

The Korean Independence Movement in the United States

Syngman Rhee, An Ch'ang-Ho, and Pak Yong-Man

Han-Kyo Kim
Professor Emeritus
University of Cincinnati

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to describe the national independence movement of the Korean residents in the United States and Hawaii before 1945, with emphasis on the roles played by its three most prominent leaders, Syngman Rhee, An Ch'ang-ho and Pak Yong-man. The first shipload of Korean immigrants came to Hawaii in 1903, largely for economic reasons. In the ensuing years, as Japan steadily made inroads into Korea, however, patriotic sentiments seized the Korean community. With the formal installation of the Japanese colonial regime in 1910, the restoration of sovereignty in their homeland became the primary political agenda of the Korea immigrants.

Early in the history of Korean immigrants, a number of local community leaders emerged in Hawaii and California and they, in time, came to rally around a few charismatic individuals, of whom the best known were Rhee, An and Pak. There certainly were other outstanding activists who played key roles in the Korean independence movement in America, but they were either transients or their activities were not as sustained as those of the trio under study here.

Rhee, An and Pak were distinctly different in personal temperament and educational backgrounds although they were contemporaries and collaborated with one another at one time or another. More importantly, perhaps, their ideological outlooks and strategic designs were clearly divergent. Such divergence bred personal rivalries among them that led to serious divisions within the organizations of Korean immigrants in America and elsewhere in the world.

We will begin with a brief history of the Korean communities in America, followed by biographical sketches of the three leaders,

focusing on their political activities in America before 1945. We will conclude with a few observations that help set the context for our review of the topic.

Korean Communities in America

The arrival of 102 Korean immigrants in Honolulu aboard the *Gaelic* on January 13, 1903, marks the beginning of the Korean community in the United States. In the next two years, 7,226 Koreans reached what was then the United States territory of Hawaii aboard 65 steamers. There were some women and children, but most of these emigrants were adult male laborers headed for sugar and pineapple plantations in Hawaiian islands.¹ In addition, there had been a few isolated cases of students and merchants making their way to the United States mainland beginning as early as 1880s, but the overwhelming majority of Korean immigrants were the farm workers brought over by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association through its agents in Korea.² In 1905, the flow of Koreans to Hawaii ceased when the Korean government bowed to pressure from the Japanese government that acted to protect the Japanese immigrant-laborers in Hawaii from competition.³

Common among these early immigrants was the desire for a better life with steady and lucrative jobs that the recruiting agents had promised. However, the reality they faced in Hawaii was much harsher—long hours of hard physical labor six days a week for meager wages, averaging from sixty-five to seventy cents a day.⁴ Reports of higher wages and non-farm employment opportunities on the mainland enticed a sizable number to leave Hawaii—more than 1,000 in 1905—1910.⁵ It is then no surprise that "the early Korean immigrants had a weak national consciousness," pressed as they were by daily survival and adjustment problems.⁶

Before long, "the new life in a land of strange historical and cultural background made them feel a strong love for Korea and her people which inspired them to organize self-governing bodies on the Hawaiian farms."⁷ As early as 1905, a Friendship Association (*Ch 'inmok-hoe*) was established on Ewa Plantation on Oahu Island that launched, in addition to a program of mutual aid, a boycott of Japanese goods. When Japan pressed Korea to appoint a Japanese diplomat as an honorary consul to protect Korean immigrants' interests in Hawaii, the presumed beneficiaries protested and asked for a Korean official instead, even at their own expense if necessary.⁸

Patriotic motives became clear when a special convention of Korean residents in Hawaii adopted, sometime in or before mid-July 1905, a petition addressed to President Theodore Roosevelt, requesting

his intervention on behalf of Korea's sovereign independence at the peace conference to end the Russo-Japanese War. The same convention also selected, as the representatives of "8,000 Korean residents" in Hawaii a local church pastor, Rev. Yun Pyong-gu, and a secret emissary from Seoul, Syngman Rhee.⁹

The Korean plea went unheeded. Japan took over Korea's foreign affairs and set up a quasi-colonial structure, a Residency-General, which steadily expanded its control over Korea's financial, judicial and military affairs. In 1907, Emperor Kojong of Korea was forced to abdicate in favor of his feeble-minded son and the last army units were dissolved.

Koreans in Hawaii and on the United States mainland held a joint protest rally against the so-called Protectorate Treaty of 1905 and passed a resolution condemning Japan's encroachment on Korea and vowed never to recognize Japanese authorities in Korea or Japanese jurisdiction over the Koreans in the United States. Between December 1905 and September 1907, more than twenty organizations emerged and their stated purposes "included, without exception, resistance against the Japanese colonial policy and political independence for Korea."¹⁰ These groups came together by September 1907 in the United Korean Society (*Hanin Hapsdng Hyophoe*) headquartered in Honolulu."

On America's west coast, in the meantime, similar communal-cum-political organizations were formed: the Mutual Assistance Society (*Kongnip Hyophoe*) after 1905, with several local chapters in California, and the Great Unity Fatherland Protection Society (*Taedong Poguk-hoe*) in San Francisco. The Mutual Assistance Society publicly rejected Japan's offer of relief funds in the aftermath of the 1906 earthquake in San Francisco. Members of these organizations also attacked and killed Durham W. Stevens, a pro-Japanese American advisor to the Korean government.¹²

In a bold move to consolidate the patriotic efforts of all Koreans outside Korea, which was now under Japanese control, the Korean National Association (*Tae Hanin Kungmin-hoe*; "KNA" hereafter) was organized on February 1, 1909, in San Francisco to represent all Korean interests in the United States, Siberia and Manchuria. On the United States mainland and Hawaii, KNA acted as a quasi-consular agency, requiring all Korean residents to become its members and pay dues. At the news of Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910, the KNA held a large rally and adopted a resolution that called Japan an enemy nation and declared August 29, the date of the annexation treaty, a day of national humiliation. Most Korean political organizations in America were soon "consolidated" into the KNA.¹³

A few years after Korea had been placed under the firm and harsh rule of the Japanese Government-General, the Korean community in America went through a prolonged period of internal discord and realignment that was fueled, among others, by the schism between those supporting Pak Yong-man and those backing Syngman Rhee. At the same time, new organizations came on the scene. The Korean Women's Association was organized in Honolulu in 1913, as the arrival of the "picture brides" were beginning to alter the lifestyle of the Koreans on the island.¹⁴ Student and youth groups were formed for para-military training in Nebraska and elsewhere by Pak Yong-man and others after 1909, while educational objectives were professed by An Ch'ang-ho as he recruited the first members of the well-known Academy (*Hvngsa-dari*) in San Francisco in 1913.¹⁵

We should underscore here the pivotal roles played by various Korean Christian churches in meeting the communal as well as spiritual needs of the Korean emigrants from the very beginning of their life in the new world. The first church service was held on July 4, 1903. The Christian population among the Koreans in Hawaii, which numbered only 400 or so in 1905, gained, by 1918, approximately 2,800 new converts attending thirty-nine churches.¹⁶ In California, church services began in Oakland in June 1914. In time, several churches of different denominations came to be established in other cities, including Los Angeles, Chicago and New York.¹⁷ These churches were "centers of the Korean community" where even non-Christians came for companionship and the discussion of various issues, including those that reflected their aspiration for national independence.¹⁸ One example of the Korean congregations' nationalistic behavior was the controversy in 1912 over the acceptance of a \$750 donation from the Japanese consul in Honolulu by American Methodist superintendent John W. Wadman, ostensibly to help poor Koreans. Despite Wadman's credible record as a pro-Korean sympathizer,¹⁹ he was roundly denounced by Koreans for taking Japanese money.

The March First Movement of 1919 rekindled the flame of nationalism among Koreans in the United States. When World War I ended, the KNA planned to send a three-man delegation, which included Syngman Rhee, to the Peace Conference to plead the Korean cause. (It did not materialize due to the United States' refusal to issue necessary travel documents.) The news of massive peaceful demonstrations and their brutal suppression by the Japanese in Korea took days to reach the Koreans in America. But by mid-March 1919, the KNA held a mass rally in San Francisco in support of the Movement and decided to establish a Korean Information Office headed by Philip Jaisohn (So Chae-p'il). Furthermore, the KNA chose

to send its chairman, An Ch'ang-ho, to China in anticipation of the formation of a Korean provisional government.²⁰

Shortly thereafter, "the First Korean Congress" was held in Philadelphia, April 14-16, 1919, under the leadership of Philip Jaisohn and Syngman Rhee. Approximately 150 Koreans, representing twenty-seven organizations from the United States and Mexico, gathered and passed resolutions announcing a blueprint for the future Korean republic based on democratic principles and pledged to support the Korean provisional government in Shanghai as "a legitimate government of the Korean people." On the last day, the conferees marched, waving the Korean as well as the American flags, through the streets to Independence Hall and conducted an impressive ceremony that included the reading of the Korean Declaration of Independence by Rhee in the same room where the American Declaration had been signed.²¹

Clearly, the aim of the Korean Congress was to publicize the Korean cause and influence the American public. To that end, Jaisohn's information office started publishing pamphlets and a monthly magazine, the *Korea Review*. He also formed a League of the Friends of Korea to solicit active support from American sympathizers. By the fall of 1919, Syngman Rhee, as the head of the Korean Provisional Government ("KPG" hereafter), created a Korean Commission in Washington and appointed Kim Kyu-sik (Kiusic Kimm) to chair it. Its principal mission was to win friends, especially among the members of the United States Congress. A few American lawmakers did speak in the halls of the United States Congress on Korea's behalf, although no formal action was taken.²²

In addition to these public relations activities in the United States, the attention of Koreans in America was naturally focused on the rising tempo of patriotic activities in China and Siberia, where the majority of Korean activists were. There were three geographical centers of Korean exiles in Northeast Asia: Shanghai, the Chientao region of Manchuria, and the Maritime Province of Siberia. An Ch'ang-ho was one of the first to arrive in Shanghai from America and he was instrumental in establishing Shanghai as the center of the independence movement and in getting KPG operations underway.²³ Syngman Rhee did not arrive in Shanghai until December 1920 to assume his formal duties as the president. A substantial portion of the funds that had been collected from Koreans in Hawaii and elsewhere in the United States was funneled to China. One source estimates that over \$200,000 had been contributed by approximately 7,000 Koreans in the United States and Mexico for patriotic causes at this time, or roughly 30 dollars per person, one month's income.²⁴ Moreover, Pak Yong-man, who

vehemently opposed the KPG in Shanghai, perhaps for both policy and personal reasons, was active in northern China, preparing for immediate military actions against Japan. Pak's followers in Hawaii gave him the financial and moral support for his campaign.²⁵ In short, the Korean communities in America provided two crucial ingredients to energize the independence movement in the period following the March First Movement: leaders and financial resources.

By the end of 1921, however, the KPG had lost much of its steam. An Ch'ang-ho and a few other members of the cabinet resigned, voicing disagreement with Syngman Rhee, who in turn left abruptly for the United States. When the Washington Disarmament Conference met in 1921-1922, it was Jaisohn who submitted a petition signed by the representatives of various Korean groups in Korea, asking for recognition of the Korean Provisional Government as the legitimate government of the Korean people. The petition was never discussed because of strong Japanese objection.²⁶ When the League of Nations met in Geneva in 1933 to discuss Japan's invasion of Manchuria, Rhee journeyed there to mount a solitary campaign among the delegates and the journalists for international recognition of the KPG, but gained only occasional informal words of sympathy.²⁷ The KPG, in the meantime, won attention — and sympathy, at least from China — through individual acts of terrorism aimed at Japanese leaders, including its emperor in 1932. Kim Ku, a KPG leader allegedly operating with financial support from Korean residents in Hawaii, directed the bombing assaults.²⁸

As Japan pushed deeper into China, Rhee moved from Honolulu to Washington to resume an active diplomatic campaign for Korea's freedom. He foresaw an American war with Japan and issued a warning in the form of a book, *Japan Inside Out*, which was published in the summer of 1941. The gathering war clouds prompted the various Korean organizations, including the KNA and the Comrade Society (*Tongji-hoe*),²⁹ to join forces and form the United Korean Committee ("UKC" hereafter) in April 1941 to give financial and spiritual support to the KPG. As the sole agent of the KPG, the UKC was to collect "independence contributions" and forward two-thirds of the revenue to the KPG. Rhee was chosen to chair the UKC, and was so approved subsequently by the KPG.³⁰

After Pearl Harbor, the primary objective of the UKC was to secure formal diplomatic recognition of the KPG as the government of Korea, albeit in exile, and an ally of the United Nations against the Axis powers. Rhee, his advisors and a small staff met with or wrote to American officials, a Korean-American Council was formed to support the Korean endeavor, and a Korean Liberty Conference was held at a

Washington hotel in 1942 on the anniversary of the March First Movement.³¹ For a variety of reasons which we cannot discuss in this paper,³² the United States rejected the repeated Korean pleas. A seven-man delegation headed by Rhee arrived in San Francisco in March 1945 to attend the first meeting of the United Nations Organization, but it was barred from the conference. World War II ended without an internationally-recognized governmental entity representing the Korean people.

Having sketched the broad outline of the patriotic activities of the Korean community in America prior to 1945, we can now examine the contrasting records of the three leaders who led these activities.

Syngman Rhee Before 1945

Rhee was born in 1875, the only son of an impoverished descendant of Prince Yangny(ng, the older brother of King Sejong of the Yi dynasty. Rhee's birthplace was a small village in Hwanghae Province, but his family moved to Seoul when he was only two years old. After a period of customary Confucian tutoring, Rhee enrolled in 1895 at Paeje School that was established by an American Methodist missionary and attracted young students interested in Western learning. He excelled in his studies, especially in English, and his speech at his graduation ceremony in 1898 was delivered in English—a feat that won praise from Korean and American dignitaries in attendance.³³

It was a time when Korea was undergoing for the first time systematic political and cultural modernization. As an impressionable youth in his early twenties, Rhee plunged into the rough waters of politics by joining the Independence Club (*Tongniip Hyophoe*) and advocating frontal assaults on the ancien regime. His speeches inspired crowds to stage street demonstrations and his writings in the newly emerging journalistic publications demanded reforms. By the standards of the day, he was a radical.³⁴ After a brief period of triumph, Rhee was imprisoned on a charge of high treason and spent more than five-and-a-half years behind bars. In his prison cell, he managed to write a book, *The Spirit of Independence*, exhorting fellow countrymen to do their patriotic duties and reform their society.³⁵ He also became a Christian and converted more than forty of his fellow inmates to join him.

As Japan was tightening its grip on Korea in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, Rhee was released and, within a few months, headed for the United States under circumstances that have not been fully explained. It is said that his trip was arranged by two of Emperor Kojong's confidants, Min Yong-hwan and Han Kyu-sol, to solicit American intervention on Korea's behalf at the Portsmouth Peace Conference. Rhee and Rev. Yun Pyong-gu of Hawaii were able to

secure a meeting with President Theodore Roosevelt, but their mission was a failure. Rhee then spent the next five years studying and earning academic degrees from George Washington University (BA), Harvard (MA) and Princeton (Ph.D.) — an impressive achievement in a record time. When Japan formally annexed Korea, the first Korean with an American doctorate was on his way home to work at the Seoul YMCA.

Rhee's stay in Seoul did not last long, however. Feeling threatened by the mass arrest of Korean leaders in the so-called "105-man case," Rhee left for the United States for the second time in March 1912, ostensibly to attend a Methodist convention in Minneapolis. Several months after the church meeting, Rhee decided to move to Hawaii and open a new chapter of his life. For the next several years, he was engaged in running a church-operated school for Korean children, publishing a monthly magazine for Korean residents—the *Korean Pacific Magazine* (later, the *Korean Pacific Weekly*)—and in promoting evangelical works of church groups. As he became more established as a leader in the Korean community, he also became involved in a bitter internecine power struggle with Pak Yong-man, his erstwhile "sworn brother" and a fellow inmate in the Seoul prison. They were both energetic and ambitious, and they shared patriotic devotion to Korea, but they were miles apart in their plans for recovering Korea's sovereign independence.

Pak advocated a direct military challenge to Japan and, to that end, training and establishing an army was the most urgent task. Rhee, on the other hand, believed that the most effective way to defeat the Japanese colonial rule in Korea was to use diplomacy and propaganda means to secure the political support of major foreign powers and of the international community. If Pak considered Rhee's strategy somewhat uninspiring and irresolute, Rhee believed that Pak was too simplistic and misguided in his approach. Rhee had earlier visited Pak's military training bases in Nebraska and Hawaii, perhaps to humor his younger comrade, but when the allocation of the limited resources of the KNA in Hawaii was at stake in mid-1915, the two protagonists became irreconcilably hostile to each other. Malicious rumors of embezzlement and corruption spread fanning ill will between them that escalated into physical confrontations, police intervention and litigation.³⁶

The March First Movement transformed Rhee overnight from a local community activist in Hawaii into a national political leader with a revolutionary agenda. Independence movement leaders within Korea, in the Russian Maritime Province and in Shanghai all selected him as the top leader of the governments that they announced, although none of them used the title "president."³⁷ Why was he chosen to lead the government in exile? Presumably Rhee's past activities that had led to

his imprisonment and later his meeting with the American president, his educational credentials and his residency in America were some of reasons for the fame and support that he enjoyed. His non-involvement in political jockeying among the contending personalities and groups in China and elsewhere in Asia may also have helped him seem more attractive.

Even before he went to Shanghai in late 1920 to assume his duties, Rhee wasted no time in representing himself—and acting—as "president," the title which his KPG colleagues formally conferred on him only later. He addressed a memorandum to the emperor of Japan announcing the creation of "a completely organized, self governed State" of Korea and the election of himself as "President of the Republic of Korea."³⁸ Similar notifications were sent to the governments of the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy as well as to the presiding officer of the Versailles Peace Conference. He appointed Kim Kyu-sik to head a Korean Commission and started a fundraising campaign by selling bonds. At one point, he also signed a petition requesting that Korea be declared a mandate territory of the League of Nations as a means to ending Japan's domination of the peninsula. Rhee took all these actions without prior consultation with his colleagues in the KPG.

Rhee's sojourn in Shanghai failed to create unity in the KPG and his refusal to accommodate the left-leaning faction that included Yi Tong-hwi, a powerful advocate of an anti-Japanese military campaign, exacerbated the schism in Korean leadership. Moreover, Rhee's explanations for some of the controversial decisions he had made in Washington, such as the petition for a League mandate, failed to mollify his critics. After only six months in Shanghai, Rhee returned to the United States, citing the need to attend to pressing diplomatic and financial problems for his departure. Back in Washington, Rhee teamed up with Jaisohn and others in an unsuccessful attempt to present the Korean case before the Washington Disarmament Conference, 1921-1922. In September 1922, the frustrated Rhee returned to Honolulu. His KPG presidency ended officially in 1925, when he was impeached by a one-vote margin for abandoning his office and for dereliction of duty in a hastily improvised impeachment proceeding in Shanghai.

For the next several years, Rhee remained mostly in Hawaii cultivating his political base, especially around the Comrade Society (*Tongji-hoe*) of which he was president for life. He traveled to Europe in 1932-1933, primarily to bring the Korean case before the League of Nations conference that met to discuss Japan's invasion of Manchuria. He was once again disappointed although his solo mission received

some attention from the local press.³⁹ As Japan moved into China proper after 1937, Rhee foresaw a future conflict between Japan and the United States. He wrote *Japan Inside Out*, as mentioned earlier, to alert Americans to the impending danger. He also moved back to Washington and revived the long dormant Korean Commission, as both the UKC and the KPG commissioned Rhee to head a diplomatic mission and obtain formal recognition of the KPG.

During the war years, 1941-1945, Rhee became a familiar figure around Washington, trying to win support from skeptical or unconcerned officials, politicians, journalists and other men of influence. A Korean Liberty Congress was convened in a downtown hotel as a publicity event. Proposals were submitted to the United States military for organizing guerrilla forces consisting of Korean fighters. Rhee also began sounding an alarm over the dangers coming from Soviet Communism.⁴⁰ These entreaties were largely ignored, including Rhee's attempt to attend the first United Nations conference in April 1945.

Two months after Japan's surrender, Rhee returned to Korea for the first time in 33 years. A discussion of his life and activities in the subsequent years is outside the scope of this study.

An Ch'ang-ho

An Ch'ang-ho was born in 1878 in South P'yŏngan Province to a poor farming family. He was the youngest of four children. Although his family lacked the social status of *yangban*, it nevertheless provided the young An with an education in the Confucian classics. In 1894, the fifteen-year old An witnessed firsthand the Sino-Japanese War, which brought destruction and misery to the hapless Korean civilians in the Pyongyang area. According to Yi Kwang-su, the popular literary figure of the 1920s who wrote a biography of An, the destruction caused by foreign armies fighting on Korean soil made the young An realize that Korea's own weakness was to be blamed.⁴¹ He made his way to Seoul and began studying at a missionary school, Kuse Haktang. He also became a Christian.

In 1898, An joined the Independence Club and became active in Pyongyang, where he delivered a stirring speech denouncing bureaucratic corruption before a large crowd. When the reactionary government banned the Independence Club, An returned home in 1899 and started a co-educational school that he named Chomjin Hakkyo, or "gradual progress school," reflecting his belief in evolutionary change through education. Meanwhile, he decided to seek further education himself by going to the United States. He was encouraged in his decision by some American missionaries, including Rev. F. S. Miller,

who officiated at An's wedding the day before the newlyweds left for America.

The Ans arrived in San Francisco on October 14, 1902, and landed jobs as live-in domestic helpers. An also sought opportunities for public school education, above all, to learn English, but the over-age Korean student was not welcome. He then made a decision "to forsake a formal education in America and to work towards strengthening the local Korean community."⁴² No more than a dozen in number, Korean residents in San Francisco lacked internal harmony and, according to Yi Kwang-su, An witnessed a scuffle on the street between two Korean ginseng peddlers, an embarrassing experience that convinced him of the need to organize a fraternal society (*Ch 'immok-hoe*). He visited with and persuaded fellow countrymen in the city to follow a civilized life style and to assist one another in becoming more respectable members of the community. He personally set an example by helping clean and beautify the homes of some Korean residents. It was a case of down-to-earth community work through patient person-to-person contact.⁴³

In March 1904, An moved to Riverside, California, and took a job doing "schoolboy work," which entailed cooking, cleaning and other domestic chores. Some evenings, he studied English and the Bible. He also worked in fruit orchards with other Korean workers. In 1905, he moved back to San Francisco and organized the Mutual Assistance Association (*Kongnip Hyophoe*) to help Koreans arriving from Hawaii settle in and find employment. Within the next few years, local chapters of the Association, of which An was the president, were formed in Los Angeles, Riverside, Redlands and Rock Springs in Wyoming with a total membership of 600.⁴⁴ This Association also published a newspaper, the *United Korean (Kongnip Sinbo)*, that reported—and denounced—Japanese acts of aggression against Korea.⁴⁵

Early in 1907, An returned to Korea to see for himself what changes had taken place in his homeland and what he could do to stop the precipitous decline of the nation. On the way he stopped in Tokyo where he met Korean students, some of whom, such as Yi Kwang-su, were deeply impressed by him. Once in Korea, he gave speeches before students and intellectuals as well as the general public, in Seoul, Pyongyang and elsewhere. His themes included Christian principles, an exhortation not to sell land to the Japanese and a plea that everyone should do whatever he could, however small, for the country. The Japanese authorities kept a close watch on An's activities, which they suspected stirred up anti-Japanese sentiment. An also became friends with a number of individuals who were or soon would be key figures

in journalistic and scholarly circles, such as Ch'oi Nam-son, Pak Un-sik, and Sin Ch'ae-ho.⁴⁶

Sometime soon after his arrival in Korea, An established a secret organization, the New People's Association (*Sinmin-hoe*, "NPA" hereafter) whose professed purpose was "to renew our people, to renew business ... and to help establish a renewed, civilized and free nation by a renewed and united people." The membership of the NPA included journalists, youth and religious leaders, military officers, merchants and industrialists and members of the California-based Mutual Assistance Association. An talked Yang Ki-t'ak, a veteran newspaperman, into accepting the NPA presidency and he himself chose to work without an official title, concentrating on the recruitment of new members.⁴⁷

An helped establish fourteen schools including the well-known Osan Middle School and Taesong Middle School, between 1907 and 1909. In order to establish a nationwide reputation for the latter school, which was meant to be a model for other schools, An invited Yun Ch'i-ho, the well respected educator and former high official, to serve as head of the school, while An himself actually operated it. Among the Taesong graduates were future activists in national independence movement, but it was ordered closed by the Japanese colonial government in 1913.⁴⁸

An and the NPA were also involved in many other projects: a chain of book stores, publication of a magazine, *The Youth (Sonyon)* edited by Ch'oe Nam-son, a young students association, and a number of business ventures, including a ceramics factory, in keeping with An's idea of building educational, cultural and industrial foundations for a modern Korea. Apparently, An's ability to win friends and manage various voluntary organizations was intriguing enough for Japanese Resident-General Ito Hirobumi to invite An to a meeting in November 1907, where Ito allegedly floated the idea of An heading a Korean cabinet consisting of younger leaders. An summarily rejected the offer.⁴⁹ When Ito was assassinated by a Korean nationalist in 1909, An was suspected of involvement in the conspiracy and had to spend two months in a Japanese army prison.⁵⁰ By then, An knew that it was not safe for him to remain in Korea and decided to go into exile.

He slipped away aboard a Chinese salt carrier and landed in Weihaiwei in April 1910. A meeting with several of his comrades was held in Qingdao in July to discuss plans for restoring Korea's independence. The conferees were split between those advocating an immediate military campaign and those, including An, in favor of a more gradual process of building up Korea's capabilities to win and keep its freedom. No firm decision was reached. After Qingdao, An traveled to Vladivostok, where he stayed a few months meeting Korean

residents in the area and even visiting a **potential** site in Manchuria for a **Utopian** Korean settlement. He made his way back to America via the trans-Siberian railway, Berlin and London, arriving in New York early in September 1911.⁵¹

For the next several years until 1919, An devoted himself to the works of Korean organizations in the United States, Hawaii and Mexico. He focused on strengthening and unifying the KNA, a project that led to his election, in late 1912, as chairman of the Central Congress of the KNA, a newly created top-level body, above the regional conferences of North America, Hawaii, Siberia and Manchuria. He traveled to Hawaii in 1915 to mediate an internal feud within the regional KNA that was caused by bitter rivalry between Syngman Rhee and Pak Yong-man. He made a ten-month trip to Mexico, starting in October 1917, to help organize KNA branches especially in Merida, Yucatan, where hundreds of Koreans worked on sisal hemp farms under miserable conditions.⁵²

At the same time, An undertook to organize a select group of patriotic young men into a fraternal society for moral and intellectual development; the Young Korean Academy (Hungsadan) was formally established on May 13, 1913, in San Francisco with 35 original members in attendance. An personally conducted rigorous interviews whenever possible before inviting new members to join the Academy, and he took pains to have all eight provinces of Korea represented in the Academy's membership in order to avoid any suspicion of regional favoritism.⁵³ In time, local chapters of the Academy came to be organized in China and Korea itself, providing An a dependable base of support for his nationalist campaign.

True to his conviction that Koreans should build up their economic muscle, An made a sustained effort during his second sojourn in the United States to establish a business corporation, the North American Industrial Company (*Pungmi Sirop Chusik Hoesa*), as a first step. Common stock was sold to Koreans in America and Mexico, with many shares going to members of the Young Korean Academy, and by 1918, \$70,000 had been raised. The company first undertook commercial potato farming, and switched to rice cultivation later, but the venture was largely unsuccessful.⁵⁴

At the conclusion of the armistice in 1918, An called a KNA meeting that resolved to submitted a petition to the Paris peace conference. He also took steps to raise funds for the diplomatic activities. But he was not optimistic about the chances for success; he continued to hold the view that Koreans should first build a firm foundation for independence. While KNA leaders were still discussing their plans for the peace conference, the March First Movement

erupted in Korea. An first received the news via Shanghai, and he promptly notified various regional KNA conferences and individual leaders such as Syngman Rhee and Philip Jaisohn. Under An's leadership, the Central Congress of the KNA passed resolutions to mount diplomatic and public information campaigns for American support which Jaisohn and Rhee were to conduct on the East Coast. The Central Congress also decided to raise funds and urged all Korean residents to contribute a minimum of \$10 for the month of March and one twentieth of their monthly income thereafter. An personally traveled extensively in California to solicit "independence contributions." He was also selected to go to Shanghai as a representative of the KNA and participate in the establishment of a Korean provisional government.⁵⁵

An arrived in Shanghai via Hong Kong May 25, 1919, and stayed in China, mostly in Shanghai, for the next five-and-a-half years until November 1924. Even before his arrival, An had already been selected by those pressing for the immediate establishment of a provisional government to assume the post of Minister of Home Affairs. An, however, preferred a more gradual process of various individuals' and groups' cooperating, perhaps, to form an united political party and declined the cabinet post. But he was eventually persuaded to join the government as acting premier and helped reorganize the government (KPG) from a parliamentary cabinet system to a presidential system. Armed with the modest funds he had brought with him, An patiently convinced suspicious rivals to compromise and keep the facade of a functioning KPG under Syngman Rhee as the first president—until 1921.⁵⁶

The contentious exiles could not, however, long refrain from going their separate ways. The incumbent of the second highest office, Premier Yi Tong-hwi, resigned and left Shanghai in early 1921, shattering any hope for continuation of a functioning KPG. An himself resigned in May 1921 as KPG's labor department superintendent, a modest title that he had allowed himself to take after giving up the acting premiership. Freed of formal KPG ties, An tried anew his campaign to construct a political organization of national unity. After months of painstaking preparations, he organized a conference of national representatives of all Koreans from various geographical areas and of all political persuasions. On January 3, 1923, the conference opened in the French concession area of Shanghai with approximately 160 attendees representing over seventy organizations. An opened the session and he tried for the next six months to hammer out a common strategy for the independence movement. The future of the KPG was one of the hotly-debated issues but the discussion of three options—to

keep the status quo, to reform it, or to abandon it in favor of a new organization—became deadlocked without any resolution.⁵⁷

An was more successful in organizing the Far Eastern Branch of the Young Korean Academy. He recruited new members, including Yi Kwang-su, who helped him write and disseminate his "Epistle to My Compatriots" (*Tongp'o ege kohanim gift*) that encapsulated An's political ideas. He also visited northern China in search for a suitable piece of land to build an ideal community—a life long dream of An. Turning to education, another long standing interest of his, An established in March 1924 a school in Nanjing, Tongmyong Institute, to help prepare Korean students for college education in Europe, America or China.⁵⁸ An then left Shanghai to return to his family and comrades in America.

An's stay in America was relatively short this time, and he was kept busy visiting and thanking his supporters and conferring with the Young Korean Academy members in California. He also toured the Midwest and the East Coast of the United States. He stopped for varying lengths of time in Chicago, South Bend, Detroit, Kansas City, Princeton and New York to give speeches and meet with students including PaekNak-chun, Ho Chong, Chang T6k-su, Kim To-yon and others. A young Columbia University student, Chang Ni-uk accompanied him part of the way. He also met Philip Jaisohn twice in the course of 1925. Early in 1926, An had to leave the United States, primarily because he could not extend his visa to stay longer. He sailed to China via Australia and Hong Kong, arriving in Shanghai in mid-May.

Upon arrival in Shanghai, An was informed that he had been elected premier of the KPG but he declined. Instead, he endorsed a new venture by the Young Korean Academy to publish a magazine, *Tongkwang* (Eastern Light), in Korea. At the same time, he planned to create a Great Independence Party (*Tae Tongnip Tang*) and to continue exploring the chances for the model community project. With these in mind, he visited Beijing in the fall and went on to Manchuria. While visiting the Jirin area in southeastern Manchuria, he delivered a speech before a large crowd that apparently included the young Kim II Sung, according to sources in North Korea.⁵⁹ The lecture meeting was broken up when Chinese police moved in and arrested dozens of people, including An, presumably at the request of Japanese authorities in the area. He was released, however, after a twenty-day detention, and went on to visit northern Manchuria before returning to Shanghai. His continuing interest in a model community site was part of the reason for his trip to the Philippines in 1929, where he was impressed by the open and more democratic American colonial policy, as compared to the

Japanese behavior in Korea.⁶⁰

An was one of the 28 founding members of the Korean Independence Party (*Han 'guk Tongnip Tang*) that was established on January 25, 1930; other co-founders included Yi Tong-nyong, Kim Tu-bong, Yun Ki-sop, Cho So-ang and Cho Wan-gu. Kim Ku, the future leader of the KPG, was also involved in the party.⁶¹ The formation of the party that brought together various non-Communist nationalists at this time may have been an attempt to keep the moribund KPG alive. The exiled group, however, won the respect and support from the Chinese when two young KPG supporters hurled bombs at the procession of the Japanese emperor in January 1932, and at high Japanese officials in Shanghai three months later. The two attacks were directed by Kim Ku who used \$1,000 sent to him by his supporters in Hawaii.⁶² In the aftermath of the second attack, the Japanese police conducted a massive search for the presumed accomplices, and An fell into their hands.

An was taken to Korea in June 1932. The fifty-four-year-old prisoner, in failing health, was charged with violation of the infamous Peace Preservation Law and was sentenced to four years in prison. Paroled after three years, An visited a few friends in Seoul and elsewhere and retired to a cottage on a secluded hillside in his home province of South P'yongan. He was re-arrested a little over two years later when scores of his friends, including Yi Kwang-su, were jailed by the Japanese thought police only days before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident that eventually led to World War II in Asia. Six months later, the gravely ill An was transferred to the University Hospital in Seoul, where he died on March 10, 1938, at age 59.

Pak Yong-man

Pak Yong-man was born July 2, 1881, to a yangban family of military tradition in a rural town in Kangwon province. The only son of his parents, Pak was orphaned at an early age and was raised by his uncle, Pak Hui-byong. When his uncle moved to Seoul and began studying English, Pak Yong-man enrolled at a Japanese language school. When his uncle went to Japan to study, Yong-man once again followed and he graduated from a middle school and studied politics at Keio Gijuku for a couple of years. His uncle also introduced him to Pak Y6ng-hyo (no relation), a prominent reform advocate in exile in Japan, and the latter may have influenced the young Pak with reformist ideas. The budding political activist returned home, perhaps in 1897, and became involved in a peasant rights movement, *hwalpin-tang* ("Help the Indigent Party"), the People's Assembly (*Manmin kongdong-hoe*) and a protest movement of Poan-hoe against a Japanese demand for

Korean farm lands. He was also active in the Christian youth group that gathered at Sangdong Church in Seoul and became well known to some of the American missionaries. Although details on his life in this period remain murky, we know that he was imprisoned twice by the conservative Korean government, each time for several months at least. During his second stay in prison, he and Syngman Rhee, a fellow inmate, became "sworn brothers."⁶³ It was Pak who smuggled the manuscript of Rhee's *The Spirit of Independence* out of prison and out of Korea to the United States.⁶⁴

Released from prison some time in 1904, Pak followed his uncle to Sonch'on, South P'yongan Province, and taught Korean, Japanese, arithmetic and Chinese classics at a local private school, for a short time. Pak, together with several other students, left for the United States, presumably in late 1904.⁶⁵ Landing in San Francisco, Pak and his party made their way to Nebraska where railroad construction work was easily available. At one point, however, Pak joined his uncle, H(i-by(ng, who had arrived in the United States in 1905 and operated an employment agency in Denver, Colorado. While in Denver, Pak organized a conference of thirty-six "patriotic" Koreans from various parts of the United States partly, to publicize the Korean cause to the Republican National Convention that met there in June 1908. The Korean conference also made the decision to establish a military school as a step toward an armed struggle against Japan.⁶⁶

Following the death of Pak Hui-byong, Pak Yong-man returned to Nebraska and enrolled at the University of Nebraska. He also set up "The Young Korean Military School" in a rented farm at Kearny, Nebraska, in the summer of 1909; a year later the school moved to the campus of Hastings College. About thirty students registered for a summer program of farm work and training that included, besides military drills, learning etiquette, American history, English and Korean. Pak himself prepared a primer for Korean lessons. The school project was partially financed by an assessment levied on the members of the Korean Resident Association of Nebraska that had been first organized in 1909. The military school, or program, produced its first "graduating class" of thirteen students in 1912 and remained in operation until 1915.⁶⁷

Pak Yong-man, in the meantime, was busy not only with his own college education⁶⁸ but also with a year of journalism work in San Francisco as the editor of *Hapsong Sinmun* (renamed *Sinhan Minbo* later), a newspaper published by the North American Regional Headquarters of the KNA. He published an essay, "On a Universal Draft System," in the paper and stressed the patriotic duty of everyone to serve in the military as well as to pay an assessment. Pak's

journalistic career continued in Hawaii, beginning in December 1912, when he became the editor of *Sin Han 'guk-po* (renamed *Kungmin-po* or *The Korean National Herald* later), published by the Hawaiian Regional Conference of the KNA.⁶⁹

Hawaii provided Pak an opportunity to expand his military training project. He established the Korean Military Corporation in June 1913 at Ahuimanu, Oahu, and a Korean Military Academy in August. The Academy enrolled some 124 students who had been soldiers in Korea before they emigrated to Hawaii; they worked ten or more hours a day on a pineapple farm but spent their "spare" time in military training. The project, however, did not last long and came to an end by late 1917. Financial difficulty was a reason for its closing as well as opposition from United States government sources responding to complaints by the Japanese. Moreover, Pak had to cope with growing opposition from within the Korean community, especially from Syngman Rhee and his supporters, who considered the project too costly and unrealistic.⁷⁰

When World War I ended, Pak "published a declaration of independence in the name of the Korean nation, the first declaration of its kind."⁷¹ He also organized a Korean Independence League (Tongnip-dan) in March 1919 as a military training school, and the League functioned as his support group even when he was away. Pak, in the meantime, decided to go to the Northeast Asia because it was the logical place to wage the campaign against Japanese colonialism. He joined the United States Siberian Expeditionary Forces as an intelligence officer and left Hawaii on board a United States transport in May 1919.⁷² While in Siberia, Pak worked together with a Comintern agent named Wurin in a Sino-Russian Joint Propaganda Department headed by the latter.⁷³ After the American expedition ended, Pak remained in the area. Although he had been offered the post of foreign minister in the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, he declined it, in part because Syngman Rhee was selected the head of the KPG. Instead, he organized in April 1921 a "Military Unification Conference" in Beijing that was attended by Sin Ch'ae-ho, a nationalist historian, and Kim Ch'ang-suk, a Confucian activist, and others representing groups in Manchuria, Siberia and Hawaii. Apart from issuing a demand for the dissolution of the KPG and a call for a conference of national representatives, the conference was not otherwise productive.⁷⁴

Pak's activities in subsequent years can only be stated in tentative terms, because little verifiable information is available. He is said to have contacted Korean leaders in Manchuria to explore the chances for collaboration in setting up a military base. He also allegedly worked

with a few Chinese warlords in northern China, including Wu Peifu, Feng Yuxiang, and Chang Zuoxiang, to consider Mongolia as a possible site for a military base. Incredible as it may sound, Pak at one point allegedly conferred with the Japanese on anti-Communist measures, and he had entered Korea on a Chinese passport.⁷⁵ We do know that Pak made a trip to Hawaii in 1925 to raise funds from his supporters. We also know that Pak was assassinated by a Korean youth, a member of Uiyoldan, the left-leaning terrorist group, in 1928 under circumstances that are not clear.⁷⁶

Concluding Commentaries

By way of conclusion, three broad observations are offered. (I) The independence movement of Koreans in the United States before 1945 had peaks and valleys that reflected the political changes surrounding Korea. (II) The three most influential leaders of Koreans in the United States provide sharp contrasts in personal attributes and political ideas, and these differences had a negative impact on the movement. (III) The Korean community in the United States has long displayed a high degree of patriotic devotion and commitment, despite dispiriting setbacks.

(I) Patriotic activities of the Korean immigrants in America surged in three periods, each of which witnessed major changes in political circumstances facing Korea: 1905-1910, 1919-1921, and 1941-1945.

The years between 1905 and 1910 saw the initial organization of the newly-arrived Korean immigrants. Several thousand farm laborers made up the majority of the emigrants and they lacked the financial and educational background necessary to adapt to their new environment. Local mutual aid groups and churches were first formed and provided opportunities for cooperation and community life during this period.

These were the years of accelerated and ruthless intrusion of Japanese power into Korea, leading to the final extinction of the Korean empire. In response, the Korean groups and churches in America became politicized and energized. A national consciousness developed and sacrifices, mostly, but not confined to, monetary contributions were made for the sake of patriotic causes. Sundry social and civic organizations came together in the Korean National Association that had branches even in Manchuria, the Russian Maritime Province and Mexico. Active, if inconclusive, discussions on regaining national sovereignty took place. Once Japan's colonial rule became a fait accompli, however, the sense of urgency in the activities of Koreans overseas subsided.

The second period, 1919-1921, was comprised of the immediate post-World War I years that kindled the flames of nationalism in

various parts of the world, including Korea. The March First Movement touched the heart of every Korean living in America. Participants rallied, demonstrated, and lobbied for support from the United States and the victorious allies. The KNA and other Korean organizations mobilized their members and collected funds for these purposes.

At the same time, Koreans in America took part in the formation and operation of the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai. An Ch'ang-ho, Syngman Rhee and a few others went to China from the United States and played key roles. Rhee was active in Washington, before and after his brief China trip, as the president of the KPG in making diplomatic contacts and in raising funds. Pak Yong-man refused participation in the KPG but he, too, rushed to China to prepare an active anti-Japanese campaign. All three men enjoyed the moral and financial support of their friends and supporters in America. The flurry of activity touched off by the March First Movement subsided eventually, especially after An's resignation from the KPG in 1921.

By 1941, both An and Pak were gone, but Rhee resuscitated the long-dormant Korean Commission in Washington D.C. and waged a steady diplomatic and publicity campaign to gain a sympathetic hearing from the United States government. With the prospect of Korea's liberation in sight at long last, Koreans were eager to join the fighting ranks of the allies and prepare for an independent fatherland. However, they had at best only limited success. Furthermore, their cause was marred by internecine feuds.⁷⁷

It is not easy to point to any tangible and direct consequences of the Korean endeavors in America during the war years. But the presence of Korean residents on American soil and the expressions of their aspiration did not go unrecognized at the conferences at Cairo, Yalta and Potsdam. Above all, Koreans in the United States—despite the disunity among them—undoubtedly had the satisfaction of having remained faithful to their nationalist cause.

(II) One of the root causes for the internal discord among the Koreans must be attributed to the inability of Syngman Rhee, An Ch'ang-ho and Pak Yong-man to work together for the common end that they sought with passion. The marked divergences and contrasts in family and educational background, in personality, and in political and policy priorities among the three leaders ultimately prevented them from agreeing on a common approach and, consequently, splintered and weakened the nationalist movement.

The families of both Rhee and Pak belonged to the yangban class, while An was born into a commoner's family. All three received a traditional Confucian education in their early years, but Rhee and Pak completed formal university education in America, while An had only

occasional instruction in English and Bible studies. We are reminded of these social and educational differences when we read about the contrast between the aristocratic behavior ascribed to Rhee and the plebian style to An.⁷⁸ We should also remember that An and, to a lesser degree, Pak, worked as common laborers at different times of their American experiences, but the same cannot be said about Rhee. Those who knew An recollected that he was personable and helpful, particularly to those in need.⁷⁹

Rhee's relationship to An was never close or warm, although they worked together to establish the KPG as a functioning organization, and An reportedly defended Rhee to those in Shanghai who criticized Rhee. For one thing, Rhee and An lived and worked mostly in different parts of the United States, An in California and Rhee in Hawaii or Washington. In contrast, Rhee and Pak had maintained a close but turbulent relationship, especially after they both moved to Hawaii. They attracted devoted followers and competed for political and financial support in a geographically-confined area. After 1915, rivalry between these two strong-willed individuals became intense, turning their "sworn brotherhood" into sworn animosity. The underlying cause was their disagreement over the best strategy to recover Korea's independence.

Put in simple terms, Pak advocated a direct military campaign to fight for independence. In preparation for such a campaign, a universal draft system would have to be instituted, and military training, particularly for the officer corps, should be supported by all patriotic Koreans. He set up training camps in Nebraska and Hawaii and was busy until his death trying to set up a new, perhaps larger, base somewhere in northern China or Mongolia in collaboration with Chinese warlords. The primary purpose of his last visit to Hawaii in 1925 was to raise funds for the project. He apparently had no qualms about working with either the Bolsheviks or the right-wing militarists, as long as they could help him fight the Japanese.

Rhee, on the other hand, realized that Koreans could not defeat the arms. International support, particularly from major Western powers, was a *sine qua non* in order to force the Japanese out of Korea. Diplomacy and public relations were the most logical tools for this strategy. Of course, in order to win foreign support, Koreans must prove themselves worthy of such assistance. Education and social reforms based on democratic principles would create an enlightened and civilized society that would ultimately win the respect and support of the international community. To that end, Korea should follow the Western democratic model and eschew Communism.

An's record shows a two-pronged strategy to build Korea's national power: education and economic development. He established schools in Korea and in China. He also started business enterprises in Korea and the United States. He stressed education not only for its pragmatic application, but also for its promise to effect moral regeneration. Honesty, sincerity and industry were the virtues that the members of the Young Korean Academy were to strive for under his leadership. Although he did not categorically reject the military campaign strategy that he at times seemed to endorse while in China, his counsel to his friends and supporters was to transcend personal or ideological differences, and unite and work together for the long haul toward independence.

In terms of both personal temperament and political priorities, it appears that An was the best qualified to serve as peacemaker between Rhee and Pak. An indeed tried—unsuccessfully—his hand in personal mediation by going to Hawaii in 1915.⁸⁰ Had he succeeded, he could have brought together Rhee's sophistication and knowledge of the world affairs with Pak's dynamic energy for their common cause and may have prepared the Korean community in America better to face the avalanche of events in the 1940s. Pak's untimely and tragic death and An's own painful but heroic end foreclosed a potentially promising opportunity for Koreans to emerge as a united nation within and outside Korea as the thousands of Koreans in America had hoped for over forty years.

(III) It is truly remarkable that the Korean community in America, numbering only in the thousands and for the most part struggling to eke out a living during the initial stages of their settlement, was able to support not only the succession of nationalist programs in the United States but also anti-Japanese activities elsewhere in the world as well. They were largely from the less privileged socio-economic classes in their home country, which then was unable to protect or assist them in any way. Virtually cast away in a strange land without advance preparation, these Koreans survived and retained their emotional ties to their distant homeland for four decades or more.

Called upon by their leaders to support various diplomatic, propaganda and educational activities in the cause of Korea's independence, these immigrants responded with substantial financial contributions, although their aggregate sum cannot be ascertained. Time and again, the KPG and other organizations in China looked toward their compatriots in the United States for money to help finance their patriotic campaigns. Geography dictated a division of labor among the nationalist Koreans overseas, assigning financial responsibility to those in America.⁸¹ It was not an easy burden to bear.

With the benefit of historical hindsight, it is tempting to speculate what the Koreans in America could have accomplished with a more united leadership at the top: Could they have secured a better hearing for their cause in the capitals of the allied powers in World War II and altered the course of history for their homeland after 1945?

Notes

1. Bong-young Choy, *Koreans in America* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1979), pp. 75-77; Hyung-chan Kim and Wayne Patterson, compils. and eds. *The Koreans in America, 1882-1974, A Chronology and Fact Book* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1974), pp. 2-6.
2. Yu Kil-chun, So Chae-p'il, Yun Ch'i-ho are examples of early Korean students who had come before the waves of farm laborers. Choy, pp. 71-72. For details on the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association and its project to bring in Korean workers to balance off the Japanese who had arrived earlier, see Wayne Patterson, *The Korean Frontier in America: Immigration to Hawaii, 1896-1910* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), especially chaps. 6-9.
3. *Ibid.*, chap. 13.
4. Choy, pp. 94-96. The monthly income was \$16 for men and \$12.50 for women in Hawaii.
5. *Ibid.*, p.76.
6. Yo-jun Yun, "Early History of Korean Immigration to America," in Hyung-chan Kim, ed. *The Korean Diaspora* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1977), p. 37.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38.
9. Yu Y6ng-ik, *Yi Sung-man ui salm kwa kkum* [The Life and Dream of Syngman Rhee] (Seoul: The Joong Ang Ilbo-sa, 1996), pp. 38-44.
10. Choy, p. 143; Hyung-chan Kim, "Korean Community Organizations in America: Their Characteristics and Problems," in Hyung-chan Kim, *The Korean Diaspora*, p. 70.
11. *Ibid.* Also see Warren Y. Kim [Kim Won-yong], *Koreans In America* (Seoul: Po Chin Chai Printing Co., 1971), pp. 50-51. Warren Kim gives a different English translation of the name of this organization: the Korean Consolidated Association.
12. Choy, pp. 143-144. Stevens was on his way from Seoul to Washington D.C. His defense of Japanese policy in Korea aroused the anger of Koreans in San Francisco and when he refused to retract his pro-Japanese remarks, Chang In-hwan of the Great Unity Fatherland Protection Society shot him. The Korean community in California and Hawaii hired lawyers and provided the defense fund for Chang's trial; Chang was sentenced to a 25-year prison term but was released after ten years. *Ibid.*, pp. 146-149; Hyung-chan Kim, "Korean Community Organizations .. ." in Hyung-chan Kim, *The Korean Diaspora*, pp. 70-71.

13. Choy, p. 115; Hyung-chan Kim, "Korean Community Organizations in *The Korean Diaspora*, p. 71.
14. Kim and Patterson, *The Koreans in America*, p.20. The first "picture bride," a Sara Choe, arrived in November 1910. Eventually more than 800 of them came to Hawaii. Choy, pp. 88-89.
15. Kim and Patterson, *The Koreans in America*, pp. 19-20; Choy, pp. 116-117. Kim and Patterson translate Hungsa-dan as "Corps for the Advancement of Individuals."
16. Kim and Patterson, pp. 3—4; Hyung-chan Kim, "The History and Role the Church in the Korean American Community," in Hyung-chan Kim, *The Korean Diaspora*, pp. 50-51.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.
18. Choy, pp. 257-258.
19. It was Wadman who helped secure a letter of introduction for Rev. Yun Pyong-gu to meet President Theodore Roosevelt in 1905. Wadman was instrumental for the development of the Methodist church in the Korean community; see Hyung-chan Kim, "... The Church in the Korean American Community," in Hyung-chan Kim, *The Korean Diaspora*, pp. 51-52.
20. Choy, pp. 153-154.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 154-156; Yu Y6ng-ik, *Yi Sung-man ui. . .*, pp. 134-140. For a detailed account on the First Korean Congress see Chong-Sik Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 142-144.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 144-145.
23. An had reservations about creating an exile government at this time and he was reluctant to accept a high position in the government. Nevertheless, An patiently persuaded opposing factions and personalities to compromise in the interest of unity and set the provisional government in motion; *ibid.*, pp. 131-137.
24. See Choy, p. 158. However, the basis for these figures cannot be verified although they may be within possible ranges.
25. Pak Yong-man had been designated as the minister of foreign affairs in the provisional government but he did not work in that capacity very long, if any time at all. Chong-Sik Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism*, pp. 174-176.
26. Choy, pp. 159-160.
27. Yu Y6ng-ik, *YiSung-man ui. . .*, pp. 174-176.
28. Choy, pp. 167-168.
29. Syngman Rhee had organized Tongji-hoe in Hawaii in July 1921 as his own political support group. *Ibid.*, 118-119.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 170-172.
31. Yu Y6ng-ik, *Yi Sung-man Ui*, pp. 194-196.
32. Han Kil-su, the controversial head of a Sino-Korean People's League, is often mentioned as Rhee's archrival who sabotaged the UKC's work thereby giving the impression to the American policy makers that the Koreans were hopelessly divided. Alger Hiss and his alleged pro-Soviet orientation is also mentioned as a contributing

factor for the unsympathetic decisions of the State Department, of which Hiss was a key official, see *ibid.*, pp. 198-205. This writer holds the view that the United States had no coherent Korea policy and was merely treading water in the turbulent sea of world politics.

33. Unless noted otherwise, most of the biographical information on Rhee are from Yu Y6ng-ik, *Yi Sung-man ui...*

34. A recent study on Rhee calls him a radical, see Chong-Sik Lee, *Syngman Rhee: The Prison Years of a Young Radical* (Seoul: The Yonsei University Press, 2001), 208 pp.

35. An English translation of the full text is now available: Syngman Rhee, *The Spirit of Independence: A Primer of Korean Modernization and Reform*, translated by Han-Kyo Kim (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 305 pp. For a comprehensive study of Rhee's activities in prison, see Yu Y6ng-ik, *Cholmun nalui Yi Siingman* (Youthful Syngman Rhee) (Seoul: The Yonsei University Press, 2002), 511 pp.

36. For an account of the Rhee-Pak conflict, see Kingsley K. Lyu, "Korean nationalist Activities in Hawaii and the Continental United States, 1900-1945, Part 1:1900-1919," in *Amerasia Journal* (published by the Asian American Studies Center, University of California, Los Angeles), vol. 4, no. 1, 1977, pp. 65-85. Lyu is very critical of Rhee's tactics. More spiteful account is in Dae-sook Suh, ed. *The Writings of Henry Cu Kim: Autobiography with Commentaries on Syngman Rhee, Pak Yong-man, and Chong Sun-man* (Honolulu: Center for Korean Studies, University of Hawaii, and University of Hawaii Press, 1987).

37. The formal titles varied from "Director of the State and Foreign Affairs" (announced March 21, 1919, by the Siberian group), to "prime minister" (April 11 by the Shanghai group), and to "chief executive" (April 23 by the group in Seoul). Yu Yong-ik, *Yi Sung-man ui...* p. 142.

38. See a photo copy of the memorandum sent to the Japanese emperor: *ibid.*, p. 149.

39. Rhee contacted diplomats from major countries, and targeted Chinese representatives in particular but could not get much beyond repudiation of Japanese imperialist expansion, and no support for raising the Korean issue at the conference. While he was in Geneva, he met an Austrian woman, Francesca Donner, whom he married in New York in 1934.

40. See a reference to Rhee's letter to President Roosevelt dated May 15, 1943 in Yu Yong-ik, *Yi Sung-man ui ...* p.246. On February 4, 1945, Rhee wrote to the Undersecretary of the State, Joseph Grew, urging a prompt recognition of the KPG to thwart the Soviet plans for a communist regime in Korea, *ibid.*

41. Yi Kwang-su, *Tosan An Ch'ang-ho* [Tosan is An's *nom de plume*.] (Seoul: Hungsa-dan Ch'ulp'anbu, 1998), pp. 7-8. This is the fourth printing of the third edition. The same biography was published in 1947 by Tosan kinyom saop-hoe (Tosan Memorial Foundation) without revealing the author's identity.

42. Hyung-chan Kim, *Tosan Ahn Ch 'ang-ho: A Profile of a Prophetic Patriot* (Seoul: Tosan Memorial Foundation and others, 1996), p. 32.

43. *Ibid.*, p.32; Yi Kwang-su, pp. 15-16.

44. Hyung-chan Kim, *Tosan Ahn Ch'ang-Ho*, p.41.

45. Ibid. It is said that the newspaper circulated even in Korea despite Japanese attempts to suppress it.
46. Ibid., pp. 51-54.
47. Ibid., 56-59.
48. Ibid., 59-64.
49. Ibid., pp. 65-70.
50. Ibid., pp. 70-71. An was released not only because he was not a party to the assassination conspiracy but also because the Japanese were still hoping that he would turn a collaborator.
51. An probably had to wait in Vladivostok for a remittance of travel fund from his wife in America. See *ibid.*, pp. 72-77.
52. Ibid., pp. 85-89, 96-121. Also see Tosan An Ch'ang-ho Sonsaeng Kinyom Saop-hoe [*An Ch'angho Memorial Foundation*], *Sunan ui minjok ill wihaydf: Tosan An Ch'angho ui saeng'ae* [In the service of the suffering nation: the life of An Ch'ang-ho] (Seoul: Tosan An Ch'angho Sonsaeng Kinyom Saop-hoe, 1999), Chronology, pp. 232-259.
53. Hyung-chan Kim, *Tosan Ahn Ch'ang-Ho*, pp. 89-96. For a putative verbatim record of An's close questioning of a prospective Academy member, see Yi Kwang-su, pp. 164-205.
54. Hyung-chan Kim, *Tosan Ahn Ch'ang-ho*, pp. 84-85; 123-124.
55. Ibid., pp. 121-130. It is interesting to note that Hyung-chan Kim speculates that An would have declined any active participation in the planning of the March First Movement had he been in Korea, *ibid.*, p. 130.
56. Ibid., pp. 135-162. An is credited for having constructed an underground communication system to keep in contact with nationalist activists in Korea. He also took on a diplomatic task of conferring with visiting United States congressmen seeking American help for the Korean cause.
57. Ibid., pp. 180-186.
58. Ibid., pp. 186-204.
59. Ibid., p.233 and Endnotes 61, 62 and 64 on p. 317.
60. Ibid., pp. 235-237.
61. Ibid., p.238. Also see Kim Ku, *Paekpdm Ilchi: The Autobiography of Kim Ku*, translated by Jongsoo Lee (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2000), p. 227.
62. Hyung-chan Kim, *Tosan Ahn Ch'ang-ho*, pp. 244—245.
63. So Yong-sok, "Pak Yong-man ui sasang kwa minjok undong: Nationalistic Movement and Thought of Yong-Man Park," *Hydpsdng Nonch 'ong*, published by Wonsim University, No. 13 (September 2001), pp. 24-25.
64. See "The Translator's Introduction" by Han-Kyo Kim, and "Postscript" by Pak Yong-man, in Syngman Rhee, *The Spirit of Independence*, pp.13 and 27-28.
65. Yu Il-han and Chong Han-gyong (Henry Chung) traveled with Pak Yong-man. Pak also took Syngman Rhee's six-year old son, Pong-su, to America. So Yong-sok, p.27.

66. Dae-Sook Suh, ed. *The Writings of Henry Cu Kim*, pp. 256-260; S6(Yong-sok, pp. 27-28
67. *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30; Dae-Sook Suh, pp. 262-263. Some of the information in these two sources are ambiguous or inconsistent and require scrutiny and additional data. Henry Cu Kim recalled that "some 100 students" enrolled in the Young Korean Military Academy but Yu Yong-ik has a more plausible number of "about 30," Yu Yong-ik, *Yi Sung-man Ui ...*, p. 128.
68. Henry Cu Kim noted that Pak received "a B.A. degree in political science with a minor in military science" in 1912, see Dae-Sook Suh, p. 189.
69. In early February 1913, Syngman Rhee arrived in Hawaii, apparently at Pak's urging, see *ibid.*, p. 190. Also see Yu Y(ng-ik, Yi S(ng-man (i p. 130.
70. *Ibid.*, pp. 130-131. Henry Cu Kim recounts the details of the Pak-Rhee dispute in Dae-Sook Suh, pp. 190-196.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 273. What Pak said in the "declaration of independence" is unknown and I have not seen any reference to this declaration in other sources.
72. Kingsley K. Liu, p. 73.
73. Chong-Sik Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism*, p. 175.
74. *Ibid.*, pp. 151 and 175; Son Po-gi, "Pak Yong-man," in *Han'guk kundae inmul paekin son* (One Hundred Koreans in Modern History), published by *Sin dong-a*, January 1970, p. 216. Lee gives the dates of April 17 and 24 for the conference, but Son states that it met in June 1919.
75. Dae-Sook Suh, pp. 273-276. See also Suh's own comments on Pak's activities in the 1920s in *ibid.*, xiv-xv.
76. Son Po-gi, p. 216; Dae-Sook Suh, 276.
77. Koreans in the United States were able to gain a special status different from that of the Japanese during World War II. About 20 Koreans received training and worked for the Office of Strategic Services during the war. See Yu Yong-ik, *Yi Sung-man ui ...*, p. 196. Rhee's Korean Commission had a rival group headed by Kim W(n-yong (Warren Kim) and sanctioned by the United Korean Committee operating in the wartime Washington, see Choy, pp.178—181.
78. A long-time supporter of Rhee, Ho Chong, contrasted An and Rhee in these terms, see Hyung-chan Kim, *Tosan Ahn Ch 'ang-ho*, pp. 210-211.
79. Easufk Emsen Charr who came to America in 1904 as a small child and met An on several occasions writes how An bought a three-piece suit and helped find a job for him in San Francisco; see Easurk Emsen Charr, *The Golden Mountain: The Autobiography of a Korean Immigrant, 1895-1960*, edited and with an introduction by Wayne Patterson, Second Edition (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1996), pp. 142-149.
80. Hyung-chan Kim, *Tosan Ahn Ch 'ang-ho*, pp. 102-105.
81. A policy proposal submitted by Pak Yong-man to his supporters in the Korean Independence Laegue in July 1925 contains an explicit statement of this division of labor: "The actual campaign of the independence movement shall be entrusted to the Korean residents in the Far East, and the Korean residents in Hawaii shall provide financial support to the movement and promote education for children." See Warren Kim, pp. 63-64.