Disabling “Nuclear” North Korea  
for Regional Balance and Security

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The reality of a rising “nuclear” North Korea, with its test-firing of seven missiles on July 5, 2006, and underground testing of a nuclear device on October 9, was met by world-wide condemnation and emergency sessions of the United Nations Security Council. The world had not yet gotten accustomed to the two UN Security Council resolutions (1695 and 1718), imposing limited economic sanctions on North Korea, when it was surprised once again by the breakthrough announcement of February 13, 2007: the Six-Party Talks Accord on “Disabling the North Korean nuclear program.” 1

The regional security environment surrounding the Korean peninsula was jolted, and may still undergo a structural change, as a result of the North’s nuclear test and the subsequent “nuclear accord” of 2007. If carried out strictly, it may usher in a new chapter-- heralding a major shift-- in international politics of Northeast Asia. Whether a peaceful alternative to defusing the “nuclear standoff” is likely, and whether some of the chronic conflict issues between North Korea and the United States are settled, remains to be seen.2 The same is true for policy issues involving the other Six-Party Talks partner countries of China, Russia, South Korea and Japan. 

The nagging question still remains: “Will the dark nuclear cloud hanging over the Korean Peninsula be lifted soon, once and for all,” because of the 2007 implementation plan of the Six-Party Talks accord? Although the answer remains uncertain, the time for Korean denuclearization has yet to arrive. The obvious follow-up points are “how come?” and “why not?”

To draw certain policy implications for future U.S.-Korea and inter-Korean relations, this article will proceed in several steps: first, examine the likely shifting power balance and new security environment, in the wake of the North’s nuclear test; second, analyze the Six-Party Nuclear Accord of February 13, 2007, as it impinges upon the future of inter-Korean relations; and, third, draw possible implications of the nuclear fallout on sustaining the future U.S.-ROK alliance and inter-Korean relations. This article will conclude, finally, by adding a historical perspective to “denuclearization” of Korea and the “nuclear-free” Korean Peninsula.

Shifting Power Balance Surrounding the Korean Peninsula

North Korea’s testing of a nuclear device, on October 9, 2006, attested to its capacity for system maintenance in a dual sense: not only of a technically demanding program of nuclear weapons development, but also of a politically-motivated leadership determined to play an active role in international diplomacy and foreign relations. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, backed up by its testing of a nuclear device, is now a fact of life, and is no longer a bargaining chip.

North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announced that the nuclear test was carried out safely and successfully: “The field of scientific research in the DPRK successfully conducted an underground nuclear test under secure conditions on October 9, Juche 95 (2006) at a stirring time when all the people of the country are making a great leap forward in the building of a great prosperous powerful socialist nation.” It also added that there was no danger, such as from radioactive emission in the course of testing: “The nuclear test was conducted with indigenous wisdom and technology 100 percent. It marks a historic event as it greatly encouraged and pleased the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and people that have wished to have powerful self-reliant defense capability.”

The timing of the nuclear test was also notable, in its intent to maximize both internal and external influences. Internally, the test took place between two commemorative dates: first, the day when its leader Kim Jong-il became the general secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) nine years ago in 1997, and on the eve of the 60th anniversary of establishing the North Korean chapter of the Korean Communist Party in Pyongyang on October 10, 1946.4 On the day of testing, Japanese Prime Minister Shinjo Abe was on a state visit to Seoul from Beijing. After the two-hour summit meeting with Abe, the ROK President Roh Moo-hyun said his government’s policy on
Pyongyang “will change course in the wake of the nuclear test.” A few hours later Roh spoke by telephone with U.S. President George W. Bush, agreeing “to deal with the nuclear test calmly and strategically.” In a statement Bush said that North Korea’s reported nuclear test posed “a threat to global peace and security” and that it was an “unacceptable” action requiring an immediate response by the U.N. Security Council.5

Checkmating the Rise of a New Nuclear State?

Even if the results of the underground test may not have been what Pyongyang had expected, this act cannot be “undone.”6 Despite its isolation and internal vulnerabilities, North Korea succeeded in conducting a nuclear test, in open defiance of non-proliferation norms and regimes of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The immediate policy questions, as Jonathan D. Pollack of the U.S. Naval War College has noted, relate to “what outside powers can do both to minimize the risks posed by North Korean actions” and “to make it as difficult as possible for North Korea to achieve significant headway in its nuclear goals.” It is imperative for the United States and its allies that “communication channels remain open” to North Korea without triggering responses from Pyongyang “that make the existing situation even more dangerous.”7

It is encouraging to hear, in this regard, that China’s efforts to induce Pyongyang’s return to the Six-Party talks following its nuclear testing were eventually successful in December 2006. The U.S. display of its willingness to meet bilaterally with North Korea in Berlin in mid-January 2007 also constituted new evidence of the Bush Administration’s diplomatic flexibility. These efforts eventually yielded meaningful results in the form of the February 13, 2007 “joint statement” of the Six-Party Talks on “disabling the North Korean nuclear program.”

At the same time the United States and its allies needed to seek policy alternatives in case North Korea either refused to “fold its tent” or “undertook additional, even riskier steps to counter perceived threats to its (regime) survival.” On October 9, the day North Korea detonated its nuclear test, the U.S. responded with an explicit warning to North Korea that the “transfer of nuclear weapons or material” to other countries or terrorist groups “would be considered a grave threat to the United States,” and that the North would be held “fully accountable.” The U.S. could issue this credible warning in part because the IAEA had a library of nuclear samples from North Korea, obtained before the agency’s inspectors were thrown out of the country, and the U.S. has access to that database of nuclear DNA.8

The U.S. declaration aimed at North Korea was unique because it can be differentiated from similar warnings to other nuclear states, like Russia and Pakistan, and the would-be nuclear states, like Iran. “We need to distinguish between the leakage problem, where it would be inadvertent, and the provider problem, where it would be an intentional act,” according to Robert S. Litwak the author of “Regime Change: U.S. Strategy Through the Prism of 9/11.” “To the provider we should say, ‘Don’t even think about it,’ and this more explicit declaratory policy can get us traction because these regimes value their own survival above all else.” Kim’s North Korea would be a prime example of that. “For the leakage problem, we don’t want to be trapped into a question of how we retaliate against” them (i.e., Russia or Pakistan). “But through calculated ambiguity, [the U.S.] can create incentives for them to do even more in the area of safeguarding their weapons and capabilities.”9

Moreover, “what if the regime is able to revive its economy through a process of incremental reform without foregoing its nuclear capabilities and longer-term nuclear potential?”10 In speculating about North Korea’s nuclear program a decade later in 2015, there are three scenarios identifiable, according to Pollack: (1) pursuit of a symbolic nuclear capability; (2) pursuit of an operational nuclear deterrent; and, (3) a deficient (or failed) effort to achieve an operational capability.11 These and related questions will require careful studies and frank discussion, “unburdened by unrealistic preconceptions about North Korea” and “without remaining tethered to past policy decisions and their consequences.”12

Four immediate policy considerations that the United States and international community would benefit from exploring, according to Pollack, are:

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Determining additional measures to discourage or impede North Korea’s future weapons development, which in the near term should focus on convincing North Korea to forego additional nuclear tests or further tests of ballistic missiles.

Reiterating to Pyongyang that any transfer of nuclear materials, technologies, or completed weapons outside its borders would constitute a grave danger to the international community as a whole.

Imposing additional costs on North Korea for any further nuclear tests.

Fully weighing the trade-offs in pursuing partial steps to restrict nuclear weapons development versus pursuit of maximal policy goals.13

There is virtually no possibility that North Korea will irrevocably yield the totality of these capabilities in the absence of fundamental internal change in North Korea or extraordinary changes in the negotiating strategies of the U.S. and other powers. Given this reality, the most likely outcome, according to Pollack, would be a symbolic nuclear capability “given that Pyongyang still confronts major technical hurdles.” Even if such a move of “symbolic nuclear capability” would not entail a definitive end to the program, this possibility warrants careful consideration by the U.S. and its allies seeking a negotiated end to Pyongyang’s nuclear program. It is not prudent to anticipate, therefore, “an early end to Pyongyang’s program” or to the dangers this program poses both for security in East Asia and for the future viability of the non-proliferation regime.14

North Korea’s nuclear program, whether successful or not, will have implications and an impact for other countries in the region, such as Japan, South Korea, and the ROC in Taiwan, in terms of their own nuclear ambitions. Failure of the United States and regional governments in Northeast Asia to halt North Korea’s nuclear program, however, need not yet dissolve into a process of wider nuclear proliferation in the region, according to a recent study by Christopher W. Hughes.15 This is because Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan seem set to continue hedging their nuclear bets “as long as the U.S. remains impeccable and engaged in its security commitments.” Under these circumstances the United States faces a major challenge in its attempt to roll back the North Korean nuclear program; the U.S. may, in fact, already have failed in its endeavor.16 The challenging question is “for how long is this U.S.-led status-quo” likely to endure?

Forging a New Security Order?

In the aftermath of the North Korean nuclear test, the major power relations in Northeast Asia are expected to change with a gradual shift in the power balance surrounding the Korean peninsula. The United States’ security role in Northeast Asia in the fundamental sense, however, is “no different in the wake of the North Korean nuclear test from what it was before,” according to one astute observer. The reason is that “the United States will continue to be the most powerful nation present in the region” and will continue to have “vital political, economic and security interests that will . . . continue to play the role of regional balancer or stabilizer for the foreseeable future.”17

The military balance on the Korean peninsula itself, for instance, “has not been changed by the DPRK test, nor would it be fundamentally changed even if the North were believed to have a truly deliverable weapon,” so Aland D. Romberg notes. “The latter would, of course, raise the ante not only in terms of the threat to South Korea, but most especially to Japan and U.S. forces there given the substantial Rodong missile force in the North’s inventory.” Nonetheless, according to the same author, “a workable Taepodong II missile would expand the North’s reach substantially, but even in that case, to put it in its crudest terms, the balance of forces ensures that if North Korea started a war, we would finish it.”18

Nonetheless, the nuclear test has altered the situation in some important ways, according to Romberg, in that the challenge for the United States and its allies “is to rise to the occasion to manage the new situation constructively.” “Handled well, the net effect could be to strengthen the American role and the prospects for peace and security of the region. Mishandled, the net effect could be to diminish U.S. influence over time, and
to generate forces toward a much less certain future for all concerned.”

The North Korean nuclear test, in short, “has not had a harmful effect so far on U.S. interests or substantially changed the role in North East Asia,” according to Romberg. However, “the situation is not static” and, if the U.S. does not seize the moment to press the advantages that have been created, the U.S. will “not only have squandered an opportunity presented by the North Korean test to consolidate” U.S. relations with its allies and with China, but the U.S. might ironically find itself “relatively isolated and cast in the role of spoiler. There is no reason for the United States to allow that to happen, and every reason to ensure it doesn’t.”

General Burwell Bell, commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, warned in 2007 of a second nuclear test by North Korea, which he claimed could continue nuclear development, making North Korea a moderate nuclear power by 2010 if it goes unchecked. Speaking before a U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, he said: “Unless the Six-Party talk’s process prevails, we expect North Korea to continue nuclear weapons research and development to perpetuate its strategy of intimidation, adding that Pyongyang “may ultimately aim to develop nuclear armed missiles to threaten regional countries and even the U.S.” He said North Korea has 50 kg of plutonium, enough to produce seven nuclear bombs. He also warned that North Korea’s record of selling missiles and arms could lead the regime to “proliferate nuclear weapons technology, expertise or material to anti-American countries, rogue regimes or non-state actors.”

In the aftermath of the DPRK’s nuclear testing in 2006, and its demonstrated WMD stockpile and missile launching capabilities, a potential shift in the balance of power has been occasioned in Northeast Asia surrounding the Korean peninsula. It is imperative, therefore, that the United States and its allies begin to explore the alternative path to nuclear disarmament, through diplomacy, that the Six-Party Talks “joint statement” on February 13, 2007 stipulated.

The Six-Party Talks Accord of February 13, 2007 and Its Implementation: An Analysis

The bi-multilateral (i.e., 2 + 4) approach to diplomacy toward North Korea, which the Six-Party Talks on North Korean nuclear standoff epitomize, finally came to bear intended fruit on February 13, 2007. On that day the chief negotiators from the six nations, the U.S., North Korea, China, South Korea, Russia and Japan, managed to issue a “joint statement” on the implementation of “the Principles of September 19, 2005,” thereby upholding the principle of “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.”

Under the 2005 plan, the Six Parties had agreed to (1) reaffirm the goal of attaining the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner; (2) undertake, in their relations, to abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognized norms of international relations; (3) promote economic cooperation in the fields of energy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally; (4) commit to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia; (5) take coordinated steps to implement the afore-mentioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of “commitment for commitment, action for action;” and, (6) hold the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing in early November 2005, at a date to be determined through consultations.

Under this plan, which reflected the norm of a “quid-pro-quo” diplomatic settlement, North Korea agreed to “disable” its nuclear facilities in exchange for a series of incentives and rewards packages. North Korea was to shut down nuclear facilities in Yongbyon within 60 days, which included a halting operation of its 5 mw nuclear reactor and canning spent fuel rods. The North also agreed to admit IAEA inspectors to conduct the necessary monitoring. In return, South Korea would initially provide 50,000 tons of heavy oil worth US$20 million, an additional 950,000 tons to be delivered depending on how far North Korea went along the road to disabling the facilities. Asked what the “disabling” meant, a South Korean official was quoted as saying: “This goes a step further than halting the operation of nuclear facilities and involves processes all the way
to—but just one step away from—completely dismantling them.”

The six nations would establish within the month five working groups to discuss issues, including denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, a security mechanism in Northeast Asia and the normalization of diplomatic ties between the U.S. and the DPRK (an official name for North Korea) as well as between Japan and the North. Although the agreement prevented the North from producing more plutonium that could be used to make nuclear weapons, it did not affect North Korea’s existing nuclear arms; hence, full denuclearization was still a long way away. It also remained to be seen whether North Korea would keep it’s “word for word” and declare its nuclear programs in full.

The six nations agreed to “share the cost of the rewards” equally, except that Japan still maintained that it could contribute only when the issue of Japanese nationals abducted by the North was resolved. The six agreed that matters regarding the North’s existing nuclear weapons and the highly enriched uranium program that the U.S. claimed would be discussed later. They also agreed to start negotiating the removal of North Korea from the U.S.’ list of states sponsoring terrorism and the subsequent removal of U.S. economic restrictions under the Trading with the Enemy Act.

Bush’s New Pragmatism Prevails

From the perspective of the U.S., the February 13, 2007 “nuclear accord” reached beyond resolving the immediate North Korean nuclear crisis. It also signified a general shift in U.S. relations with North Korea, Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula security. The Bush Administration, which remained mired in Iraq and Afghanistan, seemed to have changed its policy on pragmatic grounds.

The U.S. called the accord a “unique deal,” “the first step toward implementing” the statement of principles that were agreed upon in September 2005. These were to be implemented on “a step-by-step basis.” During a subsequent press conference Bush responded by saying that his former ambassador to the U.N., John Bolton, was “flat wrong” in criticizing the agreement.
negotiations Hill and Cha held with North Korean counterparts in Berlin in January. In those informal talks Cha hinted at the possibility of unfreezing some BDA accounts which North Korea called legitimate; this lead to the Berlin meeting.31

Opinions are divided as to the real meaning and significance of the February 13 nuclear accord. Did North Korean leader Kim Jong-il make the strategic decision to give up his nuclear program this time? Or did he just make what short-term concessions he needed to overcome financial sanctions and a food shortage? The cynics naturally wondered how long the agreement would last.32 Others also tended to be cautious. “This is a freeze with a promise to negotiate subsequent disarmament,” said Gary Samore, director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, who took part in the nuclear negotiations with North Korea under the Clinton administration. “And a North Korean promise to negotiate later is pretty worthless.” Joel Wit, a former U.S. State Department official who coordinated the Agreed Framework in 1994, commented: “It gives the illusion of moving more rapidly to disarmament, but it doesn’t really require anything to happen in the second phase.”33 Underlying these and other remarks was and is a fundamental American distrust of North Korea.

Following the six-party talks in February, U.S. negotiator Hill invited his North Korean counterpart to New York as the first step in the working-group talks between the U.S. and North Korea. During a March 5 meeting in New York, the North Korean chief negotiator Kim Kye-gwan was quoted as asking Hill to “treat us the way you treat India.” In 2006 U.S. President had visited New Delhi and signed the U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, which reversed 30 years of U.S. criticism of India for not signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; it then allowed sales of nuclear technology to New Delhi. The U.S. rejected Kim’s demand, noting that North Korea could never become India.34

In making such demands North Korea seemed to be attempting to normalize relations with the U.S. without scrapping the nuclear weapons it said it had already built. It remains to be seen, however, whether Kim’s demand reflects North Korea’s bottom line or was merely a statement for negotiation purposes. The February 13 agreement did not mention the dismantling of nuclear weapons, even at the stage when the nuclear facilities have been disabled; some observers say this will necessitate separate negotiations to dismantle the nuclear weapons.35

Speaking at a seminar in Washington, D.C. Hill said the United States “will not form any ties with a nuclear-equipped North Korea” adding that the Indian precedent would not apply to North Korea. Washington’s goal, as he put it, was “the abolition of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”36 The six-nation nuclear agreement of February 13 did not include a concrete deadline for North Korea’s removal from the list of state sponsors of international terrorism. It is no surprise to see, therefore, that North Korea was still on the U.S. list of states that sponsor terrorism, when the U.S. State Department sent its annual report on international terrorism to the U.S. Congress. Removing North Korea from the list would take at least 45 days.37

Unexpected Delay and Hurdles

The February 13 agreement to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis soon started to crack. Within 60 days the U.S. was to release North Korean funds frozen at Macao’s Banco Delta Asia, and North Korea was to shut down and seal its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon after having it verified by IAEA inspectors. South Korea was to supply to the North 50,000 tons of heavy oil, while the six-nation talks were to put into motion working groups discussing a wide range of outstanding issues. The deadline came and went without the scheduled resumption of the six nation talks immediately after April 14. What went wrong?38

All parties share responsibility. North Korea, needless to say, was a responsible party. The North missed the April 14 deadline to shut down its main reactor, as agreed under the February agreement; it cited a failure to release the funds at Macau-based Banco Delta Asia (BDA). The release of the money, frozen after the U.S. blacklisted the BDA where the North had 52 accounts allegedly linked to money laundering and counterfeiting, proved harder than expected since no other bank would touch the money.
Although the U.S. allegedly did everything it could to resolve the BDA question, the bottom line was that a precondition North Korea set was not met. The U.S. Treasury Department acted to release all the USS25 million frozen at the bank, both legal and illegal funds, so that Pyongyang could withdraw them anytime it wanted to, but the North also insisted that the situation be restored to what it had been before the BDA affair flared up. It also increased demands, not only to release the funds, but also to normalize all its overseas financial transactions. This was an impossible demand unless the alleged illegal actions that led to the initial financial sanctions stopped.

The U.S. was also responsible for letting the deadline to slip. The Bush administration, in the wake of its defeat in the 2006 mid-term elections, was impatient for quick results by changing its North Korea policy. Washington hastily pushed ahead with a working-level conference on normalizing diplomatic ties with Pyongyang before the nature of the February 13 accord had fully been disclosed. The U.S. made a mistake by overstraining itself to reconcile the position of the Treasury Department and the legal issues involved in releasing the frozen funds. As a result of offering the North excessive expectations, the U.S. lost a lever in the negotiation and, in effect, wasted the 60 days.

South Korea must also share the blame. When the February 13 accord was announced, the Roh government proposed resuming the inter-Korean dialogue as a separate track. It was eager to induce North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons program voluntarily. Seoul went ahead, during the 20th inter-Korean ministerial talks in Pyongyang, proposing to link rice aid to the initial implementation of the February 13 accord. Whereas the North stalled, citing the unresolved BDA question, the South resumed the talks on fertilizer aid and rice delivery. In this way Seoul seems to have deprived itself of a card it could have used to pressure the North into implementing the February 13 agreement.

Eventually, progress was made to find a solution to the Macau funds that Pyongyang liked. North Korean officials held talks with authorities in the Chinese territory of Macau, on April 28, reportedly requesting that some of the money be transferred to unspecified financial institutions in Russia and Italy. The news of North Korea proposing a transfer of its released funds was conveyed by China’s Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei to Japan’s visiting delegation in Beijing headed by former Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura, according to Japan’s Mainichi newspaper. North Korea was expected to transfer the released money to Pyongyang, via a third-country bank. After the BDA accounts were frozen, Pyongyang opened accounts with United Overseas Bank (UOB) in Singapore, the Vietnam Bank for Foreign Trade (Vietcombank), and Golomt Bank of Mongolia.

In the end, despite the lifting of the freeze, no bank in the world proved willing to receive the funds. They were afraid that handling the funds could be seen as helping North Korea launder money from illicit activities. Under these circumstances allowing a U.S. bank to play an intermediary role in transferring the fund to designated banks was considered the best solution. In fact, U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack confirmed that Charlotte, North Carolina-based Wachovia -- the fourth-largest American bank -- was asked to play an intermediary role in the transfer of funds but declined to offer specifics.

Also, the South Korean government reportedly considered letting the state-run Export-Import Bank of Korea handle North Korea’s unfrozen US $25 million from a Macau bank before these funds would go to a third country. The U.S. reportedly agreed to Seoul’s suggestion and promised not to take issue with the Korean bank. If true, Seoul’s offer to play an intermediary role helped the stalled Six-Party talks meeting to resume, but it also injected new controversy to the election year domestic politics in South Korea. The lesson of the BDA issue, according to one analyst, is that “bilateral frameworks must be in sync with the multilateral framework.” DPRK-U.S. negotiations require proceeding “simultaneously with other active discussions between the U.S. and China, North Korea and China, and the two Koreas” that “can serve as a buffer to help resolve issues.”

On May 15, the DPRK acknowledged that it might soon receive the frozen funds and would start to shut down its nuclear reactor. “Currently, a process is ongoing to wire the funds in Macau’s Banco Delta Asia to our bank account in a third country,” a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman told the North Korean official KCNA news agency. “If the money transfer has
been completed, we will immediately take steps to close nuclear facilities as agreed upon under the February 13 deal,” the spokesman was quoted as saying. In Washington, the U.S. State Department said it did not have any updates on the BDA issue and did not know whether the problem with the frozen funds had been sorted out.46 In the end U.S.-Russian deal on money transfer was worked out and lead to resuming the stalled Six-Party talks in Beijing sometime late in June.47

On March 25, South Korea and the U.S. started military drills, dubbed Reception, in Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI). North Korea urged the South to halt the drills warning that they could disrupt six-party talks on Pyongyang’s nuclear program.48 On April 24 North Korea went ahead with a military show of its own, with a 90-minute military parade through the capital’s central Kim Il Sung Square, including a massive display of 48 missiles of four different sizes, reviewed by the North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. This procession marked the 75th anniversary of the Korean People’s Army, which dates its origin to anti-Japanese resistance movement during the Japanese occupation of Korea before its defeat in 1945.49

The Korean military tension and security threat remain, despite the February 13 agreement on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. On May 25 North Korea test-fired several short-range guided missiles into the East Sea, in response to South Korea’s launch of its first destroyer equipped with high-tech Aegis radar technology.50 This was followed by North Korea’s firing two short-range anti-ship missiles into the West Sea on June 7.51 Despite tensions provoking the Six-Party Talks, aimed to find a peaceful resolution to the regional security concerns relative to the North Korean nuclear programs, have made headways in a series of meetings.

On July 15, 2007, North Korea announced that it had shut down its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon. IAEA inspectors flew in from Beijing, and verified this fact the next day. These new developments made it possible for the resumption of the Six-Party talks in Beijing, on July 18-20, when the delegates discussed the next phase of implementing the February 13 agreement on denuclearization. The Six-Party Talks during the 6th round of its meetings, on July 20, adopted a joint statement in which North Korea confirmed its prior announcement of July 15, regarding its decision to stop the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and facility, and also “to disclose all nuclear programs and disable all facilities” related to nuclear programs.52

The second phase of the Six-Party Talks met, on September 27-30, to hear the working groups report, and reaffirmed the roadmap to complete the implementation of the DPRK commitment “to disable all nuclear facilities” including three facilities at Yongbyon by December 31, 2007: the 5 MW Experimental reactor, the Reprocessing Plant, and the Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Facility.53 This suggests what has not been included and left out from the agreement. The February 13, 2007 Denuclearization Action Plan, for instance, did not include actions that would address fissile material stocks, the uranium enrichment program, or dismantlement of warheads, but instead focused on shutting down and disabling, for at least a year’s time, the key plutonium production facilities.

A six power foreign ministers conference was to be convened shortly, but did not happen, in the closing months of 2007. The third phase stage, to begin in January 2008, was supposed to address “all aspects of North Korea’s nuclear program,” including weapons, using North Korea’s declaration as a basis for future action. This understanding of the scope of the program and the North’s weapons capability, however, required transparency and careful verification for “complete, verifiable, irreversible” disarmament, the essence of the Bush Administration stance, to be achieved down the road.

In the Six-Party Talks negotiation North Korea demanded, in return for its “freeze” of its plutonium nuclear program, that the United States agree to a number of U.S. concessions, including removing North Korea from the U.S. terrorism-support list.54 If the Bush Administration removes North Korea from the terrorism list, it is required under law to notify Congress 45 days prior to removal. For Congress to prevent removal, it would have to pass legislation (not a resolution) that would be subject to a presidential veto. The Bush Administration, at the time of this writing, seems ready to the requirement of providing Congress with a 45-day notice.55
Effects of the Nuclear Fallout 1: South Korea and Inter-Korean Relations

It can be argued that the day after North Korea carried out its nuclear test in 2006, South Korea and the United States saw a “very different world.” South Korea was increasingly vulnerable in the face of the North’s nuclear threats. It can only confront a nuclear-armed North Korea with its conventional military might. In reality what can protect South Korea from the North’s nuclear threat is only the nuclear umbrella of its ally the United States. But the United States is no longer the ally it once was. It is ironic that independent exercise of war-time operational control of the ROK troops, that the Roh Moo-hyun administration sought and negotiated with the Bush administration in 2006, had little to do with North Korea’s nuclear testing. South Korea must, henceforth, seek new ways of protecting itself from North Korea’s threat. A recent CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) study reports that both Republicans and Democrats in Congress are skeptical about Seoul’s North Korea policy as “too generous, naive, and/or dangerous.”

Seoul’s Crisis Response and Management

Engagement or sanctions are the two opposite strategic options open to the U.S. and South Korea as they seek to deal with the North Korean nuclear threat and to defuse the nuclear standoff with Pyongyang. Engagement, a non-hostile interaction between two parties, is usually considered a positive action with many different forms, whereas sanctions are generally looked upon as negative actions that can be imposed by both the U.S. and South Korea to deter, punish, or compel the North Korean regime.

The Roh Moo-hyun administration, since its inauguration in 2003, pursued a policy of reconciliation with Pyongyang as its top priority. The Peace and Prosperity Policy, as it was called, was intended not only to expand the scope of the Sunshine Policy of its predecessor, the Kim Dae-jung administration, but also to accelerate the level and intensity of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation via so-called co-activity and co-prosperity. Mt. Kumgang tourism, which was initiated by the Kim administration, and the Kaesong Industrial Complex, promoted by the Roh administration, are the twin pillars of Seoul’s engagement policy, and both take great pride in the promise of inter-Korean economic co-prosperity.

Roh’s three-stage implementation strategy was aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis in the short-term, bringing lasting peace to the peninsula in the mid-term, and building a Northeast Asian economic hub in the long-term. However, without achieving the denuclearization of the North as the first step, Roh’s entire edifice and strategy of peace and prosperity undermined and became little more than an idealistic dream.

As the news of the nuclear test spread like a wild fire, South Korea was hit the hardest. It is possible that President Roh confronted the news of nuclear testing, with a sense of personal responsibility for his government’s failed policy of engagement, as well as with a new resolve to cope with future crisis situations with sound decision making. The essence of leadership is rational decision-making, and Roh must have resolved to move in two separate fronts of domestic and foreign policies, so as to respond to the crisis situation. Roh was keenly aware that the engagement policy had not been successful and that he would have to move decisively to overcome the post-nuclear test security environment of South Korea: both by addressing the election and party politics at home and by repairing the South Korea-U.S. alliance through pressing the on-going KorUs FTA negotiations to a successful conclusion.

Despite North Korea’s having crossed an imaginary red line by going nuclear, President Roh’s preferred policy, on balance, seems to have been engagement over sanctions. This is based on the continued belief that South Korea with a rich economy can and must render “humanitarian” assistance to the poverty-stricken North Korea in the spirit of fraternal and ethnic solidarity as a divided nation-state.

The year 2007 for South Korea was the presidential election year and the Korean voters went to the polls to select the next president on December 19, 2007. Naturally, the political climate in South Korea’s domestic politics was imbued by the heated
presidential campaigns and partisan contentions. Although a nuclear North Korea loomed large on the voter’s minds, the issue did not exercise decisive pressures upon the electoral campaigns and political process of choosing the next ROK president. Nevertheless, the Korean voters elected the opposition Grand National Party candidate Lee Myung-Bak who demanded the dismantlement of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program as a prerequisite for the South’s provision of economic aid to the North over the ruling United New Democratic Party candidate Chung Dong-young, with a large margin of 48.7 percent of the vote for Lee and 26.2 percent for Chung. Lee Hoi-chang, the unsuccessful GNP candidate in 1997 and 2002 who stood as an independent this time, finished third with 15.1 per cent.

Inter-Korean Relations on a Faster Track?

The Roh Moo-hyun administration appeared more than eager to use the February 13 accord as justification for resuming its promised aid of rice and fertilizer delivery to North Korea, which was suspended in July 2006 in the wake of the North Korean missile launching. During the Inter-Korean ministerial talks, held in Kyungju in mid-July, the North Korean chief delegate dismissed the missile launching by the North, which precipitated the crisis, as a separate issue. He walked out of the session and left for home one day earlier than expected during a three-day scheduled session.

Early in March 2007 Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung attended the sessions of economic cooperation talks in Pyongyang and pledged to resume the negotiations on the promised delivery of rice and fertilizer. At the end of the five days of meetings South Korea promised to send 400,000 tons of rice and 300,000 tons of fertilizer to North Korea starting in late May. The joint statement itself, in the end, showed an agreement over the rice aid with no strings attached. The South Korean government contended that the two sides had a verbal agreement to link rice aid and North Korea’s adherence to the February 13 nuclear accord. Yet, South Korea as a donor country was not able to get it put in writing by the North. Minister Lee, upon his return from Pyongyang, said that Seoul would start sending rice aid to Pyongyang once North Korea started meeting its obligations under the February 13 six-nation agreement. He indicated that the North could get rice aid “if it honors just one of the requirements, namely, either shutting down its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon or readmitting inspectors from the IAEA.”

In the economic cooperation talks, the two Koreas agreed once again to conduct a test run of the Donghae and Kyungui rail lines in the East and West on May 17. They had already agreed three times before, since 2004, to conduct a trial run of the railways, but each time they floundered because of last-minute resistance from the North Korean military. The Unification Minister Lee said that yet another cancellation of a trial run of cross-border railways would severely strain inter-Korean relations. Lee also announced a plan to sell the remaining 1.75 million square meters in the inter-Korean Kaesong Industrial Complex in the North starting on April 30. Sale of the land was indefinitely postponed after North Korea test-fired missiles in July 2006.

A pair of passenger trains did cross in opposite directions on a test-run, on May 17, 2007 marking a historic journey across the DMZ. Each train carried 100 South Koreans northward on a 27.3 kilometers (17 miles) of track, between the South’s Munsan station and the Kaesong station in the North, and 50 North Koreans southward on a 25.5 kilometer (16 miles) track, between the North’s Diamond Mountain station and the South’s Jejin station. Marking this event Seoul’s Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung was quoted as saying: “It is not simply a test run. It means reconnecting the severed bloodline of our people. It means that the heart of the Korean peninsula is beating again.” Pyongyang’s Senior Cabinet Councilor Kwon Ho Ung was also quoted as saying the two sides should not be “derailed from the track or hesitate” in moving towards unification.

To entice the North to allow this railway crossing, the South reportedly offered some $80 million in additional aid for its light industries. South Korea had already spent $589 million on reconnecting the rail system, including $195 million worth of equipment, tracks and other material lent to North Korea. Whether “this is a precious first step for a 1,000 mile journey,”
which will invigorate inter-Korean trade and connect its trains to China and to the trans-Siberian railways, remains to be seen. The opposition GNP members were quoted as calling the event a "train of illusion" organized to draw voters’ attention in an election year.69

South Korea had already agreed to be the sole provider of an initial 50,000 tons of fuel aid, once Pyongyang allowed IAEA inspectors in for confirmation. It already sent the first batch of fertilizer on March 27 and resumed emergency aid the next day with 20,500 tons of rice, 70,415 tons of cement, 50 eight-ton trucks, 60,000 blankets and 1,800 tons of iron bars.70 GNP Presidential candidate, Park Geun-hye, and both Korean and Japanese newspaper editorials criticized these actions by Seoul, claiming the eagerness could decrease incentives for the North to comply with the denuclearization deal.71

Fortunately, for the sake of keeping the Six-Party Talk process intact and credible, the Roh’s government decided to postpone food shipments to North Korea until the Kim’s Pyongyang government fulfilled its promise to shut down the Yongbyon nuclear reactor. This position was reconfirmed during the 21st inter-Korean ministerial talks held in Seoul, May 29-June 1. The four-day talks broke up without a deal but managed to produce a four-sentence statement: both sides “have sufficiently presented their positions and held sincere discussions on fundamental and actual matters linked to progress in inter-Korean relations.”72 Hoping that the BDA dispute would have been resolved by the end of May, the ROK government had approved budget spending for the rice aid worth $170 million and raw materials worth $80 million for North Korea to make soap, footwear and clothing. The ROK plan was to start sending 400,000 tons of rice late in May 2007 in the form of a loan to be paid back over 30 years after a 10-year grace period.73

In parallel with an anticipated progress on the Six-Party Talks in Beijing, the Roh Administration took an initiative toward holding a South-North Summit, before its five-year term in office ended. The summit discussed, among others, the idea of establishing a peace regime on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. The lame-duck President Roh was most anxious to make sure that both North and South Korea had come to play an active role that was in parallel with the separate track for the United States and the North making moves toward improving their relations, as the progress was being made in their mutual negotiations over disabling the North’s nuclear facilities.74

The Roh Moo-Hyun Kim Jong-Il summit meeting of October 2-4, 2007, in Pyongyang, owed as much to the change of political atmosphere as to an improvement in the Six-Party talks negotiation on the North Korean denuclearization, following the July 15th Pyongyang’s important decision to suspend the operation of its Yongbyon nuclear complex and facilities. The October 2007 summit was hailed by some as opening “Korea’s New Era of Détente” by producing a landmark declaration that contained the more specific details on Korean security and economic cooperation between the two sides.75 The gist of the major agreements, and the proposed action plans, at the summit pertained to three topical issues and issue-areas of inter-Korean peace, economy and human contacts.

The two Korean leaders agreed, for instance, on the peace issue “to seek three or four-party summit for signing the Korean Peninsula peace treaty, to support the Six-Party denuclearization talks, to end military hostility, to hold defense ministerial talks in Pyongyang in November, and to oppose any war on the Korean Peninsula.” On the economy issue, they agreed “to set up a special peace zone in West Sea, to expand cross-border investments, economic cooperation projects, to construct joint shipbuilding complexes in Nampo and Anbyon, to open direct air routes between Seoul and Mt. Paektu, and to open a cross-border cargo railway.” On the issue of promoting human contacts, they agreed “to allow South’s Olympic cheering squad use of North Korean railway to reach Beijing, to hold inter-Korean summits more frequently to discuss pending issues, to hold inter-Korean prime ministerial talks in Seoul in November, and to expand reunions of the separate family members.”76

Interestingly, these agreements between the two Korean leaders were attained on the eve of the scheduled seventeenth Presidential election on December 19, 2007 in South Korea. However, it had rather minimal effect on the election outcome.
Effects of the Nuclear Fallout 2: the Future of US-South Korea Relations

The Korean government of President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) was not always in close consultation and prior policy coordination with the Bush administration on initiatives of positive engagement toward North Korea’s Kim Jong-il regime. The Roh Administration, in fact, was largely responsible for the failure to prevent a rising tide of anti-Americanism in South Korea among the progressive forces in the initial phase of his five-year term in office.

With the North Korea’s nuclear testing and its fallout, time has changed. South Korea can no longer afford to gamble with its security requirements and with the future fate of its divided nation. There is a growing awareness among the public that true peace will require a sound and healthy partnership in the form of the Korea-U.S. security alliance and, with it, the need to renegotiate the pace and timing of the handover of the war-time troop control as already agreed.

Revamping the Alliance Partnership?

The military imbalance is likely to prevail in the Korean Peninsula in the wake of North Korea’s nuclear testing. The changing reality is that the North is now armed with nuclear weapons, whereas the South is force-ready only with conventional arms. To address such an imbalance the governments of South Korea and the United States are expected to make needed adjustments, as shown by a joint decision regarding the timing of wartime military control transfer moving from the initial date of October 15, 2009 to a new date of March 15, 2012.

Independent control over the military by South Korea during wartime was requested by the Roh administration. This signified the dissolution of the Combined Forces Command, and would disrupt the chain of command structure of joint decision making on military matters through the ROK-U.S. alliance. In making this new decision, both governments seem to have over-looked and effectively neglected North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. The South Korean public, not surprisingly, had awakened to the new security dynamics, and raised their concerns over the pace of hand over of the wartime military control at this time of heightened security concerns.

The defense committee inside South Korea’s National Assembly, for instance, is reportedly planning to adopt a new resolution barring Seoul from taking back of its wartime military control from the U.S. command until the North Korean nuclear crisis is resolved. Both the ruling and opposition parties are now backing this resolution, after a few revisions were to be made, including a recommendation for flexibility on timing and not being fixated on the 2012 deadline.

After a U.S.-ROK defense consultative meeting held in Washington on February 7-9, 2007, South Korea Defense Minister Kim Jang-soo and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates discussed the new timing for the transfer of wartime operational control of the Korean forces to Seoul. They reaffirmed an earlier decision made during the talks of October 2006 when they agreed to complete the transfer sometime between October 15, 2009 and March 15, 2012. Whereas the United States has favored the date of 2009, South Korea has insisted on the later date of 2012.

South Korea clearly needs a mature and healthy alliance partnership because no country can survive on its own in this age of complex interdependence and globalization. A country needs allies that share the same values and interests. Taking a neutral stance diplomatically, without national defense and preparedness, is like an invitation to invasion and disdain by the powerful neighboring countries. South Korea must let its public realize the strategic payoffs and benefits that will accrue from a revamped and enhanced U.S. ROK alliance partnership.

The ROK Constitution stipulates that the President as the chief executive will have strong authority on matters of making foreign policy and national security policy including the ones on inter-Korean relations. The new president Lee Myung-Bak is likely to make greater strides toward improving relations with the U.S., which has been strained throughout the Bush administration, and also to seek better ties with both Japan and China. Progress is less likely in the highly emotional territorial dispute with Japan. Lee has said that he wants to see more South Korean investment in China and closer consultation on security
issues. His move toward Beijing is not likely to be pursued, however, at the expense of the alliance relations with Washington.

Conclusion

A “nuclear-free” Korean Peninsula has been an aspiration of many in Korea, and a stated-policy objective of the governments of the two Korean states. A historical record shows that both North and South Koreas signed the “Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” on December 31, 1991. This came into effect on January 19, 1992, but became an empty promise because it was soon boycotted by the North.80

Attaining this goal of denuclearization, therefore, was like “dreaming an impossible dream” for the Korean people. Its realization was out of the reach for more than fifteen years and there were indications that the Six-Party Talks “nuclear accord” of February 13, 2007 might also end up with the same fate. Without full compliance and implementation of the agreement, there is no assurance that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will come about, even if the “disability” phase of the “Nuclear” North Korea might come to pass in the days ahead.

What must follow, if the February 13 provisions of implementation are fully to be met, will be a series of logical steps that will require specific follow-up measures of mutual confidence-building with the safeguard of CVID (Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Disarmament) before the “peace treaty and peace framework” regime will come about on the Korean Peninsula. Pyongyang has agreed to “shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment” the plutonium processing operations at the Yongbyon nuclear facility. It also agreed to allow International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to monitor the cessation of activity. The document carefully avoided the term “freeze,” which would have elicited direct comparisons with President Bill Clinton’s Agreed Framework, much resisted by the Bush Administration during its first term in office.

Left unclear is whether the language of “all necessary monitoring and verifications as agreed between IAEA and the DPRK” includes pre-existing authority for challenge inspections of suspected sites and any additional measures needed to verify the parameters of the uranium program and monitor stockpiles of nuclear weapons and radioactive material outside of the Yongbyon facility.81 In addition, North Korea should honor its commitment to returning to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as soon as possible.

Disarming Kim’s North Korea is a risky enterprise that continues to remain highly uncertain. Only time will tell whether the February 13 nuclear accord, this time around, will represent “an ephemeral diplomatic victory or a real breakthrough.”82 Nonetheless, the United States and South Korea must continue to plan on foreign policy measures that transcend the nuclear accord into the broader subjects of maintaining peace and security on the Korean Peninsula as part of building a realistic regional order in Northeast Asia further into the 21st century.83

Notes:


5 As cited by Lee, ibid. It also coincided with the day of ex-South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon being elected by the Security Council as the new Secretary General of the United Nations.

6 Analysis of air sample, collected on October 11, 2006, detected radioactive debris indicating that it was plutonium fuel testing. Since the explosion yield was less than a kiloton, some called it a “fizzle” rather than a full-blown and sophisticated weapon-grade explosion. Thom Shanker and David Sanger, “North Korean fuel identified as plutonium.” The New York Times, October 17, 2006.

7 Jonathan D. Pollack, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program to 2015: Three Scenarios.” Asia Policy, Number 3 (January 2007): 105-123.


9 As cited by Sanger and Shanker, Ibid.


11 Ibid, Executive Summary, 106.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., Executive Summary, 10.

14 Ibid.

15 Christopher W. Hughes, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Implications for the Nuclear Ambitions of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.” Asia Policy, Number 3 (January 2007): 75-104.

16 Ibid., Executive Summary, 76.


18 Ibid.

19 Ibid., 130.

20 Ibid., 137-38.


42 “Wachovia considers request to transfer of NK funds.” CNN.com, April 30, 2007.

43 Ibid.


46 Reuters “North Korea Says Nuclear Deal Block May be Cleared,” May 15, 2007.


51 “N. Korea fires two missiles into West Sea.” Digital Chosun.com, June 8, 2007.

52 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-party_talks

53 Ibid.


55 Ibid.


60 For an analysis of the electoral rules and election cycles in South Korea’s Sixth Republic, see: Young Whan Kihl, Transforming Korean


64 Ibid.


69 Ibid.


71 “SKorean presidential contender criticizes restored aid to North before nukes dismantled.” International Herald Tribune, April 9, 2007; “Is denuclearization possible with the sunshine policy?” Yomiuri Shimbun, March 3, 2007 (in Japanese); “If there is no progress on denuclearization, we should delay rice aid.” JoongAng Ilbo, April 19, 2007 (in Korean).


