

The Proposed South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): Problems and Prospects

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On February 2, 2006, United States Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Portman and South Korean Trade Minister Kim Hyun-chong announced their two countries' intention to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA). The announcement came after many years of official and unofficial discussions of the feasibility of concluding an FTA. The climate for launching the negotiations improved following South Korean willingness to address four areas of concern to the United States: beef, automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and Ascreen quotas. (Screen quotas limit the amount of screen time that foreign films can be shown.)²

The U.S. Congress would have to approve an FTA before it could enter into force. The U.S.-South Korea FTA (KORUSFTA) negotiations have been conducted under the trade promotion authority (TPA) that the Congress granted to the President under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210). The authority allows the President to negotiate trade agreements to expedite congressional consideration (no amendments and limited debate). However, the executive branch must fulfill a number of criteria in order to exercise the authority, including specified negotiating objectives in the final agreement and consultation with the Congress prior to and during the negotiations.

The launching of negotiations comes with a high degree of political risk for both South Korea and the United States. The United States and South Korea have been allies since the United States intervened on the Korean Peninsula in 1950 and fought to repel a North Korean takeover of South Korea. Over 33,000 U.S. troops were killed and over 100,000 were wounded during the three-year conflict.³ Although the alliance remains strong, it has shown signs of fraying. Some observers argue that the FTA would help to strengthen the alliance.

U.S.-South Korean trade friction has diminished over the last decade and a half as political leaders have been forced to give higher priority to foreign policy and national security concerns, and the United States and South Korea have increasingly used the multilateral dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other forums to address bilateral trade problems. In addition, South Korea has introduced a number of reforms to open its economy to foreign competition and investment to address some of the U.S. complaints. Yet, even though tensions have diminished, a number of long-standing, deep-seated differences in trade and investment relations have remained below the surface. The FTA negotiations could be risky as these fissures are likely to be exposed. If South Korean and U.S. negotiators can successfully address them, the relationship will be strengthened. If not and negotiations fail, the bilateral relationship could be seriously harmed for some time as failure may be a sign of the lack of trust.

The timing of the negotiations also presents a challenge. They began during the week of June 5, 2006, with the first round, just 13 months before the President's TPA is scheduled to expire on July 1, 2007; that is, an agreement must be signed before July 1, 2007, if it is to receive expedited congressional consideration under that authority. In addition, the TPA requires a 90-day presidential notification to Congress of *intent* to sign the agreement; therefore, the KORUS FTA would have to be completed before April 2, 2007, giving the negotiators a 10-month window in which to complete the negotiations. Some U.S. FTA agreements have been completed within a year; others have taken more than a year. While reauthorization of TPA in 2007 is a possibility, it is widely considered remote at this time, given the highly charged partisan environment in Congress on trade.

A number of members of Congress from both political parties have expressed strong support for undertaking an FTA with South Korea. Others have expressed skepticism that an FTA can bridge the differences between the two countries on trade. Still others oppose the effort outright. In the coming months, the Congress will likely monitor the negotiations closely, thus exercising its responsibilities of oversight over the executive branch as well as participating in the consultation process mandated by the TPA. In South Korea, the FTA negotiations have been watched even more

closely than in the United States. While many members of the National Assembly have expressed their support for an FTA in principle, other members – most notably some members of the ruling Uri Party – have expressed skepticism if not outright opposition to the FTA and/or the way the government of Roh Moo-hyun has handled the consultation process.

An Overview of the U.S.-South Korean Economic Relationship

South Korea is a major economic partner for the United States. In 2005, two-way trade between the two countries was nearly \$70 billion, making South Korea the United States's seventh-largest trading partner, ahead of France and Italy. (See **Table 1** and **Table 2**.) South Korea is among the United States's largest markets for agricultural products. For some western states and U.S. sectors, the South Korean market is even more important, ranking number five for California's exporters (in 2004), number two for Oregon's exporters, and number four for all U.S. agricultural exporters. Major U.S. exports to South Korea include semiconductors, machinery (particularly semiconductor production machinery), aircraft, and agricultural products.

Table 1.
Annual U.S.-South Korea Merchandise Trade, Selected Years
(Billions of U.S. Dollars)

Year	U.S. Exports	U.S. Imports	Trade balance	Total trade
1990	14.4	18.5	-4.1	32.9
1995	25.4	24.2	1.2	49.6
2000	26.3	39.8	-13.5	66.1
2003	22.5	36.9	-14.4	59.5
2004	25.0	45.1	-20.1	70.1
2005	26.2	43.2	-16.9	69.4
Major U.S. Export Items	Semiconductor chips and manufacturing equipment; aircraft; corn and wheat; plastics. (See Appendix A for more details)			

Major U.S. Import Items	Cellular phones; cars, semiconductor circuits; televisions and flat panel screens; construction vehicles (See Appendix A for more details)
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Sources: 1990 & 1995 data from Global Trade Information Services. Data from the 2000-2005 U.S. International Trade Commission.

South Korea is far more dependent economically on the United States than the United States is on South Korea. In 2005, the United States was Korea's third-largest trading partner, second-largest export market, third-largest source of imports, and its largest supplier of foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2003, China for the first time displaced the United States from its perennial place as South Korea's number one trading partner. Two years later, Japan overtook the United States to become South Korea's second-largest trade partner.

Table 2.
Asymmetrical Economic Interdependence (2005)

	Total Trade	Export Market	Source of Imports	Source of FDI
For the U.S., South Korea ranks	#7	#7	#7	#28 (2004)
For South Korea, the U.S. ranks	#3	#2	#3	#1

Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce © Bureau of the Census and Bureau of Economic Analysis. Bank of Korea.

Increased economic interaction between the United States and South Korea has been accompanied by numerous disagreements over trade policies. Most of the disputes have consisted of U.S. complaints, though South Korea has its own (smaller) list of grievances. In general, U.S. exporters and trade negotiators identify the lack of transparency of South Korea's trading and regulatory systems as the most significant barriers to trade with South Korea in almost every major product sector. Many U.S. government officials also complain that Seoul continues to use

government regulations and standard-setting powers to discriminate against foreign firms in politically sensitive industries, such as automobiles and telecommunications. Another major cross-sectoral complaint is that rigidities in the South Korean labor market, such as mandatory severance pay, raise the cost of investing and doing business. Finally, the United States and other countries have pressed South Korea to open further its agricultural market, which is considered one of the most closed among members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).⁴

The intensity of these disputes has diminished considerably since the late 1980s and early 1990s, in part because South Korea has enacted a set of sweeping market-oriented reforms as a *quid pro quo* for receiving a \$58 billion package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) following the near collapse of the South Korean economy in 1997. In particular, as a result of the reforms, South Korea has opened its doors to foreign investors, ushering in billions of dollars of foreign portfolio and foreign direct investment (FDI). The result is that foreign companies, including U.S. firms, now are significant shareholders in many prominent industrial conglomerates (*chaebol*), own an estimated 40% of the value of the shares traded on South Korea's stock exchange, and at one point have owned about one-third of the South Korean banking industry. Since the 1997 crisis, FDI commitments by U.S. companies have totaled approximately \$20 billion.

Additionally, the United States and South Korea appear to have become more adept at managing their trade disputes. This may be partly due to the quarterly, working-level trade action agenda trade meetings that were initiated in early 2001. Both sides credit the meetings, which appear to be unique to the U.S.-South Korean trade relationship, with creating a more constructive dialogue that helped pave the way for the two sides to feel sufficiently confident to launch FTA negotiations.

The Possible Structure of the FTA

A limited definition of an FTA is a pact between or among two or more countries under which tariffs and non-tariff border restrictions (for example quotas) are eliminated in trade in goods among the parties to the agreement. However, FTAs in which the United States participates have been more complex, reflecting the

increasing complexity of bilateral and regional economic relationships in which tariffs and quotas are among the least critical issues. These FTAs cover regulations, policies, and practices that affect a broad range of economic activities.

While the final shape and content of the KORUS FTA, if achieved, will be the product of the bilateral negotiations that began on June 5, 2006, previous U.S. FTAs have some generic elements that will probably be part of an agreement with South Korea. Specifically, the FTA would likely include provisions on market access for manufactured and agricultural goods, including schedules for the phase-out of tariffs and nontariff barriers and special provisions for longer phase-in periods for sensitive products, such as rice, beef, autos, and textiles and apparel. The length of the phase-out periods will probably be a major focus of the negotiations.

The agreement will likely also contain provisions on trade in services. The United States has insisted FTAs in which it participates use the *negative list* approach in scheduling treatment of services. In other words, the agreement covers barriers to trade in all services sectors and subsectors unless specifically listed as to be excluded in the agreements' schedule of commitments. In contrast, the WTO employs the more cumbersome *positive list* approach that requires that a service sector or subsector must be identified in a schedule of commitments in order to be covered under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).

In addition to provisions on trade in manufactured goods, agricultural goods, and services, an FTA would probably include provisions on intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, foreign investment, trade-related labor and environment issues, government procurement policies and practices, and competition policy. An important element of any FTA is rules of origin: How will the agreement partners define which products are to be considered eligible for duty-free or other preferential treatment provided under the agreement, if they include parts from third countries. Another important provision would indicate how disputes on issues covered by the agreement will be handled. The agreement would also include a provision providing the date on which the FTA would enter into force.

U.S. Interests and FTA Negotiating Objectives

An FTA with South Korea would have immediate economic and foreign policy implications for U.S. relations with South Korea specifically, but could also have broader implications for U.S. economic and foreign policy interests in East Asia and beyond. The United States has entered the negotiations with a number of issues and objectives.

Why an FTA?

As indicated earlier, South Korea is the seventh largest U.S. trading partner overall. It is also the third largest U.S. trading partner in East Asia (behind China and Japan). Many supporters view an FTA as a logical extension of the bilateral economic relationship that would provide a means by which the two trading partners could address and resolve fundamental issues and, thereby, raise the relationship to a higher level. The FTA could also stand as a symbolic indication of the firmer relationship.

An FTA may also be viewed by some as a means to reassert the importance of a critical foreign policy and national security alliance by rising above differences that have caused the U.S.-South Korean alliance to fray recently. For example, the Bush Administration and South Korean leaders have differed over how to manage relations with North Korea. Specifically, South Korea's *sunshine policy* of emphasizing bilateral reconciliation with North Korea generally has meant that Seoul has not supported U.S. diplomatic and rhetorical efforts to pressure North Korea, especially on North Korea's nuclear weapons programs. The re-positioning of U.S. troops in South Korea has also generated some friction between the two allies.⁵

Some experts have suggested that a KORUS FTA could curb the rising tide of China's economic and political influence in East Asia. China has surpassed the United States as the most important export market for South Korea and the second most important source of imports into Korea (behind Japan). China is also forging ties with the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in an ASEAN+3 arrangement (China, Japan and South Korea), arrangements from which the United States is excluded. An FTA could ensure that the United States has an institutional presence in East Asia. In addition, trade expert Claude Barfield of the American Enterprise Institute suggests that a KORUS FTA

could generate a domino effect that leads to other countries, such as Japan, entering into similar arrangements with the United States.⁶ All of this would come as the discussions within the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum have stalemated.

In terms of broader U.S. trade policy, an FTA with Korea would build on the policy first introduced by then-USTR Robert Zoellick, a competitive liberalization that uses free trade agreements and multilateral trade agreements to encourage trading partners to remove trade and investment barriers and be a model for others. In that sense, the KORUS FTA would be a major step forward in policy. It would be the largest U.S. FTA in terms of mutual trade and investment, since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect in 1994. It would also respond to some critics of Bush Administration trade policy who argue that the FTAs that the United States has entered into since NAFTA account for very little trade and yield relatively little in commercial benefits.

South Korea has entered into FTAs with Chile, Singapore, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and is negotiating with other countries, including Japan.⁷ A U.S. FTA could help prevent U.S. exporters from being placed at a competitive disadvantage with these other countries in the South Korean market.

U.S. Issues and Negotiating Objectives

The launching of U.S.-South Korea negotiations has by and large met with bipartisan support in the Congress and broad approval in the U.S. business community, the members of which see the agreement as an opportunity to obtain the removal of long-standing South Korean tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and investment.⁸ Some groups oppose the negotiations because they doubt that an FTA can address their problems of doing business in South Korea. For example, organized labor has raised concerns about workers' rights issues in South Korea and about the possibility of products that North Korean workers produce in the Kaesong industrial complex could be transshipped duty free to the United States through South Korea.⁹ The U.S.-based auto manufacturers may also oppose the FTA, if South Korea does not show signs of improving market access to their exports.

The issues that the United States will likely raise during the negotiations cut across many sectors and other areas of interest.

Agriculture

Agriculture is high on the U.S. agenda and is an area expected to be among the most contentious in the negotiations. Agriculture is an important sector in U.S. trade as a whole and in trade with South Korea. It is also an area that has generated a great deal of bilateral trade friction because of Korea's highly protectionist agricultural policies.

Negotiations pertaining accessing Korea's domestic rice market will likely be among the most contentious, pitting a diminishing but, nevertheless, highly vocal community of South Korean rice farmers against an equally influential community of U.S. rice growers who are also major exporters. Although agriculture accounts for around 7% of South Korean employment, strong cultural ties to rural areas still makes the agriculture sector a formidable political force that is manifested in very strict controls on imports of agricultural products, including rice.

As the South Korean economy has become more dependent on exports of manufactured goods, South Korea's trading partners, including the United States, have demanded that South Korea reduce restrictions on agricultural imports in exchange for greater access for South Korea's exports of manufactured goods. As part of the WTO Uruguay Round Agreements that went into effect on January 1, 1995, South Korea opened its rice markets to imports but was given special treatment by being allowed to do so under an import quota system that gradually increased the volume of rice imports. The program was due to expire at the end of 2004, but South Korea reached an agreement with major rice-exporting countries to continue importing rice under a growing, but restrictive, quota that is in effect through 2014.

U.S. rice producers have expressed support for the U.S.-South Korean FTA negotiations. However, they want the FTA to include completely free trade in rice, requiring Korea to remove the quotas completely. Furthermore, they want the quotas and tariffs to be phased out faster than the United States agreed to in the DR-CAFTA, and in FTAs with Peru and Colombia. U.S. rice producers

also oppose emergency safeguards measures for Korean rice imports beyond the phase-out period.¹⁰

In addition to restrictions on rice, the USTR and agriculture trade groups have indicated the following among U.S. priorities in the negotiations:¹¹

- eliminate unnecessary and unscientific South Korean sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) regulations, with Korea reaffirming its commitment to the WTO SPS agreement that requires SPS regulations to be science-based;
- ensure that the phase-out periods for agricultural tariffs and quotas will not be unnecessarily long and eliminate non-tariff barriers, including permit and licensing requirements;
- eliminate unnecessary restrictions on perishable imports and cyclical agricultural products;
- provide special rules of origin for U.S. beef shipments to South Korea to include a born, raised, and slaughtered rule giving preferential treatment to U.S. beef producers;¹² and,
- eliminate export subsidies on all South Korean agricultural products.

Autos and Auto Parts

Negotiations on trade in some manufactured goods are also likely to be intense, particularly in cars and auto parts. After a false start in the 1980s and 1990s, South Korean manufactured passenger cars have been achieving competitive success in the U.S. market, especially as soaring gasoline prices have increased demand for smaller, gas-efficient vehicles. However, U.S.-based car manufacturers have been much less successful in gaining shares of the Korean domestic car market. South Korean imports of foreign automobiles totaled fewer than 31,000 in 2005 (including about 5,800 U.S. vehicles) just over 3% of total car sales in the South Korean market. In contrast, South Korean auto manufacturers exported over 730,000 cars to the United States in 2005, capturing over 4% of the U.S. market.

U.S.-based auto producers have blamed various Korean regulations for the limiting U.S. market share. In 1998, the United States and South Korea signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in which the Korean government agreed to take steps to address the U.S. issues. While the Office of the USTR reports that South Korea has fulfilled many of the commitments, it asserts that other steps should be taken to prevent discrimination toward U.S. auto exporters. Among them are to reduce or eliminate the 8% tariff on car imports and to revise the domestic taxes that are applied to the full price (including tariffs) of imported cars, and car taxes that are based on engine displacement that allegedly disadvantage U.S.-made cars, which tend to be larger than domestically-produced Korean cars.¹³ An indication of the importance of the issue in the negotiations is that a special working group on the auto issue will be part of the structure of the negotiations.

Charles Ulthus, vice-president of the Automotive Trade Policy Council, complaining about past South Korean anti-import policies on autos, laid out the U.S. auto industry position stating:

Given Korea=s status as a major global player, its closed market to imports, and [the] long history of unsuccessful U.S. efforts to dismantle Korea=s nontariff barriers, we are advocating for a comprehensive dismantling of Korea=s nontariff barriers and we are asking that Korea demonstrate up front that its market is open before we unilaterally provide it with preferential access to the U.S. market. . . [W]e are looking for something more than just promises that the market will open, more than just commitments to address one tariff barrier, which very well could be circumvented at a later date.¹⁴

Other Manufactured Goods

In addition, U.S. exporters of manufactured goods have indicated that they would like to see the following objectives, among others, included a final U.S.-South Korea FTA:

- eliminate tariffs and other barriers to reciprocal access to the South Korean market for U.S. textile and apparel products with reasonable phase-in periods;

- eliminate immediately tariffs on 99% of imported manufactured goods (as is the case in the U.S.-Australia FTA);
- remove non-tariff barriers and prevent new ones from emerging; for example, health and safety requirements that differ widely from accepted practices in other countries; unnecessarily burdensome technical standards; duplicative testing requirements for foreign products; and requirements to submit proprietary manufacturing information;
- provide access to U.S. exporters in the development of South Korean domestic regulations; and
- address the use of adjustable border taxes, adjustment taxes, domestic taxes, and indirect government support for local industries that adversely affect U.S. exports.¹⁵

An issue that has arisen since the negotiations were launched in February pertains to the change in the South Korean government=s policy on reimbursements for costs for pharmaceuticals. The government announced on May 3 that it was changing its approach from a negative list to a positive list. In other words, only those products specifically listed as eligible for reimbursement would be covered, making non-coverage the default. U.S. pharmaceutical representatives and U.S. negotiators have been pressing the South Korean government to reverse its decision.¹⁶ South Korea announced at the beginning of the second round of negotiations on July 10 that it intended to go ahead with the change. As a result, lead U.S. negotiator, Assistant USTR Wendy Cutler, suspended the work of the pharmaceuticals working group, stating that South Korea=s decision to implement the decision was inconsistent with both the mandate of the pharmaceuticals group and the market opening spirit of the KORUS FTA. To ensure continued balance in the overall negotiations, the U.S. suspended work in the trade remedies and services groups, two areas of particular importance to South Korea.¹⁷

Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Protection

U.S. negotiators will strive to secure South Korean agreement to strengthen enforcement of intellectual property rights, including controls over unauthorized online transmission and distribution of copyrighted works, the seizure of pirated goods and equipment to make and transmit pirated goods, and proper compensation to victims of IPR violations.¹⁸ The U.S. business community has targeted specific Korean policies and practices in intellectual property issues. For example, the Korean Food and Drug Administration (KFDA) requires that proprietary data on pharmaceutical manufacturing processes be submitted for new drugs; in addition, the South Korean government has, in some cases, approved the marketing of some pharmaceuticals before it has determined that the applicant is the rightful owner of the patent and trademark.¹⁹ The USTR has continued to place South Korea on the special 301 Watch List. The USTR indicated that the South Korean government has strengthened its enforcement of copyright laws but still needs to go further.²⁰

Services

The United States likely will press South Korea to reduce barriers to sales on U.S.-origin media in South Korea. South Korea took a major step in this direction, leading up to the launching of negotiations, by reducing by half the to 46 days per year as the number of days that South Korean cinemas had to show South Korean films. U.S. movie producers and distributors will likely push for a further reduction. U.S. providers in telecommunications, financial services, professional services, and other services sectors want to see greater market access in South Korea, and the United States will be pushing for improved transparency and predictability of South Korean government regulatory procedures in all services sectors.

Foreign Investment

In the area of South Korean foreign investment policies and regulations, U.S. negotiators will generally push South Korea to: remove trade distorting barriers (export and local content requirements) to U.S. investment; provide timely resolution of disputes between U.S. investors and South Korean authorities; and extend national treatment for U.S. investors in Korea, so that U.S.

investors would be treated no less favorably than domestic South Korean investors. U.S. negotiators will aim to obtain other rights for U.S. investors comparable to their rights in the United States but make sure that South Korean investors in the United States are not accorded rights that are more favorable than U.S. domestic investors.²¹

Competition Policy

The United States wants to encourage discussion, in the areas of competition policy, anti-competitive business conduct, designated monopolies, state enterprises, and other competition-related issues as appropriate. It also wants to prevent the application of South Korean competition laws and regulations in a discriminatory manner and apply anti-trust laws effectively against South Korean firms. U.S. businesses have complained that the *chaebols*, the family-owned business conglomerates that dominate the South Korean economy, have made it difficult for foreign companies to compete in the Korean market.²² U.S. and other foreign businesses also have complained that the opacity of the *chaebols*= ownership structure makes it difficult, if not impossible, for foreigners to acquire majority stakes in major South Korean companies. Additionally, the relationship between major *chaebol* and the South Korean government occasionally has led to trade disputes between the two governments. In 2003, for instance, the United States and the European Union assessed punitive countervailing duties tariffs against Hynix Semiconductor, then the world's third-largest producer of dynamic random access memory (DRAM) semiconductor chips, for allegedly receiving subsidies from the South Korean government. South Korea challenged the rulings in the WTO, which eventually upheld the U.S. duties. Hynix formerly was part of the Hyundai *chaebol*.

Other U.S. Objectives

In addition to the above, the USTR has indicated that the following will be among U.S. goals in the negotiations:²³

- ensure that South Korea does not discriminate in e-commerce trade.

- get South Korea to reaffirm its commitments under the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.
- press South Korea to expand its commitments under the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement to cover more government agencies and at lower contract-value thresholds.
- provide safeguards measures in the form of temporary revocation of tariff preferences during a transition period to protect against import surges.
- encourage South Korea to pursue policies that limit currency intervention and allow the won/dollar exchange rate to be set by the market.²⁴
- promote trade and environment policies that are mutually supportive and ensure South Korean commitment to enforcing labor rights.

South Korean Interests and FTA Negotiating Objectives

Why an FTA?

Entering an FTA with the United States meshes with a number of South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun's long term economic and strategic goals. Roh apparently has made the signing of an FTA, along with reducing income inequality, the top economic priority for the remainder of his tenure, which expires in February 2008.²⁵ Soon after his election in 2002, Roh committed himself to raising South Korea's per capita gross domestic product (GDP) to \$20,000 by the end of the decade and to transforming South Korea into a major economic hub in Northeast Asia by expanding the economic reforms begun by his predecessor following the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Ongoing competitive pressure from Japanese firms, increased competition from Chinese enterprises, and the rapid ageing of the South Korean workforce have heightened the sense of urgency about boosting national competitiveness. Continuing along this line of argument, Han Duk-soo, South Korea's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, has said that a failure to adopt significant economic changes will mean that Korea's long term growth potential is likely to deteriorate.²⁶

During a televised debate over the proposed FTA in March 2006, Han linked the KORUS FTA to this broader economic reform

agenda, arguing that a trade agreement with the United States is essential for South Korea's survival.²⁷ To accelerate Korea's reform efforts and also to avoid being left out from other FTAs being created globally and in Asia President Roh has pursued an aggressive effort to negotiate FTAs, the first of which South Korea signed with Chile in 2004. Convincing the United States to launch an FTA became a part of this larger effort.²⁸

South Korea's FTA Drive

Completed FTAs:

- Chile (entered into force April 2004)
- Singapore (entered into force March 2006)
- EFTA (signed December 2005)
- ASEAN (final agreement on goods reached May 2006; excludes Thailand due in part to South Korea's exemption of rice from the agreement)

FTAs being negotiated:

- United States (launched February 2006)
- Mexico (launched September 2005)
- Canada (launched July 2005)
- Japan (launched December 2003; negotiations currently stalled)

FTAs under consideration:

- India (joint study concluded January 2006)

South Korean officials and other South Korean proponents of the KORUS FTA have tended not to focus on the increased access to the U.S. market that South Korean firms presumably would receive, despite the predictions that South Korean manufacturing exports would increase significantly. Rather, they emphasize the medium and long-term gains that would stem from increased allocative efficiency of the South Korean economy, particularly in the services industries. This would presumably be brought about by an influx of U.S. investment and technology into South Korea and by the spur of increased competition with U.S. firms.²⁹ The President and other senior officials in particular have emphasized the need to boost the competitiveness of South Korean service industries. An FTA with the United States, they argue, will help

address South Korea's increased economic polarization by spurring job creation in fields such as medical, legal, education, and accounting services in a free trade agreement.³⁰ Some, however, say an FTA will worsen South Korea's income gap.³¹

Strategically, some in South Korea and the United States also see the FTA as a means for boosting the U.S.-South Korean alliance. In announcing the start of the FTA, for instance, Trade Minister Kim stated that the FTA launch was "the most important event" in the history of the alliance, one that would take the U.S.-South Korean relationship "to the next tier, the next level."³² Some in Korea and the United States feel a need to boost the relationship because of bilateral strains over major alliance issues, primarily brought about by different views about how to handle North Korea and China. Since the late 1990s, even as Americans have come to feel that the danger from North Korea has increased, South Koreans' perception of a threat from North Korea has declined markedly. This has led some to question the purpose of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, which is predicated upon deterring an attack by North Korea. Additionally, South Korea's policy of emphasizing bilateral reconciliation with North Korea generally has meant that South Korea has not supported U.S. efforts to pressure North Korea. Another major difference between Seoul and Washington is that many South Korean officials, including President Roh, oppose the deployment of U.S. forces based in South Korea to other areas in Asia without South Korean consent; South Korean leaders generally do not wish to antagonize China over the Taiwan issue. In the face of these growing questions about the utility of the alliance to Seoul, many argue that an FTA will provide a counterweight to help balance areas of difference and help provide a "new basis" for the alliance with something to "stand for" rather than "stand against."³³

There is an expectation among some Koreans that a U.S.-South Korea FTA will have even broader strategic effects. Some analysts in Seoul believe that an FTA will improve South Korea's standing in Northeast Asia by boosting its status as a middle power. President Roh has spoken vaguely of South Korea's asserting a future role as a "balancer" among the major powers in the region. An FTA conceivably might help South Korea play this role, not

only by boosting South Korea's economic performance, but also by ensuring that the United States remains a strategic and economic counterbalance to China and Japan.³⁴ Some South Koreans have turned this argument on its head, positing that China might consider a U.S.-South Korean FTA a threat to its interests.³⁵ Additionally, some South Korean proponents of an FTA believe that successfully negotiating an agreement could lessen disagreements between Washington and Seoul over North Korea policy, by compelling politicians and officials in each nation toward a deeper understanding of the broad forces at play in the other.³⁶ Given the importance of North Korea in the foreign policies of both countries, however, it is unlikely that an FTA will have much impact.

Criticism of the FTA within South Korea

The launching of FTA negotiations with the United States has generated much debate in South Korea. Numerous news articles have analyzed the benefits and costs of an agreement, and a number of televised debates about the FTA have been held. Criticism of the decision to launch an FTA with the United States intensified in the early spring of 2006, fanned in part by public opposition by some former senior members of Roh's ruling camp. Opposition to the FTA occasionally has been intense. In February, farmers' groups blocked the South Korean government's initial public hearing in Seoul regarding the FTA. At least one major umbrella group, the Pan-national Movement Headquarters to Frustrate the South Korea-U.S. FTA, comprising over a dozen organizations, has been formed to rally opposition to the agreement. In mid-April 2006, one Korean information technology union announced it had mobilized thousands of its members to try to shut down the White House's website by flooding it with e-mails.³⁷

One reason for the intensity of the opposition to a proposed FTA with the United States is that the negotiations have merged a number of forces in the Korean polity, including anti-American forces on the far left of Korea's political spectrum and traditional trade liberalization opponents, such as farmers and trade unions. The latter groups also have opposed other trade deals. South Korean farmers engaged in occasionally violent protests during the December 2005 multilateral Doha Development Agenda (DDA) ministerial meetings in Hong Kong, and one Korean farmer

committed suicide outside the meetings in the 2003 Cancun DDA Ministerial Meeting. After the Roh government signed Korea=s first FTA with Chile in 2003, it took South Korea=s National Assembly nearly a year to ratify the agreement because of the strength of the opposition, particularly from farm groups and rural legislators.³⁸ Some Koreans argue that an FTA with the United States will primarily benefit Korean *chaebol* (conglomerates), thereby widening economic disparities inside South Korea.³⁹

Barring a dramatic reversal in Roh=s political fortune, the South Korean President is likely to be in a fairly weak political position to try to sell an FTA to the National Assembly if South Korea and the United States successfully reach an agreement in late 2006 or early 2007. In 2007, the full force of the *Alame duck* phenomenon is expected to hit Roh; South Korea will hold its presidential election in December of that year and by law Roh cannot run for a second term. Roh generally is regarded as an unpopular president, and his Uri party lost control of the National Assembly in 2005, when it was routed in successive bi-elections by the main opposition group, the conservative Grand National Party (GNP). Complicating the political difficulties for President Roh is that, as a left-of-center politician, his natural base consists of many of the groups that oppose the KORUS FTA. Indeed, many of these groups have turned lukewarm toward Roh since his election in 2002, as a result of his support for continued market-opening measures and his periodic efforts to cooperate with the United States, particularly his dispatch of over 3,000 Korean troops to Iraq after the U.S. invasion.

South Korean Issues and Negotiating Objectives

With some important exceptions, in the FTA talks, South Korea is likely to be the *demandeur* on fewer issues compared to the United States. Not only is South Korea far more economically dependent on the United States, but the United States also has lower and fewer tariff and non-tariff barriers than Korea. Also, as discussed above, top South Korean officials believe the FTA=s primary economic benefits will derive not from the short-term reductions in U.S. trade barriers, but rather from the medium-to-long term effects of improving the dynamism and efficiency of the South Korean economy. Thus, as in the overall bilateral economic relationship, South Korea=s basic stance in the FTA talks by

definition is likely to be defensive and reactive in nature. In general, South Korea is expected to adopt a traditional *Acustomized* negotiating strategy of seeking higher protections and longer phase-in periods for particularly sensitive products and sectors such as medical services. Korean officials reportedly will push for a general safeguard system to guard against a surge in imports, including the most sensitive sector, agriculture.⁴⁰

Agriculture

A net importer of food, South Korea is among the United States=s largest export markets for agricultural products.⁴¹ South Korea=s farmers, while shrinking in terms of population and contribution to GDP, remain a politically powerful force in South Korea. This political power is reflected in the protection South Korea=s farm sector has been able to gain from Seoul; South Korean agricultural tariffs are particularly high compared to the United States and most OECD members. According to United States Trade Representative (USTR), South Korea=s average applied agricultural tariff is 52%, more than four times the U.S. average.⁴² South Korean exports of agricultural products to the United States in 2005 were just over \$200 million, representing approximately 0.5% of total South Korean bilateral exports.⁴³

When asked about opening Korea=s farm market at the February 2, 2006, launch of the FTA, Trade Minister Kim said that while South Korea is ready to make *Atough decisions,* he added that *I don=t know a single free trade agreement whereby there are no exceptions, or a staged implementation period. . . .*⁴⁴ South Korea=s chief negotiator in the KORUS FTA has said that Seoul will try to obtain a phase-in period of more than ten years for certain sensitive products, particularly rice.⁴⁵ An outline of the South Korean government=s goals presented to the National Assembly in May 2006 by the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) mentions excluding some highly sensitive agricultural goods. For other items, the draft envisioned long-term tariff reductions, tariff rate quotas, and special safeguards.⁴⁶ In May 2006, South Korea and the ASEAN announced an FTA that excluded a number of agricultural items, including rice. Thailand, a major rice exporter, did not join in the agreement.

Seoul plans to spend over \$100 million in adjustment assistance to South Korean farmers and rural areas over the coming decade. The package was first unveiled during the debate over the South Korea-Chile FTA.

The Kaesong Industrial Complex

A potentially contentious issue in the FTA talks is the status of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC). Located near the North Korean city of Kaesong (also spelled *Gaesong*), 40 miles north of Seoul, the KIC is designed for South Korean companies to employ North Korean workers. A pilot site at Kaesong, housing the factories of over ten South Korean firms, opened in 2004, and as of early spring 2006 employed over 6,000 North Korean workers. In 2005, firms in the complex produced nearly \$15 million in manufactured goods, mostly light industrial products such as textiles and electronic goods.⁴⁷ There are plans to expand the zone dramatically to 300 tenant South Korean companies employing about 70,000 North Koreans by the end of 2007, though South Korean officials say the pace and scope of the expansion is contingent upon the status of negotiations over North Korea's nuclear programs.⁴⁸ Further expansion is contemplated between 2007 and 2012. The United States officially supports the KIC. In 2004 and 2005, the United States approved several export controls clearances that were required by U.S. law for South Korean firms to bring items such as computer and telecommunications equipment to Kaesong.⁴⁹

Since the KIC opened, it has been South Korean policy to request that its FTA partners allow exports from Kaesong to be considered as *Made in Korea* (meaning South Korea), thereby enabling these products to receive the preferential status conferred by the FTA. The Korea-Singapore, Korea-EFTA, and Korea-ASEAN FTAs contain such a provision.⁵⁰ In May, the South Korean government reported to the National Assembly that it would seek treatment comparable to that provided in the South Korea's FTA with EFTA.⁵¹ That agreement lists a specific set of products that will receive FTA treatment if the KIC's contribution to the final product is no more than 40%, if final production takes place in South Korea, and if the final product is exported from South Korea. When questioned about this policy during the February 2, 2006

launch of the FTA, USTR Portman stated that the FTA would cover only products made in South Korea. At an economic press roundtable in Seoul on February 8, 2006, an unnamed official with the U.S. embassy said A . . . the provisions of the FTA in our view will apply to goods originating within the territories of the two parties . . . what qualifies as an originating good is something that will be settled in the chapter [of the FTA] called Rules of Origin.⁵² Senator Max Baucus, ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee, stated that including Kaesong-origin products in an FTA could sink the negotiations.⁵³

Two important issues for the United States in considering South Korea's demand are the conditions for North Korean workers and the income the KIC provides for the North Korean government. Some U.S. labor and human rights advocates have argued that North Korean workers in Kaesong are being exploited. South Korean officials, as well as other analysts, counter by saying that conditions including wage conditions at Kaesong are far better than those in the rest of North Korea.

The North Korean government derives hard currency from several sources in the KIC project, including leasing fees and surcharges levied on North Korean workers' wages, which are paid to an arm of the North Korean government agency before being passed on to employees (in the form of North Korean *won*).⁵⁴ To date, according to information provided by the South Korean government, these streams likely total less than \$20 million in hard currency. However, if the South Korean government realizes its most ambitious goals for the Kaesong project, by the middle of the next decade the North Korean government will likely derive hundreds of millions of dollars annually from tax revenues and its slice of North Korean workers' wages, assuming the KIC's current tax and wage structures remain in place.⁵⁵ Some South Koreans caution that the uncertainties over the future course of the KIC project make such projections highly speculative.

The KIC arguably has become the centerpiece for South Korea's *sunshine* policy of engaging North Korea. The South Korean government envisions the complex, which has broad support inside South Korea, as a way to ensure stability on the Korean Peninsula and ease the presumed costs of an eventual North-South reunification by introducing global economic standards to North

Korea and linking North Korea to the global economy. The complex is also designed to encourage legitimate North Korean economic activity. Additionally, the worsened economic situation for many South Korean small and medium sized enterprises has led many in South Korea to see cheaper North Korean labor as a way to compete against lower-cost Chinese firms.

Many South Korean officials appear to view the U.S. position on including Kaesong in the KORUS FTA as a litmus test for the U.S. approach toward Seoul's entire sunshine policy. To some in the United States, however, the South Korean push to include Kaesong in the FTA may appear to be an attempt to move U.S. policy from not opposing the KIC to promoting it.

The U.S. Visa Waiver Program

Although South Korea's status in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP) is not formally part of the FTA negotiations, it is a priority the South Korean government is pursuing with the United States.⁵⁶ Any changes made by the United States in this area are likely to play a political role in selling the agreement in Seoul. For years, South Korean officials, Korean businesses, the American Chamber of Commerce in South Korea, Korean-Americans, and others have questioned why South Korea is not a participant in the VWP, under which foreigners traveling from certain countries are permitted to travel to the United States for up to 90 days without obtaining a visa. Since the United States put in place new visa procedures after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, almost all South Koreans who want to visit the United States must interview for a visa at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul. Reportedly, the U.S. consular section in Seoul has become among the busiest and largest U.S. nonimmigrant visa processing posts in the world, processing an average of almost 2,000 visas per day. During his November 2005 summit with President Roh in South Korea, President Bush announced that the United States would work with Seoul to develop a Roadmap to assist South Korea in meeting the requirements for membership in the Visa Waiver Program.⁵⁷ H.R. 4304, introduced in November 2005 by Representative James Moran, would designate South Korea as a program country under the VWP.

Among the statutory requirements for countries to participate in the VWP is that the country must have a nonimmigrant visa refusal

rate of below 3%.⁵⁸ According to State Department officials, South Korea's visa refusal rates have consistently been over this threshold. The FY2004 rate was 3.6% and according to one report, in early 2005 the rate again was below 4%.⁵⁹ Meeting the refusal rate is not the only requirement. A country's participation in the VWP must also be deemed to be in the economic, law enforcement, and security interests of the United States. Since the late 1990s, no country has been added to the VWP, an indication of the difficulty in meeting the participation requirements. For South Korea to become a participant would likely require significant attention from the White House.

U.S. Antidumping Practices

For over a decade, South Korea has chafed at the U.S. use of antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) laws that raise tariffs on South Korean exports. According to one study, in July 2000 the five CVD and 18 AD orders against South Korean exports covered approximately \$2.5 billion, or over 7%, of the U.S. imports from South Korea in 1999. Moreover, these tariff hikes have tended to be concentrated in a handful of South Korean industries – semiconductors, steel, televisions, and telecommunications equipment – that have considerable political influence in Seoul. MOFAT's May 2006 draft FTA contains provisions that would constrain U.S. use of AD measures.⁶⁰ South Korea is specifically concerned about the U.S. practice of zeroing in determining antidumping margins and cumulation in determining material injury in antidumping and countervailing duty determinations. It is also concerned about U.S. sunset reviews of countervailing duty and antidumping cases, which South Korea alleges results in antidumping and countervailing duty orders being extended unnecessarily. In the multilateral Doha Development Agenda talks, South Korea is one of several countries demanding revisions to global antidumping rules, changes the United States opposes.⁶¹

Other Issues for South Korea

Kim Jong-hoon, the lead South Korean negotiator in the KORUS FTA, reportedly has said that his delegation will take the offensive in areas such as autos and textiles/clothing items to promote South Korean exports to the United States.⁶² South Korea

also may ask the United States to eliminate its 25% tariff on light trucks. In services trade, South Korea plans to encourage the United States to open its domestic market to services delivered by so-called mode-4 delivery, that is by the temporary movement of South Korean service providers to the United States, and to maritime services.⁶³ South Korea has promoted these issues in the Doha Development Agenda round of WTO negotiations currently underway. However, they are issues that would likely meet with strong U.S. resistance.⁶⁴ Another set of issues South Korea plans to present deal with U.S. customs procedures, which many South Korean exporters believe are inefficient.⁶⁵

The Potential Economic Effects of a U.S.-South Korean FTA

A KORUS FTA would likely have important direct and indirect effects on the bilateral economic relationship as well as on U.S. economic relations throughout East Asia. South Korean tariffs are much higher than U.S. tariffs, so U.S. exporters, especially of agricultural goods, could realize gains in trade. South Korea's average applied tariff is 11.2%, and the average U.S. applied tariff is 3.7%. South Korea's average applied tariff on agricultural goods is 52%, while the U.S. average applied tariff is 12%.⁶⁶

At this point a more general assessment of the impact can only be circumscribed since the contours of an agreement, especially in such sensitive areas as agriculture and autos, would take shape only after negotiators have reached agreement. Nevertheless, informed, albeit speculative, analyses provide some insights that could be helpful to the Congress as it oversees the negotiations.

Economists usually base their analysis of the impact of FTAs on the concepts of *trade creation* and *trade diversion*. These concepts were first developed by economist Jacob Viner in 1950.⁶⁷ Viner focused his work on the economic effects of customs unions, but his conclusions have been largely applied to FTAs and other preferential trade arrangements. His analysis was also confined to static (one-time) effects of these arrangements.

Trade creation occurs when a member of an FTA replaces domestic production of a good with imports of the good from another member of the FTA, because the formation of the FTA has made it cheaper to import rather than produce domestically. The creation of the trade is said to improve economic welfare within the

group because resources are being shifted to more efficient uses. Trade diversion occurs when a member of an FTA switches its import of a good from an efficient nonmember to a less efficient FTA member because the removal of tariffs within the group and the continuation of tariffs on imports from nonmembers, make it cheaper to do so. Trade diversion is said to reduce economic welfare because resources are being diverted from an efficient producer to a less efficient producer.

In most cases, it appears that FTAs lead to both trade diversion and creation with the net effects determined by the structure of the FTA. Therefore, even if two or more countries are moving toward freer trade among themselves in an FTA, the FTA could make those countries and the world as a whole worse off if the FTA diverts more trade than it creates, according to economic theory.⁶⁸

U.S.-based analysts have conducted some comprehensive estimates of the direct economic impact of an FTA on the U.S. and South Korean economies. The United States International Trade Commission (USITC) conducted a study published in 2001 that the Senate Finance Committee requested.⁶⁹ The non-partisan Institute for International Economics (IIE) produced a study in 2001 that it updated in 2004.⁷⁰ Both studies concentrated on the static economic effects, that is, the direct economic effects resulting from the elimination of tariffs and quotas on all bilateral trade, including agricultural trade. These analyses do not take into account the dynamic effects of trade liberalization, that is, the indirect longer-term economic effects on other parts of the economy. They also do not take into account the economic effects which result from changes in non-tariff and non-quota barriers, such as sanitary and phyto-sanitary regulations, intellectual property rights protection, trade-related foreign investment regulations, a services-related barriers, all of which are difficult to quantify. Therefore, the eventual impact of an FTA would likely be greater than the static estimates that the two studies present.

The two studies draw very similar conclusions. A U.S.-South Korean FTA's economic impact on South Korea would be relatively much greater than the impact on the U.S. economy. This is a logical conclusion, since the South Korean economy is much smaller, is more protected, and is much more dependent on foreign trade than is the U.S. economy. The IIE study predicts that the FTA

would increase South Korean GDP between 0.38% and 2.41%, and the USITC study estimates the growth at about 0.7%. The two studies predict very small effects on the U.S. GDP: the IIE study estimates an increase of 0.02% to 0.13% while the USITC study estimates the growth at 0.2%.

Regarding the impact on bilateral trade flows, the IIE and USITC studies draw similar conclusions. According to both studies, U.S. exports to South Korea would rise more than U.S. imports from South Korea. U.S. exports to South Korea would rise by 54% and U.S. imports from South Korea would rise by 21%, according to the USITC. The IIE estimates that U.S. exports to South Korea would increase 46% to 49%, while imports from Korea would increase 26% to 30%. As might be expected, the largest trade-flow impact of an FTA would occur in the most sensitive, and therefore the most-protected, sectors. These are the areas that are expected to present the greatest negotiating challenges. Thus, the largest gains for U.S. exports would be in agricultural exports. USITC has estimated that U.S. exports to South Korea of beef and cheese could increase as much as 60% and exports of beer by as much as 100%. The largest gains in South Korean exports to the United States would be in manufactured goods, especially in textiles and apparel, leather goods, chemicals and allied products, electronic products, and cars, according to the USITC. The USITC also concludes that at least some of the increase in U.S.-South Korean bilateral trade would be as the result of the diversion of trade from other U.S. and South Korean trade partners. For example, increased U.S. exports to South Korea would be at the expense of German and Japanese exports to South Korea. Increased South Korean exports to the United States would be partially at the expense of exports from Taiwan, Japan, and Mexico to the United States.

In December 2005, the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) published a study measuring the potential economic impact of an FTA on South Korea alone. The study estimated some of the dynamic economic effects in addition to the static effects of the FTA on South Korea. The KIEP study estimated that the FTA would eventually lead to a 0.42% to 0.59% increase in South Korea's GDP according to a static analysis, and 1.99% to 2.27% according to a dynamic analysis.⁷¹

Not captured by these studies would be the non-trade economic effects as a comprehensive FTA would be expected to promote a more efficient allocation of economic resources, especially in South Korea, the smaller and more regulated of the two economies. South Korea would likely realize welfare gains in the long term by reducing protection for agriculture and opening up its services sectors to foreign competition. On the other hand, the South Korean government would probably have to provide some type of transitional income programs to help those adversely affected by the increased competition and to obtain political support for the FTA.

Prospects and Potential Implications

The first round of U.S.-South Korea negotiations began the week of June 5, 2006, in Washington. That week of talks reportedly went well with few surprises and the two sides exchanging their respective versions of draft agreement texts. Presumably, the negotiations could become more challenging as the two sides face the more difficult issues. The second round, held the week of July 10 in Seoul, was considerably more difficult, with the United States suspending work in the pharmaceuticals, trade remedies, and services working groups to protest a South Korean decision – over U.S. opposition -- to go ahead with a proposed change in its pharmaceutical reimbursement program. Additional rounds are scheduled to occur approximately every six to eight weeks. The negotiators are striving to complete the negotiation by the end of 2006. The stakes are high for both countries, perhaps more for South Korea given its high dependency on the United States in trade. To consider the prospects for the negotiations, one might examine those factors that promote success and those that could prove problematic.

Factors Promoting Success

Among the factors promoting success is the political commitment of the U.S. and South Korean leaders as demonstrated by their decision to undertake the negotiations in the first place. The February 2, 2006 announcement to negotiate occurred after many years of discussions and studies on the feasibility of such an endeavor and presumably a clear understanding of its potential pitfalls. The joint political commitment implies a sense of mutual

trust that could carry negotiators through the rough periods of negotiations.

Another factor dictating success is that the KORUS FTA negotiations will take place on the foundation of an already strong bilateral economic relationship. Each country is an important trade and investment partner of the other and views an FTA as preserving, if not strengthening, the relationship. Furthermore, a KORUS FTA conforms to each country's current trade policy of pursuing regional and bilateral agreements with critical partners.

The emergence of China as an economic power in East Asia provides another incentive for success. The rise of China is an ambiguous phenomenon for both South Korea and the United States. Each sees China as both an increasingly important economic partner and a challenger. Each country sees the KORUS FTA as a hedge against the threat of China as a challenger. The FTA could be seen as of symbolic importance. When all factors are taken into account, the impression is that these negotiations are too important to fail.

Factors that Could Inhibit the Negotiations

If the factors that are pulling the United States and South Korea toward reaching an FTA are substantial, so are those that could inhibit the negotiations. One factor is the tight deadline under which the FTA must be negotiated. The United States faces the expiration of trade promotion authority on July 1, 2007, and South Korea faces the conclusion of President Roh's term in 2007. Moreover, because 2007 is a presidential election year in South Korea, a completed FTA could come up for ratification in the South Korean National Assembly at the height of the political season, giving the deal's opponents maximum publicity and, possibly, leverage.

The complexity of the issues to be negotiated, especially those that go to policies and practices behind national borders (not just at borders) present another challenge. For example, competition policy will likely be on the agenda as the United States will want South Korea to go further in reducing the influence of the *chaebols* and make government regulatory procedures more transparent. In addition, the United States will raise its concern about *domestic* taxation of autos in South Korea.

Some issues will be politically sensitive. South Korean rice farmers are demanding that they be protected from trade liberalization and South Korean negotiators have already indicated they will seek special treatment for rice under the FTA. South Korea has also indicated that it will seek the inclusion of products from the Kaesong industrial zone inside North Korea under the FTA, an objective that has met with strong resistance from U.S. labor and other sources. South Korea has indicated that antidumping and countervailing duty rules should be part of the negotiations, an idea that would likely meet with strong resistance from the U.S. Congress.

Furthermore, the imbalance in U.S.-South Korean economic relationship will probably be reflected in the manner the countries conduct the negotiations and could create some tension. The U.S. economy is much larger, less dependent, and more open than the South Korean economy; therefore, U.S. negotiators will be the primary *demandeur* in the negotiations, placing South Korean negotiators on the defensive. This could make it more difficult for South Korean President Roh's administration to sell a deal to the South Korean National Assembly even though reductions in trade barriers would benefit the domestic economy as a whole.

Additionally, developments with North Korea are likely to affect the fate of the KORUS FTA because events on the Peninsula will influence Americans' and South Koreans' views of the value of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Much is likely to hinge on the status of the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear program, which appear to have stagnated. If the talks produce a breakthrough or appear to be developing some forward momentum, then U.S. and South Korean differences over North Korea policy are less likely to spill into the trade realm. However, if the talks collapse completely or appear to stagnate, more Americans and Koreans may begin to question the benefit of the alliance, particularly if it leads the Bush Administration to increase economic and other pressures on North Korea. In such a scenario, more U.S. policymakers are likely to view South Korea's Apeace and prosperity policy of emphasizing bilateral reconciliation with North Korea as undermining U.S. policy. Likewise, more South Koreans would be likely to view the United States as blocking their paramount foreign policy goal of pursuing North-South reconciliation. Such an atmosphere could

make it difficult for leaders in both capitals to make the concessions necessary to produce a final free trade agreement.

Potential Implications

The outcome of the negotiations could have broad implications for the U.S.-South Korean bilateral relationship. If the two sides successfully resolve the fundamental issues that have caused friction, the bilateral relationship could be stronger in the long term.

If they fail, the relationship could be damaged for some time. Also, the KORUS FTA would be the second largest FTA in which the United States is a participant and the largest in which South Korea is a participant, representing a major step for both countries in their pursuit of their respective trade strategies.

The U.S. and South Korean FTA negotiations could have repercussions beyond the bilateral relationship. For example, some of the issues that the two sides will address, such as agriculture and competition policy, are similar to issues confronting the U.S.-Japan economic relationship. If U.S. and South Korean negotiators can successfully address these issues, the outcome could serve as a model for the U.S.-Japan relationship. Indeed, the KORUS FTA negotiations have already stimulated discussion of a U.S.-Japan FTA.

Appendix A.

Top 10 U.S. Exports to and Imports from South Korea, 2005
 (Billions of U.S. Dollars)

U.S. Exports		U.S. Imports	
Total	27.7	Total	43.8
Electrical Machinery	6.9	Electrical Machinery	13.6
Non-electrical Machinery	4.6	Vehicles	10.2
Optical Equipment	2.2	Non-electrical Machinery	6.7
Organic Chemicals	2.0	Mineral Fuels	1.8
Aircraft	1.9	Iron and steel products	1.1
Plastic	0.9	Plastic	1.0

Vehicles	0.7	Rubber	0.9
Mineral Fuels	0.6	Iron and steel	0.9
Cereals	0.4	Knit Apparel	0.7
Misc. Chemical Products	0.4	Special category	0.7

Source: Two-digit HS categories. U.S. Department of Commerce data compiled by Global Trade Information Systems, Inc.

Endnotes

¹The authors work as analysts with the Congressional Research Service (CRS). The views presented in this article represent their own, and not those of the CRS.

²United States Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Portman reportedly told his South Korean counterparts that an FTA could not be launched unless Seoul demonstrated its ability to deliver compromises in major outstanding bilateral issues, and throughout 2005 U.S. officials had included these sectors on the list of major trade disputes. South Korean government officials say that whatever changes were made in beef, automotive, and pharmaceuticals were unrelated to the negotiations over launching an FTA. Inside US Trade, APortman Says U.S. Not Ready to Launch FTA Talks with Korea, @ June 10, 2005; Edward Alden, et. al., ASouth Korean Film Concession Paves Way for Free Trade Talks with the US, @ *Financial Times*, January 27, 2006; conversations with U.S. officials in June 2005, September 2005, and December 2005.

³For more on the U.S.-South Korean alliance, see CRS Issue Brief IB98045, *Korea: U.S.-Korean Relations C Issues for Congress*, by Larry A. Niksch.

⁴OECD, *Economic Survey - Korea 2004*.

⁵CRS Issue Brief IB98045, *Korea: U.S.-Korea Relations C Issues for Congress*, by Larry Nikisch.

⁶Remarks given at AEI Conference, *The Future of U.S. Trade Policy*. April 3, 2006.

⁷EFTA is comprised of Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein. ASEAN consists of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Thailand has

not signed on to the ASEAN-Korean FTA, in large measure because of South Korea's unwillingness to liberalize its rice market as much and as quickly as Thailand would like.

⁸Primosch, William. *Testimony of Senior Director, International Business Policy, National Association of Manufacturers on the Proposed United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement for the Trade Policy Staff Committee, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative*. March 14, 2006.

⁹Lee, Thea M. *Testimony on the Proposed U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement*. Submitted by the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations. March 14, 2006.

¹⁰USA Rice Federation. *Submission to the Trade Policy Subcommittee in Response to the Federal Register Notice of February 9, 2006 C U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement*. March 14, 2006.

¹¹Office of the United States Trade Representative. Notification to Congress of intent to begin free trade agreement negotiations with the Republic of Korea. *Congressional Record*. February 2, 2006. pp. S503-S505.

¹²R-CALF USA. United Stockgrowers of America. Press Release. Korea FTA Could Provide Substantial Benefits to U.S. Cattle Producers. March 16, 2006.

¹³Office of the United States Trade Representative. *National Trade Estimates C Foreign Trade Barriers Report, 2006*. April 2006. pp. 413-414.

¹⁴Quoted in *International Trade Reporter*. May 18, 2006. p. 760.

¹⁵Primosch, William. *Testimony of Senior Director, International Business Policy, National Association of Manufacturers on the Proposed United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement for the Trade Policy Staff Committee, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative*. March 14, 2006.

¹⁶USTR, Industry Push Korea on New Reimbursement Program. *Inside U.S. Trade*. May 26, 2006.

¹⁷Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. *Transcript of Assistant USTR Wendy Cutler Press Roundtable on KORUS FTA*. July 14, 2006.

¹⁸Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.

¹⁹Primosch, William, Testimony.

²⁰Office of the USTR. *Special 301 Report*. April 2006.

²¹Office of the United States Trade Representative. Notification to Congress of intent to begin free trade agreement negotiations with the Republic of Korea. *Congressional Record*. February 2, 2006. pp. S503-S505.

²²*Inside U.S. Trade*. April 21, 2006.

²³Ibid unless otherwise indicated.

²⁴Primosch, William. op. cit.

²⁵AROK Editorial: Roh=s >Special Lecture=,@ *The Korea Times*, posted on the Open Source Center, KPP20060329042002, March 29, 2006.

²⁶Ministry of Finance and Economy Weekly Briefing, AKorea-US FTA Projected to Boost the Korean Economy,@ March 9, 2006.

²⁷Korea Broadcast System, March 31, 2006 Broadcast in Korean, summarized by the Open Source Center, AROK TV Carries Economic Minister=s Comments on ROK-US FTA,@ April 10, 2006, FEA20060410021900.

²⁸During an on-line chat with South Koreans, President Roh reportedly said that the initiative to launch the FTA had come from South Korea. The President was responding to criticism that the United States had pressured South Korea to begin negotiations. AROK Daily: Roh Discusses Administration=s Policies in Online Chat,@ *JoongAng Ilbo*, posted on the Open Source Center, KPP20060324971166, March 23, 2006.

²⁹See, for instance, Junkyu Lee and Hongshik Lee, *Feasibility and Economic Effects of a Korea-U.S. FTA* (Seoul: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, 2005), pp. 116-117; Inbom Choi and Jeffrey Schott, *Free Trade between Korea and the United States?* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2001), pp. 79-82.

³⁰ARoh=s >Special Lecture=,@ *The Korea Times*, March 26, 2006.

³¹Korea Broadcast System, March 31, 2006 Broadcast.

³²USTR Press Release, ARemarks by U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman and Republic of Korea Trade Minister Hyun-chong Kim, Launch of U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement,@ US Capitol, February 2, 2006.

³³For more on U.S.-Korean strategic relations, see CRS Issue Brief IB98045, *Korea: U.S.-Korean Relations*, and CRS Issue Brief IB91141,

North Korea=s Nuclear Weapons Program, both by Larry Niksch.

³⁴ROK President Roh Moo-hyun=s speech at the 53rd Air Force Academy Graduation and Commissioning Ceremony, March 8, 2005, translated by FBIS, KPP20050308000923.

³⁵AFormer Presidential Aide Slams FTA Talks With U.S.,@ *Yonhap*, April 4, 2006.

³⁶*Feasibility and Economic Effects of a Korea-U.S. FTA*, p.139.

³⁷AROK Civic Groups Launch Joint Anti-ROK-US FTA,@ *Hankyoreh* (Internet version, in Korean), March 29, 2006, from OpenSource.gov, KPP20060329051001; AUnionists Attack White House Web Site,@ *The Korea Times* (in English) April 6, 2006, from OpenSource.gov, KPP20060412971421.

³⁸AAssembly Passes Chile FTA at Last,@ *The Korea Herald*, February 17, 2004.

³⁹AKorea-U.S. FTA Remains Contentious,@ *The Korea Herald*, April 25, 2006.

⁴⁰AFTA Chief Lays Out Goals for Korea-U.S. Agreement,@ *JoongAng Ilbo*, April 27, 2006.

⁴¹In 2005, U.S. agricultural exports to South Korea surpassed \$2 billion, making South Korea the United States= sixth largest market for agricultural goods despite Korea=s ban on imports of U.S. beef. U.S. beef exports totaled nearly \$800 million in 2003 before the beef ban went into place late that year. USTR, AFTA: United States and Republic of Korea. Opportunities for Agriculture,@ *Trade Facts*, February 2006; USTR, AFTA: United States & Republic of Korea. Economic and Strategic Benefits,@ February 2, 2006.

⁴²USTR, *FTA: United States & Republic of Korea Economic & Strategic Benefits*, February 2, 2006.

⁴³South Korean trade data compiled by Global Trade Information Service, Inc.

⁴⁴USTR, ARemarks by U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman and Republic of Korea Trade Minister Hyun-chong Kim, Launch of U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement,@ February 2, 2006.

⁴⁵AFTA Chief Lays Out Goals for Korea-U.S. Agreement,@ *JoongAng Ilbo*, April 27, 2006.

⁴⁶South Korean government report to the National Assembly, ANegotiating Objectives of Korea-U.S. FTA,@ translation provided by the U.S. Embassy; BNA International Trade Reporter, ASouth Korea=s MOFAT Outlines Goals of Draft Free Trade Agreement with U.S.,@ May 18, 2006.

⁴⁷Ministry of Unification, AThe Statistics on the Gaesong Industrial Complex (as of Jan. 31, 2006).@

⁴⁸April 2006 conversations with South Korean officials.

⁴⁹U.S. Embassy in Korea, AQuestions and Answers from Economic Press Roundtable with Embassy Official,@ February 8, 2006; January and February 2006 conversations with officials familiar with the Kaesong export control discussions.

⁵⁰For instance, the South Korea-ASEAN FTA reportedly includes a list of 100 items that will be recognized as AMade in Korea,@ as long as more than 60 percent of the materials from which they are made are of South Korean origin or if the added value of South Korean materials put in the product is more than 40 percent. *Dong-A Ilbo*, AOne Hundred Gaesong Product Items Recognized as >Made in Korea=,@ May 17, 2006.

⁵¹South Korean government report to the National Assembly, ANegotiating Objectives of Korea-U.S. FTA,@ translation provided by the U.S. Embassy, Seoul.

⁵²Relevant to the Kaesong debate is a provision of the U.S.-Singapore FTA called the Integrated Sourcing Initiative (ISI). The ISI allows certain information technology and medical components manufactured on the Indonesian islands of Batam or Bintan and exported to the United States (either in products assembled in Singapore or through Singapore) to be considered to be of Singapore origin if they meet the rules of origin requirement in the FTA. However, the ISI may be of limited precedent for including Kaesong in the KORUS FTA. Most of the products covered by the ISI provision already traded duty free under the World Trade Organization=s Information Technology Agreement. Although the ISI would have no effect on duties paid, it was designed to help American companies eliminate extra paperwork, fees, and red tape. Additionally, USTR officials have said that the ISI was very unpopular with Congress. Spring 2006 conversations with USTR officials. For more on the ISI and the U.S.-Singapore FTA, see CRS Report RL31789, *The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement*, by Dick Nanto.

⁵³*Washington Trade Daily*. June 16, 2006.

⁵⁴North Korean workers in Kaesong receive a base monthly salary of \$50 for a 48-hour work week. In 2005, the average workweek (including overtime) at Kaesong was 55 hours, bringing the average gross monthly salary to \$67 per month. South Korean officials say they are unsure of precisely how much is taken by the North Korean government, but from conversations with workers and other sources, they estimate the government takes an estimated 30% Asocial services fee@ from the wages to pay for housing and other services that are to be provided the North Korean state. If these figures are correct, the average Kaesong worker=s take-home monthly pay in 2005 was just under \$37, paid in North Korean *won*. Presumably, payments are made at the official rate of exchange, which is much lower than black market rates. The North Korean government also levies a 15% social insurance surcharge, which is paid by the South Korean employer, to pay for unemployment and occupational hazards.

⁵⁵Moon Ihlwan, ABridging the Korean Economic Divide,@ *Business Week*, Mar 8, 2006.

⁵⁶For more on the U.S. Visa Waiver Program, see CRS Report RL32221, *Visa Waiver Program*, by Alison Siskin. Speech by ROK Ambassador to the United States Lee Tae-sik, AThe Korea-US Alliance - A Partnership for the Future,@ February 7, 2006 Korea Economic Institute Forum, The St. Regis Hotel, Washington, DC; Balbina Hwang, AA Bumpy Road for the U.S. C ROK Free Trade Agreement,@ *Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum* No. 995, March 2, 2006. U.S. trade officials say they do not plan to include the VWP in the FTA negotiations. Spring 2006 conversations with U.S. officials. If the VWP, or any other immigration issue, is included in the FTA, those provisions could fall under the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.

⁵⁷White House Press Office of the Press Secretary, AJoint Declaration on the ROK-U.S. Alliance and Peace on the Korean Peninsula,@ November 17, 2005.

⁵⁸Specifically, to qualify for the VWP, countries must have had a nonimmigrant refusal rate of less than 3% for the previous year, or an average of no more than 2% over the past two fiscal years with neither year going above 2.5%. 8 U.S.C. ' 1187(c)(2)(A).

⁵⁹Balbina Hwang, AIncluding South Korea in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program,@ *Heritage Foundation Backgrounder* No. 1872, July 25, 2005.

⁶⁰South Korean government report to the National Assembly, ANegotiating

Objectives of Korea-U.S. FTA,⁶⁰ translation provided by the U.S. Embassy, Seoul; BNA, ⁶¹South Korea=s MOFAT Outlines Goals of Draft Free Trade Agreement.⁶²

⁶¹In his address at the December 2005 Doha Development Round ministerial in Hong Kong, South Korean Trade Minister Kim said that a tangible outcome⁶³ in anti-dumping was indispensable⁶⁴ for South Korea. Statement by Mr. Hyun Chong Kim Minister for Trade, World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference Sixth Session Hong Kong, WT/MIN(05)/ST/19 14 December 2005 (05-5992).

⁶²As. Korea Seeks To Exclude Sensitive Goods From U.S. FTA: Official,⁶⁵ *Yonhap*, April 27, 2006.

⁶³South Korean government report to the National Assembly, ⁶⁶Negotiating Objectives of Korea-U.S. FTA,⁶⁷ translation provided by the U.S. Embassy.

⁶⁴For more information on the antidumping issue in the Doha Development Agenda round, see CRS Report RL32810, *WTO: Antidumping Issues in the Doha Development Agenda*, by Vivian C. Jones.

⁶⁵South Korean government report to the National Assembly, ⁶⁸Negotiating Objectives of Korea-U.S. FTA,⁶⁹ translation provided by the U.S. Embassy.

⁶⁶Office of the United States Trade Representative. Fact Sheet. *FTA: United States and Republic of Korea Economic and Strategic Benefits*. February 2006.

⁶⁷Viner, Jacob. *The Customs Union Issue*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1950. New York. These concepts are discussed in CRS Report RL31356, *Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy*, by William H. Cooper.

⁶⁸This conclusion is called the General Theory of the Second Best and was developed by economists Richard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster. Lipsey, Richard and Kelvin Lancaster. "The General Theory of the Second Best." *Review of Economic Studies*. Vol. 24, pp. 11-32. Cited and discussed in Lawrence, Robert Z. *International National Economies: Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Deeper Integration*. Brookings Institution. Washington, D.C.: 1996. p. 22.

⁶⁹A new, classified USITC study, that is required under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002, is scheduled to be submitted to the USTR by

July 14, 2006.

⁷⁰United States International Trade Commission. *U.S.- Korea FTA: The Economic Impact of Establishing a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Between the United States and the Republic of Korea*. Investigation No. 332-425. September 2001 Also, Choi, Inbom and Jeffrey J. Schott. *Free Trade Between Korea and the United States?* Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, April 2001.

⁷¹Lee, Junyu and Hongshik Lee. *Feasibility and Economic Effects of a Korea-U.S. FTA*. Korean Institute for International Economic Policy. December 2005. p.86.