang Sung-taek,” Kim Jong Il’s brother-in-law, who was called back to oversee an orderly political succession in the days ahead.

The military was also divided into three branches: the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, General Political Affairs, and the General Staff. Kim Jong Il gave direct orders to General Political Affairs and the General Staff, bypassing the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces. These three organs became equal rather than hierarchical. This governing style, however, faced a dramatic change when Kim Jong Il abruptly fell sick in August 2008 and was unable to play a pivotal role. With his 26-year old son unofficially nominated as his successor, Chang Sung-taek coordinated both international and external policies in Kim’s name. Institutionally, North Korea expanded and strengthened the National Defense Commission (NDC) by including all the important figures from the military, secret police, and the second economy. Some of the new members of the NDC were sons and offspring of retiring KPA veterans.

A larger and stronger NDC, with the addition of Chang Sung-taek as its vice-chairman, and Li Yong-ho as a member, may signify the end of the “divide and rule” governing style under the military-first policy, by which there was little communication between core organs of the party, the military and the state. Instead, Kim Jong Il deliberately controlled each organ one-on-one. The walls between the organs within the NDC have now shrunk, so argues Choi Jinwook, as they communicate more easily and freely without Kim Jong Il’s one-on-one control.
North Korea today is truly at a critical point, however, with the deterioration of Kim Jong Il’s health. Unsurprisingly, the North Korean military, excluding the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Department of United Front, seems to dominate the decision-making process, and their decisions are “provocative, unprofessional, and even unpredictable rather than well designed and manipulated” in one analyst’s opinion.44

Who will rule North Korea after the death of Kim Jong Il? Institutional changes, including a constitutional revision and an expansion of the NDC in April 2009, have been implemented to ease the leadership transition. Nobody can be certain, however, who will end up ruling the post-Kim Jong Il North Korea because the DPRK has experienced only one previous succession, and the next leader will face unprecedented changes and challenges. In fact, the process of power consolidation by the heir apparent, Kim Jong Un, has already been launched within the NDC, as shown by his appointment as Director of the State Security Department, the regime’s chief spy agency, in late 2009.45

Kim Jong Un, the youngest and least known son of Kim Jong Il, has emerged rapidly to succeed his father as the next leader of North Korea. In September 2010 Kim Jong Un appeared publicly for the first time at a meeting of the ruling Workers’ Party, was given the rank of four-star general and received two significant political posts, membership on the Central Committee of the party and a vice chairmanship of the party’s Central Military Committee. Whereas Kim Jong Il oversaw important party affairs before he officially took over leadership following Kim Il Sung’s 1994 death, no such apprenticeship seemed in place for Kim Jong Un until after his father’s stroke in 2008.46

It is unclear whether Kim Jong Un will have the personal capacity and support to lead effectively. In the short-term, a smooth transition may take place, but if Kim Jong Il’s successor cannot improve the economy and provide adequate solutions for other crises, there could be a violent power struggle, leading either to the KPA’s taking direct control or a regime collapse.47 Such an uncertain scenario seems to have been apparent to the North Korean leadership before Kim Jong Il chose his third son as heir and successor. Nevertheless, one source speculates that after Kim Jong Il’s death, there will emerge a collective military leadership, which will probably use Kim Jong Un as a figurehead. In that event, the post-Kim Jong Il North Korea will no longer be a one-man dictatorship.48
Kim Jong Il’s succession dilemma, therefore, cannot be casually dismissed but must be taken seriously. Scott Snyder has laid out three possible scenarios for North Korea’s father-son political succession: managed, contested and failed. If North Korea sees a successful father-to-son succession, or establishes a collective leadership system, Snyder believes relations between Pyongyang and Washington will not undergo great changes. If, however there is a contested succession, Snyder foresees various factions competing for leadership, resulting in a continuation of “institutional and interpersonal rivalries.”

Challenges to the post-Kim Jung Il Regime

The Kim dynasty in North Korea oversees a highly regimented and stratified society, with the ruling elites strongly entrenched in power. Kim’s North Korea is “nuclear armed” and pursues the economic goal of building the Kangsong Taeguk by 2012. All state policies are also strongly influenced by Kim Jong Il’s “military first” doctrine in which the KPA is supposed to set an example and lead efforts to improve the economy. In contrast to these expectations, the quality of life is deteriorating for most of the population, and the weakest and most vulnerable pay the highest price – children, the elderly, peasants and those classified as politically disloyal or wavering. However, none of the current domestic problems alone, neither poverty nor food shortages, has yet been sufficient to destabilize the regime.

The slogan of building kangsong taeguk is reminiscent of the imperial Japanese policy of “Fukoku Kyohei” (Enrich the State and Strengthen the Army) in the era preceding World War II and the policy of “Pukuk Kangbyong” during the Park Chung-hee years in the 1970s. Pursuing this policy of “enriching the state and strengthening the army” was conceived not only as a way of modernizing but also as the path toward modernity in both prewar Japan and South Korea’s Third and Fourth Republics under Park Chung-hee. This slogan of building kangsong taeguk acquires significance when it is combined with the DPRK’s continuous path toward building a nuclear capability and a missile delivery system.

After 2009’s nuclear and missile tests, Kim’s North Korea began to focus more on the economy. The 150-day and 100-day labor mobilization campaigns or “speed battles” implemented in 1999 along with the currency reform are clear indications that the DPRK was interested in economic reform measures, with means of relaxation of...
Economic Failure, Food Shortage and Civil Society

Meanwhile, economic crisis was continuing to plague North Korea. On November 30, 2009, KWP officials suddenly were informed that currency reform would be implemented that afternoon. The state issued new currency from December 1-6, but limited the amount of old money citizens could exchange, effectively wiping out any “illicit” household savings in North Korean won. The new currency was issued against the old at an exchange rate of 100:1, so that old W1,000 bank notes were exchanged for W10 notes. This was the fifth time North Korea has issued a new currency—exchanges had also been implemented in 1947, 1949, 1959, and 1992.

This currency reform had multiple objectives: controlling price inflation; reasserting state control of the economy; weeding out corruption; eliminating or reducing market activities; and redirecting human resources to the formal state sector. The surprise announcement and the severe limits on exchanging old currency, however, had a devastating effect on any confidence that North Koreans had in their currency.

By mid-January 2010, the economic turmoil was evident, as reports of rising starvation deaths worked their way up the party ranks. The first head to roll was that of Pak Nam-gi, planning and finance minister. Kim Jong Il reportedly ordered the release of emergency food stock and told party officials they would be held accountable for preventing starvation. In short, the DPRK reform had grave consequences, and Pyongyang has recognized that the reform had failed.

After the Korean War, the DPRK collectivized agriculture and established a centrally planned economy with a Public Distribution System (PDS) to provide food at subsidized rates. The state also devised a stratified system to distribute food according to age, occupation, geographic region and degree of political loyalty. Although the state control of food was an important part of political control under the DPRK regime, the PDS broke down during the famine in the mid-1990s.

Sporadic anecdotal accounts of food shortages in North Korea seem grim, indeed, especially after the currency reform. Rice and corn prices reportedly had dropped by about 20-25 percent, although soaring immediately after the reform was announced. Small traders holding
North Korean currency tried to acquire foreign currency or any durable commodities that would retain value, and sellers hoarded food and other goods in anticipation of price inflation, thereby exacerbating the cycle of food insecurity.55

Under these dire economic conditions, Pyongyang faced several domestic problems that, in isolation, would be manageable but together have serious consequences for regime survival. The leadership seems to have a limited capacity, however, to manage the simultaneous crises of currency reform and economic deprivation, worsening food security, and the looming succession crisis. Nonetheless, the regime seems adept at transferring the cost of economic failures and poor governance to the lower rungs of society. The Kim Jong Il coalition also remains loyal, and revolution from below seems very unlikely in North Korea.56

Still Pyongyang’s economic failures could cause dissension within the senior political and military leadership. Although unlikely in the short-term, fissures in the senior leadership, particularly during a succession crisis, may not be ruled out completely. It is true that instability, a coup d’état or regime collapse would not be observable from the outside until well underway. However, as a recent report has pointed out, under some circumstances, international intervention may also be required to address a humanitarian emergency, a scenario resulting from regime collapse for the Kim dynasty.57

North Korea’s recent confiscatory currency conversion and subsequent prohibition on the use of foreign currency has led to “the winter of discontent” and to Pyongyang’s attack on the nascent market, according to a Peterson Institute Policy Brief by Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland.58 Measures undertaken by the Kim regime show no attempt to veil its efforts to strengthen socialist economic control. These policies come at an inopportune time when “facing economic stagnation, spiraling prices,” with a resurgence of food shortages, will surely reduce economic welfare” of the millions of ordinary North Koreans. An open question confronting the Kim regime, the report notes, is whether “they have sown such discord that these moves will ultimately destroy the country politically as well.”59

North Korea’s domestic economy, then, continues to be in a shambles. Grain production in 2010 was estimated to reach around 3.8-3.9 millions, which is 200,000-300,000 tons short of the demand. The food shortage is directly linked to public support for the regime, especially during the lean spring season,60 and the regime must divert
rice from military storage or foreign sources of supply to make up the shortfall. Seoul’s government and private businesses reportedly gave North Korea an astronomical sum of US$ 2.98 billion during the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations from 1998 to 2008. Pyongyang must have used some of these funds to develop nuclear weapons and to support Kim politically.\(^{61}\)

According to internal documents from Seoul’s Unification Ministry and other South Korean government agencies, the government and private businesses provided North Korea $1.84 billion through commercial trade, $544 million for package tours to the Mt. Kumgang resort, $450 million for an inter-Korean summit, $41 million in land use fees and wages for North Korean workers at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and $30 million as part of various social and cultural exchanges.\(^{62}\)

In addition, Pyongyang owes Seoul huge amounts of money for outstanding loans. Both Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations reportedly gave the North 2.4 million tons of rice and 200,000 tons of corn from 2000 to 2007, on condition of repayment over a period of 20 years with a 10-year grace period of one percent annual interest. The loans amounted to US $720.04 million, with the interest reaching $155.28 million.\(^{63}\) Apart from the food and economic loans, Seoul also lent the North W1.27 trillion through the KEDO project from 1998 to 2006 for the construction of a light-water nuclear reactor. Since the money was raised by issuing government bonds and the KEDO was subsequently scrapped in 2006, there is no way for Seoul to get the money back. The total amount most likely will be handled as “irredeemable government bonds” that have to be made up for with tax money.\(^{64}\)

**Expanding the Nuclear Program**

In spite of economic difficulties, North Korea surprised the world by showing the existence of a sophisticated uranium enrichment facility at its Yongbyon nuclear complex to a visiting team of American scientists early in November 2010. On November 20, a Stanford University physicist, Siegfried S. Hecker, startled Washington by releasing a report that documented the presence of 2,000 centrifuges that had recently been installed.\(^{65}\) Hecker reported that he saw the key equipment on November 12. North Koreans told the visiting American scientist that the centrifuges were already beginning to enrich uranium to 3.5% purity for
possible use in a light water reactor that had been under construction since the closing of the KEDO project during the second term of George W. Bush’s Administration.66

Mr. Hecker reported that he could not confirm that uranium gas had already been introduced into the centrifuges, but said he was “stunned” by the advancement and sophistication of the enrichment plant. “Instead of seeing a few small cascades of centrifuges, which I believed to exist in North Korea, we saw a modern clean centrifuge plant of more than a thousand centrifuges all neatly aligned and plumbed,” Hecker reported. He estimated that the North Korean facility could produce roughly two tons of low-enriched uranium per year, or about 40 kilograms (or 88 pounds) of highly enriched uranium---nearly enough for a single atomic weapon. Subsequently, a detailed report for the Daedalus has elaborated points of his claim further.67

Hecker’s report also seemed to put to rest a debate that has ranged inside the U.S. intelligence community for nearly a decade: whether North Korea actually has a uranium-enrichment capacity. But the finger-pointing about how Pyongyang’s facility grew so advanced without U.S. awareness or intervention only seemed to be beginning. A sharp focus remained on what to do about Pyongyang’s growing and on-going nuclear ambition and capabilities.

The possibility of a joint investigation of Pyongyang’s uranium enrichment program, however, will need to be established first through the U.N. nuclear agency IAEA. Yet, in the absence of a consensus among the major powers, authorization by the U.N. Security Council is not a realistic option. China is said to prefer the six-party talks to the U.N. Security Council.

At present, the Yongbyon nuclear complex contains a 5MW graphite-moderated reactor, plutonium extraction facilities, a nuclear fuel processing plant, a half-built 50 MW reactor, two unreported storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel, one storage facility that has been reported, and a light-water reactor that may be completed as early as 2012. To be sure, it is not clear whether North Korea is capable of building the LWR by 2012, as claimed. But if the North compromises safety standards by hastily finishing the project, the world might witness a nuclear disaster in the making, with a radioactive contamination equal to Japan’s 2011 Fukushima nuclear fiasco.68

In order to persuade North Korea to implement its commitments on denuclearization, parties to the six-power talks are pushing for the
resumption of the stalled six-party talks. On April 17, 2011, Seoul and Washington, through their foreign ministers’ meeting in Seoul, agreed to conditional acceptance of a three-stage Chinese plan to jump-start stalled six party talks. The plan entails initiating talks between Seoul and Pyongyang, followed by a meeting between U.S. and North Korean officials, and culminating in the resumption of six-country negotiations. At this meeting Seoul and Washington called on Pyongyang to halt its uranium enrichment, stop testing nuclear weapons and firing ballistic missiles, and also allow the return of IAEA inspectors. The success or failure of the three-stage process hinges on whether North Korea takes these steps.  

Conclusion

The diplomatic moves to reconvene the stalled six-party talks are visible, at the time of this writing, but the prospect for a possible North—South Korean summit to address the peace and security of the Korean peninsula does not look good. ROK President Lee Myung Bak made an offer to invite North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, in March 2012, during his Berlin stop over on May 9. North Korea rejected this offer, characterizing Seoul’s precondition (an apology on the Chonan-ho sinking and the shelling of Yeonpyong Island with a pledge eventually to denuclearize) as an insult to the “dignity” of the state and a “mockery” of the DPRK’s effort to restart dialogue with the ROK. In doing so, the KCNA statement also attacked what it saw as an implied and improper comparison between North Korea and East Germany and castigated the Seoul government as being led by the “traitor Lee Myung-Bak.” These developments dampen the prospect for the early resumption of the six-party talks on the denuclearization of North Korea.

With the institutional changes put into effect since 2009, it is in the process of experimenting with the second hereditary succession. Whether that process can succeed is uncertain. It is unclear whether Kim Jong Un will have the personal capacity and support to deal with the challenges in the days ahead. In the short-term, a smooth and orderly transition may take place, timed with the 2012 centennial celebration of founding leader Kim Il Sung’s April 15 centennial birthday. However, if Kim Jong Il’s successor cannot improve the economy and provide adequate solutions for other crises, including food shortages, there could be a violent power struggle among the elites which may result in the
regime collapse or direct control of the regime by the military.\textsuperscript{71}

Prospects of North Korea’s abandoning its nuclear weapons seem less likely under the newly-anointed successor, Kim Jung Un, for he will need the nuclear program to secure the support of the military. Hopefully, Pyongyang’s new leadership would adopt a more pragmatic domestic and foreign policies, to improve the livelihood of the North Korean people, instead of pursuing a policy of confrontations with the U.S. and its allies.

Notes:

\textsuperscript{1} This article was initiated during the author’s tenure as a visiting professor at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, in the 2009-2010 academic year. The author is currently an emeritus professor at Iowa State University, Ames, and in residence at Laguna Woods Village, California.


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26 Vantage Point, 6, 2 (February 1983), 13.


28 Kihl, Politics and Policies in Divided Korea, op. cit., 126-127.

29 This and subsequent information on this subsection are derived from Kihl, 1984, op.cit. esp 92.

30 Kihl, 1984, 92.

31 Ibid., 92-93.


33 Kihl, 1984, 94.

34 Kihl, 1984, 96.

35 People’s Daily, September 18 and 19, 1980, as reprinted in Koria Hyoron 238 (January 1982), 51-55.

36 Kihl, 1984, 97.


38 Brownlee, Ibid.


Kihl and Kim, *North Korea*, op. cit., 4-17.


Also, see Marcus Noland and Stephan Haggard, Engaging North Korea: The of Economic Statecraft, East-West Center Policy Studies 59, 2011.

59 One source identifies five reasons for food shortages in Kim’s North Korea: Drop in Food Production, Hoarding Rice for the Military, Preparing for 2012, No Assistance from China, and the Kim Regime Stashing of Gold and Silver (instead of their use for food purchases from abroad). See Why N. Koreans are Starving, op. cit.


62 Ibid.


64 Ibid.


66 Ibid.


70 China, Japan and South Korea had a weekend summitry in Tokyo, on May 21, 2011, attended by China’s Premier Wen Jiabao, South Korea’s President Lee Myung Bak, and Japan’s Prime Minister Naoto Kan, hosting. As for Pyongyang’s repeated calling of “traitor” Lee, see “DPRK denounces Lee Myung Bak’s provocative remarks against the DPRK,” KCNA, May 11, 2011, as cited in NAPSNET May 19, 2011, the Nautilus Institute.

71 Scott Snyder, “Kim Jong-il’s Successor Dilemma,” op. cit., 35-46.