

# **The North Korean War Plan and the Opening Phase of the Korean War**

## **A Documentary Study**

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### **Introduction**

No war in modern history is so obscure about its beginning as the Korean War. From the very first day of the war, both the North Korean and the South Korean governments accused the opponent of being guilty of an invasion. In the early morning of June 25, 1950, the North Korean government charged that the South Korean Army had made a surprise attack into its territory by 1-2 km across the 38th parallel at four points, the west of Haeju (Ongjin), the direction of Kumchon (Kaesong), the direction of Chorwon (Yonchon and Pochon), and Yangyang, and announced a counterattack to repulse the attack.<sup>1</sup> The South Korean government announced on that day that the North Korean Army had invaded all along the 38th parallel at dawn. Based on the South Korean Army's reports, Ambassador Muccio reported to the U. S. government that the North Korean Army invaded the South by bombarding Ongjin around 4 o'clock in the morning and began to cross the 38th parallel at Ongjin, Kaesung, Chunchon, and the East Coast. In the United Nations, the U. S. government condemned the North Korean government for unlawfully invading South Korea and made a move to admonish North Korea to take back its army.

Since then, the issue of discerning who was responsible for the calamitous internecine war has been a focal point among many scholars. In the West, it has been generally accepted that the North Korean government initiated the war and was to blame for that matter. But scholars like Gupta and Cumings suspected that the South Korean

Army might have provoked the North Korean Army in the Ongjin peninsula. President Rhee Syngman, Gen. Kim Paekil, Kim Sukwon and Col. Paek Inyup were put under suspicion by Cumings as persons who probably had ordered an attack on the Ongjin peninsula after Cumings had scrutinized various documents and interviews on the situation in Ongjin in particular and in other places along the 38th parallel on the eve of the war.<sup>2</sup> The North Korean government ever since has maintained the version of the beginning of the war that it provided to the public 51 years ago.<sup>3</sup>

With former Soviet archival documents on the Korean War released in the middle of the 1990s, it became widely known that Stalin, Kim II Sung, and Mao were deeply involved in the scheme of unifying Korea by the North Korean military force in the spring of 1950. At meetings in Moscow in April 1950, a final agreement on the war issue was made between Stalin and Kim. Mao gave consent to Kim's war plan in Peking in May 1950. Through secret telegrams between Moscow and Pyongyang, Stalin and Kim had discussed and adjusted the war plan in detail and prepared for the war up to the beginning of the war.<sup>4</sup>

Being short of documentary materials concerning the outbreak of the war, however, on lower levels rather than on the top political one, we do not know what actually happened on both sides of the parallel for several days up to the outbreak of the war. What was the North Korean operation plan if the North attacked first? Was there any provocation from the South while the North Korean Army was getting fully ready for a counterattack as Cumings inferred?<sup>5</sup> Was the North Korean military action on June 25, 1950, really begun as a counterattack as the North Korean government proclaimed? Now one may have some plausible explanations to deny the last two questions, but with only a little concrete evidence which one can hardly doubt. We have never examined the outbreak of the war all along the 38th parallel in a systematic way with sufficient undeniable evidence.

Owing to this circumstance, some scholars are not certain how events actually developed on the parallel line in the early morning of June 25, 1950, and the following several days. Even after the opening of former Soviet archives, William Stueck had a reserved view on the issue of who started the war.<sup>6</sup> A scholar in Korea formulated a hypothesis that the North Korean government did not have further intention of occupying the whole territory of South Korea except Seoul, and instead it planned to have a negotiated peace with moderate South Korean politicians excluding Syngman Rhee and his followers.<sup>7</sup> Others are suspicious that Rhee's government and the United States government must have known the North Korean move and even the exact timing of its attack on the South before the war but allowed the

North to invade purposefully.<sup>8</sup> The influence of skepticism on "the traditional version of the war's beginning" and the explanatory power of plausible evidences in Cumings' second mosaic are still alive, although Cumings toned down his original inference after Soviet materials on the Korean War poured out.

The purpose of this paper is to conduct factual research on the North Korean Army's actions on the eve and at the beginning of the war. The focus will be on the northern side of the 38th parallel, about which we do have many unclear points. Questions to answer are: first, what was the North Korean Army's operational plan for the war, and what relations did it have with discussion of a war plan between Stalin and Kim II Sung in April 1950 in Moscow? Second, how did things actually develop on the 38th parallel on the first day of the war? Third, why could not (or did not) the North Korean Army advance across the Han River after occupying Seoul for three days? Was it because North Korean leaders were planning to stay there, expecting the South Korean people to make mass uprisings as Park Hon Yong assured his colleagues before the war, or was it because there were other factors that hindered the North Korean Army from continuing the advance?

In conducting research on these questions, fortunately I could obtain several important but hitherto unknown sources. The first is a report of Gen. Razuvaev, the Soviet ambassador and chief of the military advisory corps to the North Korean government after January 1951, to Gen. Shtemenko, who was then the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces.<sup>9</sup> This report contains the military plans upon which the North Korean People's Army launched assaults in June 1950, as well as a narrative account of the conduct of operations from the beginning of the war to the end of May 1951. The latter is a file of daily situation reports of the Soviet General Staff on the Korean War, which had been maintained by the Far Eastern Bureau from the beginning of the war to the end of 1951.<sup>10</sup> The value of these sources is enormous. We can look into the North Korean Army's real situation and the progress of the war from the viewpoint of the North. Above all, these are the first sources known to us that describe in an unstudied manner the North Korean Army's actual conduct of the war.

In addition, I could use a group of captured North Korean documents that were investigated and partially introduced in Korea by Prof. Sun Joo Pang but not yet fully used in doing research on the North Korean Army's actions at the outbreak of the war.<sup>11</sup> These materials often provide us with real views and experiences of North Korean officers and soldiers and untainted records on actual deeds of North Korean units.

## **The North Korean War Plan for Invasion of South Korea in June 1950**

Now it is widely known that the overall North Korean War Plan was discussed and agreed upon first between Stalin and Kim II Sung in Moscow in April 1950. What attracts our attention in conversations in the Moscow meeting is that the overall strategy of the war was not Kim's but Stalin's, although Kim was eager for the war. According to summarized proceedings of the conversations among Stalin, Kim II Sung and Park Hon Young on the issue of war, it is clear that Stalin suggested a war plan and Kim accepted it. Stalin advised Kim that it was important to make a thorough preparation for war and to form elite attack divisions as well as to create additional units. He promised that Kim's request of any material support for equipping weapons and mechanized means of movement and combat would be fully satisfied.<sup>12</sup>

Stalin then proposed a three-stage war plan, which was vicious as well as cunning. The three stages were:

1. Troops are concentrated in the designated areas, close to the 38th parallel.
2. The highest bodies of power in North Korea make fresh proposals for peaceful unification. They'll be certainly rejected by the other side.
3. Then, after they are rejected, a counterattack must take place.

Stalin continued, "I agree with your idea to engage the adversary in the Ongjin peninsula as it will help to disguise who initiated the combat activities. After you attack and the South counterattacks it would give you a chance to enlarge the front."<sup>13</sup>

As we shall see later, the contour of the North Korean War Plan was set here in Moscow in April. Stalin's war plan would be carried out faithfully by Kim II Sung, who considered it almost as a bible. In addition, it is important to keep in mind Stalin's view on provoking an attack on the Ongjin peninsula and his using the term "counterattack" when we interpret North Korean operational plans that would be prepared by Soviet advisers, as well as the North Korean description of actual fighting that occurred on the front on June 25, 1950.

No less important is Stalin's advice to Kim II Sung on waging a war. Stalin told Kim, "The War should be quick and speedy, Southerners and Americans should not have time to come to their senses. They won't have time to put up a strong resistance and to mobilize international support."<sup>14</sup> It was a lesson he learned from plentiful experiences during the Second World War. With no experience in any large-scale war except for some guerrilla operations, and being buoyed by the hope of unifying Korea by his move, Kim

expressed to Stalin his optimistic evaluation that there was least probability of American intervention in the war and his assurance that he would achieve victory within three days after launching the war. Kim expected that the victory would be quick, all of the Korean people would enthusiastically support him, and Americans would not have time to intervene. Park Hon Yong intervened in the conversation to elaborate on Kim's evaluation, saying "200,000 party members will participate as leaders of the mass uprising." Stalin, however, did not have such an optimistic evaluation of the improbability of U. S. intervention and was astute enough to prepare a worst-case scenario. He gave Kim II Sung his consent to the war on the condition that Mao agreed to the plan and Soviet troops would not participate directly in the war in any situation.<sup>15</sup>

Returning to North Korea at the end of April, Kim II Sung hurried preparation for the war following Stalin's advice exactly. He visited Mao in Peking with Park Hon Yong on May 13 and received Mao's consent to his war plan. Before leaving for Peking, Kim II Sung ordered Kang Kon to draw an operation plan for the war. The North Korean Army relocated and renamed the newly arrived Chinese Independent 15th Division composed of Koreans to the 12th Infantry Division of the Korean People's Army and finished the training of recruits who were earmarked for three new divisions to be created in early June. The 10th, 13th and 15th Divisions were created out of these soldiers just before the war.

The North Korean government and organs affiliated with it presented peace proposals thrice on June 7, 11, and 16 in order to conceal relocation of attack divisions near the 38th parallel in June and to give South Koreans false hope for a peaceful unification. While Syngman Rhee and his government suspected the North peace proposals and dubbed them as mere propaganda, the North succeeded in relocating units in war footing 10-15 km north of the 38th parallel between June 12 and June 23, disguising the movement of units to their soldiers as a grand field maneuver.<sup>16</sup>

As for the process of drawing the invasion operation plan, former North Korean General Sung-Chol Yu made testimony, which appears as genuine in the general context but dubious in some particular points. According to Yu, a chosen group of North Korean generals and high-ranking officers who were mostly Soviet-born Koreans drew up an operation plan under the direction of the Chief of General Staff, Kang Kon. However, Soviet advisers took the responsibility of making a new plan in Russian, saying that the North Korean plan was too simplistic. The plan was composed of four components: combat orders, movement plans of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, supply plans, and plans

disguising the various units' preparation for war as military exercises. These were translated into Korean. Yu recalled that the title of the plan was "Preemptive Strike Plan." He said that the invasion plan ended with the occupation of Seoul, and there was no other plan to occupy the rest of South Korea. According to him, occupation of Seoul meant the end of war among the North Korean leaders and generals, for they expected that there would be extensive general uprisings once the army entered Seoul.<sup>17</sup>

Authenticity of some features in Yu's testimony is now partly corroborated by some captured North Korean documents. Soviet military advisers did draw the operation plan up to the level of division combat orders under the supervision of the chief Soviet adviser General Postnikov.<sup>18</sup> The well-known combat order No. 1 of the North Korean 4th Division, which was translated into Korean, dated June 22 and captured near Taejon in July 1950, must have been drawn by Russians. Now we can verify the captured documents, a set of reconnaissance directives distributed to the 3rd Border Security Brigade, the 6th, 1st, 4th, 3rd, 2nd, 12th Divisions and the 12th Motorcycle Regiment, which was written in Russian and, because of the fact, suspected by Cumings in its authenticity as genuine.<sup>19</sup> There is no reason to doubt authenticity of the reconnaissance directive issued on June 20 in Russian in which the Information Chief of the North Korean General Staff set missions for reconnaissance troops to fulfill in each stage of the operation plan. The stages in the operation plan described in the document were three, and the content was almost identical with the three-stage operation plan that will be discussed later. Existence of plans disguising the preparation for war in forward units as a training exercise in Yu's testimony can be verified by an order in a set of captured orders of the North Korean 2nd Division. The order was issued on June 19 and it directed units to carry out an exercise program that would last from June 20 to June 30.<sup>20</sup>

The fact that the overall operation plan of the North Korean Army for invasion of South Korea at first was a three-stage one was discovered in a form of operation map and made public by Prof. Korotkov in 1992.<sup>21</sup> and now can be corroborated by an archival document. Bajanov and Bajanova recently made public the contents of the plan after discovering it in a Russian archive. This plan in a finished form was presented to and signed by Kim Il Sung on June 15, 1950. It was reported by Shtykov to Stalin on the following day and received his consent. According to Shtykov's telegram to Stalin on June 16, the timing of the attack was set as the early morning of June 25, 1950, and the stages of the plan were as follows:

The First Stage: formations and units of the KPA start at the Ongjin

peninsula like a local operation and then deliver the main strike along the western coast of Korea to the South.

The Second Stage: Seoul must be taken and the Han River put under control. At the same time, on the eastern front, North Korean troops will liberate the cities of Chunchon and Kangneung. As a result, the main forces of the South Korean Army have to be encircled around Seoul and eliminated.

The Third Stage: the final one, will be devoted to the liberation of the rest of Korea by destroying the remaining enemy forces and seizing major population centers and ports.<sup>22</sup>

As shown in the quotation, the plan set the Ongjin operation as the first stage. The most important and main stage was the second one, in which encirclement of the South Korean main force as well as occupation of Seoul and other cities would be accomplished. It is notable that the plan contained the third stage, which is contrary to Yu's testimony.

However, this operation plan underwent a revision at the last moment before the outbreak of the war. It was because Kim II Sung wanted to change the plan on June 20 when he received reports that the South Korean troops in Ongjin seemed to perceive a threat from the North and made a reinforcement by putting more troops in positions. He suggested to Stalin through Shtykov that it seemed better to launch all-out attacks on the whole front along the 38th parallel rather than to attack Ongjin first. Finding Kim's idea sound, Stalin gave consent to the idea of revising the original plan on June 21,<sup>23</sup>

Although the Soviet archival documents released so far do not contain detailed contents of the final plan, the Razuvaev report contains a four-stage operation plan for the war. It does not tell us exactly when the plan was redrawn; it must have been the final plan revised as a result of the above-mentioned agreement between Stalin and Kim II Sung on June 21. It is worth quoting in length.

### **Planning of the Counterattack of the Korean Peoples' Army**

After the South Korean Army's attack on the territory of North Korea, the Headquarters of the Korean Peoples' Army made, based on the governmental directive of DPRK, following decision. "As our Army is always prepared for a counterattack we begin actions from the present state of deployment." For this, an operational plan was established, which ordered units of the Korean Peoples' Army to switch simultaneously to a counterattack all along the 38th parallel.

Considering characteristics of the relief of the terrain and relative importance of operational fronts, the main attack was planned on the

Yesung River Area, Siniuri[i.e. Pochon]-Uijongbu road, toward the general direction of Syananri (?) - Seoul - Suwon - Ansung.

The depth of the operation is 350 km.

Operation for the liberation of South Korea is divided into following four stages.

The First Stage: The army is to destroy the main force of the enemy in the northern and the southern area not far from of the 38th parallel; to occupy Seoul and advance to the line of Suwon - Wonju; at the same time, to liberate the Yonan and the Ongjin peninsulas from the enemy in the west of River Yesung, and to occupy Samchok on the east coast. This stage lasts five days and the operational depth is 90 km.

The Second Stage: The army is to destroy enemy reserve troops that will be put from the rear, and the main attacking force of the army is to advance to the line of Chonan - Chechon. It lasts four days and the operational depth is 40-90 km.

The Third Stage: The army is to make a pursuit after retreating enemy and to advance to the line of Taejon - Sunsan. The operational depth is 90 km and it lasts 10 days.

The Fourth Stage: While continuing pursuit of the enemy, the army is to destroy remaining resistance centers and the main attacking force of the army is to advance to the line of Imsil - Kochang - Waegwan - Pohangdong. At the same time, Units maneuvering along the western coast are to advance toward the northwestern area of Pusan, to cut retreating routes of remaining units of the South Korean Army and to destroy them completely. The operational depth is 40-80 km.<sup>24</sup>

As shown in the quotation, the idea of initial attack on the Ongjin peninsula in the previous plan was incorporated as a part into the first stage of the newly revised plan, i.e. simultaneous attacks all along the 38th parallel. What attracts our attention is the time assigned to accomplish each stage. Although the time needed to finish the last, the fourth stage, was not specified in the plan, it can be presumed that it was 8-13 days since we have another Soviet document which informs us that the plan envisaged the North Korean Army to need 22-27 days to occupy the whole territory of South Korea.<sup>25</sup> The Razuvaev report also contains detailed missions and operation plans for frontline divisions and brigades. Summaries of the operation plans were presented in detail up to the regimental level in the report, which we will discuss briefly in following pages.

One point that attracts our attention in the Razuvaev report is that it described the title of the plan as well as the war's beginning as a "counterattack" to a South Korean initial attack. It is interesting to note that the Razuvaev report said that the North Korean Army had a



prepared operational plan, but at the same time it was still called "counterattack" in the internal report. It was probably intended to deceive future readers who were not well versed in the discussion of the war plan amongst top level leaders. Or it was written so to allude that there were South Korean attacks before the North Korean Army launched the planned "counterattack." Be that as it may, the North Korean government announced clearly on the morning of June 25, "On the early daybreak of today, the so called Defence Army units of the South Korean puppet regime began sudden attacks into the north of the 38th parallel all along the 38th parallel...,"<sup>26</sup> The term "counterattack" was only a forgery to conceal the real nature of the invasion in light of the fact that it was already discussed between Stalin and Kim II Sung in April 1950. The cause of the war presented in the Razuvaev report is not compatible with what the North Korean government explained on June 25, 1950.

### **The Outbreak of the Korean War**

#### *Ongjin*

Early on the morning of June 25, 1950, on the far west side of the 38th parallel, roaring sounds of gunfire signaled the start of the Korean War. For more than 50 years, there has been a continuous debate on who started the war in Ongjin. For a time, although Gupta, Cumings and others have insisted that the South Korean 17th Regiment in Ongjin must have started an attack, their inference was no more than a hypothesis based on some dubious testimonies and circumstantial facts without concrete evidence. But now in addition to the discussion between Stalin and Kim II Sung in Moscow in April 1950, there are plentiful direct and indirect evidences that the North Koreans provoked the war in the area.

As we have seen above, the plan for an attack on the Ongjin peninsula was contemplated in the North Korean Army well before June 25. Although the idea of preliminary attack in Ongjin was discarded in a revised operation plan on June 21, the attack in the front started at 4 o'clock on June 25, about 40 minutes earlier than those in other fronts. The daily operational journal of the Soviet General Staff on the Korean War, mentioning Ongjin, Kaesung, Syniuri, Chunchun and Kangneung as places where battles occurred, recorded "The North Korean Army's assault was switched to counterattack at 4:40 after preparatory artillery fire for 20 to 40 minutes, and other units and divisions advanced 3 to 5 km during the first 3 hours after the start of the war."<sup>27</sup> Although the report mentions "counterattack," we have evidence that it could not be considered as such.

The North Korean attack on that day was meticulously planned

beforehand. In the Razuvaev report, we can find a detailed operation plan on the Ongjin peninsula: 7 battalions of the 3rd Border Security Brigade and the 1st Regiment of the North Korean 6th Division had concrete missions and directions of attack. The plan demanded these units to occupy the peninsula within two days.<sup>28</sup> A captured North Korean document clearly shows that the plan was drawn well ahead of time. The title of the document was "Reconnaissance Directive No. 8," and it was issued on June 21 by the 3rd Brigade in Jukchon. It gave each battalion concrete reconnaissance missions to be accomplished in each projected stage of the attack. For this, it presented in the form of a table directions of attack for seven battalions of the 3rd Brigade, a police battalion and the 1st Regiment.<sup>29</sup> If we compare this with the Ongjin operation plan in the Razuvaev report, one cannot but recognize that both contain the identical operational concept. Thus there is no doubt that the North Korean units north of the 38th parallel on the Ongjin peninsula already had an established operation plan at least four days ahead of the war and prepared for it. Another captured North Korean document has a title "Rear Order No. 1," and it was issued on June 24 by the Rear Section commander of the 1st Regiment, Han Tae-Sook. It instructed units how to collect "war trophies" and provided them with a form to record captured items.<sup>30</sup> Units had been preparing the battle, which was to occur according to the above-mentioned plan.

Even after mentioning the established operation plan, the Razuvaev report described the initial battle on the Ongjin peninsula as if the North Korean troops switched to a counterattack responding to a South Korean attack. It reads "On June 25, units of the 3rd Border Security Brigade in the Ongjin peninsula stopped enemy attacks on the north of the 38th parallel by previously organized fires and, after executing preparatory artillery fires for 30 minutes, began to attack the enemy which had switched to defense. The Brigade advanced 2-2.5 km on the axis of the main attack at around 6 o'clock."<sup>31</sup> However, it is unbelievable that the South Korean units in the Ongjin peninsula began to attack to meet exactly the timing of the early morning of June 25 that Kim Il Sung set as D day H hour of the war already on June 15.

The official formula, "the South Korean attack and the North Korean counterattack," was well abided by war reporters. I identified four articles dealing with stories of initial engagements on the Ongjin peninsula in North Korean newspapers issued in July and August 1950 and found that the articles written by war reporters all followed the formula when they described the start of the war in Ongjin. At the beginning of those articles, reporters all condemned briefly the vicious nature of Rhee's regime and the South Korean attack on the North on

that morning. However, contents of the battle stories in the articles were all contrary to the formula. North Korean soldiers infiltrated in darkness into areas behind South Korean positions, trying not to be detected by the South Korean soldiers. They succeeded in this and accomplished missions like lifting mines and laying communication cables. After accomplishing their secret missions, they heard that their artillery opened fire and their infantry comrades began to attack and smashed the South Korean positions without meeting any serious obstacles. In the articles we do not have any inkling of when the North Korean soldiers encountered the advancing South Korean soldiers, where they fired against them to stop the attack, or how the southerners retreated then. If South Korean units attacked first, it must have been impossible for the war reporters to miss such stories in their accounts. North Korean war reporters followed the official formula but they could not describe what North Korean soldiers had not seen and therefore had had nothing to tell them about.<sup>32</sup>

There is no doubt that the attack was launched by the North Korean units following the well-prepared plan on the Ongjin peninsula. Achieving superiority in numbers of soldiers by three times, as well as in artillery firepower, the North Korean troops on the Ongjin peninsula could occupy Ongjin city by 8 o'clock p.m. on the first day of the war and swept the whole area on June 26.<sup>33</sup> The officers and soldiers of the South Korean 17th Regiment could not stand the assault and evacuated themselves to Inchon and Kunsan using requisitioned civilian boats and a Navy LST.

#### ***Kaesong***

In Kaesong, which the North Korean government referred to as one of the points the South Korean Army attacked across the 38th parallel in early morning of June 25, the first attack began somewhat later than on the Ongjin peninsula. In this area, the North Korean units that launched attacks were the 13th and the 15th Regiments of the 6th Division. According to the Razuvaev report, these units were given mission "to be prepared for battle, to stop the enemy attack directed toward Kumchon and smash the enemy main force on the 38th parallel, and then to switch to a counterattack according to a special order."<sup>34</sup> According to the report, the 13th Regiment was to occupy Kaesung, to reach the southern end of the Kaepung peninsula on the first day, and to land on the Kimpo peninsula on the early morning of the second day in order to attack Yongdongpo. The 15th Regiment was to advance toward Kangwha, and an element of the division was given mission to take Inchon.

There are an ample number of captured North Korean documents that show concrete actions after the movement of the two regiments from Sariwon to Jaeryong to assembling points, 8 km north of Kaesong between June 13 and June 18. After arriving at Bingodong just north of Kaesung, the commander of the 13th Regiment gave an oral order at 18:35 on June 23, which is the only known North Korean combat order at the regimental level. The mission of the 13th Regiment was to capture Kaesong and to advance southward to force a river-crossing operation on the Han River. It mentions that the preparation for attack should be finished by 24:00 on June 23.<sup>35</sup> The contents of the order written down in an officer's notebook can be checked against the mission given to the regiment in the operation plan of the North Korean 6th Division in the Razuvaev report. Both coincide with each other in contents except in detail.<sup>36</sup>

Although the Razuvaev report mentioned "counterattack" in describing the initial battles of the North Korean units in Kaesong, a captured memo of a North Korean officer serving in a battalion of the 13th Regiment shows a vividly real situation of units from the eve up to the outbreak of the war. His unit arrived at Bingodong just north of Kaesung at 21:30, June 24, and began to prepare for the attack. Soldiers were distributed rations for the next day's breakfast beforehand at 24:00. During the night, his battalion commander returned to the unit after having had confirmed with the regimental commander the timing of the attack set by the order, according to which the artillery was to start bombardment at 4:40 and the infantry to launch the assault at 5:00. The timetable was as follows: to occupy starting positions at 2:30 of June 25, to begin the attack at 4:40 and to begin assault at 5:00. Upon receiving orders, company commanders led their men to starting positions and had the latter concealed. It was raining and soldiers underwent many hardships. However, when the time for action arrived, the expected artillery fire did not begin. In reality, the artillery bombardment was postponed by the higher command, as the latter considered that the effect of gunfire would be not so good because of mist. At 5:15, the artillery opened fire and the infantry sprang into attack at 5:25. His unit rushed into the enemy positions and easily occupied them.<sup>37</sup> In this fairly detailed account of battle scenes, we do not find any hint that his unit encountered advancing South Korean soldiers whatsoever.

Another captured notebook of an officer serving in the 13th Regiment illustrates the fact that North Koreans in this sector did prepare the attack very carefully. It records the following scribbles:

**On June 16: assembly of the unit.**

On June 18: investigation of the depth of the Han River between Inchon and Seoul

On June 23: high-ranking advisors gave following instructions

Operation for Unification

Signals and [need of] uniformity in using them

Need to continue advance under any circumstances

On June 25: at 4:40 a.m. preparation for the artillery bombardment; at 5:25 began attack; at 6:40 assaulted on Kaesung.<sup>38</sup>

Having received sudden blows accompanied with tank fire from the North, the 12th Regiment of the South Korean 1st Division lost Kaesung within two hours after the war began. The regiment, which was filled with only one half of its personnel because of overnight parlor given to soldiers on the previous day, could not sustain the assault and dispersed quickly. The North Korean Regiments quickly drove South Korean soldiers out of the Yonan peninsula on the first day, and reached the southern end of the peninsula and prepared tomorrow's landing. On the morning of June 26, an advance party of the 13th Regiment, the North Korean 6th Division, could cross the Han River using civilian boats. However, advance of the landed party toward Kimpo airfield was delayed because the North Korean 6th Division failed to make sufficient artillery pieces and tanks cross the Han River until June 28 owing to strafing and bombing of American fighters actively participating in the war from June 27 and hard fighting by a growing number of South Korean soldiers in the area.<sup>39</sup>

*Seoul Area: Yonchon and Pochon*

Seoul was the main objective of the North Korean operation plan. The plan assigned four infantry divisions and one tank brigade to this area. The North Korean 1st Division with a tank regiment attached was to break the 38th parallel first and then cross the Imjin River to approach Seoul from the direction of northwest. Since the division was to cross the Imjin River and to take an important part in occupying Seoul, the only pontoon battalion the army had was assigned to this division. The 4th Division was to advance from Yonchon through Tongduchon to Uijongbu and the 3rd Division from Yongpyong through Pochon to Uijongbu with two regiments of the 105th Tank Brigade attached to these two divisions. These divisions were given mission to attack Seoul on the second day of the war. The 13th Division kept in reserve in Tosong was to follow them.<sup>40</sup>

As for North Korean activities in this area, a number of captured documents have long been examined and scrutinized by historians. A reconnaissance order issued to the North Korean 4th Division on June 18, 1950, and the Combat Order No. 1 issued by the commander of the

division on June 22, 1950, have long been considered as apparent evidences of the preplanned attack of the North Korean Army on the South. However, Cumings, who had tried to find the original documents written in Korean but found that they were not kept in the National Archives, suspected the authenticity of the documents. Since he doubted the fact that Russians were involved in the planning of the war, the existence of captured Russian materials embarrassed him and he suspected the authenticity of photostatic copies of the Russian original.<sup>41</sup> Now with the Razuvaev report in hand as well as with the knowledge that Russian advisers gave a hand in drawing the divisional operation orders, there is no ground to doubt the authenticity of those captured documents.

Apart from the operation documents on the division level already known, a number of captured documents of lesser units in the North Korean 3rd and 4th Division illustrate that North Korean troops carried out preparation for the war carefully in this area. Captured documents of the artillery regiment of the 4th Division, as well as those of a battalion under the regiment, show that units of the 4th Division Artillery Regiment carried out a reconnaissance mission, planning artillery fire systematically. The artillery regiment produced on June 22 and 23 "Fire Plan," "Reconnaissance Directive No. 1," "Reconnaissance Map," "Maneuver Plan of Units," and other documents. Some of the documents were signed by the commander, Ro Shuk Sung, of the 16th Regiment, to which the 3rd Battalion of the artillery regiment was attached.<sup>42</sup> A political officer of a self-propelled gun battalion of the North Korean 3rd Division made a report on the political mood and high morale of soldiers expecting "Unification War" on June 21. Soldiers were informed by political officers of the South Korean government's objection to the North Korean proposal of peaceful unification as a means of encouraging soldiers' hostility toward the South.<sup>43</sup>

Some captured North Korean documents record detailed actions of units in this area on the eve and on the morning of June 25. The 1st Battalion of the 4th North Korean Division Artillery Regiment began to write a [Daily] War Diary, which had been written up to the date of August 15.<sup>44</sup> On activities of the unit on June 24, the record is written, "All preparations for battle have been completed by 24:00." In the diary entry of June 25, the writer wrote, "Received the order to begin attack at 4:40 of the 25th from the regimental artillery commander." This diary on the same date recorded that the artillery opened fire at 4:40 and the infantry troops [of the 18th Regiment of the 4th Division that it supported] began to attack at 4:50 under the support of the artillery fire and successfully crossed the [Hantan] river and took the

first and the second lines of enemy positions.<sup>45</sup>

In the battle reports three battalion commanders of the 7th Regiment of 3rd North Korean Division reported to their regimental commander on June 29, 1950, it is shown most vividly how the North Korean soldiers on the 38th parallel acted on the very morning of June 25. These units were to attack on the Chorwon-Seoul main road. Soldiers moved into starting positions just north of the 38th parallel on the night of June 24/25 and awaited a signal to attack in the rainy weather. The 1st Battalion occupied the starting positions at 2 o'clock, June 25, awaited an order for attack, and sprang out of trenches to attack at 5 o'clock following the regimental commander's sign of go. The 2nd Battalion departed the assembly area at 8 o'clock on June 24 and arrived in starting positions at 3:30 on June 25. It began to attack 20 minutes later than the artillery, which began to fire at 4:40. The commander of the 3rd Battalion reported that his companies occupied starting positions at 3:30 and began attack at 5 o'clock.<sup>46</sup> Although the battle reports describe fairly minute events in the morning, one cannot find any statement of South Korean soldiers' advance to the north before the beginning of the North Korean artillery's bombardment at 4:40. A commander in charge of the most advanced North Korean tank company in this sector wrote his experience in a military journal issued in August 1950. The tank company began to advance at 7:15 and arrived at Pochon around noon.<sup>47</sup>

It is obvious that the North Korean units attacked the South Korean Army first in this area as well. The attack in the direction of Seoul began at 4:40, 40 minutes later than that on the Ongjin peninsula. There is no need to repeat the process of the battle for Seoul in detail, about which many books have been written. The South Korean 7th Division was caught by surprise and retreated in dismay on that morning. Although it recovered from the initial disorder in the afternoon of June 25 around Uijongbu and launched a counterattack with the help of a segment of the 5th Division on the next morning, it failed. Frequently, soldiers with no effective weapon to destroy North Korean tanks began to retreat upon seeing the appearance of the T-34 tanks. However, some units put up with the attack heroically, trying suicidal attack on the tanks by using a bunch of explosives usually made of grenades and an 81mm mortar shell. The North Korean 3rd and 4th Divisions supported by tank units could enter Seoul in the early morning of June 28. Accomplishment of the mission to occupy Seoul by these two divisions was delayed by two days against the operational plan. Still, the 1st North Korean Division could not enter Seoul on June 28, encountering the stiff resistance of the 1st South Korean Division around Munsan and Bongilchon.

The performance of the two North Korean divisions in this area was highly praised by the North Korean government for capturing Seoul, and the occupation of Seoul within four days was indeed an achievement for the recently created army. However, the Soviet advisers were somewhat critical of the army's performance, especially of the leadership of high-ranking generals and officers. They lacked initiative and boldness to achieve more than those objectives assigned in the operation plan. Especially, the Soviet advisers accused North Korean commanders of neglecting the importance of speed and successive pressure on the enemy in the offensive. The commanders in the 105 Tank Brigade were criticized for losing time to capture a bridge on the Han River in advancing toward Seoul.<sup>48</sup>

#### *Chunchon and Hongchon*

Although Seoul was the most important objective for the North Korean Army, Soviet military advisers put great importance on operations of the 2nd and 12th Divisions and the 12th Motorcycle Regiment, which were to occupy Chunchon on June 25 and Hongchon on June 26 and then to advance quickly to the southwest direction to cut the rear of the main force of the South Korean Army in Suwon. The newly created 15th Division was to be kept in reserve in Kimhwa. It depended on successful operations of the 2nd and 12th Divisions whether the North Korean Army could succeed in encircling the main South Korean force around Seoul.<sup>49</sup>

The 2nd Division arrived in Hwachon north of the 38th parallel on June 17 and prepared the attack. According to a captured document of the 2nd Division, commanders and staff officers carried out a command reconnaissance on June 21.<sup>50</sup> The engineer units attached to the Division carried out the mission of lifting South Korean mines laid just south of the parallel from 7 o'clock p. m. June 24 to 4 o'clock a.m. June 25 in order to guarantee a smooth advance of the attacking 4th Regiment of the division toward Chunchon.<sup>51</sup>

The 12th Division, which was to advance to Hongchon, arrived in Inje (north of Hongchon) somewhat late for unknown reasons on June 23.<sup>52</sup> Although the division was composed of mostly battle-experienced Korean-Chinese soldiers, the late arrival of the division must have had a harmful effect on preparatory work for the impending operation.

On this front, the two divisions achieved a surprise to the enemy and advanced successfully on the morning of June 25, but they soon encountered a number of difficulties and could not continue the advance as expected. The problems for these divisions were mixed. Generally the high mountains and narrow roads running through stiff valleys in this area deprived the North Korean units of freedom of



action; the South Korean 6th Division was quite well prepared for battle by exploiting this advantage of the terrain. Especially, the South Korean 6th Division was keeping an eye on the front because it knew from reconnaissance activities that a significant number of North Korean troops and pieces of mechanized equipment were concentrated on the north of the 38th parallel, although it did not consider the concentration as a preparation for an all-out attack on the South and failed to predict exactly when the enemy would attack or whether they would really launch an attack or not.

Retarded advance of the two divisions was caused by the stereotyped method of maneuver as well. The North Korean 2nd Division repeated frontal attacks along the road from Hwachon to Chunchon with self-propelled guns on June 25 and 26. The 7th Regiment of the South Korean 6th Division made an ambush attack on the advance party of self-propelled guns and succeeded in destroying two guns on the afternoon of June 25. Having retreated from the setback and reorganized disheartened troops, the 2nd Division reopened frontal attacks repeatedly along the narrow road and nearby flat grounds north of Chunchon, but South Korean soldiers and artillerymen played havoc with the 4th and 17th Regiments of the North Korean 2nd Division and could defend Chunchon until noon June 28. The progress of operations of the North Korean 12th Division was retarded by the skillful delaying actions of the 2nd Regiment of the South Korean 6th Division using successive mountain ridges and making an ambush antitank attack on an S-curve in a defile north of Hongchon on June 28. The North Koreans lost six or eight tanks in the engagement by the South Korean storm troops attacking with Molotov cocktails. Frightened by the casualties, the 12th North Korean Division became cautious in advancing and could reach Hongchon only on the night of June 30. The two divisions eventually occupied Chunchon and Hongchon, but the possibility of encircling the South Korean main force diminished. Delay of operations in this sector disrupted the hope of the North Korean Army to cut early the rear of the enemy and destroy them, which was the bold scheme of Russian planners of the invasion.

#### *East Sea Coast*

Although the East Sea Coast was considered a secondary and isolated battle area in the North Korean operation plan, the operational planners sought a small-scale encirclement under the cover of the Navy. They put the 1st Border Security Brigade, the 5th Division, as troops for the frontal attack along Sokcho-Kangneung road and had infiltration troops composed of one guerrilla-type regiment (the 766 Unit) and two

marine battalions (the 945 Unit) supported by the Navy land on several points along the sea coast south of the 38th parallel in order to cut the rear of the South Korean 8th Division in Kangneung.<sup>53</sup>

As the plan demanded the North Korean Navy to ship the 766 Unit and the 945 Unit and to protect them in landing operations, the navy had torpedo boats and marine units in Wonsan base prepared for landing battle from the middle of June 1950. A captured file of "Morning Reports" of the Wonsan naval base is an interesting source to look into the navy's participation in the war. It seems that preparation for the war in the navy was ordered around June 13-14. From that date on, the nature of training in the Navy began to switch from base training to fire exercises on the sea. It must have been that the Navy received a combat order around June 20. The entry of "Morning Report" of June 21 said, "We made each unit prepare a battle following the order from above." On June 23, the "Morning Report" recorded, "[Torpedo boats] Nos. 21, 24, 25, 42, 43 are docked in the 7th dockyard and other fighting boats are all mobilized to the sea. The 945 Unit, the 588 Unit are fully prepared for a battle." The report on June 24 said, "One anti-tank gun platoon was assigned to the general mobilization." It was reported in the "Morning Report" on June 25, "[Torpedo boats Nos.] 11, 12, 13, 14, 21, 23, 31, 32, 33, 34 departed Sokcho and crossed the 38th parallel."<sup>54</sup>

On June 25, seven battalions of the 1st Border Security Brigade and the 10th Regiment of the North Korean 5th Division lunged across the 38th parallel at 5:40 under the artillery support of the 5th Division. The first wave of the landing troops, composed of two marine battalions and 1,000 partisan troops, landed on Aninjin south of Kangneung at 5 o'clock. The second wave, composed of 600 partisan troops (766 Unit), landed on Urchin south of Samchok.<sup>55</sup>

Although the South Korean 8th Division, composed of only two regiments, the 10th and the 21st, was divided in Kangneung and Samchok, the division commander could succeed in delaying the North Korean attack by consolidating the troops in Kangneung and then delivering a defense battle on the north of Kangneung until June 28. After entering Kangneung, the 5th North Korean Division, replacing the advancing 1st Brigade as the spearhead attacking troops, pursued the South Korean 8th Division retreating from Kangneung toward Wonju but failed to catch up with it. The North Korean troops in this sector could occupy Kangneung on June 28 and Samchok on July 3, but they failed to encircle and destroy the South Korean 8th Division, which was the expectation of operation planners.

## Conclusion

In studying the Korean War, clarification of the war's actual beginning is not sufficient but necessary work for a proper understanding of the political nature as well as the origins of the war. In this paper, I tried to show the interconnection between the North Korean plans and preparations for the war and the military actions on the front at the outbreak of the war. As a result, we find that there is no doubt that the North was well prepared for the war and they were the first to break the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950, following a systematic operation plan.

In the light of this study, Cumings' scrupulous endeavor to show the possibility that the South Korean Army provoked the first attack on the Ongjin peninsula turns out to be a groundless hypothesis. There might have been exchanges of fire between the North and the South in several days before the outbreak of war, but they cannot be considered as a cause of the war. Kim Il Sung knew far ahead in January 1950 that the South would not attack first, and he decided to choose a military solution from his side.<sup>56</sup> Stalin, with Kim Il Sung, concocted a provoking attack on the Ongjin peninsula to evoke a South Korean response and to make it a pretext for an all-out attack of the North Korean Army. It was the event at early dawn on June 25 that Kim Il Sung announced as a South Korean invasion. But it is clear now that the South Korean attack on that early morning of June 25, 1950, did not exist in reality except in propaganda of the North Korean government.

As for the North Korean Army's staying in Seoul for three days, the reason for it was not from a deliberate political consideration but mainly from military impediments.<sup>57</sup> We can concede that there prevailed euphoria among the North Korean leaders on June 28 and 29, 1950, and they stopped the military action in the Seoul area for a day. However, the euphoria did not last long. They tried to make the whole army cross the Han River from the evening of June 29, and a part of the infantry troops with light artillery pieces succeeded in crossing the river, but they failed to make tanks and heavy artillery troops cross the river until July 3. Causes for the failure are many: they hopelessly lacked river-crossing vessels and equipment; the 105 Tank Brigade advanced too slowly to capture a bridge on Han River in time; South Korean soldiers fought desperately, devoting their lives in order to repulse North Korean attempts to cross the Han River; the 2nd and 12th Divisions and the 12th Motorcycle Regiment could not approach Suwon early enough to cut or to threaten retreating South Korean units; and an early participation in the war of fighters of the U. S. Fifth Air Force in Japan caused serious damages on the North Korean units that had been trying to cross the river since June 27.<sup>58</sup> The casualties of the

North Korean Army between June 25 and July 5 were 7,396 with 1,593 men killed and 5,803 men wounded, which was no slight sacrifice.<sup>59</sup> The hypothesis that the North Korean leaders voluntarily stopped military action and were planning to make a negotiated peace with moderate South Korean politicians is simply against facts. The North Korean Army had a plan to occupy the whole area of South Korea. They continued fighting since the beginning of the war and resumed actions to cross the Han River in the Seoul area on June 29. In addition, there is no evidence that the North Korean leaders suggested a political proposal to discuss with South Korean politicians. In North Korean wartime newspapers, we only find the fact that the North Korean authority admonished South Korean politicians to give "voluntary surrender,"<sup>60</sup> rather than inviting them to a negotiation table or to a political meeting for peaceful unification of the country.

If there remains an agenda for studying the issue of the war's beginning, it would be whether Mac Arthur was aware of the timing of the North Korean invasion before the war. We need scrupulous documentary research on the issue. However, we have found so far, in a top secret G-3 report of the Far East Command, only the fact that the Korean problem had had a lower profile in comparison with the Formosa issue in MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo before the war, and it had no emergency operation plan except for a plan for evacuation of American diplomatic personnel and civilians in Korea to Japan in case of an all-out North Korean attack on South Korea.<sup>61</sup>

## Notes

1 *Rodong Sinmun*, June 26, 1950; ChosUn Central New Agency, *Chosun Central Yearbook 1951-1952* (in Korean) (Pyongyang, 1952), pp. 90-91.

2 Karunakar Gupta, "How did the Korean War Begin?" *The China Quarterly*, No. 52 (October-December 1972), pp. 699-716; Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Vol. II The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 568-576.

3 DPRK, *History, of the Just Fatherland Liberation War of the Korean People* (in Korean) (Pyongyang, 1959); DPRK, *History of the Fatherland Liberation War* (in Korean) Vol. 1 (Pyongyang, 1981), pp. 5-78.

4 Kathryn Weathersby, "New Findings on the Korean War," *Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project* 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 15-18; Kathryn Weathersby, "To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il-sung, and the Prelude to War," *Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project* 5 (Spring 1995); "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," *Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 36-39; Evgeniy P. Bajanov & Natalia Bajanova, "The Korean Conflict, 1950-1953: The Most Mysterious War of the 20th Century - Based on Secret

- Soviet Archives," (unpublished manuscript, 1997) pp. 36-42.
- 5 Cumings, op. cit., pp. 615-18.
- 6 William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 10.
- 7 Bok-Ryong Sin, "Origins of the Korean War - Focusing on Kim II Sung's Decision to Make the War," (in Korean) *Korean Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Autumn 1996), pp. 163-82. Another scholar seems to accept the plausibility of this view. See Sang-In Chun, "Social History of the Korean War," presented to the 4th International Conference of the Institute for Modern Korean Studies: Korea and the Korean War (The Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University, Oct. 6, 2000), p. 122.
- 8 It is a widely shared view of a group of scholars although they are not able to give concrete evidence. See Dong-Choon Kim, *War and Society* (in Korean)(Seoul: Tolbaegae, 2000), pp. 65-76.
- 9 V. N. Razuvaev, "Nachapniku General'nogo Shtaba SA Generalu Armii Tovarishchu Shtemenko S. M.: Deistviia voisk KNA; Deistviia artillerii KNA; Deistviia Bronetankovykh I Mekhnizirovannykh voisk KNA," Arkhiv TsAMO, Fond 16, Opis' 3139, Delo 128,11. 23-239.
- 10 General'nyi Shtab, Dal'nevostochnoe napravlenie [General Staff, Far Eastern Bureau], "Zhurnal boevykh deistvii v Koree (c 25 iunia 1950 g. po 31 dekvria 1951 g.)," Arkhiv TsAMO, Fond 16, Opis' 3139, Delo 133,11. 1-327.
- 11 National Archives [ will be abbreviated hereafter as NA ], RG 242 Captured Enemy Documents (North Korea); Sun-Joo Bang, "Introduction to Captured North Korean Documents, Part 1" [in Korean], *Asian Culture*, Vol. 1 (1986), pp. 41-156.
- 12 Bajanov & Bajanova, "The Korean Conflict, 1950-1953," p. 41.
- 13 Ibid., p. 42.
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 Telegram Shtykov to Zakharov, July 26, 1950, in Weathersby, "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," p. 39. For detailed information of the movement of the North Korean divisions during the period, see Razuvaev, "Nachal'niku General'nogo Shtaba SA Generalu Armii Tovarishchu Shtemenko S. M.: Deistviia voisk KNA", pp. 14-15.
- 17 Gen. Yu, Sung-Chol, "My Testimony," [in Korean] *Hanguk Ilbo*, November 9, 1990.
- 18 Telegram Shtykov to Zakharov, July 26, 1950, in Weathersby, "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," p. 39; Joo, Yong-Bok, *The Korean War That I Experienced* (in Korean) (Seoul: Koryowon, 1990), Vol. 1, pp. 237-40.
- 19 NA RG 242 Captured North Korean Documents (North Korea) ATIS, Doc. No. 200564. These documents, in a state of photostat, are kept in the archive. Cumings, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 589-590.
- 20 NA RG 242 Captured Enemy Documents (North Korea), ATIS Doc. No. 201103. "Order - On the Special Combat Training Program and Its Mission." (in Korean)
- 21 "N. K. preemptive strike plan in '50 made public in Russia," *Korea Herald*, April 30, 1992. The original title in the copy of the operation map was "Plan pervogo udara KNA"(Plan of the First Strike of the Korean Peoples' Army) but was wrongly translated as "preemptive strike plan" of the Korean Peoples' Army.
- 22 Bajanov & Bajanova, "The Korean Conflict, 1950-1953," pp. 58-59.
- 23 Ibid., pp. 59-60.
- 24 Razuvaev, op. cit., pp. 15-16.
- 25 Weathersby, "New Findings on the Korean War," p. 16.
- 26 The Chosun Central News Agency, *Chosun Central Yearbook 1951-1952* (Pyongyang, 1952), p. 90.

- 27 General'nyi Shtab, Dal'nevostochnoe napravlenie, "Zhurnal boevykh deistvii v Koree," p. 3.
- 28 Razuvaev, "Nachal'niku General'nogo Shtaba SA Generalu Armii Tovarishchu Shtemenko S. M.: Deistviia voisk KNA", pp. 18-20. Appleman misidentified the 1st Regiment as the 14th in his book and it should be corrected. See Roy Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (Washington, D. C, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961), p. 22.
- 29 NA RG 242 Captured Enemy Documents (North Korea), ATIS Doc. No. 200174. "Reconnaissance Directive No. 8." (in Korean)
- 30 NA RG 242 Captured Enemy Documents (North Korea), ATIS Doc. No. 200177 "Rear Order No. 1 - On Establishing an Organization for War Trophies Captured." (in Korean)
- 31 **Razuvaev**, op. cit., p. 20.
- 32 *Rodong Sinmun*, July 2, July 8, July 19, 1950; *Chosun Inminbo*, August 19, 1950. For a detailed discussion of these articles, see my "North Korean Operation Plans and the Opening Battle of the Korean War on the Ongjin Peninsula," [in Korean] *Military History*, Vol. 41. (December 2000), pp. 333-39.
- 33 Razuvaev, op. cit., pp. 18-22. It is notable that the report does not mention "occupation of Haeju by a South Korean unit," which Cummings believed had occurred.
- 34 **Ibid.**, p. 23.
- 35 Sun-Joo Bang, op. cit., pp. 65 and 95.
- 36 Razuvaev, op. cit., p. 22.
- 37 NA RG 242 Captured Enemy Documents (North Korea) ATIS Doc. No. 200492 [an officer's memo] [in Korean].
- 38 "Diary of an officer named Han Sin Ho," quoted from Sun-Joo Bang, op. cit., p. 76.
- 39 Razuvaev, op. cit., pp. 22-24.
- 40 **Ibid.**, pp. 26-28.
- 41 **Cummings**, op. cit., pp. 588-92.
- 42 NA RG 242 Captured Enemy Documents (North Korea) ATIS Doc. No. 200522 "A File on Combat Documents in a Artillery Battalion in Attack." (in Korean)
- 43 Sun-Joo Bang, op. cit., pp. 107-111.
- 44 NA RG 242 Captured Enemy Documents (North Korea) ATIS Doc. No. 200446 "War Diary"
- 45 *Ibid.*
- 46 NA RG 242 Captured Enemy Documents (North Korea) ATIS Doc. No. 200261 "Battle Report." (in Korean)
- 47 Kim, Jae-Bok, "On an Independent Tank Company As an Advance Guard," (in Korean) *Military Knowledge* (August 1950), pp. 19-20. NA RG 242 Captured Enemy Documents (North Korea), ATIS Doc. No. 200858.
- 48 Razuvaev, op. cit., p. 43.
- 49 *Ibid.*, pp. 15, 17, 28-29.
- 50 NA RG 242 Captured Enemy Documents (North Korea) ATIS Doc. No. 201103 "Preliminary Order." (in Korean)
- 51 Sun-Joo Bang, op. cit., pp. 61-62.
- 52 Razuvaev, op. cit., p. 15.
- 53 Razuvaev, op. cit., pp. 18,37. Roy Appleman misidentified the 1st Border Security Brigade, which attacked first, as a vanguard toward Kangneung on June 25 as the 5th Division. It must be corrected. The 10th Regiment of the 5th Division was to follow the 1st Brigade as a reserve. The name of the marine regiment that landed on the east coast was the 945 Unit, not the 549 Unit as Roy Appleman identified based on POW

interrogation results. It must be corrected as well. See General'nyi Shtab, Dal'nevostochnoe napravlenie, "Zhurnal boevykh deistvii v Koree," p. 1.

54 [The North Korean Wonsan Naval Base], "Morning Reports (May 1 to September 28, 1950)." (in Korean)

55 General'nyi Shtab, Dal'nevostochnoe napravlenie, "Zhurnal boevykh deistvii v Koree," pp. 3-4.

56 Bajanov & Bajanova, op. cit, p. 34.

57 For a good discussion on this issue, see Yong-Ho Kim, *The Origins and Development of the Korean War* [in Korean](Seoul: Doore Publishing Co., 1998), pp. 60-79.

58 Razuvaev, op. cit, pp. 18-41, passim.

59 General'nyi Shtab, Dal'nevostochnoe napravlenie, "Zhurnal boevykh deistvii v Koree," p. 16.

60 *Haebangllbo*, July 3, 1950.

61 GHQ SCAP/FEC/UNC, "Command Report of the G-3 Section (1 January -31 October 1950)", pp. 6-13. Although Cumings and Shaller scrutinized MacArthur documents extensively, they had not found evidence that MacArthur put a significant consideration on the Korean situation except he ordered his intelligence chief to carry out intelligence works in Korea before the war erupted. See Michael Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), chap. 11 and pp. 181-191; Cumings, op. cit, chapter 16.