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The Korean Independence Movement in the United States

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Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to describe the national independence movement of the Korean residents in the United States and Hawaii before 1945, with emphasis on the roles played by its three most prominent leaders, Syngman Rhee, An Ch'ang-ho and Pak Yong-man. The first shipload of Korean immigrants came to Hawaii in 1903, largely for economic reasons. In the ensuing years, as Japan steadily made inroads into Korea, however, patriotic sentiments seized the Korean community. With the formal installation of the Japanese colonial regime in 1910, the restoration of sovereignty in their homeland became the primary political agenda of the Korea immigrants.

Early in the history of Korean immigrants, a number of local community leaders emerged in Hawaii and California and they, in time, came to rally around a few charismatic individuals, of whom the best known were Rhee, An and Pak. There certainly were other outstanding activists who played key roles in the Korean independence movement in America, but they were either transients or their activities were not as sustained as those of the trio under study here.

Rhee, An and Pak were distinctly different in personal temperament and educational backgrounds although they were contemporaries and collaborated with one another at one time or another. More importantly, perhaps, their ideological outlooks and strategic designs were clearly divergent. Such divergence bred personal rivalries among them that led to serious divisions within the organizations of Korean immigrants in America and elsewhere in the world.

We will begin with a brief history of the Korean communities in America, followed by biographical sketches of the three leaders,

focusing on their political activities in America before 1945. We will conclude with a few observations that help set the context for our review of the topic.

Korean Communities in America

The arrival of 102 Korean immigrants in Honolulu aboard the *Gaelic* on January 13, 1903, marks the beginning of the Korean community in the United States. In the next two years, 7,226 Koreans reached what was then the United States territory of Hawaii aboard 65 steamers. There were some women and children, but most of these emigrants were adult male laborers headed for sugar and pineapple plantations in Hawaiian islands.¹ In addition, there had been a few isolated cases of students and merchants making their way to the United States mainland beginning as early as 1880s, but the overwhelming majority of Korean immigrants were the farm workers brought over by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association through its agents in Korea.² In 1905, the flow of Koreans to Hawaii ceased when the Korean government bowed to pressure from the Japanese government that acted to protect the Japanese immigrant-laborers in Hawaii from competition.³

Common among these early immigrants was the desire for a better life with steady and lucrative jobs that the recruiting agents had promised. However, the reality they faced in Hawaii was much harsher—long hours of hard physical labor six days a week for meager wages, averaging from sixty-five to seventy cents a day.⁴ Reports of higher wages and non-farm employment opportunities on the mainland enticed a sizable number to leave Hawaii—more than 1,000 in 1905—1910.⁵ It is then no surprise that "the early Korean immigrants had a weak national consciousness," pressed as they were by daily survival and adjustment problems.⁶

Before long, "the new life in a land of strange historical and cultural background made them feel a strong love for Korea and her people which inspired them to organize self-governing bodies on the Hawaiian farms."⁷ As early as 1905, a Friendship Association (*Ch 'inmok-hoe*) was established on Ewa Plantation on Oahu Island that launched, in addition to a program of mutual aid, a boycott of Japanese goods. When Japan pressed Korea to appoint a Japanese diplomat as an honorary consul to protect Korean immigrants' interests in Hawaii, the presumed beneficiaries protested and asked for a Korean official instead, even at their own expense if necessary.⁸

Patriotic motives became clear when a special convention of Korean residents in Hawaii adopted, sometime in or before mid-July 1905, a petition addressed to President Theodore Roosevelt, requesting

his intervention on behalf of Korea's sovereign independence at the peace conference to end the Russo-Japanese War. The same convention also selected, as the representatives of "8,000 Korean residents" in Hawaii a local church pastor, Rev. Yun Pyong-gu, and a secret emissary from Seoul, Syngman Rhee.⁹

The Korean plea went unheeded. Japan took over Korea's foreign affairs and set up a quasi-colonial structure, a Residency-General, which steadily expanded its control over Korea's financial, judicial and military affairs. In 1907, Emperor Kojong of Korea was forced to abdicate in favor of his feeble-minded son and the last army units were dissolved.

Koreans in Hawaii and on the United States mainland held a joint protest rally against the so-called Protectorate Treaty of 1905 and passed a resolution condemning Japan's encroachment on Korea and vowed never to recognize Japanese authorities in Korea or Japanese jurisdiction over the Koreans in the United States. Between December 1905 and September 1907, more than twenty organizations emerged and their stated purposes "included, without exception, resistance against the Japanese colonial policy and political independence for Korea."¹⁰ These groups came together by September 1907 in the United Korean Society (*Hanin Hapsdng Hyophoe*) headquartered in Honolulu."

On America's west coast, in the meantime, similar communal-cum-political organizations were formed: the Mutual Assistance Society (*Kongnip Hyophoe*) after 1905, with several local chapters in California, and the Great Unity Fatherland Protection Society (*Taedong Poguk-hoe*) in San Francisco. The Mutual Assistance Society publicly rejected Japan's offer of relief funds in the aftermath of the 1906 earthquake in San Francisco. Members of these organizations also attacked and killed Durham W. Stevens, a pro-Japanese American advisor to the Korean government.¹²

In a bold move to consolidate the patriotic efforts of all Koreans outside Korea, which was now under Japanese control, the Korean National Association (*Tae Hanin Kungmin-hoe*; "KNA" hereafter) was organized on February 1, 1909, in San Francisco to represent all Korean interests in the United States, Siberia and Manchuria. On the United States mainland and Hawaii, KNA acted as a quasi-consular agency, requiring all Korean residents to become its members and pay dues. At the news of Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910, the KNA held a large rally and adopted a resolution that called Japan an enemy nation and declared August 29, the date of the annexation treaty, a day of national humiliation. Most Korean political organizations in America were soon "consolidated" into the KNA.¹³

A few years after Korea had been placed under the firm and harsh rule of the Japanese Government-General, the Korean community in America went through a prolonged period of internal discord and realignment that was fueled, among others, by the schism between those supporting Pak Yong-man and those backing Syngman Rhee. At the same time, new organizations came on the scene. The Korean Women's Association was organized in Honolulu in 1913, as the arrival of the "picture brides" were beginning to alter the lifestyle of the Koreans on the island.¹⁴ Student and youth groups were formed for para-military training in Nebraska and elsewhere by Pak Yong-man and others after 1909, while educational objectives were professed by An Ch'ang-ho as he recruited the first members of the well-known Academy (*Hvngsa-dari*) in San Francisco in 1913.¹⁵

We should underscore here the pivotal roles played by various Korean Christian churches in meeting the communal as well as spiritual needs of the Korean emigrants from the very beginning of their life in the new world. The first church service was held on July 4, 1903. The Christian population among the Koreans in Hawaii, which numbered only 400 or so in 1905, gained, by 1918, approximately 2,800 new converts attending thirty-nine churches.¹⁶ In California, church services began in Oakland in June 1914. In time, several churches of different denominations came to be established in other cities, including Los Angeles, Chicago and New York.¹⁷ These churches were "centers of the Korean community" where even non-Christians came for companionship and the discussion of various issues, including those that reflected their aspiration for national independence.¹⁸ One example of the Korean congregations' nationalistic behavior was the controversy in 1912 over the acceptance of a \$750 donation from the Japanese consul in Honolulu by American Methodist superintendent John W. Wadman, ostensibly to help poor Koreans. Despite Wadman's credible record as a pro-Korean sympathizer,¹⁹ he was roundly denounced by Koreans for taking Japanese money.

The March First Movement of 1919 rekindled the flame of nationalism among Koreans in the United States. When World War I ended, the KNA planned to send a three-man delegation, which included Syngman Rhee, to the Peace Conference to plead the Korean cause. (It did not materialize due to the United States' refusal to issue necessary travel documents.) The news of massive peaceful demonstrations and their brutal suppression by the Japanese in Korea took days to reach the Koreans in America. But by mid-March 1919, the KNA held a mass rally in San Francisco in support of the Movement and decided to establish a Korean Information Office headed by Philip Jaisohn (So Chae-p'il). Furthermore, the KNA chose

to send its chairman, An Ch'ang-ho, to China in anticipation of the formation of a Korean provisional government.²⁰

Shortly thereafter, "the First Korean Congress" was held in Philadelphia, April 14-16, 1919, under the leadership of Philip Jaisohn and Syngman Rhee. Approximately 150 Koreans, representing twenty-seven organizations from the United States and Mexico, gathered and passed resolutions announcing a blueprint for the future Korean republic based on democratic principles and pledged to support the Korean provisional government in Shanghai as "a legitimate government of the Korean people." On the last day, the conferees marched, waving the Korean as well as the American flags, through the streets to Independence Hall and conducted an impressive ceremony that included the reading of the Korean Declaration of Independence by Rhee in the same room where the American Declaration had been signed.²¹

Clearly, the aim of the Korean Congress was to publicize the Korean cause and influence the American public. To that end, Jaisohn's information office started publishing pamphlets and a monthly magazine, the *Korea Review*. He also formed a League of the Friends of Korea to solicit active support from American sympathizers. By the fall of 1919, Syngman Rhee, as the head of the Korean Provisional Government ("KPG" hereafter), created a Korean Commission in Washington and appointed Kim Kyu-sik (Kiusic Kimm) to chair it. Its principal mission was to win friends, especially among the members of the United States Congress. A few American lawmakers did speak in the halls of the United States Congress on Korea's behalf, although no formal action was taken.²²

In addition to these public relations activities in the United States, the attention of Koreans in America was naturally focused on the rising tempo of patriotic activities in China and Siberia, where the majority of Korean activists were. There were three geographical centers of Korean exiles in Northeast Asia: Shanghai, the Chientao region of Manchuria, and the Maritime Province of Siberia. An Ch'ang-ho was one of the first to arrive in Shanghai from America and he was instrumental in establishing Shanghai as the center of the independence movement and in getting KPG operations underway.²³ Syngman Rhee did not arrive in Shanghai until December 1920 to assume his formal duties as the president. A substantial portion of the funds that had been collected from Koreans in Hawaii and elsewhere in the United States was funneled to China. One source estimates that over \$200,000 had been contributed by approximately 7,000 Koreans in the United States and Mexico for patriotic causes at this time, or roughly 30 dollars per person, one month's income.²⁴ Moreover, Pak Yong-man, who

vehemently opposed the KPG in Shanghai, perhaps for both policy and personal reasons, was active in northern China, preparing for immediate military actions against Japan. Pak's followers in Hawaii gave him the financial and moral support for his campaign.²⁵ In short, the Korean communities in America provided two crucial ingredients to energize the independence movement in the period following the March First Movement: leaders and financial resources.

By the end of 1921, however, the KPG had lost much of its steam. An Ch'ang-ho and a few other members of the cabinet resigned, voicing disagreement with Syngman Rhee, who in turn left abruptly for the United States. When the Washington Disarmament Conference met in 1921-1922, it was Jaisohn who submitted a petition signed by the representatives of various Korean groups in Korea, asking for recognition of the Korean Provisional Government as the legitimate government of the Korean people. The petition was never discussed because of strong Japanese objection.²⁶ When the League of Nations met in Geneva in 1933 to discuss Japan's invasion of Manchuria, Rhee journeyed there to mount a solitary campaign among the delegates and the journalists for international recognition of the KPG, but gained only occasional informal words of sympathy.²⁷ The KPG, in the meantime, won attention — and sympathy, at least from China — through individual acts of terrorism aimed at Japanese leaders, including its emperor in 1932. Kim Ku, a KPG leader allegedly operating with financial support from Korean residents in Hawaii, directed the bombing assaults.²⁸

As Japan pushed deeper into China, Rhee moved from Honolulu to Washington to resume an active diplomatic campaign for Korea's freedom. He foresaw an American war with Japan and issued a warning in the form of a book, *Japan Inside Out*, which was published in the summer of 1941. The gathering war clouds prompted the various Korean organizations, including the KNA and the Comrade Society (*Tongji-hoe*),²⁹ to join forces and form the United Korean Committee ("UKC" hereafter) in April 1941 to give financial and spiritual support to the KPG. As the sole agent of the KPG, the UKC was to collect "independence contributions" and forward two-thirds of the revenue to the KPG. Rhee was chosen to chair the UKC, and was so approved subsequently by the KPG.³⁰

After Pearl Harbor, the primary objective of the UKC was to secure formal diplomatic recognition of the KPG as the government of Korea, albeit in exile, and an ally of the United Nations against the Axis powers. Rhee, his advisors and a small staff met with or wrote to American officials, a Korean-American Council was formed to support the Korean endeavor, and a Korean Liberty Conference was held at a

Washington hotel in 1942 on the anniversary of the March First Movement.³¹ For a variety of reasons which we cannot discuss in this paper,³² the United States rejected the repeated Korean pleas. A seven-man delegation headed by Rhee arrived in San Francisco in March 1945 to attend the first meeting of the United Nations Organization, but it was barred from the conference. World War II ended without an internationally-recognized governmental entity representing the Korean people.

Having sketched the broad outline of the patriotic activities of the Korean community in America prior to 1945, we can now examine the contrasting records of the three leaders who led these activities.

Syngman Rhee Before 1945

Rhee was born in 1875, the only son of an impoverished descendant of Prince Yangny(ng, the older brother of King Sejong of the Yi dynasty. Rhee's birthplace was a small village in Hwanghae Province, but his family moved to Seoul when he was only two years old. After a period of customary Confucian tutoring, Rhee enrolled in 1895 at Paeje School that was established by an American Methodist missionary and attracted young students interested in Western learning. He excelled in his studies, especially in English, and his speech at his graduation ceremony in 1898 was delivered in English—a feat that won praise from Korean and American dignitaries in attendance.³³

It was a time when Korea was undergoing for the first time systematic political and cultural modernization. As an impressionable youth in his early twenties, Rhee plunged into the rough waters of politics by joining the Independence Club (*Tongniip Hyophoe*) and advocating frontal assaults on the ancien regime. His speeches inspired crowds to stage street demonstrations and his writings in the newly emerging journalistic publications demanded reforms. By the standards of the day, he was a radical.³⁴ After a brief period of triumph, Rhee was imprisoned on a charge of high treason and spent more than five-and-a-half years behind bars. In his prison cell, he managed to write a book, *The Spirit of Independence*, exhorting fellow countrymen to do their patriotic duties and reform their society.³⁵ He also became a Christian and converted more than forty of his fellow inmates to join him.

As Japan was tightening its grip on Korea in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, Rhee was released and, within a few months, headed for the United States under circumstances that have not been fully explained. It is said that his trip was arranged by two of Emperor Kojong's confidants, Min Yong-hwan and Han Kyu-sol, to solicit American intervention on Korea's behalf at the Portsmouth Peace Conference. Rhee and Rev. Yun Pyŏng-gu of Hawaii were able to

secure a meeting with President Theodore Roosevelt, but their mission was a failure. Rhee then spent the next five years studying and earning academic degrees from George Washington University (BA), Harvard (MA) and Princeton (Ph.D.) — an impressive achievement in a record time. When Japan formally annexed Korea, the first Korean with an American doctorate was on his way home to work at the Seoul YMCA.

Rhee's stay in Seoul did not last long, however. Feeling threatened by the mass arrest of Korean leaders in the so-called "105-man case," Rhee left for the United States for the second time in March 1912, ostensibly to attend a Methodist convention in Minneapolis. Several months after the church meeting, Rhee decided to move to Hawaii and open a new chapter of his life. For the next several years, he was engaged in running a church-operated school for Korean children, publishing a monthly magazine for Korean residents—the *Korean Pacific Magazine* (later, the *Korean Pacific Weekly*)—and in promoting evangelical works of church groups. As he became more established as a leader in the Korean community, he also became involved in a bitter internecine power struggle with Pak Yong-man, his erstwhile "sworn brother" and a fellow inmate in the Seoul prison. They were both energetic and ambitious, and they shared patriotic devotion to Korea, but they were miles apart in their plans for recovering Korea's sovereign independence.

Pak advocated a direct military challenge to Japan and, to that end, training and establishing an army was the most urgent task. Rhee, on the other hand, believed that the most effective way to defeat the Japanese colonial rule in Korea was to use diplomacy and propaganda means to secure the political support of major foreign powers and of the international community. If Pak considered Rhee's strategy somewhat uninspiring and irresolute, Rhee believed that Pak was too simplistic and misguided in his approach. Rhee had earlier visited Pak's military training bases in Nebraska and Hawaii, perhaps to humor his younger comrade, but when the allocation of the limited resources of the KNA in Hawaii was at stake in mid-1915, the two protagonists became irreconcilably hostile to each other. Malicious rumors of embezzlement and corruption spread fanning ill will between them that escalated into physical confrontations, police intervention and litigation.³⁶

The March First Movement transformed Rhee overnight from a local community activist in Hawaii into a national political leader with a revolutionary agenda. Independence movement leaders within Korea, in the Russian Maritime Province and in Shanghai all selected him as the top leader of the governments that they announced, although none of them used the title "president."³⁷ Why was he chosen to lead the government in exile? Presumably Rhee's past activities that had led to

his imprisonment and later his meeting with the American president, his educational credentials and his residency in America were some of reasons for the fame and support that he enjoyed. His non-involvement in political jockeying among the contending personalities and groups in China and elsewhere in Asia may also have helped him seem more attractive.

Even before he went to Shanghai in late 1920 to assume his duties, Rhee wasted no time in representing himself—and acting—as "president," the title which his KPG colleagues formally conferred on him only later. He addressed a memorandum to the emperor of Japan announcing the creation of "a completely organized, self governed State" of Korea and the election of himself as "President of the Republic of Korea."³⁸ Similar notifications were sent to the governments of the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy as well as to the presiding officer of the Versailles Peace Conference. He appointed Kim Kyu-sik to head a Korean Commission and started a fundraising campaign by selling bonds. At one point, he also signed a petition requesting that Korea be declared a mandate territory of the League of Nations as a means to ending Japan's domination of the peninsula. Rhee took all these actions without prior consultation with his colleagues in the KPG.

Rhee's sojourn in Shanghai failed to create unity in the KPG and his refusal to accommodate the left-leaning faction that included Yi Tong-hwi, a powerful advocate of an anti-Japanese military campaign, exacerbated the schism in Korean leadership. Moreover, Rhee's explanations for some of the controversial decisions he had made in Washington, such as the petition for a League mandate, failed to mollify his critics. After only six months in Shanghai, Rhee returned to the United States, citing the need to attend to pressing diplomatic and financial problems for his departure. Back in Washington, Rhee teamed up with Jaisohn and others in an unsuccessful attempt to present the Korean case before the Washington Disarmament Conference, 1921-1922. In September 1922, the frustrated Rhee returned to Honolulu. His KPG presidency ended officially in 1925, when he was impeached by a one-vote margin for abandoning his office and for dereliction of duty in a hastily improvised impeachment proceeding in Shanghai.

For the next several years, Rhee remained mostly in Hawaii cultivating his political base, especially around the Comrade Society (*Tongji-hoe*) of which he was president for life. He traveled to Europe in 1932-1933, primarily to bring the Korean case before the League of Nations conference that met to discuss Japan's invasion of Manchuria. He was once again disappointed although his solo mission received

some attention from the local press.³⁹ As Japan moved into China proper after 1937, Rhee foresaw a future conflict between Japan and the United States. He wrote *Japan Inside Out*, as mentioned earlier, to alert Americans to the impending danger. He also moved back to Washington and revived the long dormant Korean Commission, as both the UKC and the KPG commissioned Rhee to head a diplomatic mission and obtain formal recognition of the KPG.

During the war years, 1941-1945, Rhee became a familiar figure around Washington, trying to win support from skeptical or unconcerned officials, politicians, journalists and other men of influence. A Korean Liberty Congress was convened in a downtown hotel as a publicity event. Proposals were submitted to the United States military for organizing guerrilla forces consisting of Korean fighters. Rhee also began sounding an alarm over the dangers coming from Soviet Communism.⁴⁰ These entreaties were largely ignored, including Rhee's attempt to attend the first United Nations conference in April 1945.

Two months after Japan's surrender, Rhee returned to Korea for the first time in 33 years. A discussion of his life and activities in the subsequent years is outside the scope of this study.

An Ch'ang-ho

An Ch'ang-ho was born in 1878 in South P'yŏngan Province to a poor farming family. He was the youngest of four children. Although his family lacked the social status of *yangban*, it nevertheless provided the young An with an education in the Confucian classics. In 1894, the fifteen-year old An witnessed firsthand the Sino-Japanese War, which brought destruction and misery to the hapless Korean civilians in the Pyongyang area. According to Yi Kwang-su, the popular literary figure of the 1920s who wrote a biography of An, the destruction caused by foreign armies fighting on Korean soil made the young An realize that Korea's own weakness was to be blamed.⁴¹ He made his way to Seoul and began studying at a missionary school, Kuse Haktang. He also became a Christian.

In 1898, An joined the Independence Club and became active in Pyongyang, where he delivered a stirring speech denouncing bureaucratic corruption before a large crowd. When the reactionary government banned the Independence Club, An returned home in 1899 and started a co-educational school that he named Chomjin Hakkyo, or "gradual progress school," reflecting his belief in evolutionary change through education. Meanwhile, he decided to seek further education himself by going to the United States. He was encouraged in his decision by some American missionaries, including Rev. F. S. Miller,

who officiated at An's wedding the day before the newlyweds left for America.

The Ans arrived in San Francisco on October 14, 1902, and landed jobs as live-in domestic helpers. An also sought opportunities for public school education, above all, to learn English, but the over-age Korean student was not welcome. He then made a decision "to forsake a formal education in America and to work towards strengthening the local Korean community."⁴² No more than a dozen in number, Korean residents in San Francisco lacked internal harmony and, according to Yi Kwang-su, An witnessed a scuffle on the street between two Korean ginseng peddlers, an embarrassing experience that convinced him of the need to organize a fraternal society (*Ch 'immok-hoe*). He visited with and persuaded fellow countrymen in the city to follow a civilized life style and to assist one another in becoming more respectable members of the community. He personally set an example by helping clean and beautify the homes of some Korean residents. It was a case of down-to-earth community work through patient person-to-person contact.⁴³

In March 1904, An moved to Riverside, California, and took a job doing "schoolboy work," which entailed cooking, cleaning and other domestic chores. Some evenings, he studied English and the Bible. He also worked in fruit orchards with other Korean workers. In 1905, he moved back to San Francisco and organized the Mutual Assistance Association (*Kongnip Hyophoe*) to help Koreans arriving from Hawaii settle in and find employment. Within the next few years, local chapters of the Association, of which An was the president, were formed in Los Angeles, Riverside, Redlands and Rock Springs in Wyoming with a total membership of 600.⁴⁴ This Association also published a newspaper, the *United Korean (Kongnip Sinbo)*, that reported—and denounced—Japanese acts of aggression against Korea.⁴⁵

Early in 1907, An returned to Korea to see for himself what changes had taken place in his homeland and what he could do to stop the precipitous decline of the nation. On the way he stopped in Tokyo where he met Korean students, some of whom, such as Yi Kwang-su, were deeply impressed by him. Once in Korea, he gave speeches before students and intellectuals as well as the general public, in Seoul, Pyongyang and elsewhere. His themes included Christian principles, an exhortation not to sell land to the Japanese and a plea that everyone should do whatever he could, however small, for the country. The Japanese authorities kept a close watch on An's activities, which they suspected stirred up anti-Japanese sentiment. An also became friends with a number of individuals who were or soon would be key figures

in journalistic and scholarly circles, such as Ch'oi Nam-son, Pak Un-sik, and Sin Ch'ae-ho.⁴⁶

Sometime soon after his arrival in Korea, An established a secret organization, the New People's Association (*Sinmin-hoe*, "NPA" hereafter) whose professed purpose was "to renew our people, to renew business ... and to help establish a renewed, civilized and free nation by a renewed and united people." The membership of the NPA included journalists, youth and religious leaders, military officers, merchants and industrialists and members of the California-based Mutual Assistance Association. An talked Yang Ki-t'ak, a veteran newspaperman, into accepting the NPA presidency and he himself chose to work without an official title, concentrating on the recruitment of new members.⁴⁷

An helped establish fourteen schools including the well-known Osan Middle School and Taesong Middle School, between 1907 and 1909. In order to establish a nationwide reputation for the latter school, which was meant to be a model for other schools, An invited Yun Ch'i-ho, the well respected educator and former high official, to serve as head of the school, while An himself actually operated it. Among the Taesong graduates were future activists in national independence movement, but it was ordered closed by the Japanese colonial government in 1913.⁴⁸

An and the NPA were also involved in many other projects: a chain of book stores, publication of a magazine, *The Youth (Sonyon)* edited by Ch'oe Nam-son, a young students association, and a number of business ventures, including a ceramics factory, in keeping with An's idea of building educational, cultural and industrial foundations for a modern Korea. Apparently, An's ability to win friends and manage various voluntary organizations was intriguing enough for Japanese Resident-General Ito Hirobumi to invite An to a meeting in November 1907, where Ito allegedly floated the idea of An heading a Korean cabinet consisting of younger leaders. An summarily rejected the offer.⁴⁹ When Ito was assassinated by a Korean nationalist in 1909, An was suspected of involvement in the conspiracy and had to spend two months in a Japanese army prison.⁵⁰ By then, An knew that it was not safe for him to remain in Korea and decided to go into exile.

He slipped away aboard a Chinese salt carrier and landed in Weihaiwei in April 1910. A meeting with several of his comrades was held in Qingdao in July to discuss plans for restoring Korea's independence. The conferees were split between those advocating an immediate military campaign and those, including An, in favor of a more gradual process of building up Korea's capabilities to win and keep its freedom. No firm decision was reached. After Qingdao, An traveled to Vladivostok, where he stayed a few months meeting Korean

residents in the area and even visiting a **potential** site in Manchuria for a **Utopian** Korean settlement. He made his way back to America via the trans-Siberian railway, Berlin and London, arriving in New York early in September 1911.⁵¹

For the next several years until 1919, An devoted himself to the works of Korean organizations in the United States, Hawaii and Mexico. He focused on strengthening and unifying the KNA, a project that led to his election, in late 1912, as chairman of the Central Congress of the KNA, a newly created top-level body, above the regional conferences of North America, Hawaii, Siberia and Manchuria. He traveled to Hawaii in 1915 to mediate an internal feud within the regional KNA that was caused by bitter rivalry between Syngman Rhee and Pak Yong-man. He made a ten-month trip to Mexico, starting in October 1917, to help organize KNA branches especially in Merida, Yucatan, where hundreds of Koreans worked on sisal hemp farms under miserable conditions.⁵²

At the same time, An undertook to organize a select group of patriotic young men into a fraternal society for moral and intellectual development; the Young Korean Academy (Hungsadan) was formally established on May 13, 1913, in San Francisco with 35 original members in attendance. An personally conducted rigorous interviews whenever possible before inviting new members to join the Academy, and he took pains to have all eight provinces of Korea represented in the Academy's membership in order to avoid any suspicion of regional favoritism.⁵³ In time, local chapters of the Academy came to be organized in China and Korea itself, providing An a dependable base of support for his nationalist campaign.

True to his conviction that Koreans should build up their economic muscle, An made a sustained effort during his second sojourn in the United States to establish a business corporation, the North American Industrial Company (*Pungmi Sirop Chusik Hoesa*), as a first step. Common stock was sold to Koreans in America and Mexico, with many shares going to members of the Young Korean Academy, and by 1918, \$70,000 had been raised. The company first undertook commercial potato farming, and switched to rice cultivation later, but the venture was largely unsuccessful.⁵⁴

At the conclusion of the armistice in 1918, An called a KNA meeting that resolved to submitted a petition to the Paris peace conference. He also took steps to raise funds for the diplomatic activities. But he was not optimistic about the chances for success; he continued to hold the view that Koreans should first build a firm foundation for independence. While KNA leaders were still discussing their plans for the peace conference, the March First Movement

erupted in Korea. An first received the news via Shanghai, and he promptly notified various regional KNA conferences and individual leaders such as Syngman Rhee and Philip Jaisohn. Under An's leadership, the Central Congress of the KNA passed resolutions to mount diplomatic and public information campaigns for American support which Jaisohn and Rhee were to conduct on the East Coast. The Central Congress also decided to raise funds and urged all Korean residents to contribute a minimum of \$10 for the month of March and one twentieth of their monthly income thereafter. An personally traveled extensively in California to solicit "independence contributions." He was also selected to go to Shanghai as a representative of the KNA and participate in the establishment of a Korean provisional government.⁵⁵

An arrived in Shanghai via Hong Kong May 25, 1919, and stayed in China, mostly in Shanghai, for the next five-and-a-half years until November 1924. Even before his arrival, An had already been selected by those pressing for the immediate establishment of a provisional government to assume the post of Minister of Home Affairs. An, however, preferred a more gradual process of various individuals' and groups' cooperating, perhaps, to form an united political party and declined the cabinet post. But he was eventually persuaded to join the government as acting premier and helped reorganize the government (KPG) from a parliamentary cabinet system to a presidential system. Armed with the modest funds he had brought with him, An patiently convinced suspicious rivals to compromise and keep the facade of a functioning KPG under Syngman Rhee as the first president—until 1921.⁵⁶

The contentious exiles could not, however, long refrain from going their separate ways. The incumbent of the second highest office, Premier Yi Tong-hwi, resigned and left Shanghai in early 1921, shattering any hope for continuation of a functioning KPG. An himself resigned in May 1921 as KPG's labor department superintendent, a modest title that he had allowed himself to take after giving up the acting premiership. Freed of formal KPG ties, An tried anew his campaign to construct a political organization of national unity. After months of painstaking preparations, he organized a conference of national representatives of all Koreans from various geographical areas and of all political persuasions. On January 3, 1923, the conference opened in the French concession area of Shanghai with approximately 160 attendees representing over seventy organizations. An opened the session and he tried for the next six months to hammer out a common strategy for the independence movement. The future of the KPG was one of the hotly-debated issues but the discussion of three options—to

keep the status quo, to reform it, or to abandon it in favor of a new organization—became deadlocked without any resolution.⁵⁷

An was more successful in organizing the Far Eastern Branch of the Young Korean Academy. He recruited new members, including Yi Kwang-su, who helped him write and disseminate his "Epistle to My Compatriots" (*Tongp'o ege kohanim gift*) that encapsulated An's political ideas. He also visited northern China in search for a suitable piece of land to build an ideal community—a life long dream of An. Turning to education, another long standing interest of his, An established in March 1924 a school in Nanjing, Tongmyong Institute, to help prepare Korean students for college education in Europe, America or China.⁵⁸ An then left Shanghai to return to his family and comrades in America.

An's stay in America was relatively short this time, and he was kept busy visiting and thanking his supporters and conferring with the Young Korean Academy members in California. He also toured the Midwest and the East Coast of the United States. He stopped for varying lengths of time in Chicago, South Bend, Detroit, Kansas City, Princeton and New York to give speeches and meet with students including PaekNak-chun, Ho Chong, Chang T6k-su, Kim To-yon and others. A young Columbia University student, Chang Ni-uk accompanied him part of the way. He also met Philip Jaisohn twice in the course of 1925. Early in 1926, An had to leave the United States, primarily because he could not extend his visa to stay longer. He sailed to China via Australia and Hong Kong, arriving in Shanghai in mid-May.

Upon arrival in Shanghai, An was informed that he had been elected premier of the KPG but he declined. Instead, he endorsed a new venture by the Young Korean Academy to publish a magazine, *Tongkwang* (Eastern Light), in Korea. At the same time, he planned to create a Great Independence Party (*Tae Tongnip Tang*) and to continue exploring the chances for the model community project. With these in mind, he visited Beijing in the fall and went on to Manchuria. While visiting the Jirin area in southeastern Manchuria, he delivered a speech before a large crowd that apparently included the young Kim II Sung, according to sources in North Korea.⁵⁹ The lecture meeting was broken up when Chinese police moved in and arrested dozens of people, including An, presumably at the request of Japanese authorities in the area. He was released, however, after a twenty-day detention, and went on to visit northern Manchuria before returning to Shanghai. His continuing interest in a model community site was part of the reason for his trip to the Philippines in 1929, where he was impressed by the open and more democratic American colonial policy, as compared to the

Japanese behavior in Korea.⁶⁰

An was one of the 28 founding members of the Korean Independence Party (*Han 'guk Tongnip Tang*) that was established on January 25, 1930; other co-founders included Yi Tong-nyong, Kim Tu-bong, Yun Ki-sop, Cho So-ang and Cho Wan-gu. Kim Ku, the future leader of the KPG, was also involved in the party.⁶¹ The formation of the party that brought together various non-Communist nationalists at this time may have been an attempt to keep the moribund KPG alive. The exiled group, however, won the respect and support from the Chinese when two young KPG supporters hurled bombs at the procession of the Japanese emperor in January 1932, and at high Japanese officials in Shanghai three months later. The two attacks were directed by Kim Ku who used \$1,000 sent to him by his supporters in Hawaii.⁶² In the aftermath of the second attack, the Japanese police conducted a massive search for the presumed accomplices, and An fell into their hands.

An was taken to Korea in June 1932. The fifty-four-year-old prisoner, in failing health, was charged with violation of the infamous Peace Preservation Law and was sentenced to four years in prison. Paroled after three years, An visited a few friends in Seoul and elsewhere and retired to a cottage on a secluded hillside in his home province of South P'yongan. He was re-arrested a little over two years later when scores of his friends, including Yi Kwang-su, were jailed by the Japanese thought police only days before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident that eventually led to World War II in Asia. Six months later, the gravely ill An was transferred to the University Hospital in Seoul, where he died on March 10, 1938, at age 59.

Pak Yong-man

Pak Yong-man was born July 2, 1881, to a yangban family of military tradition in a rural town in Kangwon province. The only son of his parents, Pak was orphaned at an early age and was raised by his uncle, Pak Hui-byong. When his uncle moved to Seoul and began studying English, Pak Yong-man enrolled at a Japanese language school. When his uncle went to Japan to study, Yong-man once again followed and he graduated from a middle school and studied politics at Keio Gijuku for a couple of years. His uncle also introduced him to Pak Yŏng-hyo (no relation), a prominent reform advocate in exile in Japan, and the latter may have influenced the young Pak with reformist ideas. The budding political activist returned home, perhaps in 1897, and became involved in a peasant rights movement, *hwalpin-tang* ("Help the Indigent Party"), the People's Assembly (*Manmin kongdong-hoe*) and a protest movement of Poan-hoe against a Japanese demand for

Korean farm lands. He was also active in the Christian youth group that gathered at Sangdong Church in Seoul and became well known to some of the American missionaries. Although details on his life in this period remain murky, we know that he was imprisoned twice by the conservative Korean government, each time for several months at least. During his second stay in prison, he and Syngman Rhee, a fellow inmate, became "sworn brothers."⁶³ It was Pak who smuggled the manuscript of Rhee's *The Spirit of Independence* out of prison and out of Korea to the United States.⁶⁴

Released from prison some time in 1904, Pak followed his uncle to Sonch'on, South P'yongan Province, and taught Korean, Japanese, arithmetic and Chinese classics at a local private school, for a short time. Pak, together with several other students, left for the United States, presumably in late 1904.⁶⁵ Landing in San Francisco, Pak and his party made their way to Nebraska where railroad construction work was easily available. At one point, however, Pak joined his uncle, H(i-by(ng, who had arrived in the United States in 1905 and operated an employment agency in Denver, Colorado. While in Denver, Pak organized a conference of thirty-six "patriotic" Koreans from various parts of the United States partly, to publicize the Korean cause to the Republican National Convention that met there in June 1908. The Korean conference also made the decision to establish a military school as a step toward an armed struggle against Japan.⁶⁶

Following the death of Pak Hui-byong, Pak Yong-man returned to Nebraska and enrolled at the University of Nebraska. He also set up "The Young Korean Military School" in a rented farm at Kearny, Nebraska, in the summer of 1909; a year later the school moved to the campus of Hastings College. About thirty students registered for a summer program of farm work and training that included, besides military drills, learning etiquette, American history, English and Korean. Pak himself prepared a primer for Korean lessons. The school project was partially financed by an assessment levied on the members of the Korean Resident Association of Nebraska that had been first organized in 1909. The military school, or program, produced its first "graduating class" of thirteen students in 1912 and remained in operation until 1915.⁶⁷

Pak Yong-man, in the meantime, was busy not only with his own college education⁶⁸ but also with a year of journalism work in San Francisco as the editor of *Hapsong Sinmun* (renamed *Sinhan Minbo* later), a newspaper published by the North American Regional Headquarters of the KNA. He published an essay, "On a Universal Draft System," in the paper and stressed the patriotic duty of everyone to serve in the military as well as to pay an assessment. Pak's

journalistic career continued in Hawaii, beginning in December 1912, when he became the editor of *Sin Han 'guk-po* (renamed *Kungmin-po* or *The Korean National Herald* later), published by the Hawaiian Regional Conference of the KNA.⁶⁹

Hawaii provided Pak an opportunity to expand his military training project. He established the Korean Military Corporation in June 1913 at Ahuimanu, Oahu, and a Korean Military Academy in August. The Academy enrolled some 124 students who had been soldiers in Korea before they emigrated to Hawaii; they worked ten or more hours a day on a pineapple farm but spent their "spare" time in military training. The project, however, did not last long and came to an end by late 1917. Financial difficulty was a reason for its closing as well as opposition from United States government sources responding to complaints by the Japanese. Moreover, Pak had to cope with growing opposition from within the Korean community, especially from Syngman Rhee and his supporters, who considered the project too costly and unrealistic.⁷⁰

When World War I ended, Pak "published a declaration of independence in the name of the Korean nation, the first declaration of its kind."⁷¹ He also organized a Korean Independence League (Tongnip-dan) in March 1919 as a military training school, and the League functioned as his support group even when he was away. Pak, in the meantime, decided to go to the Northeast Asia because it was the logical place to wage the campaign against Japanese colonialism. He joined the United States Siberian Expeditionary Forces as an intelligence officer and left Hawaii on board a United States transport in May 1919.⁷² While in Siberia, Pak worked together with a Comintern agent named Wurin in a Sino-Russian Joint Propaganda Department headed by the latter.⁷³ After the American expedition ended, Pak remained in the area. Although he had been offered the post of foreign minister in the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, he declined it, in part because Syngman Rhee was selected the head of the KPG. Instead, he organized in April 1921 a "Military Unification Conference" in Beijing that was attended by Sin Ch'ae-ho, a nationalist historian, and Kim Ch'ang-suk, a Confucian activist, and others representing groups in Manchuria, Siberia and Hawaii. Apart from issuing a demand for the dissolution of the KPG and a call for a conference of national representatives, the conference was not otherwise productive.⁷⁴

Pak's activities in subsequent years can only be stated in tentative terms, because little verifiable information is available. He is said to have contacted Korean leaders in Manchuria to explore the chances for collaboration in setting up a military base. He also allegedly worked

with a few Chinese warlords in northern China, including Wu Peifu, Feng Yuxiang, and Chang Zuoxiang, to consider Mongolia as a possible site for a military base. Incredible as it may sound, Pak at one point allegedly conferred with the Japanese on anti-Communist measures, and he had entered Korea on a Chinese passport.⁷⁵ We do know that Pak made a trip to Hawaii in 1925 to raise funds from his supporters. We also know that Pak was assassinated by a Korean youth, a member of Uiyoldan, the left-leaning terrorist group, in 1928 under circumstances that are not clear.⁷⁶

Concluding Commentaries

By way of conclusion, three broad observations are offered. (I) The independence movement of Koreans in the United States before 1945 had peaks and valleys that reflected the political changes surrounding Korea. (II) The three most influential leaders of Koreans in the United States provide sharp contrasts in personal attributes and political ideas, and these differences had a negative impact on the movement. (III) The Korean community in the United States has long displayed a high degree of patriotic devotion and commitment, despite dispiriting setbacks.

(I) Patriotic activities of the Korean immigrants in America surged in three periods, each of which witnessed major changes in political circumstances facing Korea: 1905-1910, 1919-1921, and 1941-1945.

The years between 1905 and 1910 saw the initial organization of the newly-arrived Korean immigrants. Several thousand farm laborers made up the majority of the emigrants and they lacked the financial and educational background necessary to adapt to their new environment. Local mutual aid groups and churches were first formed and provided opportunities for cooperation and community life during this period.

These were the years of accelerated and ruthless intrusion of Japanese power into Korea, leading to the final extinction of the Korean empire. In response, the Korean groups and churches in America became politicized and energized. A national consciousness developed and sacrifices, mostly, but not confined to, monetary contributions were made for the sake of patriotic causes. Sundry social and civic organizations came together in the Korean National Association that had branches even in Manchuria, the Russian Maritime Province and Mexico. Active, if inconclusive, discussions on regaining national sovereignty took place. Once Japan's colonial rule became a fait accompli, however, the sense of urgency in the activities of Koreans overseas subsided.

The second period, 1919-1921, was comprised of the immediate post-World War I years that kindled the flames of nationalism in

various parts of the world, including Korea. The March First Movement touched the heart of every Korean living in America. Participants rallied, demonstrated, and lobbied for support from the United States and the victorious allies. The KNA and other Korean organizations mobilized their members and collected funds for these purposes.

At the same time, Koreans in America took part in the formation and operation of the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai. An Ch'ang-ho, Syngman Rhee and a few others went to China from the United States and played key roles. Rhee was active in Washington, before and after his brief China trip, as the president of the KPG in making diplomatic contacts and in raising funds. Pak Yong-man refused participation in the KPG but he, too, rushed to China to prepare an active anti-Japanese campaign. All three men enjoyed the moral and financial support of their friends and supporters in America. The flurry of activity touched off by the March First Movement subsided eventually, especially after An's resignation from the KPG in 1921.

By 1941, both An and Pak were gone, but Rhee resuscitated the long-dormant Korean Commission in Washington D.C. and waged a steady diplomatic and publicity campaign to gain a sympathetic hearing from the United States government. With the prospect of Korea's liberation in sight at long last, Koreans were eager to join the fighting ranks of the allies and prepare for an independent fatherland. However, they had at best only limited success. Furthermore, their cause was marred by internecine feuds.⁷⁷

It is not easy to point to any tangible and direct consequences of the Korean endeavors in America during the war years. But the presence of Korean residents on American soil and the expressions of their aspiration did not go unrecognized at the conferences at Cairo, Yalta and Potsdam. Above all, Koreans in the United States—despite the disunity among them—undoubtedly had the satisfaction of having remained faithful to their nationalist cause.

(II) One of the root causes for the internal discord among the Koreans must be attributed to the inability of Syngman Rhee, An Ch'ang-ho and Pak Yong-man to work together for the common end that they sought with passion. The marked divergences and contrasts in family and educational background, in personality, and in political and policy priorities among the three leaders ultimately prevented them from agreeing on a common approach and, consequently, splintered and weakened the nationalist movement.

The families of both Rhee and Pak belonged to the yangban class, while An was born into a commoner's family. All three received a traditional Confucian education in their early years, but Rhee and Pak completed formal university education in America, while An had only

occasional instruction in English and Bible studies. We are reminded of these social and educational differences when we read about the contrast between the aristocratic behavior ascribed to Rhee and the plebian style to An.⁷⁸ We should also remember that An and, to a lesser degree, Pak, worked as common laborers at different times of their American experiences, but the same cannot be said about Rhee. Those who knew An recollected that he was personable and helpful, particularly to those in need.⁷⁹

Rhee's relationship to An was never close or warm, although they worked together to establish the KPG as a functioning organization, and An reportedly defended Rhee to those in Shanghai who criticized Rhee. For one thing, Rhee and An lived and worked mostly in different parts of the United States, An in California and Rhee in Hawaii or Washington. In contrast, Rhee and Pak had maintained a close but turbulent relationship, especially after they both moved to Hawaii. They attracted devoted followers and competed for political and financial support in a geographically-confined area. After 1915, rivalry between these two strong-willed individuals became intense, turning their "sworn brotherhood" into sworn animosity. The underlying cause was their disagreement over the best strategy to recover Korea's independence.

Put in simple terms, Pak advocated a direct military campaign to fight for independence. In preparation for such a campaign, a universal draft system would have to be instituted, and military training, particularly for the officer corps, should be supported by all patriotic Koreans. He set up training camps in Nebraska and Hawaii and was busy until his death trying to set up a new, perhaps larger, base somewhere in northern China or Mongolia in collaboration with Chinese warlords. The primary purpose of his last visit to Hawaii in 1925 was to raise funds for the project. He apparently had no qualms about working with either the Bolsheviks or the right-wing militarists, as long as they could help him fight the Japanese.

Rhee, on the other hand, realized that Koreans could not defeat the Japanese arms. International support, particularly from major Western powers, was a *sine qua non* in order to force the Japanese out of Korea. Diplomacy and public relations were the most logical tools for this strategy. Of course, in order to win foreign support, Koreans must prove themselves worthy of such assistance. Education and social reforms based on democratic principles would create an enlightened and civilized society that would ultimately win the respect and support of the international community. To that end, Korea should follow the Western democratic model and eschew Communism.

An's record shows a two-pronged strategy to build Korea's national power: education and economic development. He established schools in Korea and in China. He also started business enterprises in Korea and the United States. He stressed education not only for its pragmatic application, but also for its promise to effect moral regeneration. Honesty, sincerity and industry were the virtues that the members of the Young Korean Academy were to strive for under his leadership. Although he did not categorically reject the military campaign strategy that he at times seemed to endorse while in China, his counsel to his friends and supporters was to transcend personal or ideological differences, and unite and work together for the long haul toward independence.

In terms of both personal temperament and political priorities, it appears that An was the best qualified to serve as peacemaker between Rhee and Pak. An indeed tried—unsuccessfully—his hand in personal mediation by going to Hawaii in 1915.⁸⁰ Had he succeeded, he could have brought together Rhee's sophistication and knowledge of the world affairs with Pak's dynamic energy for their common cause and may have prepared the Korean community in America better to face the avalanche of events in the 1940s. Pak's untimely and tragic death and An's own painful but heroic end foreclosed a potentially promising opportunity for Koreans to emerge as a united nation within and outside Korea as the thousands of Koreans in America had hoped for over forty years.

(III) It is truly remarkable that the Korean community in America, numbering only in the thousands and for the most part struggling to eke out a living during the initial stages of their settlement, was able to support not only the succession of nationalist programs in the United States but also anti-Japanese activities elsewhere in the world as well. They were largely from the less privileged socio-economic classes in their home country, which then was unable to protect or assist them in any way. Virtually cast away in a strange land without advance preparation, these Koreans survived and retained their emotional ties to their distant homeland for four decades or more.

Called upon by their leaders to support various diplomatic, propaganda and educational activities in the cause of Korea's independence, these immigrants responded with substantial financial contributions, although their aggregate sum cannot be ascertained. Time and again, the KPG and other organizations in China looked toward their compatriots in the United States for money to help finance their patriotic campaigns. Geography dictated a division of labor among the nationalist Koreans overseas, assigning financial responsibility to those in America.⁸¹ It was not an easy burden to bear.

With the benefit of historical hindsight, it is tempting to speculate what the Koreans in America could have accomplished with a more united leadership at the top: Could they have secured a better hearing for their cause in the capitals of the allied powers in World War II and altered the course of history for their homeland after 1945?

Notes

1. Bong-young Choy, *Koreans in America* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1979), pp. 75-77; Hyung-chan Kim and Wayne Patterson, compils. and eds. *The Koreans in America, 1882-1974, A Chronology and Fact Book* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1974), pp. 2-6.
2. Yu Kil-chun, So Chae-p'il, Yun Ch'i-ho are examples of early Korean students who had come before the waves of farm laborers. Choy, pp. 71-72. For details on the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association and its project to bring in Korean workers to balance off the Japanese who had arrived earlier, see Wayne Patterson, *The Korean Frontier in America: Immigration to Hawaii, 1896-1910* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), especially chaps. 6-9.
3. *Ibid.*, chap. 13.
4. Choy, pp. 94-96. The monthly income was \$16 for men and \$12.50 for women in Hawaii.
5. *Ibid.*, p.76.
6. Yo-jun Yun, "Early History of Korean Immigration to America," in Hyung-chan Kim, ed. *The Korean Diaspora* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clío, 1977), p. 37.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38.
9. Yu Y6ng-ik, *Yi Sung-man ui salm kwa kkum* [The Life and Dream of Syngman Rhee] (Seoul: The Joong Ang Ilbo-sa, 1996), pp. 38-44.
10. Choy, p. 143; Hyung-chan Kim, "Korean Community Organizations in America: Their Characteristics and Problems," in Hyung-chan Kim, *The Korean Diaspora*, p. 70.
11. *Ibid.* Also see Warren Y. Kim [Kim Won-yong], *Koreans In America* (Seoul: Po Chin Chai Printing Co., 1971), pp. 50-51. Warren Kim gives a different English translation of the name of this organization: the Korean Consolidated Association.
12. Choy, pp. 143-144. Stevens was on his way from Seoul to Washington D.C. His defense of Japanese policy in Korea aroused the anger of Koreans in San Francisco and when he refused to retract his pro-Japanese remarks, Chang In-hwan of the Great Unity Fatherland Protection Society shot him. The Korean community in California and Hawaii hired lawyers and provided the defense fund for Chang's trial; Chang was sentenced to a 25-year prison term but was released after ten years. *Ibid.*, pp. 146-149; Hyung-chan Kim, "Korean Community Organizations" in Hyung-chan Kim, *The Korean Diaspora*, pp. 70-71.

13. Choy, p. 115; Hyung-chan Kim, "Korean Community Organizations in *The Korean Diaspora*, p. 71.
14. Kim and Patterson, *The Koreans in America*, p.20. The first "picture bride," a Sara Choe, arrived in November 1910. Eventually more than 800 of them came to Hawaii. Choy, pp. 88-89.
15. Kim and Patterson, *The Koreans in America*, pp. 19-20; Choy, pp. 116-117. Kim and Patterson translate Hungsa-dan as "Corps for the Advancement of Individuals."
16. Kim and Patterson, pp. 3—4; Hyung-chan Kim, "The History and Role the Church in the Korean American Community," in Hyung-chan Kim, *The Korean Diaspora*, pp. 50-51.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.
18. Choy, pp. 257-258.
19. It was Wadman who helped secure a letter of introduction for Rev. Yun Pyong-gu to meet President Theodore Roosevelt in 1905. Wadman was instrumental for the development of the Methodist church in the Korean community; see Hyung-chan Kim, "... The Church in the Korean American Community," in Hyung-chan Kim, *The Korean Diaspora*, pp. 51-52.
20. Choy, pp. 153-154.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 154-156; Yu Y6ng-ik, *Yi Sung-man ui. . .*, pp. 134-140. For a detailed account on the First Korean Congress see Chong-Sik Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 142-144.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 144-145.
23. An had reservations about creating an exile government at this time and he was reluctant to accept a high position in the government. Nevertheless, An patiently persuaded opposing factions and personalities to compromise in the interest of unity and set the provisional government in motion; *ibid.*, pp. 131-137.
24. See Choy, p. 158. However, the basis for these figures cannot be verified although they may be within possible ranges.
25. Pak Yong-man had been designated as the minister of foreign affairs in the provisional government but he did not work in that capacity very long, if any time at all. Chong-Sik Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism*, pp. 174-176.
26. Choy, pp. 159-160.
27. Yu Y6ng-ik, *YiSung-man ui. . .*, pp. 174-176.
28. Choy, pp. 167-168.
29. Syngman Rhee had organized Tongji-hoe in Hawaii in July 1921 as his own political support group. *Ibid.*, 118-119.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 170-172.
31. Yu Y6ng-ik, *Yi Sung-man Ui*, pp. 194-196.
32. Han Kil-su, the controversial head of a Sino-Korean People's League, is often mentioned as Rhee's archrival who sabotaged the UKC's work thereby giving the impression to the American policy makers that the Koreans were hopelessly divided. Alger Hiss and his alleged pro-Soviet orientation is also mentioned as a contributing

factor for the unsympathetic decisions of the State Department, of which Hiss was a key official, see *ibid.*, pp. 198-205. This writer holds the view that the United States had no coherent Korea policy and was merely treading water in the turbulent sea of world politics.

33. Unless noted otherwise, most of the biographical information on Rhee are from Yu Y6ng-ik, *Yi Sung-man ui...*

34. A recent study on Rhee calls him a radical, see Chong-Sik Lee, *Syngman Rhee: The Prison Years of a Young Radical* (Seoul: The Yonsei University Press, 2001), 208 pp.

35. An English translation of the full text is now available: Syngman Rhee, *The Spirit of Independence: A Primer of Korean Modernization and Reform*, translated by Han-Kyo Kim (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 305 pp. For a comprehensive study of Rhee's activities in prison, see Yu Y6ng-ik, *Cholmun nalui Yi Siingman* (Youthful Syngman Rhee) (Seoul: The Yonsei University Press, 2002), 511 pp.

36. For an account of the Rhee-Pak conflict, see Kingsley K. Lyu, "Korean nationalist Activities in Hawaii and the Continental United States, 1900-1945, Part 1:1900-1919," in *Amerasia Journal* (published by the Asian American Studies Center, University of California, Los Angeles), vol. 4, no. 1, 1977, pp. 65-85. Lyu is very critical of Rhee's tactics. More spiteful account is in Dae-sook Suh, ed. *The Writings of Henry Cu Kim: Autobiography with Commentaries on Syngman Rhee, Pak Yong-man, and Chong Sun-man* (Honolulu: Center for Korean Studies, University of Hawaii, and University of Hawaii Press, 1987).

37. The formal titles varied from "Director of the State and Foreign Affairs" (announced March 21, 1919, by the Siberian group), to "prime minister" (April 11 by the Shanghai group), and to "chief executive" (April 23 by the group in Seoul). Yu Yong-ik, *Yi Sung-man ui...* p. 142.

38. See a photo copy of the memorandum sent to the Japanese emperor: *ibid.*, p. 149.

39. Rhee contacted diplomats from major countries, and targeted Chinese representatives in particular but could not get much beyond repudiation of Japanese imperialist expansion, and no support for raising the Korean issue at the conference. While he was in Geneva, he met an Austrian woman, Francesca Donner, whom he married in New York in 1934.

40. See a reference to Rhee's letter to President Roosevelt dated May 15, 1943 in Yu Yong-ik, *Yi Sung-man ui ...* p.246. On February 4, 1945, Rhee wrote to the Undersecretary of the State, Joseph Grew, urging a prompt recognition of the KPG to thwart the Soviet plans for a communist regime in Korea, *ibid.*

41. Yi Kwang-su, *Tosan An Ch'ang-ho* [Tosan is An's *nom de plume*.] (Seoul: Hungsa-dan Ch'ulp'anbu, 1998), pp. 7-8. This is the fourth printing of the third edition. The same biography was published in 1947 by Tosan kinyom saop-hoe (Tosan Memorial Foundation) without revealing the author's identity.

42. Hyung-chan Kim, *Tosan Ahn Ch 'ang-ho: A Profile of a Prophetic Patriot* (Seoul: Tosan Memorial Foundation and others, 1996), p. 32.

43. *Ibid.*, p.32; Yi Kwang-su, pp. 15-16.

44. Hyung-chan Kim, *Tosan Ahn Ch'ang-Ho*, p.41.

45. Ibid. It is said that the newspaper circulated even in Korea despite Japanese attempts to suppress it.
46. Ibid., pp. 51-54.
47. Ibid., 56-59.
48. Ibid., 59-64.
49. Ibid., pp. 65-70.
50. Ibid., pp. 70-71. An was released not only because he was not a party to the assassination conspiracy but also because the Japanese were still hoping that he would turn a collaborator.
51. An probably had to wait in Vladivostok for a remittance of travel fund from his wife in America. See *ibid.*, pp. 72-77.
52. Ibid., pp. 85-89, 96-121. Also see Tosan An Ch'ang-ho Sonsaeng Kinyom Saop-hoe [*An Ch'angho Memorial Foundation*], *Sunan ui minjok ill wihaydf: Tosan An Ch'angho ui saeng'ae* [In the service of the suffering nation: the life of An Ch'ang-ho] (Seoul: Tosan An Ch'angho Sonsaeng Kinyom Saop-hoe, 1999), Chronology, pp. 232-259.
53. Hyung-chan Kim, *Tosan Ahn Ch'ang-Ho*, pp. 89-96. For a putative verbatim record of An's close questioning of a prospective Academy member, see Yi Kwang-su, pp. 164-205.
54. Hyung-chan Kim, *Tosan Ahn Ch'ang-ho*, pp. 84-85; 123-124.
55. Ibid., pp. 121-130. It is interesting to note that Hyung-chan Kim speculates that An would have declined any active participation in the planning of the March First Movement had he been in Korea, *ibid.*, p. 130.
56. Ibid., pp. 135-162. An is credited for having constructed an underground communication system to keep in contact with nationalist activists in Korea. He also took on a diplomatic task of conferring with visiting United States congressmen seeking American help for the Korean cause.
57. Ibid., pp. 180-186.
58. Ibid., pp. 186-204.
59. Ibid., p.233 and Endnotes 61, 62 and 64 on p. 317.
60. Ibid., pp. 235-237.
61. Ibid., p.238. Also see Kim Ku, *Paekpdm Ilchi: The Autobiography of Kim Ku*, translated by Jongsoo Lee (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2000), p. 227.
62. Hyung-chan Kim, *Tosan Ahn Ch'ang-ho*, pp. 244—245.
63. So Yong-sok, "Pak Yong-man ui sasang kwa minjok undong: Nationalistic Movement and Thought of Yong-Man Park," *Hydpsdng Nonch 'ong*, published by Wonsim University, No. 13 (September 2001), pp. 24-25.
64. See "The Translator's Introduction" by Han-Kyo Kim, and "Postscript" by Pak Yong-man, in Syngman Rhee, *The Spirit of Independence*, pp.13 and 27-28.
65. Yu Il-han and Chong Han-gyong (Henry Chung) traveled with Pak Yong-man. Pak also took Syngman Rhee's six-year old son, Pong-su, to America. So Yong-sok, p.27.

66. Dae-Sook Suh, ed. *The Writings of Henry Cu Kim*, pp. 256-260; S6(Yong-sok, pp. 27-28
67. *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30; Dae-Sook Suh, pp. 262-263. Some of the information in these two sources are ambiguous or inconsistent and require scrutiny and additional data. Henry Cu Kim recalled that "some 100 students" enrolled in the Young Korean Military Academy but Yu Yong-ik has a more plausible number of "about 30," Yu Yong-ik, *Yi Sung-man Ui ...*, p. 128.
68. Henry Cu Kim noted that Pak received "a B.A. degree in political science with a minor in military science" in 1912, see Dae-Sook Suh, p. 189.
69. In early February 1913, Syngman Rhee arrived in Hawaii, apparently at Pak's urging, see *ibid.*, p. 190. Also see Yu Y(ng-ik, Yi S(ng-man (i p. 130.
70. *Ibid.*, pp. 130-131. Henry Cu Kim recounts the details of the Pak-Rhee dispute in Dae-Sook Suh, pp. 190-196.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 273. What Pak said in the "declaration of independence" is unknown and I have not seen any reference to this declaration in other sources.
72. Kingsley K. Liu, p. 73.
73. Chong-Sik Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism*, p. 175.
74. *Ibid.*, pp. 151 and 175; Son Po-gi, "Pak Yong-man," in *Han'guk kundae inmul paekin son* (One Hundred Koreans in Modern History), published by *Sin dong-a*, January 1970, p. 216. Lee gives the dates of April 17 and 24 for the conference, but Son states that it met in June 1919.
75. Dae-Sook Suh, pp. 273-276. See also Suh's own comments on Pak's activities in the 1920s in *ibid.*, xiv-xv.
76. Son Po-gi, p. 216; Dae-Sook Suh, 276.
77. Koreans in the United States were able to gain a special status different from that of the Japanese during World War II. About 20 Koreans received training and worked for the Office of Strategic Services during the war. See Yu Yong-ik, *Yi Sung-man ui ...*, p. 196. Rhee's Korean Commission had a rival group headed by Kim W(n-yong (Warren Kim) and sanctioned by the United Korean Committee operating in the wartime Washington, see Choy, pp.178—181.
78. A long-time supporter of Rhee, Ho Chong, contrasted An and Rhee in these terms, see Hyung-chan Kim, *Tosan Ahn Ch 'ang-ho*, pp. 210-211.
79. Easufk Emsen Charr who came to America in 1904 as a small child and met An on several occasions writes how An bought a three-piece suit and helped find a job for him in San Francisco; see Easurk Emsen Charr, *The Golden Mountain: The Autobiography of a Korean Immigrant, 1895-1960*, edited and with an introduction by Wayne Patterson, Second Edition (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1996), pp. 142-149.
80. Hyung-chan Kim, *Tosan Ahn Ch 'ang-ho*, pp. 102-105.
81. A policy proposal submitted by Pak Yong-man to his supporters in the Korean Independence Laegue in July 1925 contains an explicit statement of this division of labor: "The actual campaign of the independence movement shall be entrusted to the Korean residents in the Far East, and the Korean residents in Hawaii shall provide financial support to the movement and promote education for children." See Warren Kim, pp. 63-64.

China and the United States in the Korean Reunification Process

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The Reunification-cum-Collapse Scenario Revisited

For the first time since the Korean War, and particularly in the wake of German reunification, the question of Korean reunification has generated a flurry of debate both inside and outside Korea, but usually with more heat than light. With North Korea constantly back in the news as East Asia's time-bomb, seemingly ripe for implosion or explosion, prospects for Korean reunification have quickly become conflated with the question of the future of North Korea—whether it will survive or will collapse, slowly or suddenly.

The popularity of this reunification-cum-collapse scenario has been evident not only in academic circles but also in the policy communities of some neighboring states. When North Korean Leader Kim II Sung died in July 1994, many predicted that the hermit kingdom would collapse within six months or in no more than three years, accompanied by a German-style reunification by absorption. South Korean President Kim Young Sam jumped on the collapsist bandwagon when he depicted North Korea as a "broken airplane" headed for a crash landing that would be followed by a quick reunification. The specter of collapse has even prompted behind-the-scenes efforts by the U.S. Department of Defense to coordinate contingency planning with South Korean and Japanese allies. At a summit meeting held on Cheju Island in April 1996, leaders of South Korea and the United States jointly agreed to promote a two-plus-two formula—the Four-Party Peace Talks, with the two Koreas, China, and the United States—even as they privately predicted that the collapse in the North could come as soon as two or three years.¹ Indeed, such a dichotomist endism debate, with many pundits selecting "soft" or "hard" landings and "collapse" or "muddling through" as quick and easy choices in the forum on the future of North Korea, has become a favorite sport that almost anyone, including North Korea's elite defectors in South Korea, can play.²

Despite the hype about an impending collapse, the shape of things

to come in post-Kim II Sung North Korea is far from certain or predetermined. Much of the collapsist debate has been marred by tenuous on-the-fly speculation, by ideological polemics and presuppositions, by inattention to the full range of available empirical evidence and policy options, and above all by the "level of analysis" problem. There has been too much undisciplined speculation about the collapse, without prior delineation of any specifics such as what will actually collapse, when, how, and with what consequences. These speculations have erred in (1) treating "state," "system," and "regime" synonymously, (2) overstating the importance of domestic factors at the expense of external factors, (3) confusing underlying causes with surface symptoms, and (4) underplaying crucial "intervening variables" between system inputs and system outputs.³

Most collapsist arguments commit the fallacy of premature economic reductionism, based on the misleading equation of economic breakdown with system collapse or with the collapse of the North Korean state itself. The much publicized collapse of the Soviet Union was simply its collapse as a superpower and as a system, not its disappearance as a "state-turned-into Russia." As Robert Legvold argues, the collapse of the Soviet Union "was less the disintegration of a state than the decolonization of the last empire."⁴ Furthermore, many extremely poor developing (Fourth World) countries limp through sluggish or even negative rates of economic growth despite rampant bureaucratic corruption, ineffective or divided leadership, and endemic social unrest, without the kind of totalitarian control mechanisms North Korea employs. Despite these failings, these countries do not collapse, let alone disappear, because social unrest and political opposition do not overwhelm the repressive forces of the state or its coping mechanisms. Of course, the collapse of the North Korean economy could trigger the demise or replacement of the regime, which could in turn trigger the demise and replacement of the system. But both in theory and practice, collapse at the highest level entails the collapse of the state. The state is most resilient, however, often surviving the collapse of the economy, the regime, and even the system.

What is needed here is a more dynamic, process-oriented conception of several possible future scenarios, including (1) status quo of neither peace nor war, (2) peaceful coexistence, (3) collapse-cum-absorption, (4) conflict escalation, and (5) reunification. In this essay I take as a point of departure that there are a variety of what French futurist Bertrand de Jouvenal calls "futuribles" (possible futures),⁵ each of which seems compelling without being comprehensive from a particular perspective, and furthermore that the either/or endism debate needs to be enriched by the appreciation that the future of Korean

reunification is not providentially predetermined but rather a product of selective human behavior. There are at least four futurible reunification scenarios—reunification via force, via negotiations, via capitulation, and via collapse.⁶ These futurible scenarios should not be viewed as mutually exclusive, as one can flow into another.

The difficulties of predicting Korean reunification as a single event rather than as a long-term process are directly connected to the challenge of prognosticating the future of the post-Kim II Sung system, since any country's future will be significantly affected by the structures of regional and global politics that prevail. This is especially the case for North Korea, as a small state sandwiched in the strategic Northeast Asian crossroads where the United States, China, Russia, and Japan uneasily meet and interact. Paradoxically, the uncertainty of North Korea's future permits some hope and some room for alternative policy choices in Seoul, Washington, Tokyo, Beijing, and Moscow that would steer the post-Kim II Sung system and its future in a preferred direction.

The roles of China and the United States are of crucial importance in this respect. While the reunification process is for the two Koreas to make or unmake, China and the United States by dint of what they are and what they do can transform both the context and the conditions under which any given reunification scenario can be impeded or facilitated. The Korean Peninsula is widely regarded as the last remaining Cold War glacier. Even today, almost half a century after the Korean War "ended" with an armistice accord, the so-called demilitarized zone (DMZ) remains the most heavily fortified conflict zone in the post-Cold War world, where more than 1.8 million military personnel confront each other, armed to the teeth with the latest weapons systems. Consider as well the continuing, if somewhat dilapidated, Cold War alliance systems linking the two Koreas, China, and the United States in the bilateralized regional security complex. The Korean Peninsula has the dubious distinction of being the only conflict zone buttressed by the two competing Cold War alliance systems. North Korea is the one and only country with which China "maintains" its 1961 Cold-War alliance pact—whether in name or in practice—while the U.S.-ROK alliance codified through the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty seems to have stood the test of time. As a result, the shape of inter-Korean life to come is closely keyed to the state of Sino-American relations, which will in turn impact upon and shape the future of the emerging Northeast Asian order. And yet, in the absence of the East-West conflict, the relations between the world's lone superpower, with its creeping unilateralism, and the world's most populous country, with its rooted exceptionalism, have become the

single greatest source of uncertainty in the shaping of the future of the Korean Peninsula.

The Shifting Role of China

Despite the lack of consensus on China's great power status or on the feasibility and desirability of various engagement or containment strategies to manage the rise of Chinese power through balancing, bandwagoning, capitulating, or ignoring,⁷ there is no mistaking the importance of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in post-Cold War Korean Peninsula affairs. Even some of the harshest critics of the rise-of-China thesis admit that "only on the Korean Peninsula do China's capacities seriously affect U.S. policy."⁸

Consider China's sources of power and influence in Korean affairs: 1) demographic weight: it is the world's most populous country (fifty-nine times the population of North Korea and nineteen times the population of the two Koreas); 2) continental size (the world's second largest, and forty-four times the size of the Korean Peninsula) and territorial contiguity, sharing with North Korea a border some 1,416 kilometers long, across almost the entire northern stretch of the Korean Peninsula; 3) military capability that is steadily being modernized, with the world's largest armed forces (2.94 million troops in active service) and the world's third-largest nuclear weapons arsenal after the United States and Russia; 4) veto power in the United Nations Security Council; 5) new economic status as the world's second-largest economy (with 2000 gross national income at \$4,966 billion, measured at purchasing-power parity);⁹ and 6) traditional Confucian cultural influence with strong historical roots.

Not surprisingly, Chinese strategic thinkers and analysts regard the Korean Peninsula as a vital strategic shield as well as the "core problem" (*hexin wenti*) of Northeast Asian security.¹⁰ Chinese leaders, including President Jiang Zemin, have stated on many occasions that without peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula there can be no genuine peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Even the looming conflicts in the South China Sea—a flashpoint in the Asia-Pacific region where no less than six states including China have competing jurisdictional claims over the potentially oil-rich Spratly Islands—pale in comparison to the potential escalation of military tensions and political instability on the Korean Peninsula.¹¹ The dynamic Northeast Asian political economy and an imploding North Korean economy have also combined to make the Korean Peninsula one of the central geoeconomic concerns of Chinese foreign policy.

Because the Korean Peninsula is also generally perceived as one of the persistently dangerous flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific region,

China's Korea policy is closely intertwined with its regional and global policy. Without Chinese support or at least acquiescence, the combined impact of policy initiatives stemming from President Kim Dae Jung's "sunshine policy" and the currently stalled Four-Party Talks in Geneva is likely to remain rather minimal. Of the four major powers that have been entangled in Korean affairs during and since the Cold War era, Beijing today is the only power with a full-fledged and multidimensional two-Korea policy.

The widening and deepening systemic crisis that reflects and amplifies the GDP decline since 1990 and the critical shortages of food, energy, hard currency, and new ideas has had far-reaching ramifications for political stability and even regime survival. As a result, the possibility of Korean reunification by Southern absorption or by system collapse in the North has found its way into China's foreign policy approach.

Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that China's thinking on Korean reunification, far from being cast in stone, evolves with the Chinese domestic, Northeast Asian regional, and global situation, including perhaps most importantly any changes in Sino-American relations. In 1993 Chen Qimao, a leading scholar and former president of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, stated China's position on the Korean unification issue in the following terms:

China supports President Kim II Sung's plan to reunify North and South Korea in a Confederal Republic of Koryo under the principle of "one country, one nation; two systems, two governments." This is not only because of China's traditional friendship with North Korea but also because the Chinese leadership believes this policy meets *the current situation* of Korea and supports Korea's national interest as well as the peace and stability of the region. By contrast, *a dramatic change*—which would be very dangerous and could easily turn into a conflict, even a ' war—would be a disaster for the Korean nation. Further, it would threaten not only China's security but the security of the entire Asia-Pacific region and even the world as well.¹²

China now wanted to have Korean unification both ways, supporting the peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas under Kim II Sung's "Confederal" formula but also opposing any "dramatic change" (i.e., German-style reunification). This was seen as the most feasible way to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

A major 1995 survey of fifty Koreanists—five each from the United States, Japan, China, Russia, and Germany, and twenty-five

from South Korea—showed there was general agreement that Korean reunification would eventually occur, with 2.1 percent of the respondents predicting that it would occur within one year (1996); 8.3 percent before 2000; 29.2 percent in 2001-2005; 20.8 percent in 2006-2010; 16.7 percent in 2011-2010; and 16.3 percent after 2015. That is, half predicted that Korean reunification would occur during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Tellingly, as shown in Table 1 below, the United States and China occupy opposite extremes on Korean reunification with 66 percent of American respondents expressing support for Korean reunification compared to only 22 percent of Chinese respondents.¹³ A more recent survey found that "the Chinese tended to be most conservative about [Korean] unification, in the hope that the status quo could be maintained for a considerable period of time."¹⁴

Table 1. Experts' Views of Where the Big Four Stand on Korean Reunification

	Strong Support	Slight Support	Neutral	Slight Objection	Strong Objection
United States	38%	28%	12%	22%	0%
Japan	8%	18%	28%	36%	10%
China	8%	14%	22%	32%	24%
Russia	14%	12%	40%	30%	4%

Source: Lee Young-sun, "Is Korean Reunification Possible?" *Korea Focus* 3:3 (May-June 1995): 13.

Despite China's lip service to reunification, the central challenge of post-Mao foreign policy was and remains creation of a congenial external environment, especially in Northeast Asia, for its accelerated march to great-powerdom. By mid-1994, when Kim II Sung suddenly died, Pyongyang's reunification policy had turned into a kind of habit-driven trumpery, devoid of substantive relevance.¹⁵ The real issue for Pyongyang—and for Beijing—was how to avert system collapse, which would threaten not only the survival of the North Korean state but also China's security environment. With the balance of national strength having already shifted decisively in favor of South Korea, thus enhancing the prospects for reunification by absorption, one of Beijing's central strategic goals has become strengthening its ties with

the weaker North, albeit in a cost-effective way.

Beijing's opposition to the reunification-by-absorption scenario has also been heightened by its perception of U.S. strategy. "To put it bluntly," one pro-China newspaper in Hong Kong wrote, "the United States wants to use this chance to topple the DPRK, and this is a component of U.S. strategy to carry out peaceful evolution [*heping yanbian*] in the socialist countries." Accordingly, the United States "will practice a strategy of destruction against North Korea... with the aim of enabling South Korea to gobble up North Korea, like West Germany gobbling up East Germany." Such a perceived strategy posed not only an ideological challenge to China but, more importantly, a strategic threat since "China regards the Korean region as an important buffer zone between China and the United States."¹⁶

Given its realpolitik perspective and security concerns, there are other reasons Beijing takes a skeptical view of Korean reunification. It is hardly surprising that post-Tiananmen China assesses the global and regional situation in terms of impact on threats to the regime, both internal and from the near abroad. Of particular concern to China is that local and ethnonational conflicts, previously overshadowed by superpower rivalry, are breaking out throughout the world. Now that the threat of direct military invasion has subsided, China too is plagued by ethnic separatism and border disputes, and "hypernationalism" (*jiduan minzuzhuyi*) has made extensive inroads among China's separatists.¹⁷ From the perspective of Beijing, a "concerted Western plot to weaken China" is said to be another way of playing upon such internal divisions and serves as a more serious challenge to the PRC than does global interdependence.¹⁸ The point here is that a united Korea would add more *Chosunjok* (ethnic Korean) fuel to China's ethnonational conflict, especially in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture (*Yanbian Chaoxian Zizhiqu*) in Jilin Province, which constitutes Korea's largest Diaspora.

From 1995 to 1997, a new round of Sino-American conflict introduced a highly charged nationalistic prism through which to redefine both the evolving security situation on the Korean Peninsula and America's Korea policy. Situated at the center of Northeast Asia, the Korean Peninsula was seen as the site where the four Great Powers were aggressively pushing their contending strategic plans. From the Chinese standpoint, Japan viewed a unified Korea as a great threat to its own military and economic security and was therefore aggressively involving itself in the Korean question in order to arrest the continuing strategic imbalance between the two Koreas. Russia, too, was trying hard to get back into the game in order to curb the growing influence of the other major powers, namely the United States, China, and

especially Japan. The United States was singled out as eyeing the other three powers as threats to its hegemonic position. The importance that the United States had attached to the Korean Peninsula had to do with containing China, Russia, and Japan by gearing up its military presence and strengthening its security ties with South Korea. The ultimate goal would be to put North Korea on America's strategic track in order to create a united Korea with an American-style political system. Consequently China, *faute de mieux*, had to respond to this ominous situation by stepping up its influence on the Korean Peninsula. China and North Korea are said to be two good neighbors who still enjoy strategic relations as close as "lips and teeth," in contrast to Sino-ROK economic relations. Hence China saw itself in a unique position to check the Great Powers' expansionism and American hegemonism in this region, considered to be China's vital strategic shield, and to safeguard effectively the peace and stability in Northeast Asia.¹⁹

With the improvement of Sino-American relations since 1997, such anti-American assessments of the Korean situation have subsided, especially in the wake of President Jiang Zemin's state visit to the United States. Changes also occurred in the policies of all peripheral players in 1996 and 1997, especially on the part of the United States. Probably reflecting a shift in America's North Korea policy from deterrence to "deterrence plus"—a policy of conditional engagement—the United States was said to have adopted a "coordinating and mediating attitude" instead of taking a concerted united-front position with its South Korean ally.²⁰

The Kosovo war marked another turning point in Sino-American relations, serving this time as the proximate catalyst for setting in motion the process of repairing the strained relationship with North Korea. In the wake of a rapid succession of seemingly threatening developments in the late 1990s—the new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and the growing U.S.-Japan cooperation in the development of the theater missile defense (TMD) system, the U.S./NATO air war against Yugoslavia, and the accidental American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade—China's relations with the United States in the military and security realm have been fraught once again with worsening threat perceptions, giving rise in China to images of an America bent on global hegemony through the containment of China. For many Chinese strategic analysts, the Kosovo war would establish dangerous precedents of bypassing the UN Security Council for American neointerventionism, of lowering the threshold for the use of force, and of replacing or trampling state sovereignty as the core principle of international relations. Worse yet, for some Chinese analysts, Kosovo served as a warning that the

struggle for a multipolar world order would now last far longer than previously thought—some twenty to thirty years longer—and that America-led war disguised as humanitarian intervention might not be as remote from China's home turf as they had previously assumed.²¹ Moreover, Kosovo was a turning point, according to one Chinese security analyst, causing "a shift in Chinese thinking on the matter of tolerance for U.S. forces in Asia. China now [felt] surrounded by the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliances."²²

By the same token, Kosovo triggered alarm in Pyongyang, filling the North Korean leadership with a sense of crisis that it, too, could become another Yugoslavia. With the worsening external security environment, Pyongyang was now more determined to build up its military muscle.²³ Kosovo also prompted Pyongyang to feel the urgent need to restore and improve its peripheral diplomacy, especially with Beijing and Moscow.

With such shared security concerns and fears, China's Korea policy made a subtle readjustment at a time when Pyongyang was launching an unprecedented diplomatic outreach. As a result, Beijing's displeasure with its unruly socialist ally in the strategic buffer zone was largely put aside as the Chinese leadership began to see the United States as the more clear and present threat to its own interests in Northeast Asia. In short, both Beijing and Pyongyang were sufficiently alarmed by America's military operation in Kosovo to bring back the allied relationship of strategic convenience.

There is far more than meets the public eye in Beijing's status quo policy anti-unification stance. Although China views North Korea as maximizing the PRC's leverage as a balancer in Northeast Asia politics; it also genuinely fears that North Korea could come to feel cornered and see no choice but to fight back, triggering a regional war, at minimum. Beijing does not doubt that Pyongyang would fight rather than succumb to German-style hegemonic unification. Even if the system in the North simply collapses, the result is likely to be bloody, triggering a civil war rather than immediate absorption by the South.

Until at least 1996, unification by Southern absorption was regarded by many Chinese scholars and policymakers as wishful thinking on the part of Western analysts. With the economic crisis in North Korea further reflecting and effecting the structural contradictions within the system, an increasing number of Chinese analysts began to acknowledge the possibility of system collapse, even if they doubted such a collapse was imminent.²⁴ In other words, not to think about the unthinkable came to be viewed in 1997 as an exercise of Chinese wishful thinking. In late October 1997, the *Beijing Review*, which toes the party line on every issue, published an unsigned article

in which it offered an unprecedented analysis (and rebuke) of the root causes of North Korea's food crisis:

What's more, a heavy military burden is using up much needed resources. . . . The present military expenditure of DPRK is US\$6 billion, bringing a huge burden to its economy. For the time being, the U.S., Japan and Republic of Korea (ROK) are three main forces in the aid of DPRK. Due to conflicting points of view, however, many political conditions are attached to the aid process. . . . Ultimately, it's up to the [North] Korean people themselves to resolve the grain crisis. It requires spirit and will power to meet the challenge of such reforms as introducing foreign investment and opening up, while maintaining a stable political situation. And Korea needs to be flexible while carrying out diplomatic policies.²⁵

Even if we accept the heroic assumption that Korean reunification will come about peacefully, without igniting a civil war or generating a massive refugee population, Beijing would still face a wide range of territorial disputes over fisheries and over mineral, oil, and gas deposits in the Yellow Sea. China's security dilemma today is largely shaped by the 80 million minorities in the strategically sensitive "autonomous" regions that comprise roughly 64 percent of Chinese territory. In this regard, what would a united and nationalistic Korea do about its territorial claims along the Sino-Korean border and in China's northeastern provinces, inhabited by the world's largest concentration of ethnic Koreans?

Despite the widely shared belief that system collapse in North Korea is not imminent, some Chinese analysts have given thought to various futuristic scenarios. According to one scholar, China's ultimate concern is not who will be the next "Great Leader" in Pyongyang, but "whether the DPRK will remain as a stable and friendly buffer state.... From Beijing's point of view, although Kim Jr. may lose the internal power struggle [if it occurs], there should be no reason why China cannot come out a winner."²⁶

Another scenario envisions factional infighting in a collapsed North Korea, with one factional group seeking help from the United States and/or South Korea and another seeking help from China. In such an event, Eric McVadon writes, based on extensive interviews with Chinese military officers, "Beijing would reject the appeal and urge Washington and Seoul to do the same."²⁷

As the world's seventh largest economy—or the second-largest economy on a purchasing-power parity basis—with a strong sense of

assertive nationalism, Beijing's fears of a unified Korea becoming an assertive "regional power" in Northeast Asia are reflected in its realpolitik approach towards the Peninsula. The new unified Korea would lead to a new geostrategic landscape in the region, we are told, fundamentally changing Korea's foreign relations with the four major powers and making the "power struggle and economic competition in the region more apparent and more intense."²⁸ Some Chinese analysts have even compared the nationalism of a rising Korea with that of Japan more than a half century ago.²⁹

As long as Beijing has profound concerns about the strategic orientation of a united Korea, particularly as it relates to the United States, maintenance of the status quo of the two Koreas means continued Chinese support of the weaker DPRK no matter what the cost. The tradeoff here is that Pyongyang provides an opportunity for China to project its great-power identity. As Campbell and Reiss aptly put it, "if the road to Pyongyang runs through Beijing, Washington should expect to be charged a toll. This toll could be quite high."³⁰

Ultimately, China is not opposed to Korean reunification, we are told, provided (1) it comes about gradually and peacefully; (2) it is a negotiated unification between the two Koreas, not a hegemonic unification by absorption; and (3) a unified Korea does not harm or threaten China's security or national interests. "China will use her influence to strive for the peaceful unification of Korea, and to keep unified Korea as a friendly, or at best, neutral neighbor."³¹ A united Korea would be expected, moreover, to be drawn within China's economic and military sphere; China should help shape developments in Korea, not merely follow the lead of the United States and Japan."³² In short, China has become and will remain a critical factor in North Korea's future—whether it will survive or collapse, or, more accurately, whether the trajectory it takes from here to there will be system-maintaining, system-reforming, system-decaying, or system-collapsing.

The Shifting Role of the United States

It is of some historical significance that the U.S. diplomatic presence on the Korean Peninsula, which started in 1882 with the signing of a friendship and commerce treaty, was terminated in 1905 by a classical imperialistic deal—the Taft-Katsura agreement—under which Japan recognized America's dominant interests in the Philippines in return for U.S. recognition of Japan's dominant interests in Korea. Five years later, when Japan transformed its protectorate over Korea into complete annexation, the United States did not even bother to protest.

United States involvement in Korean affairs was resumed in 1945 with the most auspicious set of expectations on the part of the Korean people. First, the United States was perceived as having had no colonial or imperialistic involvement in Korea or elsewhere. Second, the traditional American values as embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination captured the national imagination of Koreans and became a legitimizing symbolism for many Korean nationalists. Finally and most importantly, the United States was the leader of the Allied Powers which had defeated the hatred enemy state, Japan. Hence, the United States was pictured by many Koreans as the national savior with all the goodwill, responsibility, and promise that such symbolism entails.

And yet, as some argue, the United States bears the heavy historical burden of having engineered the Korean division in 1945. With his eyes partially shut to the rapidly changing reality on the ground (i.e., Soviet troops entering and rapidly advancing down the Korean Peninsula in early August 1945) and using Churchillian language, the late Gregory Henderson wrote in 1974: "No division of a nation in the present is so astonishing in its origin as the division of Korea; none is so unrelated to conditions or sentiment within the nation itself at the time the division was effected; none is to this day so unexplained; in none does blunder and planning oversight appear to have played so large a role. Finally, there is no division for which the U.S. government bears so heavy a share of the responsibility as it bears for the division of Korea."³³ "In North Korea and South Korea alike," as Selig Harrison argues in a similar vein, "it is an article of faith that the United States deserves the principal blame for the division of the peninsula and thus has a special responsibility for helping to restore national unity."³⁴

Herein lies a double paradox. On the one hand, the United States is perceived and acted upon by many as deserving the principal blame for the Korean division. On the other hand, as shown in table 1, the United States stands at the opposite extreme in expressing "strong support" for Korean reunification. Despite the on-again, off-again, situation-specific anti-American demonstrations in South Korea, the United States elicited the highest positive public perception of a national sample of 2,000 South Korean respondents (30.7 percent, compared to 11.0 percent for Russia, 22.6 percent for China, and 17.1 percent for Japan) in a major multinational citizens' opinion survey that was jointly sponsored by *Tong-a Ilbo* (Seoul) and *Asahi Shimbun* (Tokyo) in late 2000. What the survey shows with disturbing clarity is why Northeast Asia has little if any social and psychological foundation to forge truly cooperative multilateral security institutions. In addition, anti-Americanism in South Korea is not as wide or deep as some would

have us believe.³³

During the Cold War, Washington's overall foreign policy as well as its policy in this important region reflected America's anti-communism and its focus on "the Soviet threat." The impact of the Korean War (1950-53) upon national, regional, and global systems cannot be overemphasized. More than any other postwar international event, the Korean War enacted the rules of the Cold War game and congealed patterns of East-West conflict across East Asia and beyond.³⁶ The Korean War seems to have crystallized East-West conflict into a rigid strategic culture dependent on a Manichean vision of stark bipolarity, the same vision that was made evident most recently in President Bush's triangulation of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as the charter members of the "axis of evil." It was this creed of global anti-communism that formed the postwar national symbol system, which in turn provided the ark and anchor of America's postwar national identity. It was this creed that imposed a measure of unity and coherence upon this region, without any sense of shared cultures and ideologies, via a series of geopolitical and geoeconomic ties stretching from Japan and South Korea to the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) states, Australia, and New Zealand.

With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet threat, the United States too had to reformulate its role in the new but uncertain security environment in East Asia. During the first half of the 1990s, the U.S. East Asian security strategy was revised three times: in 1990, 1992, and 1995. A 1990 Department of Defense report defined America's role as that of the "regional balancer, honest broker, and ultimate security guarantor." Even if the Soviet threat were to decline substantially, the American military presence in East Asia would continue to check the "expansionist regional aspirations" of "second tier" states.³⁷ The 1995 report, entitled *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, is said to have been designed to rejuvenate America's leadership strategy, halting the planned reductions in the region through the end of the decade (i.e., keeping the existing level of about 100,000 troops in the region, stationed mostly in Japan and South Korea, for the foreseeable future), reinforcing American bilateral alliances in the region with Japan as the linchpin, and developing regional multilateral security dialogues and mechanisms as a supplement to, not a substitute for, "American alliance leadership" in the region. Tellingly, all of this is justified as financially cost-effective. "In fact," as Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph S. Nye, Jr., the chief architect of the 1995 report, put it, "because of the host-nation support provided by Japan and South Korea, it is cheaper to base the forces in Asia than in the United States."³⁸

By any reckoning, the United States remains the most powerful external power in inter-Korean affairs. In the post-Cold War era, the United States has come to play the rather unusual role of the "honest broker" in the resolution of the Korean conflict, without first dismantling its Cold War U.S.-ROK alliance, without addressing the issue of U.S. troop presence in South Korea, and without normalizing its relations with North Korea. Indeed, one of the most striking features of the great-power politics on the Korean Peninsula is that none of the three neighboring powers has a military presence on the Peninsula. Only the United States, the lone superpower, maintains some 37,000 troops on South Korean soil.

The point here seems clear enough. A divided or united Korea would hardly matter in American foreign policy were it not for three factors: its strategic location at the vortex of Northeast Asian geopolitics, Pyongyang's asymmetrical military capabilities (i.e., WMD or weapons of mass destruction), and the clear and continuing danger of a system or state collapse with destabilizing regional spillovers. Since the mid-1990s, North Korea's growing weakness and instability, combined with the dangerous asymmetry of power on the Korean Peninsula, has paradoxically set in motion an agonizing reappraisal of America's North Korea policy. It has become increasingly clear that America's deterrence policy alone is no longer sufficient for coping with the threat of a third kind—a North Korean "hard landing" (i.e., a reunification-via-collapse leading to an absorption of North Korea by South Korea). America's North Korea policy shifted in the late 1990s from deterrence to "deterrence-plus." The logic of the deterrence-plus policy, associated with the Perry process, is neither to prop up the North Korean system nor to seek its collapse, but to promote a process of dialogue and confidence-building relations that move beyond deterrence.³⁹ With the deterrence-plus policy has come a shift from a reactive to a more active role in the management of inter-Korean affairs. And yet it has not been easy to pursue the deterrence-plus policy because of a mismatch between desirability and feasibility in two scenarios: the hard landing scenario is the least desirable but most likely outcome, while the "soft landing" is the most desirable but least likely outcome.⁴⁰

Does Washington still figure prominently in Pyongyang's calculations, to place the world's lone superpower in the economic and security role previously played by the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War? Or has there been a subtle but significant reorientation in Pyongyang's great-power strategy, as showcased in the rejuvenation of Sino-DPRK and Russia-DPRK relations since 1999? Is Pyongyang playing multiple cards—the China card, the Russia card, and the U.S.

card—in the strategic games of Northeast Asian international relations?

In the post-Cold War era, as Robert Manning argues, the United States has become the focal point of Pyongyang's efforts at regime survival, the key to enhancement of international legitimacy, economic aid, investment and increased trade, and tactical benefits in its relations with South Korea.⁴¹ Indeed, the United States is at once a strategic life boat, a mortal threat, and a Rorschach test, calling for an ever larger array and variety of threats (asymmetrical military capabilities) as bargaining chips as well as for existential deterrence. Yet the successful execution of such an America-centric survival strategy has encountered a host of problems, all stemming from the different priorities and incentive structures that drive each party's respective policies toward the other.

For Washington, the central concern has remained the same: how to deal with Pyongyang's asymmetrical threats in an alliance-friendly and cost-effective way. The North Korea policy of the United States, as the lone superpower in the post-Cold War era, is shaped by global concerns (such as maintenance of the integrity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime), but also by East Asian regional and U.S.-ROK bilateral concerns and by fractious partisan politics at home.

Contrary to the conventional realist wisdom, in asymmetrical negotiations the strong state does not ipso facto exert greater control than the weak state. If a small and weak state occupies territory of strategic importance to a larger and stronger state, or if the "field of play" is on the weak actor's home turf (as was the case in the U.S.-Panama negotiations and British-Iceland Cod Wars, and as now is the case in U.S.-DPRK asymmetrical negotiations), the weaker state can display bargaining power disproportionate to its aggregate structural power.⁴² Pyongyang's proximity to the strategic field of play, its high stakes, resolve, and control, its relative asymmetrical military capabilities, and its coercive leverage strategy have all combined to enable the DPRK to exercise bargaining power disproportionate to its aggregate structural power in the U.S.-DPRK asymmetric conflict and negotiations.

The Clinton administration learned the hard way that the United States had no alternative but to retreat by accepting North Korea's package deal proposal that culminated in the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework. Reflecting on his involvement in the emergency national security meeting of June 16, 1994, on the most serious North Korean nuclear brinkmanship crisis of his tenure as Secretary of Defense, William Perry writes about a third-way option for a negotiated deal in the face of the extremely limited alternatives available to U.S. policymakers: "We were about to give the president a choice between

a disastrous option—allowing North Korea to get a nuclear arsenal, which we might have to face someday—and an unpalatable option, blocking this development, but thereby risking a destructive nonnuclear war."⁴³ Given all the constraints on America's issue-specific power, the rise of a cost-effective foreign policy, and the collapse of a bipartisan foreign policy consensus in the 1990s, the Agreed Framework could be said to be the worst deal, except that there was no better alternative.

At the same time, Pyongyang's normalization efforts are best seen as part of a Cold War habit of manipulating major powers to gain maximum security and economic benefits. It is becoming increasingly clear that Kim Jong II's agreement to hold the historic inter-Korean summit in June 2000 was a major concession not so much to Seoul as to Washington. Pyongyang was exploiting the new connection with Seoul to speed up normalization talks with the United States and to gain access to bilateral and multilateral aid and foreign direct investment.⁴⁴ Indeed, the second half of 2000 witnessed a flurry of Pyongyang-Washington interactions, including two quasi-summit meetings—one between President Clinton and Vice Marshal Jo Myong-Rok in Washington and another between Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Chairman Kim Jong II in Pyongyang. Despite significant progress toward a U.S.-DPRK missile accord, at the end of the year Pyongyang stopped short of diplomatic success, due partly to on-site verification issues and partly to rapidly changing U.S. political circumstances beyond its control.

The presence of 37,000 American troops on South Korean soil, coupled with President Kim Dae Jung's public declaration on several occasions that U.S. troops must, for the sake of peace and security in Northeast Asia, remain even after the two Koreas are unified, have become symbols of allied credibility, resolve, and commitment. As President Kim Dae Jung has explained, "The US forces stationed on the Korean Peninsula and in Japan are decisive to the maintenance of peace and balance of power not only on the Peninsula but also in Northeast Asia. By the same token, the U.S. forces in Europe are an indispensable factor for peace and stability of all of Europe."⁴⁵ The United States and South Korea have agreed publicly that U.S. forces in Korea will remain even after the disappearance of the North Korean threat: "The US welcomes the public statements of ROK President Kim Dae Jung affirming the value of the bilateral alliance and the US military presence even after reunification of the Korean peninsula. The US strongly agrees that our alliance and military presence will continue to support stability both on the Korean Peninsula and throughout the region after North Korea is no longer a threat."⁴⁶

Although the United States and South Korea share the common

goal of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, their interests and strategies are not identical. Even under the best of circumstances, it is not easy to harmonize competing global, regional, and bilateral interests. But the demise of the Soviet threat, accompanied by the rise of contentious partisan domestic politics—in American foreign policy in general and East Asia policy in particular—has increasingly become a moving target on turbulent trajectories of competing and mutually conflictive ends and means. Post-Cold War American foreign policy is marked not only by the traditional discrepancy between ends (purposes) and means (power), but also by multiple discrepancies between ends and ends—neo-Wilsonian multilateralism, mercantile realism (economic nationalism), strategic realism, humanitarianism, and neo-isolationist minimalism—as well as between means and means—unilateralism, bilateralism, neo-multilateralism (bilateralism-cum-multilateralism), and U.S. hegemonic leadership.⁴⁷

With the coming of the hardline "ABC" (All But Clinton) Bush administration, it was Clinton's North Korea policy, not North Korea itself, that first experienced a hard crash landing, with the paradoxical consequence of a remarkable role reversal in the U.S.-ROK alliance relationship. More than ever before, Washington's and Seoul's North Korea policies are out of sync with each other. All the same, the Bush administration has initiated a major paradigm shift in its military and strategic doctrine from a "threat-based" to a "capabilities-based" model, better to cope with the asymmetrical advantages of its adversaries, including North Korea.⁴⁸ Pyongyang has held Washington's new hard-line administration hostage to the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue for more than a year (from early 2001 to mid-2002). This America-centric effort not only breaches the letter and the spirit of the North-South Joint Declaration of June 15, 2000 (Article 1), but also contradicts North Korea's own longstanding party line that Korean affairs should be handled without foreign intervention or interference. With the Bush administration openly threatening to launch a preemptive military strike against Iraq, one of the three charter members of the "axis of evil," will North Korea be next on America's hit list?

Concluding Remarks

There is no simple answer to the question of how long the post-Kim II Sung system will survive and in what shape or form, because the interplay of North Korea and the outside world is highly complex, variegated, and well-nigh unpredictable. What complicates our understanding of the shape of things to come in North Korea is that all the neighboring countries involved, including China and the United

States, have become moving targets on turbulent trajectories of their respective domestic politics, subject to competing and often contradictory pressures.

Still, the interplay of China and the United States in inter-Korean affairs leads to an obvious and somewhat paradoxical conclusion. For its part, post-Tiananmen China as a rising power is arguably a more influential player than at any time since the Korean War, and more so than any other peripheral power in the reshaping of the future of the Korean Peninsula. For its own geopolitical interests, Beijing has played a generally positive role in Korean affairs, not only by providing necessary if insufficient (in Pyongyang's eyes) diplomatic and economic support to the DPRK, but also by making it clear to Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo that it is now in the common interest of all to promote the peaceful coexistence of the two Korean states on the Peninsula, rather than having to cope with the turmoil, chaos, and even massive exodus of refugees that would follow in the wake of system collapse in the North. Thus, Beijing seems determined to manage the threat of a North Korean collapse and the costs of regional spillover in the form of refugees or even armed conflict escalation. Washington, however, is determined to eliminate the threat of Pyongyang's asymmetrical capabilities (weapons of mass destruction) once and for all, even at the risk of igniting armed conflict escalation on the Korean Peninsula and beyond.

Although Beijing and Washington today command a rather unique position and rather unique influence as holding the key to regime survival, the future of North Korea is not for China or the United States to make or unmake. Both countries can help or hinder North Korea in taking one system-rescuing approach instead of another, but in the end no outside power can determine North Korea's future and the future of the Korean Peninsula.

That said, however, we may proceed from the premise that the way the outside world, especially Beijing and Washington, responds to Pyongyang is closely keyed to the way North Korea responds to the outside world. To say that North Korea's future is unpredictable is to say 'that its future is malleable, not predetermined. Herein lies the potential of external factors in the reshaping of North Korea's future in a preferred direction. Such a nondeterministic image of the future of the post-Kim II Sung system opens up some space for the outside world to use whatever leverage it might have to help North Korean leaders opt for one futuristic scenario or another in the coming years. The jury is still out as to whether post-Kim II Sung North Korea can ride out its economic difficulties by means of a tenuous external life-support system without forfeiting its *juche* identity or without a sudden crash

landing. Final note: to paraphrase Campbell and Reiss, if the long and bumpy road to Korean reunification runs through Pyongyang, Beijing and Washington should expect to be charged a heavy toll.

Notes

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South Korea-U.S. Economic Relations Cooperation, Friction, and Future Prospects*

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Introduction

Over the past decade, South Korea has emerged as a major economic partner for the United States. Korea is the U.S.'s seventh-largest trading partner, its sixth-largest export market, and has also become a significant investment site for American companies. The U.S. is Korea's largest export market, second-largest source of imports, and largest supplier of foreign direct investment. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the main issues and trends in U.S.-South Korean economic relations.

Increased economic interaction has been accompanied by disagreements over trade policies. The level of bilateral friction is principally affected by four factors: the size of the U.S. trade deficit with South Korea; the state of the U.S. economy; the progress of Korea's economic reforms; and the question of whether or not bilateral political or security issues override bilateral trade considerations.

During Korea's financial crisis in 1997 and 1998, the Clinton Administration tended to mute its criticism of Seoul's alleged barriers to foreign exports and investors. Since the spring of 2000, however, the United States has intensified its pressure on bilateral trade issues, protesting that Seoul has been unresponsive to a host of longstanding U.S. complaints. The shift in U.S. policy was due in part to the swings in the U.S.-Korean trade balance; after enjoying three years of trade surpluses with South Korea, the U.S. has run increasingly large bilateral trade deficits since 1998. As the U.S. economy has slowed and Korea's economic reforms have stalled, Congress has become more vocal on bilateral trade issues, particularly on semiconductors and automobiles.

* The views expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of the Library of Congress or the Congressional Research Service.

Additionally, the Bush Administration's harsher U.S. policy toward North Korea, combined with the overall stalemate in North-South Korean relations, has dulled the acuteness of security issues in the U.S.-South Korean relationship; unlike the situation during the Clinton years, Washington does not have to be as concerned that its trade policy will jeopardize its own or Seoul's negotiations with Pyongyang.

An interesting development over the past year has been that Washington and Seoul appear to have become more adept at managing their trade disputes, so that they tend to be less acrimonious than in the past. In large measure, this is due to the quarterly, working-level bilateral trade meetings that were first held in early 2001.

U.S.-South Korea Bilateral Trade Flows

Over the past decade, South Korea has emerged as a major economic partner for the United States. Between 1990 and 2000, U.S.-Korean trade more than doubled (see Table 1). In 2001, two-way trade (exports plus imports) was over \$55 billion, down 17% from the all-time high reached in 2000. For several years, South Korea has been the U.S.' seventh-largest trading partner and its sixth-largest export market (after Canada, Mexico, Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom). Major U.S. exports to South Korea include semiconductors, machinery (particularly semiconductor production machinery), aircraft, agricultural products, and beef. South Korea is the U.S.' 4th largest market for agricultural products and 3rd largest market for beef. For decades, the United States has been Korea's largest export market. Exports to the U.S. accounted for approximately 20% of Korea's total exports in 1999 and 2000. In recent years, exports to the United States have accounted for around 5% of Korea's gross domestic product (GDP). Moreover, since Korea's financial crisis in 1997, the United States has overtaken Japan as Korea's largest supplier of imports. Major U.S. imports from South Korea include electrical machinery (with semiconductors typically accounting for nearly 20% of the total South Korean shipments to the U.S.), cellular phones, general machinery, automobiles, textile products, and steel.

Mid-1990s: U.S. Bilateral Trade Surplus. As shown in Table 1, from 1994-1997 the U.S. ran a trade surplus with South Korea, after several years of trade deficits. The surplus peaked at nearly \$4 billion in 1996, the same year South Korea became the U.S.'s fifth largest export market. The primary reason for the surplus was a sharp rise in U.S. exports - which peaked at \$26.6 billion in 1996-propelled by the boom in South Korea's economy in the mid-1990s, which increased demand for foreign products. The 60% rise in U.S. shipments from 1990 to 1997 more than offset the 25% increase in U.S. imports from

South Korea over the same time period.

1998-2002: U.S. Bilateral Trade Deficit. In the fall of 1997, South Korea plunged into a serious economic crisis. In December of that year, Seoul and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to the terms of a \$58 billion financial support package. As a *quidpro quo* for receiving IMF emergency loans, Seoul agreed to tighten its fiscal and

Table 1. Annual U.S.-South Korea Merchandise Trade
(Billions of U.S. Dollars)

Year	U.S. Exports	U.S. Imports	Trade Balance	Total Trade (Exports + Imports)
1990	\$14.40	\$18.49	-\$4.09	\$32.89
1991	\$15.51	\$17.02	-\$1.51	\$32.53
1992	\$14.64	\$16.68	-\$2.04	\$31.32
1993	\$14.78	\$17.12	-\$2.34	\$31.90
1994	\$18.03	\$19.63	-\$1.60	\$37.66
1995	\$25.38	\$24.18	\$1.20	\$49.56
1996	\$26.62	\$22.66	\$3.97	\$49.28
1997	\$25.05	\$23.17	\$1.87	\$48.22
1998	\$16.49	\$23.94	-\$7.46	\$40.43
1999	\$22.04	\$31.15	-\$9.11	\$53.19
2000	\$26.30	\$39.83	-\$13.53	\$66.13
2001	\$20.89	\$34.92	-\$14.03	\$55.81
Jan - June 2001	\$10.84	\$17.78	-\$6.94	\$28.62
Jan - June 2002	\$10.31	\$16.94	-\$6.63	\$27.25

Sources: 1990-1998 data from Global Trade Information Services. 1999-2002 data from U.S. International Trade Commission.

monetary policies and engage in far-reaching, market-oriented reforms of its financial and corporate sectors, and of its labor market policies. South Korea also agreed to open its economy further to foreign goods and investors. Since Korea's economic crisis, the U.S. has run an increasingly large bilateral trade deficit with that country. Korea's 1998 recession, during which time its gross domestic product (GDP) shrank by 6.7% (see Figure 1), led to a sharp decline in most countries' exports to South Korea, including those from the United States.² American imports from South Korea, however, rose slightly in 1998 and significantly in 1999 and 2000. These increases were propelled by

the strong U.S. economy, which increased U.S. demand for foreign goods and services, and by the devaluation of the won (see Figure 2), which made Korean products cheaper for Americans to buy. In 2001, the slowing U.S. economy led to a drop in Korean imports.

In 1999, when Korea's economy grew by 10.9%, U.S. exports to South Korea recovered somewhat. With Korea's economy growing by over 9% in 2000, U.S. shipments to Korea rose by more than 20% compared with 1999. Growth in imports from Korea (up by nearly 30% in 2000), however, continued to outstrip U.S. export growth, causing the trade deficit to widen. The deficit further expanded in 2001. U.S. exports decreased in large measure because of Korea's sharp economic slowdown and the effects of the Korean *won's* devaluation (see Figure 2). The sharp devaluation of the dollar against the won (and other major currencies) in the late spring and summer of 2002 may reduce the deficit.




Figure 1. Won:Dollar Exchange Rate (Average), 1997-2002
Source: Bank of Korea

Foreign Direct Investment Flows

As part of its commitment to the IMF in December 1997, Seoul pledged to eliminate most restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI). The government of President Kim Dae Jung, who was elected during the nadir of Korea's financial crisis, has moved aggressively to liberalize Korea's foreign investment regime. Partly as a response to Kim's reforms, and partly in response to the lower prices of Korean assets following the 1997 crisis, FDI flows have increased markedly, soaring from \$3.2 billion in 1996 to \$15.7 billion in 2000, before falling to \$11.9 billion in 2001. American companies have invested nearly \$10 billion in South Korea over the past three years. U.S. FDI in 2001 alone was greater than total U.S. FDI in Korea from 1993 to 1996.

In 2001, U.S. firms resumed their historical position as the leading source of FDI into Korea. From 1998-2000, European firms had supplanted their American counterparts at the number one position.

Despite the increased openness to foreign ownership, a number of high-profile acquisitions by foreign companies have been either delayed or cancelled, due to nationalistic objections to the sale, disagreements over the sales price, and/or the discovery of previously undisclosed debts owed by the Korean firm. For the first half of the 1990s, annual South Korean FDI in the U.S. ranged from \$350 million to \$535 million. After soaring to \$1.57 billion in 1996, Korean FDI fell to \$729 million in 1997 and \$874 million in 1998.³

Bilateral Investment Treaty Negotiations For several years, the U.S. and South Korea have been discussing a bilateral investment treaty (BIT). BITs are designed to improve the climate for foreign investors - typically by committing the signatories to prohibit discrimination against foreign investors - by establishing dispute settlement procedures and by protecting foreign investors from performance requirements, restrictions on transferring funds, and arbitrary expropriation. The U.S. has signed over 30 BITs, primarily with countries undergoing significant economic reforms. The U.S. and South Korea last held formal negotiations in 1999. The major stumbling block is Korea's so-called "screen quotas," which are limits on the dates and screen time given to foreign films. Foreign ownership in the Korean telecommunications industry and Korea's copyright rules also remain outstanding issues.

A Possible Korea-U.S. Free Trade Area (FTA). In recent years, there have been some calls for the U.S. and Korea to negotiate a free trade area, which would lower trade barriers between the two countries. The idea enjoys the support of the American business community in Korea, and many Korean businesses operating in the U.S. In the Senate, Max Baucus introduced legislation in May 2001 (S. 944) authorizing FTA negotiations with Seoul, the second time he has presented this initiative. No legislative action was taken on his first attempt, S. 1869, introduced in the 106th Congress. To date, no formal government-to-government discussions have been held over an FTA. Speaking in December 2001, U.S. Ambassador to Korea Thomas Hubbard said that a Korea-U.S. FTA is not on the Bush Administration's short-term policy agenda.

In 2001, at the request of the Senate Finance Committee, the International Trade Commission conducted a fact-finding investigation on the likely economic impact of a South Korea-U.S. FTA. The ITC's final report estimated that within four years after implementation of an FTA, U.S. exports to Korea would increase by 54% while U.S. imports

would rise by 21%. In the short run, the biggest beneficiaries would likely be those industries in both countries that face high initial trade barriers. On the U.S. side, the ITC found that bilateral agricultural exports would increase by more than 200%. For Korea, the ITC projected that textiles and apparel exporters would see their shipments to the U.S. rise by 125%.⁴ Thus, the report implied that the FTA's potential benefits would be greatly diluted if these politically sensitive sectors were excluded.⁵

Overall, the ITC estimated that within four years after implementation of an FTA, the U.S. GDP would increase by approximately 0.2%, while the Korean GDP would rise by 0.7% as a result of the FTA.⁶ An earlier study by the Institute for International Economics (IIE) found similar effects for the U.S. economy, but had a wider band for the increase on Korean GDP, which was projected in the 0.4%-2.0% range. As in the ITC study, the IIE report found that most of the benefits to U.S. firms would derive from increased access to Korea's markets. In contrast, the IIE projected that most of Korea's gains from an FTA would stem not from preferential access to the U.S. market but from improvements in the allocative efficiency of the Korean economy brought about by the trade reforms required by an FTA.⁷




Figure 2. Foreign Direct Investment in Korea
Source: Ministry of Commerce & Industry

President Kim also has discussed publicly his desire to negotiate FTAs with Japan and Chile, presumably to give further impetus to the economic reforms he has initiated.

Major U.S. Trade Disputes with South Korea

Given the disparities in size and economic dependence, it is not surprising that the United States typically sets the agenda of U.S.-ROK trade talks. An recent exception is the case of steel, where Korea increasingly has taken on the role of *demandeur* in challenging U.S. measures to protect its domestic steel industry.

During the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and 1998, the U.S. tended to mute its criticism of South Korea's alleged barriers to foreign companies. Since the spring of 2000, however, the U.S. has intensified its pressure on trade issues, protesting that Seoul has been unresponsive to a host of longstanding U.S. complaints. In its annual report on foreign trade barriers, issued in April 2002, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) devoted 28 pages to South Korea - a country of slightly less than 50 million people - more than it did to any other country except Japan, the European Union, and China. A year earlier, the USTR had cited Korea as a "priority watch country" under "Special 301" (Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974) because it deemed Seoul's enforcement of intellectual property rights to be unsatisfactory. Korea remains on this list. In the spring of 2001, U.S. negotiators - frustrated by the lack of progress in bilateral talks - proposed that the two countries hold quarterly, working-level, interagency "trade action agenda" meetings to discuss progress on and strategies for settling major bilateral trade disputes. Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade accepted, and negotiators on both sides credit the meetings with creating a more constructive dialogue by serving as "action-forcing" events.

Congressional interest in U.S.-Korean trade relations also has increased in recent months. After introducing no major Korea-related economic legislation in 2000, in 2001 and 2002 members of Congress have introduced a number of measures complaining about alleged Korean trade barriers and allegedly unfair subsidy policies.

Below are brief descriptions of several major sector-specific disputes between the U.S. and South Korea. In general, U.S. exporters and trade negotiators identify the lack of transparency of Korea's trading and regulatory systems as the most significant barrier to trade with Korea, in almost every major product sector.

Automobiles South Korea, the world's fourth-biggest producer of automobiles, has long maintained a variety of barriers to the import of automobiles, including a ban on Japanese automobiles and the auditing of the income taxes of individuals who purchased foreign luxury cars. The ban on Japanese automobiles was eliminated in 1999. In its

October 1997 Super 301 report to Congress, the Clinton Administration designated Korea as a "Priority Foreign Country" for its barriers to foreign motor vehicles.⁸ USTR subsequently initiated an investigation under Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, as amended, and issued a call for bilateral consultations to provide fair market access for foreign autos in Korea.⁹ In 1998, the U.S. and South Korea signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on foreign access to Korea's auto market, which led the USTR to terminate its Section 301 investigation. Under the MOU, Seoul agreed to reduce its tariffs on motor vehicles from 80% to 8%,¹⁰ proactively address instances of anti-import activity in Korea, lower or eliminate many automobile taxes, create a new financing system to make it easier to purchase automobiles, and streamline its standards and certification procedures. Many of these steps - including lowering tariffs - have been implemented.

Table 2. U.S.-ROK Auto Trade(number of vehicles)

	1999	2000	2001
Korean Auto Companies' Exports to the U.S.	410,000	573,000	618,000
U.S. Auto Companies' Exports to Korea	739	1,214	1,500

Source: American Chamber of Commerce in Korea

In the spring of 2000, the USTR criticized South Korea's compliance with some areas of the MOU, and called on Seoul to take additional steps - outside the MOU - to open the auto market. Foreign market share for autos remains extremely low at approximately 0.37%, compared with 5% in Japan, 25% in the European Union, and 30% in the United States.¹¹ Meanwhile, led by Hyundai Motors, Korean auto manufacturers exported over 600,000 vehicles to the United States in 2001.¹² U.S. officials and businesspeople attribute the poor sales in Korea to a "buy Korea" mentality among most Koreans, protectionist statements made by high-level Korean government officials, high tariffs and auto taxes, onerous standards and certification rules, and a perception among Koreans that their income taxes will be audited if they purchase a foreign automobile. The U.S. government and auto executives have called on the Korean government to take more visible steps to encourage purchases of foreign cars and to rewrite Korean regulations to reduce the barriers to foreign autos. Most recently, U.S. initiatives have focused on pressuring Seoul to lower its 8% tariff on

autos to 2.5%. Korean officials contend that few foreign vehicles are sold because of the decreased purchasing power of Korean consumers since the economic crisis (foreign autos cost considerably more than Korean models), the lack of advertising by foreign auto manufacturers, and Korean consumers' preference for smaller vehicles. The finalization in April 2002 of GM's long-anticipated takeover of Daewoo Motors may help to increase the sales of U.S. autos in Korea.

U.S.-Korean consultations on the MOU have been held regularly in recent months, but without any progress. One obstacle appears to be paralysis in the Korean government; with President Kim Dae Jung's popularity at an all-time low, governmental authorities appear unwilling to take the high-profile, politically-unpopular, steps to encourage more automobile imports. It is unclear whether the completion of General Motors' takeover of Daewoo Motors will alter Korea's auto imports. During his summit with President Kim in February 2002, President Bush raised the automobile trade issue.

H.Con.Res. 144 and S.Con.Res. 43, introduced in May 2001, call on South Korea to end the practices that impede foreign market access, and request various U.S. executive agencies to monitor Korea's progress on this issue.

Pharmaceuticals Korea is ranked in the world's top 15 pharmaceutical markets, with sales approaching \$4 billion annually. Imports comprise approximately 30% of the total market, compared with an average of 50%-70% for countries that do not have a significant research-based domestic industry. Korea's expenditures on pharmaceutical products is about \$115 per person, less than half the \$240 average for OECD countries.¹³ The country has a nationalized health insurance system, which has had a negative cash flow since 1995.

For years, the U.S. government has raised complaints about a number of Korea's pharmaceutical policies, which it has described as "onerous," non-science based, and designed to protect the domestic Korean industry.¹⁴ Criticisms have mounted since 2001, when the Korean government began to implement a series of emergency measures to fill the national health insurance fund's mounting deficit, estimated at over 4 trillion won (\$3.3 billion). Recent complaints include: the lack of transparency of the Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare, particularly the Ministry's allegedly poor record on consulting with and notifying companies about regulatory changes; poor protection of intellectual property rights for medical patents; the vagueness of a July 2000 Korean law requiring that "cosmeceuticals" - cosmetic products that have a functional or therapeutic effect - be reviewed for safety and efficacy; and the discriminatory nature of

Seoul's requirements that foreign drugs must be retested on Koreans living in Korea, rather than on other ethnic Asians, as the U.S. has insisted. In a sign of the growing importance of pharmaceuticals on the bilateral trade agenda, in January 2002, the two sides established a bilateral health care reform working group.

U.S.-Korea friction over pharmaceutical issues flared into political controversy in Korea in July 2002, when some Seoul politicians and officials blamed the dismissal of the Health and Welfare Minister on pressure from the U.S. government and foreign multinationals. The minister was replaced as part of a July 11, 2002, Cabinet reshuffle. The dispute first arose in May 2001, when the Ministry announced a new "reference pricing" system for reimbursing patients' prescription drug expenditures as part of efforts to stabilize the health insurance fund. Foreign multinationals and the U.S. government criticized the plan as favoring domestic producers of generic drugs and of violating a 1999 U.S.-ROK agreement on prescription drug pricing policies. The plan was scheduled to begin in August 2001, but following strong opposition from the foreign pharmaceutical industry and the U.S. government, it was delayed. The dismissed Health and Welfare Minister had called for the reference pricing plan to be implemented. To date, the plan's status is unclear. Some reports indicate the new system may be unveiled later this year.

Agricultural Issues. U.S. agricultural exporters have long complained about high tariff and non-tariff barriers maintained by Korea, which is the United States' fourth largest market for agricultural products. Approximately 44% of Korea's farm imports in 2000 came from the United States.¹⁵ Agricultural policy is highly political in South Korea, given the influence of the country's shrinking but vocal farm sector. Korean Ministers of Agriculture often have lost their jobs because of concessions made in bilateral and multilateral trade talks.

In September 2001, Washington and Seoul settled their most contentious agricultural dispute in recent years, when the U.S. accepted Korea's abolition of its requirement that imported beef be distributed and sold through different channels than domestic beef. In 2000, a dispute settlement panel requested by the U.S. and Australia ruled that Korea's beef import system discriminated against foreign suppliers. South Korea is the United States' third largest market for beef.

Although the beef dispute has been temporarily settled, several other disagreements linger. The U.S. has criticized the clarity of Korea's new labeling and rule of origin requirements for genetically modified foods, an issue which President Bush raised in his February 2002 summit with South Korean President Kim. Bilateral consultations appear to have partially resolved the dispute. Significant market access

barriers allegedly remain on foreign citrus products and rice. In the fall of 2001, Korea for the first time tendered a contract for imported rice to a U.S. company. The U.S. has also charged that Korea's quarantine policies and mandated shelf-life requirements are barriers to imports. U.S. agricultural groups contend that Korea's import certification requirements and testing standards are unduly onerous.¹⁶

Steel For years, South Korean steel exports to the United States have been one of the most politically-charged items on the bilateral economic agenda, particularly since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. From 1997 to 1998, Korean shipments of steel to the U.S. surged by 109%, vaulting South Korea into the top five U.S. sources of steel imports. Although Korea's steel exports to the U.S. have declined since 1998 (see Figure 4), they have not returned to pre-crisis levels. For the first six months of 2001, Korea exported just under 1.3 metric tons of steel to the United States, a 22.4% year-on-year decline, in line with a general decline in U.S. steel imports.

In response to the 1998 surge from Korea and other steel-producing countries, Congress joined major U.S. steel manufacturers in pressuring the Clinton Administration to take action. Clinton granted safeguard relief (under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974) for U.S. producers of steel welded line pipe and wire rod, a move that raised tariffs on imports of those products.¹⁷ In September 2000, Korea challenged the Section 201 action in the World Trade Organization (WTO). In October 2001, the WTO panel ruled that the Korean claims were partly valid. Subsequently, the U.S. lost an appeal to the WTO Appellate Body. Following the appeal, in July 2002, the two sides reached a




Figure 3. Steel Imports from Korea
Source: International Trade Commission

bilateral agreement, significantly increasing Korean line pipe exporters' access to the U.S. market for the remaining six months that the Section 201 safeguard action is in effect.¹⁸ The Clinton Administration also imposed anti-dumping duties on Korean exports of stainless steel plate in coils and stainless steel sheet and strip. Seoul protested these duties in the WTO, and a dispute settlement panel was formed in November 1999. In its final report of December 2000, the WTO panel ruled against the United States' methodology used to calculate the margin of dumping in the case, and the U.S. subsequently agreed to abide by the ruling.

President Bush's Section 201 Steel Investigation Steel became an even more prominent trade issue in June 2001, when President Bush initiated a Section 201 investigation of the effects of imports of over 600 steel products on the U.S. steel industry. In December 2001, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) recommended that the President grant the U.S. industry relief through a variety of trade remedies - including increased tariffs - for imported steel products representing a majority of U.S. imports. Three months later, President Bush announced trade remedies (higher tariffs and in some cases quotas) for almost all of the products for which the ITC had found substantial injury. All remedies will be of three years' duration, and will decline over that period. Tariffs for some products will rise to 30% in the first year.¹⁹ The President will make final decisions on specific product exemptions over the next 120 days.

Higher duties are expected to have a substantial, but not devastating, impact on Korea's steel industry in part because many of Korea's major export items to the United States were excluded from the Section 201 investigation. Additionally, in a major concession, Pohang Iron & Steel Co (POSCO), the world's second-largest steel producer, received an exemption from President Bush for up to 750,000 metric tons (827,000 short tons) of crude steel exports to its California joint venture with U.S. Steel, equivalent to about one-third of Korea's total steel exports to the United States in 2000 and 2001.²⁰ The Korea Iron and Steel Association (KOSA) estimates that the higher duties will reduce Korea's exports to the U.S. market by 20% in 2002, costing the industry between \$200 - \$300 million. Seoul has joined the European Union and Japan in challenging the Section 201 decision in the WTO.

Korean Government Ownership of the Steel Industry From time to time, Congress has called on the Korean government to end its ownership of some steel firms and the subsidization of others. The October 1998 omnibus spending bill (P.L. 105-277), for example, directed (section 621) USTR to monitor and report upon the Korean government's support for Korean producer Hanbo Steel, the insolvency

of which in 1997 helped precipitate the country's financial crisis that year.²¹ In 2000, a consortium of U.S. investors abandoned its attempt to purchase Hanbo for \$480 million, reportedly because a number of its demands had not been met by the government-controlled entity that is managing Hanbo. Japan's Yamato Steel has since announced a take-over of Hanbo.

For years, the U.S. has demanded that the South Korean government reduce its ownership of the Korean steel industry. Most prominently, the U.S. has called on Seoul to *fully* privatize POSCO, which has been accused of using government subsidies to dump steel in the U.S.²² In October 2000, the Korean government partially met U.S. demands by selling off the remaining 6.84% stake held by state-run Korea Development Bank (KDB), formerly the majority shareholder in POSCO. Shortly before the sale, the government also scrapped its rules limiting individual owners to a 3% stake in POSCO. Seoul now contends that the privatization of the steel-maker is complete. Korea, however, has not yet met the United States demand that the Korea Industrial Bank - which is 98% owned by the Korean government - divest its 3% stake in POSCO. Foreign interests now own a majority of POSCO's shares. POSCO dominates the Korean steel industry, accounting for over 60% of the nation's crude steel output in 1999.²³

Intellectual Property Rights Issues Bilateral tensions have often arisen over U.S. allegations that Korea does not sufficiently protect intellectual property rights (IPRs). In 1999, the U.S. praised Korea for making significant efforts to strengthen its IPR laws, a result of Seoul is becoming a signatory to the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) in 1994. The USTR downgraded Seoul from Special 301 "priority watch list" in 1997 to "watch list" in 1998.²⁴ In May 2000, however, Korea was elevated back to the "priority watch list," because of concerns about inadequate protection of rights in the pharmaceutical industry, continued piracy of computer software, and new (December 1999) revisions to Korea's copyright laws. In 2000 and early 2001, the Korean government took many steps to improve the enforcement of its intellectual property rights regulations, particularly those pertaining to the computer software industry. Citing these moves, in 2002, USTR again downgraded Korea to "watch list" status.²⁵ However, bilateral IPR talks in August 2002 broke down over the lack of progress in copyright and other issues.

*Assistance to Hynix Semiconductor*²⁶ In 2001, a major trade dispute nearly erupted between the United States and South Korea over allegations that the Seoul government was propping up Hynix

Semiconductor, presently the world's third-largest producer of dynamic random access memory (DRAM) semiconductor chips. Last year, Hynix's leading creditors — most of which are owned by the Korean government — orchestrated a series of rescue packages that have kept Hynix in business by enabling it to restructure its 8.6 trillion *won* (over \$6.5 billion) in debt. In the U.S., Micron Technology, the Idaho-based second-largest producer of DRAMs, led a campaign against the support packages, arguing that they amounted to government-sponsored bailouts that allow Hynix to export at low prices and that they were a prime cause of the drastic plunge in global chip prices in 2001. Micron, the last U.S.-based DRAM producer, threatened to file countervailing duty and anti-dumping petitions. Prodded by Micron and some members of Congress,²⁷ the Bush Administration raised the matter in bilateral and multilateral meetings with South Korea and considered requesting that the World Trade Organization establish a dispute settlement panel to investigate. The Korean government has presented evidence that the decisions on whether to aid Hynix have been in the hands of the company's creditors.

The economic stakes are high. U.S. and South Korea trade in DRAMs totaled almost \$3 billion in 2000, nearly twice the value of the two countries' trade in iron and steel products. Semiconductors as a whole are the number one U.S. import from and export to Korea. Furthermore, the Hynix packages call into question the Korean government's commitment to economic reforms, which are designed to make Korean conglomerates more responsive to market pressures and end the past practice of rescuing troubled conglomerates considered "too big to fail." Hynix accounts for an estimated 4% of South Korea's exports. Over 150,000 Koreans are employed by Hynix and its network of suppliers.

In early December 2001, the impetus for the dispute was suddenly removed - at least temporarily - by the announcement that Micron and Hynix had begun negotiating a possible strategic alliance. In April 2002, the two sides announced that Micron would acquire Hynix's DRAM business for \$200 million and over 100 million shares of Micron stock. Hynix's board, however, vetoed the deal, arguing that the sale price was too low and that the recent rise in global chip prices meant that Hynix's DRAM business could survive independently. Subsequently, the Korean government pledged that it would not bail out the company and Hynix's creditors - most of whom backed the deal with Micron - exercised their right to take management control of Hynix.

The new management team initially appeared to favor selling off the company's assets, a move that is likely to generate considerable

political controversy in South Korea, which is in the middle of a presidential election campaign. Recently, however, there are reports that the creditors are backing away from a sale in favor of internal restructuring. Micron has stated that it no longer has any interest in acquiring Hynix or any of its constituent parts, and has taken steps that some believe are designed to preserve its ability to file an anti-dumping or countervailing duty case against Hynix in the future.

Korean's Complaints Against U.S. Anti-Dumping and CVD Practices For over a decade, South Korea has chafed at the United States' use of anti-dumping and counter-vailing duty (CVD) laws to raise tariffs on Korean exports. According to Choi and Schott's study, in July 2000 the five CVD and 18 anti-dumping orders against South Korean exports covered approximately \$2.5 billion, or over 7%, of U.S. imports from South Korea in 1999. Moreover, these tariff hikes have tended to be concentrated in a handful of Korean industries — semiconductors, steel, televisions, and telecommunications equipment — that have considerable political influence in Seoul.

During the Uruguay Round (1986-1993) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, the WTO's predecessor organization), Korea was one of several countries demanding revisions to global anti-dumping rules, changes the United States opposed because of fears they would constrain U.S. anti-dumping investigators. South Korea, joined most prominently by Japan, has taken up this issue again in the WTO's current round of negotiations, against U.S. opposition.²⁸

In recent years, Seoul has become more assertive in using the WTO to challenge United States' trade practices. In 1999 and 2000, Seoul took the U.S. to the WTO over allegedly discriminatory U.S. anti-dumping duties placed on Korean exports of steel and semiconductors. Korea won both of the steel cases it initiated. In the semiconductor case, in September 2000, Korea and the U.S. reached an agreement whereby the U.S. dropped anti-dumping duties imposed against Korean dynamic random access memory (D-RAM) chips. In exchange the Korean semiconductor industry pledged to collect D-RAM price and cost data, and provide this information to the U.S. if a new anti-dumping case is filed against Korean semiconductor imports. The agreement preempted a WTO panel decision that was widely expected to rule against the U.S., a ruling that could have required changes to U.S. anti-dumping regulations. As part of the agreement, Korea asked that the WTO suspend its panel covering the case.

Conclusion

The level of U.S.-South Korean trade friction is principally affected

by four factors: the size of the U.S. trade deficit with South Korea; the state of the U.S. economy; the progress of Korea's economic reforms; and whether or not political or security issues override bilateral trade considerations. Since the spring of 2000 - a period of rising bilateral deficits and a slowing U.S. economy - trade tensions between Washington and Seoul have been rising, after a lull of about three years in which trade disputes were deemphasized to focus on Korea's recovery from its 1997 financial crisis. The change was more a result of shifting priorities on the U.S. side, rather than an increase in the number of disputes, as virtually all current areas of disagreement have been continued sources of tension for years.

For most of 1999 and 2000, with the notable exception of steel, the United States' focus on areas of trade friction was confined primarily to the executive branch. The 107th Congress, however, has intensified its interest in U.S.-Korean economic relations, principally on the issues of semiconductors and automobiles. In late 2001, tensions over assistance to the Hynix Semiconductor - which some members of Congress closely tracked - very nearly caused a major trade dispute between the United States and South Korea to erupt. Additionally, the months-long stalemates in North-South Korean and North Korean-U.S. relations has meant that Washington does not have to be as concerned that its trade policy will jeopardize Seoul's negotiations with Pyongyang. However, in the near future, the growing attention that the Bush Administration is placing on North Korea's weapons of mass destruction may mean that security issues will crowd out many economic considerations that otherwise would occupy a higher place on the bilateral negotiating agenda. This phenomenon was seen during the February 2002 Bush-Kim summit in Seoul; the two leaders' debate over how to deal with North Korea left little time to discuss trade matters. President Bush raised the issues of trade in automobiles and genetically-modified organisms. President Kim expressed concern over the Bush Administration's Section 201 investigation of imported steel.²⁹

An interesting development over the past year-and-a-half has been that Washington and Seoul appear to have become more adept at managing their trade disputes, so that they tend to be less acrimonious than in the past. In large measure, this is due to the quarterly, working-level bilateral trade meetings that were first initiated by Deputy Assistant USTR Barbara Weisel and her counterpart in the Korean embassy, Cho Tae-yul, in early 2001. Dubbed the Trade Action Agenda Meetings, the forum in some ways is a more robust successor to the U.S.-ROK annual trade subgroup meetings that were initiated in the early 1980s, but had lapsed in the 1990s. Both sides credit the meetings, which appear to be unique to the U.S.-South Korean trade

relationship, with creating a more constructive dialogue by serving as "action-forcing" events.

Notes

1. See Raymond Ahearn, *South Korea's Economic Prospects*, CRS Report RS20041, February 1, 1999.
2. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *International Direct Investment Statistical Yearbook 1999*.
3. United States International Trade Commission (ITC), *U.S.-Korea FTA: The Economic Impact of Establishing a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Between the United States and the Republic of Korea*, (Washington, DC, 2001), p. 5-1 - 5-2.
4. For a similar argument, see Choi and Schott, *Free Trade*, p.80.
5. ITC, *U.S.-Korea FTA*, p. x-xi.
6. See Choi and Schott, *Free Trade*, p. 79-82.
7. Super 301 (Section 310 of the 1974 Trade Act) requires the USTR to report to Congress on "priority foreign countries" that practice unfair trade and "priority practices" that have the greatest effect on restricting U.S. exports. If agreement is not reached on the priority practices, the USTR is required to initiate a Section 301 case (see the following footnote). For more information, see Wayne Morrison, *Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974*, CRS Report 98-454. See also Gwenell Bass, *U.S.-South Korea Auto Talks*, CRS Report 97-1030, December 4, 1997.
8. Section 301 (sections 301-309 of the Trade Act of 1974) authorize the USTR to initiate investigations of foreign trade practices that allegedly discriminate against U.S. commerce. If a settlement with the foreign country is not reached following the initiation of the investigation, the USTR decides whether or not to retaliate, usually in the form of 100% tariffs on selected imports from the offending country. See CRS Report 98-454, *Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974*, by Wayne Morrison.
9. By way of comparison, the U.S. tariff on passenger vehicles is 2.5%. The Japanese tariff rate is 0%..
10. According to the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea, of the more than 1 million automobiles sold in Korea in 2000, 4,414 were foreign-made. See American Chamber of Commerce in Korea, *Improving Korea's Business Climate. Recommendations from American Business 2001*, p.50-52.
11. In April 2002, Hyundai Motors announced it would build a \$1 billion production plant in Alabama.
12. American Chamber of Commerce in Korea, *Improving Korea's Business Climate 2002*, p. 148.
13. United States Trade Representative. *2001 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers*, p. 288, 294-96.

14. ITC, *U.S.-Korea FTA*, p.3-10.
15. Caroline Cooper, "KEI Trade Brief. U.S.-Korea Bilateral Trade Relations," July 2002.
16. Section 201 relief, often referred to as "safeguard" or "escape clause" relief, is defined in sections 201-204 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2251-2254). Safeguard relief provides for temporary duties, quotas, or other restrictions on imports that may be traded fairly but that enter in such quantities as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to a domestic industry. The relief is intended to give the domestic industry an opportunity to adjust to the new competition and remain competitive. Within six months after a Section 201 petition has been filed with the International Trade Commission, the ITC must conduct an investigation, determine if relief is warranted, and recommend appropriate remedial action from a specified range of options. The President then decides whether to implement the recommended measure, apply an alternative measure, or take no action at all.
17. The agreement entitles Korean companies to 17,500 tons of line pipe per quarter at the most favored nation tariff rate, more than a seven-fold increase from the Section 201 tariff-rate quota of 9,000 tons per year. "U.S. Increases Korean Steel Access, Resolving WTO Line Pipe Dispute," *Inside US Trade*, August 2, 2002.
18. For more on the Section 201 case, see CRS Report RS21152, *Steel: Key Issues for Congress*, by Stephen Cooney.
19. The exemption is contained in section b.xxiv of the annex to President Bush's proclamation. The proclamation and the annex can be found at [<http://www.usitc.gov/steel>]. The European Union received a 420,000 ton exemption. Japan received 250,000 tons. See *American Metal Market*, August 12, 2002.
20. See CRS Report RL30073, *The Steel Import Surge: Causes and Proposed Remedies*, by Gwenell Bass.
21. See Chapter 3 of the U.S. Department of Commerce's report, *Global Steel Trade*, available as of October 4, 2000, at [<http://www.ita.doc.gov/media/steelreport726.htm>].
22. ITC, *U.S.-Korea FTA*, p.3-23.
23. "Special 301" refers to Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974. Since the start of the Special 301 provision in 1989, the USTR has issued annually a three-tier list of countries judged to have inadequate regimes for IPR protection, or to deny access: 1) *priority foreign countries* are deemed to be the worst violators, and are subject to Section 301 investigations and possible trade sanctions; 2) *priority watch list countries* are considered to have major deficiencies in their IPR regime, but do not currently warrant a Section 301 investigation; and 3) *watch list countries*, which maintain IPR practices that are of particular concern, but do not yet warrant higher level designations. See Morrison, *Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974*, CRS Report 98-454.
24. United States Trade Representative, *2002 Special 301 Report*, [<http://www.ustr.gov/reports/2002/speciaB 01. htm>].
25. For more on the Hynix Semiconductor dispute, see Mark Manyin and Steven Cooney, *The Semiconductor Industry and South Korea's Hynix Corporation*, CRS Report RL31238.

26. For instance, in September, an amendment sponsored by Senator Larry Craig protesting the "Republic of Korea's improper bailout of Hynix" was incorporated into the Senate's version of H.R. 2500, the appropriations bill for Commerce, Justice, and State. The legislation notes that in 1998, Congress inserted a provision into the Omnibus Fiscal 1999 Appropriations Act (H.R. 4328, P.L. 105-277) requiring that the 1997 IMF \$58 billion assistance package to Seoul not be used to support South Korean companies that compete unfairly with U.S. companies. The Craig amendment was stripped from the bill in conference.

27. Notwithstanding Korea's position on anti-dumping, U.S. trade officials have praised their Korean counterparts for their willingness to compromise and serve as a bridge to developing countries during the November 2001 WTO Ministerial talks in Doha, Qatar.

28. *Inside U.S. Trade*, March 1, 2002.

Korean Population in the United States, 2000

Demographic Characteristics and Socio-Economic Status

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Introduction

The U.S. Census Bureau reported 1,076,872 Koreans residing in the United States as of April 1, 2000 (<http://www.census.gov>). These are the respondents who identified themselves as "Korean alone." If those who reported themselves as "Korean in combination with other Asian or other race" are added, the total amounts to 1,228,427. The figures for mixed-heritage persons belonging to two or more ethnic and/or racial groups should be used with caution, especially for comparative analysis, because categories containing these individuals are not mutually exclusive. For this reason, in this analysis the "Korean alone" population figure was mainly used.¹

Of the 1.08 million Koreans, approximately 379,000 (35.2%) are U.S. born and 698,000 (64.8%) are foreign born. Of the 698,000 foreign born, 341,000 (48.9%) are naturalized U.S. citizens. The U.S. born together with naturalized citizens (720,000) now comprise two-thirds of the total Korean population in the United States.² "Koreans in America" may have been an appropriate term for the 1990s and before, but now the more appropriate term would be "Korean Americans." This change in designation also reflects the transformation of their identity.

Population and economic data for this study are drawn from the 1997 Economic Census, the Population Census 2000, and the Census 2000 Supplementary Survey Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS).³ Immigration statistics have been drawn from the annual Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.⁴ Utilizing these statistics, this paper attempts to highlight basic demographic,

social, and economic characteristics of the Korean population in the United States as of 2000.

Immigration

Korean immigration to the United States proceeded in four distinct periods. The first period was between 1883, when the diplomatic relationship between the United States and Korea was established, and 1902, when the first organized migration of Korean laborers to Hawaii started. Approximately 200 to 400 Koreans came to the United States during this period.⁵ By the time the first organized group of Korean immigrants arrived in Hawaii in 1903, a small Korean community had already formed in San Francisco and Los Angeles respectively.⁶ Among well known Koreans in this group were So Jai-pil (Phillip Jaisohn), So Kwang-bom, Syngman Rhee, and Aim Chang Ho.

The second period started in 1903, with the arrival of Korean laborers to Hawaii, and ended in 1924, with the ban of all Asian immigration by the U.S. government. Some 7,000 Koreans were recruited to Hawaii as plantation laborers, from January 1903 to July 1905.⁷ Most of these immigrants were young bachelors and were brought in to meet the labor demand on Hawaiian plantations.⁸ From 1910 to 1924, approximately 1,100 Korean picture brides immigrated, about 900 to Hawaii and about 200 to the mainland.⁹ About 540 political exiles came by way of China and Europe without passports during this period.¹⁰ Approximately 289 Korean students were able to arrive with passports issued by the Japanese government between 1921 and 1940.¹¹ Between 1924 and 1945, no Koreans were admitted to the U.S. as immigrants. About 1,000 Koreans of the pre-1924 immigrants eventually returned to Korea according to the anecdotal documents of early Korean organizations. Because of a great imbalance of the sex ratio and anti-miscegenation laws, many of the first wave immigrants stayed single throughout their lives. As a result, the Korean population in the United States did not grow much until 1950, numbering around 10,000 at that time. They were mostly concentrated in Hawaii and California.

American intervention in the Korean War initiated the third phase of Korean immigration. American soldiers stationed in Korea played a significant role by bringing Korean brides, arranging adoption of war-orphan to American homes, and sponsoring students to come to the U.S. Between 1951 and 1964, approximately 6,500 brides, 6,300 adopted children, and 6,000 students came to this country.¹² These three groups constituted a significant component of the Korean immigration to the United States during this third phase. Additionally, many of the exchange scholars, scientists, government workers,

physicians, and nurses who arrived during this period became permanent residents later on.

The fourth phase occurred after the Immigration Act of 1965, which abolished the national origin quota system based on race, and allowed Koreans for the first time to immigrate to the United States as families. Until this time, Korean immigrants came mostly as individual laborers, students, picture brides, war brides, and orphans. However, between 1965 and 1970, students-turned professionals, guest nurses, and physicians were able to apply for permanent residence visas, and became a major component of Korean immigration. Subsequently, these professionals, together with the wives of U.S. servicemen, petitioned for their respective spouses, siblings, and parents to immigrate as well. Since 1970, relatives of the permanent residents, or citizens, have become an overwhelming majority of the Korean immigration to the U.S.

Consequently, Korean immigration to the United States accelerated, until the 1980s. Between 1948 and 1950, only 107 Korean immigrants were admitted. During the 1951-60 decade this number increased to 6,231. The number jumped to 34,526 between 1961 and 1970, constituting 1.04% of the total immigrants admitted to the United States. The number of Korean immigrants admitted during the 1971-80 period grew exponentially to 267,638. These Koreans constituted 6% of the total immigrants admitted to the U.S. in that decade, and ranked third in number surpassed only by Mexicans and Filipinos. Korean immigration peaked during the next decade (1981-1990), when 333,746 Koreans were admitted, constituting 4.6 percent of the total immigrants and ranking fourth after Mexico, the Philippines, and China. The number of annual admittance, however, has steadily declined after reaching its peak of 35,849 in 1987. Although the number of Korean immigrants admitted in 1999 was only 12,301, one of the lowest levels recorded since 1972, the number in 2000 increased to 15,214. About one-half of these numbers, however, represents those who are already in the United States and had their status changed to permanent residency. Only about 7,000 to 8,000 Koreans per year are actually arriving from Korea in recent years as immigrants.¹³ As a whole, a total of 806,414 Korean immigrants were admitted to the United States between 1948 and 2000.

The 164,166 Koreans admitted between 1991 and 2000 were less than one-half of those Koreans admitted during the previous decade and represented 1.8 percent of the 9,095,417 immigrants admitted to the U.S. Korea was the only country to experience such a drastic decline in immigration in the 1990s. Other countries, for the most part, maintained their usual patterns of immigration flow. The drastic

decline of Korean immigration in the 1990s may be due to the improved conditions in politics and economy in Korea since the late 1980s. While Korean immigration to the U.S. has slowed substantially since 1987, the volume of Chinese immigration has remained at a high level. In 2000, China (including Hong Kong) with 49,060, ranked second to Mexico in the total number of immigrants admitted to the United States.

The steady and substantial flow of immigration from Korea has accelerated the size of the Korean population in the United States. It increased from about 10,000 in 1950 to 70,000 in 1970, and again to 355,000 in 1980. The number reached 799,000 in 1990 and, as of the year 2000, it reached 1,077,000 (Korean alone) or 1,228,000 (Korean alone plus Korean in combination with others). The Korean alone population constituted 0.38% of the 281,422,000 U.S. population. During the last thirty-year period, the Korean population in the United States increased more than 15 fold.

Three Categories of Koreans

The total number of ethnically, and/or racially, mixed Koreans accounts for 12.34% of the 1,228,000 people of Korean ancestry. The multi-ethnic Koreans mixed with other Asians are 22,550, which account for 1.84%. The 129,005 multi-racial Koreans account for 10.50%. Altogether, 151,555 persons are identified as Koreans with multiple ethnic and/or racial heritages. The Korean's rate of mixing with other ethnic or racial groups is among the lowest of the major Asian groups. On the other hand, ethnically or racially mixed people account for 30.66% of all people of Japanese heritage, 4.83% mixed with other Asians and 25.82% with other races. Among the Chinese, mixed-heritage persons constitute 15.52%, 5.03% mixed with other Asians and 10.49% with other races. As the children born to the post-1965 immigrants enter into reproductive ages, the number of racially or ethnically mixed Koreans should increase significantly.

The percent of multi-ethnic and/or racial Koreans varies greatly from state to state. Hawaii has the highest number and proportion of multi-ethnic/racial Koreans with 43% of all persons of Korean heritage to be of mixed ethnic and/or racial heritage - 14.5% mixed with other Asians, and 28.6% with other races. Many of the U.S.-born descendants of the first-wave Koreans who immigrated at the turn of the twentieth century still live in Hawaii and their out-marriage rate is very high.¹⁴

The proportion of the mixed heritage persons among Koreans in Hawaii is even higher than that of the Japanese (32%).

In the continental United States, states with a relatively small

number of Koreans such as North Dakota, Idaho, New Mexico, Arkansas, and Oklahoma tend to show a high percentage of mixed-heritage Koreans. More than a quarter of all Koreans in these states are ethnically or racially mixed. Korean women married to American soldiers and Korean children adopted by American homes have been a significant component of Korean immigration since the Korean War and they tend to settle all over the United States.¹⁵ Children born to these Koreans apparently contributed to the high rate of multiple heritage persons in these states. On the other hand, states with a relatively large number of Koreans such as California, New York, New Jersey, and Maryland show a relatively low rate of mixed-heritage Koreans. These are also the states where a large number of more recent immigrant families have settled. In these states, persons of mixed-heritage constitute less than 8% of all Koreans. Proximity is apparently a factor here. As people of a common ethnic heritage share a vicinity, the higher the chances that they will meet and marry with one another.

Distribution

Koreans, like other East Asians, have traditionally been concentrated in the Western region of the United States. Hawaii and California were home to the great majority of Koreans until the 1950s.

Nevertheless, the pattern of geographic distribution has changed significantly since the 1960s; Koreans have been quicker than other Asians to disperse themselves across a wider region in the United States. They are visible in most of the metropolitan areas in the United States. The 2000 Census reveals that 44% of Koreans are located in the West, 23% in the Northeast, 12% in the Midwest, and 21% in the South. For the general population, the percentage shares are 24% in the West, 19% in the Northeast, 21% in the Midwest, and 36% in the South.¹⁶

California continues to be the state with the largest number of Koreans, with 345,882. During the 1990-2000 decade, the Korean population in California grew 33%, similar to the growth rate for Koreans in the nation (35%). Thus California's share of the total Korean population was about one-third, both in 1990 and in 2000. New York's growth rate of the Korean population during this decade, 25%, was significantly lower than the national average, but was still second in size in 2000 with 119,846 Koreans. Forty-three percent of the Koreans are concentrated in these two states. Illinois was the third-ranking state in size of Koreans in 1990, but their rank fell to fourth in 2000, with 51,453 Koreans. This state's Korean population increased 24% during this decade, much lower than the national average. On the

other hand, New Jersey's growth rate of the Korean population, 70%, was nearly twice as high as the national average, becoming the third most populous state for Koreans in 2000, with 65,349 Koreans. This was in part due to a heavy influx of Koreans to the New Jersey portion of the greater New York metropolitan suburbs during the 1990s.

The fact that the two most populous states for Koreans, California and New York, contain 43% of all Koreans, as well as the fact that three-quarters of the total Korean population are concentrated in just 10 states, suggests that Koreans experience a relatively high degree of geographic concentration. Nevertheless, these rates are not as high as other Asian groups. Chinese and Japanese, for example, show a much higher degree of geographic concentration. California and New York are the two most populous states for the Chinese, representing 57% of the total Chinese population in the U.S. Furthermore, California and Hawaii contain 62% of the total Japanese population.

As compared with other Asians, Koreans are under-represented in the West and over-represented in the South. The 2000 Census counted 73% of the Japanese, 68% of the Filipinos, 50% of the Vietnamese, and 49% of the Chinese in the Western states, in comparison with 44% for Koreans. Contrarily, the Korean's presence in the South is relatively much higher than other Asians. Twenty-one percent of the Koreans were found in Southern states whereas only 10% of the Japanese, 14% of the Chinese, and 13% of the Filipinos were located in the region. Meanwhile, 55% of the Black population and 34% of the White population were counted in the South.

The relatively high concentration of Koreans in the South as compared with other Asians may be attributed to the fact that Koreans do not have as strong an ethnic networking infrastructure in the West as the Chinese and Japanese. The immigration of wives of American soldiers has been a significant component of the post-1950 period, and contributed to the wider geographic distribution for Koreans. The high rates of entrepreneurship among Koreans also have contributed to their wider dispersion over the nation. During the 1990s, the Southern states showed the highest rates of increase for Koreans. The Korean population in Georgia experienced the highest increase rate, 88%, among all 50 states. The high growth rate was particularly noticed among states on the Atlantic coastal region. Six of the 10 fastest growing states (Georgia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Delaware, Florida, Virginia) for the Korean population were from the South. Between 1990 and 2000, Southern states showed the highest increase rate of the Korean population at 46%.

Koreans live in large metropolitan areas and a great majority of them live in the suburbs. Ninety-six percent of Koreans in the United

States are found in metropolitan areas, while, in contrast, 80% of the general population resides in metropolitan areas. Korean immigration to the United States since 1965 has typically been an urban-to-urban migration,¹⁷ from large urban centers of South Korea to the large metropolitan areas of the United States.

Within metropolitan areas, more Koreans (57%) live in the suburbs than in the central cities (40%). The rate of suburbanization for Koreans is one of the highest among major racial/ethnic groups. Asian Indians are the only group with a higher percentage living in metropolitan suburbs (59%). For the general population, about 50% live in the suburbs, while 30% live in central cities.¹⁸ The high rate of residential suburbanization for Koreans is in part due to their relatively high levels of educational achievement. Asian Indians as a group also exhibit one of the highest income and educational achievement levels in the United States. The suburbs attract Koreans mainly because the suburbs usually have better schools.

Although Koreans generally live in metropolitan areas, they are especially concentrated in the largest areas. The largest number of Koreans is found in the Southern California metropolitan region called Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange-San Bernardino-Ventura, CA Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA). More than a quarter million (257,975) Koreans living in this five-county area constitute nearly one-fourth of Koreans in the United States. The next largest area of Korean concentration is the area encompassing New York City and surrounding metropolitan areas of New York, Northern New Jersey, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania. More than 170,000 Koreans live here and constitute approximately 16% of the Koreans in the United States. Forty percent of all Koreans in the U.S. are found in these two metropolitan regions. As seen in Table 2, 72% of Koreans in the U.S. live in the 13 metropolitan areas, each of which has at least 10,000 Koreans.

Age and Sex Composition

As compared with other groups, the Korean population is relatively young. According to the 2000 Census, its median age is 32.4 versus 35.3 for the total U.S. population. This is not necessarily because of high fertility, but is related to the recency nature of the Korean immigration. The post-1965 immigration has been largely a family migration. Adult parents and young children represent the majority of these immigrants. The proportion of the Korean population 65 years of age and over is 6.75%, while the proportion for the total population is 12.06% as of 2000. However, census data demonstrate a continued increase of the elderly population for the Koreans. The proportion of

the Korean population 65 years and over increased from 2.40% in 1980, to 4.30% in 1990, and again to 6.75% in 2000.

In terms of the sex ratio as measured by the number of males per 100 females, Korean females generally, when compared to the national population, are significantly overrepresented between the ages of 20 to 54 years. As shown in Table 3, sex ratios of the Korean population in these age groups are much lower than the general population. This is largely due to a sustained imbalance of sex ratios among Korean immigrants; that is, a significantly higher number of females than males among young adult immigrants. For example, the numbers of Korean males per 100 females admitted between 1996 and 2000 were 59.90 for 20-24 years of age, 37.99 for 25-29, 58.67 for 30-34, 68.48 for 35-39, and 73.21 for 40-44.¹⁹ This pattern of sex imbalance in favor of young adult females has continued ever since the latest immigration wave began in 1965. The only counterbalancing force to this pattern has been the sex ratio of U.S. born Koreans, which has followed a general pattern of the U.S. population. Young Korean female adults, in comparison with their male peers, appear to be more attracted to the prospects of new opportunities in America. Social and economic opportunities open to the young adult females in Korea are also less favorable relative to their male counterparts. Korean males in the earlier period, 1903-45, suffered a great deal due to a shortage of female counterparts. Now, the problem has completely shifted to the opposite sex, due to the shortage of males.

The sex ratio imbalance is reversed for Koreans under 15 years of age. Korean males outnumber Korean females for every five-year age interval below age 20. The sex ratio imbalance is more notable when compared to the general U.S. population. This is again due to the unbalanced sex ratios among immigrants favoring males in the youngest age groups. This imbalance reflects the age-sex structure of the Korean population in Korea. In recent years, due to the male preference of Korean parents, sex-selective abortions were carried out in alarming rates although the practice is illegal. A much higher number of aborted female fetuses contributed to the unusually high imbalance in the sex ratios for the younger population. The population structure of Korean Americans 19 years of age and under reflects these imbalanced sex ratios. Sex ratios for Korean immigrants are 118.85 for under five years of age, 107.30 for 5-9 years of age, 114.39 for 10-14, and 116.30 for 15-19, while the corresponding ratios for the total U.S. population are 104.75, 104.93, 104.90, and 105.29.

According to the 2000 Census, there are 338,196 Korean alone households, with an average size of 2.77, as compared with 2.59 for total U.S. households. The total number of Korean families counted in

the census is 241,054, with an average size of 3.30 versus 3.14 for all U.S. families. The difference between Korean and U.S. averages can be attributed to the variation in family types between the two. While 82% of the Korean-American families are married-couple families, 76% of the U.S. families are as such. These figures reflect a relatively stable family structure for Koreans as compared with the general population. Furthermore, 54% of the Korean married-couple families have own children below 18 years of age, while 46 percent of U.S. married-couple families have such children. Female householder families, with no husband present, constitute 13 percent of Korean families as compared with 18 percent of all U.S. families. Moreover, families with children under 18 years of age living with a single parent constitute 14.5 percent of all Korean families with children under 18, while 28.2 percent of the U.S. families with children under age 18 live with a single parent.²⁰ The traditional emphasis placed on family welfare over individual interest contributes to the maintenance of a stable family structure among Korean Americans. This relative family stability among Koreans partly contributes to the high educational achievement of their second generation as seen in the following section.

Koreans show one of the lowest divorce or separation status among major racial and ethnic groups according to the Census 2000 Supplementary Survey Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) statistics. As shown in Table 6, Koreans in a divorced or separated state constitute 6.1 percent of all Koreans 15 years of age and over, while the corresponding figure for the nation as a whole is 11.8 percent. Asian Indians are the group with the lowest level of divorce or separation, with 3.4 percent. The Chinese show the second lowest proportion, with 4.3 percent. Koreans are the third lowest group. The black population shows the highest proportion, with 17.4 percent of its population 15 and over being in a divorced or separated state. The divorce and separation rates for Asian Indians, Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese are substantially lower than blacks, Hispanics, and whites.

Socio-Economic Status

Education. Koreans, like other Asian groups, continue to exhibit one of the highest levels of educational achievement. According to the 1990 Census, the percentage of persons 25 years of age and over with at least a bachelors degree was generally high for most Asian groups as compared with the national average: 58% for Asian Indians, 41% for Chinese, 39% for Filipinos, 34% for Japanese, 34% for Koreans, and

17% for Vietnamese. The corresponding figure for all persons in the U.S. was 20%. For the U.S. born persons, the figures were 44% for Asian Indians, 51% for Chinese, 22% for Filipinos, 34% for Japanese, 32% for Koreans, and 17% for Vietnamese. For the general U.S. born population, the figure was 20%. For both U.S. born and foreign born groups, the educational level of Asians far surpasses the national average.

The Census 2000 Supplementary Survey PUMS data provide a similar picture. Asians continue to display higher levels of educational achievement when compared to the national average. According to the PUMS data, the six Asian groups mentioned above and the national average have all increased their proportion of educational attainment, with the Asian level far exceeding the national average with the exception of Vietnamese, the most recent immigrant community. Asian Indians maintain the highest level of educational attainment with 64% of their overall population 25 years of age and over possessing at least a bachelor's degree. The corresponding figure for Koreans is 49%. For other Asian groups, they are 52% for Chinese, 42% for Filipinos, 42% for Japanese, and 23% for Vietnamese. The national figure is 27%. For the U.S. born population, the corresponding figures are 65% for Chinese, and 55% for Koreans. For whites the figure is 28%. Again, the national figure for U.S. born persons is the same as the overall figure, at 27%. Although the educational level of U.S. born Koreans is twice as high as the general population, it falls significantly below the level for the U.S. born Chinese, both in 1990 and 2000. The gap in educational achievement rate between Koreans and Chinese has been reduced substantially between 1990 and 2000, as the number of U.S. born children 25 years of age and over born to the post-1965 Korean immigrants increased greatly during the decade.

Work. A major source of livelihood for Koreans in the United States is undoubtedly the entrepreneurship of small business. Surveys conducted in Los Angeles, Chicago, New York, and Atlanta indicate that about one-third of Korean immigrant householders engage in a self-owned business, about one-fifth in professional work, and the rest in other salaried occupations.²¹ A typical pattern in the 1970s for a newly-arriving family was to start a small business with capital saved from a few years of labor on assembly lines, maintenance companies, and other blue-collar jobs. In recent years, many immigrants started businesses shortly after arriving in part due to the strong economy and the liberalization of foreign exchange laws in Korea.

The 1997 U.S. Economic Census provides detailed information regarding the status of business firms owned by minorities. It supported many of the anecdotal pictures of Korean business patterns

that have been reported in the Korean media. According to the economic census, Asian and Pacific Islander-owned businesses totaled about 913,000 firms, employed more than 2.2 million people, and generated \$306.9 billion in revenues in 1997. The vast majority of Asian-and Pacific Islander-owned firms, 71%, were unincorporated businesses owned by individuals.²² Koreans rank third among Asian groups in terms of the number of firms owned, 135,571, after the Chinese and Asian Indians, respectively. However, their business concentration was the highest among all ethnic and racial groups examined. The ratio of the proportion of business firms owned by an ethnic or racial group divided by the proportion of that group's population in the U.S. is 1.713 for Koreans, 1.467 for Japanese, 1.411 for Chinese, 1.335 for Asian Indians, 1.174 for Vietnamese, 0.615 for Filipinos, 0.459 for Hispanics, and 0.315 for Blacks. The Korean ratio of 1.713 is derived by dividing the proportion of Korean-owned firms (0.65%) to the total number of firms in the United States by the proportion of the Korean population (0.38%) to the total U.S. population. A ratio of 1 indicates that the proportion of business ownership of one group is the same as its proportion of the nation's total population. The Korean ratio indicates that their rate of business ownership is 71% higher than their share of the population in the nation. The ratio for Blacks shows that their rate of business ownership is 68% less than their share of the population. According to the data, Koreans represent a merchant class.

Korean business ownership varies widely by the type of industry. The Korean population may constitute only 0.38% of the U.S. population, but they own 1.49% of all retail trade firms in the United States. The 42,916 Korean-owned retail trade firms make up 32% of all business firms owned by Koreans. Korean businesses have the highest concentrations in apparel and accessory stores (concentration ratio=13.00), food stores (12.59), general merchandise stores (9.53), apparel and other textile products (9.03), textile mill products (7.24), eating and drinking places (5.43), personal services (4.41),²³ and local and interurban passenger transit services (3.58). The high concentration of Koreans in these types of industries partly explains their concentration in large urban centers and their dispersion over wider regions as compared with other Asian groups. These firms are mostly small in scale, labor intensive, and family, or individually, operated. The heavy concentration of Koreans in these areas reflects their relatively recent immigration history. A high concentration in these types of retail and personal services is also observed among Vietnamese, whose immigration history is more recent than that of Koreans. On the other hand, Chinese, with a longer history in the

United States, show a much wider range of business concentration as compared with Koreans.

The average of annual sales and receipts per Korean-owned firm is \$339, 000 for the nation as a whole. This is substantially less than those of the Japanese (\$511,000), Chinese (\$420,000), and Asian Indian (\$405,000) firms, and is far less than the national average (\$891,000) for all firms. The national average confirms the dominant position of white-owned firms. The average for Korean-owned firms, however, is far higher than Hispanic (\$ 155,000), Filipino (\$131,000), Vietnamese (\$95,000), and Black (\$86,000)-owned firms. In terms of the number of employees, Korean firms also stand in the middle. The data clearly situate Korean-owned firms in the middle of the American business structure. It also illustrates a racial hierarchy existing in corporate America, where without strong political leverage, Koreans often become scapegoats.

Why do Koreans concentrate in small business? Language difficulties and unfamiliarity with American culture hinder them from finding an occupation in mainstream society commensurate with their education and work experience. Operating a small business at the margins of mainstream industries in a harsh work environment is a practical choice for many of them. Korean small businesses stay competitive by working longer hours, mobilizing ethnic resources, and family labor.²⁴ Oftentimes husbands and wives work together to operate the family owned business without enjoying vacations or weekends.²⁵ Their children also help during the after-school hours. Running one's own business may be difficult and risky, but the potential profitability is the driving force. Nevertheless, these Korean merchants occupy a necessary but marginalized niche in the mainstream industrial structure, like foot soldiers in the army. Some do well, but many still struggle as seen in the income statistics.

The feeling of control of their work environment represents yet another important reason for the high concentration of entrepreneurship among Koreans. A critical issue that Korean immigrants face when they arrive is status inconsistency and the ensuing erosion of self-esteem. The most important factor in adult self-esteem is related to a person's occupation.²⁶ Owning a business gives psychological satisfaction for being one's own boss, in Korea referred to as a *sajangnim* (President). Many immigrants therefore opt for entrepreneurship.

Income. The Census 2000 Supplementary Survey PUMS data show two distinct qualities for Koreans in terms of their respective median family, household, and individual income when compared to other Asian groups, races, and the nation as a whole. First, Koreans seem to defy the strong correlation between the levels of educational attainment

and economic prosperity by recording incomes far less than expected when compared to other groups of similar educational achievement. Secondly, the fact that the mean family, household, and individual income for Koreans is notably higher than their median and that their respective standard deviations are the highest for all Asian and racial groups, indicates that Koreans experience a high disparity in income among themselves. They show an extremely skewed income distribution relative to other groups. Simply, the Koreans have a polarized economic stratification. The mean family, household, and individual income for Koreans all fluctuate around the national averages surpassing blacks and Hispanic, but significantly trailing behind the Asian Indians, Japanese, and Chinese. The mean family income for Koreans, \$72,600, is just slightly over the national figure of \$66,000. The mean individual income for persons aged between 25 and 64 is \$32,807 for Koreans as compared with the national average of \$35,017. This mean for Koreans is far ahead of Native Americans, Blacks, and Hispanics, but substantially lower than Asian Indians, Chinese, Japanese, and Whites. However, when comparing the median, Koreans fall below the national level for all three categories (family, household, and individual) of income. In all three categories, the median for Koreans is again substantially below Asian Indians, Japanese, and Chinese. The median individual income for Koreans is among the lowest of all racial and Asian ethnic groups presented in Table 11. This discrepancy between education and income is more apparent among foreign-born Koreans.

There are several possible explanations about this discrepancy between education and income for Koreans. First, the tendency to concentrate in self-owned business is highest for Koreans as discussed above, yet their businesses are still mostly in retail and personal service sectors where profit margins are slim. Secondly, although Koreans possess a relatively high education level, they experience greater difficulty adjusting to a new environment due to their English language limitations. Thirdly, Koreans are relatively new immigrants when compared with Japanese and Chinese, and accordingly, lack an efficient system of ethnic networking and a strong economic resource. Lastly, it is possible that some Koreans may just underreport their income, in light of the fact that a high proportion of Koreans engage in self-owned, cash-based small businesses.

In contrast, the situation is quite different among U.S. born Koreans. U.S. born Koreans exhibit one of the highest education levels as compared with other groups. Chinese are the only group that shows a higher level. In family, household, and individual income, U.S. born Koreans are ahead of all other groups, except the Chinese as well. The

number of U.S. born Koreans in the PUMS data set is relatively small, and one needs to exercise caution in interpreting the numbers. However, it is apparent from the data that although the first generation Korean immigrants still struggle, the U.S. born second generation Koreans seem to fare well in terms of education and income. It is expected that as more second generation Koreans enter into adulthood, the gap between education and income will ease steadily.

Conclusion

Koreans enthusiastically responded to the drastic liberalization of U.S. immigration laws in the 1960s, and for the first time in Korea's history, large numbers of Koreans moved to the United States. The number of Koreans in America has increased at an accelerated rate during the 1970s and 1980s, and now has reached more than one million in number. Koreans have become a visible and significant minority in this multi-ethnic and multi-cultural nation. This hard-working, highly-educated, and actively organized ethnic community is increasing its stake in the American society. The impact will be tremendous when the second-generation Koreans reach a mature adulthood. As the Korean stake in political and economic affairs is reaching the significant threshold of becoming a viable participant in the American community, the volume of Korean immigration appears to have slowed down.

Aspects of Korean culture and values have influenced the demographics of Korean American society in several ways. These norms reflected in Korean American society may vary in degree, but they still allude to the characteristics found among Korean Americans. The family structure of Koreans in the United States still reflects the stability of the traditional Korean family, as reflected in the higher proportion of children living with both parents and the lower divorce and separation rates as compared with other groups. When looking at the age and sex structure of the Korean American population, two distinct patterns appear that reflect a gross imbalance in its composition. As the younger Korean population in the United States - those 14 years and under — reflects a sex ratio significantly higher than the national average favoring males, the adult population - those 20 years and older — experiences the exact opposite trend showing a much lower sex ratio than the national mean favoring females. Both trends can be attributed to the influence Korean immigration and Korean social norms have held over the demographics of Korean Americans. Korea is a male-dominant society. These preferences affect the Korean American landscape by making the prospects of immigrating to the United States more attractive to a disproportionately large amount of adult Korean

females, and by tolerating the artificial manipulation of births based on gender which favors males.

The data presented here indicate a divergent quality of the Korean American population in terms of citizenship, nativity, language, culture, and socio-economic status. The American-born and English-speaking second generation are a significant component of the Korean American community, and their relative share is expected to increase rapidly. Now, two-thirds of Koreans in the United States are U.S. citizens and their identity is definitely a "Korean-American." At the same time, the economic status in the community is quite polarized. The ever-divergent Korean American population and the significantly-reduced volume of new immigration from Korea, point to a rapid transformation of the Korean American community in the near future. The business pattern in the Korean community will significantly diversify and the focus of the immigrant generation (small businesses and institutions such as Korean churches and Korean media) will have to be broadened in order to survive. These changes will shake up the much isolated community of the first generation Korean Americans and will necessitate the development of social networks with other communities. Those first generation institutions, organizations, and businesses that can not diversify their clientele and can not accommodate the new demands will fade away.

The population size also has a significant bearing not only to the political empowerment of those Koreans who live in the United States, but also on the country they left behind. In this closely tied global village, the number of Koreans, Japanese, and Chinese people living in the United States has a significant effect on the bilateral and multilateral relationships among the United States, Korea, China, and Japan. This significance will only increase in the future. In light of the ever-increasing tide of Chinese immigration to the United States and a significant decline in Korean immigration to the United States, it may be an appropriate time to revisit the proactive emigration policies of the 1960s and 1970s for public debate and policy concern.

The Census 2000 data clearly broadens the scope and definition of the Korean American identity in terms of their language, culture, and progeny. Korean Americans, who do not speak Korean, adopt American values and culture, and have a multi-racial and multi-ethnic heritage, will steadily increase as the main generation of the Korean population gradually shifts to second and succeeding generations, as the Japanese experience has clearly demonstrated. The Korean American is no longer a Korean integrating, or adapting, into mainstream American society, but rather a fusion of Korean and American norms and values forging out their own unique Korean American identity.

Table 1. Korean Population by State, 1990 -2000

State	1990		2000		Percent Change
	Number	%	Number	%	
California	259,941	32.54%	345,882	32.12%	33.06%
New York	95,648	11.97%	119,846	11.13%	25.30%
New Jersey	38,540	4.82%	65,349	6.07%	69.56%
Illinois	41,506	5.20%	51,453	4.78%	23.97%
Washington	29,697	3.72%	46,880	4.35%	57.86%
Texas	31,775	3.98%	45,571	4.23%	43.42%
Virginia	30,161	3.78%	45,279	4.20%	50.12%
Maryland	30,320	3.80%	39,155	3.64%	29.14%
Pennsylvania	26,787	3.35%	31,612	2.94%	18.01%
Georgia	15,275	1.91%	28,745	2.67%	88.18%
Hawaii	24,454	3.06%	23,537	2.19%	-3.75%
Michigan	16,316	2.04%	20,886	1.94%	28.01%
Florida	12,404	1.55%	19,139	1.78%	54.30%
Massachusetts	11,744	1.47%	17,369	1.61%	47.90%
Colorado	11,339	1.42%	16,395	1.52%	44.59%
Ohio	11,237	1.41%	13,376	1.24%	19.04%
North Carolina	7,267	0.91%	12,600	1.17%	73.39%
Minnesota	11,576	1.45%	12,584	1.17%	8.71%
Oregon	8,668	1.09%	12,387	1.15%	42.90%
Arizona	5,863	0.73%	9,123	0.85%	55.60%
Nevada	4,315	0.54%	7,554	0.70%	75.06%
Indiana	5,475	0.69%	7,502	0.70%	37.02%
Tennessee	4,508	0.56%	7,395	0.69%	64.04%
Connecticut	5,126	0.64%	7,064	0.66%	37.81%
Wisconsin	5,618	0.70%	6,800	0.63%	21.04%
Missouri	5,731	0.72%	6,767	0.63%	18.08%
Oklahoma	4,717	0.59%	5,074	0.47%	7.57%
Iowa	4,618	0.58%	5,063	0.47%	9.64%
Alaska	4,163	0.52%	4,573	0.42%	9.85%
Kansas	4,016	0.50%	4,529	0.42%	12.77%
Alabama	3,454	0.43%	4,116	0.38%	19.17%
Kentucky	2,972	0.37%	3,818	0.35%	28.47%
South Carolina	2,577	0.32%	3,665	0.34%	42.22%
Utah	2,629	0.33%	3,473	0.32%	32.10%
Louisiana	2,750	0.34%	2,876	0.27%	4.58%
Nebraska	1,943	0.24%	2,423	0.23%	24.70%
Delaware	1,229	0.15%	1,991	0.18%	62.00%
New Hampshire	1,501	0.19%	1,800	0.17%	19.92%
New Mexico	1,464	0.18%	1,791	0.17%	22.34%
Rhode Island	1,294	0.16%	1,560	0.14%	20.56%
Arkansas	1,037	0.13%	1,550	0.14%	49.47%
Mississippi	1,123	0.14%	1,334	0.12%	18.79%
Idaho	935	0.12%	1,250	0.12%	33.69%
D. of Columbia	814	0.10%	1,095	0.10%	34.52%
Maine	858	0.11%	875	0.08%	1.98%
West Virginia	777	0.10%	857	0.08%	10.30%
Montana	668	0.08%	833	0.08%	24.70%
Vermont	563	0.07%	669	0.06%	18.83%
South Dakota	525	0.07%	584	0.05%	11.24%
Wyoming	402	0.05%	412	0.04%	2.49%
North Dakota	526	0.07%	411	0.04%	-21.86%
Total	798,846	100.00%	1,076,872	100.00%	34.80%

Table 2. Korean Population in Selected Metropolitan Areas, 2000

Metropolitan Area	Number	Percent
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange-San Bernardino-Ventura, California Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA)	257,975	23.96
New York-North New Jersey-Long Island, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Pennsylvania CMSA	170,509	15.83
Washington, D.C.-Baltimore, District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia CMSA	74,454	6.91
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, California CMSA	57,386	5.33
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, CMSA	46,256	4.30
Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton, Washington CMSA	41,189	3.82
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland CMSA	29,309	2.72
Atlanta, Georgia Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)	22,317	2.07
Honolulu, Hawaii MSA	21,681	2.01
Dallas-Ft Worth, Texas CMSA	18,123	1.68
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maine, Connecticut, CMSA	15,560	1.44
San Diego, CA MSA	12,004	1.11
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria., Texas CMSA	10,341	0.96
Total for 13 Metropolitan Areas	777,104	72.16
Total Koreans in the United States	1,076,872	100.00

Note: Only areas with at least a population of 10,000 Koreans.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Population Census 2000.

Table 3. United States Total and Korean Population by Age and Sex, 2000

Total Population

<i>Total Population</i>	Males	% of Males	Females	% of Females	Total	% of Total Population	Sex Ratio*
Under 5 years	9,791,115	7.33%	9,346,859	6.67%	19,137,974	6.99%	104.75
5 to 9 years	10,504,352	7.87%	10,010,859	7.15%	20,515,211	7.50%	104.93
10 to 14 years	10,469,540	7.84%	9,980,260	7.12%	20,449,800	7.47%	104.90
15 to 19 years	9,623,303	7.21%	9,139,940	6.52%	18,763,243	6.86%	105.29
20 to 24 years	8,690,853	6.51%	8,728,437	6.23%	17,419,290	6.37%	99.57
25 to 29 years	9,363,065	7.01%	9,500,542	6.78%	18,863,607	6.89%	98.55
30 to 34 years	9,925,396	7.43%	10,109,995	7.22%	20,035,391	7.32%	98.17
35 to 39 years	10,915,338	8.17%	11,300,990	8.07%	22,216,328	8.12%	96.59
40 to 44 years	10,799,229	8.09%	11,236,407	8.02%	22,035,636	8.05%	96.11
45 to 49 years	9,665,666	7.24%	10,142,567	7.24%	19,808,233	7.24%	95.30
50 to 54 years	8,461,727	6.34%	8,925,567	6.37%	17,387,294	6.35%	94.80
55 to 59 years	6,414,817	4.80%	6,913,082	4.93%	13,327,899	4.87%	92.79
60 to 64 years	5,064,864	3.79%	5,620,371	4.01%	10,685,235	3.90%	90.12
65 years +	13,862,098	10.38%	19,136,034	13.66%	32,998,132	12.06%	72.44
Total	133,551,363	100.00%	140,091,910	100.00%	273,643,274	100.00%	95.33

(continued)

Korean Population

Under 5 years	28,796	6.35%	27,272	5.64%	56,068	5.98%	105.59
5 to 9 years	32,470	7.16%	30,061	6.22%	62,531	6.67%>	108.01
10 to 14 years	33,204	7.32%	30,580	6.33%	63,784	6.81%	108.58
15 to 19 years	33,113	7.30%	31,368	6.49%	64,481	6.88%	105.56
20 to 24 years	34,224	7.54%	36,293	7.51%	70,517	7.53%	94.31
25 to 29 years	46,740	10.30%	48,597	10.06%	95,337	10.18%	96.18
30 to 34 years	43,320	9.55%	43,206	8.94%	86,526	9.24%	100.26
35 to 39 years	38,498	8.49%	43,350	8.97%	81,848	8.74%.	88.81
40 to 44 years	39,330	8.67%	45,297	9.37%	84,627	9.03%	86.83
45 to 49 years	29,676	6.54%	35,840	7.42%	65,516	6.99%	82.80
50 to 54 years	27,023	5.96%	31,211	6.46%	58,234	6.22%	86.58
55 to 59 years	22,588	4.98%	24,232	5.01%	46,820	5.00%	93.22
60 to 64 years	18,812	4.15%	18,651	3.86%	37,463	4.00%	100.86
65 years and over	25,859	5.70%	37,265	7.71%	63,124	6.74%	69.39
Total	453,653	100.00%	483,223	100.00%	936,877	100.00%	93.88

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Population Census 2000

Table 4. Korean Immigration by Age and Sex, 1996 - 2000

	Males	% of Males	Females	% of Females	Total	% of Total	Sex Ratio for Total
Under 5 years	5,211	15.37%	4,392	10.60%	9,603	12.75%	118.65
5-9 years	1,470	4.34%	1,370	3.31%	2,840	3.77%	107.30
10-14 years	3,028	8.93%	2,647	6.39%	5,675	7.53%	114.39
15-19 years	4,317	12.73%	3,712	8.96%	8,029	10.66%	116.30
20-24 years	1,310	3.86%	2,187	5.28%	3,497	4.64%	59.90
25-29 years	2,057	6.07%	5,415	13.07%	7,472	9.92%	37.99
30-34 years	2,569	7.58%	4,379	10.57%	6,948	9.22%	58.67
35-39 years	3,154	9.30%	4,606	11.12%	7,760	10.30%	68.48
40-44 years	3,462	10.21%	4,729	11.42%	8,191	10.87%	73.21
45-49 years	2,767	8.16%	2,795	6.75%	5,562	7.38%	99.00
50-54 years	1,785	5.26%	1,586	3.83%	3,371	4.48%	112.55
55-59 years	1,015	2.99%	1,091	2.63%	2,106	2.80%	93.03
60-64 years	709	2.09%	911	2.20%	1,620	2.15%	77.83
65-69 years	464	1.37%	729	1.76%	1,193	1.58%	63.65
70-74 years	282	0.83%	418	1.01%	700	0.93%	67.46
75-79 years	171	0.50%	237	0.57%	408	0.54%	72.15
80 years +	88	0.26%	164	0.40%	252	0.33%	53.66
Unknown age	46	0.14%	55	0.13%	101	0.13%	83.64
Total	33,905	100.00%	41,423	100.00%	75,328	100.00%	81.85

SOURCE: Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1996 - 2000

Table 5. Family Type By Presence and Age of Own Children, All Persons and Korean, 2000

United States	All Persons	Percent	Korean	Percent
Total:	71,787,347	100.00%	241,054	100.00%
Married-couple family:	54,493,232	75.91%	196,963	81.71%
With own children under 18 years:	24,835,505	34.60%	106,726	44.27%
Under 6 years only	5,892,433	8.21%	27,269	11.31%
Under 6 years and 6 to 17 years	5,316,384	7.41%	17,902	7.43%
6 to 17 years only	13,626,688	18.98%	61,555	25.54%
No own children under 18 years	29,657,727	41.31%	90,237	37.43%
Other family:	17,294,115	24.09%	44,091	18.29%
Male householder, no wife present:	4,394,012	6.12%	12,183	5.05%
With own children under 18 years:	2,190,989	3.05%	3,130	1.30%
Under 6 years only	594,889	0.83%	679	0.28%
Under 6 years and 6 to 17 years	284,895	0.40%	241	0.10%
6 to 17 years only	1,311,205	1.83%	2,210	0.92%
No own children under 18 years	2,203,023	3.07%	9,053	3.76%
Female householder, no husband present:	12,900,103	17.97%	31,908	13.24%
With own children under 18 years:	7,561,874	10.53%	14,958	6.21%
Under 6 years only	1,532,745	2.14%	2,098	0.87%
Under 6 years and 6 to 17 years	1,274,233	1.78%	1,057	0.44%
6 to 17 years only	4,754,896	6.62%	11,803	4.90%
No own children under 18 years	5,338,229	7.44%	16,950	7.03%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Population Census 2000

**Table 6. Marital Status by Race and Asian Ethnicity, 15 Years of Age and Over,
Census 2000 Supplementary Survey PUMS Data Set, 2000**

Race/Ethnicity		Marital Status					Total
		Married	Widowed	Divorced	Separated	Never Married	
Vietnamese	Count	587	47	38	27	327	1,026
	Percent	57.2%	4.6%	3.7%	2.6%	31.9%	100.0%
Korean	Count	572	34	51	8	300	965
	Percent	59.3%	3.5%	5.3%	.8%	31.1%	100.0%
Japanese	Count	792	88	89	12	329	1,310
	Percent	60.5%	6.7%	6.8%	.9%	25.1%	100.0%
Filipino	Count	1,272	97	105	34	575	2,083
	Percent	61.1%	4.7%	5.0%	1.6%	27.6%	100.0%
Chinese	Count	1,655	112	108	34	761	2,670
	Percent	62.0%	4.2%	4.0%	1.3%	28.5%	100.0%
Asian Indian	Count	1,210	61	43	18	450	1,782
	Percent	67.9%	3.4%	2.4%	<i>im</i>	25.3%	100.0%
Native American	Count	1,022	106	242	70	651	2,091
	Percent	48.9%	5.1%	11.6%	3.3%	31.1%	100.0%

(continued)

Black	Count	9,442	2,140	3,239	1,334	10,156	26,311
	Percent	35.9% ^c	8.1%	12.3%	5.1%	38.6%	100.0%
Hispanic	Count	12,637	963	1,940	784	8,186	24,510
	Percent	51.6%	3.9%	7.9% ^d	3.2%	33.4%	100.0%
White	Count	142,833	17,444	24,160	3,590	54,753	242,780
	Percent	58.8%	7.2%	10.0% ^d	1.5%	22.6%	100.0%
Total	Count	166,427	20,700	29,248	5,583	73,403	295,361
	Percent	56.3% ^d	7.0%	9.9% ^d	1.9%	24.9%	100.0%

Hispanic is not a racial category and the U.S. total does not include the Hispanic total. Total includes all others not presented in the table.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Supplementary Survey PUMS Data Set. <http://www.census.gov/c2ss/www/Products/PUMS.htm>.

Table 7. Educational Attainment by Race and Asian Ethnicity, 25 Years of Age and Older, 2000

Race/Ethnicity	AGE				Educational Attainment		Total
					Less than BA/BS	BA/BS or Higher	
Vietnamese	25 and Over	Place of Birth	U.S. Born	Count	12	10	22
				Percent	54.5%	45.5%	100.0%
			Born outside U.S.	Count	640	183	823
				Percent	77.8%	22.2%	100.0%
Total			Count	652	193	845	
			Percent	77.2%	22.8%	100.0%	
Korean	25 and Over	Place of Birth	U.S. Born	Count	24	29	53
				Percent	45.3%	54.7%	100.0%
			Born outside U.S.	Count	374	357	731
				Percent	51.2%	48.8%	100.0%
Total			Count	398	386	784	
			Percent	50.8%	49.2%	100.0%	
Japanese	25 and Over	Place of Birth	U.S. Born	Count	433	304	737
				Percent	58.8%	41.2%	100.0%
			Born outside U.S.	Count	254	192	446

				Percent	57.0%	43.0%	100.0%
		Total		Count	687	496	1,183
				Percent	58.1%	41.9%	100.0%
Filipino	25 and Over	Place of Birth	U.S. Born	Count	178	83	261
				Percent	68.2%	31.8%	100.0%
			Born outside U.S.	Count	846	658	1,504
				Percent	56.3%	43.8%	100.0%
		Total		Count	1,024	741	1,765
				Percent	58.0%	42.0%	100.0%
Chinese	25 and Over	Place of Birth	U.S. Born	Count	116	213	329
				Percent	35.3%	64.7%	100.0%
			Born outside U.S.	Count	992	968	1,960
				Percent	50.6%	49.4%	100.0%
		Total		Count	1,108	1,181	2,289
				Percent	48.4%	51.6%	100.0%
Asian Indian	25 and Over	Place of Birth	U.S. Born	Count	34	35	69
				Percent	49.3%	50.7%	100.0%
			Born outside U.S.	Count	499	903	1,402
				Percent	35.6%	64.4%	100.0%

(continued)

		Total		Count	533	938	1,471
				Percent	36.2%	63.8%	100.0%
Native American	25 and Over	Place of Birth	U.S. Born	Count	1,339	231	1,570
				Percent	85.3%	14.7%	100.0%
			Born outside U.S.	Count	92	10	102
				Percent	90.2%	9.8%	100.0%
		Total		Count	1,431	241	1,672
				Percent	85.6%	14.4%	100.0%
Black	25 and Over	Place of Birth	U.S. Born	Count	16,447	3,025	19,472
				Percent	84.5%	15.5%	100.0%
			Born outside U.S.	Count	1,459	468	1,927
				Percent	75.7%	24.3%	100.0%
		Total		Count	150,572	57,632	208,204
				Percent	72.3%	27.7%	100.0%
White	25 and Over	Place of Birth	U.S. Born	Count	138,986	53,466	192,452
				Percent	72.2%	27.8%	100.0%
			Born outside U.S.	Count	11,586	4,166	15,752
				Percent	73.6%	26.4%	100.0%
		Total		Count	150,572	57,632	208,204
				Percent	72.3%	27.7%	100.0%

Non-Hispanic White	25 and Over	Place of Birth	U.S. Born	Count	134,300	52,545	186,845
				Percent	71.9%	28.1%	100.0%
			Born outside U.S.	Count	6,507	3,362	9,869
				Percent	65.9%	34.1%	100.0%
		Total		Count	140,807	55,907	196,714
				Percent	71.6%	28.4%	100.0%
Hispanic	25 and Over	Place of Birth	U.S. Born	Count	7,670	1,335	9,005
				Percent	85.2%	14.8%	100.0%
			Born outside U.S.	Count	8,649	1,142	9,791
				Percent	88.3%	11.7%	100.0%
		Total		Count	16,319	2,477	18,796
				Percent	86.8%	13.2%	100.0%
All Persons	25 and Over	Place of Birth	U.S. Born	Count	162,284	58,389	220,673
				Percent	73.5%	26.5%	100.0%
			Born outside U.S.	Count	21,039	8,698	29,737
				Percent	70.8%	29.2%	100.0%
		Total		Count	183,323	67,087	250,410
				Percent	73.2%	26.8%	100.0%

Hispanic is not a racial category and the U.S. total does not include the Hispanic total. All Persons include all other categories not presented in the table.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Supplementary Survey PUMS Data Set. <http://vw.v.census.gov/c2ss/vvvvvv/Products/PUMS.htm>.

Table 8. Characteristics of Business Firms in the United States by Race and Asian Ethnicity, 1997

	Total Firms	Total Sales/Receipts (\$1,000)	Average Sales per Firm	% of Firms with Employees	Average # of Employees Per Firm
United States	20,821,934	18,553,243,047	891,000	25.43%	4.96
Black	823,499	71,214,662	86,000	11.32%	0.87
Hispanic	1,199,896	186,274,582	155,000	17.66%	1.16
Asian / Pacific Islander	912,960	306,932,982	336,000	31.76%	2.41
Asian Indian	166,737	67,503,357	405,000	40.30%	2.94
Chinese	252,577	106,196,794	420,000	35.86%	2.74
Filipino	84,534	11,077,885	131,000	17.25%	1.30
Japanese	85,538	43,741,051	511,000	27.25%	3.07
Korean	135,571	45,936,497	339,000	36.94%	2.46
Vietnamese	97,764	9,322,891	95,000	19.38%	0.81

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1997 Economic Census.

**Table 9. Mean and Median Yearly Family Income by Race
and Asian Ethnicity by Place of Birth, 1999 - 2000**

Place of Birth	Race and Ethnicity	Mean (\$)	N	Std. Deviation	Median (\$)	
U.S. Born	Vietnamese	52,410.00	7	40,348.35	54,600.00	
	Korean	73,895.33	15	52,594.00	70,000.00	
	Japanese	79,979.13	280	61,044.37	65,350.00	
	Filipino	70,744.92	64	48,604.85	63,850.00	
	Chinese	106,352.98	116	87,029.54	86,700.50	
	Asian Indian	59,150.00	18	40,309.37	48,900.00	
	Native American	43,058.16	683	35,501.63	35,000.00	
	Black	43,160.03	8,306	38,859.26	34,000.00	
	White	69,317.48	78,079	65,612.18	54,000.00	
	Non-Hispanic White	69,863.44	75,713	66,062.85	54,500.00	
	Hispanic	49,038.10	3,937	44,290.30	39,800.00	
	Total		66,216.51	90,056	63,533.06	51,800.00
	Born outside U.S.	Vietnamese	70,970.91	29	71,497.02	55,850.00
Korean		72,491.67	261	95,147.12	50,000.00	
Japanese		91,107.39	110	92,622.87	66,750.50	
Filipino		82,329.04	507	70,607.46	68,000.00	
Chinese		77,335.21	712	66,847.87	60,750.00	
Asian Indian		97,473.01	565	90,231.58	75,500.00	

(continued)

	Native American	42,109.29	41	36,623.42	31,100.00
	Black	52,342.42	770	44,165.63	41,500.50
	White	64,723.47	6,015	68,372.39	46,000.00
	Non-Hispanic White	76,899.82	3,671	76,051.08	57,555.00
	Hispanic	44,468.67	3,896	44,418.36	34,000.00
	Total	64,541.11	11,266	66,639.84	47,000.00
Total	Vietnamese	70,533.45	297	70,935.83	55,700.00
	Korean	72,567.96	276	93,274.32	50,000.00
	Japanese	83,117.87	390	71,426.17	66,000.00
	Filipino	81,030.64	571	68,557.55	67,000.00
	Chinese	81,400.50	828	70,686.89	63,850.00
	Asian Indian	96,289.80	583	89,338.75	75,000.00
	Native American	43,004.43	724	35,540.78	34,700.00
	Black	43,939.06	9,076	39,417.70	35,000.00
	White	68,988.88	84,094	65,823.68	53,600.00
	Non-Hispanic White	70,188.83	79,384	66,573.67	54,700.00
	Hispanic	46,765.35	7,833	44,410.02	36,000.00
	Total	66,030.22	101,322	63,887.80	51,200.00

Hispanic is not a racial category and the U.S. total does not include the Hispanic total. Total includes all other categories not presented in the table.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Supplementary Survey PUMS Data Set. <http://www.census.gov/c2ss/ww\v/Products/PUMS.htm>.

**Table 10. Mean and Median Yearly Household Income by Race
and Asian Ethnicity by Place of Birth, 1999 - 2000**

Place of Birth	Race and Ethnicity	Mean (\$1	N	Std. Deviation	Median (\$)
US Born	Vietnamese	50,727.65	17	90,593.9C	17,600.00
	fCorean	71,549.67	3C	68,287.94	60,240.00
	Japanese	71,659.75	411	59,403.55	59,120.00
	Filipino	60,618.26	112	45,284.24	49,912.50
	Chinese	81,605.11	206	77,609.92	61,310.00
	Asian Indian	44,652.5C	56	39,079.3C	37,750.00
	Native American	40,736.9C	942	38,388.44	31,900.00
	Black	38,321.78	12,50C	36,989.43	29,400.00
	White	59,381.0C	115,972	61,454.56	44,850.00
	Non-Hispanic White	59,703.52	112,770	61,831.90	45,000.00
	Hispanic	45,974.77	5,262	43,226.19	36,000.0C
	Total	56,969.32	133,757	59,433.73	42,640.00
Born outside US	Vietnamese	68,216.12	345	72,355.08	51,000.00
	Korean	62,064.43	358	84,845.26	41,650.00
	apanese	67,855.16	204	82,404.26	46,500.00
	Filipino	78,401.71	61C	70,730.93	62,550.00
	Chinese	70,026.27	94C	67,026.37	53,900.00
	Asian Indian	90,203.88	696	86,630.01	70,550.00

(continued)

	Native American	38,002.02	55	34,904.9C	29,550.00
	Black	48,130.72	1,07C	43,309.73	37,950.00
	White	57,642.02	8,412	64,773.84	40,000.00
	Non-Hispanic White	64,341.55	5,579	71,252.19	44,500.00
	Hispanic	44,029.72	4,657	44,135.35	33,600.0C
	Total	58,793.19	15,084	63,910.16	41,775.00
Total	Vietnamese	67,394.84	362	73,254.38	50,065.00
	Korean	62,797.82	388	83,645.41	42,010.00
	Fapanese	70,397.74	615	67,857.38	55,400.00
	Filipino	75,643.06	722	67,697.35	61,900.00
	Chinese	72,107.63	1,146	69,155.35	55,740.00
	Asian Indian	86,811.76	752	84,853.96	68,100.00
	Native American	40,586.03	997	38,193.46	31,800.00
	Black	39,095.22	13,57C	37,617.67	30,000.00
	White	59,263.39	124,384	61,685.95	44,400.00
	Non-Hispanic White	59,922.15	118,349	62,315.39	45,000.00
	Hispanic	45,061.56	9,919	43,663.95	35,000.0C
	Total	57,154.15	148,841	59,904.93	42,500.00

Hispanic is not a racial category and the U.S. total does not include the Hispanic total. Total includes all other categories not presented in the table.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Supplementary Survey PUMS Data Set.

<http://www.census.gov/c2ss/www/Products/PUMS.htm>.

**Table 11. Mean and Median of Total Person's Yearly Income
by Race and Asian Ethnicity by Place of Birth,
25 - 64 Years of Age, 1999 - 2000**

Place of Birth	Race and Ethnicity	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Median
U.S. Born	Vietnamese	30,235.00	20	28,569.27	22,000.00
	Korean	51,086.51	43	67,012.79	32,080.00
	Japanese	43,749.91	520	42,001.61	37,115.00
	Filipino	33,363.28	232	33,030.53	29,750.00
	Chinese	51,753.45	275	61,008.62	38,000.00
	Asian Indian	37,170.82	61	33,508.00	30,000.00
	Native American	23,856.09	1,393	23,674.39	19,200.00
	Black	25,200.75	16,072	26,038.28	20,400.00
	White	37,160.28	149,765	46,186.02	28,000.00
	Non-Hispanic White	37,440.18	145,028	46,516.27	28,000.00
	Hispanic	26,838.53	7,858	30,196.78	21,000.00
	Total	35,659.95	173,514	44,307.09	26,900.00
	Born outside U.S.	Vietnamese	28,961.92	764	34,630.66
Korean		31,656.37	683	52,514.87	20,000.00
Japanese		39,623.75	355	60,492.62	22,000.00
Filipino		32,949.37	1,299	36,234.45	27,250.00
Chinese		35,539.77	1,681	43,778.40	24,000.00

(continued)

	Asian Indian	46,015.05	1,313	60,912.78	30,000.00
	Native American	20,217.65	98	15,609.10	17,450.00
	Black	27,168.70	1,755	27,651.46	22,000.00
	White	31,865.42	12,457	47,147.27	20,000.00
	Non-Hispanic White	39,884.09	7,213	54,930.47	26,000.00
	Hispanic	20,085.69	8,861	28,676.40	15,000.00
	Total	30,570.62	25,078	43,679.36	20,000.00
Total	Vietnamese	28,994.4C	784	34,474.56	20,050.0C
	Korean	32,807.19	726	53,623.33	20,000.00
	Japanese	42,075.87	875	50,337.42	34,000.00
	Filipino	33,012.09	1,531	35,757.43	27,800.0C
	Chinese	37,819.30	1,956	46,908.37	27,000.0C
	Asian Indian	45,622.40	1,374	59,982.57	30,000.0C
	Native American	23,616.94	1,491	23,244.10	19,000.00
	Black	25,394.49	17,827	26,207.25	20,700.00
	White	36,753.69	162,222	46,281.87	27,000.00
	Non-Hispanic White	37,555.97	152,241	46,951.63	28,000.00
	Hispanic	23,259.55	16,719	29,592.46	17,100.0C
	Total	35,017.27	198,592	44,260.50	26,000.00

Hispanic is not a racial category and the U.S. total does not include the Hispanic total. Total includes all other categories not presented in the table.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Supplementary Survey PUMS Data Set. <http://www.census.gov/c2ss/www/Products/PUMS.htm>.

Notes

1. From these numbers, the U.S. Census Bureau estimates that 182,621 Koreans are "residual foreign born" (<http://www.census.gov/population/documentation/twps0061/ta6-6.xls>). The "residual foreign born" population includes people in "quasi-legal" status who are awaiting action on their legal migration requests as well as "unauthorized" migrants. The numbers specific for these two categories have not been determined, but a great majority of the residual foreign born Koreans are believed to be those persons in quasi-legal status. These "residual foreign born" Koreans are already included in the census totals for Koreans according to the Census Bureau. The theoretical maximum of the Korean population therefore may not significantly exceed 1,228,427, including those Koreans mixed with others, as of 2000.
2. U.S. Census Bureau, *Current Population Reports*, P20-534; *Statistical Abstract of the United States*: 2001.
3. <http://www.census.gov/c2ss/www/Products/PUMS.htm>.
4. <http://www.ins.gov>.
5. Son, Young Ho, "Early Korean Immigrants in America: A Socioeconomic and Demographic Analysis," *Korea Journal* Vol. 28, No. 12(1988), p. 33. Warren Y. Kim, *Koreans in America* (Seoul: Po Chin Chai Printing Co, 1971), pp. 3-4. Bong-young Choy, *Koreans in America* (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1979), p. 72. The immigrants during this period were mostly political refugees, students, and petty merchants.
6. Ahn Chang Ho's attempt to peacefully resolve disputes between Korean ginseng merchants in San Francisco in 1902 is a well known Korean anecdote.
7. For a detailed political economic analysis of the early Korean immigration to Hawaii, see Wayne Patterson, *The Korean Frontier in America: Immigration to Hawaii, 1896-1910* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988).
8. Starting with the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, the U.S. Congress enacted a series of laws in order to exclude the Chinese from the United States and by 1900 Chinese were totally banned from entering the country including Hawaii. On the other hand, Japanese laborers in Hawaii organized themselves to demand their rights. There were twenty-nine Japanese inspired work stoppages between 1890 and 1897 and plantation owners looked for another source for more docile labor. See Patterson, *Korean Frontier in America*, p. 6.
9. The number of picture brides varies slightly according to the sources. Bong-young Choy puts it at around 900 (*Koreans in America*, Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1979, p. 88) and Warren Y. Kim puts it at 1,066 (*Koreans in America*, Seoul: Po Chin Chai Printing Co, 1971, p. 22). Most of the Korean labor immigrants were poor and not able to afford a trans-Pacific journey to find a spouse. Instead, pictures were exchanged between prospective spouses. Women brought through such arrangements were called picture brides. These brides were better educated than their male partners and led their husbands from Hawaiian farms to Honolulu and California, where they actively took part in church activities and independence movements. For activities of Korean-American women in this period, see Eun Sik Yang, "Korean Women in America: 1903-1930," in *Korean Women in Transition: At Home and Abroad*, ed. Eui-Young Yu and Earl H. Phillips (Los Angeles: Center for Korean American and Korean Studies, California State University, Los Angeles, 1987), pp. 167-181. This "picture bride"

practice was also common for Japanese and Filipino immigrants at the time.

10. Warren Y. Kim, *Koreans in America* (Seoul: Po Chin Chai, 1971), pp. 23-26.
11. Warren Y. Kim, *Koreans in America* (Seoul: Po Chin Chai Printing Co, 1971), p. 24. Bong-youn Choy, *Koreans in America* (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1979), p.78. Won Moo Hurh and Kwang Chung Kim, *Korean Immigrants in America: A Structural Analysis of Ethnic Confinement and Adhesive Adaptation* (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1984), p. 49.
12. Won Moo Hurh and Kwang Chung Kim, pp. 49-52.
13. Of the 15,830 Korean immigrants admitted in year 2000, 7,332 were new arrivals and 8,489 were visa adjustments from nonimmigrant to immigrant status. *Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2000*, Table 11. p. 45.
14. Wayne Patterson, *The Use: First-Generation Korean Immigrants in Hawai'i, 1903-1973* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000), pp. 123-124.
15. It is estimated that Korean women married to American soldiers and Korean children adopted to American homes constitute nearly one-quarter of approximately 800,000 Korean immigrants admitted to the United States since 1948 according to statistics published by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
16. **Northeast** - Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania; **Midwest** - Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas; **South** - Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas; **West**-Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, Hawaii.
17. Pyong Gap Min, *Caught in the Middle: Korean Communities in New York and Los Angeles*, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1996), p. 31.
18. For the white population the ratio of suburb-city living is 54% to 24%. For the Japanese, the distribution is 50% in the suburbs and 41% in the central cities. For the Chinese, the percentage is reversed - 48% in the suburbs and 49% in the central cities. Blacks are largely city dwellers, 53% living in the central cities and 33% in the suburbs. Likewise, more Latinos live in central cities (47%) than in the suburbs (45%).
19. *Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1996-2000*, Department of Justice.
20. http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DDTable?_Js=44802365868^
21. Pyong Gap Min, "Problems of Korean Immigrant Entrepreneurs," A paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Asian Studies Association, San Francisco, March 26, 1988, p. 2; Eui-Young Yu, "Korean Communities in America: Past, Present, and Future," *Amerasia* 10:2 (1983), pp. 23-35; Won Moo Hurh and Kwang Chung Kim, *Korean Immigrants in America: A Structural Analysis of Ethnic Confinement and Adhesive Adaptation* (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1984), p. 226. The Los Angeles Times Poll reported in Karl Schoenberger, "Moving Between 2 Worlds," *Los Angeles Times*, July 12, 1992, p. A24.

22. U.S. Census Bureau, "Census Bureau News," May 22, 2001, pp. 1-2. <http://www.census.gov/dcmd/www/embargo/cbl-88.html>
23. A high proportion of personal services for Koreans represent those who engage in laundry or dry cleaning businesses.
24. Won Moo Hurh and Kwang Chung Kim, *Korean Immigrants in America: A Structural Analysis of Ethnic Confinement and Adhesive Adaptation* (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1984); Eui-Young Yu, *Korean Community Profile, 1990* ; Karl Schoenberger, "Moving Between 2 Worlds," *Los Angeles Times*, July 12, 1992; Ivan Light and Edna Bonacich, *Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Koreans in Los Angeles 1965-1982* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988).
25. Edna Bonacich, Mokerrom Hossain, and Jae-hong Park, "Korean Immigrant Working Women in the Early 1980s," in *Korean Women in Transition: At Home and Abroad*, ed., Eui Young Yu and Earl H. Phillips (Los Angeles: Center for Korean-American and Korean Studies, California State University, Los Angeles, 1987), pp. 219-247; Kwang Chung Kim and Won Moo Hurh, "Employment of Korean Immigrant Wives and the Division of Household Tasks," In *Korean Women in Transition*, pp. 199-218.
26. Harold L. Sheppard, "The Potential Role of Behavioral Science in the Solution of the 'Older Worker Problem'," *American Behavioral Scientist* XIV-1 (September - October 1970), pp. 71-80.

The An Ch'angho Controversy Gradualist-Pacifism, Cultural Nationalism, or Revolutionary-Democracy?

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Introduction

With the advent of civil democracy in Korea, the grand epic of the Korean independence struggle began to be more systematically mined in the 1990s with newly discovered sources from the leading revolutionaries, albeit with mixed outcomes.¹ In the past decade, the most spirited controversy in the international arena of Korean Studies has been "the An Ch'angho Controversy" which created spirited debates on the interpretation of An Ch'angho (1878-1938) and the Korean nationalist movement, including the nature of his philosophy, vision and strategy. Since An Ch'angho was arguably the foremost leader of the Korean independence quest, it was not only a controversy about An Ch'angho as a man and leader but also about getting at the truth of the shape and course of the Korean nationalist struggle as a whole.

From 1995 to the present, the controversy on An Ch'angho and Korean nationalism has been actively debated on a truly global manner with a concurrent exchange of opinions at the speed and intensity of light. As heated debates on An Ch'angho and the Korean nationalist movement have continued and escalated, not only in the cyberspace forum but also at international academic conferences, "An Ch'angho" indeed has become the most controversial subject, following the "origins of the Korean War", in modern Korean history.

What actually constituted An Ch'angho's nationalist revolutionary ideology, strategy and purpose? Why did An continue to be defined as a 'gradualist pacifist' and 'cultural nationalist', or worse, a "passive collaborationist" or compromiser, who supposedly only advocated non-confrontational means of education and cultural development within the Japanese colonial framework? What are some of the newest revelations and insights that have proved earlier views have been derived from

misreadings of modern Korean history? What have been some of the more recently unearthed historical documents and sources that have challenged and debunked past scholarship? The nature of the An Ch'angho controversy, i.e., the ongoing critical issues of debate, the updated discoveries and analyses which have shed new light on the Korean nationalist leadership and movement, are the subjects of this essay. Since An Ch'angho was the chief architect and strategist of the Korean independence movement, his programs, strategies, and vision essentially defined the nature and direction of the Korean independence struggle. Discovering An Ch'angho's true identity as a nationalist, therefore, offers a vital key to unraveling the puzzling mystery surrounding the Korean independence movement, which struggled for decades to achieve freedom from Japanese colonial rule.

In earlier scholarship, the formulaic assumptions concerning An Ch'angho and the Korean nationalist movement could be described as the "tripartite division" scheme of strategic divergence: i) the diplomatism or propagandism of Syngman Rhee and So Chaep'il; ii) the militarism of Yi Tonghwi and Pak Yongman; and iii) the "gradualist pacifism", or subsequently "cultural nationalism", of An Ch'angho himself.² Such a conception of a "tripartite division" offered a convenient and facile explanation for generations of scholars to explain away the personality conflicts, political and professional rivalries, strategic and ideological differences, organizational divisions and various other incongruencies and contradictions found in Korean nationalism. In the "tripartite division", it was axiomatically posited that An Ch'angho focused on education and economic-cultural empowerment as a "gradualist pacifist" and/or "cultural nationalist" and espoused gradual reforms and improvements in the colonial and diasporic Korean communities. The danger with such a view was that it implicitly, if rather pejoratively, assumed that these strategic differences between the leaders led to the inevitable division, eventual decline and subsequent failure of the Korean independence movement. This view was also sometimes extended as an analytical tool or framework to explain the independence movement and the pioneering activism of the overseas communities, including the leaders of early Korea-America, such as An Ch'angho, Syngman Rhee and Pak Yongman. Yet, such an analysis did not effectively discern the fact that the leaders, An Ch'angho, Syngman Rhee and Pak Yongman as well as So Chaep'il and Yi Tonghwi, were at one time or another militarists, diplomatists, or self-strengthening educators in their anticolonial revolutionary careers.³

Not only has the "tripartite division" schema offered a quite reduced and formulaic depiction of the Korean nationalist struggle, it

has pivoted on a misguided hypothesis that neglected to address how and why the independence quest could be still sustained as a "movement" from the late nineteenth century to Liberation, even with its many weaknesses. The problem with past writings has been that they concentrated too much on the lack of unity and continuity in Korean nationalism which, in turn, denied the holistic yet dynamic historical authenticity to the movement.

As far as I can see, the lively debates in the "An Ch'angho controversy" over the years encompassed several critical issues in interpreting and re-interpreting Korean colonial history, which will, no doubt, still resonate in the years to come. They were: i) gradualist pacifism vs. radical militarism, as in a lengthy thread of opinions displayed on the theme of "An Ch'angho not a gradualist?"; ii) a new view of "revolutionary-democracy" vs. an old view of the "tripartite division" of Korean nationalist movement; iii) revision of "cultural nationalism" vs. neo-revisionism of revolutionary nationalism; iv) patriotism vs. collaborationism in the colonial period and the complicated legacy of the issue thereafter; and v) the origins of Korean democracy, including the origins and drafting of the Korean republican constitution.

By joining the controversy, my intent is to fundamentally reconstruct the structural edifice of the earlier historiographical assumptions and theoretical underpinnings of the past decades of scholarship, so that we may come to rethink the political and ideological make-up of the Korean nationalist movement which preceded the Korean War and geopolitical division.

Beyond the Colonial Legacy, Cold War and Conventional Wisdom: A Critique

An Ch'angho has long been a critical subject of literary and scholarly attention among the colonial and post-colonial Korean intellectuals in Korea and West. Inevitably, the earlier interpretations of An Ch'angho reflected and embodied the painful legacy and tumults of colonialism, the Korean War, and division and successive military dictatorships in modern Korean history, including its dilemmas, ambiguities and contradictions. As a pivotal figure in modern Korean history, such entanglement of An Ch'angho's legacy and the collective Korean historical fate may be inescapable. Even during his life, the distinction between self and nation often blurred for him.

Caught at the nexus of modern Korean history and historiography, An Ch'angho was misinterpreted or misjudged as a "gradualist-pacifist" by Yi Kwangsu, Chu Yohan, Chong-sik Lee and Arthur Gardner from the 1940s to the 1970s⁴; a "cultural nationalist" by Michael Robinson in the 1980s⁵

and a "self-reconstruction nationalist" by Kenneth Wells in the 1990s⁶, among others. As disciple-biographers, Yi Kwangsu and Chu Yohan presented An as a "gradualist-pacifist" and set the tone for subsequent interpretations of An's life and thought. If their works were marked by inconsistencies and paradoxes, Yi and Chu's collaborations further clouded and complicated understanding of An and the Korean liberation struggle.

Evolving from a heroic nationalist icon to an object of hostile criticism, there are, in fact, few other nationalists who have experienced as many recent academic controversies as An. Consistently lionized as the very paradigm of a Korean leader and ideal personality by the writers and scholars like Yi Kwangsu, Chu Yohan, An Pyong'uk, and Chong-sik Lee, An came under serious attack and scrutiny during the 1980's by Kang Tongjin, Michael Robinson, So Chungsook, and Pak Ch'ansung, among others.⁷ Actually, many of the interpretive problems concerning An Ch'angho and Korean nationalism originated from *The Politics of Korean Nationalism* (1965) by Chong-sik Lee, which outlined the origins and evolution of Korean nationalism. Delineating the causes of the political division among nationalists of the Provisional Government, the study characterized An Ch'angho as a "gradualist"; Syngman Rhee and So Chaep'il as "propagandists"; and Yi Tongwhi and Pak Yongman as "militarists".⁸ Offering the classic "tripartite division" as a conceptual framework to discern the Korean nationalist leadership and politics, Lee's seminal work has heavily influenced academic writing on Korean nationalism for the past several decades, without ample and systematic scrutiny. While it was admitted that the analytical categories of division in the "study done nearly forty years ago" were "vague", with an over-reliance on the Japanese colonial sources, other scholars still continued to adopt this view of Korean nationalism.⁹

In *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925* (1988), Robinson, for example, asserted that Yi Kwangsu and An Ch'angho were essentially unrevolutionary "cultural nationalists" by examining Yi Kwangsu's *Minjok kaejoron* (Essay on National Character Reform). Adopting the radical leftist critique of the 1920s which arose from the intense political and propaganda struggle between Korean nationalists and communists, Robinson contended that Yi and An were "elitist gradualists" whose measures toward recovering independence were actually "a tacit acceptance of the colonial rule" or "passive collaborationism". His analysis thus has misconstrued An Ch'angho as a gradualist-pacifist who originated the conservative "rightist" nationalist philosophy with an emphasis on cultural accommodationist, rather than political and military revolutionary, activities. Within such logic, An Ch'angho's *supposedly* gradualist or cultural nationalist strategy of nonconfrontation and

educational-cultural reform was explicitly condemned and ridiculed as cautiously tepid, if not outright anachronistic and hypocritical. Provocatively challenging the nationalist credentials of An Ch'angho, it led to the conclusion that his gradualist ideologico-methodology was "conservative-rightist" with its linear teleology as self-rule (*Jach* 7) under the Japanese.¹⁰

Charging that such 'cultural nationalists' sought non-political gradualist reform before independence and only wished to work *within* the Japanese colonial framework, Robinson examined the journals and social movements already censored and curtailed under repressive Japanese rule within Korea. Failing to evaluate the activities of the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, he did not connect the nationalist movement within the peninsula and *without*. In turn, the work hardly considered the reality of domestic-exile linkage among revolutionary nationalists and communists, including the war of independence. After all, the locus of action of the anticolonial movement lay outside Korea in the 1920s.

Here, some of pertinent problems and issues of such historiographical works concerning An Ch'angho will be illumined.¹¹ First, a number of analytical concerns can be noted with the works which portrayed An as a gradualist or a cultural nationalist, i) In terms of Robinson and Pak Ch'ansung's assertions that An Ch'angho and Yi Kwangsu sought to work only within the Japanese colonial framework, it seems that their analyses concentrated too much on the time period between 1920 and 1925 and failed to investigate the extensive exile activities of An Ch'angho and other nationalists during this period, which, after all, was where the *action* was, with an almost frantic array of activities of the Provisional Government, ii) Only an indirect and referential treatment of An Ch'angho was possible through an evaluation of *Minjok Kaejoron*, a single work of famously prolific Yi Kwangsu. Yi actually portrayed An Ch'angho as a role model for the Korean youths to emulate in several of his major works such as *Mujong*, *Hurk*, and *Sondoja*, in addition to a posthumous biography of An. iii) Such historiographical works were also strongly influenced by Yi Kwangsu's subsequent collaboration with the Japanese, with too much emphasis on the relationship between Yi Kwangsu and An Ch'angho who possessed vastly different moral-spiritual character and strength. Throughout his life as a nationalist leader, An was, naturally, quite close to a significant number of prominent nationalists, including An Chung'gun, Kim Ku, Yi Tonghwi, Yo Unhyong, So Ch'apil, Pak Unsik and Cho Soang.

Second, a more serious methodological and empirical problem of the earlier historiography is an over-reliance on the Japanese Government-General (*Choson ch 'ongdokbu*) records, without a careful

examination of the-then available material on An such as diaries, speeches, biographies, recollections, and journals. A historiographical interpretation solely based on Japanese sources cannot adequately grapple with the colonial reality of harsh repression vs. gritty resistance. For example, with routine exposure to grave danger and threat which included strict censorship and the curtailment of activities, the nationalists were often forced to disguise their true intentions or identities. And such *deception* or *pretense* against the notoriously severe Japanese was no less than a matter of life and death for them. It can be observed that An Ch'angho, who successively operated multitudes of underground and exile activities, including an espionage communication network (*Yont'ongje*) of the Provisional Government, did not intend to reveal his genuine revolutionary philosophy or methods. After all, it is quite improbable to imagine An revealing his innermost revolutionary thought or strategy to the Japanese authorities. As he sought to preserve his anticolonial revolutionary career for a long time, it would have been irresponsible, if not outright foolhardy, for An to make provocative statements of revolutionary character, as indicated in his much censored "Plea to Compatriots" as an exile leader.¹²

The Japanese sources on An Ch'angho or any other nationalists, including the so-called "collaborators", must be utilized with extreme caution and care, since the subtle guiles of the Korean nationalists and the delicate and indelicate pressures by the Japanese colonialists must be fully accounted for an accurate description of the colonial/nationalist reality. Indeed, the colonial subtext and intertext must be intuitively probed and decoded. The blank spaces and silent voices too must be read and heard to appreciate the nationalist movement as an epic tapestry of complexly interwoven layers and linkages of figures and activities. Otherwise, an over-invested confidence in the colonialist sources can only result in a superficial depiction of a nationalist's *colonial disguise*, as in the case of An Ch'angho. For example, in the Japanese police interrogation report (*Yesim simmunggi*), An only appears to be forthcoming about the nature and extent of his nationalist activities, while he completely denies any revolutionary or military intent in them. The hazards of interpretation can be perceived when we realize that this very report has been widely used by scholars without careful discretion, particularly for its biographical details concerning An.¹³ It may also be an ironic perpetuation of the unfortunate colonial legacy, especially as the Japanese administration's records are, still, somehow considered more "legitimate" to judge a Korean nationalist revolutionary. Without sensitive and intuitive discernment, therefore, it is not possible to analyze colonial sources on the activities of Korean nationalists properly.

Third, a philosophical limitation of Neo-Marxist historiography of An Ch'angho is that it is inherently unable to delineate the core essence of An's spirituality or metaphysics, perhaps reminiscent of the character Donghyok in Sim Hoon's *Sangnoksu* (Evergreen) who quixotically trusts that the transcendental matters of the spirit can actually be reduced to an imminent scientific and materialistic ideology.¹⁴ A historian of political ideas, Eric Voegelin, remarked that "the soul of Marx was demonically closed to transcendental reality" since "in the critical Post-Hegelian situation he cannot extricate himself from the difficulties by returning to the freedom of the spirit."¹⁵ Yet, the Marxist discourse which is characterized by "spiritual impotence" and "dictatorial prohibition of metaphysical questions" was also a part of Utopian vision to fulfill the promise of perfection of man and society which profoundly engaged Tosan.¹⁶

If the problem of the pre-1980's scholarship on An Ch'angho was its narrow focus of Tosan as a nationalist philosopher and educator, the post-Kwangju historiography of the eighties with its overtly politicized and ideologized motivations, too, hardly succeeded in grasping the full dimensions of An as a revolutionary democrat. To better comprehend a multifaceted and multilayered revolutionary democrat such as An, the substantive nature and universe of his metaphysics, ideology, strategy and activities need to be systematically illuminated. In this regard, An's internal choices and responses against his external challenges, constraints, and circumstances have to be carefully reconstructed. Furthermore, the paradigmatic structure of An's authentic inner existence which molded the contour of his unique adaptability, originality, creativity and imagination should be investigated. Only then, it seems possible to accurately understand An as the Korean nationalist leader who courageously confronted, scientifically attempted, boldly applied, always hoped, frequently disappointed, often agonized, eagerly transformed and experientially matured.

Undoubtedly, Yi Kwangsu and Chu Yohan's collaboration has complicated and clouded An Ch'angho's legacy. The historical legacy of other prominent collaborators such as Yun Ch'ihoo and Kim Songsu has further compounded the difficulties of grasping the true An Ch'angho in the 1990s. In *New God, New Nation: Protestants and Self-Reconstruction Nationalism in Korea, 1896-1937* (1990), Kenneth Wells explored the ethico-spiritual, or 'self-reconstructionist', character of Protestant Christian nationalism. Redefining 'cultural nationalism' as "self-reconstruction nationalism", however, he did not distinguish the nationalist philosophy and activities of Yun Ch'ihoo and Yi Kwangsu from those of An Ch'angho. Believing that An was a leading culturalist, Wells, too, judged An Ch'angho as a 'gradualist', or non-

political pacifist.¹⁷ He suggested that An chose to pursue the goals of "nation (i.e., culture) over state (i.e., politics)".¹⁸ While Wells focused on the underlying tension of Christian universalism vs. nationalistic particularism to explain Yun's collaboration, this could not apply to An Ch'angho, whose nationalist program and worldview sharply diverged from the culturalists. An not only actively sought the political and military means to achieve independence but also never collaborated with the Japanese.

More recent publications on An Ch'angho further attest to the limitations of the colonial intellectuals and the ambivalence of the post-colonial generation in grappling with historicity. A work edited by Tschung-Sun Kim and Michael Reinschmidt, *Strengthened Abilities: Assessing the Vision of Tosan Chang-ho Ahn* (1998), for instance, is a translation of papers presented at a conference on An Ch'angho in Los Angeles in 1996. While a number of articles discussed the possible new directions in research on An Ch'angho, the editors ignored the findings and still thematically framed the discourse with the old notions of An Ch'angho as a "gradualist-pacifist" and "ability-strengthenener".¹⁹ Hyung-chan Kim's *Tosan Ahn Ch'ang-ho: A Profile of a Prophetic Patriot* (1996) is a rather typical example that entails obscurantist interpretive problems frequently found in the works on An Ch'angho and Korean nationalism. Uncritically accepting the earlier misconception of An Ch'angho as a "gradualist-pacifist", Kim opts to sidestep the 'An Ch'angho controversy' from the outset of his book: "I am well aware of the continuing debate among scholars of modern Korean history on how to analyze and interpret Tosan (An Ch'angho's pen name) and his role in the Korean independence movement. I do not intend to lend support to any theoretical framework within which Tosan and his independence activities have been thus far crafted and framed. It is still not only too premature to characterize Tosan either as a 'gradualist' or 'radical nationalist', but also too presumptuous to frame him in a theoretical perspective." Absence of a persuasive conceptual framework in biography is unfortunate, for it then becomes merely a chronological and pictorial description of the life events of An Ch'angho. Without concrete theoretical underpinnings as a critical narrative guide and paradigmatic anchor, it is not possible to fully navigate and chart the complex yet systematic universe of An's nationalist philosophy, strategy and movement. Kim's hasty organization and metaphorical reflection are evident in the lackluster chapters titles, such as "Tosan's First American Experience", "Tosan in Korea", "Tosan in America", "Tosan as Public Official in Shanghai", "Tosan out of Government in Shanghai", "Tosan's Last Stay in America and China" and "Tosan's Last Journey".²⁰

Unavoidably, Kim accepts and perpetuates the earlier view of An Ch'angho as a 'gradualist-pacifist' that had already begun to be seriously challenged, even while he prepared this work. Evidently, Kim only selectively used currently available sources, especially among a vast holding of An Ch'angho's private papers at the Independence Hall of Korea in Ch'onan.

Kim fails to unveil the comprehensive nation-building paradigm of An Ch'angho to achieve independence and democracy, which was a unique and indigenous praxis of philosophy and program with a compelling inner logic, reflecting the harsh colonial and diasporic circumstances of Koreans. As a peripatetic exile and underground leader, An's interior landscape was configured by an intensely idealistic and Utopian longing for a democratic self-government propelled by desperate desire to overcome the brutal colonial reality. In part, almost impenetrably elaborate character of his independence program and strategy distinguished by unusual creativity and originality mirrored An's tightly-wound experiential self and experimental logic, with sheer human will and determination. Therefore, the 'appearance vs. reality' duality of An Ch'angho was a life-and-death matter and a well-honed survival technique as a leader of the anticolonial revolution who lived with a sense of urgent threat and danger as a way of life. A man of steely moral and strategic discipline, An was acutely aware of his leadership responsibility in shaping the overall direction, strategy, momentum and survivability of the movement. There was no room for negligence or imprudence for An. A stoic man of self-control, there could be no eccentric outbursts of Sin Ch'aeho, no false trust of Yi Tonghwi, and no compromise of Yi Kwangsu. In the end, An was tortured to death in prison. His life and destiny emblemize the unfulfilled promise of the collective quest of his nation and people.²¹

Even in the latest work of Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, as much as the already highly controversial *The Origins of the Korean War*, for example, not much substantive new investigation nor serious historical analysis of the Korean nationalist movement can be found. Thus, no scrutiny or reflection beyond the conventional view of the binary ideological division of the nationalist movement is included. Obviously, this is a deep lacuna and problematique to discern the course of historical development of post-liberation and post-Korean War politics, ideology and division.²²

A Revolutionary-Democrat: The Constitutional Drafts and the Master Plan

Who, after all, was An Ch'angho? An Ch'angho for long remained an elusive, if mysterious and misunderstood, figure in modern Korean

history. Enduring as an enigma, the leading intellectuals, writers, and scholars of Korea and the West, actually, could not figure him out. In a sense, his genius as an "undercover" revolutionary — i.e., his adoption of a moderate reformist stance to camouflage yet advance his ultimate revolutionary agenda of waging an independence war to reclaim his country — which eluded the Japanese police for decades also eluded them. Well-known yet unknown, An Ch'angho seems have been a leader par excellence of the Korean independence quest with principled moral dignity and labyrinthine strategic mind. More than any other nationalist leaders of his time, An Ch'angho demonstrated much greater political, strategic, organizational and moral-spiritual leadership and influence and led an international network of exile and underground activities evading Japanese suppression from the 1900s to 1930s. Committed to the patriotic cause of freedom of his people and country, he did not fully reveal his revolutionary aims or intentions even to those who were close to him. With multilayered and multidimensional strategic vision and planning, he neither eschewed violent tactics nor progressive socialist ideologies to champion his life-long goal of independence.²³

While it is a painstaking process to piece together the whole anticolonial revolutionary enterprise of Koreans that continued to transform and camouflage as a way of survival from brutal repression and remained transnational in character and scale, it is still possible to discern the nature of the overwhelmingly complex and ambitious revolutionary oeuvre and vista of An Ch'angho as the leader. From the study of sources, An Ch'angho emerges as an arch-patriot, a pioneering constitutional democrat, institution-builder and military strategist. A man of prodigious intellectual, oratorical and political gifts and resolute will, An was a profoundly spiritual man who also offered the requisite ethico-spiritual leadership for the Korean nationalist movement. Leading and shaping the independence movement as an international network of underground and exile activities, An Ch'angho was perhaps the most talented and expansive of institution-builders and modernizers among Korean nationalists. He was also an eloquent orator, systemizer of nationalist ideology and methodology, political leader who initially conceived and established the Korean Provisional Government, underground and exile revolutionary, grass-roots organizer, reformist educator, writer and publisher of leading journals, and composer of patriotic lyrics and songs, among others.

The most astonishing, if serendipitous, discovery among An Ch'angho's private papers is a series of his own constitutional drafts of the anticolonial revolutionary organizations, which became the embryonic basis of the Constitution of the Provisional Government

during the colonial era and the Republic of Korea after the Liberation. While this clearly was not acknowledged or recognized before, An Ch'angho seems to have been the first Korean to draft the earliest Korean republican constitution. Indeed, An's constitutions are the earliest constitutional drafts as the "founding documents" of the Republic of Korea. The textual analysis of the constitutions reflect An's unique personality and gifts as much as his intellectual and institutional vision and applicability which critically shaped the moral-spiritual vision and liberational strategy of the collective quest of an independent democracy.

Such constitutional drafts of his revolutionary organizations demonstrate the creative and original, if evolving and complex, character of An Ch'angho's constitutional philosophy and institutional experiments. An Ch'angho unfailingly wrote constitutions for his associations, including the *Kongnip hydphoe* (United Koreans in America), *Sinminhoe* (New People's Society), *Taehan kungminhoe* (Korean National Association), and *Hungsadan* (Young Korean Academy), the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, the National Representatives Congress, and the Korean Independence Party, in addition to numerous other organizations. Among them, the most remarkable document is the 'Constitution of the Hungsadan'. From his draft of no less than forty-five notebook pages in pencil from 1913, one can easily observe his passionate commitment toward the democratic process of self-government, such as elections, the separation of powers and the transfer of office by limited terms. With such a constitutional framework, An Ch'angho attempted to ensure the viability and longevity of the *Hungsadan* which he hoped to be the role model of democracy for Koreans. An Ch'angho's emphatic insistence on democracy for Koreans derived from his belief that the very act of self-governing constituted an essential part of a subversive anticolonial revolution. The Hungsadan is a revolutionary leadership-training association, founded by An Ch'angho in 1913 in San Francisco, which survives as the leading nationalist organization in Korea, with branches in other countries.

Perhaps the most arresting document is his handwritten "Master Plan of independence and democracy" before the outbreak of World War I in 1914. (The "Master Plan" is my nomenclature for the document and the outline included is my translation of the document.) Here, An Ch'angho charted the entire course of the independence movement with comprehensive knowledge and systematic planning. A private and concrete articulation of a program of action for the nationalist movement, the outline manifests the totality of An's revolutionary strategy. In his typically meticulous manner, the Master

Plan is also a detailed diagrammatic chart which describes the necessary virtues, personnel, skills, means, and resources to achieve his ultimate aims, i.e., independence and democracy.

Underlying the Master Plan in which An Ch'angho envisioned a well integrated stage-by-stage development are his "philosophy of strength" to build "moral, intellectual and economic strength" of Koreans and revolutionary conviction that national liberation was only possible by military means. Consisting of five major stages and thirteen substages progressively evolving toward his final goal, it is apparent that An intended much of his own and compatriots' efforts to be mobilized for an all-out *independence war* to restore national sovereignty. The Master Plan is as much a mobilization roadmap for the independence war as a prophetic blueprint to create a new democratic nation. In fact, a striking feature of the Master Plan is how An Ch'angho entwined his dual aims of seemingly paradoxical democracy-building and war-preparation within a single structure of the plan.

Prepared when An Ch'angho was thirty-six years old, the Master Plan can be also read as a synopsis of philosophical currents of his time and space. For example, we can notice the formative influence of Confucian classics from his insistence on building moral character and strength as the fundamental requisites. Here, Social Darwinism was a transvaluative philosophy from Confucian-Mencianism to Christian Enlightenment to Faustean-Promethean democracy for An Ch'angho. His understanding of Social Darwinism was translated into dialectical self-strengthening and military revolutionism. Ultimately, however, his futuristic orientation and democratic vision of equality and freedom derived from his life-long Christian faith.²⁴

Korean-America and Diaspora

An Ch'angho was born in P'yongyang in 1878 to an impoverished gentry family. His father, a scholar-farmer who was a village *sodang* teacher, passed away when An was eight. An Ch'angho studied Chinese classics until sixteen, when he decided to go to Seoul. He became a Christian at the Underwood School where he was taught English by Underwood himself, studied the "new learning", and taught as a teacher for a number of years. By meeting So Chaep'il, he was introduced to the patriotic activities of the Independence Club and the ideals and practice of self-governing democracy.²⁵

As one of the earliest Koreans to arrive in America in 1902, An wished to pursue further study in theology and education. However, he chose an activist path of activist when he saw two Korean ginseng merchants fighting in the streets of San Francisco. After moving to

Riverside, he pursued his education with evening Bible and English classes at a Methodist church in Los Angeles. Soon he became a successful entrepreneur operating an employment agency, helping to place Koreans workers on local orchards where he sometimes joined them.

Following the creation of the Friendship Society in California, An Ch'angho founded the *Kongnip hyophoe* in 1905. Applying the American federalist constitution to the *Kongnip hyophoe*, An Ch'angho wrote a pioneering democratic constitution prescribing the system of separation of powers and checks and balances. Devising a two-tiered bicameral system of the headquarters and local branches in the constitution, a dual system of executive and legislative bodies of self-government functioned as separate but equal powers. In the local branches, autonomy was stressed with an executive and legislative system of its own. A product of An Ch'angho's own inimitable interpretation and application of the sociopolitical requisites of compatriots, the *Kongnip hyophoe* seems to have been the first Korean association with the republican constitution as the earliest crystallization of his conception of constitutional democracy and practice of the rule of law.²⁶

Returning to Korea in 1907, An Ch'angho formed the secret revolutionary organization *Sinminhoe* with a democratic constitution, which reflected the transnational linkage of the republican revolutionary project of Korean-Americans and Koreans, with a well-developed plan for the war of independence.²⁷ In the years before annexation in 1910, he strove to open numerous branches of the *Kungminhoe* as a constitutional self-governing organization in Russia, Manchuria and China, and continued his grassroots efforts to lead and strengthen the organization as a transnational enterprise in America. As the fruit of An Ch'angho's peripatetic organizational groundwork, the *Kungminhoe*, was solidified when he became the chairman of the central assembly in 1912, eventually with branches numbering over a hundred in Asia and Americas.²⁸ Here, An Ch'angho laid the political foundation for diasporaic Koreans and begun to conceive the idea of exile government. Already, the Korean National Association possessed the body and network of international structure and started to behave as the central organ of the "provisional government". Thus it is not surprising that An Ch'angho would later head the Provisional Government in Shanghai. In 1913, An Ch'angho established a revolutionary leadership-training society *Hungsadan* and drafted the 'Constitution of the Hungsadan' in California. Displaying sophisticated skill and a grasp of democratic mechanisms by then, such *tourde force* constitution prefigured the fact that An Ch'angho would author the first

Constitution of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea.²⁹

Here, a number of controversial issues in terms of the Korean independence leadership and movement in America will be examined. First, the different strategic approaches of An Ch'angho, Syngman Rhee and Pak Yongman as "education and cultural developer", "diplomatist", and "militarist", respectively, have been considered.³⁰ Of course, the problems of such a "tripartite division" view of the overall Korean nationalist movement has already been mentioned. Yet, it has also been questioned whether An Ch'angho was a gradualist activist of reform and enlightenment in America but more of a militarist revolutionary only after he arrived in Shanghai in 1919. Since An Ch'angho possessed a militarist plan several years before the annexation of 1910 and continued his nationalist drive along this line in subsequent decades in America, Korea, China, Russia and other nations, such a view of An Ch'angho as a leader who only championed educational-cultural and economic empowerment in America is not accurate. In this regard, a suggestion that An Ch'angho was such a gradualist-pacifist that he would not have even participated in the March First movement, let alone shun and criticize the event, seems quite contrary to the documented facts of history.

Second, in comparing An Ch'angho with Syngman Rhee and Pak Yongman, a conservative criterion of class and education have been sometimes adopted to determine the strength of their leadership ability and possible strategic divergence. While these standards are not adequate to judge a life and career in general, they are particularly insufficient to measure a leader's character, intelligence, courage, sacrifice, creativity and originality. And they are especially problematic as sole indicators to discern the quality of leadership of politicians, activists and revolutionaries who operate in the realm of "action", rather than of "thought". The late Edward Wagner once said that "Politics is an art of the possible, yet the most difficult of human endeavors. That is why it is much more tough to be a politician than an academic." He also added, "An Ch'angho was a truly exceptional leader in Korean history. The country's fate may have turned out differently had he survived after the Liberation."³¹

In terms of the Korean independence movement in America, it seems to me that the more accurate yardstick would be a leader's capability and responsibility for division or unity in the formative years of the Korean American community. For example, it is well-known that Rhee's notorious tendency to monopolize and dominate influence and resources in the course of the independence movement caused rampant organizational and personnel problems with its bitter reverberations for years to come. Rhee was highly responsible for

much of the disruption and break-up, where as An Ch'angho was quite responsible for much of the unification and organizational outcome. When An went to Hawaii in 1915 to unify the two leaders of the Kungminhoe, Pak Yongman and Syngman Rhee, neither even came out to see him. How do we judge this?

Moreover, schools are not the only educational tools or means. The books from An Ch'angho's personal library in America shows that An was a committed intellectual with a wide range of interests and a high level of intellectual curiosity as an exceptional autodidact who was quite well-read in several languages. He also seemed to have had life-long passion for books. He had created a T'aeguk Bookstore in P'yongyang in 1907, stating, "A bookstore is also a school. A book is a teacher. A bookstore is more threatening than a school. A book is an even more intimidating teacher."³²

Third, concerning the issue of continuity and change of the independence movement in America, it has been suggested that there were "peaks" and "valleys". While it is true that there were peaks of expanded enthusiasm and commitments in the years immediately before and following the Protectorate Treaty in 1905, the annexation in 1910 and the March First movement in 1919, it appears that there existed a surprising fluidity and continuity in the liberational plan, execution and structure of the Korean independence movement in America and other nations. The continuity becomes more evident when the anticolonial project is more holistically envisioned as an integrally linked and evolved transnational enterprise, with regional divisions of labor with separate means and aims in America, China, Russia, Korea, and Japan, among others. The distinguishing contribution of Korean-Americans to the independence movement was, indeed, the "funds and leaders".³³

Fourth, the contradiction or paradox of "revolution" and "democracy" in An Ch'angho in America and other countries has been questioned. In my view, it was not a paradox but the revolutionary history of America as An Ch'angho's principle model of revolution and democracy. An Ch'angho observed that the national formation of America began from the independence movement against the tyrannical Britain and the American democracy was the fruit of the success of the independence war and revolution. An Ch'angho understood the relationship between independence revolution and democracy from the American historical example, and attempted to recreate the experience for Koreans in America.³⁴

Finally, what is the relationship between the colonial diaspora and Korean globalization? It is my contention that the process of Korean globalization was inaugurated with the independence movement of colonial diaspora, most actively initiated, staged and fertilized by An

Ch'angho, as can be read from his efforts through the transnational Korean National Association at the turn of the twentieth century. Thus, the colonial diaspora and Korean globalization are intimately tied in modern Korean history by the colonialist accident and nationalist design.

Constitutional Democracy and the War of Independence

Prior to the nationwide uprising on March First in 1919, An Ch'angho was already engaged in a plan to create the Provisional Government, and he had signed the radical version of the declaration of independence with other Korean revolutionaries in Manchuria. Widely acknowledged as the most skilled conciliator and gifted institution-builder, An Ch'angho was invited by the Korean revolutionaries in Shanghai after the March First movement. Following the meeting, An was sent as a representative of the *Kungminhoe* in America. From a young firebrand independence fighter, he had also become a seasoned revolutionary who thought with his head as much as his heart in his early forties.

Arriving in Shanghai, An Ch'angho purchased a house as the seat of government and his residence with funds provided by the *Kungminhoe* and *Hungsadan*.³⁵ Since three provisional governments arose in Vladivostok, Seoul and Shanghai, An Ch'angho consolidated the Provisional Government in Shanghai in August of 1919, carefully balancing the Seoul and Vladivostok cabinet appointments. As an acting premier, An Ch'angho considered the Seoul government as the legitimate heir of the March First revolution, he followed the representation of the Seoul government as closely as possible, against those who insisted that the roster of the Seoul government merely represented an underground resistance group. Toward grand solidarity, An appointed Syngman Rhee as the president, for he could potentially be the most critical agent in altering the direction of American policy toward colonial Korea. Also, he appointed Yi Tonghwi, the most influential revolutionary leader in the Far East, as the premier of the Korean Provisional Government.

Though an unfair slight, An Ch'angho accepted an insignificant title for himself as the Chief of the Bureau of Labor (*Nodong ch'ongpan*) assigned by the Seoul government. He accepted such a post for himself toward the larger task of unification of the Korean Provisional Government. For An entirely subsumed his personal ambition or reputation for the goal larger than himself, this act of charitable humility and earnest stewardship stunned the nationalist community, both at home and abroad.³⁶

The Unified Provisional Government in Shanghai

Vladivostok/Seoul

Shanghai

(Unified)

Head(<i>Suban</i>)	Son Pyonghui / Syngman Rhee	Syngman Rhee/ Pak Yonghyo
Premier	Syngman Rhee / Yi Tonghwi	Yi Tonghwi
Minister of Interior	An Ch'angho /Yi Tongnyong	Yi Tongnyong
Minister of Diplomacy	Pak Yongman	Pak Yongman
Minister of Finance	Yun Hyonjin / Yi Siyoung	Ch'oe Chaehyong
Minister of Military	Yi Tonghwi / No Paengnin	No Paengnin
Minister of Education	Kim Kyusik	Kim Kyusik
Minister of Justice	Sin Kyusik	Sin Kyusik
Minister of Transportation	Mun Ch'angbom	Mun Ch'angbSm
Minister of Labor	Nam Hydng'u / An Ch'angho	An Ch'angho

Upon unifying the Korean Provisional Government, An Ch'angho drafted the first Constitution of the Republic of Korea which espoused the presidential system with the three branches of government. Cognizant of his historic task to lay the cornerstone of future independent democracy, he prepared a comprehensive constitution of eight chapters and fifty-eight articles as the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Korea. After considerable debates, the constitution was passed by the Provisional Assembly on September 11, 1919. In the prefatory chapter, it read:

- I. The Republic of Korea is composed of the people of Korea.
- II. The sovereignty of Korea rests entirely on the people of Korea.
- III. The land of Korea is the peninsula of the old Choson dynasty.
- IV. The people of Korea are all equal.
- V. Korea's legislative right belongs to the Assembly (*Uijongwori*), executive right belongs to the Executive (*Kungmuwori*), and the judicial right belongs to the Judiciary (*Popwon*).
- VI. Within the limits of the Constitution, the governing of Korea is delegated to the Provisional President.
- VII. Korea will courteously respect the monarch of the *ancien regime*?

In simple yet elegant language, the constitution proclaimed the sovereign right and equality of Koreans and stipulated a presidential system based on the separation of powers. Emphasizing the Provisional Government as the legitimate exile government, the declaration of the

Provisional Constitution buttressed the overseas movement as the highest body of organized resistance to the Japanese rule, with its legitimacy ultimately derived from anticolonial democratic revolution of the March First by the Korean people.

Soon thereafter, An Ch'angho declared the Military Rules of the Provisional Government (*Taehan minguk imsi kunje*), an extensive body of military guidelines and regulations to unify and supervise the military groups under a central authority. Apparently, he not only anticipated but also engaged in the systematic preparations for the War of Independence. He began to unite the scattered Korean military groups in the Far East by consolidating the disparate military organizations in Russia, Manchuria and China under the jurisdictional umbrella of the Provisional Government. Through his effort, many of the scattered military groups either declared their support or submitted to the authority of the Provisional Government. With a growing number of military groups in Manchuria expressing allegiance, further unification became possible, in the Far East. Indeed, the leading military figures in Russia and Manchuria, including Yi Tonghwi, Hong Pomdo and Kim Chwajin, conjoined to form the Korean Independence Army. Especially Kim Chwajin and Hong Pomdo would play the leading roles in the War of Independence at Ch'ongsanni, northwest of Vladivostok.³⁸

Encouraging the nationalist community, including the cabinet members of the Provisional Government, to submit their policy proposals and objectives, An Ch'ango formulated a comprehensive independence movement strategy as the acting premier. His strategic vista was encapsulated in an address in January 3, 1920, of *Six Major Tasks Which Our People Must Achieve*. Perhaps the most important speech at the inception of the Korean Provisional Government, An Ch'angho offered his systematic strategic vision and priority of the major tasks for Koreans to reclaim independence: "Now, there are six great tasks that our people must achieve. They are, i) military, ii) diplomacy, iii) education, iv) law, v) finance, and, vi) unification." Especially concerning the primary military task, An asserted the importance of unification, training, and national conscription by stating, "an independence war is not an imagination, for the war to be a reality ... we all have to be soldiers ... Let's all receive military drills... Even women have to learn."³⁹

In elaborating his grand strategy, An Ch'angho stated, "The military is the most critical of the six major tasks." He directly tackled the issue of war vs. peace and asserted that this was the time to wage war. He also explained why preparation was absolutely necessary:

The great task that we now encounter is whether to continue the independence movement by peaceful means or war. It can be said that the loyalty is the same for those who emphasize peace or war... [Yet], do you really believe that this is not the time to fight, considering the timing and loyalty? Nonetheless, should we relentlessly go forward or after complete preparation? Some say that the business of revolution cannot be calculating to wait preparation. Yet, preparation is demanded. Of course, when I speak of preparation, it is not the kind of preparation to fully meet the resources of the enemy. Nonetheless, preparation is definitely necessary. Even in mock fights, the fighting groups take pains to develop a strategic plan. Thus, to fight an independence war without any preparation is to slight the war too much. If each soldier requires twenty won per day, it will require 60,000 won to feed 10,000 soldiers for a month. If we open war without preparation, the soldiers will die not from the enemy but famine. Therefore, if you agree to a war, please understand that preparation is absolutely requisite.⁴⁰

Such a war agenda reflected the military thrust of the Provisional Government evident from the composition of the cabinet which included leading military figures such as Yi Tonghwi, Ch'oe Chaehyong, No Paengnin, and Sin Kyusik. Among them, Yi Tonghwi and Ch'oe Chaehyong were commanders whose military organizations were influential in both Russia and Manchuria. Possessing military training and leadership, No Paengnin was from America and Sin Kyusik from China. With almost equal weight of representation, the cabinet was divided into the operational regions of America and the Far East. From America was An Ch'angho, Syngman Rhee, Kim Kyusik, and No Paengnin; from the Far East was Yi Tonghwi, Ch'oe Chaehyong, Sin Kyusik and Mun Ch'angbom.

While Syngman Rhee was exclusively devoted to diplomacy, An Ch'angho, Yi Tonghwi, Kim Kyusik, No Paengnin, and Sin Kyusik were involved in both military and diplomacy activities. In addition to Syngman Rhee and So Chaep'il who became diplomatic plenipotentiaries of the Provisional Government, Kim Kyusik and No Paengnin initially directed their diplomatic endeavors to the West, especially in America. A socialist nationalist, Yi Tonghwi's diplomatic negotiation was strictly conducted with Russian communists. Sin Kyusik mostly concentrated his diplomacy on Chinese revolutionaries. Realistic and pragmatic, An Ch'angho preferred the balance of power approach to America and the West as well as China and Russia.

In his *Shanghai Diary* in 1920-1921, An Ch'angho conscientiously

recorded the nature of his daily activities, including each visit, meeting, personage, and substance of discussion. Aware of the historical significance of the account, he carefully delineated the circumstances and characters surrounding the birth of the first republican Korean Government in Shanghai. Upon conceiving the constitutional foundation of the Provisional Government, the *Diary* affirms that An Ch'angho committed himself to the task of concrete preparations for the War of Independence and devoted much of his time and energies toward unification, enlargement and empowerment of the Korean Independence Army. From the earliest entry on January 15, 1920, to the last on March 1, 1921, An Ch'angho was most preoccupied with the military unification of the Provisional Government and pursued the following activities to coordinate the effort to wage the Independence War: formulation of military policy and rules; organization of the conference of military leaders; formation of an alliance between the Provisional Government and the existing military groups; recruitment and training of soldiers in Manchuria and Russia; establishment of the military schools; referral of Korean students to foreign military schools; importation and accumulation of food, weapons and other logistical support; and dispatch of military envoys and/or correspondents.⁴¹

Most likely in Shanghai (but also possibly in America), An Ch'angho also prepared "Tasks for All Armed Koreans to Implement", an extensive set of instructions for Korean military training. In the document consisting of three chapters and twenty-eight articles, An demonstrated his revolutionary vision for all Koreans to be militarily trained for the war of independence. Here, An stressed that a smallest military unit would consist of from ten to twenty-five people and a unit leader among them would be selected by vote and unanimous acceptance. An also emphasized change and the transfer of responsibility for the leader and reiterated lack of greed as an important leadership quality.⁴² An displayed an easy familiarity with the subject of the military by reading books in his personal library, such as *A Summary of Military Tactics*, *History of Seize and Destroy Warfare*, *Applied Minor Tactics*, *Manual of Field Artillery* and *What a Soldier Must Know (Kunin suji)*.^{43*}

With "great zeal", An Ch'angho also began a registration drive to recruit soldiers for the Korean Independence Army among the Korean expatriots in Shanghai, enlisting himself, Yi Tonghwi and Sin Kyusik, among others. Emphasizing that the war of independence was "the ultimate instrument of the independence movement", An Ch'angho dedicated much of the activities of the Provisional Government to "open the independence war" (*kaejon*), with "disciplined and persevering" endurance.⁴⁴ In his quest for national freedom, An

Ch'angho continued to utilize every possible means to recover national independence, including the military, paramilitary and anarchist means until his last days, becoming a martyr to the nationalist cause.

An Ch'angho led the efforts for the war of independence against Japan in Korea, America, China, Manchuria, and Russia from the 1900s to the 1930s. As a nascent constitutional democrat who brought about the constitutional revolution for Koreans, An Ch'angho trusted that democracy was a matter of survival and the most radical yet enduring revolution of all. For him, the anticolonial self-governing and the independence war were the means; the creation of a new sovereign democracy was the end.

In Search of a New Paradigm

Last August, a statue of An Ch'angho was unveiled, next to the statue of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi, in the city square of Riverside, California, where An first resided and began his organizational activities in America. The statues of the leaders were erected to celebrate the ethnic diversity and racial harmony as well as to honor the contribution of these minority communities to American history and society. As a pioneer, An Ch'angho represents the formative history and transformative flowering of the Korean-American community as the most dedicated grass-roots organizer and leader of the early Korean community who offered ethico-spiritual guidance and fellowship with moral courage and sacrifice. Yet, An was unlike Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. in that he did not only advocate the peaceful means of civil-disobedience to achieve his goal of freedom for Koreans. An Ch'angho did not shy away from military engagements or violent means to promote independence. As a matter of fact, he continued to make efforts to wage an independence war throughout his life.

Against the former backdrop of understanding of An Ch'angho and the mainstream Korean nationalist movement as "gradualist pacifist", "cultural nationalist", "self-reconstructionist" or "rightist ability-cultivationist", An's philosophy and strategy were not only limited to the educational and cultural means, for his ultimate aim was to recover national sovereignty by military means, or, in other words, a war of independence. The documentary sources affirm that An Ch'angho was actually a multi-layered militarist strategist and life-long revolutionary who advocated, planned and waged a war of independence against colonial Japan for over a quarter of a century. In this regard, An was also more of a "political nationalist", rather than a "cultural nationalist" or self-reform nationalist, whose lifelong passion and energy were directed to champion the ideals and practices of constitutional

democracy for Koreans. As the first Korean to advocate a republican form of government and the first to draft the Korean republican constitution, An Ch'angho introduced and experimented with the democratic principles of self-government as the very means of anticolonial struggle and wrote constitutions for his revolutionary organizations, prescribing a system of separation of powers, including the constitution of the Provisional Government. Leading anticolonial revolution as democratic revolution for colonial and diasporic Koreans, An was both a theorist and a practitioner of democracy, who conceived constitutional praxis of self-government as the very means and the end of the anticolonial struggle. Essentially, An Ch'angho originated modern constitutional democracy and the rule of law as the very means to achieve national freedom, beginning a "republican revolution" for Koreans.

Through the An Ch'angho controversy, the previous conceptions of An Ch'angho were challenged as conventional wisdom which had not been questioned in the past several decades. The controversy also engaged debates about the long-sustained "tripartite division" framework which too simplistically portrayed the Korean nationalist leadership, movement and politics. Beyond the "tripartite division" or binary paradigms, new revelations suggest that An Ch'angho possibly originated a one-of-kind paradigm as a synthesis of democratic ideology and revolutionary strategy. The controversy included the debates concerning the actual scope and intensity of the Korean independence struggle which had been seriously underestimated and misread by the previous scholars in Korea and the West, due to the residual colonial legacy and the Cold War division that ineluctably shaped the subsequent historiographical treatment.

Departing from the *post hoc* divisional and binary logic which pervaded historiography on modern Korea during the Cold War era ~ which often took its points of departure as the peninsular division after the Korean War - the new view aims to highlight the unique paradigm of the Korean nationalist leadership and movement in its own terms and conditions of colonial diaspora. It is sometimes asked, "Was the Korean nationalist movement a success or failure?" The answer depends on the eye of the beholder as it left behind a rich moral and political legacy as well as spiritual and communal inheritance from which new millennium Koreans at home and abroad still draw historical identity and personal meaning. Ultimately, the series of interpretive debates and discourses of the "An Ch'angho Controversy" were fruitful, for they advanced the idea that Korean colonial-nationalist history encompassed far greater complexities and mysteries. Perhaps, to assert otherwise would be to insist on the shibboleth of Orientalist hubris or imperialist nostalgia.

Engaging in the An Ch'angho controversy, the new view underscores the compelling inner logos, and ethos within the self-defining process of historical evolution of the Korean nationalist movement as a global and transnational, yet unique and indigenous, project. Defining An Ch'angho as a "revolutionary-democrat", the new view encompasses the distinctive manner in which An entwined constitutional democracy-building and preparations for the independence war in his nationalist ideology and methodology, especially within the colonial/nationalist duality of *appearance vs. reality*. It illuminates the nature of his role in constructing the ideal and process of nascent democracy and the war of independence and offers a new interpretive framework to reassess the pattern and dynamics of the Korean liberational struggle. Through the new discoveries on the independence leadership, it is possible to rethink the underlying ideological pattern and political dynamics of the nationalist movement from the *kaehwa* enlightenment reform to the independence war of Ch'ongsalli to An Ch'angho's continued military unification drive in China and Russia in the subsequent decades. The transformation of the cultural and military movements can also be reevaluated in terms of division and merger over several decades from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. Here, a more dynamic and fluid, yet everchanging, unity, rather than an artificial division, between the cultural and military movements, can be perceived in the historical stream of the Korean nationalist movement. What I mean by cultural and military, or *mun* and *mu*, movements are the patriotic enlightenment and righteous army movements (*kyemong undong* and *uibyong undong*) as the two major strands of Korean nationalist movement.⁴⁵

During the course the Korean anticolonial movement, An Ch'angho attempted to reconcile democracy and revolution, nationalism and communism, as well as the left and the right. In the process, An creatively and imaginatively entwined his goals and vision of Korean democracy and revolution, or the *mun* and *mu* spheres of civil body politic and military affairs, as a matter of strategic dialectics and historical requisites. Such dialectical and dynamic intertwinement of "revolution" and "democracy", as the means and the end, lies at the heart of the paradigm shift in the interpretation of the nationalist movement as "revolutionary-democracy". As a model of anticolonial movement, a rare merger of revolution and democracy and the transnational diaspora, as well as visionary leadership that firmly fixed its gaze on the independent and democratic future, distinguish the Korean experience in the twentieth century.

Notes

1. Jacqueline Pak, *The Founding Father: An Ch 'angho and the Origins of Korean Democracy*, Stanford University Press, forthcoming. Also, the Korean translation, *An Ch 'angho: Han 'guk minjujuui ui kiwon* (2003). The monographs are based on Jacqueline Pak, "An Ch'angho and the Nationalist Origins of Korean Democracy", Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 2000. The An Ch'angho Collection comprises over four thousand items of his private papers, including diaries, speeches, letters, documents, books, photographs, and artifacts. Perhaps the most significant and extensive collection among Korean nationalists, the An Ch'angho Collection of private papers provides valuable insights into his role as the chief architect and strategist of nationalist movement and offers a rare glimpse of the actual *modus operandi* of the global network of exile and underground activities. Among others, the new research closely investigates the private papers of So Chaep'il (1866 -1951), An Ch'angho's mentor and luminary of the Independence Club, and An Chunggun (1879-1910), a revolutionary who assassinated Ito Hirobumi. Consisting of over two thousand items, the So Chaep'il Collection includes letters, documents, essays, radio broadcasts and photographs. The papers of An Chunggun include his renowned calligraphy, court testimonies, prison writings and autobiography.

2. The "tripartite division" framework first appeared in Chong-sik Lee, *Politics of Korean Nationalism*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1965. Adopting this approach, Arthur Gardner wrote "The Korean Nationalist Movement and An Ch'angho, Advocate of Gradualism", Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1979.

3. A series of critiques of the problems of the past decades of scholarship and its theoretical and empirical underpinnings were offered in a number of my earlier presentations, including the shared aspects of militarism, diplomatism and so-called gradualism that can be found among the anticolonial Korean revolutionaries.

4. Yi Kwangsu, *Tosan An Ch 'angho*, Hungsadan, Seoul, 1947; Chu Yohan, *An Tosan chonso* (Complete Works of An Tosan), Samjungdang, Seoul, 1963; Chong-sik Lee, *Politics of Korean Nationalism*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1965; and Arthur Gardner, *The Korean nationalist Movement and An Ch 'angho, Advocate of Gradualism*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1979. Also, Chang Iuk and Chu Yohan, *Nauisaranghanpandoya* (My Love, Korean Peninsula), Hungsadan, 1987; and AnPyonguk, *Tosan sasang* (Philosophy of Tosan), Samyuk ch'ulpansa, Seoul, 1991, among others.

For discussions on the collaboration of Yi Kwangsu and Chu Yohan, read the circumstances of the Hungsadan trial, *Hungsadan undong ch 'ilsipnyonsa* (The Seventy Year History of the Hungsadan Movement), Hungsadan, Seoul, 1983 and Kim Yunsik, *Yi Kwangsu wa ku ui sidae* (Yi Kwangsu and His Time), Hangilsa, Seoul, 1986.

5. Michael Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1988.

6. Kenneth Wells, *New God, New Nation: Protestants and Self Reconstruction Nationalism in Korea, 1896-1937*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1990.

7. Kang Tongjin, *Ilje han 'guk ch 'imnyak chongch 'aeksa* (History of the Strategy of Japanese Colonial Aggression toward Korea), Hangilsa, Seoul, 1980; So Chungsok, *Hanmal ilje ch'imnyakha ui chabonjui kundaehwaron ui songkyok -Tosan An Ch 'angho ui sasang ul chungsim uro* (The Character of Capitalistic Modernization Theory under the Japanese Colonial Aggression at the End of Choson-Centering on

Tosan An Ch'angho's Philosophy), Han'guk kunhyondae ui minjok munje yongu, Chisik sanopsa, Seoul, 1989; and Pak Ch'ansung, *Han gukkundae chongch 'isasangsa yongu: Minjokjui upa ui sillyok yangsong undongnon* (Study of History of Modern Korean Political Philosophy: Theory of the Rightist Nationalist Ability-cultivationist Movement), Yoksa pipy'ongsa, Seoul, 1992

8. Lee, *Politics of Korean Nationalism*. Here, An Ch'angho's nationalist leadership and strategy are mainly delineated by the Japanese investigative reports.

9. Lee's updated comment about *Politics of Korean Nationalism*. Chong-sik Lee made much contribution to the field of Korean nationalism and communism. His more recent books are: Kwon Kibung, trans., *Ch 'odae daet 'ongnyong: YiSungman ui ch 'ongnyon sijol* (The First President: The Tinie of Syngman Rhee's Youth), Tong'a ilbosa, Seoul, 2002, and Yi Ch6ng-sik and Kim Hakchun, eds., *Hyongmyonggatul ui hang 'il hoasang* (Memoirs of Anti-Japanese Revolutionaries), Minumsa, 1988. Particularly, his book on Rhee is quite helpful to understand the currents of his time, his activities during the prison years and rise as the leader, despite Rhee's subsequent troublesome behavior in America and Korea. A complex figure, Rhee's remarkable earnestness and sincerity as a patriotic and thoughtful youth are captured in the work.

10. Michael Robinson, *op. cit.*

11. These points were raised first raised in the paper, Jacqueline Pak, "An Ch'angho as a Nationalist Leader: A Revisionist Perspective", Association of Korean Studies in Europe (AKSE) Conference, Prague, Czech Republic, April 23, 1995.

12. *Plea to Compatriots, An Tosan chonso*, Volume 2, pp. 1-20. This was written by An Ch'angho in 1924. For more details on the espionage network of *Yont 'ongje* of the Provisional Government devised by An, see my forthcoming work.

13. *Yesim simmungi, An Tosan chonso*, Volume 2, pp.447-462.

14. Sim Hoon, *Sangnoksu* (Evergreen), Munhak sasangsa, Seoul, 1991.

15. Eric Voegelin, *From Enlightenment to Revolution*, Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1975, p.298.

16. *Ibid.*

17. Wells, pp.9 and 16.

18. *Ibid.* p. 18.

19. Tschung-Sun Kim and Michael Reinschmidt, eds., *Strengthened Abilities: Assessing the Vision of Tosan Chang-hoAhn*, Academic Koreana, Los Angeles, 1998; Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun and The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1981.

20. Pak, Book Review, *Korean Studies*, July 2001, p.xvii.

21. *Ibid.*

22. Among others, Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun and The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1981.

23. Pak, Book Review, op.cit.
24. Pak, AKSE, Prague, 1995, op.cit.
25. Interviews with the family members of An Ch'angho, including his eldest daughter Susan Cuddy in Northridge, CA and niece, An Songgyol, in Seoul, Korea.
26. For more discussion on the constitution of the *Kongnip hyophoe*, Chapter 4, Pak, diss.
27. My own view of the *Sinminhoe*, founded by An Ch'angho in Korea, was that it was much more heavily influenced by the earlier Korean-American *Sinminhoe* of Hawaii established in 1903, although it was the earlier orthodox view of the organization was that it was mainly a homeland organization created by the revolutionaries in Korea. The Korean-American component of the *Sinminhoe* is further reinforced in Wayne Patterson, *The Use: First-Generation Korean Immigrants in Hawaii, 1903—1973*, University of Hawaii Press, 2000, pp.49-52.
28. For further detail on the *Kungminhoe*, Chapter 5, Pak, diss. Also Ban Byong Yool, "Korean Nationalist Activities in the Russian Far East and North Chientao, 1905-1921", University of Hawaii, Ph.D. dissertation, 1996.
29. "The Constitution of the Hungsadan", The Tosan An Ch'angho Collection. There are a number of drafts of the *Hungsadan* constitution among the private papers. With over eighty-year history, the *Hungsadan* continues the tradition of democratic self-government and is one of the three oldest surviving organizations in modern Korea, along with the *Ch 'ondogyo* and *Wonbulgyo*.
30. Han-Kyo Kim, "The Korean Independence Movement in the United States: Syngman Rhee, An Ch'ang-Ho and Pak Yong-Man", "The Korean Americans: Past, Present and Future" Conference, A Centennial Celebration of Korean Immigration to the US, sponsored by International Council on Korean Studies and the Centennial Committee of the Korean Immigration to the USA, Falls Church, VA, August 17, 2002.
31. Edward Wagner, the "godfather of Korean Studies", was social historian of Choson dynasty. He was my graduate advisor at Harvard University, 1989-1991.
32. Pak, diss., p.86.
33. Han-Kyo Kim, Ibid.
34. Jacqueline Pak, "An Ch'angho and the Origins of Korean Democracy", "The Origins of Korean Democracy" Conference, Special Report, Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, Washington, DC, 2001.
35. Newly discovered documents of the *Hungsadan*, indicating the purchase of bonds issued by the Provisional Government, reveal that the *Hungsadan* assumed perhaps the greatest financial burden of the Korean Provisional Government from its inception.
36. For greater detail concerning the background and creation of the Provisional Government, Chapter 8, Pak, diss. Also, Yi Hyonhui, *Taehan minguk imsi chongbusa* (History of Korean Provisional Government), Chipmundang, 1983, among others.

37. Kukhoe Tosogwan, *Tosan An Ch'angho Charyojip: Choson Ch'ongdokpu KyongmugukSojangPimil Munso*, 1997, p. 172. Also, Kim Yongsu, "The Constitution of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea" (*Taehan minguk imsi honjang*), *Taehan minguk imsi honbopnon* (Theory of Korean Provisional Constitution), Samyoungsa, 1980, pp. 85-86.
38. For an account of the Korean Independence War of Ch'ongsanni and the Independence Army, Yun Py6ngs6k, *Tongnippgunsa* (History of Independence Army), Chisik sanopsa, Seoul, 1991.
39. *An Tosan chonso*, Volume 2, p. 130.
40. The Speech of "Six major tasks which our people must achieve", *An Tosan chonso*. Volume 2, p. 129.
41. *Sanghai ilgi* (The Shanghai Diaries), The Tosan Collection.
42. "Tasks for All Armed Koreans to Implement", The Tosan Collection.
43. "Book List" prepared by An Ch'angho, The Tosan Collection, and *Sojang charyo pangmok* (The List of Source Holdings), The Independence Hall of Korea, Ch'onan, Korea, 1993, pp. 68-83
44. It is possible that the "Tasks for All Armed Koreans to Implement" was prepared when An Ch'angho began his military recruitment drive in Shanghai. Yet, An Ch'angho's oratorical assertions to "open war" began in 1907 in Korea and, even before in 1905, through the newspaper editorials of his revolutionary organizations, in America.
45. A new perspective on examining the tension and merger of the patriotic enlightenment and righteous army movements was discussed in depth in Jacqueline Pak, "Reform or Revolution?: Reassessment of the Late Nineteenth Century Korea", 'Conference on the Nineteenth Century Korea, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, June 14-16,2001. This will be published as a conference volume.

Interim Development Assistance for North Korea

A Multilateral Approach*

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North Korea has been such a closed country that it is impossible to accurately assess the state of her economy. However, all measures available to outsiders indicate that the North Korean economy is functioning below subsistence level. It seems to have lost not only the ability to sustain itself without outside assistance but also the ability to recover by itself. Thus, it is now incumbent upon the international community to find a long-term solution for developing North Korea backed by appropriate resources. The purpose of this article is to propose a multilateral framework through which resources can be effectively and sensibly channeled into North Korea, satisfying current political constraints both donors and the recipient face.

Historically, North Korea has been mostly an inward-looking country except when she makes occasional brushes with the outside world. Recently, however, North Korea has shown some willingness to change her attitude toward outside. On the diplomatic frontier, she has normalized ties with EU countries, Australia, the Philippines, and Canada. Most significantly, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il met with South Korean President Kim Dae-jung in Pyongyang in June 2000. The summit was followed by exchange visits of separated families, ministerial level talks, and even defense minister meetings. In the

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economic area, the two sides agreed to introduce institutional safeguards for investment such as protecting investment and avoiding double taxation. They also agreed to reconnect the Seoul-Shinuiju railroad line and build a road between Moonsan and Kaesung.

After the summit, the North-South rapprochement first proceeded at a pace not anticipated by most people. This raised hopes that North Korea would greatly improve her external relations. Then, the initial euphoria subsided. There are at least two factors for this change of mood. One factor is the North's attitude toward the North-South dialogue. The North has been backing off from commitments made earlier. They have shown the pattern of insisting on deals that require front-loaded economic gifts from South Korea and then not honoring their share of the deals, mostly humanitarian and peace-enhancing measures. Such attitudes from the North have turned public opinion in the South against further unreciprocated concessions to the North.

The other factor contributing to the slow progress of the North's external relations has been the change in the stance of the US government. Before they left office, the Clinton administration came close to striking a deal with North Korea, linking the resolution of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) issue with the normalization of ties. The new Bush administration came into office without a coherent set of policies regarding North Korea but with the traditional Republican stance that favors hardline postures against certain regimes, such as North Korea. The policy review that had been conducted in the first half of 2001 did not help to make the US policy more transparent. Then came the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon by Middle Eastern terrorists. Since North Korea is still on the US list of countries that sponsor terrorism, the attack made any positive development in the US-DPRK relationship very difficult. Then came President Bush's remark in his 2002 State of Union address labeling North Korea as part of the "Axis of Evil" that included Iran and Iraq. Even though the "axis" part may be misguided rhetoric, the "evil" part reveals President Bush's moral judgment on the North Korean regime. It is a signal that the Bush Administration intends to use more sticks than carrots in dealing with North Korea. In other words, even though the US is maintaining that it is open to dialogues with North Korea, the US is signaling that she will attempt to resolve the WMD issue with the threat of sanctions rather than offering additional incentives. This development makes the prospect of any rapprochement between the US and North Korea unlikely, if not impossible, in the near term.

North Korea has stalled on North-South relations and seems to be losing a great opportunity. For instance, the North has ignored repeated calls by President Kim Dae-jung for the North Korean leader's visit to

South Korea. North Koreans have cited the stalled US-DPRK dialogue as the main reason for the stalled North-South dialogue. This claim partly reveals their strategy of using the North-South rapprochement as a stepping stone toward improving relations with the United States. But the real reason for their hesitancy is most likely their concern for regime security.

President Kim Dae-jung, who received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 for enhancing the prospect of peace between North Korea and South Korea, will attempt to achieve some tangible progress in the North-South relationship before he leaves the office. This effort will not be easy. President Kim is in his lame duck year and the public support for his "sunshine" policy is waning.

One can have some hope for the North's desire to make deals with President Kim rather than his successor. But, if past behavior is any guide, the North will only attempt to extract as much economic aid as possible from the South without seriously addressing issues that concern the South Korean public. Another hopeful factor is the dire economic situation of North Korea. She cannot afford to lose economic assistance from the outside, despite all the reservations her leaders might have about the wisdom of letting in outside influences.

The North Korean regime seems to be increasingly split between the desire for seeking outside economic assistance and the desire for maintaining internal security and thus is becoming less coherent. The unpredictable nature of the North Korean regime revealed itself one more time in the naval clash of June 2002 between North and South Korea. The regime probably wanted to raise the stakes by showing that she can still cause armed conflicts, a concern for all her neighbors. The South Korean public was filled with dismay and demanded that the flow of economic resources from the South to the North be stopped. The United States halted a planned visit by a special envoy to North Korea, further dampening the prospect of an improved DPRK-US relation. Then, in another unpredictable turn, the North Koreans expressed "regret" over the naval clash, swallowing their ego. This was a clear signal that their choices were limited, given the dire economic situation and the increasing international pressure on dealing with "rogue" countries. They renewed efforts to improve their external relations. This resulted in a resumed North-South dialogue in August 2002 and the first visit to Pyongyang by a Japanese prime minister in September 2002.

In resumed ministerial-level talk between the two Koreas, the two sides agreed on implementing the previously agreed railway connection and the North's sending athletes to the 2002 Asian Games in Busan, South Korea. Following up on the agreement, they actually began in

September to clear mines in the DMZ, the 4km wide no man's land established at the end of the Korean War.

During Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang, the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, admitted to North Korea's kidnapping of Japanese citizens in the past and promised that those who are still alive would be returned to Japan. This issue has been a longterm major roadblock in improving relations between North Korea and Japan. They agreed that talks for normalizing diplomatic relations should be resumed. One of the major issues will be reparations for the Japanese colonial rule on Korea. The reparations are expected to be settled in the form of economic aid.

While the road is still murky, the signals from North Korea indicate that she is becoming increasingly dependent on the outside world. Paradoxically, the chill after the naval clash induced her to recognize this dependence.

Given the prospect that the progress of North Korea's external relationships will be less than satisfactory in the short term, one should now perhaps shift the gear toward longer term perspectives. Addressing long-term issues is not only desirable but also practical. In designing long-term policies, one has to take into account the welfare of the North Korean people. Only such policies could contribute toward peace and prosperity in the region in the long run. In this regard, what one needs now are plans for developing the North Korean economy. Outsiders who have stakes in the stability of North Korea should help North Korea develop herself.

Of course, it is not an easy task to develop a nation's economy when the initiatives are not coming from within. One should remember, however, that political situations can change quite unexpectedly as one has seen in former socialist countries. Thus, it would be desirable to pursue policies that would be fruitful, whether or not political situations change. This approach would be beneficial to all parties no matter what political and strategic goals they may have.

We submit that it would be useful to set up an interim multilateral framework that can deal with the economic development of North Korea. Specifically, we propose establishing an Interim North Korea Development Assistance Group (INKDAG) that would consist of major donor countries and international organizations.

The multilateral framework can achieve what bilateral relations cannot. For instance, it can facilitate the transparent and efficient use of valuable resources provided to North Korea. When it looked as if things were going well, especially after the North-South summit, South Korea, US, and Japan all focused on their bilateral relationships with North

Korea and did not pursue any multilateral framework. Also, it has been assumed that a natural multilateral framework will emerge as North Korea joins the international financial institutions (IFIs). But with recent developments in international relations, this cannot be hoped for in the near future. Thus, there is a need for some interim solutions in coordinating the effort of the international community in assisting North Korea in the economic area.

Assisting North Korea's Development

It is unfortunate that North Korea is unwilling to take bold initiatives to improve her economy. As a consequence, the North Korean people have long been suffering from economic hardship, especially chronic shortages of food. What is encouraging, however, is that the North Korean leadership now seems to be accommodating what is inevitable, if not championing reform and opening North Korea's economy. This is evidenced by their allowance of spontaneous markets for necessities, reaching out to donor countries, and pursuing North-South economic cooperation. In other words, even though the North Korean leadership has been reluctant to embark on a reform strategy that may risk regime security, it seems to be adopting a more realistic approach to enhance the sustainability of the regime.

Given the recent signals that North Korea desires to benefit from economic interactions with the outside world, she deserves serious attention by the international community as a target for development assistance. The bulk of the assistance is bound to come from South Korea. But there are other neighboring countries that have stakes in the stability of the Korean Peninsula and are willing to contribute to the economic development of North Korea.

At present, North Korea is not able to effectively absorb private investment. She has insufficient infrastructure and cannot access international private loans because of her virtual default status on external debts. Thus, she needs public assistance, such as grants and concessional public loans, in the form of development aid. South Korea went through a similar stage in the 1950s and 1960s.¹

The North Korean economy has steadily fallen after making significant progress up to the mid 1970s, exhibiting a pattern shared by many former socialist countries. Even though most former socialist countries adopted market economies after the fall of the socialist block in the early 1990s, North Korea has maintained a closed command economy. As a result, the North Korean economy has deteriorated to a state of virtual collapse. In particular, the state distribution system has ceased to function, and many people are starving.²

One consequence of the collapse of the state distribution system has been the rise of spontaneous markets, where some necessity goods are exchanged. This, however, does not mean that North Korea is becoming a market economy. The North Korean leadership is not deliberately introducing the market system but is only tolerating market elements out of necessity. There is no sign that the leadership is ready for the institutional reforms necessary to unleash market forces.

The international community has responded to the plight of the North Korean people with humanitarian aid. But this effort seems to be running out of steam. There is recognition that private donor groups possess neither sufficient resources to continue their operations nor the technical skills to deal with North Korean partners. What is needed now is the broad and systematic efforts of the international public sector to assist North Korea.

Even though North Korea has been slow in initiating internal reforms, she has recently demonstrated her willingness to participate in international financial institutions that could provide financial assistance. In April 1997, she applied for membership to the Asian Development Bank (ADB); in September 1997, she received a fact-finding visit from the International Monetary Fund (IMF); and in February 1998, she hosted a senior World Bank official. In August 2000, North Korea wrote a letter "reminding" the ADB Executive Board of her application for membership made in 1997,³ but there were no positive results from these applications.

If North Korea joins IFIs, she can receive both financial and technical assistance. Possible sources of assistance include the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) fund of the IMF, the International Development Association (IDA) fund of the World Bank, and the Asian Development Fund (ADF) of the ADB. If, furthermore, North Korea successfully implements reform programs required by the IMF and the World Bank, she can receive external debt relief through the Koln Initiative, which is an enhanced version of Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. Thus, North Korea's joining the IFIs would be a major step toward international development assistance for North Korea.

South Korea has supported North Korea's membership in IFIs. At the ADB Annual Meeting held in May 1997, and at the IMF/World Bank Joint Annual Meeting in September 1997, the South Korean government announced its position supporting North Korea's joining the IFIs. On May 15, 2000, President Kim Dae-jung indicated that it was time for the global community and international organizations to participate in efforts to provide North Korea with economic assistance, if the North requests it. And the South Korean government formally

asked the members of the ADB to support North Korea's efforts to become a member at the Bank's annual meeting held in Thailand in May 2000.

To clear the way for North Korea's membership, the bilateral relationship between the US and North Korea as well as the bilateral relationship between Japan and North Korea need to be improved. Of particular importance is the removal of North Korea from the US Administration's list of countries supporting terrorism. Under a domestic law, the US Administration is required to oppose financial assistance from IFIs to countries on the terrorism list. North Korea has been on the list since January 1988. Seven nations are currently on the list. The other countries are Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Syria. Given the attitude of the current administration in Washington, the removal of North Korea from the list is not likely to occur any time soon. The US eased sanctions on North Korea on June 19, 2000, but restrictions on North Korea based on multilateral arrangements remain in place.

Interim Assistance for North Korea

Even if all hurdles are cleared, it would still be a couple of years before North Korea can become a member of IFIs and begin to receive substantial financial assistance. Thus, it is necessary to come up with some interim measures to assist North Korea until the IFIs are in a fully operative mode.

Possible interim measures include both multilateral and bilateral initiatives. One conceivable multilateral measure is to establish a Trust Fund for North Korea that could provide not only technical assistance but also financial assistance before North Korea's admission to the IFIs.⁴ There are precedents for trust funds such as those for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the West Bank and Gaza, East Timor, and Kosovo. Setting up a trust fund requires the support of major stakeholders but to a lesser degree than in the case of membership in the IFIs. Richard Armitage, US Deputy Secretary of State in the Bush administration, supported the idea in a report written before assuming his post: "If the North takes the necessary steps, the United States, with its allies, should consider establishing a Korean reconstruction fund within the World Bank or Asian Development Bank."⁵

The most effective measure to assist North Korea during the interim period would be to establish an Interim North Korea Development Assistance Group, which would serve as an aid coordination group.⁶ Participants could include major donor governments, major IFIs, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), international aid agencies,

and NGOs. In establishing and operating the group, South Korea needs to take a central role as the largest donor. But as North Korea joins the IFIs, the INKDAG can be transformed into a formal Consultative Group (CG) led by the World Bank.⁷ Alternatively, the INKDAG can be given a fixed lifespan, say five years, so that it can operate as a CG for a while even after North Korea joins the IFIs.

The INKDAG as a multilateral aid coordination group has certain merits. First, from the viewpoint of the recipient country, a collective approach compensates for the lack of diplomatic capacities to reach out to many donors. Second, from the viewpoint of donor countries and organizations, a multilateral policy dialogue mechanism can be useful in preventing aid duplication and in assuring transparency of the use of resources provided. Third, for both the recipient and donors, a multilateral mechanism is less susceptible to domestic political concerns than bilateral channels.

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) is a precedent for a multilateral coordination group for North Korea, albeit one restricted to the energy sector. There is also a precedent in a multilateral coordination meeting in the agricultural sector: there were two Roundtable meetings in Geneva sponsored by the UNDP,⁸ one in May 1998⁹ and another in June 2000. North Korea asked donors to provide \$250 million for North Korea's agricultural development programs based on unrealistic production projections. Still the Roundtable on agriculture has not been well supported by its participants. In contrast to these initiatives, the INKDAG would be a comprehensive aid coordination group covering all sectors.

The KEDO has had its critics who are skeptical of the efficiency of nuclear plants in resolving the energy problem in North Korea. Some groups in the US have argued for replacement of light water nuclear reactors (LWRs) by coal-fired power plants or even the abandonment of the Agreed Framework signed in October 1994. Others, to a lesser degree, have noted a need to update certain provisions of the Agreed Framework. For instance, David Von Hippel, Peter Hayes, Masami Nakata, and Timothy Savage suggested offering a package of infrastructure assistance to North Korea in exchange for changes in HFO (heavy fuel oil) deliveries.¹⁰

We note that the main structure of KEDO should be maintained in order to retain credibility with North Korea. Furthermore, any changes in the contents of the KEDO agreement need to be approved by its major financiers, South Korea and Japan. Nonetheless, as many energy experts have already pointed out, construction of two LWRs will at best trigger many infrastructure problems in North Korea's energy sector.¹¹ For instance, the electricity grid in North Korea has to be substantially

rebuilt if the nuclear reactors provided are to operate properly. The providers and the recipient of the reactors will have to talk again to resolve these problems and perhaps launch another round of talks concerning the agreed framework. It seems to us that we have little time to spend on devising a series of quick fixes. What we need is a much broader multilateral coordination framework than KEDO, however improved it may be.

If INKDAG forms, earlier multilateral coordination groups can be absorbed by the new framework, even though this does not necessarily have to be the case. Under the INKDAG, the US and its allies could get more than the KEDO program is supposed to secure, say a nuclear moratorium. North Korea surely demands more carrots in the form of development assistance, international guarantees of her security, etc., while the North needs to offer more than nuclear concessions. China and Russia would also be interested in participating in the INKDAG.

Private Investment in North Korea

North Korea is not able to effectively absorb private investment at her present stage. The investment by South Korean firms in North Korea approved by the government from 1995 to 2001 has totaled approximately \$400 million including almost \$200 million for the Mt. Kumgang project, but not including investment for the LWR construction of more than \$4 billion.¹² Some projects were aborted even before they began, and some were discontinued because the North Korean government did not allow the necessary personnel to visit the North. Most projects have lost money.

The largest obstacle to foreign investment is North Korea's insufficient infrastructure. Most transportation in North Korea is by rail. In 1996, the total length of the railroad network was about 5,000 km, 80 percent electrified. Most railroads are single-tracked and allow operating speeds of only 30-40 km per hour.¹³ In 1996, there were about one million main telephone lines in North Korea, but only 10 percent of them were owned by individuals. During the 1990s, the North Korean government made a substantial investment in optical fiber networks. They have been mainly used for vertical linkages from Pyongyang to local areas, but horizontal communications between households and businesses have not been encouraged.¹⁴

The problem of infrastructure facing private investors can be best illustrated by the plight of a South Korean company, Taechang, which has invested in a spring water project in North Korea since 1996. In order to carry out the project, the company had to build a railroad with its own resources. Partly due to its loss in the North Korea project,

which cost more than \$10 million, the company went bankrupt.

The infrastructure problem applies not only to the physical infrastructure but also to institutional and intellectual infrastructure. For instance, contract enforcement is not taken seriously by North Koreans. In the case of Taechang's spring water project, the contract originally stipulated that Taechang pay \$3.5 per ton to the North Korean counterpart, but later the North Koreans demanded that the payment be raised to \$100 per ton. Also, it is not rare that North Koreans make "exclusive" deals with several parties.

It is well known in public economics that the private sector cannot be expected to provide adequate public goods because of the free-rider problem. Thus, it is the public sector's responsibility to provide public goods such as infrastructure. The INKDAG can be used as an instrument of the international public sector to provide infrastructure necessary for facilitating private investments in North Korea.

If massive public assistance enters the North, private companies can participate in implementing the development programs such as building infrastructure. In particular, the member countries of the INKDAG will probably have some advantage in getting their commercial enterprises involved in the development projects. Furthermore, if private companies believe in the effectiveness of the public programs in developing the North Korean economy, they might enter North Korea on the basis of anticipating evolving and expanding markets.

Another problem that hinders private investment in North Korea is her inability to access international financial markets, due to her default status on external debts. North Korean debts have been traded at more than 90 percent discount in the secondary market. To the extent that the ultimate success of the development program lies in its ability to attract private investment to the target region, the INKDAG should get involved in debt relief and in rescheduling negotiations that would be carried out by the Paris Club, which consists of public creditors, and the London Club, which consists of commercial creditors.

Perhaps what is more important than the external conditions is the will of the North Korean leadership to attract private investment with a view to developing a market economy. In this, we have not yet seen any clear signal. Despite apparent efforts to attract foreign investment, there seems to be no commitment to market-oriented reforms, which would be a necessary condition, not only for a full-scale investment inflow but also for this inflow to have a positive impact on the North Korean economy. Instead, there are indications that foreign investment is only regarded as a channel for generating hard cash for the North Korean regime.

A good case to examine is the Rajin-Sunbong Free Economic and Trade Zone (RSFETZ), established in December 1991 in a remote Northern border area. Rajin-Sunbong is one of the three locations within the UNDP's Tumen River Economic Development Area, which includes also Hunchun in China and Posyet in the Russian Far East. According to the data from the DPRK's Committee for Promotion of External Economic Cooperation available on the website (www.korea-np.co.jp) of Chosun Shinbo, the total cumulative investment realized in RSFETZ as of December 1997 was \$58 million for 77 projects (\$62.5 million including investment by UNDP and "private foreign investors") out of business contracts valued at \$750 million for 111 projects. The poor performance is due to many factors, including the infrastructure problem mentioned above. But the most significant factor is probably its location. The isolated and remote border area was chosen, not to maximize the probability for success and the positive effect on the North Korean economy/but to minimize the impact on the rest of North Korea.

The Mt. Kumgang tourism project, sponsored and operated by the South Korean conglomerate Hyundai since 1998, is another case in point. On this project Hyundai has lost about \$300 million. The project is now dependent on subsidies from the South Korean government. From Pyongyang's perspective, this is a perfect project, one that generates cash for the North Korean government but does not affect the North Korean economy.

The lack of commitment by the North Korean leadership for pro-market reforms and the opening of the North Korean economy is obviously due to the fear that the change introduced may start a dynamic process that cannot be controlled and may eventually lead to the loss of political power. Also, even if the leadership is inclined toward a bold move, the military establishment, which is the most important power base for the current leadership, does not seem to be predisposed to market-friendly reforms. The technocrats who are relatively more open toward changes do not seem to hold sway.

Conclusion

Whatever assumptions people of different ideological shades may make on the future course of North Korea, there seems to be a consensus on one observation: North Korea needs outside assistance to develop her economy. If so, the international community may well take a systematic and organized approach to the task and begin the coordination process now. The long-term benefits of such an approach includes peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and therefore in East Asia.

In this paper, we have argued that North Korea should be a major target for development assistance. Specifically, we propose an Interim North Korea Development Assistance Group (INKDAG). If North Korea can join the International Financial Institutions now, INKDAG would not be necessary. But this is very unlikely, given the recent international environment. Thus, one should find some interim solution in assisting North Korea's development.

South Korea should take a lead in the proposed multilateral effort. It is perhaps natural that South Korea hopes to reap fruits from an improved bilateral relationship with North Korea. But it would be difficult for the South to control the progress of the bilateral relation, primarily because of North Korea's refusal to let the North-South relationship to become the centerpiece of her external relations. Thus, it would be practical for South Korea to pursue long-term policies based on multilateral efforts for North Korea's development. Once South Korea takes the lead, the US, EU, Japan, and international organizations are expected to participate in the multilateral framework, perhaps after some initial hesitancy.

From North Korea's point of view, the multilateral framework would provide an opportunity to tap large-scale international resources even when bilateral relations with key players are fluctuating. Through the multilateral framework, North Korea would be subject to more economic logic and discipline and fewer political demands compared to bilateral assistance. Once the process begins, the new mode of economic development will have a major impact on popular attitudes toward the economy and on the fabric of the North Korean society, especially given the dire economic situation in North Korea. In the long run, economic development will be the real driving force changing the North Korea.

Notes

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3. *Financial Times*, September 6, 2000.
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9. See UNDP, *Thematic Roundtable Meeting on Agricultural Recovery and Environmental Protection in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)*, 1998.
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12. See Ministry of Unification, *Intra-Korean Exchange and Cooperation for 2001*, February 2002.
13. For the status of transport infrastructure in North Korea, see Hae-Hak Oh, "Strategies for Developing Transport Infrastructure in North Korea", in Chang-Ho Yoon and Lawrence J. Lau, eds., *North Korea in Transition*, (Northampton: Edgar Elgar, 2001), pp. 215- 236.
14. For the status of telecommunications infrastructure in North Korea see Chang-Ho Yoon and Young Soo Lee, "Transformation of the Telecommunications Infrastructure in North Korea", in Chang-Ho Yoon and Lawrence J. Lau, eds., *op. cit.*, pp. 183-214.

Neither Mountain Nor Marketplace Placing the Buddhist Nun in Contemporary Korean Literature

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Despite its distinct presence in Korean society for nearly one and a half millennia, the world of Buddhist nuns has remained closed to the "gaze" of outsiders.¹ Even the hagiographies on renowned nuns are available to the public only in snippets and mostly as legends.² The dearth of serious treatments of Buddhist nuns in Korean literature thus reflects and at the same time perpetuates the sense of mystery with which the life of a female renunciant is veiled in popular perception. In modern poetry, there is a tendency to lyricize the mystique of the nun, as is illustrated by two well-known poems from the 1930s: Paek Sok's "Yosung" (The Nun); and Cho Chi-hun's "Sungmu" (The Nun's Dance). From the late 1980s, however, the female monastic community has come under increasing scrutiny by a handful of writers and filmmakers, most notably represented by Han Sung-won, Nam Chi-sim, and Im Kwon-taek.

This paper investigates the portrayals of Buddhist nuns in two novels published in the late 1980s: Han's *Aje Aje Para Aje* (Come, Come, Come Upward) and Nam's *Ltow6ara*(Udumbara).³ Unlike the passing vignettes on the nun provided by poems and short stories, Han's and Nam's multi-volume novels employ a quasi-epic mode to probe the processes and implications of women's enlightenment, from broad socio-historical contexts. Of particular interest among the common narrative strategies adopted in these two works is the use of a pair of nuns, foils to each other, who take widely divergent paths to spiritual attainment. Through these characters, the novelists explore the complex and intrinsic relationship between wisdom and compassion, a foundation of Mahayana doctrine. In both novels, wisdom and compassion are topographically figured in the mountain and the

marketplace, respectively. As the loci of differing types of spiritual pursuit undertaken by Buddhist women, these spatial tropes are crucial in unraveling thematic trajectories in both narratives. Given the multivalent narrative functions of spatial metaphors, this paper traces the patterns of the nun's itinerancy in the two texts, paying special attention to the problematics of sexuality and motherhood, which are clearly mapped in the progress toward the goal of bodhisattvahood.

The Buddhist monastery, as portrayed in *Aje Aje Para Aje* and *Udambara*, can best be described in terms of what Michel Foucault calls "heterotopia."⁴ According to Foucault, heterotopias are "counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted **Utopia** in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted" (p. 24). They are special forms of utopia existent in any society. But unlike a **Utopia**, which by definition has no physical manifestation, a heterotopia exists as a material location. Paradoxically, it can be "isolated" and is also "penetrable" (p. 26). Some heterotopias are, however, not freely accessible, demanding a special ritual for entry. The function of a heterotopia can change according to socio-historical circumstances, but in general it constructs a space of either "illusion" or "compensation" (p. 27). The former reveals the real world as illusory by contrast, and the latter makes the real world appear to be chaotic. Foucault presents brothels and colonies as two representative types of heterotopic spaces.

As heterotopic spaces, the Buddhist nunneries in *Aje Aje Para Aje* and *Udambara* embody elements of both compensation and illusion. Initially, the heroines perceive the nunneries as ideal sanctuaries for women in existential pain. As the narratives develop, however, the monastic communities turn out to be just as—if not more—intolerant, authoritarian, and hypocritical as secular organizations. In Han's and Nam's texts, this shift in the perception of the nunnery is dramatically inscribed in Sunnyo's and Chihyo's relationships to their respective temples. Both nuns share a traumatic past of malfunctioning families and failed romances which have led them to "go into the mountain." In the end, however, they are expelled from their supposed mountain "sanctuaries" because they become involved with men and thus violate monastic rules. The harsh disciplinary actions imposed upon them expose the inflexibility of the monastery as a religious institution.

Chinsong, Sunnyo's antithesis in *Aje Aje Para Aje*, represents a different case. She had caring parents and a bright future as a high school senior. Despite her comfortable life, she chooses to become a nun. Her determination to leave home against the vehement opposition

of her family is based on her cherished memories of the nuns' temple she had visited with her grandmother. Chinsong's decisive severance of her worldly ties and her determination to pursue her chosen path are sharply contrasted with Sunnyo's constant ruminations about her past and her ultimate failure to adapt to the monastic environment. However, even Chinsong—who closely follows the prescribed path for a novice—eventually encounters the inscrutable inner dynamics of monastic life upon discovering that Sunnyo, a total misfit in her eyes, is in fact favored over her by the abbess Unson in transmission of the lineage. The enigma of her role model, Unson's sympathetic attitude toward the wayward nun, Sunnyo causes Chinsong to experience anger, jealousy, and disillusionment, and ultimately to take to the road in search of different types of teachers in the marketplace.

As Sunnyo and Chinsong for different reasons return to the secular world, so do Chihyo and Hyeil in *Udambara*. A slight variation in the latter dyad is that while Chihyo struggles with her liminal status in society as an excommunicated nun, her foil, Hyeil, is displaced to India where she furthers her sutra study at a graduate school. Although Chihyo is more diligent in practice and also more observant of monastic discipline than Hyeil, it is Chihyo who is ultimately deprived of her monastic status and is forced to leave the nunnery. This may appear to contradict Han's novel in which outspoken and flexible-minded Sunnyo is expelled from the monastery. A close comparison of the two situations, however, shows that both nuns in fact share spiritual earnestness as is hinted by their uncalculating fervent involvement in romance.

In both novels, the nuns' sojourns in the Rabelaisian marketplace are depicted as a necessary step toward achieving a mind of compassion. In other words, itinerancy constitutes a vital step toward a bodhisattva ideal. Throughout his novel, Han emphasizes that religious liberation is incomplete without an understanding of humanity as flesh and blood; enlightenment can be meaningful only when it is attained through suffering. Therefore, the relocations of the nuns to the samsaric vortex are fully justified as an indispensable phase in their transformative processes. According to this thematic scheme, Buddhist itinerancy—called *manhaeng* (ten thousand actions) or *unsuhaenggak* (wandering like a cloud or water) in Korean—serves as a narrative device for synthesizing wisdom and compassion as bodhisattvahood. As is shown by Chinsong's nomadic quest for the truth, Han's literary appropriation of itinerancy purports to Sudhana's allegorical pilgrimage in the *Avatamsaka Sutra* (Flower Ornament

Scripture).

Despite their noble rationales, however, Han's and Nam's spatial reconfigurations of their heroines harbor a rather disturbing narrative mechanism. What triggers the nuns' departures from the world of spiritual contemplation for that of bodily experience is the voyeuristic male gaze constantly hovering around the temple compounds. Embodied by Hyonu and Chongnam in *Aje Aje Para Aje* and by Tonghwa and Pongdu in *Udambara*, the gaze penetrates into the sacred, forbidden space, forcing the nuns out of their sequestered mountain enclosures into the open arena of the marketplace. The menacing force of their gaze is signified by the mental and physical monstrosities branded on them. Hyonu is a serial rapist and thief. Chongnam, born of a monk and a laywoman, behaves eccentrically out of his self-consciousness about his father's unorthodox religious status. Tonghwa has a blind masseuse sister, who is violated by the husband of his spiritual mentor and sculptor-professor Ch'aeryon. An orphan who grew up in the temple, Pongdu is grotesquely deformed due to childhood injuries sustained during a fire. For these men, the young nuns are objects of desire, and both the authors and readers of the novels conjointly participate in the characters' obsessive gaze. The nuns are allowed textual spaces only so far as they fulfill the collective voyeuristic fantasy. This point is acutely borne out by Hyeil, the only nun among the four who is clean of amorous scandals. Her years of overseas stay are only summarily and perfunctorily reported. During this period abroad, she literally disappears from the story, creating a textual void.

Displaced in the modern cityscape, the nuns are reduced to domestic primitives, simultaneously uncontaminated by and vulnerable to civilization. They are simply colonial subjects at home. While their exotic attraction is on public exhibition due to their shaved heads, the nuns are pressured to exchange their innocence for experiential knowledge of humanity.⁵ This motif plays an important part in reading the novels as Bildungsromans. While both authors urge their heroines to confront rather than avoid a world rife with sin and suffering and also to accept rather than denounce humanity in all its guises, the two writers significantly differ in narrativizing these thematic concerns as part of the protagonists' spiritual growths.

The central subject Han tackles in *Aje Aje Para Aje* is the myth of "mountain Buddhism," whose allure, he argues, stems from distancing itself from the real-life problems of the masses. Han's criticism of mainstream monastic tradition is conveyed by the several renegade

monks in the novel, but especially by Chongnam, who ardently defends his father. As a married monk, Chongnam's father is despised by society, but as a master painter of *tonka*, he has made incalculable contributions to maintaining the tradition of Buddhist art. In Han's novel, the motif of celibacy is symbolic of a self-centered Hinayana inclination to a reclusive and ascetic mountain Buddhism, which aspires in principle to the Mahayana ideal of reaching out to people in pain.

Han's critical stance towards the conventional Korean form of celibate monasticism explains the overwhelming dominance of the motif of sexual union in his text. It is placed in the foreground as a prime manifestation of the "blood-red life force in which light and darkness co-exist."⁶ For example, Han makes Unson fully "human" and thus more respectable as a nun by interjecting her fantastic history of political activism and sexual indulgence into the plot. Unson's drastic metamorphosis from a worldly woman to a world-renunciant is vividly reenacted through Chinsong and Sunnyo, "the saint and the prostitute" (Vol. 2, p. 378).⁷ Sunnyo yields herself to numerous men from all walks of life, including a criminal, an ambulance driver, a factory worker, a dog-meat farmer, medical doctors, a painter, a Protestant minister, and so on. No less diverse is the gallery of humanity to which Chinsong is exposed on her journey. These range from a runaway monk, Sunchol, who happens to be Sunnyo's brother, and the bizarre Zen monk who has cut off his testicles as a way of overcoming his erotic desire, to a variety of individuals including a potter, an altruistic policeman, an ex-sailor, and gangsters. Within this dizzying microcosm of samsara, Han draws particular attention to a dog meat farm as the nethermost point of human depravity. It is at this place of "dog-like men and man-like dogs" that Sunnyo's and Chinsong's otherwise differing routes intersect one another (Vol. 2, p. 99).

Be it allegorical or realistic, the problem with Han's characterization and, indeed, his text as a whole stems from his excessive resorting to erotic sensationalism. It seems that the brutal and even gratuitous rapes of the two nun figures do not suffice; the heroines frequently fantasize about violent sexual attacks. Also, while Chinsong is repeatedly confronted with the teachings about Tantric ritual sex by profligate monks, Sunnyo, the consuming temptress, turns into a vampire, causing deaths to the men who come into close contact with her. This tendency, combined with Han's formulaic use of binarism and exploitation of shoddy melodramatic machinery, such as

implausible coincidence and extravagant language, mars the integrity of his text and calls into question the sincerity of his criticism of the religious establishment. Moreover, the novel's thematic structure fails to articulate clearly the relevance of the two women's dehumanization process to their spiritual advancement. Sunnyo dies, longing for a romantic reunion with her high school teacher, Hyonchong, in her next life, and Chinsong, at the end of her tumultuous journey, faces personal grief at the news of her brother's death and her sister's contraction of AIDS and ultimate suicide.

Han's treatment of motherhood similarly echoes a Mahayana Buddhist view of maternity as samsaric bond and dependency par excellence. Diana Paul states that in Buddhism, and especially in early Indian Mahayana tradition, "[m]others represented . . . sufferers and perpetual givers of life in pain, almost as if it were a natural law for women to suffer."⁸ Citing the image of a "sucking calf to his mother" in the *Dhammapada*, Elizabeth Harris also maintains that Buddhism does not glorify motherhood and that maternal love is a form of bondage and thus a "barrier to spiritual attainment."⁹ Maternity does not belong to the sacred but to the secular realm. The complex perception of motherhood in Buddhism can be glimpsed in the puritanical nun, Chinsong's, negative attitude toward her potential for maternity. She constantly prays for a magical elimination of menstruation, which she detests as an unwanted reminder of her female inferiority, and more importantly, as an obstacle to her practice. Her prudish attitude toward all female biological features is squarely challenged by Sunnyo's embrace of them as healthy signs of humanity. Unfortunately, Sunnyo's celebration of her femininity only causes another set of melodramatic catastrophes. Hyonu, without telling her, deserts their baby boy in Unson's temple, and Sunnyo's two stepchildren are blind and deaf. Her suffering as a mother implies the karmic consequences of her sexual dissipation. Her mentally retarded biological son, in particular, symbolizes the evil outcome of the unnatural union between the sacred (Sunnyo as an ex-nun) and the profane (Hyonu as an ex-convict). The boy is entrusted to a childless, devoted Buddhist couple by Unson, but he is eventually sent to a welfare facility after his adoptive parents' sudden deaths. Sunnyo's stepchildren are also associated with the lasciviousness of their biological mother, who abandoned her family and eloped with her paramour.

Ironically, these suffering children occasion Sunnyo to display fully her compassionate nature. In order to raise funds for building a

school for handicapped children, she literally sacrifices her body by prostituting herself with rich donors until she dies of uterine cancer. This ending is anticipated by Han's frequent allusions to Poryonhyang, a legendary nun who is said to have perished by the "fire on her lotus flower."¹⁰ Reminiscent of this legendary nun, Sunnyo is fatally condemned by her uncontainable passion; yet her utmost maternal devotion is undeniably a quintessential act of bodhisattvahood. Han's ambivalence toward the relationship between women's spiritual enlightenment, and their sexuality and motherhood, fails to find an adequate denouement for the text. The thematic tension which results from such ambiguity only escalates into an absolute spatial dichotomy at the end of the novel between the mountain to which Chinsong returns and the marketplace where Sunnyo dies. Han's denial of a meaningful resolution of their fierce competition seriously undermines the theme of the Middle Way, which he highlights at the outset of the novel by quoting Sakyamuni Buddha: "If the strings of a zither are too tight, they will break. If they are too loose, they will not create beautiful sounds. Our life should aim at a balance between the two extremes" (Vol. 1, p. 9).¹¹

Contrasted with the unrelenting rivalry between Sunnyo and Chinsong, the mutual assistance and complementary relationship between Chihyo and Hyeil in *Udambara* are close to the spirit of *toban* (road companion), the Buddhist monastic fellowship. Nam's distinction between the two nuns does not hinge so much on the issue of sexuality, as on practice and study. As mentioned above, Hyeil is a scholar nun whose academic career is hampered by ill health. Unlike the humorous and outgoing type of nun Hyeil, Chihyo is an introvert concentrating on meditation, which she persistently continues even after her expulsion from the order. In juxtaposing Chihyo's meditative training and Hyeil's intellectual pursuit, Nam's emphasis is without doubt on the former. However, Nam's focus is not on Chihyo's realization of buddhahood but on her conversion of her awakening into meaningful social service. Nam elucidates this thematic preoccupation through Chihyo's forced movement from the mountain to the marketplace.

In delineating Chihyo's complicated passage from a rebellious journalism major to a Zen monastic and then to a revered bodhisattva, Nam skillfully exploits the popular motif of the tragic romance of nuns. Chihyo's transition from the city to the mountain is prompted by her mental collapse following an unexpected separation from her fiancé, Tonghwa. In this respect, Nam can be said to capitalize on the

sentimental views of a Buddhist nunnery as an escapist shelter and of nuns as the victims of unfulfilled affairs.¹² However, what should be noted in Nam's treatment of this hackneyed motif is that she presents youthful passion more as a stage one has to undergo in order to reach a higher state of spirituality, not as a mere quagmire where one remains trapped. In this sense, Chihyo's spiritual itinerary seems to aspire to Wonhyo's idea of *muae* (non-obstruction). *Han* s Aje Para Aje* also introduces the idea of *muae* as the goal of Sunnyo's wandering. However, Han's heroine realizes her failure at both the mountain and the marketplace as she is faced with her impending death; she is not liberated from her burning desire for Hyonchong or from her lingering yearning for monastic life. By contrast, Chihyo in *Udambara* successfully overcomes the emotional residue from the past and resolutely dedicates herself to practice under the Zen Master Paekchok. Her newly-acquired equanimity results from the "courage to stain [her] body ... for transformation."¹³ As it turns out, her worldly struggle with Tonghwa functioned as an expedient for enhancing her understanding of the complexities of humanity. Consequently, she readily embraces her religious duties when Paekchok reinstates her into the nun's status.

In its philosophical thrust, Nam's approach to women's sexuality and motherhood is indebted to the Buddhist idea of non-dualistic interconnectedness. This point can be effectively illuminated by Pongdu's combination of physical repulsiveness and spiritual charm. On the one hand, his adult male body signifies a threat to the nuns' abstinence. On the other hand, his inculpable childlike innocence intimates buddha nature, capable of communion with all sentient beings, as is seen in his early morning exercises on the mountaintop. This duality is aesthetically dissolved through the wooden Buddha statues he carves, which are believed to possess magical power. "Nether sacred nor secular and neither a man nor an animal," Pongdu represents a pure state of the elemental life force, before it is subject to the socialization process (Vol. 2, p. 39).

Due to this non-dual state, Pongdu's secret gaze on Chihyo takes on a deeper resonance than a mere voyeuristic curiosity would. She has unwittingly nurtured his talent for religious art, and he has in turn become the mirror of her inner anguish. Their spiritual interconnectedness finds exquisite expression through a special statue commissioned by Lady Lee, the patroness of the temple. Pongdu's strange inability to start the project is correlated with Chihyo's confusion and sorrow, which are caused by Tonghwa's reappearance

in her life as a physics professor after years in the U. S. The spiritual bond between Chihyo and Pongdu manifests itself in the episode in which he loses an arm to a snake while digging up wild ginseng for Chihyo who becomes critically ill after Tonghwa's visit. In one of the most dramatic moments subsequent to this incident, Chihyo, well aware of Pongdu's mental paralysis, makes a nocturnal visit to his room and lets him touch her body and feel its shape. In this extraordinary scene, Nam's language so subtly blurs the borders between realism and fantasy that the reader cannot determine whether the nun-muse really takes off her clothes or whether the entire action takes place in the onlooker's imagination:

Chihyo is standing naked in the room bright with the moonlight. The woodcutter rubbed his eyes with his palms and watched her. She was apparently in a nun's robe, but for mysterious reasons, she appeared to be a naked body. Rubbing his eyes again, he cast his eyes onto her. But it was same; she looked like a naked body. (Vol. 2, p. 251)

Chihyo's unexpected visit reinvigorates Pongdu's creative force, helping him complete the statue. However, this bizarre incident, witnessed by the old woodcutter from the village, leads to their removal from the temple.

As is the case with Han, Nam presents maternal love as the primary example of compassion. However, she does not link it directly to women's sexuality, as Han does. Rather, motherhood is depicted as a part of the intricate cosmic interdependence. For instance, the baby boy Chihyo looks after for a poor working mother reveals various signs of Pongdu's karmic reincarnation. The baby likes carving as Pongdu did. In Chihyo's mental screen, the baby's beautiful eyes overlap with Pongdu's disfigured ones. When the baby innocently calls Chihyo "Mom," she reminisces about the same message Pongdu evoked through his desperate body language. Chihyo's position as Pongdu's surrogate mother figure is further suggested by the resemblance villagers find among the faces of her, Pongdu, and the Buddha statue he crafted for Lady Lee. In this regard, it is noteworthy that Nam's idea of maternity as non-gendered and non-discriminate universal love is played out linguistically in the text. As a creator of Buddha images, Pongdu is called *pulmo*, a "mother of Buddha." Nam further likens Pongdu's "maternal" status to the androgynous *Kwanum* (*Avalokiteshvara*). A parallel Chihyo discerns between the Korean

word "omma" (mom) and "om," the primordial cosmic sound, also reinforces the broad, encompassing meanings Nam assigns to the notion of motherhood in this novel (Vol. 4, p. 148).

Similarly to her treatment of motherhood, Nam resolves the thematic tension between the mountain and the marketplace differently from the way Han handles it. After her descent from the mountain, Chihyo undergoes education in the marketplace, as Sunnyo and Chinsong do in *Aje Aje Para Aje*. While wandering to find Pongdu, she encounters the sick and poor living on the margins of society. At the end of this long spiritual wandering, Chihyo, now urged by her teacher Paekchok, "returns" to society and opens a temple as an urban mission. Her spiritual progress during this period may not be officially acknowledged by the Buddhist establishment but is fully recognized by Paekchok. Converted from the large house which Ch'aeryon used as her art studio until her death, Chihyo's new temple, located in the city and yet full of trees and flowers, topographically embodies the ideals of both the mountain and the marketplace, bridging their gap as their middle ground. This temple later becomes the home to Pongdu's Buddha statue modeled on Chihyo whose "mysterious" power becomes accessible to whoever seeks serenity amidst urban frenzy.

This urban temple serves Chihyo as a testing ground for her qualifications as an ideal mother and thus for her advancement toward bodhisattvahood. This theme is conveyed through a daytime nursery she runs in the temple for slum-area children. By involving herself with these children, she earns the status of mother without being sexually "defiled." As Paul points out, buddhas and bodhisattvas are often born "parthenogenetically, that is, without the sexual intercourse of the parents."¹⁴ Chihyo's image as a compassionate mother of all children is further confirmed when she is entrusted with the religious education of Yung, the boy born of the passionate affair between Paekchok and Ch'aeryon. As Lady Lee's adopted grandson, Yung is exceptionally gifted in both the arts and sciences. Endowed with spirituality and intelligence, which he inherits from his parents, Yung is envisioned by Nam as a buddha figure who will solve various problems of humanity in the coming world. As Yung studies physics with Tonghwa at the university, Chihyo's long struggle with her unrealized love finally comes to an ironic and yet peaceful closure through their pseudo-parenting of the future Buddha.

In *Aje Aje Para Aje* and *Udambara*, Han and Nam pay homage to Buddhist nuns who strive for spiritual attainment. In doing so, they also criticize mainstream monastic education, in which the goal of

compassion is often eclipsed by that of wisdom. In a sense, the two writers attempt to redress the imbalance between them, or more broadly, the misconception of Buddhist enlightenment per se. This argument is corroborated by their common emphasis on the theme of *hoehyang*, "[t]he 'turning over' of merit acquired by good deeds of an individual to the benefit of another being, or of all beings."¹⁵ As a way of fictionalizing this theme, Han centers his text on women's sexuality, whereas Nam concentrates on motherhood.

The above difference is expressed spatially in the two novels. Both Han and Nam take their heroines away from the monastic setting. In the end, however, Han's novel closes on a skeptical note, questioning the possibility of a bridge between the mountain and marketplace, whereas Nam's offers urban Buddhism as a viable form of integration between the two symbolic places. Nam's vision does not advocate the abolition of the celibate monastic tradition. However, she clearly addresses the need for innovations in the tradition so that contemporary monastics can fulfill bodhisattvahood in changing society without forsaking the time-honored ideal of celibate communalism set forth by Sakyamuni.

What reverberates in Han's idea of reform, which is imparted through the mouths of Chongnam and his radical monk friends, is the ethos of *minjung pulgyo* (popular Buddhism) of the 1980s. Han's populist espousal of socially-engaged Buddhism cannot be easily reconciled with the seclusionism of ancient monasticism. In comparison, Nam appears to prefer a gradual alteration of the anachronistic aspects of Buddhist institutions. Their differing stances are lucidly discernible over the issue of the problematic status of the nun. Both *Aje Aje Para Aje* and *Udambara* warrant the possibility of a woman's spiritual awakening. However, this possibility is strictly framed within the guidance of monks, not senior nuns; Unson in *Aje Aje Para Aje* and Hyejo in *Udambara* tend to disappoint and frustrate rather than inspire and enthuse the young novices. Han's text only reiterates the limitations of female monastics, but Nam's, while acknowledging such constraints, nonetheless instills a prospect of innovation through Chihyo's loss and reacquisition of her religious identity. As a disrobed nun, Chihyo studies under Paekchok, together with male monks, who are shown to bow to her as a form of respect when her awakening is recognized by their teacher. These "unorthodox" scenes transpire a new direction for the flawed system of traditional Buddhism.

From a broad historical perspective, a survey of the images of

Buddhist nuns in modern and contemporary Korean literature reveals two overall patterns, both of which are configured in spatial terms. The first pattern involves the mapping of the nun's body. Modern literature nearly exclusively focuses on the nun's shaved head as exemplified by Paek's and Cho's poems, but contemporary works broaden the gaze to her entire body. While this interest can be understood as a strategy for humanizing the "divine" image of the nun, it should be put in appropriate critical perspective. Han's and Nam's approaches to the nun's body as an aesthetic object show a range of ideological cracks latent in the outsider's gaze. Im Kwon-taek's film adaptation of *Aje Aje Para Aje* well attests Han's literary sensationalism rendered into cinematic voyeurism.

The second pattern noted in the literary portraits of nuns is that the geographical settings have shifted from temple courtyards to city centers. This shift is evinced by a comparison of Han's and Nam's works, and the aforementioned poems by Paek and Cho. The "outward" movement to urban locales certainly reflects the changing role of Buddhism in today's Korean society and the increasing activism among monks and nuns.¹⁶ Hence, the interplay between the tropes of the mountain and the marketplace in the fiction can be adequately contextualized in the efforts made by monastics to find a place of their own in the industrialized modern world. The rapidly homogenized landscape of contemporary Korea erases the old topographical distinction between the mountain and marketplace. This obliteration figuratively calls for a redefinition of the relationship between wisdom and compassion, the indivisible doctrinal core of Mahayana Buddhism.

Notes

1. The beginnings of a nuns' monastic community in Korea cannot be precisely determined due to the lack of historical records. According to Japanese sources, three female members of the Japanese imperial family came to Paekche and were ordained there in the 6th century. This implies that that a sizeable community of nuns was already existent in Paekche at that time. For early history of Korean nuns, see Kim Yong-tae's two articles: "Paekche-ui nijungsugye-wa nisungjik kwangye: Ibonsaryo-wa Silla mit Namjo-ui sarye chungsim" (The relationship between the ordination and position of Buddhist nuns in Paekche: Focusing on Japanese historical sources and the cases in Silla and Southern Dynasties), *Han'gukmunhwa-wa Wonbulgyo sasang*

(Korean culture and W6n Buddhist thought) (Iri: Wongwang University Press, 1975), pp. 1-19; and "Silla-ui y6s6ng ch'ulga-wa nisungjik koch'al: Toyunarang ani-ml chungsim-uro" (A study of the Silla women who left home and of the position of Buddhist nuns: Focusing on Toyunarang Ani), *Myongsong sunim kohuikinyom pulgyohak nonmunjip* (A collection of essays in Buddhist studies in commemoration of the Venerable Myongsong's seventieth birthday) (Seoul: Pulkwang Press, 2000), pp. 37-64.

2. In light of the paucity of material on Korean Buddhist nuns, Ha Ch'un-saeng's *Kkaedalum-iii kkot: Han'guk pulgyo-rul pinnaen kuse pigunidul* (Flowers of enlightenment: Buddhist nuns who brought glory to Buddhism in the modern period), 2 vols. (Seoul: Yorae, 2001) is a most welcome contribution to the field of Korean Buddhism. This book contains thirty-two short biographies of highly respected nuns of the twentieth century.

3. The phrase "aje aje para aje" appears in the *Prajnaparamita Sutra* [Heart Sutra]. "Udambara" is the Korean transcription of the Sanskrit word "udumbara," which refers to an auspicious mythical tree whose flowers are said to bloom once in three thousand years.

4. Michel Foucault, "Of Other Spaces," *Diacritics: A Review of Contemporary Criticism*, 16:1 (1986): 22-27.

5. The social and psychosexual meanings of a woman's shaved head are extensively examined in *Off with Her Head! The Denial of Women's Identity in Myth, Religion, and Culture*, eds. Howard Eilberg-Schwartz and Wendy Doniger (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995) and in *Hair: Its Power and Meaning in Asian Cultures*, eds. Alf Hildebeitel and Barbara Miller (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998). For nuns' own perceptions of the significance of their shaved heads, see Paula Arai's ethnographic study, *Women Living Zen: Japanese Soto Buddhist Nuns* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 141-42.

6. Han Sung-w6n, *Aje Aje Para Aje*, 3 vols. (Seoul: Koryowon, 1997), Cover. All subsequent citations refer to this edition and will appear in the text parenthetically.

7. Diana Paul points out that nuns and prostitutes are sometimes associated with each other because both perform "roles dissociated from family life." *Women in Buddhism: Images of the Feminine in Mahayana Tradition*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 79.

8. Paul, op. cit., p. 60

9. Elizabeth Harris, "The Female in Buddhism" in *Buddhist Women Across Cultures: Realizations*, ed. Karma Lekshe Tzomo (New York: SUNY Press, 1999), pp. 53-54.

10. In *Aje Aje Para Aje*, Han consistently uses the metaphors of a diamond and a lotus flower to indicate the male and female genitals, respectively.

11. This passage is originally from the *Samyutta Nikaya*.

12. This perception is also widespread in Japan. See Arai's aforementioned book. Robert Buswell points out the popularity of a similar perspective on monks in Korea in *The Zen Monastic Experience: Buddhist Practice in Contemporary Korea*

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 76.

13. Nam Chi-sim, *Udambara*, 4 vols. (Seoul: Purunsup, 2001), Vol. 2, p. 210. All subsequent citations refer to this edition and will appear in the text parenthetically.

14. Paul, *op. cit.*, p. 63. With regard to the symbolic meaning of Lady Maya's death seven days after her delivery of Sakyamuni Buddha, Paul explains that it is a way of preventing her from having sexual intercourse and thereby protecting her holiness. Paul also adds that although the ideal Buddhist mother does not have to be a virgin, she should be the "paragon of virtue and chastity" (p. 63). Paul's interpretation sheds an insightful light on Ch'aeryon's death soon after giving birth to Yung. She practiced sexual abstinence throughout her marriage, although it was forced by her husband Taeso, who dreaded a fortuneteller's prophecy on birth defects in his family line. Nam portrays Ch'aeryon as an ideal woman who charms and inspires Tamsi (Paekchok's former name) emotionally and intellectually as well as spiritually. Nam describes their relationship explicitly in terms of the legendary union between Wonhyo and Princess Yosok. Yung is, therefore, equivalent to Solchong, the prominent Silla scholar and the alleged son of Wonhyo and Yosok.

15. Christmas Humphreys, *A Popular Dictionary of Buddhism*, 2nd. ed. (London: Curzon Press, 1976), s.v. "parivarta."

16. *Minjung* Buddhism is a good example which shows the participatory attitudes of younger generations of monks and nuns toward socio-political issues.

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