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The Korean War after Fifty Years
Challenges for Peace and Prosperity

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The Korean War, as a model for the possibilities of limited war which hovered in the background for the entire Cold War, has inevitably drawn conflicting interpretations. Now that the Cold War is over, now that a half-century has passed since the Korean War, we ought to be able to sort and evaluate these interpretations.

We will begin with some general issues of interpretation, and then turn to some stages in time when greater optimism or pessimism seemed to take hold.

Some General Possibilities

First, some analysts would stress that the United States, in statements by Secretary of State Dean Acheson and General Douglas MacArthur and others, did not adequately warn Joseph Stalin and his Communist allies beforehand that the United States would defend South Korea if it were attacked. One could indeed extrapolate a broader lesson from this that Americans are generally not good about advertising their intentions here, with Saddam Hussein in his invasion of Kuwait, and the Soviets in their invasion of Afghanistan, also discovering that Americans react more strongly to such aggressions than they show in advance. The Japanese in 1941 similarly under-rated the American willingness to fight World War II out to a close; one would hope that any Beijing leaders contemplating an armed attack on Taiwan have noticed these prior examples.

Second, some analysts of military strategy would have seen the Korean War as what could have been predicted once Stalin's Soviet Union had its own nuclear weapons, i.e. that Communist tanks would...
now be free to roll forward, by the theories of limited war, by the
warnings that had already been articulated by Paul Nitze's staff in NSC-
68, as the United States could not retaliate with nuclear weapons when
Moscow now had such weapons, and when Moscow had not yet used
them.

Third, most of us would have seen the war as the necessary
standing up to Communism and its advance by military aggression. As
Communist rule had been imposed, by brute force of one kind or
another, on the unwilling populations of Eastern Europe, the analogies
had emerged with the earlier advance of Fascist rule, and with the need
to resist such advances, by threat of force, by actual force where the
simple threat had not sufficed to deter aggression.

The War's End: 1953

Turning now to the trend of impressions over time, Americans have
also had more than one way of interpreting the outcome of the Korean
War, as it was negotiated to a halt in 1953.

Most important of all, Communism's advance was reversed and
halted on the Korean peninsula, as Seoul changed hands four times, as
the Republic of Korea was freed to achieve all that it was to accomplish
in the south in the following half-century.

Related to this, it could be argued that a successful defense, by
American blood sacrifice, locked in commitments that would not have
been in place otherwise. Just as America had to defend West Berlin,
once it had made an issue of its protection in the 1948 Berlin Airlift,
and just as America could never tolerate Soviet nuclear weapons in
Cuba after President Kennedy stood up to Khrushchev in the 1962
missile crisis, Americans would find it much harder to withdraw from
Korea after the casualties suffered in the Korean War.

But a third legacy of the war's ending was less fortunate, as the
final truce line, seemingly determined by the bloody battlefield
stalemate, left the DMZ much too close to Seoul. American Professors
often have a longer commute to the campuses on which they teach than
the drive from the truce line to the center of Seoul, the capital of the
Republic of Korea. The American generals who wished to push the line
further northward in 1953 were overruled by higher American
authority, simply because of the human cost that would be involved.

The final memory of 1953 was more generally pessimistic for the
future of containment, as Americans had demonstrated a sense of
frustration with limited wars fought on the Asian continent, with a war
which had see-sawed from prospects of the loss of all Korea to the
prospect of a unification of Korea under non-Communist rule, and then
back and forth again. The collective memory was thus one of
disappointment and casualties, of frustration and futility.

The Fall of Saigon: 1975

If one were pessimistic about the lessons and achievement of the 1950-53 Korean War, an even deeper pessimism might then have loomed when South Vietnam fell to Communist rule in 1975, after a guerrilla war that turned into a tank war at the end, after a guerrilla war in which the Republic Korea had sent troops to assist in the defense of South Vietnam. Many leftists around the world, and especially on American campuses, drew analogies here between South Vietnam and South Korea, asserting that each were artificial regimes serving American interests, asserting a wave of the future by which what had happened in Saigon would soon enough happen also in Seoul. As a sign of how pervasive this impression was among the member nations of the UN, there were meetings of the "non-aligned" nations "Group of 77" in 1975 to which Pyongyang was invited to send a representative, but Seoul was not.

There were at least three strands of argument by which the Communist world was expected to advance across Asia in the middle 1970s in a chain of following dominoes. Many people now saw Communism as more appropriate to the real needs of ordinary Asians than anything democracy had to offer; ideologically, they saw Communism as what the poor peasant wanted. Second, leaving aside ideology, anyone understanding basic geopolitics would have expected the Communist side to have the military advantage now, with its control over the center of the Eurasian land-mass, with the west having a difficult time defending all the promontories; Mackinder had long ago foreseen the difficulty here, when it was the British who had to worry about the plans of the Czar, rather than the United States having to worry about Moscow’s plans. And third, in a simple contest of wills, a simple matching of resolve, the United States had quit the Vietnam context, as military-age students and others crowded into Washington chanting "Hell no, we won't go."

Symptomatic of the seeming erosion of American commitments, the seeming erasure of the beneficial lessons of the Korean War, were statements of Jimmy Carter during his 1976 campaign for office, to the effect that American nuclear weapons, and American ground forces as well, might be withdrawn from Korea.

But the same nuclear weapons which had given the USSR a counter-deterrent to the U.S. after 1949, and which had thus made "limited war" the norm for Cold War conflict thereafter, could be used for other purposes, could be used as a form of deterrent reinsurance by a state whose very existence was in danger. It was thus hardly so
surprising that both the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China on Taiwan moved closer to a de facto nuclear weapons capability in these years, prodding an application of American influence to head off the plutonium reprocessing efforts involved here, prodding the United States to reconsider somewhat its erosion of commitments.

**Pleasant Surprise Post-1975**

The pessimistic picture drawn at the time of the fall of Saigon was not to be realized. Rather than strings of new violent conflicts leading to new Communist regimes in a chain of falling dominoes, the East Asian region has been remarkably free of war since 1975, and a variety of explanations again are to be found for this.

Someone focusing mainly on the factors of power politics would point to Communist China in effect switching sides toward the end of the Vietnam War. In a classic balance-of-power strategy, by which one always supports the weaker against the stronger, to head off a possible "hegemon," Beijing had apparently decided that Moscow was getting too strong, and Washington too weak. The visits of Kissinger and Nixon to Beijing were widely interpreted as a simple reshuffling of alliances, one any "realist" political scientist might have anticipated.

Apart from this, the United States appeared to get a second wind of resolve, especially after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1978; the election of Ronald Reagan as President in 1980 seemed to show that Americans were once again willing to invest resources, and risk armed conflict, as part of standing up to the advance of Communism.

Third, and perhaps the very most important, and most relevant to the Korean case, the western system of economic and political freedom now was seen to have proved itself, delivering economic growth in East Asia such as the world had never seen before, delivering benefits to peasants that contradicted the ideological assumptions of leftists on American campuses or anywhere else.

Communist China’s opening to the west, and its very enthusiastic opening of relations with the Republic of Korea, surely then reflected a little more than simple power politics. As China, under Deng Xiaoing, now abandoned Marxist solutions for its own economic growth, it heard Deng calling specifically for a Chinese imitation of the four East Asian "tigers" or "dragons": Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, — and South Korea. In the time that had been won in the prolonged but unsuccessful Vietnam War, and in the time and space that had been won in the frustrating and stalemate defense of South Korea in the Korean War, the advantages of market methods and an open society had become evident, so that the appeal of Communist guerrilla insurgency was never to be what had been projected.
If nuclear weapons had once been an important option for Seoul or Taipei, they faded in significance in the 1980s, as Taiwan and South Korea became major trading partners for the entire world, and indeed even with Communist China and Communist Vietnam. Ironically, it would be North Korea that in the 1990s became the outcast "pariah state," rather than South Korea. Yet it has to be remembered that the strategic significance of such weapons, as a deterrent to any foreign dreams of a conventional military takeover, might work as well for bad regimes as for good, i.e. might be as attractive for North Korea in the future, as for Israel or Taiwan or South Korea in the past. And, if either of the Koreas were ever to acquire nuclear weapons, one might not still be able to count on Japanese aversions to nuclear proliferation.

**Today's Assessment**

In light of the experience of the Korean War some fifty years ago, how do Americans see Korea today? Those of us who still worry about the intentions of the Pyongyang regime, or who wish that this regime could be eliminated as soon as possible, are typically accused of "Cold War thinking"; and one might indeed accept this label, as a compliment, as a sign that the Cold War indeed was about the most basic of human values.

Anyone comparing the two Koreas will sense that we have here the most perfect scientific test of two ideologies, of two approaches to the solving of human problems, as we have the same basic culture and the same basic distribution of natural resources on the two sides of the demarcation line, but such a vastly different degree of success. In other comparisons of the social systems, for example between the United States and the Soviet Union, one could blame the Soviet shortfall on the historic poverty of Russia, the weakness of the educational system under the Czar, etc. The same would hold for a comparison between democratic Belgium and Communist Romania, and for many other comparisons, where one could not "control for" the cultural and historical differences, when one was trying to test the two social approaches.

A more persuasively "fair test", "controlling for" other factors, might compare Cuba and Puerto Rico, or Taiwan and mainland China (although the sheer magnitude of the mainland's population and underdeveloped western provinces again skews the comparison). Like Puerto Rico vs. Cuba, the comparison of the two Koreas seems like a much more direct test of the impact of Communism.

The Republic of Korea is today amazingly more prosperous than it was in 1950, and it is genuinely democratic, demonstrating that politically and economically-free approaches can indeed work well in
a traditionally Asian context. Americans have reason to see South Korea as proving the value of the political and economic systems that work within the United States as well. The American model is available for adoption by anyone in the world, and a great number of countries are indeed adopting it, not because the United States government presses them to, but because it is so obvious that the model works. Americans thus have more reason today than in 1950 to identify with South Korea, because so much that was merely potentially possible then has now been realized.

But Americans, upon reflection, would have another more special reason to identify with South Korea, for there has been a great deal of much more direct American influence in the progress that South Korea has made, for a longer time through the work of American missionaries, since 1950 by the presence of the American servicemen stationed in Korea. By the example of their lifestyle, and by the radio and television signals that have leaked out over the airwaves, the nearness of the American soldiers (while often irritating, as is always the way with soldiers deployed abroad from any country) has worked to spread knowledge of the English language, and to spread an understanding of the processes of political democracy.

One index of this comes in the number of Koreans who have migrated to the United States. Related to this, another index is in the number of Koreans who have converted to one variety or another of Christianity, with South Korea by some measures being counted now as having a Christian majority, with the Republic of Korea now having a larger number of Presbyterians than the United States.

By comparison, North Korea, with its horrific Stalinist style of Communist rule, made even more bizarre by a practice of passing leadership from father to son by inheritance, and with its past record of launching terrorist attacks and submarine landings, strikes most Americans as every bit as bad as the enemy that had been fought in 1950, and perhaps all the worse because any moderating Russian influence of 1945 to 1990 is no longer in place. The comparison is then made all the more tragic by the news that famine continually threatens North Korea, with most people told to make do on two meals a day, when South Korea, just across the DMZ, has no problem in feeding its population.

When one considers the direct and indirect influences of the presence of American troops since 1950, it is interesting to think back to the news in 1958 that the Chinese Communist troops which had come to Kim Il-sung’s rescue in 1950 were being withdrawn back to China. At the time, this seemed like good news, as perhaps a step toward ending the hostility that set the two sides against each other.
Today, one almost wishes that the Chinese PLA troops had remained there, because this might have made it easier for the Chinese to persuade the North Koreans to move away from doctrinaire Marxist models, because this might have served to restrain some of the more irresponsible ventures and initiatives taken by Kim Il-sung’s regime.

Communist China today is the only friend that North Korea has. But Communist China is much more interested in cultivating its linkages with South Korea, for it is from the Republic of Korea that Beijing expects to be able to learn, and not from the Pyongyang regime.

Beijing can learn from Seoul on how to make money, how to make economic progress. It can also learn, just as it can learn from Taiwan, how an Asian society culturally governed by the Confucian ethic can handle the processes of free elections. When one sees how eager young Chinese in Beijing are to visit Seoul, and how reluctant they would be to have to visit Pyongyang instead, one sees how attractive a model the Republic of Korea has become. *

Lee Kwan Yew, the former Prime Minister of Singapore, has been eloquent and articulate in arguing that Asian societies are so different from those of the west that “American-style democracy” could not work in the Far East. Very articulate in arguing the other side, arguing that human beings everywhere have the same desire to have a choice in who governs them, and a desire to be free from arbitrary arrest and torture, has been the man elected President in the Republic of Korea, Kim Dae-jung.

One should never under-rate the importance of culture, and the power of the Confucian ethic in particular. But one can easily over-rate the “clash of civilizations” forecast by Samuel Huntington. Historically, the Americans driven by the “Protestant ethic” have found a great deal to admire in the ”Confucian ethic”. Like the Republic of China on Taiwan, the Republic of Korea has offered a nice demonstration that economic progress and hard work can go hand in hand with a functioning democracy.

The Continuing Question of Reunification

Ever since the Berlin Wall came down and West Germany absorbed East Germany, we have seen an interesting debate about whether the Koreans in the south have been increased or decreased in their desire to reunite with the North. The high economic costs encountered by the German Federal Republic, in undoing the damage of decades of Communist rule in the East, are argued to have made South Koreans wary of the similar burdens they would encounter if they had to undo the damage inflicted by all the years of Communist rule north of the 38th parallel. South Korea does not dominate North Korea in
population size or geographic area in the way that West Germany dominated East Germany. On a per-capita basis, it dominates North Korea much more, which of course would mean tremendous sacrifices of material wealth, if and when South Korea had to pull its Northern cousins up to some joint national average.

Since North Korea has been a far more totalitarian Communist state than was East Germany, the chances of winning freedom for the north have looked more remote. And, before the pleasantly surprising events of 1989, with the sudden collapse of the Berlin Wall, the chances of East Germany being freed of Communist rule had also looked remote.

Yet, in the years before 1989, one often also saw analyses of West German opinion suggesting that the hope had been given up of a German reunification, that West Germans were no longer interested in winning freedom for their East German cousins. All this turned out to be very misleading, of course, after the Berlin Wall came down. And this should suggest that we be cautious now about assuming that South Koreans would be so uninterested in winning a reunification with the North, if the opportunity should arise.

When something very desirable is out of reach, one avoids frustration by turning one's thoughts elsewhere, and this may hold for today's South Koreans just as it held for West Germans in the 1980s. To be sure, the price that West Germany had to pay for unification is a cautionary note for Koreans, but this is not by itself any decisive indication that they would want to avoid a freeing up of North Korea if this could be attained.

How a liberation of the north is to be achieved remains a most difficult question, with Americans being well-advised to take the judgments and advice of South Koreans into account, on how best to move ahead with this. But there should be much less doubt or uncertainty that such a unification of Korea, on the Seoul pattern rather than that of Pyongyang, remains very much to be desired.

One Final Overall Perspective

When weighing the overall significance of the Korean War, we might turn at the end to another kind of argument sometimes heard since 1990, by which the entire Cold War was a mistake and a waste of effort, by which all the risks of war and nuclear escalation that were run in the preparations for the defense of NATO, and in the general worldwide effort of containment, were unnecessary.

Communist China is now rapidly moving away from all the economic aspects of Communism. The unified Communist Vietnam has seen a similar move to abandon the teachings of Marx; instead of making Saigon resemble Hanoi, we now see Hanoi coming to resemble
Saigon, as market methods are introduced, as small independent shops spring up everywhere.

Wouldn’t a unified Communist Korea under Kim Il-sung thus have made the same accommodation to reality, after an interim, saving everyone the price of the Korean War? Wouldn’t a unified Communist Europe under Stalin also have given up on the Marxist-Leninist approach to economic decision-making?

There are at least two answers to this kind of false optimism, by which it was never necessary to contain Communism, by which it would not have been necessary to resist the North Korean invasion of 1950, and to mount a NATO defense/deterrence line for the next forty years.

First, there is no guarantee that Communist rulers, if they could keep expanding their domain, keep harvesting the economic accomplishments of others, would have seen the error of their Marxist assumptions about how an economy works; there is no guarantee that the Soviet economy would have collapsed as it did in the 1980s, if it had in the meantime been able to absorb the economy of West Germany and Japan, etc.

Second, the sheer magnitude of the South Korean post-1953 accomplishment, in economic, political and social terms, shows that a failure to resist would have been a tremendous waste of human opportunity, even if Kim Il-sung and his successors would have sooner or later seen the light.

The Republic of Korea, by its accomplishments after 1953, has showed the world that the Korean War was worth fighting, and that it was worth the risks and effort to contain the spread of Communism elsewhere around the world. The North Korean regime has since 1953 instead showed what needed so much to be avoided, showed what ideologically doctrinaire Communist tyranny could impose on a people.

The achievement of successfully defending the South may not have been so immediately clear to Americans and the world in 1953, or even in 1975. But it certainly should be clear today.
The North Korean War Plan and the Opening Phase of the Korean War
A Documentary Study

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Introduction
No war in modern history is so obscure about its beginning as the Korean War. From the very first day of the war, both the North Korean and the South Korean governments accused the opponent of being guilty of an invasion. In the early morning of June 25, 1950, the North Korean government charged that the South Korean Army had made a surprise attack into its territory by 1-2 km across the 38th parallel at four points, the west of Haeju (Ongjin), the direction of Kumchon (Kaesong), the direction of Chorwon (Yonchon and Pochon), and Yangyang, and announced a counterattack to repulse the attack. The South Korean government announced on that day that the North Korean Army had invaded all along the 38th parallel at dawn. Based on the South Korean Army’s reports, Ambassador Muccio reported to the U. S. government that the North Korean Army invaded the South by bombarding Ongjin around 4 o’clock in the morning and began to cross the 38th parallel at Ongjin, Kaesung, Chunchon, and the East Coast. In the United Nations, the U. S. government condemned the North Korean government for unlawfully invading South Korea and made a move to admonish North Korea to take back its army.

Since then, the issue of discerning who was responsible for the calamitous internecine war has been a focal point among many scholars. In the West, it has been generally accepted that the North Korean government initiated the war and was to blame for that matter. But scholars like Gupta and Cumings suspected that the South Korean...
Army might have provoked the North Korean Army in the Ongjin peninsula. President Rhee Syngman, Gen. Kim Paekil, Kim Sukwon and Col. Paek Inyup were put under suspicion by Cumings as persons who probably had ordered an attack on the Ongjin peninsula after Cumings had scrutinized various documents and interviews on the situation in Ongjin in particular and in other places along the 38th parallel on the eve of the war. The North Korean government ever since has maintained the version of the beginning of the war that it provided to the public 51 years ago.

With former Soviet archival documents on the Korean War released in the middle of the 1990s, it became widely known that Stalin, Kim II Sung, and Mao were deeply involved in the scheme of unifying Korea by the North Korean military force in the spring of 1950. At meetings in Moscow in April 1950, a final agreement on the war issue was made between Stalin and Kim. Mao gave consent to Kim’s war plan in Peking in May 1950. Through secret telegrams between Moscow and Pyongyang, Stalin and Kim had discussed and adjusted the war plan in detail and prepared for the war up to the beginning of the war.

Being short of documentary materials concerning the outbreak of the war, however, on lower levels rather than on the top political one, we do not know what actually happened on both sides of the parallel for several days up to the outbreak of the war. What was the North Korean operation plan if the North attacked first? Was there any provocation from the South while the North Korean Army was getting fully ready for a counterattack as Cumings inferred? Was the North Korean military action on June 25, 1950, really begun as a counterattack as the North Korean government proclaimed? Now one may have some plausible explanations to deny the last two questions, but with only a little concrete evidence which one can hardly doubt. We have never examined the outbreak of the war all along the 38th parallel in a systematic way with sufficient undeniable evidence.

Owing to this circumstance, some scholars are not certain how events actually developed on the parallel line in the early morning of June 25, 1950, and the following several days. Even after the opening of former Soviet archives, William Stueck had a reserved view on the issue of who started the war. A scholar in Korea formulated a hypothesis that the North Korean government did not have further intention of occupying the whole territory of South Korea except Seoul, and instead it planned to have a negotiated peace with moderate South Korean politicians excluding Syngman Rhee and his followers. Others are suspicious that Rhee’s government and the United States government must have known the North Korean move and even the exact timing of its attack on the South before the war but allowed the
North to invade purposefully. The influence of skepticism on "the traditional version of the war's beginning" and the explanatory power of plausible evidences in Cumings' second mosaic are still alive, although Cumings toned down his original inference after Soviet materials on the Korean War poured out.

The purpose of this paper is to conduct factual research on the North Korean Army's actions on the eve and at the beginning of the war. The focus will be on the northern side of the 38th parallel, about which we do have many unclear points. Questions to answer are: first, what was the North Korean Army's operational plan for the war, and what relations did it have with discussion of a war plan between Stalin and Kim II Sung in April 1950 in Moscow? Second, how did things actually develop on the 38th parallel on the first day of the war? Third, why could not (or did not) the North Korean Army advance across the Han River after occupying Seoul for three days? Was it because North Korean leaders were planning to stay there, expecting the South Korean people to make mass uprisings as Park Hon Yong assured his colleagues before the war, or was it because there were other factors that hindered the North Korean Army from continuing the advance?

In conducting research on these questions, fortunately I could obtain several important but hitherto unknown sources. The first is a report of Gen. Razuvaev, the Soviet ambassador and chief of the military advisory corps to the North Korean government after January 1951, to Gen. Shtemenko, who was then the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. This report contains the military plans upon which the North Korean People's Army launched assaults in June 1950, as well as a narrative account of the conduct of operations from the beginning of the war to the end of May 1951. The latter is a file of daily situation reports of the Soviet General Staff on the Korean War, which had been maintained by the Far Eastern Bureau from the beginning of the war to the end of 1951. The value of these sources is enormous. We can look into the North Korean Army's real situation and the progress of the war from the viewpoint of the North. Above all, these are the first sources known to us that describe in an unstudied manner the North Korean Army's actual conduct of the war.

In addition, I could use a group of captured North Korean documents that were investigated and partially introduced in Korea by Prof. Sun Joo Pang but not yet fully used in doing research on the North Korean Army's actions at the outbreak of the war. These materials often provide us with real views and experiences of North Korean officers and soldiers and untainted records on actual deeds of North Korean units.
The North Korean War Plan for Invasion of South Korea in June 1950

Now it is widely known that the overall North Korean War Plan was discussed and agreed upon first between Stalin and Kim II Sung in Moscow in April 1950. What attracts our attention in conversations in the Moscow meeting is that the overall strategy of the war was not Kim's but Stalin's, although Kim was eager for the war. According to summarized proceedings of the conversations among Stalin, Kim II Sung and Park Hon Young on the issue of war, it is clear that Stalin suggested a war plan and Kim accepted it. Stalin advised Kim that it was important to make a thorough preparation for war and to form elite attack divisions as well as to create additional units. He promised that Kim's request of any material support for equipping weapons and mechanized means of movement and combat would be fully satisfied.

Stalin then proposed a three-stage war plan, which was vicious as well as cunning. The three stages were:
1. Troops are concentrated in the designated areas, close to the 38th parallel.
2. The highest bodies of power in North Korea make fresh proposals for peaceful unification. They'll be certainly rejected by the other side.
3. Then, after they are rejected, a counterattack must take place.

Stalin continued, "I agree with your idea to engage the adversary in the Ongjin peninsula as it will help to disguise who initiated the combat activities. After you attack and the South counterattacks it would give you a chance to enlarge the front."

As we shall see later, the contour of the North Korean War Plan was set here in Moscow in April. Stalin's war plan would be carried out faithfully by Kim II Sung, who considered it almost as a bible. In addition, it is important to keep in mind Stalin's view on provoking an attack on the Ongjin peninsula and his using the term "counterattack" when we interpret North Korean operational plans that would be prepared by Soviet advisers, as well as the North Korean description of actual fighting that occurred on the front on June 25, 1950.

No less important is Stalin's advice to Kim II Sung on waging a war. Stalin told Kim, "The War should be quick and speedy, Southerners and Americans should not have time to come to their senses. They won't have time to put up a strong resistance and to mobilize international support." It was a lesson he learned from plentiful experiences during the Second World War. With no experience in any large-scale war except for some guerrilla operations, and being buoyed by the hope of unifying Korea by his move, Kim
expressed to Stalin his optimistic evaluation that there was least probability of American intervention in the war and his assurance that he would achieve victory within three days after launching the war. Kim expected that the victory would be quick, all of the Korean people would enthusiastically support him, and Americans would not have time to intervene. Park Hon Yong intervened in the conversation to elaborate on Kim’s evaluation, saying “200,000 party members will participate as leaders of the mass uprising.” Stalin, however, did not have such an optimistic evaluation of the improbability of U.S. intervention and was astute enough to prepare a worst-case scenario. He gave Kim II Sung his consent to the war on the condition that Mao agreed to the plan and Soviet troops would not participate directly in the war in any situation.

Returning to North Korea at the end of April, Kim II Sung hurried preparation for the war following Stalin’s advice exactly. He visited Mao in Peking with Park Hon Yong on May 13 and received Mao’s consent to his war plan. Before leaving for Peking, Kim II Sung ordered Kang Kon to draw an operation plan for the war. The North Korean Army relocated and renamed the newly arrived Chinese Independent 15th Division composed of Koreans to the 12th Infantry Division of the Korean People’s Army and finished the training of recruits who were earmarked for three new divisions to be created in early June. The 10th, 13th and 15th Divisions were created out of these soldiers just before the war.

The North Korean government and organs affiliated with it presented peace proposals thrice on June 7, 11, and 16 in order to conceal relocation of attack divisions near the 38th parallel in June and to give South Koreans false hope for a peaceful unification. While Syngman Rhee and his government suspected the North peace proposals and dubbed them as mere propaganda, the North succeeded in relocating units in war footing 10-15 km north of the 38th parallel between June 12 and June 23, disguising the movement of units to their soldiers as a grand field maneuver.

As for the process of drawing the invasion operation plan, former North Korean General Sung-Chol Yu made a testimony, which appears as genuine in the general context but dubious in some particular points. According to Yu, a chosen group of North Korean generals and high-ranking officers who were mostly Soviet-born Koreans drew up an operation plan under the direction of the Chief of General Staff, Kang Kon. However, Soviet advisers took the responsibility of making a new plan in Russian, saying that the North Korean plan was too simplistic. The plan was composed of four components: combat orders, movement plans of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, supply plans, and plans
disguising the various units’ preparation for war as military exercises. These were translated into Korean. Yu recalled that the title of the plan was “Preemptive Strike Plan.” He said that the invasion plan ended with the occupation of Seoul, and there was no other plan to occupy the rest of South Korea. According to him, occupation of Seoul meant the end of war among the North Korean leaders and generals, for they expected that there would be extensive general uprisings once the army entered Seoul."

Authenticity of some features in Yu’s testimony is now partly corroborated by some captured North Korean documents. Soviet military advisers did draw the operation plan up to the level of division combat orders under the supervision of the chief Soviet adviser General Postnikov." The well-known combat order No. 1 of the North Korean 4th Division, which was translated into Korean, dated June 22 and captured near Taejon in July 1950, must have been drawn by Russians. Now we can verify the captured documents, a set of reconnaissance directives distributed to the 3rd Border Security Brigade, the 6th, 1st, 4th, 3rd, 2nd, 12th Divisions and the 12th Motorcycle Regiment, which was written in Russian and, because of the fact, suspected by Cumings in its authenticity as genuine." There is no reason to doubt authenticity of the reconnaissance directive issued on June 20 in Russian in which the Information Chief of the North Korean General Staff set missions for reconnaissance troops to fulfill in each stage of the operation plan. The stages in the operation plan described in the document were three, and the content was almost identical with the three-stage operation plan that will be discussed later. Existence of plans disguising the preparation for war in forward units as a training exercise in Yu’s testimony can be verified by an order in a set of captured orders of the North Korean 2nd Division. The order was issued on June 19 and it directed units to carry out an exercise program that would last from June 20 to June 30."

The fact that the overall operation plan of the North Korean Army for invasion of South Korea at first was a three-stage one was discovered in a form of operation map and made public by Prof. Korotkov in 1992." and now can be corroborated by an archival document. Bajanov and Bajanova recently made public the contents of the plan after discovering it in a Russian archive. This plan in a finished form was presented to and signed by Kim II Sung on June 15, 1950. It was reported by Shytkov to Stalin on the following day and received his consent. According to Shytkov’s telegram to Stalin on June 16, the timing of the attack was set as the early morning of June 25,1950, and the stages of the plan were as follows:

The First Stage: formations and units of the KPA start at the Ongjin
peninsula like a local operation and then deliver the main strike along the western coast of Korea to the South.

The Second Stage: Seoul must be taken and the Han River put under control. At the same time, on the eastern front, North Korean troops will liberate the cities of Chunchon and Kangneung. As a result, the main forces of the South Korean Army have to be encircled around Seoul and eliminated.

The Third Stage: the final one, will be devoted to the liberation of the rest of Korea by destroying the remaining enemy forces and seizing major population centers and ports.

As shown in the quotation, the plan set the Ongjin operation as the first stage. The most important and main stage was the second one, in which encirclement of the South Korean main force as well as occupation of Seoul and other cities would be accomplished. It is notable that the plan contained the third stage, which is contrary to Yu’s testimony.

However, this operation plan underwent a revision at the last moment before the outbreak of the war. It was because Kim II Sung wanted to change the plan on June 20 when he received reports that the South Korean troops in Ongjin seemed to perceive a threat from the North and made a reinforcement by putting more troops in positions. He suggested to Stalin through Shykov that it seemed better to launch all-out attacks on the whole front along the 38th parallel rather than to attack Ongjin first. Finding Kim’s idea sound, Stalin gave consent to the idea of revising the original plan on June 21.

Although the Soviet archival documents released so far do not contain detailed contents of the final plan, the Razuvaev report contains a four-stage operation plan for the war. It does not tell us exactly when the plan was redrawn: it must have been the final plan revised as a result of the above-mentioned agreement between Stalin and Kim II Sung on June 21. It is worth quoting in length.

Planning of the Counterattack of the Korean Peoples’ Army

After the South Korean Army’s attack on the territory of North Korea, the Headquarters of the Korean Peoples’ Army made, based on the governmental directive of DPRK, following decision. “As our Army is always prepared for a counterattack we begin actions from the present state of deployment.” For this, an operational plan was established, which ordered units of the Korean Peoples’ Army to switch simultaneously to a counterattack all along the 38th parallel.

Considering characteristics of the relief of the terrain and relative importance of operational fronts, the main attack was planned on the
Yesung River Area, Siniuri[i.e. Pochon]-Uijongbu road, toward the
general direction of Syananri (?)- Seoul - Suwon - Ansung.

The depth of the operation is 350 km.

Operation for the liberation of South Korea is divided into
following four stages.

The First Stage: The army is to destroy the main force of the enemy
in the northern and the southern area not far from of the 38th parallel;
to occupy Seoul and advance to the line of Suwon - Wonju; at the same
time, to liberate the Yonan and the Ongjin peninsulas from the enemy
in the west of River Yesung, and to occupy Samchok on the east coast.
This stage lasts five days and the operational depth is 90 km.

The Second Stage: The army is to destroy enemy reserve troops
that will be put from the rear, and the main attacking force of the army
is to advance to the line of Chonan - Chechon. It lasts four days and the
operational depth is 40-90 km.

The Third Stage: The army is to make a pursuit after retreating
enemy and to advance to the line of Taejon - Sunsan. The operational
depth is 90 km and it lasts 10 days.

The Fourth Stage: While continuing pursuit of the enemy, the army
is to destroy remaining resistance centers and the main attacking force
of the army is to advance to the line of Imsil - Kochang - Waegwan -
Pohangdong. At the same time, Units maneuvering along the western
coast are to advance toward the northwestern area of Pusan, to cut
retreating routes of remaining units of the South Korean Army and to
destroy them completely. The operational depth is 40-80 km.  

As shown in the quotation, the idea of initial attack on the Ongjin
peninsula in the previous plan was incorporated as a part into the first
stage of the newly revised plan, i.e. simultaneous attacks all along the
38th parallel. What attracts our attention is the time assigned to
accomplish each stage. Although the time needed to finish the last, the
fourth stage, was not specified in the plan, it can be presumed that it
was 8-13 days since we have another Soviet document which informs
us that the plan envisaged the North Korean Army to need 22-27 days
to occupy the whole territory of South Korea. The Razuvaev report
also contains detailed missions and operation plans for frontline
divisions and brigades. Summaries of the operation plans were
presented in detail up to the regimental level in the report, which we
will discuss briefly in following pages.

One point that attracts our attention in the Razuvaev report is that
it described the title of the plan as well as the war’s beginning as a
"counterattack" to a South Korean initial attack. It is interesting to note
that the Razuvaev report said that the North Korean Army had a
prepared operational plan, but at the same time it was still called "counterattack" in the internal report. It was probably intended to deceive future readers who were not well versed in the discussion of the war plan amongst top level leaders. Or it was written so to allude that there were South Korean attacks before the North Korean Army launched the planned "counterattack." Be that as it may, the North Korean government announced clearly on the morning of June 25, "On the early daybreak of today, the so called Defence Army units of the South Korean puppet regime began sudden attacks into the north of the 38th parallel all along the 38th parallel...," The term "counterattack" was only a forgery to conceal the real nature of the invasion in light of the fact that it was already discussed between Stalin and Kim II Sung in April 1950. The cause of the war presented in the Razuvaev report is not compatible with what the North Korean government explained on June 25, 1950.

The Outbreak of the Korean War

Ongjin

Early on the morning of June 25, 1950, on the far west side of the 38th parallel, roaring sounds of gunfire signaled the start of the Korean War. For more than 50 years, there has been a continuous debate on who started the war in Ongjin. For a time, although Gupta, Cumings and others have insisted that the South Korean 17th Regiment in Ongjin must have started an attack, their inference was no more than a hypothesis based on some dubious testimonies and circumstantial facts without concrete evidence. But now in addition to the discussion between Stalin and Kim II Sung in Moscow in April 1950, there are plentiful direct and indirect evidences that the North Koreans provoked the war in the area.

As we have seen above, the plan for an attack on the Ongjin peninsula was contemplated in the North Korean Army well before June 25. Although the idea of preliminary attack in Ongjin was discarded in a revised operation plan on June 21, the attack in the front started at 4 o’clock on June 25, about 40 minutes earlier than those in other fronts. The daily operational journal of the Soviet General Staff on the Korean War, mentioning Ongjin, Kaesung, Syniuri, Chunchun and Kangneung as places where battles occurred, recorded "The North Korean Army’s assault was switched to counterattack at 4:40 after preparatory artillery fire for 20 to 40 minutes, and other units and divisions advanced 3 to 5 km during the first 3 hours after the start of the war." Although the report mentions "counterattack," we have evidence that it could not be considered as such.

The North Korean attack on that day was meticulously planned
beforehand. In the Razuvaev report, we can find a detailed operation plan on the Ongjin peninsula: 7 battalions of the 3rd Border Security Brigade and the 1st Regiment of the North Korean 6th Division had concrete missions and directions of attack. The plan demanded these units to occupy the peninsula within two days. A captured North Korean document clearly shows that the plan was drawn well ahead of time. The title of the document was "Reconnaissance Directive No. 8," and it was issued on June 21 by the 3rd Brigade in Jukchon. It gave each battalion concrete reconnaissance missions to be accomplished in each projected stage of the attack. For this, it presented in the form of a table directions of attack for seven battalions of the 3rd Brigade, a police battalion and the 1st Regiment. If we compare this with the Ongjin operation plan in the Razuvaev report, one cannot but recognize that both contain the identical operational concept. Thus there is no doubt that the North Korean units north of the 38th parallel on the Ongjin peninsula already had an established operation plan at least four days ahead of the war and prepared for it. Another captured North Korean document has a title "Rear Order No. 1," and it was issued on June 24 by the Rear Section commander of the 1st Regiment, Han Tae-Sook. It instructed units how to collect "war trophies" and provided them with a form to record captured items. Units had been preparing the battle, which was to occur according to the above-mentioned plan.

Even after mentioning the established operation plan, the Razuvaev report described the initial battle on the Ongjin peninsula as if the North Korean troops switched to a counterattack responding to a South Korean attack. It reads "On June 25, units of the 3rd Border Security Brigade in the Ongjin peninsula stopped enemy attacks on the north of the 38th parallel by previously organized fires and, after executing preparatory artillery fires for 30 minutes, began to attack the enemy which had switched to defense. The Brigade advanced 2-2.5 km on the axis of the main attack at around 6 o'clock." However, it is unbelievable that the South Korean units in the Ongjin peninsula began to attack to meet exactly the timing of the early morning of June 25 that Kim Il Sung set as D day H hour of the war already on June 15.

The official formula, "the South Korean attack and the North Korean counterattack," was well abided by war reporters. I identified four articles dealing with stories of initial engagements on the Ongjin peninsula in North Korean newspapers issued in July and August 1950 and found that the articles written by war reporters all followed the formula when they described the start of the war in Ongjin. At the beginning of those articles, reporters all condemned briefly the vicious nature of Rhee's regime and the South Korean attack on the North on
that morning. However, contents of the battle stories in the articles were all contrary to the formula. North Korean soldiers infiltrated in darkness into areas behind South Korean positions, trying not to be detected by the South Korean soldiers. They succeeded in this and accomplished missions like lifting mines and laying communication cables. After accomplishing their secret missions, they heard that their artillery opened fire and their infantry comrades began to attack and smashed the South Korean positions without meeting any serious obstacles. In the articles we do not have any inkling of when the North Korean soldiers encountered the advancing South Korean soldiers, where they fired against them to stop the attack, or how the southerners retreated then. If South Korean units attacked first, it must have been impossible for the war reporters to miss such stories in their accounts. North Korean war reporters followed the official formula but they could not describe what North Korean soldiers had not seen and therefore had had nothing to tell them about."

There is no doubt that the attack was launched by the North Korean units following the well-prepared plan on the Ongjin peninsula. Achieving superiority in numbers of soldiers by three times, as well as in artillery firepower, the North Korean troops on the Ongjin peninsula could occupy Ongjin city by 8 o’clock p.m. on the first day of the war and swept the whole area on June 26." The officers and soldiers of the South Korean 17th Regiment could not stand the assault and evacuated themselves to Inchon and Kunsan using requisitioned civilian boats and a Navy LST.

**Kaesong**

In Kaesong, which the North Korean government referred to as one of the points the South Korean Army attacked across the 38th parallel in early morning of June 25, the first attack began somewhat later than on the Ongjin peninsula. In this area, the North Korean units that launched attacks were the 13th and the 15th Regiments of the 6th Division. According to the Razuvaev report, these units were given mission "to be prepared for battle, to stop the enemy attack directed toward Kumchon and smash the enemy main force on the 3 8th parallel, and then to switch to a counterattack according to a special order." According to the report, the 13th Regiment was to occupy Kaesung, to reach the southern end of the Kaepung peninsula on the first day, and to land on the Kimpo peninsula on the early morning of the second day in order to attack Yongdongpo. The 15th Regiment was to advance toward Kangwha, and an element of the division was given mission to take Inchon.
There are an ample number of captured North Korean documents that show concrete actions after the movement of the two regiments from Sariwon to Jaeryong to assembling points, 8 km north of Kaesong between June 13 and June 18. After arriving at Bingodong just north of Kaesung, the commander of the 13th Regiment gave an oral order at 18:35 on June 23, which is the only known North Korean combat order at the regimental level. The mission of the 13th Regiment was to capture Kaesong and to advance southward to force a river-crossing operation on the Han River. It mentions that the preparation for attack should be finished by 24:00 on June 23. The contents of the order written down in an officer's notebook can be checked against the mission given to the regiment in the operation plan of the North Korean 6th Division in the Razuaev report. Both coincide with each other in contents except in detail.

Although the Razuaev report mentioned "counterattack" in describing the initial battles of the North Korean units in Kaesong, a captured memo of a North Korean officer serving in a battalion of the 13th Regiment shows a vividly real situation of units from the eve up to the outbreak of the war. His unit arrived at Bingodong just north of Kaesung at 21:30, June 24, and began to prepare for the attack. Soldiers were distributed rations for the next day's breakfast beforehand at 24:00. During the night, his battalion commander returned to the unit after having had confirmed with the regimental commander the timing of the attack set by the order, according to which the artillery was to start bombardment at 4:40 and the infantry to launch the assault at 5:00. The timetable was as follows: to occupy starting positions at 2:30 of June 25, to begin the attack at 4:40 and to begin assault at 5:00. Upon receiving orders, company commanders led their men to starting positions and had the latter concealed. It was raining and soldiers underwent many hardships. However, when the time for action arrived, the expected artillery fire did not begin. In reality, the artillery bombardment was postponed by the higher command, as the latter considered that the effect of gunfire would be not so good because of mist. At 5:15, the artillery opened fire and the infantry sprang into attack at 5:25. His unit rushed into the enemy positions and easily occupied them. In this fairly detailed account of battle scenes, we do not find any hint that his unit encountered advancing South Korean soldiers whatsoever.

Another captured notebook of an officer serving in the 13th Regiment illustrates the fact that North Koreans in this sector did prepare the attack very carefully. It records the following scribbles:

On June 16: assembly of the unit.
On June 18: investigation of the depth of the Han River between Inchon and Seoul
On June 23: high-ranking advisors gave following instructions
  Operation for Unification
  Signals and [need of] uniformity in using them
  Need to continue advance under any circumstances
On June 25: at 4:40 a.m. preparation for the artillery bombardment; at 5:25 began attack; at 6:40 assaulted on Kaesung.”

Having received sudden blows accompanied with tank fire from the North, the 12th Regiment of the South Korean 1st Division lost Kaesung within two hours after the war began. The regiment, which was filled with only one half of its personnel because of overnight parlor given to soldiers on the previous day, could not sustain the assault and dispersed quickly. The North Korean Regiments quickly drove South Korean soldiers out of the Yonan peninsula on the first day, and reached the southern end of the peninsula and prepared tomorrow’s landing. On the morning of June 26, an advance party of the 13th Regiment, the North Korean 6th Division, could cross the Han River using civilian boats. However, advance of the landed party toward Kimpo airfield was delayed because the North Korean 6th Division failed to make sufficient artillery pieces and tanks cross the Han River until June 28 owing to strafing and bombing of American fighters actively participating in the war from June 27 and hard fighting by a growing number of South Korean soldiers in the area."

Seoul Area: Yonchon and Pochon

Seoul was the main objective of the North Korean operation plan. The plan assigned four infantry divisions and one tank brigade to this area. The North Korean 1st Division with a tank regiment attached was to break the 38th parallel first and then cross the Imjin River to approach Seoul from the direction of northwest. Since the division was to cross the Imjin River and to take an important part in occupying Seoul, the only pontoon battalion the army had was assigned to this division. The 4th Division was to advance from Yonchon through Tongduchon to Uijongbu and the 3rd Division from Yongpyong through Pochon to Uijongbu with two regiments of the 105th Tank Brigade attached to these two divisions. These divisions were given mission to attack Seoul on the second day of the war. The 13th Division kept in reserve in Tosong was to follow them."

As for North Korean activities in this area, a number of captured documents have long been examined and scrutinized by historians. A reconnaissance order issued to the North Korean 4th Division on June 18,1950, and the Combat Order No. 1 issued by the commander of the
division on June 22, 1950, have long been considered as apparent evidences of the preplanned attack of the North Korean Army on the South. However, Cumings, who had tried to find the original documents written in Korean but found that they were not kept in the National Archives, suspected the authenticity of the documents. Since he doubted the fact that Russians were involved in the planning of the war, the existence of captured Russian materials embarrassed him and he suspected the authenticity of photostatic copies of the Russian original. Now with the Razuvaev report in hand as well as with the knowledge that Russian advisers gave a hand in drawing the divisional operation orders, there is no ground to doubt the authenticity of those captured documents.

Apart from the operation documents on the division level already known, a number of captured documents of lesser units in the North Korean 3rd and 4th Division illustrate that North Korean troops carried out preparation for the war carefully in this area. Captured documents of the artillery regiment of the 4th Division, as well as those of a battalion under the regiment, show that units of the 4th Division Artillery Regiment carried out a reconnaissance mission, planning artillery fire systematically. The artillery regiment produced on June 22 and 23 "Fire Plan," "Reconnaissance Directive No. 1," "Reconnaissance Map," "Maneuver Plan of Units," and other documents. Some of the documents were signed by the commander, Ro Shuk Sung, of the 16th Regiment, to which the 3rd Battalion of the artillery regiment was attached. A political officer of a self-propelled gun battalion of the North Korean 3rd Division made a report on the political mood and high morale of soldiers expecting "Unification War" on June 21. Soldiers were informed by political officers of the South Korean government's objection to the North Korean proposal of peaceful unification as a means of encouraging soldiers' hostility toward the South.

Some captured North Korean documents record detailed actions of units in this area on the eve and on the morning of June 25. The 1st Battalion of the 4th North Korean Division Artillery Regiment began to write a [Daily] War Diary, which had been written up to the date of August 15. On activities of the unit on June 24, the record is written, "All preparations for battle have been completed by 24:00." In the diary entry of June 25, the writer wrote, "Received the order to begin attack at 4:40 of the 25th from the regimental artillery commander." This diary on the same date recorded that the artillery opened fire at 4:40 and the infantry troops [of the 18th Regiment of the 4th Division that it supported] began to attack at 4:50 under the support of the artillery fire and successfully crossed the [Hantan] river and took the
first and the second lines of enemy positions."

In the battle reports three battalion commanders of the 7th Regiment of 3rd North Korean Division reported to their regimental commander on June 29, 1950, it is shown most vividly how the North Korean soldiers on the 38th parallel acted on the very morning of June 25. These units were to attack on the Chorwon-Seoul main road. Soldiers moved into starting positions just north of the 38th parallel on the night of June 24/25 and awaited a signal to attack in the rainy weather. The 1st Battalion occupied the starting positions at 2 o'clock, June 25, awaited an order for attack, and sprang out of trenches to attack at 5 o'clock following the regimental commander's sign of go. The 2nd Battalion departed the assembly area at 8 o'clock on June 24 and arrived in starting positions at 3:30 on June 25. It began to attack 20 minutes later than the artillery, which began to fire at 4:40. The commander of the 3rd Battalion reported that his companies occupied starting positions at 3:30 and began attack at 5 o'clock. Although the battle reports describe fairly minute events in the morning, one cannot find any statement of South Korean soldiers' advance to the north before the beginning of the North Korean artillery's bombardment at 4:40. A commander in charge of the most advanced North Korean tank company in this sector wrote his experience in a military journal issued in August 1950. The tank company began to advance at 7:15 and arrived at Pochon around noon.

It is obvious that the North Korean units attacked the South Korean Army first in this area as well. The attack in the direction of Seoul began at 4:40, 40 minutes later than that on the Ongjin peninsula. There is no need to repeat the process of the battle for Seoul in detail, about which many books have been written. The South Korean 7th Division was caught by surprise and retreated in dismay on that morning. Although it recovered from the initial disorder in the afternoon of June 25 around Uijongbu and launched a counterattack with the help of a segment of the 5th Division on the next morning, it failed. Frequently, soldiers with no effective weapon to destroy North Korean tanks began to retreat upon seeing the appearance of the T-34 tanks. However, some units put up with the attack heroically, trying suicidal attack on the tanks by using a bunch of explosives usually made of grenades and an 81mm mortar shell. The North Korean 3rd and 4th Divisions supported by tank units could enter Seoul in the early morning of June 28. Accomplishment of the mission to occupy Seoul by these two divisions was delayed by two days against the operational plan. Still, the 1st North Korean Division could not enter Seoul on June 28, encountering the stiff resistance of the 1st South Korean Division around Munsan and Bongilchon.
The performance of the two North Korean divisions in this area was highly praised by the North Korean government for capturing Seoul, and the occupation of Seoul within four days was indeed an achievement for the recently created army. However, the Soviet advisers were somewhat critical of the army’s performance, especially of the leadership of high-ranking generals and officers. They lacked initiative and boldness to achieve more than those objectives assigned in the operation plan. Especially, the Soviet advisors accused North Korean commanders of neglecting the importance of speed and successive pressure on the enemy in the offensive. The commanders in the 105 Tank Brigade were criticized for losing time to capture a bridge on the Han River in advancing toward Seoul.

Chunchon and Hongchon

Although Seoul was the most important objective for the North Korean Army, Soviet military advisers put great importance on operations of the 2nd and 12th Divisions and the 12th Motorcycle Regiment, which were to occupy Chunchon on June 25 and Hongchon on June 26 and then to advance quickly to the southwest direction to cut the rear of the main force of the South Korean Army in Suwon. The newly created 15th Division was to be kept in reserve in Kimhwa. It depended on successful operations of the 2nd and 12th Divisions whether the North Korean Army could succeed in encircling the main South Korean force around Seoul.

The 2nd Division arrived in Hwachon north of the 38th parallel on June 17 and prepared the attack. According to a captured document of the 2nd Division, commanders and staff officers carried out a command reconnaissance on June 21. The engineer units attached to the Division carried out the mission of lifting South Korean mines laid just south of the parallel from 7 o’clock p.m. June 24 to 4 o’clock a.m. June 25 in order to guarantee a smooth advance of the attacking 4th Regiment of the division toward Chunchon.

The 12th Division, which was to advance to Hongchon, arrived in Inje (north of Hongchon) somewhat late for unknown reasons on June 23. Although the division was composed of mostly battle-experienced Korean-Chinese soldiers, the late arrival of the division must have had a harmful effect on preparatory work for the impending operation.

On this front, the two divisions achieved a surprise to the enemy and advanced successfully on the morning of June 25, but they soon encountered a number of difficulties and could not continue the advance as expected. The problems for these divisions were mixed. Generally the high mountains and narrow roads running through stiff valleys in this area deprived the North Korean units of freedom of
action; the South Korean 6th Division was quite well prepared for battle by exploiting this advantage of the terrain. Especially, the South Korean 6th Division was keeping an eye on the front because it knew from reconnaissance activities that a significant number of North Korean troops and pieces of mechanized equipment were concentrated on the north of the 38th parallel, although it did not consider the concentration as a preparation for an all-out attack on the South and failed to predict exactly when the enemy would attack or whether they would really launch an attack or not.

Retarded advance of the two divisions was caused by the stereotyped method of maneuver as well. The North Korean 2nd Division repeated frontal attacks along the road from Hwachon to Chunchon with self-propelled guns on June 25 and 26. The 7th Regiment of the South Korean 6th Division made an ambush attack on the advance party of self-propelled guns and succeeded in destroying two guns on the afternoon of June 25. Having retreated from the setback and reorganized disheartened troops, the 2nd Division reopened frontal attacks repeatedly along the narrow road and nearby flat grounds north of Chunchon, but South Korean soldiers and artillerymen played havoc with the 4th and 17th Regiments of the North Korean 2nd Division and could defend Chunchon until noon June 28. The progress of operations of the North Korean 12th Division was retarded by the skillful delaying actions of the 2nd Regiment of the South Korean 6th Division using successive mountain ridges and making an ambush antitank attack on an S-curve in a defile north of Hongchon on June 28. The North Koreans lost six or eight tanks in the engagement by the South Korean storm troops attacking with Molotov cocktails. Frightened by the casualties, the 12th North Korean Division became cautious in advancing and could reach Hongchon only on the night of June 30. The two divisions eventually occupied Chunchon and Hongchon, but the possibility of encircling the South Korean main force diminished. Delay of operations in this sector disrupted the hope of the North Korean Army to cut early the rear of the enemy and destroy them, which was the bold scheme of Russian planners of the invasion.

East Sea Coast

Although the East Sea Coast was considered a secondary and isolated battle area in the North Korean operation plan, the operational planners sought a small-scale encirclement under the cover of the Navy. They put the 1st Border Security Brigade, the 5th Division, as troops for the frontal attack along Sokcho-Kangneung road and had infiltration troops composed of one guerrilla-type regiment (the 766 Unit) and two
marine battalions (the 945 Unit) supported by the Navy land on several points along the sea coast south of the 38th parallel in order to cut the rear of the South Korean 8th Division in Kangneung."

As the plan demanded the North Korean Navy to ship the 766 Unit and the 945 Unit and to protect them in landing operations, the navy had torpedo boats and marine units in Wonsan base prepared for landing battle from the middle of June 1950. A captured file of "Morning Reports" of the Wonsan naval base is an interesting source to look into the navy’s participation in the war. It seems that preparation for the war in the navy was ordered around June 13-14. From that date on, the nature of training in the Navy began to switch from base training to fire exercises on the sea. It must have been that the Navy received a combat order around June 20. The entry of "Morning Report" of June 21 said, "We made each unit prepare a battle following the order from above." On June 23, the "Morning Report" recorded, "[Torpedo boats] Nos. 21,24,25,42,43 are docked in the 7th dockyard and other fighting boats are all mobilized to the sea. The 945 Unit, the 588 Unit are fully prepared for a battle."

The entry of "Morning Report" of June 24 said, "One anti-tank gun platoon was assigned to the general mobilization." It was reported in the "Morning Report" on June 25, "[Torpedo boats Nos.] 11, 12, 13, 14, 21, 23, 31, 32, 33, 34 departed Sokcho and crossed the 38th parallel."

On June 25, seven battalions of the 1st Border Security Brigade and the 10th Regiment of the North Korean 5th Division lunged across the 38th parallel at 5:40 under the artillery support of the 5th Division. The first wave of the landing troops, composed of two marine battalions and 1,000 partisan troops, landed on Aninjin south of Kangneung at 5 o’clock. The second wave, composed of 600 partisan troops (766 Unit), landed on Urchin south of Samchok.

Although the South Korean 8th Division, composed of only two regiments, the 10th and the 21st, was divided in Kangneung and Samchok, the division commander could succeed in delaying the North Korean attack by consolidating the troops in Kangneung and then delivering a defense battle on the north of Kangneung until June 28. After entering Kangneung, the 5th North Korean Division, replacing the advancing 1st Brigade as the spearhead attacking troops, pursued the South Korean 8th Division retreating from Kangneung toward Wonju but failed to catch up with it. The North Korean troops in this sector could occupy Kangneung on June 28 and Samchuk on July 3, but they failed to encircle and destroy the South Korean 8th Division, which was the expectation of operation planners.
Conclusion

In studying the Korean War, clarification of the war's actual beginning is not sufficient but necessary work for a proper understanding of the political nature as well as the origins of the war. In this paper, I tried to show the interconnection between the North Korean plans and preparations for the war and the military actions on the front at the outbreak of the war. As a result, we find that there is no doubt that the North was well prepared for the war and they were the first to break the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950, following a systematic operation plan.

In the light of this study, Cumings' scrupulous endeavor to show the possibility that the South Korean Army provoked the first attack on the Ongjin peninsula turns out to be a groundless hypothesis. There might have been exchanges of fire between the North and the South in several days before the outbreak of war, but they cannot be considered as a cause of the war. Kim II Sung knew far ahead in January 1950 that the South would not attack first, and he decided to choose a military solution from his side. Stalin, with Kim II Sung, concocted a provoking attack on the Ongjin peninsula to evoke a South Korean response and to make it a pretext for an all-out attack of the North Korean Army. It was the event at early dawn on June 25 that Kim II Sung announced as a South Korean invasion. But it is clear now that the South Korean attack on that early morning of June 25, 1950, did not exist in reality except in propaganda of the North Korean government.

As for the North Korean Army's staying in Seoul for three days, the reason for it was not from a deliberate political consideration but mainly from military impediments. We can concede that there prevailed euphoria among the North Korean leaders on June 28 and 29, 1950, and they stopped the military action in the Seoul area for a day. However, the euphoria did not last long. They tried to make the whole army cross the Han River from the evening of June 29, and a part of the infantry troops with light artillery pieces succeeded in crossing the river, but they failed to make tanks and heavy artillery troops cross the river until July 3. Causes for the failure are many: they hopelessly lacked river-crossing vessels and equipment; the 105 Tank Brigade advanced too slowly to capture a bridge on Han River in time; South Korean soldiers fought desperately, devoting their lives in order to repulse North Korean attempts to cross the Han River; the 2nd and 12th Divisions and the 12th Motorcycle Regiment could not approach Suwon early enough to cut or to threaten retreating South Korean units; and an early participation in the war of fighters of the U.S. Fifth Air Force in Japan caused serious damages on the North Korean units that had been trying to cross the river since June 27. The casualties of the
North Korean Army between June 25 and July 5 were 7,396 with 1,593 men killed and 5,803 men wounded, which was no slight sacrifice.” The hypothesis that the North Korean leaders voluntarily stopped military action and were planning to make a negotiated peace with moderate South Korean politicians is simply against facts. The North Korean Army had a plan to occupy the whole area of South Korea. They continued fighting since the beginning of the war and resumed actions to cross the Han River in the Seoul area on June 29. In addition, there is no evidence that the North Korean leaders suggested a political proposal to discuss with South Korean politicians. In North Korean wartime newspapers, we only find the fact that the North Korean authority admonished South Korean politicians to give “voluntary surrender,” rather than inviting them to a negotiation table or to a political meeting for peaceful unification of the country.

If there remains an agenda for studying the issue of the war’s beginning, it would be whether Mac Arthur was aware of the timing of the North Korean invasion before the war. We need scrupulous documentary research on the issue. However, we have found so far, in a top secret G-3 report of the Far East Command, only the fact that the Korean problem had had a lower profile in comparison with the Formosa issue in MacArthur’s headquarters in Tokyo before the war, and it had no emergency operation plan except for a plan for evacuation of American diplomatic personnel and civilians in Korea to Japan in case of an all-out North Korean attack on South Korea.’

Notes

5 Cumings, op. cit, pp. 615-18.
8 It is a widely shared view of a group of scholars although they are not able to give concrete evidence. See Dong-Choon Kim, War and Society (in Korean) (Seoul: Tolbaegae, 2000), pp. 65-76.
10 General'nyi Shtab, Dal'nevostochnoe napravlenie [Geneal Staff, Far Eastern Bureau], "Zhurnal boevykh deistviy v Koree (c 25 iiunia 1950 g. po 31 dekabria 1951 g.)," Archiv TsAMO, Fond 16, Opis' 3139, Delo 133,11, 1-327.
11 National Archives [ will be abbreviated hereafter as NA ], RG 242 Captured Enemy Documents (North Korea); Sun-Joo Bang, "Introduction to Captured North Korean Documents, Part 1" [in Korean], Asian Culture, Vol. 1 (1986), pp. 41-156.
13 Ibid., p. 42.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
21 "N. K. preemptive strike plan in '50 made public in Russia," Korea Herald, April 30, 1992. The original title in the copy of the operation map was "Plan pervogo udrava KNA" (Plan of the First Strike of the Korean Peoples' Army) but was wrongly translated as 'preemptive strike plan' of the Korean Peoples' Army.
23 Ibid., pp. 59-60.
24 Razuvaev, op. cit., pp. 15-16.
31 Razuvaev, op. cit., p. 20.
33 Razuvaev, op. cit., pp. 18-22. It is notable that the report does not mention "occupation of Haeju by a South Korean unit," which Cummings believed had occurred.
34 Ibid., p. 23.
35 Sun-Joo Bang, op. cit., pp. 65 and 95.
36 Razuvaev, op. cit., p. 22.
37 NA RG 242 Captured Enemy Documents (North Korea) ATIS Doc. No. 200492 [an officer's memo] [in Korean].
38 "Diary of an officer named Han Sin Ho," quoted from Sun-Joo Bang, op. cit., p. 76.
42 NA RG 242 Captured Enemy Documents (North Korea) ATIS Doc. No. 200522 “A File on Combat Documents in a Artillery Battalion in Attack.” (in Korean)
44 NA RG 242 Captured Enemy Documents (North Korea) ATIS Doc. No. 200446 “War Diary”
45 Ibid.
46 NA RG 242 Captured Enemy Documents (North Korea) ATIS Doc. No. 200261 "Battle Report." (in Korean)
48 Razuvaev, op. cit., p. 43.
49 Ibid., pp. 15, 17, 28-29.
50 NA RG 242 Captured Enemy Documents (North Korea) ATIS Doc. No. 201103 "Preliminary Order." (in Korean)
52 Razuvaev, op. cit., p. 15.
53 Razuvaev, op. cit., pp. 18-37. Roy Appleman misidentified the 1st Border Security Brigade, which attacked first, as a vanguard toward Kangneung on June 25 as the 5th Division. It must be corrected. The 10th Regiment of the 5th Division was to follow the 1st Brigade as a reserve. The name of the marine regiment that landed on the east coast was the 945 Unit, not the 549 Unit as Roy Appleman identified based on POW
54 [The North Korean Wonsan Naval Base], “Morning Reports (May 1 to September 28, 1950).” (in Korean)
56 Bajanov & Bajanova, op. cit, p. 34.
57 For a good discussion on this issue, see Yong-Ho Kim, The Origins and Development of the Korean War [in Korean](Seoul: Doore Publishing Co., 1998), pp. 60-79.
58 Razuvaev, op. cit, pp. 18-41, passim.
59 General'nyi Shtab, Dal'nevostochnoe napravlenie, “Zhurnal boevykh deistvii v Koree,” p. 16.
60 Haebangllbo, July 3, 1950.
The South Korean Military and the Korean War

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The Weakness of the South Korean Forces and the Outbreak of the Korean War

Immediately before the Japanese surrender in the Pacific War (1941-5), there was one Korea, though it had been under Japanese colonial rule for 36 years. The 38th parallel, which the American policymakers hastily picked out as the operational boundary between U.S. and Soviet troops in the Far East at the last stage of the Pacific War, divided one Korea into the two, North and South. Soviet troops occupied North Korea, Americans entered the South, and the two sides began military occupation in the two Koreas. The latitude, which Washington policymakers conceived to be a temporary line to halt the further southward advance of Soviet troops and thereby physically eliminate the possibility of Soviet participation in the Japanese occupation, and to facilitate the process of establishing a Korean government “in due course,” however, began to embrace new political and military connotations. The two Koreas, even on a temporary basis, thus appeared. The status of and situations in the two Koreas were almost the same at the beginning of the military occupations. In both parts of Korea, people were very poor mainly because of the harsh Japanese mobilization for conducting the Pacific War. There were neither major factories, nor organized indigenous troops, nor influential political groups except the strong popular desire to establish a Korean government right away. Almost every well-informed Korean had a distinctive idea about the future of Korea and the nature of its government. As a result, "too many” political organizations and parties were formed, and, especially, the American military government judged that the Koreans were "too much” politicized. All in all, the situations in the two parts of Korea were almost identical as much as the status of being the occupied. The policies and strategies of the two
occupiers—the United States and the Soviet Union—toward Korea, however, were different. Despite the wartime agreement with the United States that Korea should be independent "in due course," which meant that a Korean government should be established after the period of multinational trusteeship, the Soviet Union was not enthusiastic about the idea of multi-tutorship for Korea. Instead, the Soviet authority was busy in communizing the northern half of Korea, trying to make it a stronghold for securing the entire Korean peninsula. The Chief Soviet Delegate, Colonel General T. F. Shtykov, made it clear, at the Joint Commission convened in Seoul on March 20, 1946, that Korea should be "loyal to the Soviet Union, so that it will not become a base for an attack on the Soviet Union" in the future. This Soviet position was directly contrary to the primary objective of the United States in Korea, that is, "to prevent Russian domination of Korea." Unable to find a compromised solution on Korea through the Joint Commission, the United States internationalized the Korean issue by turning it over to the United Nations. The Soviet Union, however, did not accept the U.N. resolution that a Korean government would be established through holding a general election throughout Korea, and the Soviet authority in North Korea rejected the entry of U.N. representatives. As a result, the two Korean governments were created, one in the South blessed by the United Nations and the other in the North brewed by the Soviet Union, in August and September 1948 respectively.

After the North Korean government was established, the Soviet Union was quick and eager to help North Korea. It readily accepted the North Korean appeal that the occupation forces should be withdrawn as soon as possible, and informed the United States that it would pull out its troops from Korea by the end of 1948 and advised the United States to do likewise. When the Soviet occupation forces withdrew, they turned over heavy weapons and equipment to the North Korean forces, and the Soviet government provided more. Stalin, the Soviet premier, received the North Korean delegation headed by Kim II Sung, the North Korean premier. Kim II Sung asked Stalin for Soviet assistance to defend the seashore at the meeting in Moscow on March 5, 1949; Stalin indicated his willingness to supply North Korea not only naval ships but also military aircraft. On March 7, 1949, when Kim asked for Stalin's permission to "liberate the whole country through military means," however, Stalin did not accept the idea by reasoning that "First of all, the Korean People's Army does not have an overwhelming superiority over the troops of the South. Second, in the South there are still American troops, which will interfere in case of hostilities. Third, one should not forget that the agreement is in effect
between the USSR and the United States on the 38th parallel. If the agreement is broken by our side, it is more of a reason to believe that Americans will interfere.” In September 1949, Kim once again asked Stalin for military action against the South by saying that North Korean forces “are capable of occupying South Korea in two weeks, at the maximum, it will take two months.” Stalin ordered the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang to review the situation in Korea. After receiving the report from the Embassy in Pyongyang that the “North Korean Army was not strong enough to secure quick success, and, therefore, an extended fighting would provide Americans a good excuse to interfere in Korea and to agitate the Soviet Union elsewhere,” Stalin “ordered” Kim not to attack South Korea, except when the South started an offensive against the North. Likewise, the Soviet Union under Stalin was very eager to have North Korea prepared, but very cautious in permitting it to act.

In January 1950, however, the North Korean leadership was buoyed by several developments. The Soviet Union successfully conducted a nuclear test in August 1949, nullifying the American monopoly of the atomic bomb. Mao and the Chinese Communists established a communist government on October 1, 1949, and drove out the Chinese Nationalists to Taiwan by the end of the year. The United States remained indifferent and acquiesced in the newly formed status of China. Furthermore, the then-U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson made public that Korea and Taiwan were excluded from the exclusive U.S. defense perimeter in the Far East in his National Press Club speech on January 12, 1950. Having been encouraged, Kim II Sung and his associates invited the Soviet Ambassador Shtykov to the dinner party hosted by North Korea’s Foreign Minister Park Hon-young on January 17, 1950, stressing that “now when China is finishing its obligation, the next order of things is liberation of the Korean people in the South,” and that Kim was eager to have “the advice of comrade Stalin concerning the situation in South Korea.” On January 30, 1950, Stalin, through Shtykov, informed Kim II Sung that he was ready to help and meet Kim. At last, Kim II Sung secured “the green light” for his military adventure against South Korea, and Stalin was fully prepared to secure a "red" Korea.

Stalin’s support and direction for military action in Korea was swift and decisive. Stalin approved to strengthen the North Korean Army to 10 divisions and invited Kim to Moscow for in-depth discussion of the matter.” Kim II Sung and Park Hon-young arrived in Moscow on March 30, 1950, and stayed there until April 25, 1950, during which time Kim met Stalin three times. Stalin emphasized that a thorough preparation for war be a "must," and that a detailed plan of offensive
must be drawn. He urged Kim to consult with Mao Zedong about the possible American intervention and acquire the Chinese support in case of American interference, because "the USSR was not ready to get involved in Korean affairs directly, especially, if Americans did venture to send troops to Korea." Stalin promised to provide more weapons and mechanized means of movement and combat and emphasized the importance of having the North Korean forces fully mobilized by the summer of 1950. In the course of discussion about a detailed plan for the offensive, Stalin directed that "the highest bodies of power in North Korea make fresh proposals for peaceful unification. They'll be certainly rejected by the other side. Then, after they are rejected, a counterattack must take place." Thus, Stalin's support and guidance for the offensive in Korea was total, and the North Korean forces were fully reinforced to obtain "an overwhelming superiority" over those of South Korea.

Unlike the Soviet Union under Stalin, the United States, the sole "could-be" sponsor of South Korea, was not enthusiastic about arming the South Korean forces. In March 1949, when Stalin assured Kim II Sung of providing heavy weapons and equipment, the U.S. National Security Council recommended President Truman to postpone the withdrawal date from the end of 1948 to June 30, 1949, because of the internal unrest in Korea. When the South Korean president asked for the answer about what the United States would do "in case of a communist attack across the 38th parallel," US Secretary of State Dean Acheson suggested, "ask the United Nations for help." When Kim II Sung requested from Stalin the permission to launch a military offensive against South Korea, South Korean President Syngman Rhee "begged" President Truman for military aid, informing him that "we have ammunition available only for two days—we will not attack the territory north of the 38th parallel." Instead of military assistance, President Rhee received "an admonitory advice" from President Truman that the development of a sound economy was far more important than amassing an "insupportable," large military force." The U.S. Congress was not enthusiastic about providing aid to South Korea. President Truman was able to allocate only $10.97 million for South Korea for the fiscal year 1950, from which only a few hundred dollars' worth of signal wire reached Korea before the outbreak of the Korean War." U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson's remarks about the U.S. Defense Perimeter in the Far East on January 12, 1950, were a straightforward expression of the military and civilian policymakers in Washington at that time. Indeed, Korea was considered a burden rather than a responsibility and certainly not an asset to the American strategic vision.
The difference of the policies and strategies of the United States and the Soviet Union, in fact, created two different Koreas, especially in the military arena. Under Stalin's full support, the North Korean forces were armed with such heavy weapons and equipment as tanks, self-propelled and field artillery guns, and even military bombers and fighters. The North Korean army had 10 fully-armed divisions, three of which were "elite" and well-trained combat divisions to lead the offensive. Mao supplied North Korea with the Korean soldiers who had fought in the Chinese Civil War. Furthermore, the Soviet military advisers educated and trained the North Korean troops and were satisfied with their performance in the combined military exercises. Quite contrary, the South Korean forces were armed with mainly rifles, mortars, and a few light liaison aircraft. The South Korean army had only 8 undermanned divisions, four of which were forced to deploy in the southern part of South Korea in order to cope with the guerrillas in the mountainous areas. Most of them could complete only company-level training before the war broke out. One American military adviser even commented that "the South Korean forces were similar to those Americans in 1775 except enhanced patriotism." The Deputy Chief of KMAG (Col. John E. Baird) mentioned that "the South Korean forces were short of all weapons and equipments except rifles." After 5 years' sponsorship of the Soviet Union and the United States, the two Koreas became totally different, especially in their military muscles.

The comparative weakness of the South Korean forces was a clear fact from which North Korea and its sponsors judged that a quick victory in Korea could easily be secured and, therefore, constituted the major cause of the Korean War. Especially for Kim II Sung it appeared certain that the far superior North Korean forces could easily deprive the weaker South Korean forces of not only their capability but also their will to fight on, and obtain a complete victory before any effective American intervention materialized. The outcome of the battles at the first stage of the Korean War seemed to prove that these judgments and convictions were correct.

South Korean Molotov Cocktails against North Korean Tanks

The North Korean and border constabulary invaded South Korea at four o'clock on the morning of June 25, 1950. The scale and tactics of the attack indicated that the invasion had been thoroughly pre-planned and prepared. Massed artillery fire, coordinated columns of Soviet-made tanks (T-34s), and well-trained infantry overwhelmed the South Korean forces. The powerful, swift-moving tanks stunned the defenders and nearly enervated their will to fight, since they had no means to halt these iron-clad "monsters," and most South Korean
soldiers were seeing these tanks, self-propelled artillery pieces, and armored vehicles for the first time.

The South Korean forces did not match those of North Korea in number, training, weapons and equipments, and combat experience. They had been created, equipped, and trained for maintaining internal security and border stability. Coping with sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla activities instigated by North Korean infiltrators and local sympathizers, South Korean forces were forced to scatter throughout the country. Actually, four of the eight divisions were busy fighting guerrillas in the southern section of South Korea. Notably, the South Korean army had been on the alert for possible North Korean attacks for several weeks. But, on June 24, 1950, just one day before the actual North Korean invasion, the Army chief cancelled an emergent alertness order. Because of this "untimely" measure, only one-third of each of the four divisions deployed along the 38th parallel were in position along the border at the time the war broke out, which meant that one South Korean battalion had to fight against one North Korean division reinforced with tanks and self-propelled artillery guns. The South Korean forces had no weapons, not one tank, but six obsolete liaison aircraft. Furthermore, South Korean officers lacked combat experience.

Facing the formidable North Korean attack, South Korean troops had to fight almost barehanded. Upon knowing that 2.36-inch bazookas were not effective against the Soviet-made T-34s, they organized "a suicidal group," approached the tanks, and threw a bundle of hand grenades with Molotov cocktails into the turrets of the North Korean tanks. Moreover, after fighting for three days, South Korean forces were out of ammunition. Seoul fell into the hands of North Korean troops on June 28, 1950. South Korean forces were in no position to fight on. Without the outside help, it was impossible for them not only to recover the antebellum status quo but also to maintain the front itself.

Despite desperate but "heroic" actions and some success, the result of the initial battles was nearly a debacle. The 17th Regiment gave up the Ongjin peninsula, 1st Division in the Kaesung area retreated individually, the 7th Division in the Uijongboo sector was nearly disintegrated, the 6th Division in the Choonchun and Hongchun region, though it had inflicted heavy damages upon the North Korean 2nd and 12th divisions, could not hold on, and the 8th division of the East Coast, after the coastal road of retreat was cut off, was forced to withdraw through the inland road, leaving the coastal area undefended. Although the South Korean army committed 2nd, 3rd, and 5th divisions, academy cadets, and untrained soldiers to the battle, it could not halt the North
Korean forces. In fact, it was inconceivable for the South Korean forces alone to recover the 38th parallel, much less to continue any defensive operations."

Fortunately, the actions of the United States and the United Nations were swift and decisive. It was quickly decided to have American ground troops committed to the battle for a U.N. "police action" in Korea. In order to make American intervention practically meaningful, however, the South Korean forces should hold the Han River Line for "at least" a week, the period necessary for the deployment of American troops then stationed in Japan. The South Korean army hastily created the Combat Command in Seeheung, just below the Han River, assembled the retreating soldiers, organized them in "X mixed battalion," and deployed those mixed battalions along the Han River under the control of the "mixed Capital Division" and so on. On the other hand, the North Korean forces named the 3, 4, and 105 tank divisions as the "Seoul" division to commemorate the capture of Seoul. It was a queer contrast between the two prefixes, the "mixed" that was hastily attached to the South Korean battalions and divisions and the "Seoul" that was commemoratively affixed on the North Korean divisions. Anyway, the South Korean forces could hold the Han River Line until July 3, 1950, making American ground troops' engagement tactically meaningful.""
calling upon all U.N. members for "every assistance" to repel aggression in Korea. The U.S. Congress and the American public supported President Truman for his measures taken in dealing with the Korean incident. General MacArthur, the then-commander of the Far East Command, flew to Korea and was welcomed by the North Korean mortar fires fired from Seoul at the southern bank of the Han River. On the way back to Tokyo, MacArthur urgently requested President Truman to send U.S. ground troops to Korea. President Truman approved the request at the dawn of June 30, 1950. Once again, the U.N. Security Council adopted another resolution and empowered the United States to coordinate U.N. assistance and direct U.N. operations in Korea on July 7, 1950. The next day, President Truman designated the Joint Chiefs of Staff as his agents for the U.N. operations in Korea, and named General MacArthur as the commander of all U.N. forces in Korea. On July 14, 1950, South Korean President Syngman Rhee also put the South Korean forces under the operational control of the U.N. commander. By these measures, the United States and the United Nations fully intervened in Korea to save, as the U.N. Secretary General Trygve Lie termed, "one of the children of the United Nations," and all the forces fighting in Korea were operationally controlled by the U.N. commander.

However, the initial performances of the defending forces were not satisfactory. "Task Force Smith," the first contingent of U.S. troops, which MacArthur named "an arrogant display of American military muscle," lost more than half of its men and equipment after a single encounter with the North Koreans. U.S. 24th, the first division deployed, was outnumbered and the Division Commander, Major General William Dean, himself became a prisoner of war. South Korean forces that defended the middle and eastern front under the operational control of the U.S. 8th Army Commander Walton H. Walker, who was in charge of the actual military operations in Korea, were forced to withdraw despite the several tactical successes. On July 22, the 1st U.S. Cavalry and 25th Infantry Divisions were put into the battle area, but did no better. Furthermore, the North Korean 4th and 6th Divisions advanced through the southwestern part of South Korea in order to capture Pusan via Masan. Facing this formidable advance, General Walker decided to form a connected defensive line along the Nakdong River and, on July 29, 1950, ordered an orderly withdrawal across the Nakdong River for a final stand. The defending forces were trapped in the so-called "Pusan Perimeter," though, ironically, for the first time since the outbreak of the war, they formed a coordinated defensive line and zone as dictated by the field manual.

The battles along the Nakdong defense line were no less bitter than...
the previous ones. Despite the heavy casualties suffered by the continuous gunfire and air bombardments, the North Korean forces launched two formidable attacks across the Nakdong River, one in August and the other in September 1950. General MacArthur, who judged that securing the Pusan Perimeter was mandatory for the bold amphibious operations, deployed even the 1st Marines, designated as the main body for the landing, for the defense of the Perimeter. The South Korean forces fought fiercely for the defense of the north and northeastern part of the Perimeter, and the British ground troops joined the battle in the Perimeter's west and southwestern sector that the American forces defended. General Walker always formed ad hoc mobile reserve task forces and threw those into the counteroffensive wherever and whenever the front was being broken through by the North Korean troops. As a result, by September 12, 1950, the North Korean offensive was largely spent. North Korean "all-court-pressing" attacks were overridden by Walker's "all-court-filling" defense. The South Korean and U.N. forces won a defensive battle along the Nakdong River and prevented a Dunkirk in Korea, securing the base for a bold amphibious envelopment.

The dazzling success of the Inchon landing and the subsequent breakthrough across the Nakdong defensive line marked the counteroffensive phase of the fighting. After Inchon the North Korean forces collapsed. By connecting the landing and chasing forces, the North Korean troops were divided, and the main retreating road of the North Korean 1st Corps was cut off. Seoul was reclaimed on September 28, 1950. The South Korean and U.N. forces reached the 38th parallel by the end of September 1950. At the urgent order from President Syngman Rhee, the South Korean troops on the eastern coast crossed the 38th parallel on October 1, 1950, and entered Wonsan on October 10, 1950, making another amphibious operation on that city into an administrative landing practice. From this time on, especially, the South Korean and U.N. forces advanced to the North as if they had a race among the friendly units, disregarding the coordination with the adjacent units. In fact, the South Korean troops won the race. The 1st Division entered Pyongyang first. The 6th Division reached the Yalu River first. However, the front was not connected, and the units were scattered. The 8th Army in the western front and the 10th Corps in the east were not linked, leaving the mountainous area in the middle undefended. Furthermore, the advancing troops were not prepared for the severe winter in the North. Despite these pitfalls, however, it seemed that Korean unification, which had not been realized by the negotiations either in Seoul or New York, could be realized by military operations.
At this juncture of optimism, China entered the scene with its "volunteer forces," and the Korean War entered what MacArthur termed "an entirely new war." The Chinese forces crossed the Yalu River from October 19, 1950, on. At first, they tried to wipe out the spearheads of the South Korean 1st and 6th Divisions, advance to the rear of U.S. and U.N. troops and attack them simultaneously in the front and rear, and secure the territorial base for the further offensive. After securing the base above the Chongchun River, the Chinese troops retreated to the mountainous area and examined the strength and weakness of the U.S. forces for the next moves. By MacArthur's order, however, the 8th Army and the South Korean forces launched an "end-of-war offensive" on November 24, 1950, only to find that the Chinese forces intervened at full strength. MacArthur ordered the commanders of the 8th Army and 10th Corps to withdraw. The 8th Army and the South Korean troops in the western front retreated until they formed a defense line along the 38th parallel, whereas the 10th Corps and the South Koreans in the east were evacuated from Heungnam through ships by December 24, 1950. Making the situation worse, the 8th Army commander, General Walton H. Walker, who had defended the Pusan Perimeter by the order of "stand or die," was killed in a car accident near Uijongbu on December 23, 1950: In name and fact, the South Korean and U.N. forces were in chaos.

The Chinese offensive continued. Despite the Commander of the Chinese forces Peng Teh-huai's desire for the Chinese troops to recuperate for a while and to launch an offensive in the spring of 1951, Mao urged Peng to push back U.N. forces without a pause. The Chinese troops launched the third offensive on December 31, 1950, known as the "New Year's Offensive." Also, the Chinese forces launched their large-scale offensives in February, April, and May.

General Matthew B. Ridgway, the new 8th Army commander, who then commanded all U.N. forces including 10th Corps and the South Korean forces, tried to block the Chinese offensives through inflicting maximum damage upon the Chinese with superior firepower, while minimizing the casualties of the friendly forces by employing the flexible tactics of withdrawal and counterattacks. Understanding that the Chinese offensive would usually be spent within a week, Ridgway ordered to attack the Chinese immediately after their offensive so that they could not have time to reorganize and recuperate. Also, Ridgway stressed the close coordination with the adjacent units and the maintenance of the connected front in order not be infiltrated and encircled by the Chinese. In this judgment, Ridgway could easily give up Seoul again without enduring the heavy casualties for holding the city. But he emphasized the importance of offensive spirit based on the
traditional army slogan: "Find them! Fix them! Fight them! Finish them!" Through conducting a series of sensible counterattacks, Ridgway blocked the Chinese offensives and recovered the 38th parallel by the end of March 1951. The South Korean troops fought fiercely along with U.S. and U.N. soldiers. The battlefront was being stabilized.

While the South Korean and U.N. forces were fighting with the Chinese and North Koreans in the battlefield, General MacArthur was quarreling with Washington policymakers. Defining the Korean War as "an entirely new war" after the Chinese intervention, MacArthur had urged taking such bold measures as bombing Manchuria and a naval blockade of China. But Washington policymakers were annoyed by the fact that the United States was fighting with "enemy No. 2" in Korea, while "enemy No. 1" was enjoying the fighting. In other words, Washington was dismayed to learn that the United States was playing "a Soviet game." At this frustrating moment, MacArthur, who had complained that Washington imposed a strange strategy of "die for tie" upon him, disclosed his conviction that "there is no substitute for victory" in his letter to the then-minority leader of the House, Joseph W. Martin. This was a direct contradiction to the President Truman's view that "there is right kind and a wrong kind victory." MacArthur was removed on April 11, 1951. Ridgway was appointed as the new U.N. commander. Lt. General James A. Van Fleet was also named as the new 8th Army commander.

The dismissal of MacArthur typified a direct clash between the two concepts of war and victory. MacArthur, who had been trained to espouse the traditional concept, "In war, there is no substitute for victory," and had fought the Pacific War (1941-5) in that concept, could not and did not accept the notion of "limited war." President Truman and his advisers, however, could not tolerate the fighting with the second team—China—while the first one—the Soviet Union—remained untouched, and judged that even winning the war with China in Korea would not contribute to American prestige. The concept that "In war, there is a substitute for victory" was about to be materialized.

At last, the United States secured stability on the three fronts: the battlefront through conducting a series of determined counterattacks by the South Korean and U.N. forces; the diplomatic front in the United Nations by castigating communist China as an aggressor on January 31, 1951; and the Tokyo front by appointing a new military commander who was amenable to Washington's direction. Now Washington was prepared to find an "honorable" compromise in Korea by imposing the maximum military and political pressures upon the communists.

The South Korean and U.N. forces repulsed the Chinese offensives,
one in the west in April and the other in the east in May 1951, and secured the Kansas-Wyoming Line that had been designed to hold for the truce as a contact line. Recognizing that the major Chinese offensives had not been successful in dividing and encircling the defending units, Mao ordered Peng to conduct "a number of small operations against Anglo-American troops" based on the "hit and run" tactics in order to demoralize their combat spirit and self-confidence. Stalin was opposed to Mao’s tactics, saying that

“This tactic is a risky one; it can be applied successfully only once or twice. The British and Americans will easily understand the plan; ... they will not allow you each time to withdraw to the north without damage to the forces. ... there is no reason to believe that the Anglo-Americans are as stupid as Chang Kai-shek. ...”

Despite this Soviet advice, the Chinese troops were in no position to launch a major offensive because of the heavy casualties and the extreme shortage of supplies. Also, the 8th Army commander was not allowed to launch a large-scale offensive, and, instead, he was permitted to conduct a limited operation in order to push up the contact line or secure the high ground for defensive purposes. As a result, the battlefront was stalemated.

Armistice under Heavy Arms and some Frustrations

After the fierce fighting for almost one year, both sides, having acknowledged that the Korean issue was too complex to be settled by military means only, were obliged to find “a substitute for victory” in order to end the war.

Washington moved first. The American government made several fruitless attempts to obtain a signal from the communists in Paris, Hong Kong, and Moscow in early May 1951. After these futile efforts, Secretary of State Dean Acheson undertook the matter directly. In mid-May 1951, Acheson summoned George F. Kennan, who was then on leave from the State Department studying at Princeton, to Washington. Acheson asked Kennan to contact Jacob Malik, the Soviet delegate to the United Nations, and clarify American intentions in Korea and probe those of the Soviet Union. On June 1, 1951, the two diplomats met at Malik’s residence on Long Island, where Kennan delivered to Malik American intention to settle the Korean War by negotiations and asked the Soviet position on the issue. Unable to give an outright answer to the question, Malik arranged another meeting on June 5, 1951, at which...
Malik told Kennan that the Soviet Union desired a peaceful settlement in Korea as soon as possible. Malik also advised that the United States should approach the North Koreans and the Chinese directly, since the Soviet Union would not participate in the discussion of a cease-fire. By this, the United States and the Soviet Union were willing to end the fighting by negotiations.

Moscow moved next. While the American government was fumbling around for a face-saving procedure for the initiation of the truce talks, Malik, in his U N. radio speech on June 23, 1951, suggested an initial step for the talks by saying that "As a first step discussions should be started between the belligerents for a cease-fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel." The Soviet government confirmed that Malik's view was its position, clarifying that the Soviet government desired to conclude an armistice without touching any political or territorial matters.

Washington policymakers discussed the matter of how to initiate the truce talks. State officials wanted to have the negotiations at the military level as the Soviet government had suggested. Military leaders were reluctant to assume the burden for initiating the talks, especially Air Force Chief General Vandenberg, who argued that "the burden of initiating talks should be imposed on the enemy by penalizing him more severely." However, policymakers in Washington decided to initiate and hold the talks through the military channel in the field, because by doing so it would be possible to exclude such thorny political issues as the status of Formosa and the Chinese representation in the United Nations.

By Washington's direction, the U N. Commander General Ridgway delivered a radio message on June 30, 1951, announcing that "... I am informed that you may wish a meeting to discuss an armistice. ... I propose that such a meeting could take place aboard a Danish hospital ship in Wonsan harbor." The response of the communists was quick. On July 1, 1951, Peking radio broadcast a joint message from the North Korean and Chinese Commanders in Korea that

We are authorized to inform you that we agree to meet your representative for conducting the talks concerning cessation of military action and establishment of peace. We propose that the place of meeting be in the area of Kaesong on the 38th parallel; if you agree, our representatives are prepared to meet your representatives between July 10 and 15, 1951.

After several preparatory meetings, both sides agreed to meet in Kaesong on July 10, 1951. At last, the two sides in Korea were
prepared to open the talks in order to search for "a substitute for victory."

However, it was extremely difficult for both parties to reach an agreement on the contents of "a substitute for victory." Despite both sides agreeing on the agenda on July 26, 1951, the communists insisted that the 38th parallel be the demarcation line, whereas the U.N. side asserted that the demarcation line be the contact line. Unable to find common ground on the demarcation line, the communists unilaterally called off the meeting on August 23, 1951. Ridgway immediately intensified military actions, including bombing of Najin that had been intentionally excluded from the target list. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, being determined to use the atomic bomb if American troops faced "a military disaster," obtained President Truman's approval and ordered the U.S. Air Force to conduct a "simulated atomic strike" in Korea to demonstrate American determination and capability of using the bombs if necessary. The U.S. Air Force carried out several mock atomic strikes in Korea under the code name "Hudson Harbor" in October 1951. Perhaps thanks to an intensified U.N. military pressure and a U.N. apology on the accidental strafing of Kaesong on September 10, 1951, the communists agreed to hold the talks at Panmunjom, south of Kaesong, the place on the then-contact line. The meetings at Panmunjom, however, showed how tortuous the road to an armistice could be.

After the tangled back-and-forth arguments on the demarcation line, both sides agreed to the contact line fixed by the staff officers on November 27, 1951. Furthermore, the two sides agreed that the fixed line with a demilitarized zone of 4 km would become the demarcation line if the two belligerents signed the armistice within 30 days, no matter what changes were made during this period. Although the agreement on a provisional demarcation line did not constitute a de facto cease-fire, it itself actually eliminated the possibility of either moving up the Yalu River or being pushed down to the Nakdong River in the battlefield. There appeared "a substitute for victory."

The next thorny issue was the prisoner of war problem on the principle of "voluntary" or "forced" repatriation, without which the fighting in Korea could have ended sooner. After the initial vacillations, the U.N. side upheld the principle of "voluntary" repatriation of the POWs, whereas the communist side strongly asserted the "forced" repatriation of all war prisoners. The very fact that there were many communist POWs who did not want to be repatriated was a vital blow to the communist propaganda that a communist world would be a "paradise" for all people. By the same token, the fact would be a good propaganda resource for the free world, especially the United
States. President Truman was determined to uphold the principle of free exchange of POWs in February 1951 by declaring that "the United States would not and could not accept an agreement demanding the forced repatriation of those prisoners-of-war whose lives would be endangered, ... so I refused to agree to any solution that provided for the return against their will of prisoners-of-war to communist domination."

On the issue of principle in dealing with the war prisoners, Stalin was no less determined than Truman. Stalin cabled Mao that "your firm position has already given positive results and must make the adversary agree to further concessions." There was no room for compromise for the two leaders of the ideologically divided East-West blocs on the issue of ideological principle.

As the talks stalled, the military actions in the battlefield were intensified. Mao had asked Stalin to provide weapons and equipment necessary for arming 60 divisions. Stalin, promising Mao to supply weapons and equipment for 10 divisions in 1951 and for other the 50 divisions in 1952, 1953, and the first half of 1954, insisted that

The Americans in general are not capable of conducting a big war, especially, after the Korean War. All their strength is in air raids, in the atomic bomb. America cannot defeat a small Korea. Firmness is required in dealing with America. Chinese comrades must know that if America doesn't lose this war, then the Chinese will never get Taiwan."

The battles continued all along the contact line to secure the high ground, impose heavy casualties on each other, and demoralize the will of the opposing troops. The U.N. Command bombed North Korean power plants, railroads, and communication lines to demoralize the North Korean fighting will and block the flow of supplies to the front. The fighting at the stalemate front was no less severe than before.

The death of Stalin became a breakthrough in the deadlocked talks for the truce. On March 19, 1953, the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union made a decision to end the war in Korea, and informed Mao and Kim II Sung of the decision. On the morning of March 29, 1953, the Soviet special envoys, Kuznetzov and Fedorenko, personally informed Kim II Sung that the Soviet government had decided to change "the strategy in Korea: from war to peace," and delivered the Soviet document of the Council's decision to Kim. They reported Kim's reaction by saying that "Kim II Sung heard our comments and became very agitated." By the Soviet decision and action, the communist side abandoned its insistence on the ideological principle in dealing with the POWs and hastened the process of the armistice talks.
The long battle for the principle of voluntary repatriation was over, and the U.N. Command won an ideological battle in Korea."

Both sides began to work on the demarcation line, reflecting the changes that had resulted from the battles fought since November 27, 1951, and finally agreed to a modified demarcation line on June 17, 1953. Despite the signing procedure yet to be agreed, the armistice in the Korean War was about to be realized. In fact, there was "a substitute for victory."

In order to secure "a substitute for victory" in Korea, the United States tried to implement the two kinds of measures: one military and the other political. Recognizing that the very weakness of the South Korean forces had provoked the "unprovoked" North Korean invasion, and that strong South Korean fighting capability was required for conducting the fighting, the United States tried to strengthen the South Korean forces step by step. The United States military approved the ceilings of the South Korean Army: 250,000 (10 infantry divisions and supporting units) on April 18, 1951; 357,000 (3 Corps, 10 infantry divisions and 10 division artillery, and supporting units) on June 25, 1952. Finally, on May 15, 1953, the United States approved 655,000 (1 Army, 4 Corps, 20 infantry divisions, and supporting units) as the ceiling in the after-truce period. ‘By these measures, the South Korean Army became a strong one, far different from the one of 90,000 men armed with rifles before the war. The South Korean Navy was also strengthened from the one with 28 patrol boats and 6,000 men before the war to the larger one armed with 59 battleships and patrol boats and 12,000 men. The South Korean Marines was enlarged from 1,200 to 22,200.’ Also, the South Korean Air Force became strengthened from the one with 22 light liaison aircraft and 1,800 men before the war to the strengthened one armed with 110 aircraft, including 80 F-51 fighters, and 11,000 men. ‘After the three years of fighting, in quantity and quality of the combat power the strength of the South Korean forces was far superior to that from before the war. Military measures to guarantee the armistice in Korea materialized.

Politically, in order to deter another communist adventure and ensure the armistice in Korea, the United States and U.N. members planned to issue a "greater sanctions" declaration, warning of the grave consequence of any renewed aggression in Korea. However, President Syngman Rhee of South Korea, having experienced that a U.N. security guarantee could not deter the North Korean invasion, demanded a bilateral security pact with the United States, the one like NATO. Rhee, who had mobilized almost all South Koreans against a truce, acted for his cause. On the night of June 17-18, 1953, by Rhee's order, more than 25,000 anti-communist Korean POWs escaped from the four
major prison camps with the full connivance of the South Korean security guards.” President Rhee readily accepted his responsibility, by saying that "...the anti-communist Korean War prisoners should have been released long before this..." "Communism is still our principal enemy in Korea” was President Eisenhower’s response to Rhee’s "presumptuous” action.” But Washington accepted the option that the United States would enter into a mutual defense treaty with South Korea, similar to the one with the Philippines and the ANZUS, provided that the South Korean government would agree to an armistice and the UNC control of its forces.

In this way, the United States swallowed “a substitute for a greater sanctions declaration” to save “a substitute for victory,” that is, a mutual defense pact to secure an armistice. The armistice in Korea, a viable compromise between "no more blood" for the United States and "no more aggression" for South Korea, was about to be implemented under heavy arms and some frustrations.

ROK-US Security Alliance and the Deterrence of another Korean War

The mutual defense treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States, "a substitute for actual fighting," opened a new era in relations between the two countries. By this treaty—which was initialed in Seoul on August 8, 1953, signed in Washington on October 1, 1953, and finally ratified by the South Korean Assembly on January 14, 1954, and by the United States Senate on January 26, 1954—the United States became the sole protector of South Korea against the communists and assumed unilateral responsibility for the security of South Korea, an obligation which it had tried to avoid since its temporary occupation. Also, by this treaty, the South Korean government was prohibited from taking any "unlawful means" to change the status quo in Korea. In this sense, the treaty strongly urged both Koreas not to use any "violent means" for the sake of changing the status quo that had been established as a result of fighting in the Korean War.

After nearly fifty years, the security alliance between South Korea and the United States, which was formalized by the mutual defense treaty and has been visualized by the presence of American forces and the combined command structure of the two nations’ forces, still remains in force as the backbone of an allied relationship between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America, deterring another Korean war and, therefore, in a practical sense, promoting rapprochement in Korea. In this sense, the strong South Korean military, which had been mandatory for the actual fighting in the
Korean War, has become an imperative element for making the ROK-U.S. security alliance meaningful, another military adventure in Korea impossible, and any political rapprochement on Korea viable in the future.

Notes

1 SWNCC Meeting Minutes, August 12, 1945, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1945, VI, p. 645; Memo by Dean Rusk, July 12, 1950, Ibid., p. 1039; James F. Schanbel, Policy and Direction: The First Fear (Washington, D.C: G. P. O., 1972), pp. 8-9. Stalin accepted the 38th parallel by not making any comment on the American proposal, see Stalin to Truman, telegram, August 16, 1945, enclosed in Memo, From Admiral Leahy to General Marshall, April 29, 1947, Record Group (RG) 59, 740.00119 Control (Japan) /4-2947, National Archives (NA), Washington, D.C., USA.


4 The Special Representative in Korea (John J. Muccio) to the Secretary of State, September 18, 1948, FRUS, 1948, VI, pp. 1305-6; The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Secretary of State, September 19, 1948, Ibid., p. 1306.

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11 Ibid.
37 Coded message N 3282, May 29, 1951, the 8th Directorate of the General Staff, Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, Archives of the President of Russia, p. 1, quoted in Ibid.
40 Kirk to Secretary of State, FRUS, 1951, VII, pp. 553-4, 560-1.
41 Acheson, The Korean War, p. 121; The JCS and National Policy, III, p. 566, RG 218: Records of the JCS, NA.
42 Ibid.
44 Ridgway to the JCS, July 2, 1951, FRUS, 1951, VII, p. 609.
45 Memo for the Secretary of Defense, sub.: The Military Effectiveness and Desirability of Employing Atomic Weapons Tactically in Korea, August 14, 1951; Messages to Commander-in-Chief, the Far East Command, and Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, Commander in-Chief, the Pacific Command, undated, Selected Records Relating to the Korean War, DoD., Truman Papers, Truman Library; The JCS and National Policy, III, p. 614.
46 Ridgway to JCS, November 27, 1951, FRUS, 1951, VII, pp. 1186-8; The JCS and National Policy, III, pp. 621-2.
56 Ibid., June 28, 1953.
American Strategy and the
Korean Peninsula, 1945-1953

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"By strategy," John Lewis Gaddis wrote in his seminal book Strategies of Containment, "I mean quite simply the process by which ends are related to means, intentions to capabilities, objectives to resources." My intention here is to employ this definition in examining the American course in Korea from the origin of the war there in the country’s division in 1945 to the aftermath of fighting in 1953. My approach is to analyze a series of key US decisions, from the one to divide the peninsula at the 38th parallel in August 1945 to the ones to conclude a military pact with the Republic of Korea and to issue a “greater sanctions” statement immediately following an armistice in July 1953. My argument is that it took a destructive war before US policymakers successfully matched ends and means in Korea in a manner that ensured future stability. Unfortunately, though, that congruence also ensured indefinite division.

I

The United States intervened in Korea in 1945 to contain Soviet expansion. A State Department paper of October 1943 concluded that,

Korea may appear to offer a tempting opportunity [for Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin]... to strengthen enormously the economic resources of the Soviet Far East, to acquire ice-free ports, and to occupy a dominating strategic position in relation both to China and Japan.... A Soviet occupation of Korea would create an entirely new strategic situation in the Far East, and its repercussions within China and Japan might be far reaching.

Time reinforced such fears, as China’s weakness became increasingly apparent as the war progressed. US President Franklin D. Roosevelt had hoped that China would become one of the world’s "four
policemen," replacing Japan as the major power in East Asia to balance the Soviet Union. Yet China remained divided between the Nationalists and the Communists. The former, who made up the only recognized government in the country, were highly corrupt and inefficient. They appeared less and less likely to be able to unite and rule China once Japan was defeated. Furthermore, to defeat Japan at the lowest cost possible to the United States, Roosevelt hoped to lure the Soviet Union into the fray once Germany had surrendered. To achieve this objective, he conceded to Stalin at Yalta in February 1945 the Kurile Islands, the southern half of Sakhalin, and special privileges in Manchuria. In July 1945 Stalin attempted to gain additional concessions on Manchuria in negotiations with the Nationalists. Meanwhile, no firm agreements had been made on Korea, although at Yalta it appears that Stalin accepted Roosevelt's proposal for a multipower trusteeship there. With Soviet forces approaching readiness to enter the war against Japan, the prospect loomed that they would overrun all of Manchuria and Korea, thus putting Moscow in a position to dictate future conditions in those strategic areas.

Combined with new projections of military events in the western Pacific, this context led Harry S Truman, the new president, to entertain alternative possibilities regarding Korea. When the United States successfully tested an atomic device in mid-July 1945, the prospect emerged more strongly than ever before that Japan would collapse without a ground invasion of its home islands, which was not scheduled to commence until the following November. The Soviet Union, it had been thought, would enter the war well before that and thus would probably control Korea when the fighting stopped. If the war ended sooner, however, say in August, the United States might get troops to Korea to accept the Japanese surrender there before Soviet forces arrived. This scenario became all the more plausible as negotiations proceeded at the Potsdam summit from July 16 to 26, where Stalin mentioned that Soviet forces would not be ready to move against Japan in Manchuria before the middle of the next month.

On August 8, however, the Soviet Union, perhaps anticipating an early surrender by Tokyo in the aftermath of the American use of the atomic bomb against Hiroshima two days before, declared war on Japan. Although the major Soviet military thrust was into Manchuria, by August 11 small Soviet units had entered Korea in the extreme northeast. General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of US forces in the western Pacific, insisted on continuing to mobilize his forces for a massive occupation of Japan rather than diverting major units for a rush to Manchuria or Korea. In any event, Washington believed that the Soviets possessed a sizable head start in occupying the peninsula.
The combination of MacArthur's views and the perception of conditions in Korea led top planners in Washington to reject the possibility of rushing US forces there to occupy the entire country. Rather, they suggested that Truman wire Stalin with a proposal that the 38th parallel serve as a dividing line between Soviet and American occupation forces. Truman agreed and the message was sent on August 15, only hours after Japan surrendered. Stalin accepted the proposal the next day.

The US decision here is subject to criticism on numerous grounds. For one thing, it grossly overestimated the lead of Soviet forces in Korea, which included only two divisions to Japan's nine and were bottled up along the coast in the extreme northeast. Washington was surprised that Stalin readily accepted the 38th parallel, but he might have accepted one still further north so long as it left him a buffer to Soviet territory. To have refused to do so under US pressure would have risked an early airlift of American troops to the peninsula and perhaps even Japanese cooperation with the United States against the Soviets. A second American miscalculation was of the difficulty of occupying Japan, to the accomplishment of which MacArthur insisted on concentrating nearly all of his forces. As it turned out, the Japanese were quite submissive and some US ground units could easily have been spared for a rapid movement into Korea. Although at the time some planners in Washington wanted to pursue this course, its feasibility is much more clear in retrospect.

For our purposes here, the most important point is that the US decision to move into Korea took place without any analysis of an occupation's sustainability over a substantial period of time. Washington assumed that Koreans were initially unprepared to govern themselves and that they were willing to submit, at least temporarily, to outside tutelage in the form of a multipower trusteeship. Washington apparently assumed as well that either political conditions within the United States were such as to enable American forces to stay in Korea indefinitely, or that such a stay was not necessary. The Americans, in sum, wanted to contain Soviet influence in Korea, but they failed to give close attention to the means required to accomplish that end beyond the short term.

II

By September 1947 this oversight had been rectified. American planners now recognized, first, that many Koreans would actively resist trusteeship or anything else short of independence and, second, that the United States was in a weak position to compete with the Soviet Union for continued influence on the peninsula. The American zone was in
considerable turmoil, for both political and economic reasons, and the US Congress seemed unwilling to provide adequate funds to sustain the military occupation much longer or to tackle the worsening conditions below the 38th parallel. With US-Soviet relations at an impasse in Korea and worldwide and American commitments to Europe and the Mediterranean rapidly expanding, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that the United States had "little strategic interest" in maintaining troops in Korea. In offensive operations in war, they believed, the United States would bypass the peninsula. Defensively, its control by the Soviet Union would complicate American "communications and operations in East China, Manchuria, the Yellow Sea, Sea of Japan and adjacent islands," but this problem was best neutralized through air action from Japan and Okinawa rather than with ground operations on the continent of Asia.

If this assessment produced strong pressure for a US withdrawal from Korea, it did not generate a consensus within the Truman administration that the peninsula could easily be written off. The State Department believed that the United States now had a substantial political stake in Korea as a result of its direct confrontation there with the Soviet Union. Because the two great powers had divided the country into occupation zones in 1945, had been unsuccessful in agreeing on terms for unification, and had pursued sharply divergent paths in their zones, the United States could not simply "scuttle and run." To do so would convey the message to allies and enemies alike that, when severe difficulties arose in an area for the United States, it was more likely to give up rather than to hang tough. State Department planners conceded that "ultimately the U.S. position in Korea is untenable even with expenditure of considerable... money and effort," but an attempt at graceful withdrawal was necessary to avert a blow to American credibility worldwide. This thinking led to a rejection of a Soviet proposal of late September '47 for a joint withdrawal from Korea by the end of the year, as this course surely would lead to civil war and an early victory for the better organized leftist forces dominated by the Communists.

The alternative chosen was to take the Korean issue to the United Nations General Assembly, which the United States dominated, in the hope of achieving approval for U.N. sponsored and supervised national elections to create an independent Korea. The Communists might come out on top through such a process, but at least it would be orderly and possess broad international sanction." A possible, even likely, alternative was that the Soviets would refuse to cooperate with the United Nations in their zone, in which case the United States would push for U.N. action in the South alone." This action would lead to
creation of an independent South Korea, which would be highly vulnerable to both internal subversion and outside attack. Hopefully independence and U.S. economic and military assistance would foster internal stability in the South and U.N. sponsorship would deter the Soviet Union from taking decisive action against it.

This last scenario was played out during 1948. Early in the year the Soviets refused to permit the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), created by a November 1947 resolution of the General Assembly, to operate in their zone. The United States then pushed the First Committee of the General Assembly to approve UNTCOK's operation in the South alone. Elections occurred below the 38th parallel on May 10, 1948, and because all leftists and many of their rightist counterparts boycotted the process, rightist forces led by Syngman Rhee emerged victorious. With UNTCOK approval, they proceeded to form a government, the Republic of Korea (ROK), which came into existence on August 15 with the inaugural of Rhee as its president. Late in the year, the U.N. General Assembly recognized the ROK as the only legitimate government in the territory under its control (meaning below the 38th parallel). Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had created an indigenous Communist government in the North, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Both governments claimed authority over the entire peninsula. In terms of both internal stability and military capability, the DPRK was considerably stronger than the ROK, so much so that Moscow was willing to withdraw its military forces at the end of 1948. The United States had refused to scuttle and run, but its ability to coordinate ends and means remained very much in doubt.11

Had the State Department alone constructed, funded, and executed American Korea policy, this coordination probably would have occurred. As it was, the diplomats had to work with a White House and a Congress stingy with funds for defense and a Pentagon faced with expanding commitments in Europe, the key region in the Cold War. Still, with highly unstable conditions prevailing in the ROK in late 1948, the State Department succeeded in delaying the withdrawal of the last 7500 U.S. combat troops from the peninsula. Already it had managed to steer through Congress a bill for economic aid that, unlike legislation the previous year, provided substantial funding for economic rehabilitation in Korea.12 The diplomats argued that, for the United States to simply leave the ROK to its fate after having taken the lead in its creation through the United Nations, would have a major psychological impact throughout East Asia and within the international organization.13
Yet in the spring of 1949 the U.S. government finally resolved to remove its remaining troops from Korea. A variety of domestic and international conditions produced this result.

U.S. military leaders were deeply concerned about evolving conditions both at home and abroad. In East Asia, the Communists were marching to victory in China with the assistance of tens of thousands of North Korean soldiers. The return of those soldiers to the DPRK would give it a huge advantage over the ROK, one which 7500 American soldiers in the South could not override. Thus those soldiers were likely to find themselves in an increasingly vulnerable position.

Equally important, Washington remained glued to a Europe-first strategy and was on the verge of committing the United States, through the North Atlantic Treaty, to the defense of the western half of the continent. With tensions high in Europe over the Soviet blockade of the western sectors of Berlin, military planners were anxious to strengthen American reserves at home so as to prepare for an emergency across the Atlantic. The U.S. war plan at the time envisioned a conflict breaking out in Europe, with the initial American effort concentrating on an atomic air offensive against Soviet territory and on maintaining a foothold on the continent, perhaps at the Pyrenees, and in the Middle East. In Asia operations would be restricted to a "strategic defensive" based on offshore islands.

This outlook grew partly out of the military's natural inclination to think in terms of preparing for a total war like World War II, but it gained reinforcement from the strict spending limits set by the president and Congress. This was an age in which people took balanced budgets and low taxes most seriously, and President Truman had domestic priorities to advance, which cost money. Moreover, atomic weapons appeared to provide for defense of America's foreign interests on the cheap. The State Department reluctantly went along with the desire of military leaders to withdraw from Korea. Economic and political conditions had improved somewhat in South Korea and, by some estimates, DPRK and ROK military forces were relatively balanced. The last American combat troops withdrew in June.

The diplomats did exact a price. The U.S. military advisory group in Korea was expanded and made permanent. Arms aid to the ROK continued, and now for an army of 65,000 rather than 50,000. In early June the Truman administration presented to Congress an economic assistance bill calling for $150 million to the ROK for the approaching fiscal year and its accompanying message from the president likened the aid program to that for western Europe. Finally, the State Department prepared a resolution for the fall session of the U.N.
General Assembly that would extend the life of the U.N. commission on Korea created the previous year. Hopefully the presence of this observer group would help to discourage the North Koreans from launching a major attack.

Despite his and his department’s ongoing concern about Korea, Secretary of State Dean Acheson failed to develop a course that deterred the Soviets from giving North Korea the green light or enabled the ROK to resist the enemy once it struck. The explanation rests in part on inattentiveness in the face of higher priorities in Europe and the limitations on intelligence, which viewed military attacks from the Communists as more likely against Taiwan and in Indochina than against South Korea. In the former cases, the United Nations was not involved and there was no Soviet-American agreement dividing the territory. In addition, American ground forces were stationed in Japan, nearby Korea but hundreds of miles from Taiwan or Indochina. In any event, the balance of conventional military power on the peninsula itself was not altogether clear and the North Koreans still were thought to have a chance of subverting the ROK through infiltration and guerrilla warfare. What information did come in of more aggressive North Korean intentions and military superiority tended to be from ROK officials who, it was feared, merely wanted more military aid so they themselves could take the offensive."

Domestic and bureaucratic politics also contributed to American unpreparedness in Korea. Despite the administration action of June 1949, new economic assistance was not passed by Congress until February 1950, and then only after the House of Representatives had rejected the legislation the previous month. Outside the State Department, the ROK had virtually no constituency in the United States and some members of the legislative branch were perfectly willing to hold aid to Korea hostage to the same for Taiwan. Acheson preferred no aid to Taiwan because he thought it would not save the island from the Communists while throwing them further into the hands of the Soviets. He remained willing to provide limited assistance, however, if it would help secure his Korean program. The Pentagon, in contrast, wanted more aid for Taiwan and, with the partial exception of the Army, could not have cared less about Korea."

Under the circumstances, it is understandable that Acheson did not do more on Korea than he did. He devoted considerable space to the peninsula in his National Press Club speech of January 12, 1950, hedging on the critical issue of U.S. aid to the ROK in the event it was attacked. Areas outside the American island defense perimeter in the western Pacific could not be guaranteed. In fact, "initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it;” but then they could look to “the
commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations, which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression." "Given the low level of defense spending and the military view that Korea was relatively unimportant, the most he could was attempt ambiguity.

Ambiguity was not enough in the face of developments in northeast Asia. Unknown to Acheson, North Korean Premier Kim Il-sung had been pressing Stalin to approve an attack on the ROK since the previous March. Stalin had demurred, only to begin to rethink the matter early in the new year. By this time, the Americans had withdrawn combat troops from the ROK, the Communists had emerged victorious on mainland China, and they had returned two divisions of Korean soldiers to the DPRK and established the People’s Republic in Beijing. Communist leader Mao Zedong was now in Moscow negotiating a political-military alliance with the Soviets. With signals emanating from Washington that the United States would not commit troops to South Korea’s defense, Stalin wired Kim Il-sung on January 30 that he was now willing to give favorable consideration to his desire to unite the peninsula by force. Early the next month, the Soviet leader approved Kim’s request for modern arms to equip three new North Korean army divisions. At the end of March, he welcomed Kim to Moscow for lengthy discussions of the project. Stalin dwelled on the improved “international environment” created by the Communist victory in China and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance concluded in February. With Mao’s approval and assurances of aid, the arrival of heavy equipment from the Soviet Union in the spring, and Soviet assistance in developing plans for a conventional attack, the DPRK was ready by late June to launch what it hoped would be its final campaign against the ROK.

Given what we now know of Stalin’s deliberations regarding a North Korean attack on the ROK, it was a tragic mistake for the United States to remove its last combat troops from Korea in 1949. Their maintenance there, along with the presence of US troops and air power in Japan and Okinawa, probably would have deterred the Soviet leader from giving Kim Il-sung the green light to attack south. And it is hard to believe that the presence of 7500 more troops in the United States would have tipped the scales in favor of NATO in defending western Europe against a determined Soviet attack.

Yet even without US combat troops in Korea, it remains possible that Stalin could have been deterred, as we know that he refused to give Kim the go-ahead until he thought a major American military intervention unlikely. Well publicized military exercises by American
forces in Japan and Okinawa for deployment to Korea, combined with inspection tours of the peninsula by top military brass from Washington, might well have conveyed a message of US commitment that would have led Stalin to shy away from supporting Kim’s designs. That no such activities occurred reflects the poor coordination of policy both in Washington between the State Department and the Pentagon and within the Pentagon itself, and between Washington and Tokyo, where General MacArthur reigned as in many ways a virtually independent sovereign.

IV

Why, in the face of the North Korean attack, did the United States suddenly return ground forces to the peninsula? The first point to be made is that the action did not represent a reversal of policy, but rather the end of one of ambiguity. The option of sending troops back into Korea had been considered in an army paper in June 1949. Then it was concluded that such action would be “unsound militarily” but possibly “necessary on the basis of political considerations....” No decision emerged on the paper at the time, probably in part because there appeared to be no pressing need for one and in part because divisions existed on the matter within the executive branch. Acheson’s ambiguity in his National Press Club speech six months later grew out of the same circumstances.

At the end of June 1950, ambiguity was no longer possible. For the first time in American policy circles, Korea was at center stage. By early on June 30, it was clear that, unless the United States committed troops, the North Koreans would overrun the South within weeks. Several other things also were clear. First, the ROK was threatened not because it was falling apart from within or it had launched an attack northward and was now suffering the consequences, but because DPRK forces had initiated an all-out attack southward, one which could not have been executed without Soviet help. This action represented aggression, a flagrant violation of the Soviet-American agreement of August 1945 and of UN resolutions recognizing the legitimacy of the ROK. Second, General MacArthur, the commander in the field, believed that two US combat divisions from Japan, joined by American air and naval forces in the area, could repulse the attack—and they could do so without compromising the defense of Japan. Third, there was no indication of direct Soviet or Chinese Communist intervention in Korea or of impending Soviet or Soviet proxy moves in other, more important areas. The conflict in Korea appeared to be an isolated event, thus justifying action outside the old category of total war. Fourth, broad support existed among allies abroad for strong American
measures, and if anything such support was even stronger at home. Under these conditions—which could not have been anticipated in advance—decisive action was warranted, Acheson thought, "as [a] symbol [of the] strength and determination of [the] west." To do less would encourage "new aggressive action elsewhere" and demoralize "countries adjacent to [the] Soviet orbit."

The commitment of troops to Korea represented more of a departure from past thinking to the Joint Chiefs than to the State Department. Why, then, did military leaders go along? First, they did so for the reasons stated above, but in their case the fourth was perhaps the most important of all. Not only did President Truman convey from the start the sentiment that whatever needed to be done to save South Korea must be done; he chose the hawkish Secretary of State Acheson to lead deliberations through the crisis. And for the first time Congress appeared to be solidly behind a major commitment to Korea. Left entirely alone to deliberate, the Joint Chiefs might have chose differently. Certainly they did not lead the tide for intervention. With that tide so strong, however, they were unwilling to demur.

The Americans took on a risky venture at the end of June 1950, but it did not represent an unreasonable coordination of ends and means. To be sure, it took some eight divisions to repulse the North Koreans rather than the two originally estimated by MacArthur, and this meant dipping into reserves at home. The key considerations in justifying the initial commitment, in addition to those outlined above, are, first, that the United States maintained a strong superiority in nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities over the Soviet Union and, second, it enjoyed similar superiority in mobilization capacity. All indications were that Moscow was not ready to start a global war and that, if it did, the United States would have a better than even chance of prevailing.

The weight of judgment shifts to the negative side, however, once we turn to the US decision in the fall of 1950 to seek unification of the peninsula by force.

V

It did not take long after the commitment of U.S. troops to Korea for planners in Washington to begin consideration of altering the initial objective of restoring the 38th parallel. By mid-July ROK President Syngman Rhee had stated publicly that North Korea’s aggression "had obliterated the thirty-eighth parallel and that no peace and order could be maintained in Korea as long as the division [of the peninsula] ... remained." In a private meeting in Tokyo with two members of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General MacArthur, the recently appointed commander of U.N. forces in Korea, opined that North Korean forces
must be destroyed and the country reunited. The United States could prevent the Chinese or the Soviets from intervening by using atomic weapons to create a radioactive barrier along the northern boundary of the peninsula. Although the use of atomic weapons for such a purpose never received serious consideration in Washington, the executive branch soon engaged in serious debate over the merits of expanding the stated objective in Korea. Whether it was because of the need to punish aggression in order to deter it, to reverse "the dangerous strategic trend in the Far East," or to take the offensive in the Cold War in general, important elements in both the Pentagon and the State Department believed that military action to unite Korea should not be ruled out." Still, by mid-August it was widely accepted that the Soviet Union and/or China would probably send forces into that country to prevent an attempt to unite it by hostile forces. Since for the moment the commitment of U.S. forces to Korea had disrupted the American capacity to execute its war plan against the Soviet Union, a consensus existed that it was too early to reach a decision on the desirability of any U.N. ground operations north of the 38th parallel. NSC 81, approved by President Truman on September 11, reflected this sentiment at the same time that, in phraseology, it revealed a predisposition toward boldness. A U.N. ground offensive should be extended into North Korea "provided that at the time of such operations there has been no entry into [that area of]... major Soviet or Communist Chinese forces, no announcement of an intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations [there] militarily."

The Inchon landing of September 15 and its follow-up over the next two weeks magnified the predisposition exponentially. MacArthur’s flanking operation at the port of Seoul and the subsequent breakout of U.N. forces from the Pusan perimeter abruptly reversed the tide of battle, magnified psychological and domestic political pressures on the Truman administration to move forward quickly, and reduced the time available for the Communist side to signal the enemy on the risks of expanding ground operations beyond the 38th parallel. Thus, when the signals finally were sent, the momentum in Washington for a U.N. advance into the North overwhelmed any lingering sense of caution. That caution did not return to the fore until the Chinese had launched a counteroffensive that sent U.N. forces reeling and even threatened again their expulsion from the peninsula."

The case for a U.S.-supported effort to reunite Korea was by no means inconsequential. For centuries, the peninsula had been united and a denial of Rhee’s determination to bring it about would have created serious strains in the American relationship with the ROK. Furthermore, the elimination of division, however difficult, would have
eradicated a tense situation within the country that indefinitely left open the prospect of resumed fighting. The punishment of aggression in this case presumably would have produced some deterrent value at other times and in other places.

Yet the negatives outweighed the positives here, at least from a broad strategic standpoint. To the United States, Korea was a secondary area in a secondary theater. The primary area in that theater was Japan, and Korea’s unification was not essential for its protection. An effort to unify Korea would stretch U.S. supply lines in the region and give China, still the second team on the enemy side, an opportunity to intervene under circumstances that would engage large American forces on the peninsula for an indefinite period. True, a divided peninsula would perpetuate the need for a U.S. military presence there, but establishment of a defensible line in the general area of the 38° parallel, combined with a strong effort to build up ROK forces, would have provided, over time, a good chance for stability at considerably less risk of overextension. With U.S. war plans against the primary enemy already compromised because of the direct military involvement in Korea, Washington was in a precarious position to take on an expanded objective there. This was all the more the case because the support of allies in the primary theater of the Cold War, namely Europe, was far more shallow on the question of unification than on the matter of the ROK’s defense, a fact which became clear in negotiations at the United Nations in early October and even more so a month later, when the first signs of large-scale Chinese intervention appeared.31

If Washington permitted means and ends to get seriously out of balance in the fall of 1950, it quickly resumed its balancing act in the winter of 1950-1951 as the magnitude of Chinese intervention on the peninsula and the level of perturbation of European allies became clear. The Truman administration retreated early on to the objective of saving the ROK and held to it through a nasty public dispute with General MacArthur.32 Only with the emergence in office in early 1953 and a continued deadlock in armistice negotiations did top people on the American side seriously contemplate expanding the objective once again.33 Fortunately for the prospects of avoiding a broader war, the Communists chose to end the stalemate by accepting the U.S. position on the POW issue.

VI

A major fear of American policymakers throughout the war was that, once concluded, the United States would again retreat into unpreparedness, thus leaving South Korea and other areas vulnerable. Joining that fear, however, was a determination to avoid past
mistakes—and that determination proved adequate for the construction of a consistently effective deterrent against a resumption of war in Korea. The United States, to be sure, greatly reduced its military presence on the peninsula, but it did so over time and, unlike in 1949, never was there a serious question of complete withdrawal. Even in the late 1970s, when President Jimmy Carter pushed for a total withdrawal of ground troops, he insisted that U.S. air forces would remain in Korea. In that case, the uproar in the United States over the prospective withdrawal of the former alone was enough to force Carter’s retreat. The United States had learned well the lesson that, as an emerging adversary put it in 1949, ”preparedness eliminates mishaps.” Never again would American defense spending become so anemic that the U.S. position in Korea seemed expendable in the face of more critical interests elsewhere.

U.S. deterrence in Korea, however, was not solely dependent on the continuing presence there of American forces. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the United States negotiated a defense pact with the ROK, one that stands to this day. It also issued, along with other U.N. members contributing forces to the peninsula, a ”greater sanctions statement” that threatened a war beyond Korea if the other side initiated a resumption of hostilities."

This survey of American strategy in Korea from 1945 to 1953 serves to remind us of the evolutionary nature of the U.S. rise to global policeman in the aftermath of World War II. The demobilization of American armed forces during 1945 and 1946 and the absence of any major rebuilding effort over the next three years left the country with a serious disjunction between its growing involvement and commitments abroad and its military strength in being. It took the North Korean attack of June 1950 and quite possibly the Chinese intervention in the fall to largely eliminate that problem. That it was eliminated is indicated both by the sustained buildup of NATO forces in Europe during and after the war and by a similar buildup of allied forces in Korea plus a formal statement of an ongoing commitment of the United States to the defense of the ROK.
Notes


3. I use "strategic areas," as do the officials in the State Department document quoted above, to mean ones possessing major material or human resources and/or locations advantageous from which to project power into other territories.

   In addition to pressing the Nationalists for concessions in Manchuria beyond the Yalta accords, by the summer of 1945 the Soviets were dealing with areas they occupied in Eastern Europe in a manner that did not inspire confidence in Washington regarding Moscow's willingness to uphold prior agreements.


6. I say "apparently" here because I have seen no documents indicating that US planners discussed or thought through the implications of an initial occupation of Korea by American forces.


10. For estimates that the process might end in Communist domination of South Korea, see ibid., 775-76, 794-96, 803-807.

11. Based on my interviews with State Department officials W. Walton Butterworth (November 16, 1971), Dean Rusk (July 24, 1972), Philip Jessup (June 6, 1972), and Niles Bond (July 30, 1977), I conclude that no consensus existed within that agency regarding prospects for Soviet acceptance of U.N.-sponsored elections in the North.

12. For a fuller treatment, see my Road to Confrontation, 88-105.


15. For details and documentation for this and the next four paragraphs, see my Road to Confrontation, 153-59.
16. See ibid., 164-70. The border clashes along the 38th parallel of 1949 were quite disturbing to the Americans, who recognized at least partial South Korean responsibility.

17. Ibid., 140-43, 146, 158, 161-62.


19. Evgeniy P. Bajanov and Natalia Bajanov, “The Korean Conflict, 1950-1953: Most Mysterious War of the 20th Century-Based on Secret Soviet Archives,” English translation of unpublished manuscript based on the Presidential Archives of the former Soviet Union, 17-18. Henceforth, this document will be identified as “Korean.” I wish to thank Professor Ohn Chang-il of the Korean Military Academy, Seoul, Republic of Korea, for providing me with a copy of this manuscript.


22. Kathryn Weathersby, ‘‘Should We Fear This’: Stalin and the Dimensions of the Korean War,’’ paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association annual meeting, January 2000 (copy in author’s possession), 13-14.


24. Acheson to Ambassador Alan Kirk in Moscow, June 28, 1950, Record Group 84, National Archives II, College Park, Md.

25. For fuller coverage of the US intervention, see my *Road to Confrontation*, 177-98.


28. See my *Road to Confrontation*, 202-206.


32. Ibid., 127-203.

33. Ibid., 320-25.


Introduction: Orthodox, Revisionism & Beyond

In the past decade or two, China's military operation during the Korean War (1950-1953) has been extensively documented in both English and Chinese literatures.1 There is, however, little agreement regarding the lessons, if any, that China learned from the Korean War.2 Part of the "non-learning" school in English language literature is that the PRC's conflict behavior in general and its operation in Korea in particular is determined by its persistent communist ideology,3 or by a highly "romantic" and certainly irresponsible attitude toward the threat and use of force.4 In a broader perspective, to argue that China has tangible security concerns like any other power5 is politically incorrect, as recent scholarship suggests, in that it is "sympathetic" to Beijing's position.6

In China, the passage of time has also led to an emerging "revisionist" school about both the decision to intervene and China's conduct of military operations in Korea.7 Some question the mainstream of China's research on the Korean War for the lack of study of the "negative cases" in the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) experience in Korea.8 Others offer alternative explanations for both the decision to intervene and the operations of the war.9 Still some cast doubt over the disproportionately high price China paid for certain operations in Korea.10

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The rethinking of China’s conduct of the Korean War both inside and outside China has certainly shed new light on the issue. However, it has generated more questions, while still being unable to deal with questions of interpreting China’s conflict behavior: how and why did China change its operational and strategic goals during the process of the war, if the ideology factor is regarded as constant throughout this period? The ideology argument simply tells us little about the operational milieu of the Chinese military during the Korean War. Nor does it provide any reliable guidance to understand PRC’s policies toward the Korean Peninsula in the new century when Washington and Beijing seem to move toward a more complicated and perhaps more confrontational path with consequences that may be neither anticipated nor liked by either side.

This paper does not intend to join the debate of whether China learned anything from the Korean War, nor is it interested in defining the “right” lessons from “wrong” ones. Rather, it examines how China adjusted itself during the process of the war at both operational and strategic levels in an “asymmetrical” environment. The process of this adjustment, however, was not linear. It was affected by variables including the PLA’s own historical experience, its ability to sustain costly warfare, civil-military relations, intra-bloc politics, etc. Whatever the case, China’s experience with the world’s most powerful military has significantly affected its policies toward the Korean Peninsula and outside powers through today.

To operationalize these variables, this paper first examines China’s conflict behavior during the Korean War, particularly the first eight months (October 1950 to June 1951). This period covers PLA’s “five campaigns” which represented significant “adjusting curves” for the PRC. PRC’s initial tactics were both cautious and bold. This was followed by a rather “optimistic” phase in which China’s military operations were considerably affected by allies politics, political concerns and miscalculations rather than a pragmatic grasp of the battlefield reality. A series of missteps during this period led China to revise its strategic and operational goals in mid-1951 toward a negotiated peace based on the reality and changes in the battlefield. In the second half of this study, I will assess the impact of the war on the PRC’s foreign/defense behavior after the Korean War and its implications for current and future East Asian security. PRC’s post-war behavior to be examined includes the PLA’s post-Korean War modernization, China’s prudent and pragmatic policies toward Korea, the PLA’s covert military action in Vietnam and America’s tacit reciprocity, the impact of China’s first nuclear test, the Taiwan factor, and the crucial role of Korea in China’s security calculus.
Military Conservatism & "Old Wine" in a "New Bottle" (October 25-December 24 1950):

Contrary to the "revisionist" arguments in both English and Chinese literature that China's conduct of the war in Korea was romantic and reckless, China's leaders were perhaps overcautious at the onset. They planned a defensive rather than offensive posture. They deliberately avoided engaging the more powerful U.S. military and instead took up the Republic of Korea (ROK) units that were perceived weaker and inexperienced. Mao switched to mobile and tactically offensive operations only after sensing the rapidly changed battlefield situation in which the U.N. forces advanced unexpectedly fast and at the same time exposed themselves dangerously to the flanking operations of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV).

It was not an easy decision for top Chinese leaders to decide to intervene in Korea. Nor was it clear exactly how to confront the U.S. military, except that they were aware of a basic strategic fact that China was to face the world's most powerful military. Moreover, the PLA's action in Korea would not be accompanied by previously promised Soviet air cover, at least not for the time being. Without any combat experience in modern warfare and with limited knowledge about the U.S. military, Mao adopted a conservative posture, taking some defensive positions in the northernmost part of Korea while waiting for the arrival of Soviet arms and supplies. In his October 2 telegraph to Stalin, Mao stated,

Under present circumstances, we will begin to dispatch the twelve divisions already deployed in South Manchuria into appropriate areas in North Korea—not necessarily down along the 38th Parallel—on October 15.... In this first phase, these troops will mainly conduct defensive operations. Their goals will be to fight the enemy attacking forces north of the 38th Parallel, to annihilate small [enemy] units and to get to know various situations. Meanwhile, they [Chinese troops] will wait for Soviet weapons so as to become better equipped, and only after that will they coordinate with the Korean comrades to counterattack US invading forces.

According to this cautious thinking, the CPV planned to construct two to three defensive lines between the Pyongyang-Wonsan line in the South and Tokchon-Yongwon line in the North. Mao also instructed the CPV to engage ROK units first in order to gain experience before fighting large U.S. units. Any major offensive operation would have to wait for at least six months until China obtained "overwhelming superiority" both in the air and on the ground."
The unexpected rapid advance of U.N. forces quickly undid Mao's initial conservative posture. Some U.N. units had already reached CPV's anticipated defensive areas while the CPV units were still 80 to 130 kilometers away. Mao, therefore, decided to abandon the original plan and to switch to mobile operations. One of the main reasons for the change was that it was detected that the U.N. troops were unaware of the CPV's presence. The huge gap between the two U.N. advancing columns in the eastern and western parts of Korea provided a perfect opportunity for the CPV to launch surprise attacks against the U.N. units.

Mobile operation, coupled with surprise effect and numerical superiority, were perhaps the only effective tactics to allow a relatively weak military to engage a much stronger opponent such as the Nationalists troops during the Chinese Civil War (1946-49). On the eve of its 1st Campaign (October 25 to November 8, 1950), the CPV was ready to replay all of these tactics. By maneuvering at night and resting during the day, some 300,000 CPV troops deployed south of the Yalu River remained undetected for one week, ready to engage the frontline ROK units. Some U.S. intelligence officers did notice large-scale military movement and deployment to North Korea. They nonetheless failed to convince top U.S. military and civilian leaders that a major intervention by China's military was either imminent or possible.

Between October 25 and November 1, the CPV dealt heavy blows to the ROK's 1st, 6th, 7th, and 8th divisions by destroying many of their scattered regiments or sending them into hasty retreat. "CPV's 1st Campaign managed to stabilize the situation, providing valuable breathing space by pushing the front line south of the Chongchon River. The temporary halt of the U.N. advance to the north also offered the needed time for the CPV to resupply and reinforce.

The impact of the CPV's 1st Campaign was apparently not strong enough to alarm MacArthur, who continued to see China's intervention as insignificant. In anticipation of the next operation, Peng suggested to Mao that U.N. forces be lured into pre-set "traps" as far north as possible so that individual U.N. units would be extended with longer supply lines and thus be more easily isolated and destroyed. Mao quickly approved the plan. Peng instructed that each CPV army would withdraw its main force farther north, but leave one division "to conduct mobile and guerrilla warfare ... to wipe out small enemy units while engaging and luring larger enemy units to the trap." The CPV tried to create the false perception of a disorderly retreat from the advancing U.N. forces. Some CPV units even reduced the duration of each rear-protecting effort so that U.N. forces would assume that the CPV's combat capability was diminishing. As a last effort to keep
MacArthur from suspecting China’s motivation and strength, the CPV also released some 100 POWs (including 27 Americans), who were deliberately told that they had to be released because the CPV had to go back to China due to supply difficulties.

On November 24, MacArthur launched his “home-by-Christmas” offensive, again leaving a huge gap between his 8th Army on the western front and X Corps on the eastern front. The CPV launched its counterattack (2nd Campaign) the following day, when all of the major U.N. units were in the anticipated areas. While four CPV armies (39th, 40th, 50th and 66th) launched a frontal attack on the 8th Army, the CPV’s 38th Army made a flanking move through the gap between the ROK’s 7th and 8th Divisions in Tokehon, threatening to trap part of the 8th Army through this encirclement from the south. Although most of the IX US Corps was able to escape the trap, it lost 3,000 POWs, the largest such group ever captured by the CPV. On the whole, the 2nd Campaign was a major victory for the CPV, thanks to careful planning, deception and execution, not just the result of “sheer good luck.” In only nine days, the CPV dealt heavy blows to U.N. forces, pushed the battle line to the 38th parallel, and retook Pyongyang.

The first two campaigns, though successful, also revealed many shortcomings of the Chinese military. On the eastern front, the 150,000-strong 9th Army Group (20th, 26th and 27th Armies) was not adequately prepared for the sub-zero Korean winter. It was hastily thrown into combat against the 1st Marine Division and the U.S. 7th Infantry Division. Although the 9th Army Group scored the only major victory of the CPV in Korea when it wiped out an entire regiment of the U.S. military (the 32nd Regiment of the 7th Division), it suffered a terrible toll from the Korean winter. More than 30,000 officers and men, some 22 percent of the entire 9th Army Group, were disabled by severe frostbite, and some 1,000 died. The 9th Army Group, therefore, was incapable of annihilating a much smaller enemy force than originally planned.

The 2nd Campaign was also affected considerably by the CPV’s logistical constraints imposed by U.N. air power, as well as by the lack of transportation assets and bad road conditions. CPV units had supplies for one week at best. Originally, CPV headquarters planned a double-encirclement by two armies and two divisions. However, food shortages forced the CPV to forego the extra two divisions. Otherwise, the CPV would have been more successful.

Despite these problems, the CPV made good use of its limited resources and fully utilized the opportunities whenever they arose. Both political and military leaders were conservative in the planning and execution of their operations. Mao and others were more willing to cater to the battlefield need, while keeping their operational goals...
within the realms of reality. This, however, did not prevent the CPV from taking bold and flexible actions when situations changed and conditions permitted. The switch from a defensive posture to mobile operations during the first two campaigns was the single most important factor that ensured the CPV’s operational success.

The 2nd Campaign represented the peak of CPV performance. As the CPV began to strike south, the tactics that it had successfully used began to lose effectiveness. U.N. forces rapidly adjusted to CPV tactics. And, as the CPV’s supply line became extended, U.N. air power began to cause heavier damage to CPV’s primitive logistical efforts. Finally, the CPV’s operations began to be complicated by bloc politics as well as by excessive optimism among some civilian and military officers. As a result, the CPV began to pursue goals beyond its capabilities.

Politics in Command & Military Unrealism (December 1950 to June 1951)

The end of the CPV’s first two campaigns, though successful, also led to growing disputes between top civilian and military leaders, between the Chinese and their Soviet/Korean allies over a range of issues including the scope, speed, and strategies for the next phase of the war. Around the time of the 3rd Campaign (31 December 1950 to 8 January 1951), optimism among top Soviet, Korean and Chinese leaders pressed the CPV to operate well beyond its capabilities. Meanwhile, field commanders also became overconfident from time to time regarding the CPV’s capabilities. As a result, the CPV suffered considerably heavier casualties than in the initial phase of the war and had to adjust its operational and strategic goals. 14

Intra-bloc Politics: Pre 3rd Campaign: The first two campaigns were operated largely on the CPV’s terms and terrain. Even so, the CPV was exhausted due to its primitive logistic systems. CPV units on the western front had fewer than 300 trucks for almost 300,000 troops. Because the U.N. air forces had destroyed much of the CPV’s winter clothing supply, many men had no adequate protection for winter. The fact that the 9th Army Group was virtually disabled due to frostbite was a chilly reminder of the CPV’s severe supply disability. For these reasons, Peng requested on December 8, 1950, a pause of a few months until the next spring and wanted to confine the forthcoming campaign to areas north of the 38th parallel. Peng’s plan was also supported by Nie Rongzhen, the PLA’s acting Chief of Staff in Beijing. 15 Peng’s request was based on his assessment that the CPV was not ready to deal with a more fortified enemy along the 38th parallel. If his troops could not deliver heavy blows to the U.N. forces, it did not make much sense for the CPV to cross the 38th parallel and capture Seoul. Besides, an
immediate crossing of the 38th parallel would make the supply of his troops even more difficult.”

Intra-bloc politics, however, placed pressure on the CPV to launch the next operation as soon as possible. On the same day Peng Dehuai requested a pause for a few months, North Korean leader Kim II Sung issued a call to the Korean people for “an all-out drive for the victorious war for national liberation.” The Soviets, too, believed that the CPV should maintain pressure on U.N. forces by resuming its offensive operations. Recently available Russian archives show that Stalin tried to delay China’s move for a possible cease-fire after the first two campaigns when China was approached by some U.N. members (India, Britain and Sweden). Specifically, Stalin suggested to Zhou Enlai not to respond to U.N. inquiries, not to cease military operation before all of China’s conditions were met, and not to submit these conditions for a cease-fire before the U.S. responded to a U.N. cease-fire plan.”

Between political pressures from allies and a difficult battlefield reality, Mao seemed more concerned about the political implications of an entire winter without any military operation by the CPV and a possible stalemate at the 38th parallel. For Mao, an immediate cease-fire at the 38th parallel was a “trick” to halt the CPV’s advance. Moreover, Mao was also aware of the “skepticism among friendly countries.” He therefore demanded on December 13 that the next campaign be launched in early January (a month and half ahead of Peng’s request) in order to boost the morale of the socialist countries.”

Peng, however, tried to scale down Mao’s ambitious plans and demanded greater flexibility should such an operation be executed ahead of his requested schedule. In his December 19 cable to Mao, Peng noted “a rise of unrealistic optimism for quicker victory from various parts.” and suggested a more prudent advance. He warned that although the CPV would not suffer a defeat in the coming campaign, there was a possibility that the CPV’s advance would be blocked or that success would be modest.” Mao eventually agreed (December 21) to Peng’s more conservative plan and granted him the tactical flexibility to disengage and stop the operation whenever necessary.”

On New Year’s Eve in 1950, while still under-supplied, the CPV launched its 3rd Campaign across the 38th parallel against U.N. forces entrenched across the entire peninsula. In a matter of eight days, CPV forces crossed the 38th parallel, recaptured Seoul and pushed the front line down to the 37th parallel. Though surprised by the CPV offense, U.N. forces managed to have an orderly retreat, and most American forces suffered few casualties. In contrast, CPV units were exhausted
after days of continuous operation. As a result, the CPV at this point only had 280,000 poorly supplied and very exhausted troops facing 230,000 well-equipped U.N. and ROK forces. A more cautious strategy was therefore necessary after the 3rd Campaign.

**Intra-bloc Politics: Post-3rd Campaign:** Despite these problems, intra-bloc politics once again put pressure on the CPV to strive for a quicker and bigger victory. Shortly after the CPV stopped pursuing the retreating U.N. forces, the Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang once again urged Peng to pursue the enemy. "No commander would stop pursuing the fleeing enemy," he said while also complaining to Stalin and North Korean leader Kim II Sung about the CPV’s decision. Peng rejected the Soviet request and reported it to Mao, who later sent Peng’s cable to Stalin. Sensing the tension between the Soviet ambassador and Peng, Stalin ordered the ambassador to keep quiet and later transferred him back home.

Likewise, North Korean leader Kim II Sung questioned the sudden end of the CPV’s 3rd Campaign. Shortly after Peng's argument with Soviet ambassador, Kim and his Foreign Minister Park Hon Yong came to see Peng and insisted that the CPV resume its pursuit. They cited opinions of the "Soviet comrades" that called for an immediate drive south to force U.N. forces out of the peninsula. Peng disagreed, explaining that the enemy was not really defeated, but had deliberately evacuated Seoul in order to lure the CPV farther south and to strike back with another amphibious attack. The CPV had suffered considerable losses and was worn out after three months of almost nonstop operations, and a pause of a few months was necessary. Indeed, the CPV conducted its 3rd Campaign with considerable difficulty and for "political considerations" only. After some hard bargaining, Peng compromised on a two-month pause.

With the pressure from allies and a bleaker battlefield situation, Mao played a rather "invisible" role. On the one hand, Mao let his field commanders take the heat from the Soviets and North Koreans. He would simply forward these "unresolved" cases to Stalin who usually made the final decisions. Meanwhile, Mao reminded Stalin that in order to avoid the previous mistakes by the North Koreans who overexposed themselves by rapidly striving south, the CPV needed a pause of two to three months for rest and resupply after its takeover of Seoul. "With the memories still fresh of the North Koreans' terrible defeat after MacArthur’s Inchon Landing just a few months before, Stalin this time sided with Mao and Peng not to advance too soon and too far down south." The CPV thus went ahead to take a two-month pause to rest and resupply before taking on the next operation in March. The battlefield reality, however, was changing fast. The CPV was unable to
proceed with its planned pause due to the U.N.’s sudden counterattack.

Military Unrealism: Political leaders were not the only ones to miscalculate. CPV commanders also contributed to their own share of the problem. Following the first three relatively successful campaigns, many CPV rank-and-file became more confident and questioned Peng’s decision not to pursue the retreating U.N. forces following the capture of Seoul. They believed that an early victory would bring the troops back home faster. Peng had a hard time convincing CPV “adventurists” that, despite initial successes, they could not ignore the U.N.’s superior firepower. Besides, the CPV also faced mounting problems, including poor supply, extreme fatigue, lack of a coastal defense and rear security, and delayed reinforcements. A more cautious strategy was necessary after the 3rd Campaign.

The sudden counteroffensive by U.N. forces in January 25, 1951, terminated the CPV’s planned two-month pause as well as the internal debate. Although the CPV managed to organize some delaying actions, it was forced to abandon Seoul on March 14, 1951, and withdraw its forces north of the 38th parallel. The CPV managed to hold its position south of the Han River in the first 20 days after the U.N.’s counterattacking (January 25 to February 16, 1951). It nonetheless suffered heavy losses. For 87 days (January 25 to April 21), the CPV’s phase of the 4th Campaign, the CPV was largely in a passive situation, while the U.N. forces were able to control the pace and scope of operations. The front line at the 37th parallel established at the end of the 3rd Campaign was the southernmost line the CPV ever reached during the Korean War. As the battlefield situation continued to worsen, Peng hurried back to Beijing in late February 1951 and convinced Mao that the war in Korea could not be won quickly.

Contrary to the revisionist argument that Mao always expected a quick win, the Chinese leader at this point was actually preparing for a much protracted war in Korea, a major change in the operational goals for the CPV, even if Mao’s strategic goals of driving the U.N. forces out of Korea remained unchanged. On February 7, 1951, two weeks before Peng returned to brief him, Mao instructed the CPV to rotate its main forces starting from March 1951. Mao explained this move as part of the plan to have a longer-than-expected war in Korea. Such a protracted period was needed to annihilate more enemy forces in order to force the U.N. forces out of Korea. The CPV’s difficulties, as conveyed by Peng in person in late February, reinforced Mao’s belief. In his telegraph to Stalin during the height of the CPV’s 4th Campaign, Mao explained to the Soviet leader the necessity and desirability of a rather long draw in Korea with the U.N. forces.

Mao’s cautious approach, however, was ironically offset by a
number of miscalculations made by his field commanders, particularly Peng, regarding the next move. One of Peng’s main reasons for launching the 5th Campaign (April 21 to June 10, 1951) was his belief that U.N. forces would attempt another amphibious landing in the rear. Peng calculated that an earlier launch of the next campaign would prevent U.N. forces from proceeding with the landing."

The CPV’s top commanders, however, disagreed considerably about how to execute the campaign. In fact, most disagreed with Peng’s idea of striking south. They preferred an "in-house" operation, engaging U.N. forces after luring them into CPV occupied areas. This would shorten the CPV’s supply line and allow it to engage the enemy by using mobile operations in terrain familiar to the unseasoned CPV units. Peng, however, was determined to strike south and seize the initiative after months of being pressed by the U.N. forces."

The CPV’s 5th Campaign was its largest of the war. The CPV and the North Koreans deployed some 700,000 troops against 340,000 U.N. forces, and the two sides fought for approximately 40 days. But the results were disappointing for the CPV. In fact, the campaign failed to achieve its goal of destroying five enemy divisions (including three American ones). At the same time, CPV units suffered heavy losses. The CPV’s 180th Division was completely destroyed by quick U.N. counterattacks. Additionally, U.N. forces took 17,000 POWs, representing 80 percent of the total CPV POWs during the entire war. More important, the front line was pushed farther north. In retrospect, official Chinese history summarized the 5th Campaign as "executed too hastily with too large a scope and striking too far down south."" Peng later admitted that the 5th Campaign was one of only four mistakes he made during his entire military career."

It was at this point that Mao realized the goal of driving the U.N. forces out of Korea was unattainable. A negotiated peace was perhaps the most achievable goal for the PRC. From the conclusion of the 5th Campaign until the end of the war, the CPV adopted more cautious and realistic strategies, including maintaining a relatively stable front line, increasing CPV air force, artillery, and tank units, improving logistics capabilities, and seeking a negotiated and realistic end to the war. These revised strategic and operational goals were similar to those of the U.S. The terms of peace China eventually obtained, however, were far less favorable than the ones made available briefly for Mao and China’s allies in mid-January 1950 after the 3rd Campaign."

**Lost Opportunity for a U.N. Cease-Fire?** On January 13, 1951, five days after the CPV’s 3rd Campaign, a U.N.-sponsored cease-fire proposal was made to the belligerents. The proposal suggested an immediate cease-fire and a phased withdrawal of foreign forces from
Korea. Four days later, Zhou Enlai rejected the U.N. cease-fire proposal by seeing it as a U.S.-backed means to gain "breathing time" for the next U.N. operation. Instead, Zhou proposed that foreign troops withdraw first before any cease-fire.

China's rejection of the bill led to several major consequences. One was a diplomatic setback because China's suggestion was seen by many as un-operational and insincere, and as a result, sympathy to China in the U.N. was weakened. Second, China's rejection of the U.N. cease-fire proposal actually helped the U.S., which was considerably constrained by the same bill. If the U.S. supported the bill, it would anger the ROK and lose public support at home. If the U.S. rejected the bill, it would certainly lose support in the U.N. The U.S.' eventual support of the bill was actually out of the expectation that China would reject it, which was exactly what China did. Finally, China's diplomatic setback was quickly translated into a U.S. gain in the U.N. on February 1, 1951, when the U.N. passed a U.S.-sponsored move to condemn China as the aggressor.

Years later, some CPV veterans and historians also echoed these views. Had the CPV tried to consolidate along this line and translate its military gains into a political compromise instead of planning a more ambitious operation, the war might have ended much more favorably for China and its allies.

These arguments in hindsight may make some sense, and China's acceptance of the U.N. cease-fire certainly would have helped China diplomatically in the world body. These "ifs," however, have their own limits. At the time the U.N. cease-fire bill was proposed, neither China nor the U.S. was interested in it, though for different reasons. Tactically, the immediate U.N. counterattacks, which surprised many CPV officers, were almost unavoidable because the U.N. retreat to the 37th parallel was deliberate and organized in order to exhaust the CPV's initial drive. It was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to persuade the U.N. commanders and U.S. politicians not to launch an offense when the U.N. enjoyed every operational advantage, including firepower, logistics, and maneuverability, as well as adaptation to the CPV tactics. The CPV was, for its part, already in a more difficult situation. Indeed, it was high time for the U.N. forces to regain battlefield initiative and, if possible, retake territories between the 37th and 38th parallels.

In between the need to satisfy domestic demands (Congress and the media) and allies (South Koreans) on one hand, and winning support in the U.N. on the other, the Truman administration would certainly choose the former even at the expense of losing support in the world body. U.S. dealing with the world body in the past 50 years repeatedly
shows that domestic concern has always been above that of the international community.

Finally, Mao would have to have a sense of Stalin's mood, which was less willing to take the U.N.'s cease-fire proposal for its face value, at least for the time being. In his cable to Mao on June 6, 1951, Stalin pointed to the "need" for a "protracted war," which "first, would give the Chinese troops an opportunity to learn modern battle tactics and, second, could shatter Truman's regime and undermine the Anglo-American military prestige." Moreover, pursuing a unilateral cease-fire at the expense of relations with Moscow would also affect relations with Pyongyang. In the final analysis, Mao and his colleagues were not entirely independent and alone in making policies for war and peace in Korea.

Implications for East Asian Security

The course of the Korean War changed forever once China intervened. Although it paid a tremendous price economically, diplomatically, and strategically, China fought the war into a stalemate against the world's most powerful military. Such a stalemate, however, was by no means the fixation of major power relations but only the beginning of a series of strategic realignments in East Asia. Although the Korean War was followed by the most intimate relations between Moscow and Beijing, this "honeymoon," however, was soon to be replaced first by an unprecedented ideological polemic between Moscow and Beijing in the 1960s and then military clashes at the decade's end. Such a turnaround also ushered in a breakthrough in relations with the U.S. in the early 1970s. In this respect, the war tested the limits of China's best relationship with both Moscow and Pyongyang as well as its worst relationship with Washington.

Despite these strategic realignments and "blowbacks" for Beijing, China's war effort in Korea has yielded some significant policy consistencies for PRC's foreign/defense policies with far-reaching implications for East Asian security. The impact of the three-year Korean War on China, therefore, can never be underestimated.

Military Modernization and "China Threat": At the operational level, the CPV underwent several cycles of learning during the first eight months of the war: from cautious pessimism and conservative tactics (1st Campaign) to sweeping and surprise actions (2nd Campaign); from being overconfident (before and after 3rd Campaign) to overwhelmed by U.N. actions (4th Campaign); and from military "unrealism" (5th Campaign) to pragmatism (post 5th Campaign). Much of this adjustment was made due to a harsh reality that the CPV was a much weaker force than its counterpart (U.N./U.S. forces).
Accordingly, the most immediate impact of the Korean War on China was to continue the PLA's modernization, which already had begun during the course of the Korean War. Between 1953 and 1959, the PLA underwent the most extensive process of professionalization and modernization under the tutelage of Peng Dehuai as defense minister. That process was interrupted for more than 20 years with the replacement of Peng by Ling Biao, who championed a "people's war" instead of a professionalized "soldiers' war" within a more limited context like Korea. In that perspective, modernization, professionalization, and restructuring of the PLA, starting from the 1980s, were a belated recognition of the lessons of the Korean War. The 1991 Gulf War, the rather "chilly" post-Cold War, the 1999 Kosovo bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and the deteriorating Taiwan Strait situation in the past few years simply added to the urgency of the PLA's drive toward a more efficient and more professional military.

The PLA's modernization since the 1980s was therefore largely derived from its "unlearned" lessons from the Korean War as a result of Mao's domestic politicization. The PLA's move has nonetheless caused anxiety and alarm outside China and, hence, the "China threat" argument particularly in Japan and the U.S. From a historical perspective, however, much of the ongoing "China threat" debate misses the point. While the "threat" school points to an upcoming or present threat from China, more cautious assessments insist that China will be a threat only in the future when the PLA is substantially modernized. China's intervention in the Korean War, however, demonstrates that a much weaker China would resort to the use of force if it views a sharply deteriorating security environment. The key to understanding China's behavior, therefore, lies in its strategic calculus regarding its underlying interest.

Strategic Prudence: At the strategic level, the Korean War was the first, if not the last, war "not to be won" on China's own terms. Instead, a negotiated settlement became acceptable as the final goal for China's military action in Korea. Such an adjustment was made, however, only after several months of intensive fighting with a much superior military.

Perhaps the most important lesson that China learned from its engagement in the Korean War is to avoid and/or prevent such a war in the future. Accordingly, the PRC's policies in the post-Korean War decades have always been to maintain the delicate stability in the peninsula with political and diplomatic means at any cost. This was true even during Mao's time.

During the reform decades, China's approach to the Korean issue
was further adjusted to a more balanced posture by normalizing relations with Seoul and supporting "dual entry" of the two Koreas into the U.N. Ever since the early 1980s, China has made clear that it only supports "peaceful" and "reasonable" means for the issue of Korean reunification, and that it opposes disturbances to the stability of the peninsula from any direction. Meanwhile, China cooperates with other powers in the resolution of the North Korean nuclear weapons issue, participates in quadripartite talks for a peace treaty in Korea, and supplies food to the North.

In regard to relations with the North, China works for medium- and long-term goals so that the North will eventually find its own way to have normal relations with the outside world. For these purposes, North Korean leaders have not been pressured but carefully provided with opportunities to get acquainted with China's economic reform and other domestic changes.

During the height of the Korean nuclear and missile crises, Beijing acted as a "constructive broker" between the Koreas and other major powers. Unlike the U.S.-attempted surgical strike against North Korea's nuclear sites in 1994 and Japan's subsequent temptation, Beijing urged for patience and prudence, insisting that the Korean problem is more political and less military. Major powers, therefore, should aim at long-term goals but not short-term returns.

At the onset of the new millennium, these policies of the PRC, together with efforts by other powers as well as the two Korean governments, provided conditions to the historical summit between North and South Korea in June 2000. For the first time in history, the warring Koreans seem to embark on the path toward national reconciliation and eventual unification.

Beijing's cautious approach toward the Korean Peninsula, however, should not be interpreted as one in which China would refrain from taking any actions no matter what happens on the peninsula in the future. Although Chinese leaders later may have regretted China's hasty entrance into the conflict, Mao's fateful decision in 1950 indicates that the Korean Peninsula constitutes a vital part of China's security. Such a concern goes far beyond the Cold War setting, communist ideology, cultural traits, and certain leaders' idiosyncrasies, but rather is based on China's concern of major power balance. This concern of China is reinforced by a historical fact that the peninsula has served as a major springboard for the conquest of continental Asia, particularly by Japan. Any major disturbance to the peninsula's delicate stability will therefore lead to serious concern, regardless of the nature of China's domestic political system.

*China's Covert War and Indirect Conflict with the U.S.*
Vietnam: Another and perhaps less known but far-reaching impact of the Korean War was China’s covert operation during the so-called “2nd Vietnam War” (1965–75). China’s involvement in Vietnam, though massive, was measured and restrained. At the strategic level, both China and the U.S. managed to separate themselves across the 17th parallel during the 10-year period, a remarkable contrast to the direct Sino-U.S. confrontation during the Korean War.

There was no question that the Korean War was a constant reminder for both China and the U.S. that a similar showdown in Vietnam, no matter how undesirable, still might be possible. To manage the conflict in Vietnam and avoid another direct engagement quickly became the PRC’s top priority. In June 1964, two months before the Tonkin Gulf Incident, Mao and his colleagues made clear, publicly and privately, that the 17th parallel was the bottom line for China’s military intervention in Vietnam and that any U.S. step to escalate the war in Vietnam would invite a corresponding move from China. In other words, if the U.S. would not cross the 17th parallel, Beijing would refrain from direct intervention.

To communicate its goals and intentions more effectively to Washington, Beijing chose more direct and more credible channels. In January 1965, Mao told the visiting American journalist Edger Snow that "we won’t fight outside China. We will strike only if the U.S. comes in. ... Vietnam does not need us at all and they can handle the situation themselves." Mao’s message through Snow was followed by a series of public statements in 1965 to draw the line on the sand (February, March 12 & 20, April 10 & 27, June 8). Meanwhile, Beijing stepped up its private effort to send to the U.S. China’s clear signals to avoid direct conflict in Vietnam. This time, China worked through U.S. friends and allies, not through a neutral party such as India as was the case prior to China’s intervention in Korea. These "go-betweens" included the Philippines (February 27, 1965), Pakistan (April 2, 1965) and Britain (May 31, 1965).

Meanwhile, Beijing and Washington actively and fully explored each other’s bottom line at ambassadorial meetings in Warsaw. On March 16, 1965, U.S. Secretary of State Rusk made clear U.S. willingness to continue diplomatic talks with China in Warsaw. The same day happened to be the 129th Sino-U.S. ambassadorial meeting, and the U.S. side emphasized that Washington had no intention to expand war to China. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai quickly made public in early April 1965 that China would not initiate a war against the U.S.

Thus, the timely and effective communication between China and the U.S. at the early stage of the Vietnam War enabled the two sides to avoid another direct conflict despite repeated U.S. escalations in
Vietnam and Beijing's public denunciation of U.S. moves. Even if the U.S. knew of China's massive involvement in the North, it chose not to publicize and politicize it. Beijing, for its part, refrained from "officially" sending its "volunteers" to Vietnam. The tacit coordination between China and the U.S. during this time was in sharp contrast to the Korean War in which China failed to deter the U.S. from crossing the 38th parallel while the U.S. failed, too, to deter China from crossing the Yalu River a few months later.

Ultimately, the type of confrontation in which Beijing and Washington were engaged in Korea should be avoided by all necessary means. For both sides, one of the basic lessons from the Korean War seems to be: if conflict cannot be avoided entirely, it should be kept from escalating to a full-blown war, even in a limited context. The scope, timing, and consequences of such an indirect war can, and should, be managed for the sake of national interests of both sides.

With the Bush administration, Sino-U.S. relations seem to be getting into a more complex mode in which low-level conflicts and crises are not entirely avoidable. To deal with, live with, and manage such a new strategic environment requires both strategic statesmanship and willingness to communicate, even between strategic adversaries as in the case of the Vietnam Wars.

**Nukes, Johnson's "New Thinking" and China's New Confidence:** Perhaps the ultimate cause for moderation on both sides during the 2nd Vietnam War was China's acquisition of nuclear weapons. On October 16, 1964, and just a few months after the August Tonkin Gulf Incident, China announced the detonation of its first atomic device, which was closely monitored by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The latter, however, pursued a very different approach to dealing with a giant communist state armed with nuclear weapons.

Up to the point of his assassination, Kennedy was convinced that a nuclear-armed Chinese communist state would be an "intolerable menace" to the U.S. As a result, he and his top advisers remained committed to depriving China of its nuclear capabilities by all necessary means, including coordination with Nationalist Chinese officials, seeking Soviet collaboration, making contingency plans for attacks by "anonymous" planes, and authorizing the CIA to take covert and paramilitary actions to raid Chinese nuclear facilities by employing Nationalist commandos. More recent case studies indicate that the Kennedy administration's commitment to the use of force was decided without complete information on the Chinese nuclear plan and without a thorough analysis of the likely impact of China's nuclear progress. These policy intentions and actions remained alive with support from some top officials of the Johnson administration even after Kennedy's
death in 1963, even after the Soviets declined to consider a joint action with Washington against Beijing, and even after a thorough analysis by a State Department official, Robert Johnson, concluded that a Chinese nuclear capability would not pose a major threat to U.S. interests, much less change the balance of power in East Asia.

Although Johnson was troubled by the implications of a nuclear China, he nonetheless rejected unilateral actions, partially due to the upcoming presidential race. Instead of the use of force, covert or not, against China's nuclear facilities, Johnson preserved his freedom of action.

The Chinese nuclear test of October 1964 did not bring the worst-case scenario that President Kennedy had feared. In the months that followed China's first nuclear test, which startled the U.S. intelligence community as a more sophisticated uranium-235 device was used rather than one based on plutonium, the PRC announced on the same day of its first nuclear test China's three basic principles regarding nuclear weapons: (1) China's purpose in developing nuclear weapons was to break the superpower monopoly; (2) China would never be the first to use nuclear weapons; and (3) China would be dedicated to the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Despite the passage of time, these principles of Chinese nuclear policy have not changed, and China remains the only major nuclear power to date with declared policies of non-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons against countries without nuclear weapons. If anything, a China with nuclear weapons actually accelerated Sino-American rapprochement, and President Nixon believed that a nuclear-capable China made a fresh approach, not preventive action, mandatory. The nuclear factor, among others, may have served as ultimate restraints on both sides of the Pacific during the 10-year Vietnam War during which the two militaries remained separated by the 17° parallel.

If the moderation of bilateral relations during the Johnson era partially resulted from China's possession of nuclear weapons, and if Beijing's nuclear capability actually led to a more confident and presumably more secure China, then the proposed U.S. missile defense systems perhaps would have the potential to alter this strategic equation. The immediate, no matter how unintended, effect of any U.S. missile defense system would compromise and neutralize the PRC's minimalist-deterrent posture consisting of two dozen old-fashioned silo-based, liquid-propelled ICBMs. Any effort of the PRC to restore the strategic balance and confidence would have uncertain and even dire consequences for cross-strait and/or cross-Pacific relations.

Korea, Taiwan & China: For China, the fate of Korea and Taiwan seem perpetually tied with one another in the East Asian geopolitical
game. In the age of imperialism, the two provided the first taste of spoils for the Empire of the Sun before it released its full energy to Mother Russia (1904-5 Russo-Japanese War) and Uncle Sam (Pearl Harbor 1941).

In 1950, Mao was genuinely disturbed and then enraged by Truman's authorization for the 7th Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait immediately after the outbreak of the Korean War and four months before the CPV entered Korea. For Mao, this meant a de facto U.S. re-entry into the Chinese civil war. It was not only a betrayal of Acheson's "hands-off policy toward China, which was pronounced 10 months before (August 1949), but it was also an effective challenge to Mao's historical mission of unifying China. A direct confrontation with the United States, therefore, might not be avoidable. If that eventuality could not be ruled out entirely, as Mao perceived, it should be kept out of China and at a place where Chinese military might have a chance to withstand the most powerful military in the world. And the rest was history.

At the outset of the new millennium, the fate of Korea, Taiwan, and China are again bound with remarkably similar linkages, though for very different reasons. For Beijing, the alleged "rogue state" of North Korea is a convenient excuse, while the real target of the U.S. missile defense systems is China. Indeed, Bush's redefining of North Korea as a "rogue state" from Clinton's "state of concern" for the U.S. missile defense system does not seem to fit the fast-evolving situation in Korea. While the South has so far preferred its moderate "sunshine" policy toward the North to supporting the U.S. missile defense plan, the North has gone so far as to express its willingness for continuous U.S. military presence in the Korean Peninsula even after the unification. At the same time, Washington has never stated that the U.S. missile defense systems would not cover Taiwan. China has been the "forgotten" nuclear power in the missile defense debate in the U.S. For Beijing, Washington's "detour" through Korea to separating Taiwan from China is quite a familiar move, similar to that after the outbreak of the Korean War half a century ago. The Korean "setting" this time, however, is so unconvincing and deceptive that it seems whether the Koreans make war or make love, the U.S. follows a predetermined course to get to Taiwan and China.

In both 1950 and 2001, the communication pattern seems to be one-way traffic in that China's effort to reach Washington is either ignored or subsided, unlike the willingness and actual moves by both sides to communicate during the height of the 2nd Vietnam War. The Bush administration—which seems to care more about "political correctness" than strategic soundness despite its pronounced "realist" foreign
policy—went so far as to have a largely symbolic meeting with an impotent, outgoing Japanese Prime Minister Mori ahead of a prescheduled meeting with China’s "foreign policy czar" Qian Qichen, who represented a country that the new administration would try hard to redefine as the real strategic adversary in the next few months. Such a strategy of not talking to the Chinese naturally leads to the Pentagon’s policy to minimize contact with the PLA after the EP-3E incident and to rid itself of any institutional "sympathy" to Beijing. Despite the passage of time, what China obtained from its outreach to the U.S. was quite similar: MacArthur’s crossing the 38th parallel in 1950 and the massive arms sales to Taiwan in 2001.

The Taiwan issue, however, was treated quite differently. In 1950, the 7th Fleet’s patrol of the Taiwan Strait was sold to the public as a way to prevent both sides from escalating hostilities. The Truman administration actually tried to minimize the impact of the move on relations with Beijing. In 2001, the Bush administration was eager to poke the Taiwan issue even if the majority of the island’s public opinion preferred maintaining the status quo to a sliding toward symbolic independence and confrontation with the mainland. Indeed, Bush’s "humble" realism is so obsessed with China that almost all of his major foreign and defense policies revolve around dealing with Beijing. This includes expanding arms sales to Taiwan, enlarging the commitment to defend the island, elevating political relations with Taiwan’s pro-independent president, shifting defense strategy from Europe to Asia, courting India, and promoting missile defense.

Washington’s policy, coupled with the 1999 embassy bombing and the recent EP-3E incident, has led to rising Chinese nationalism. Unlike 50 years ago, when Mao had to persuade most of his colleagues to intervene in Korea, in the new millennium most Chinese, including the pro-West, liberal-minded intellectual elite, would become staunch nationalists (or patriots) over the issues of Taiwan and/or Tibet. The impact of such a societal-based nationalism on China’s cross-strait and cross-Pacific policies should never be underestimated.

**Back to the Future: Ghosts & Aspirations of Versailles:** Indeed, the situation today seems similar to that of 80 years ago when the impact of the Treaty of Versailles inadvertently gave rise to the nationalist tide in both Korea and China. In Korea, the March 1, 1919, demonstration for independence from Japan was brutally suppressed with thousands killed by the Japanese occupation forces. Korean nationalism, however, never ceased its quest for unity and independence, which was, in essence, the root cause of the North-South conflict in Korea.

In China, the impact of Versailles is equally strong and deep. The
type of Chinese nationalism triggered by Versailles in May 1919 soon gave rise to the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. In Paris, the victorious European allies ignored both China’s territorial integrity and Wilsonism (self-determination and open diplomacy). Instead, the Chinese province of Shandong was transferred from Germany to Japan, even if China contributed to the victories of the allies. The triumph of West’s realpolitik in Versailles over the West’s idealism, which was wonderfully packaged and presented by U.S. President Wilson, abruptly ended China’s quest for modernization through Westernization (“Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy” in Chinese languages). And most of the young and pro-West Chinese intellectual elite, including many of the first generation of Chinese communist leaders such as Chen Duxiu, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, eventually embraced Marxism. Their switch to Bolshevism was largely triggered by Lenin’s call for the universal ending of colonialism and imperialism, which was more appealing to the young and aspiring Chinese elite for their national salvation. The continuation of communism in China today perhaps has more to do with Chinese nationalism than with orthodox Marxism.

For many in East Asia today, therefore, the aspiration (self-determination and unification) and ghosts (realpolitik) of Versailles remain. In Korea, the pace of the historical North-South reconciliation is finally in the hands of the Koreans. The Nobel Peace Prize winner Kim Dae Jung, however, was told not to make peace but to rely on missiles. The current status quo of their civil war, therefore, is allowed to continue. Between Taiwan and the mainland, the “one-China” status quo of the past 20 years, which has benefited all parties—Taiwan, China and the U.S.—is disappearing in the name of democracy. The irony is that Taiwan is perceived to be drifting away either by desire (Taiwanization) or by design (U.S. arms sales and Bush’s strategic tilt toward the island’s defense). And this is despite China’s contribution to the end of the Cold War, despite Deng’s peaceful unification with Taiwan over Mao’s liberation, despite the fact that the Chinese today are more willing and ready than at any time in China’s history to join and stay with the West and U.S.-dominated world system, and despite China’s steady and historical rise as a major power in the region and the world. The fate and future of Korea and China, which were first dictated in Versailles last century, are still beyond their own control.

History seldom mechanically repeats itself, and historical analogies, therefore, should be treated with caution. Nonetheless, history is also a stream that carries with it all the burdens, glory, wisdom, and consequences into the present and toward the future. In East Asia, history looms much larger in the past two centuries with Korea as the center for the geopolitical games of great powers. In both historical and
strategic perspectives, Korea has been a place where the U.S. and China reciprocate their resolves, power, and wisdom. Despite the enduring debate between orthodox and revisionist views of China’s conduct of the war, the conflict half a century ago, though not initiated by China and the U.S., should never be "forgotten,” but should serve as a historical benchmark against which future statesmen and their policies will be judged with regard to their mutual interests as well as regional and world security.

References


2. Zhang dismisses the war as a useful experience for China except "the highly dubious lessons" which "can lead in a very dangerous direction." Zhang, 259-60. Yu (1998), however, argues that China learned a great deal, positively or negatively, from the war and the question is how and why China learned.

4. Such a "military Romanticism" is said to be based on a "cultural" paradigm consisting of communist ideology and Chinese traditional and political culture. As a result, China "chose to act aggressively, regardless of the calculated high risk and cost." Zhang, 9-10.


6. For a list of those pro-Beijing scholars, see Zhang, 2-4.

7. For a critique of the "revisionist" argument, see Bao Guojun, "Tangmeng Yuanchao Zhanzheng Lishi Burong Waiqu [No distortion allowed for the history of the war of resisting America and aiding Korea]," www.peopledaily.com.cn, October 1, 2000.


13. See Yu, in Xiaobing Li, et al., eds.

14. For PLA's debate regarding the capability of the U.S. military, see Yu, 5-6.


18. Xu, 45. While the CPV's operational guideline was to avoid U.S. troops, and some CPV units deliberately did so, the CPV accidentally encountered a U.S. unit when the CPV's 39th Army attacked Umsan on the night of November 1. Only after sighting a much taller and heavier enemy did the CPV realize that it was engaging the Americans (the 8th Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division, which was taking over the defense of Umsan from the ROK's 15th Regiment). The 39th Army overran one battalion and defeated another two of the 8th Cavalry Regiment. See Xie, 212 and 229-30; Du, 68-70.

19. Xie, 243-56; Xu, 49-52.

20. Xie, 267-82; Yang and Wang, 166-80; Military Academy, 52-67; Xu, 55-57; Zhao, 297-319.


22. Yang and Wang, 185-87; Xie, 282-92; Du, 120-26; Military Academy, 63-66; Xu, 46-60.

23. Military Academy, 71.

25. Nie, 780.


27. RMRB, 10 December 1950, cited from Shen, 2000, Part II: 2 & note 52.

28. Gromyko to Chinese ambassador Wang Jiaxiang in Moscow that “Under present conditions in Korea I would like to remind an old proverb 'strike while the iron is hot' (chen re da tie).” Cited from Col. Victor A. Gavrilov’s comment on this paper, June 2001 and Gromyko’s diary on his talk on December 5, 1950 with Wang Jiaxiang, cited from Shen, 2000, Part II: 2 & note 53.


30. Xie, 353; Xu, 63 and 338.

31. Peng’s persistence for tactical feasibility and flexibility differs from Zhang’s account that CPV officers, including Peng, never doubted that Mao’s military thought would work in Korea. Zhang, 255.

32. Du, 143-53; Xu, 62; Military Academy, 77-8 and 88-9.

33. Shen, 2000, Part II: 2, note 58.

34. Xu, 64; Xie, 399-403; Military Academy, 88.

35. Du, 186-91; Xu, 71; Yang and Wang, 221-22.

36. Xie, 399-401.

37. Xie, 402-3.


40. Military Academy, 92-93; Du, 192.

41. DM Ping Memoirs, 186-91; Xu, 71; Yang and Wang, 221-22.

42. Xu, 72-74; Military Academy, 120-21; Du, 204.

43. Mao’s directive was “Neng susheiw ze susheng, buneng susheng ze huansheng” (win quickly if possible; if not, win with a delay), Xie, 81.

44. Military Academy, 94; See Mao’s telegraph to Stalin on March 1, 1951, cited in Xie, 453-6.

45. This appeared likely, when the U.N. forces increased their harassment, intelligence, and redeployment activities along the Korean coastal areas. Military Academy, 126-27; Du, 218-19.

46. Xie, 456-58; Yang and Wang, 252-61; Du, 218-22.

47. Military Academy, 152-54.

48. Peng’s other three mistakes were the 1932 attack on Nationalist forces in the Ganzhou city, Jiangxi Province; the 1940 “Hundred-regiment battle” against the Japanese; and the 1948 Xifu Campaign against the Nationalists. Xie, 456-58; Yang and Wang, 252-61; Du, 218-22.


50. See Shen, 2000, II: 3.

51. Views were obtained through author’s interviews with the veterans. Also see Xu, 70.

52. For U.S. position, see Sheng, 2000, Part II: 3 and note 62. For China’s calculation, see Xie, 405.


58. This was converted from Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second War (Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 2000).

59. In his 1975 visit to China, Kim II Sung sounded like he was ready to use force to unify the country, like what North Vietnam had just done. In his speech at the welcoming dinner, Kim said that "If revolution takes place in South Korea, we, as one and the same nation, will not just look at it with folded arms but will strongly support the South Korean people. If the enemy ignites war recklessly, we shall resolutely answer it with war and completely destroy the aggressors. In this war we will only lose the Military Demarcation Line and will gain the country's reunification." Mao apparently persuaded Kim not to do so. The militant rhetoric was dropped in Kim's farewell speech, and he instead stressed "peaceful" effort to unify the country. See Beijing Review, April 25 and May 2, 1975.

60. See RMRB, July 12, 1996.


62. In 1999, both Koreas adopted more pragmatic and flexible policies toward each other and other countries. The South's "sun-shine" policy by Kim Dae-Jung and its decision not to join the U.S.-led Theater Missile Defense (TMD) were reciprocated by Kim Jung II, who has so far pursued an active and omnidirectional foreign policy which has been seldom seen in its history. In his June 1999 visit to China, North Korean No. 2 leader Kim Yong-nam publicly expressed his support for China's reform and open-up policy. Such a move to embrace China's market-oriented reform was publicly endorsed by Kim Jung II himself during his secret visit to Beijing on May 29-31, 2000. RMRB, 1 June 2000. Also see Howard French, "North Korea Shyly Courts Capitalism," New York Times, April 30, 2000.


64. At the height of the Chinese involvement in Vietnam, 170,000 PLA were in North Vietnam for air defense, logistic and transportation maintenance. A total of 320,000 person/time was accumulated for the three-year period of 1965 and 1968, and over
1,000 of them were killed there. Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000) ix-x.


68. In the first two months of the Bush administration, Beijing sent three high-level diplomatic envoys to the U.S., including a group of senior diplomats, Mr. Zhou Mingwei, deputy director of PRC's Taiwan Affairs Council, and vice premier Qian Qichen. Meanwhile, a new ambassador to Washington arrived.


72. This view of Chinese nationalism differs from the prevalent depiction to divide the Chinese into hardliners and moderates. See John Lewis, 2001. The Chinese have long passed the phase (Mao’s time) when the Americans were judged by who they were rather than what they do. Recent anti-Americanism in China should not be interpreted as universal or permanent. The same college students who threw stones at the U.S. embassy in Beijing following the 1999 U.S. bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade would line up the following week for visas to study in America.

73. To a certain degree, the Korean War was “forgotten” by both the U.S. and China. While the much earlier and shorter “police action” in Korea was recognized long after the more protracted Vietnam War in the U.S., Mao’s politicization of the PRC politics and the PLA’s role during the 1960s and 1970s also delayed the learning effort of the real lessons of the Korean War.
The Impact of the Korean War on the Korean Economy

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Introduction

The three-year long Korean War (June 25, 1950 - July 27, 1953) devastated both South and North Korean economies. It broke out when the two Koreas barely managed to maintain socio-economic stability and restore pre-WWII industry production capability to some extent. The distorted and exploited economy by Imperial Japan was demolished by the brutal war. It started out as the appearance of a civil war, but in effect was carried out as an international war. Thus, it was a severe and hard-fought one between UN forces (including South Korea and 16 other nations) and North Korea and its allies (China and USSR). Although it took place in a small country in Far-Eastern Asia, it developed into a crash between world powers, East and West, and left treacherous and incurable wounds to both Koreas. Nearly four million people were presumed dead, and much worse were the property and industrial facility damages. Its impact on the Korean economy was so immense that consequential economic systems and policies re-framed the course of economic development in the following years. In spite of such enormous impacts of the Korean war on the economy, few studies exist. Of those that do, most are centered around describing or estimating war-related damages, while some focus on the long-term effects of US aid on the Korean economy.

The objective of this paper is to analyze the short-term direct impacts of the Korean War on both Korean economies and its long-term effects on their economic structure. To do this, section II will summarize the estimates of human casualties, non-human damages, production losses and rampant inflation rates, and so on. In addition, it will analyze how the war effected two major national economic reform policies, i.e., the farmland reform and privatization policies on
confiscated enemy properties. In the following section, the paper will deal with consequences of US aid brought about upon the Korean economic structure, and reevaluation of the Korean economic policy mishaps at the same time.

**Short-term Direct Economic Impacts**

The immediate effects of the Korean war can be examined in three different aspects: destruction of industrial facilities and resulting disruption of productive activities, extreme over-issue of money and consequent hyper inflation, and discontinuance or distortion of two prime national economic reform policies.

1. **Damage Estimates**

   Destruction ratios of major industries during the first four months of the war were estimated as high as 70% of textile industry, 70% of chemical industry, 40% of agricultural machinery industry, and 10% of rubber industry (ECA Report, October, 1950). In addition, the Korea Transportation Ministry statistics revealed that about 600 thousand housing units, 46.9% of railroad, 1,656 roads of a total of 500km, and 1,453 bridges totaling 49km were destroyed during the war. Furthermore, by August of 1951, 44% of factory buildings and 42% of production facilities lay in ruins. Among all, damages in the mining industry were the worst; about 51% of the industry was destroyed and the estimated amount of damage was as high as US$549 million, accounting for 23.3% of all industrial damages. Damage of power plants was even more devastating with nearly 80% destroyed. Within two months since the start of the war, power production plummeted down to a miserable level of 11 thousand kwh, about one-eighth of the 1948 production level of 80 thousand kwh, which was equivalent to one tenth of the power consumption level in 1945.\(^1\) Such massive destruction of electric facilities brought about a drastic cutback of productive activities. The total war damage was estimated as high as 41.23 billion won, equivalent to US$6.9 billion when the official exchange rate was applied (US$2.3 billion with the market rate). It was also equivalent to 86% of the 1953 GNP, although the 1953 net commodity production remained at 27% lower than 1940 level (the 1953 per-capita net commodity production was 44% lower than the 1940 level). Consequently, foreign trade deteriorated from US$208 million in 1948 (including US$188.3 million government imports) to US$2.9 million in 1950.\(^1\) Even rice crops fell down to a 65% level of the average annual product of the 1945 -1950 period. All these factors led to serious inflation.
2. Hyper Inflation

What aggravated the galloping inflation was the over-issue of currency. During the first three months of the war, the total money in circulation was increased by 72%. Temporary increase in taxes could not meet the huge demand in war expenses, which accounted for about 50% of the national budget. The government filled the gap by borrowing from the BOK, i.e., issuing new money. About 90% of the money increase during the first six months of the war was used to finance government expenses. To exacerbate the situation, Korea had to provide UN force with loans in Korean currency according to the Taegue Agreement - an agreement of UN forces expenditure. This factor alone contributed to 79% of the money increase during the three year period of war (June 1950 - July 1953). Money in circulation increased by 24 folds between June 24, 1950 and July 31, 1953. As of December 31, 1953, it again increased by 42 times. The magnitude of the loan was so huge (17,748 million hwari) that even enormous sales revenue of aid materials only redeemed 40.6% of the loan until the end of the war (see Table 1, page 100).

3. Distortion of Two Major Economic Reform Policies

Two major economic reform policies, that were about to be executed after long hardheaded disputes, were suspended due to the breakout of the war. Although the reform projects were resumed, they were subject to distortion during the war period. The farmland reform bill was enacted in June 1949, and its enforcement laws were promulgated in April 1950. The enemy property privatization bill was passed by Congress in December 1949, and implemented in June 1950, starting with public auctions in Seoul. In spite of the sudden disruption by the war, the two reforms were resumed soon because of their significant implications for the establishment of market economy system in Korea and because of the huge funds needed to carry out the war. In consequence, the reforms were destined to be executed for reasons other than the original ones. No originally planned objectives could be achieved in such a situation. The farmland reform, for example, was executed for the wrong reason of providing war supplies. Thus the farmers who wanted to buy distributed farmland, had to pay 150% of the average annual product, 30% each in five years with farm products (not with money). This obviously created a tremendous burden to new farmland owners in times of war and galloping inflation, especially when the wartime temporary farm family income tax was levied based on the revised land tax law in September 1951. The tax rate was applied progressively from a 15% to a 28% level, and again it had to be paid with farm products.
Table 1: Money Issue by Factors during the Korean War  
(Unit: Million Rwan)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Fiscal Fund</th>
<th>UN Force Expenses</th>
<th>BOK Credit</th>
<th>Sales of Aid Materials</th>
<th>Foreign Exchange Sale</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950.6.25</td>
<td>1203</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>A/46</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>A4</td>
<td>3623</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>A1440</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>3287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>A694</td>
<td>5553</td>
<td>2754</td>
<td>A2954</td>
<td>A217</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>4565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>15893</td>
<td>8027</td>
<td>6882</td>
<td>A2904</td>
<td>A15719</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>12987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Composition</td>
<td>16398</td>
<td>17748</td>
<td>10397</td>
<td>A7205</td>
<td>A15936</td>
<td>1172</td>
<td>22574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio in %</td>
<td>(73)</td>
<td>(79)</td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td>(A33)</td>
<td>(A71)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Recited from Dae Keun Lee (1989), p. 149, table 2
Note: 100 old currency (won) was converted into 1 new currency (hwari) in the Feb. 17, 1953 Currency Reform.
In addition, farmers had to sell one third of their products to the government at an official price set by the government, according to the newly established law of grains management in 1950. The overall burden to new farmers was so enormous (approximately 50% of the value of annual product) that as of the end of 1954 about 10% of them sold their land again and became leased-land workers or left for cities.

It is necessary to note that between June 25, 1950 and February 15, 1953 (currency reform), the WPI index rose 18 times, and rice prices rose 22 times. In short, distortion of the farmland reform together with heavy land tax burden and compulsory sales to the government could by no means encourage farming or improve production, although the reform could end semi-feudalistic land ownership.

Old landlords, on the other hand, were forced by law to sell all the farmland that was in excess of three chongbo in size. They received a kind of voucher called Farmland Price Securities in return for the sold farmland. The value of 150% of the average annual product was redeemed, based on the government-assessed farm product price, but 30% each in five years in the form of a voucher in times of treacherous inflation. The only benefit accorded voucher holders was that they could use it to purchase enemy properties at public auction, although instead most of the vouchers were traded for 20-30% level of its face value.

One of the original objectives of the reform was to create industrial capitalists by offering benefits for landlords to be able to purchase confiscated enemy factories and businesses with the land-price voucher. This, however, could not be accomplished not only because real value of vouchers plummeted with soaring inflation rate, but also because government redemption was carried out by 28% up until May 1955. Thus even landlords who received their vouchers as a redemption simply sold them even at the 20-30% level of their face values. Only 5% of the largest 1.4% of landlords, who owned farmland of size over 20 chongbo (1 chongbo = 0.993 hectares), participated in enemy property privatization and up until 1958 only 40% of the vouchers issued were used to buy enemy properties. Of course there was little incentive to buy factories, many of which were destroyed during the war.

The government acquired needed rice for war supplies through farmland reform and took advantage of the difference between its sales revenue and redemption payment. Although such government policies contributed to the fight against inflation," both landlords and new independent farmers were severely impoverished accordingly. Most of all, original objectives of the reform were lost in the war’s consequences.
The Korean government also went ahead and resumed sales of the confiscated enemy properties (production facilities or business firms) through auction, but only in a limited area, Kyungsang province, southeastern part of Korea which was the only non-occupied area at that time. What the government hoped for from these sales was to create new industrialists, and to encourage production by new owners, and thereby to contribute to alleviate ferocious inflation. Although special privilege was given to former landlords or voucher holders to use their vouchers at public auction on enemy properties, most of them gave up their benefits due to the plummeted real value of vouchers and the difficulty of operating business in times of war. As a result, by the end of March 1953, less then 7% (20,955 cases) of the enemy properties (29,906 cases) were sold for a total of 263 million hwan. Thus, another objective of the reform, to make up fiscal deficits with sales revenue of enemy properties, also could not be realized. Only 1.5% of the sales revenue during the 1949-1955 period was transferred to government revenue," although privatization was expedited as the war entered into a stable phase. The average sales value remained low until 1955, although the number of auctions increased. Major and big business privatization occurred beginning in 1955.

A preemptive-rights-based privatization method became dominant in this process. Instead of public auctions, priorities were given to those who had managed or leased factories and farms. Most of them were clerical workers of firms previously under Japanese rule, or administrative staffs during the US Military rule. Approximately 73% of privatization was carried out based on this method, although almost all big business sales were made this way. Although the government was hungry for money, sales were only a bargain in times of severe inflation. The repayment date was extended up to 15 years in such a way that the bigger the business, the longer the repayment period. In addition, purchasers became practical owners once they made the first year payment. The entire process produced a windfall gain to new owners. About 40% of big manufacturers in the 1950s (36 out of 89) and 68% of the top 22 big businesses (15 out of 22) were created in this privatization process. The original objective of creating industrialists in a democratic way by offering an equal and fair chance to everybody (especially previous landlords) was lost due to more urgent needs of the government during the war period. On the other hand, pro-Japanese businessmen could become economic leaders once again even in the new independent republic.

The US Military government, which emphasized democratic redistribution of farmland, did not oppose to preemptive-right-oriented privatization. Expeditious establishment of businesses was considered
more important, no matter who became new owners. It was thought that previous managerial staffs or workers would be helpful in swiftly restoring production if ownership was given to them with priority.

We need to point out at this point that the MacArthur-led US Military government in Japan forced Japan to carry out democratization of business ownership. MacArthur dissolved *zaibatsu* headquarters and dispersed stock ownership to the general public. In addition, management by *zaibatsu* leaders, their family members, and top executives was forbidden. Furthermore, monopolistic firms were divided to prevent economic concentration. The US government initiated and carried out all this reform thoroughly in Japan, but not in Korea. The prime concern of the US was probably to dissolve the core of economic power that led and supported the war against the US. There was no such motive for the US Military in Korea.

4. Impacts on the North Korean Economy

Destruction in North Korea was more severe. In addition to the terrible human casualties, 25 million death toll of North Koreans and Chinese combined, the total damage was estimated as high as 420 billion *won*, which was a lot higher than the damage in South Korea and equivalent to roughly four times of the North Korea’s 1953 GNP. To be specific, 8,700 factories and state enterprises, 600,000 housing units, and over 5,000 schools, disappeared in smoke. Additionally, 370,000 hectares of rice paddies and fields were put into a state of devastation.

Two major economic reforms, however, successfully were carried out long before the Korean War and thus were not affected at all by the war. In North Korea, the land reform was enacted on March 5, 1946 and its execution was completed in 20 days. North Korean government confiscated all the enemy-owned farmlands, tenant-based farmlands and the excess of five *chongbo* of all farmlands, and distributed them for free to tenants or farmers with small land, according to the “Confiscation without Redemption and Redistribution without Payments” principle (The North Korean Land Reform Law, Article 5). The land reform law, however, stated that distributed land could not be sold or used for mortgage or for tenant farming (same law, Article 10) and that distribution of land should be carried out by decisions made by the People’s Council (same law, Article 6). Although it was declared as free redistribution, it turned out to be a disguised nationalization of land that discouraged farming and caused a decrease in productivity in later years.

In the case of firms and production facilities that were owned by the Japanese or the pro-Japanese businessmen, they were all confiscated without redemption. They were put temporarily under the control of
The USSR military government, and then officially nationalized by the North Korean government on August 10, 1946. Following this reform, the socialistic production system accounted for nearly 90% of all production facilities.

1. Critiques on the Economic Developmental Role of the US Aid in the Korean Economy and Assessment on Them

In relation to the effects of US aid on the Korean economy, there has been a die-hard argument that has criticized US aid for destroying the economic basis of Korean agriculture, establishing a consumer goods oriented industrial structure and thus making the Korean economy dependent on the US.

Criticism of the economic effects of US aid in Korea was raised based on the following logic. First of all, critics argued that most of the initial aid items were food, medicine and other necessary consumer goods. Although these aid materials were indispensable, industrial facilities were also badly needed. In contrast, most aid for North Korea from the USSR and China was industrial machinery and facilities.

Negative aspects have been emphasized especially in relation to the Public Law (PL) 480 Aid. Aid funds were formed through sales of US surplus agricultural commodities and a considerable portion of the funds was used to purchase military supplies from the US. Some economists argue that the inflow of massive US farm product aid caused the fall of domestic farm product prices, discouraged the will of farmers to produce and thereby decreased the income of farmers.

In addition, some critics argued that the US Military Government authorities allowed pre-emptive rights to pro-Japanese farmers and manufacturers in the process of transferring confiscated enemy properties to private ownership. Other extremists even claimed that the US destroyed the agricultural industry through aid, made the Korean economy dependent on the US economy, and perpetuated its dependency by controlling the Korean economy through aid, loans and direct foreign investments.

In order to evaluate this argument, we need to start by clarifying the objective facts. The US aid to Korea started in 1945 with GARIOA (1945-1949) of a total of US$502 million, which was followed by EC A & SEC aid between 1949 and 1953 of a total of US$109 million (see Table 2, pages 106-107). These were economic relief funds and goods in nature. During the Korean War, however, the US aid began to be
used for military purposes. In May 1952, the Agreement on Economic Coordination between the ROK and the United Command was made. The CEB (Combined Economic Board) was established to carry out economic aid coordination. Following the war (December 1953), the CEB Agreement for a Program of Economic Reconstruction and Financial Stabilization between ROK and USA was signed. As FAO took the place of EC A after the war, the OEC (Office of the Economic Coordinator for Korea) was also replaced by the USOM (US Operating Mission to the ROK) in 1959 to deal with US aid in Korea. During this period, US aid combined with CRIK (Civil relief in Korea) and UNKRA began to soar from US$59 million level in 1950 to a maximum level of US$383 million in 1957. Such a large amount of aid consisted of 31.6% of Korean government revenue in 1954, 57.6% in 1955, and 49.2% in 1957. This ratio was even bigger than the total domestic tax revenue, which was slightly over the 30% level during the mid-1950s. Besides, 35% of the defense budget (51% in 1955, and 42% in 1957) was supported with aid funds.

To recapitulate, foreign aid during the 1953-1961 period accounted for about 64% of the annual gross investment. In other words, while the average annual investment for the period was 12.4%, the domestic savings ratio remained as low as 4.1%. Foreign savings, mostly foreign aid, had to fill up the remaining gap. Due to the US aid the Korean economy achieved a 3.5% annual economic growth rate during the 1954-61 period, which is obviously higher than that of 2.8% for the 1946-53 period. More importantly, US aid was very effective in stabilizing the Korean economy. The postwar average annual inflation rate was reduced to 20% from 120% of the preceding period.

On the other hand, although some extreme criticisms on the role of the US aid cannot be condoned, there is some room to reconsider some adverse effects that resulted from US aid. The so-called "counterpart fund" financed 90% of the economic reconstruction project expenses. The counterpart fund was designed to be spent for financing defense expenses in part and financing or offering loans to economic reconstruction projects, either public or private. The fund, however, was one that was raised by selling US aid commodities, mostly US surplus agricultural products. In addition, even among ICA aid, 23.2% was agricultural product. Article 402 of the MSA required that any US aid receiving country should have aid of about 25% of it in the form of agricultural products. The problem was that all these agricultural commodities brought in Korea either through ICA or PL480 were so big that they did contribute to lowering prices of Korean farm products and decreasing the income of farmers. Some Korean agricultural
### Table 2: Foreign Aid
(Unit: Thousand US Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>CRIK</th>
<th>UNKRA</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GARIOA</td>
<td>ECA &amp; SEC</td>
<td>PL480</td>
<td>AID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>4934</td>
<td>4,934</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>49,496</td>
<td>49,496</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>175,371</td>
<td>175,371</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>179,593</td>
<td>179,593</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>92,703</td>
<td>23,806</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>49,330</td>
<td>49,330</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>31,972</td>
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<td>1952</td>
<td>3,824</td>
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<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>5,571</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>82,437</td>
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<td>1956</td>
<td>32,955</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>45,222</td>
<td>323,268</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>调整后</td>
<td>来自</td>
<td>增加</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>47,896</td>
<td>265,629</td>
<td>313,525</td>
<td>7,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>11,436</td>
<td>208,297</td>
<td>219,733</td>
<td>2,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>19,913</td>
<td>225,236</td>
<td>245,149</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-50</td>
<td>502,097</td>
<td>73,136</td>
<td>575,233</td>
<td>9,376</td>
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<td>1951-55</td>
<td>36,028</td>
<td>293,823</td>
<td>329,851</td>
<td>447,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-60</td>
<td>15,722</td>
<td>1293,479</td>
<td>145,201</td>
<td>331</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961-65</td>
<td>329,543</td>
<td>599,230</td>
<td>928,773</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966-70</td>
<td>274,789</td>
<td>22,246</td>
<td>496,035</td>
<td>496,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-75</td>
<td>33,651</td>
<td>26,938</td>
<td>60,589</td>
<td>60,589</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTALS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>调整后</th>
<th>来自</th>
<th>增加</th>
<th>减少</th>
<th>balances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945-80</td>
<td>502,097</td>
<td>109,164</td>
<td>795,705</td>
<td>2438,158</td>
<td>38245124</td>
<td>457,378</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Bank of Korea
products such as wheat and cotton eventually disappeared completely due to the sharp decline of their prices.

On the other hand, major items of ICA were fertilizer, cotton, petroleum, sugar, wheat, cowhide, etc. This contributed to bolstering consumer industries in Korea, especially the "three white" industries, flour, cotton and sugar. As a result, secondary industry (mining and manufacturers) increased its share in the national economic structure from 9.8% in 1953 to 15.1% in 1961. The proportion of consumer goods industry, however, maintained its supremacy over production goods industry, by 74.4% vs. 18.3% in 1953 and 77.3% vs. 19.3% in 1961. Such a trend contributed to the retardation of the producer goods industry in the years to come.

Regardless, it is not logical to blame US aid in terms of surplus agricultural commodities for all the adverse effects on the Korean agricultural sector. Militaristic use of aid funds can be criticized, but this was inevitable in some respects, as was the Marshall Plan in Europe. It is extremely irrational to accuse the US of trying to destroy the basis of Korean agriculture through aid, and then to force or strengthen its supremacy over the Korean economy, when we consider the insignificance of the Korean economy to the US.

Although Korea was important for the US as a front base against the communist block, the Korean economy could not be prime interest to the US. It was just a trivial interest, not worthy of playing with or exploiting. At best it could be only a burden.

It may be useful at this point to look at how Taiwan utilized US agricultural commodity aid. The Taiwanese government sold it to people for a low price so that they could alleviate hunger or famine. On the other hand, the government sold its domestically grown farm products overseas for a high price. That was how Taiwan could achieve such an early success in developing rural areas and agriculture. Development in rural areas brought not only an increase in demand for manufactured goods, but also for some primitive capital formation. Together with the successful farmland reform, appropriate policies on foreign aid farm products contributed a great deal to the formation of agricultural capital and later to the formation of industrial capital as well. Of course, the Taiwanese success cannot be replicated in Korea, because Korea experienced a three year long devastating war. Besides, Korea could not produce any internationally competitive farm products due to its inherent unfavorable natural conditions.

2. Conflicts between the US and Korean Governments

There was conflict between the Korean government and the US on how to utilize the remaining counterpart fund (65%) except for the
portion for defense expenditure (35%). Korea wanted to spend it in order to expand and reconstruct SOC’s and key industries including some heavy and chemical industries, while the US wanted to spend stabilizing the Korean economy and maintaining regional securities through acquiring enough supplies of urgent and indispensable needs. Instead of immediate industrialization of Korea, the US even recommended that Korea resume (free) trade with Japan for needed goods and to form a kind of anti-Communist block through cooperation. Japan was in need of raw materials from Asian countries including Korea, and wanted to sell their manufactured goods to Asian markets. Such an ambitious hope by the US could not be realized, however, since antagonism against Japan could not disappear within only a few years. President Seungman Rhee, especially, strongly opposed to this idea of forming an anti-Communist block with Japan as a leader. Instead, President Rhee himself wanted to play a leading role to that end. As a result he forbade special-foreign-exchange-loan funded imports from Japan.

Finally a compromise was made in December 1953 between the two governments. Both governments agreed that reconstruction investments should be agreeable to fiscal stabilization in principle. On other disputable issues they agreed to make further discussions and negotiations. The first remaining issue was which government should decide where to buy aid materials. The US hoped to purchase aid commodities from Japan so that the Japanese economy could be revitalized. The US intention was to build up a strong Japanese economy to lead the overall Asian economy and to replace the US role in the near future in providing proper economic assistance to Asian nations. A final decision was made to indirectly allow Japan to participate in the open international auction, but to allow Korea to be in charge of its operation.

The second issue was which exchange rate to apply, official or market rate. Korea wanted official rate applied so that it could import capital goods and intermediate goods for lower costs, while the US wanted market rates applied so that it could lessen the burden of repayment for UN forces loans from Korea. The US position on this point was so strong that the official exchange was finally raised to a realistic market rate level in 1951 from $1 = 60 hwan to $1 = 180 hwan. In 1955 the rate was again adjusted to $1 = 500 hwan, reflecting price changes in Korea.

The third and the most controversial issue was what kind of goods were to be delivered as aid. Again the US maintained a firm position. Priority was thus given to consumer goods for the sake of economic stability. About 70% of aid fell under this category. In consequence,
textile (cotton), milling (flour) and sugar refining industries had grown up fast and became leading industries in Korea. As noted earlier, consumer-goods producing light-industry oriented structure was formed in Korea as a result.

The fourth and final issue was about how to allocate aid. The US tried to maximize sales earnings of the aid materials through public auction with general merchants participating and by applying market foreign exchange rate in determining prices of the aid materials in terms of Korean currency. The Korean Defense Ministry, on the other hand, insisted on maintaining "real-demand principle," that allowed sales only to those who had operational production facilities. It also expressed its priority for the application of the official exchange rate in determining prices. The final decision was to allow real-demand principle to Korea in only a few major items such as cotton, wheat and sugar.


The serious consequence of the Korean government’s "real-demand principle" was that it gave a windfall gain to those who could acquire aid materials, since the WPI rose four times during the 1953-61 period. On the other hand, even when the official exchange rate approached market rate in 1955, the immediate discrepancy between sales price of aid materials and their market price ranged from 7 to 73% on the spot. Thus, the Korean government was actually more responsible than the US for fostering consumer goods industry and later on paving the way for the rise of big-business oriented Chaebol structure.

In addition to the advantage given to those who had operational production facilities, especially in relation to "three-white" industry, the Korean government provided them with special benefits such as the application of much lower interest rates for their loans, mostly 10% or lower, which was lower than general bank loan rate, 18.25%, and much lower than the curb rate of 48% (4% per-month). Even the inflation rate was higher than the nominal bank loan rate at that time. Further, various tax credits and benefits were added. Also, loans were allocated in favor of big firms. This in turn made the owned capital ratio of big firms lower than that of small and medium firms. The former was 28%, and the latter, 46% in 1960. Such a practice finally contributed to the establishment of special government-business nexus and corruption. The usual kickback rate of bank loans was reported to be about 20% (Shin, 2000, p. 277).

Such procedure helped those big businesses to form cartels such as the Korea Textile Association, through which they could monopolize raw material aid such as cotton (100%), molasses (100%), wheat (81%).
and sugar (27%). These associations also practiced sales cartelization. For example, 19% of textile industries took 89% of the market, while 2% of sugar industries took 92% of the market. The Che-il Woolen Textile Co. controlled 60% of the market, and three leading flour milling companies took up 50% of the market in the 1950s.

Since such monopoly was not built up based on economic productivity, but on special benefits from government, they could establish neither optimum level of production scale, nor competitiveness in international markets. In addition, the labor productivity was estimated as low as the one third or one half level of the Japanese counterpart in the textile industry (cotton).

What made those industries either flourish or survive was special favor in aid material allocation, special benefits in tax and financing, monopolistic business operation, and most of all, utilization of labor of long working hours for very low wages. People worked 11-12 hours a day for a monthly salary of 13-26 thousand hwan, when the minimum living expenses of laborers of 8 hours working was set at 23 thousand hwan. This was possible because there was infinite number of an unemployed labor force. The unemployment rate was estimated to be 45%, if 20% level of disguised employment was included.

All these facts helped big businesses grow with high profits. The gains only from the difference between different exchange rates were estimated to be as big as US$1.3 billion during the 1953-1960 period. Nine of the biggest ten Korean Chaebols established their core sectors during this period. Unfortunately, their products were centered around aid raw material related products such as cotton, wool, sugar and food. Consumer goods industries such as fertilizer, cement, flat glasses, which could generate bigger forward and backward linkage effects, were not yet being produced any for markets.

Another major mishap of the Korean government occurred in relation to its policy on the agricultural sector. The Korean government transferred inflationary pressure onto the agricultural sector through low grain price policy based on aid grains and heavy tax. Aid by grains between 1945-1960 consisted of 33% of all aid offered in Korea. The size of inflow of aid grains was 400-500 thousand tons per year, which was equivalent to 15% of domestic production, and which was obviously a lot higher than grain import in the pre-war year 1949 (2% of the domestic production).

The grain price index fell by 35% during the 1956-59 period, while prices of consumer goods rose by 72% during the 1953-54 period, and it rose by only 20% while those of other consumer goods rose by 64% during the 1955-59 period (see table 3).
Table 3: WPI in the 1950s (1955 =100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>WPI For Grains</th>
<th>WPI For Non-Grains</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956, 10 - 1957, 1</td>
<td>142.1</td>
<td>174.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957, 10 - 1958, 1</td>
<td>143.3</td>
<td>142.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958, 10 - 1959, 1</td>
<td>140.3</td>
<td>133.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959, 10 - 1960, 1</td>
<td>152.8</td>
<td>120.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is true that the low price of grains was related to heavy inflow of aid grains. But the Korean government policy was responsible for this low grain price. During the war, the government tried to acquire grains for war supplies through government purchasing policies within one third of the annual product. The government tried to maintain a government purchasing price that was as low as possible. It was estimated as low as 74% of the average production costs and much lower than market prices. This policy was carried out until 1961. The government also tried to keep grain prices low so that it could lessen the burden of redemption for the landlords who sold their land to the government. The government was supposed to pay for them based on the monetary value of the specified quantity of grain on the voucher (farmland securities).

There was another reason for the low grain price policy. The government needed to keep grain prices low, because they were a leading factor of the WPI. If the WPI rose more than 25% per year, Korea had to devalue Korean currency against US dollars, which was not what the Korean government wanted. One last additional reason for the low grain price was that it could help poor urban dwellers.

The temporary land tax was created and levied on deprived farmers in order to finance war expenses. Farmers had to pay this tax with real farm products. This started in 1951 and continued even after the war until April, 1960 when the tax was allowed to be paid in money. This temporary land tax was 5.5 times higher in its money value in terms of official grain price (10 times in market price). Tax revenue from this alone accounted for 30% of the total tax revenue in terms of official grain prices (70-90% in market prices) during the war, and 12-24%, even after the war. Faced with such heavy burden, farmers could depend only upon borrowing in order to continue farming. According to Dae Keun Lee's study (1987), farm family debt rose by 4.4 times during the 1953-56 period, and 1.7 times. Nearly 80-90% of all farm families had some debts. Unfortunately 70-80% of them were high-interest curb loans. This situation drove many small new independent farmers to sell their farmland. About 58% of those who bought...
farmland of 0.3 chongbo or smaller, and 32% of those who bought farmland of 0.3-0.5 chongbo sold their farmland (Jindo Park, 1994). Consequently 26% of all farmland returned to tenant farming again in reality. In the meantime, those who sold their land had to stay in rural areas, working as farmers on leased land, because at that time the urban sector could not absorb any bankrupted farmers.

Conclusion

The Korean War brought about devastating damages to both Koreas, although damages to North Korea are estimated to be a lot larger than those to South Korea. Financial aid to the North by the communist block (excluding construction assistance) was, however, a little bit smaller than to the South - US$3 billion for the North and US$4.4 billion for the South. The assistance for reconstruction of damaged industrial facilities and new construction of SOC and key industries in the North surely made it surpass the Southern counterpart in terms of GNP up until 1974. While for various reasons the South Korean agricultural sector was impoverished through the farmland reform in times of war, North Korea built up a collective farming system through virtual nationalization of farmland, which lowered productivity for different reasons. In the meantime, South Korea came to foster consumer-goods oriented and big-business oriented industrial structures while neglecting a producer-goods oriented industry. North Korea built up a heavy-industry oriented industrial structure and neglected the production of daily necessities.

Construction-oriented assistance helped North Korea to surpass South Korea in economic development in earlier stages, but made it very much dependent on foreign technology and facilities. North Korea simply used aided facilities and machinery without knowing how to produce them. It thus soon became helpless when assistance from its allies was cut off and its facilities were rusty since the 1970’s, although the root cause for economic failure of North Korea stemmed from other sources such as extreme collectivism, economic autarky principle, etc. They prohibited the inflow of foreign technology and capital, which in turn lowered productivity and economic growth through its inherent inefficient economic system, and most of all proscribed basic human rights.

The Korean War damaged two major economic reforms and thereby made the Korean economic structure distorted and foreign-dependent. Although some criticisms were raised on the role of the US in South Korea, we find that the mishaps of the Korean economic policy were more responsible for the adverse effects of foreign aid. The most serious consequence of the war is the consolidation of division,
antagonistic confrontation, and acceleration of heterogeneous societies in a nation, making probable unification costs astronomically high. Division of land cut off markets from each other, blocked interrelated linkage effects between different industrial structures, and brought about the heavy burden of high defense expenditure. More importantly, democratization has been retarded for security reasons in both areas for a long time.

References


Hong, Sung-Yoo, Capital Accumulation Process of the Korean Economy, Asia Research Institute, 1965 (in Korean).


**Notes**

1 The Korea Defense Ministry statistics shows that 301,866 Korean soldiers, 33,629 UN forces soldiers, and 1,060,968 civilians were dead or missing, while about 2.5million North Korean and Chinese were dead.

2 North Korea cut electric power supply to South Korea starting from May 14, 1948, making energy shortage problem more serious than before.


4 Chun and Park(1995) revealed that WPI rose by 531% in 1951 and 30% in 1956. They also reported that money (MI) was increased tremendously from 120 million won in 1949 to 1.4 billion won in 1952. Kim (1986, p.51) even claimed that the price level in 1951,1952, and 1953 were 22,48, and 65 times higher than that in 1947. Estimates and even some publicized data vary depending on the sources. The only obvious fact is that the inflation rate was fierce, and the money was tremendously over-issued.
Actually about 60% of tenant farmland had been privately sold before the farmland reform was enacted in 1950. Thus, the farmland reform was carried out for the remaining tenant farmland and owner farmland of three chongbo or bigger in size. The ratio of owner farmers rose from 14% in 1945 to 88% in 1957 according to the government publication.

In the case of confiscated enemy farmland privatization, executed by the US Military government on March 22, 1948, buying farmers were to pay 300% of the annual average product, 20% each in 15 years, for the farmland of size two or less chongbo. 199 thousand chongbo(61.4% of the total confiscated farmland, 324 thousand chongbo) were sold to 505 thousand farm families. The remaining 38.6% were transferred to the Korean government for later privatization(June, 1949).

This tax alone accounted for about one third of government revenue during the war (38.1% in 1950, 22.5% in 1951, 30.4% in 1952 and 20.6% in 1953). The burden from this tax was big enough to discourage farming and deteriorate agricultural productivity.

As of March 1955, only 56.8% of the total sales were paid in, due to the heavy burden of the new farmland owners. It took 13 more years to get all the sales get paid (98% complete in 1968). In this process many new independent farmers returned to a tenant status in reality. They began to work on leased land.

We need to compare farmland reform policy of Korea with those of other countries in the similar situation in order to make a proper evaluation. In fact the US Military Government Authorities simultaneously enforced a farmland reform in three occupied countries, Korea, Japan and Taiwan. For example, in Japan, General McCarthur ordered Japanese government to liberate farmers. Japan thus made a bill for the farmland reform on Nov. 22, 1945. McCarthur was not satisfied with the bill and refused to accept it. Thus Japan came to make a revised version of the reform bill in May 1946, which was passed in congress in Nov. 1946. It was a swift and thorough reform. Even though Japan had to listen to McCarthur and thus had to revise their original bill, Japan carried out all the reform process all by themselves. Fortunately Japan did not face opposition from big landowners whose economic power and influence had been weakened very much during the war. The most important feature of the Japanese reform was that former tenant farmers could pay for their new ownership with government bonds for the period of 30 years. That obviously alleviated the burden of farmers.

Taiwanese government legislated Rent Decrease Law in 1949, Law of State Property Privatization in 1951, and Law of General Ownership Transfer. 'Farmers Only Principle' was also indoctrinated there. Again all the reform process was planned and executed by the Taiwanese government. And they achieved quite a successful farmland reform. Compared with farmland reforms in Japan and Taiwan, that in Korea was neither successful nor desirable. We can, however, bestow the following meanings upon the farmland reform in Korea. First, it put an end to the old feudal-ownership-based governing system. Second, it abolished a highly exploitive tenant farming system and created many small independent farmers. Third, 'Farmers Only Principle' paved the way for modern civil society and capitalism, and provided a momentum for productivity improvement through privatization of farmlands.

If landlords wanted to exchange their land securities (or vouchers) for money, they could receive the money value of the number of sok of rice specified on the voucher. Evaluation was made only at an official price of rice, which was nearly 30-40% of the market price. What was worse was that the amount of money they could get by selling their vouchers was limited to 300 thousand won (three thousand hwan) in a month. Besides vouchers were not allowed to be put up as security (mortgage) for bank loans except when loans were used for operating privatized enemy factories.
In order to cope with inflation, Korean government carried out currency exchange measure three times during the war (Sep. 15, 1950 - Sep. 22, 1950; Oct. 25, 1950 - Nov. 3, 1950; Nov. 11, 1950 - Nov. 18, 1950). The first exchange was made only in the unoccupied area, Pusan and vicinities, and was intended to get rid of the illegally issued currency which was seized and circulated by North Korea. The second and the third exchanges were carried out after Seoul was recovered and they were intended purely to unify the official currency, and to initiate anti-inflationary measure at the same time. Each family was allowed to exchange currency only 20 thousand won or less, and to withdraw 50 thousand won each month thereafter. Further the government carried out currency reform in the form of denomination (100 won = 1 hwan) and froze 3 billion hwan as compulsory savings in order to fight against inflation in Feb. 1953.

On the other hand, Korean government requested UN forces to pay back its loans, which was the major factor of inflation and balance-of-payment deficits. UN forces borrowed 30-35 billion won from Korea every month, which accounted for about 79% of money issued. Korea and UN forces reached an agreement in May 1953 (called Mayer Agreement) regarding the repayment schedule. Twelve million US dollars were repaid until the end May 1952. And an agreement was made on how to repay the remaining 80 million US dollars.

In spite of all these efforts made by the government, neither economic stability, nor acquisition of industrial fund, nor correction of ill-distributed wealth could be accomplished.


Since the estimate was made based on the different sources, direct comparison with that of South Korea may not be meaningful, though. In any case, industrial production in 1953 was estimated 64% smaller than its 1949 level, and agricultural production was down to 24% lower than its 1949 level.

Ko, 1993, pp. 104-106.

According to the North Korean publication, 53% of the farmland was confiscated (equivalent to 90% of all tenant-based farmland), and was distributed for free to 70% of farmers.

The Russian economic aid to North Korea in the pre-Korean War period (Jan. 1946 - Dec. 1949) was estimated as big as US$547 million. This helped North Korea to restore major industrial facilities such as coal mines, iron and steel mills, fertilizer industries, power plants and railroads, with special assistance from Russian technical advisors. What differentiated the Russian aid to the South was that the Russian aid was concentrated on restoration of industrial facilities with aided industrial equipment and technical assistance, while the US aid was centered around consumer goods. It should be remembered that the Russian aid was offered in an effort to build up strong-tie among communist block and was used to prepare for the war, although the Russian style aid helped the North Korean economy surpassed the South Korean economy.

Aid the North Korea by Russia continued during and after the war. Communist aid consisted of two different types of assistance in general, financial aid and construction assistance. The total amount of financial aid alone to North Korea approached US$3 billion, which was almost comparable to the total aid to South Korea by the US and UN, US$4.4 billion. About 67% of financial aid was free. Approximately 52% of the aid to North Korea came from Russia, 31% from China, and 27% from the East European Communist countries combined. The construction assistance orientated aid surely helped North Korea restore its industrial facilities much sooner than South Korea and thus could keep its per-capita GNP higher than that of the South until 1974.

Per capita GNP of South Korea in 1953 was only US$67, and her net commodity product level was 27% lower than that in 1940. People could save only 9% of their incomes.

Aid by CPIK and ECA(&SEC) was mostly relief goods, i.e., either consumer goods...
or raw materials. On the other hand, about 70% of UNKRA aid was project assistance aid, through which industrial facilities for reconstruction were brought in. The size of UNKRA aid was very small compared with US ICA aid (about one fifteenth during the 1954-61 period). And in the case of ICA aid, only 28% was industrial reconstruction and raw materials. 31.5% of them was for railroads and trains, 10.7% for electric facilities, 8% for housing and welfare facilities, and 15% for manufacturing sector.

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MSA-aid receiving countries were required to spend some proportion of the "counter fund" for the military purpose. During the 1954-60 period, 35% of the fund was used for defense expenditure. About 40% of the Korean budget was financed by this fund in order to maintain armed forces as big as 630-720 thousand soldiers.

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Theorizing The Untheorizable
The Korean War and Its Impact on Korean Politics

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Like all major wars of attrition, the Korean War brought devastation to the natural and human landscapes of the entire Korean peninsula. Not only did the individuals suffer, but also the social fabric that had held the nation together was irreparably damaged. Not exempt from the ravages of the war, politics also had to undergo transition. It hence makes sense to ask the question of what impact the war made on Korean politics. Seen from a short-term perspective, the war forced each side to taste the governing style of the opposite side—albeit with a strong military touch in both. During the first three months of the war, for instance, the South was occupied by the northern forces and ruled in "people's democracy." In the subsequent few months of northward march after the Inchon landing, the allied forces controlled the restored areas under "liberal democracy." In the period immediately following the 1953 armistice, the politics of each Korea saw post-war adjustments, the most pronounced of which was the bloody purge in the North of potential challengers to Kim II Sung.

Of interest here is not the period of war and its immediate aftermath. Instead, our intellectual curiosity is on whether the war caused any long-lasting tectonic shifts in Korean politics. Limiting the inquiry to South Korea for now, we want to focus our attention on one aspect of political change—democratization. Has the war delayed the process of democratization in the South? If so, how? Conversely, was the war irrelevant or marginal to South Korean democratization? If so, why? Put differently, had there been no war, would the democratization process have taken a different pace and path? These are indeed challenging questions due to the inherent indeterminacy of historical "what ifs." The literature on the Korean War and democratization suggests numerous hypotheses about the potential link between the two.
Yet no authoritative view is available that is backed by a comprehensive theory capable of withstanding the test of empirical fit. Perhaps it is too daunting a task to theorize about what kind of lasting impact the war left on South Korea’s democratization. Trying to theorize the "untheorizable" may nevertheless afford us a glimpse of the link between the two phenomena.

The main objective of this essay is to lay a preliminary groundwork for research on long-term effects of the Korean War on South Korea’s democratization. It begins with some broad observations about the outcome of war with emphasis on the types of war—civil, international, and proxy. Then it moves to an examination of the major factors that influenced the democratization process and whether their origins can be traced to the war itself. Finally, it will attempt to suggest a direction we might want to take in future research.

WARS END IN WIN, LOSS, OR DRAW

While every war may be unique in and of itself, history tells us that there are three broad categories in the way it ends—win, loss, or draw. These are only the prototypical points on a scale marked by a total win and a total loss at each end. Even though almost infinite variations are possible on the scale, an examination of these three will help produce a rough sketch of the outcome of a war.

Win: What does the winner of a war do to the loser? A prerequisite to answering this question is the definition of winners and losers. But the fact of the matter is that the concept of win or loss is not clearly discernible. It could range from a complete annihilation of the inhabitants on the losing side to the acceptance of surrender with little physical damage inflicted on the loser. Even though a definitional rigor would surely help inform our thinking, it might not be counterproductive to exploit such conceptual breadth, especially in the early stage of theory building. Given the infantile state of our knowledge about the link between the ending of a war and its outcome, an inductive approach seems appropriate to delineate the various forms a win can take.

The wars of the 20th century have shown that there are a number of forms a win could take. First and foremost, the winner might conquer and absorb the loser in the classic manner of a zero-sum game. The case in point was the socialist integration of the southern part of Vietnam in 1975. Another form of managing the victory was exemplified in what the U.S. did to Japan after World War II. The winner would not force a merger or colonial control on the loser. Instead, the victor would transplant its system of political economic governance onto the loser while suppressing the latter’s potential for
military growth. The idea was to make the loser a secondary power and client that would remain loyal and friendly to the winner. It was tantamount to a cloning process, if such were possible in international relations. Yet another way in which the winner might handle the loser was seen in what the U.S.-led coalition did to Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War. That is, the winner would execute a punitive strike and hope the loser would remember the painful lessons long enough so that it could enjoy a relationship of deterrence, if not compulsion.

**Loss:** Turning to the losing side, what are the options available to it? The answer largely depends on what the winner would wish to do. In the case of conquest and absorption, the loser would get completely assimilated into the victor’s system—political, economic, and socio-cultural. The loser would cease to exist as an independent entity. Should the winner wish to make the loser a semi-permanent client, the latter would have to surrender to the political will of the former and accept whatever terms might be imposed on it. While healing the wounds from the war, the loser could then wait for a chance to get even—perhaps not on the battlefield but on other playing fields. That Japan almost won an economic war against its conqueror, the U.S., must be counted as a compelling example. Moving to the third model in which the winner leaves after a punitive strike, the loser would not have to change anything while it might even be able to turn the military defeat into a political victory. Today Iraq is still considered a “rogue” state whose leader seems convinced that his hegemonic position in the region became enhanced as a result of the war. Similarly, one should not forget that North Vietnam needed barely two years to unify the country after the U.S. could not secure a win and had to pull out.

**Draw:** Unlike the win or its mirror image, loss, a draw most often restores the antebellum status quo. It would force the two sides to put utmost priority on maintaining the bilateral balance of power. Driven by a security dilemma, the adversaries would seek parity in war-fighting capability, which in turn is likely to ignite a costly arms race. At the same time, means other than a full-scale war might be utilized to continue the war-like confrontation. The Korean conflict fits the model almost perfectly. When the war ends in a draw, it would be rare for the belligerents to make radical post-war changes in their political-economic system.

**Different Wars Produce Different Outcomes**

Whereas how the war ends shapes its outcome, there is another factor with equally potent effects. It is the different types of war, and discussion is limited here to only one variable depicting the status of the
players—namely, civil war versus international war. As seen in many civil wars, they are often fought to the end until one side becomes part of the other. If not halted for some reason, including external intervention, a civil war could drag on endlessly until a resolution is found in one way or another. On the contrary, international wars fought by two different nations could end without the winner absorbing the loser. And depending on the shift in the international power configuration, yesterday's enemy could end up becoming today's ally. Without being Clausewitzian, war becomes an extension politics—just another tool of foreign policy.

The Korean War began as a civil war in which the North attempted a quick unification by force. Due to the global bipolar confrontation, however, it became an international war between the two major blocs. While the Korean troops, South and North, were the primary belligerents in terms of numbers, they were relegated to a secondary position under the leadership of their respective patrons. In the first major test of the Cold War stability, they ended up fighting a proxy war. As principals, the U.S. and the former Soviet Union feared its escalation into a global nuclear war, thus, the Korean conflict had to end in a draw.

Combine how the Korean War ended—draw—with the complexity of a civil-international-proxy war and one cannot but notice the mixed nature of the post-war development. Simply put, it came to include some aspects from all three types of war as shown in the list below.

**International-proxy war components**
- Continued division along the line close to the original partition
- Military presence of external powers—first two, then one (U.S. forces under the United Nations command, after the departure of Chinese troops)
- Dependence on the patrons who fought the war in military and nonmilitary areas
- Armistice structure under international supervision
- The system of governance on either side remaining largely intact

**Civil war components**
- Persistence of confrontation and competition on all fronts—military, diplomatic, political, economic, social, espionage, and terrorism (anti-terrorism)
- Continued emotional cry for unification—a sacred cow despite the fact that the half century of division has made the reintegration a herculean task
Though it is a select list, it clearly demonstrates the enormous influence the Korean War had left on the peninsula and its occupants. The Korean peninsula became one of the most important arenas in which the Cold War game of stalemate would be played out in the next 40 years.

**Did the Korean War Affect South Korea's Democratization?**

Despite the sweeping changes caused by the Korean War, did it affect South Korea's politics in general and its democratization in particular? At first blush, no direct impact was visible for two reasons. One was that the international nature of the war and its ending in a draw combined to restore the status quo in which the Syngman Rhee regime could remain untouched. If anything, his hands became stronger as he felt free to utilize anti-communism as the magic wand in legitimating his dictatorial rule. The other reason was the dire economic straits the country was in after the war and its heavy dependence on external assistance: ordinary citizens were simply too busy sustaining themselves to get involved in politics.

From a longer-term perspective, however, one could discern two domestic factors that grew out of war, which would later shape South Korean politics. The three years of war and the continued military tension necessitated a military buildup. In addition, the professional training many Korean soldiers received in the U.S. made the military a strong institution with Western-style organization. The military was becoming a force to be reckoned with. Along with the rise of the military, there emerged a new group of entrepreneurs who began to challenge the supremacy of the traditional ruling elite, many with roots going back to the *yangban* class. The military and new capitalists consummated a marriage of convenience after the 1961 military coup and led the modernization drive, which by the 1970s made South Korea one of the four Asian Tigers. Through the symbiosis of military authoritarianism and crony capitalism, they helped each other in securing a privileged position in South Korea's political economy.

It was not until the modernization programs bore a substantial amount of fruits and subsequently produced a large middle class core that military authoritarianism came under siege. Now that "their stomachs were full and backs warm," people began demanding political rights commensurate with their improved economic status. It was a poetic irony that the authoritarian regimes fell victim to their success. Even with Park Chung-hee's assassination in 1979 and the "spring of democratization" in 1980, however, democratic transition was slow to materialize. It was the mass uprising in 1987 that led to the first peaceful transfer of power—albeit between the former classmates of the
Korean Military Academy. In 1993 Kim Young-sam became the first president with no military background since Park’s 1961 military coup, and then the first-ever lateral change of power was accomplished in 1998 from a government to an opposition party.

In light of the long history of military authoritarianism, it is commonplace to claim that the Korean War had a negative impact on the South Korean democratization. The reasoning is simple and straightforward: the war produced a strong military; the military took over political power from the weak, democratically elected government; and military governments used the carrot of industrialization and the stick of national security in extending their rule for almost 32 years—counting the Roh Tae-woo administration as the last leg.

Now the critical question we would like to pose is, “Had it not been for the Korean War, would democratization have taken a different process?” It is impossible to run an experimental test with war. It is also impractical to run a quasi-experimental test treating the war as if it were an experimenter’s intervention, since democratization did not emerge as a major issue until well past the war. Thus, one of the few options with which to tackle this question is to take stock of both the facilitating and inhibiting factors of South Korea’s democratization before investigating whether any of them can be traced to the Korean War. Considering Seoul’s heavy dependence on Washington in the post-Korean War era, it is important to look at not only domestic factors but also international influence with particular emphasis on the role of the U.S.

**Domestic Factors: The Triad of Patriarchy, Military Culture, and Crony Capitalism**

The most frequently identified inhibitor of South Korea’s democratization is the patriarchal tradition in all layers of social hierarchy. In both the public and private sectors, Koreans have lived in a vertically structured society in which the communication flowed mostly top-down. Throughout their history, Koreans had never experienced Western-style democracy until after World War II. And this should not be considered a deficiency on the part of the Koreans. It was a rather common phenomenon not only in Korea but also throughout Asia. Even in Western Europe, one should be reminded, the modern version of democratic governance began only in the mid-17th century.

When the First Republic was established in 1948, Syngman Rhee, its president, considered himself the inheritor of the old monarchy and behaved like the absolute patriarch. Park Chung-hee, who took over power through a coup, did not hesitate to become another patriarch.
While Rhee founded the new state, Park thought of himself as the one who rebuilt it through industrialization. Chun Doo-hwan, who rose as Park’s successor through a mini-coup of his own, also became a patriarch and wanted to be remembered as the leader who brought economic stabilization to Korea. Roh Tae-woo, who took the baton from Chun, did not leave the image of a hard-driving patriarch. But it was mostly due to his personality rather than any idealistic commitment to democracy. Even Kim Young-sam, who became the first civilian president in over 30 years, practiced “civilian dictatorship” according to his critics. At present, Kim Young-sam denounces his successor Kim Dae-jung as a dictator. Throw Kim Jong-pil into the political arena and one should be able to see that patriarchy indeed dies hard. Formerly the right arm man of Park Chung-hee, Kim Jong-pil is the third member of the noted “Three Kim Troika” that has been dominating the Korean political scene. To make the picture even more bleak, the top two forerunners of the 2002 presidential election are being painted as authoritarian, if not totalitarian, in their personal orientation.

The bottom line is that patriarchy is an inherent component in Korean society. As such, it is difficult to ascertain whether the Korean War made any distinctive impact on the patriarchal tradition. It is plausible to argue that the military, more precisely Park Chung-hee’s charisma, might have enhanced the patriarchal tendencies. Nevertheless, the degree of enhancement could be insignificant, as he might have been riding the existing waves of authoritarian culture. It is through the maturation of genuine civil society movements, not the kinds that package interest group activities as civic service, that South Korea will see a gradual demise in patriarchy.

No less important than the tradition of patriarchy, military culture has been blamed for hindering South Korea’s democratization. Although a pinpoint definition of military culture is difficult to formulate, a broad characterization is possible. First, it refers to the system of vertical control in which a superior’s orders are carried out with little questioning from below. Blind obedience is required to conduct the affairs of war, but it becomes problematic when such is asked in areas outside strategic and tactical aspects of military operation. Second, military culture tends to emphasize results over the process. An atmosphere in which results justify the means is hardly conducive to democratic thinking, which values procedural justice. Third, the military prizes organizational cohesiveness and, therefore, discourages dissenting opinions. The latter are sorely needed for any form of democratic process to grow. Fourth, the military is run by the manuals: it has standard operating procedures for everything from the
way sleeping quarters are set up to how to conduct an air-land assault. Though a must for battlefield success, too high an emphasis on bureaucratic efficiency tends to dampen creativity. And creativity is another key ingredient for democracy to bloom. Lastly, the military culture is noted for its idolization of individual charisma. In the act of war where the irrational rules, it is easier to push the soldiers’ morale by asking them to follow so-and-so’s example than engaging them in an analytical discourse on why it is necessary to kill the enemy. It has been shown that charismatic worship does not go well with democratic governance, in which voices of the small people need to be heard.

Due to the system of universal conscription, young men in South Korea have had to absorb the military culture during the ages when they are sensitive to new ways of life. Once programmed in the military way of thinking, deprogramming is not easily achieved.

And many retired men chose to retain the military culture to promote their careers in the society controlled by the military. The civil military relationship in South Korea can thus be categorized into what is called the "reverse penetration model," in which the military way of thinking pervades the civilian society. Once the military culture saturates the entire nation, it becomes self-evident that other cultures will find little room to take root. To worsen the situation, military regimes have shown extremely allergic reactions to students and their activities. Surely the ghosts of the 1960 Student Revolution must have been lurking behind the heads of the military leaders who would do anything to preserve their regime. To a lesser extent, the same was true about another class of people with the potential to challenge the military rule—labor unions. But the military apparently viewed the labor sector less threatening to them than student groups due to the fact that the former enjoyed a lower social esteem than the latter.

Turning to the central inquiry, had there not been the Korean War, would it have been impossible for the military to rise as a political force? While we cannot offer a clear-cut answer, we want to make a cautious speculation that the political ascendancy of the military might have been inevitable. The division of the peninsula and the constant harassment from the North must have necessitated a military buildup, while the war might have accelerated the process. Supporting this observation is the fact that it was not until eight years had passed before the military staged a coup, and even then it almost failed.

Lastly, the collusion of business conglomerates known as chaebol and the military-cum-political leadership gave birth to crony capitalism, which in turn is seen to have hampered the democratization process. It all began as a rather innocuous attempt by Park Chung-hee to help solve the national problems of hunger and poverty. That economic
growth would serve as the legitimating device for his military regime provided him with additional boost, of course. Driven by mercantilistic nationalism, Park first built a base for import substitution industries and then moved to an ambitious program of export expansion. As the "CEO of Korea, Inc.,” Park even presided over a monthly meeting of industrialists and bureaucrats in order to promote exportation. Over time, however, corruption set in and Park’s neo-mercantilistic capitalism degenerated into a crony capitalism in which the political logic dictated the terms of economic redistribution. Chaebols became bigger and bigger at the expense of medium to small industries. Not only did the government set the industrial policy, but also it chose which conglomerates would specialize in what industries. And in many cases, the choices were made not on the principle of competitiveness but on the criterion of political closeness at a given time.

Undoubtedly, crony capitalism weakened the political power of the business sector, which otherwise might have acted as a powerful pressure group against the government. Korean businessmen had to tune their antennae in the direction of the presidential palace. It was unthinkable for them to demand fair play according to the rules of the game or a change in the governmental decision-making. Once co-opted, many chaebol owners gladly became housemaids of authoritarian regimes, as they could exploit the labor class with the help of the government’s coercive force.

Thanks in large part to the success of chaebol-bastd industrialization, however, the middle class was born, and it became the primary force behind democratic transition. Paradoxically, business conglomerates still hold on to the old, undemocratic, crony capitalism and resist the winds of change. Since 1993, the two civilian presidents have been learning at great pains that chaebols are quite resilient in withstanding the governmental efforts at structural reform. It is disheartening to observe that chaebols have been far removed from democratic ideals, although they indirectly helped promote democratization via the rise of the middle class. Most importantly, their behavior makes one believe that crony capitalism must have been an unavoidable development: chaebols would have linked up with the powers that be, whether military or civilian.

International Factors: America with Two Faces

Clearly the most important development that influenced Korea after World War II was the emergence of a global Cold War system along with the ensuing confrontation between the two superpowers over the peninsula. The focus of our attention is Washington’s foreign policy
objectives in South Korea. Generally speaking, the U.S. pursued the two goals of regime stability and democratization in its two Northeast Asian clients. On the occupied Japan, the U.S. imposed a democratic constitution and a wholesale demilitarization. By destroying the legacy of militarism, Washington’s planners sought to build a new Japan with minimal influence from the old guards. Unlike the divided Korean peninsula, Japan faced no immediate threat from the former Soviet Union, which allowed the U.S. to pursue simultaneously the two goals of stability and democracy. On the other hand, South Korea posed a different challenge to the U.S. The utmost priority had to be placed on the stabilization of the political military situation, given the precarious confrontation across the 38° parallel and later the DMZ.

It might be argued that the U.S. did intervene for democracy as shown in the 1960 Student Revolution when it persuaded the dictator Syngman Rhee to step down. But was that act motivated by a genuine intent to democratize South Korea? Or was it more due to Washington’s apprehension that a prolonged crisis could lead to instability and might tip the balance in favor of the North? If the U.S. had truly been interested in democratizing South Korea, why did it not do much for its promotion until 1960, 12 years after installing Rhee at the helm? Similarly, America’s delay in endorsing Park Chung-hee after the 1961 coup could be traced to its concern about his shady leftist background rather than an attempt to pressure him to go back to the barracks. The pattern continued with successive military governments in Korea, and one must note that it was part of the global policy the U.S. had maintained in the Cold War era.

At the same time, the U.S. did make gestures of support for democracy in South Korea—albeit at a scale not threatening the viability of the authoritarian regimes it supported. For instance, the American government saved the life of Kim Dae-jung in 1973 when he was kidnapped in Japan and was about to be dumped into the East Sea. And when Kim was implicated in the Kwangju crisis and sentenced to death, Ronald Reagan bargained the commutation of Kim’s sentence in exchange for the invitation to Chun Doo-hwan to a summit meeting. While such duality may seem abominable, it served the U.S. quite well during the Cold War period. It helped showcase America’s idealism and commitment to democracy, while at the same time helped solidify its perimeter of defense around the communist bloc.

Consequently, the answer becomes clear to the question of whether the U.S. might have pushed South Korea’s democratization vigorously had there not been the war. The U.S. must have propped up the regime in the South, regardless of its character, as long as it remained a friendly and dependable client. Unlike in Japan, democratization was
not on the top of Washington’s agenda in the post-World War II reconstruction program.

**Conclusion**

In our discussion, we have tried to focus on the question of "Without the Korean War, would the process of political development have changed in South Korea?" To answer the question, we have examined several factors considered to have affected South Korea’s democratization and attempted to trace their origins to the Korean War. Our preliminary analysis suggests that it is difficult to make a conclusive case for the conventional wisdom—one which states that the Korean War allowed the military to rise; the military usurped political power, pushed industrialization, and suppressed democratization; and then the military authoritarianism fell victim to its own success in economic growth when the middle class it helped create caused its downfall. The weakest link is between the war and the rise of military authoritarianism; even without the war, the military could have become a source of political power. In addition, the model does not address the possibility of any government, regardless of its type, pursuing economic growth for the survival of regime and state.

Where do we go from here? Definitely more theorizing and research are required. We need to address a host of questions. If we accept the proposition that economic growth led to democratization, then what was the impact of the Korean War on economic growth? Discounting the short-term devastation, did the war help fuel the growth in the long run? Given the inefficiency and lack of strong leadership in the civilian sector, the military was perhaps better equipped to spearhead the economic development. Or was the miracle of the Han River made possible thanks to America’s doctrine of hegemonic stability?

If we suppose that the economic growth-democratization link is but one plausible route, what are the alternatives? And what is their applicability to the South Korean case? For example, under what conditions might the U.S. have imposed the Japanese model of democratization on South Korea? In addition, the possibility of alternative explanations leads to an observation that economic development could be just a necessary condition for democratization. If so, what would be the sufficient conditions and did South Korea have any? And one may go one step further to speculate that, with a strong civic consensus, democratization might be realized even without extensive economic development.

By casting doubt on the conventionally accepted hypothesis, we are not trying to defend any particular ideology or political stance. There
is no hidden agenda in our research. We are simply making plea for a more open-minded approach to the study of the relationship between the Korean War and South Korea's democratization. As South Korea has yet to go a long way toward democratic consolidation, the proposed line of research will hopefully help reveal what paths to follow and what pitfalls to avoid.

Notes


2 Technically, the Korean War has not ended as no peace treaty has been signed. Since 1953 an armistice is in force with the inspection mechanism in Panmunjom. For the purpose of our discussion, however, we will view the war as ended in 1953.

3 The types of war could include a whole array of variables ranging from the nature of the war (colonial versus independence war), who started first (preemptive attack versus defense), the weaponry used (conventional versus unconventional warfare), the duration (prolonged war versus blitzkrieg), and to the sanctions of an international body (collective security action). As research progresses, some of these variables will be included as the determinants of post-war political changes.

4 The literature on South Korea’s democratization is replete with the themes along this line of argument. For an excellent review of the issue, see Hyug-Baeg Im, Democracy in the Era of Globalization: Realities, Theories, and Reflections (in Korean), (Seoul: Nanam, 2000). In a similar vein, a longer historical view can be found in Kongdan Oh, "The Korean War and South Korean Politics," in David R. McCann and Barry S. Strauss (eds), War and Democracy: A Comparative Study of the Korean War and the Peloponnesian War (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), pp. 176-190


6 The author coined the term in his review of civil military relationship. The "penetration model" describes the communist regimes in which the party uses political commissars to brainwash and control the military force. The "reverse penetration model" describes the many cases of military authoritarian regimes in which the military, as rulers, impose their way of doing business on the civilian sector. For a comprehensive survey of civil military relations, see Tong Whan Park, "A Study of Social Change and Military Leadership (in Korean)," in KookbangHaksoolNonchong, No. 5, (Seoul: Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, 1991), pp. 161-202; Morris

Effects of the Korean War on Social Structures of the Republic of Korea

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Effects of the Korean War on Demographic Structures of the Population

The Korean War was among the world’s most destructive wars, in proportion to the population. During the war, the population of South Korea declined by nearly two million, excluding an influx of nearly 650,000 North Korean refugees. During the same period, about 290,000 South Koreans migrated to North Korea, either by force or by choice. Redistribution of the South Korean population continued on a large scale even into the immediate post-war years.

Mortality. Changes in demographic processes serve as important indicators of the impact of the Korean War on the population of South Korea. Mortality is the most obvious demographic footprint left by a war, but its effects may also be observed in patterns of fertility and migration for the period of the actual conflict and the period immediately following the war. Between 1910 and 1945, the crude death rate in South Korea declined from 34 to 22 per 1,000 people. Following the period of liberation, mortality continued to decline to a low of 19 per 1,000 in 1950.

Mortality figures for the war years (1950-1953) are extremely incomplete. Indirect estimation procedures were heavily influenced by inaccuracies plaguing the censuses of 1949 and 1955, including serious undercounting and age misreporting. Nonetheless, according to death statistics compiled by the Office of Information, Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United Nations Forces, South Korean war deaths included 373,599 civilians and 29,294 ROK military personnel. An additional 150,133 South Koreans were reported "kidnapped or captured," and 408,884 were listed as "missing or prisoner of war."
The quality of the data in these reports is suspect, owing to unspecified compilation procedures. As noted by Kwon, assuming the category of "missing" to be comprised equally of South Koreans who had died, those who had migrated to North Korea, and those still living in South Korea, the number of war deaths increased to 540,000 and the number of migrants to North Korea increased to 290,000, bringing the total war-related decrease to 830,000. Underreporting of war deaths and inadequate death-registration systems following the war render this estimate less than half of reported war-related losses, which are likely to have been between 1.5 and 2 million.

Kwon estimates the crude death rate for the war years to be between 36 and 47 per 1,000 population - a rate that only slightly exceeds the crude birth rate of the same period. The population of South Korea, then, had no appreciable natural growth, and may have actually experienced natural decrease between 1950 and 1953. If Kwon's estimates are accurate, the death rate during the Korean War was nearly twice that of the five years immediately preceding the war.

The rise in mortality during the war strongly affected both the age and sex composition of the South Korean population, because war casualties included disproportionately high numbers of males between the ages of 20 and 34. In 1949, the sex ratio of the 20-34 age group was 101.1. The reported sex ratio of the same cohort had dropped to 80.5 by 1955. The ratio would have been much lower had North Korean refugee migrants - who were disproportionately male - not been included in the 1955 census.

The marital status composition of the South Korean population was also affected by the rise in mortality during the war. Immediately prior to the war, the proportion of ever-married women between the ages of 15 and 49 listed as "currently widowed" was less than six percent. In 1955, the proportion for the corresponding age group had risen to 9.5 percent. Because remarriage historically has not been common among Korean women, particularly before 1960, the war had long-lasting effects on marital status composition and family structures in South Korea.

Migration. The migration of North Korean refugees to ROK was among the major migration streams caused by the war, as were the forced and voluntary migrations of South Koreans to North Korea, the movement of South Korean refugees from combat zones to southern provinces, and the subsequent return migration after the war.

During the war, an estimated 646,000 North Korean refugees moved to South Korea, mostly during the two-month period between December 1950 and January 1951, immediately preceding the Chinese intervention and the retreat of United Nations forces from North Korean
As reported in the census of 1955, about half of the North Korean refugees resided in the provinces of Kyonggi and Kangwon, while about 21 percent inhabited Kyongnam province. Thirteen percent of the refugees lived in Seoul, with the remaining refugees dispersed among all other provinces. The concentration of refugees in Kyonggi and Kangwon was largely due to the inmigration of North Korean residents from the northern parts of those provinces and in the Whanghae province, which became part of North Korea at the end of the war. Additionally, the initial settlement of North Korean refugees was heavily concentrated in urban areas. In the 1955 census, about 47.9 percent of North Korean refugees lived in urban areas, compared with 24.4 percent of the total population. Combined with their residential concentration in large metropolitan areas, their occupational concentration in business and trade sectors led the North Korean refugees to become highly visible during the post-war period.

Internal migration within South Korea occurred on a large scale during the war in addition to migration streams between North and South Korea. According to Kwon, Korean wartime migration entailed: 1) an exodus from Seoul, Kangwon, and other front areas, 2) heavy migration from North to South, concentrated in southern cities, 3) movement in the northern provinces from urban to rural areas, 4) heavy refugee migration into Kyongnam, and 5) urban concentration of refugees in the South. Most internal migrants who fled to rural areas during the war returned to their urban places of origin at the close of the conflict, with the exception of migrants to Pusan, Taegu, and other southern cities, who took longer to return and resettle.

In both scale and effect, the Korean War refugee movement was perhaps the most significant redistribution of population in Korean history. First, wartime migration consisted mainly of either "impelled flight" or "forced displacement," nearly destroying the economic, social, and psychological bases of refugee families. A substantial proportion of these losses was unrecoverable, and had profound effects on the life course of Korean families. Second, interactions among the refugees themselves and with the residents of their host cities were made difficult by the massive and sudden influx of war refugees into a limited number of cities that had not experienced North Korean military invasion. Strained living arrangements combined with economic hardship and uneasy inter-group relations produced strongly antagonistic in-group/out-group attitudes. The widespread redistribution of population exacerbated regional prejudice,
stereotyping, and regionalism in general. The actions and behavioral styles of the North Korean Army and refugees led to negative regional sentiments manifested in such epithets as “pyungando chidul” - commoners from Pyungan - and "hamkyungdo abai" - guys from Hamkyung province. Additionally, the devastating effects of the war on economic, social, and industrial infrastructures served to heighten existing regional disparities in socioeconomic development. I will discuss these effects further in a latter section.

A third effect of refugee migration during the war was that the large-scale settlement of North Korean refugees in urban areas and the intraprovincial rural-urban migration streams that developed in the southern provinces were turning points in the urbanization and modernization of South Korea. The wartime population movement led to extreme disjunctures in network interactions, due to massive displacement, settlement and resettlement. The movement of migrants of rural origin into large cities required a fundamental shift from traditional life orientations and interpersonal behavior. Interpersonal relationships in rural Korea had traditionally been based on the direct, face-to-face interactions of primary groups, while urban environments encouraged differentiation and individuation based on membership in impersonal and casual "secondary groups." The modernization of South Korea would most likely have accelerated in the 1950s, even in the absence of the war, but the process was intensified by the population redistribution during and after the war. The movement of migrants of rural origin into large cities required a fundamental shift from traditional life orientations and interpersonal behavior. Interpersonal relationships in rural Korea had traditionally been based on the direct, face-to-face interactions of primary groups, while urban environments encouraged differentiation and individuation based on membership in impersonal and casual "secondary groups." The modernization of South Korea would most likely have accelerated in the 1950s, even in the absence of the war, but the process was intensified by the population redistribution during and after the war.

Fourth, the flight of the rural poor into urban areas represented more than a pattern of spatial movement; it had profound effects on the Korean system of stratification, traditionally based on Confucian order and agrarian economic models. Displaced war refugees and poor migrants of rural origin initially settling, for the most part, in shantytowns or the slums of large cities gave rise to an urban underclass, which eventually became institutionalized into the stratification structure. Although a "petty bourgeoisie" had existed even before the war, its emergence as a bona fide social class category coincided with the rapid expansion of urban centers following the war. The war distorted the relationship of individuals and families to the economic system because of the breakdown of economic establishments and the consequent softening of prewar social class structures. The rapid urbanization process created new dimensions in social stratification systems in post-war Korea.

**Fertility.** In addition to its impact on mortality and migration, the Korean War substantially affected fertility levels between 1950 and 1953. During this time, the number of live births declined by about 15 percent from the preceding five years. The lowest wartime fertility was
government bureaucracy and its attendant network of police, security, and tax agencies."

According to Koo, Japanese colonialism simultaneously produced a strong state and a contentious society. The dismantling of the yangban status system by the colonial government represented a fundamental shift in state-society relations; a complex bureaucratic state now took precedence over rigid social order. The oppressive colonial regime further separated state and society by giving rise to powerful anti-Japanese sentiment among the people of Korea. The coercive power exercised by the colonial governments, and their introduction of institutions designed to maintain a strong state, produced a restless and reactive society poised to redress the injustices of the past. Colonial rule also galvanized Korean nationalism into a powerful and articulate ideology."

The 1945 liberation from Japanese colonial rule saw the advent of a wide array of organizations oriented to political activities as well as concerns of labor, peasants, students, youth, women, religion, and culture. These organizations actively promoted agendas and policies designed to shape the emerging state. According to Choi, regardless of communist or conservative orientation, the nationalist leaders of the post-liberation period were united in their quest to establish Korea as an independent nation-state purged of all traces of colonial rule."

The unified political environment was soon to be polarized, ironically, due to the interventions of the United States and the Soviet Union and their subsequent rivalry. In its support of the Syngman Rhee regime, the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) effectively undercut the effects of liberation by restoring to power those who had collaborated with the colonial forces. Relief from colonial coercion was brief, alienating civil society from the state, which itself lost legitimacy. A strong state quickly emerged in the North with the establishment of communist systems of politics and administration, aided by the Soviet Union. By September of 1948, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been established as a strong satellite communist state, under the leadership of Kim II Sung."

The post-liberation activities of citizens' organizations motivated USAMGIK to develop strategies to cultivate conservative, reactionary, and anticommunist orientations. Due to the lack of popular ideological consensus, the weak Syngman Rhee regime was plagued by bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption, and factional strife. Vestiges of conflict between the conservatively oriented state and progressively oriented elements of society were evident in the Cheju Island Rebellion of April 3, 1948, and in the Yosu-Sunchon Rebellion of October 19-27, 1948. These rebellions also brought to light many problems associated
name of national security and anticommunist sentiment." The experience of the war, division of the country, and the constant exploitation of military threats and ideological confrontations by the state had enduring effects on the daily lives of individual South Koreans. This sociopolitical environment fostered the re-emergence of a strong state-weak society relationship.

Following Rhee, successive authoritarian military regimes effectively utilized their coercive power, thus maintaining a strong state-weak society relationship throughout the 1980s. As noted by Koo, Park Chung Hee viewed economic growth as a means of establishing the political legitimacy of his regime." The developmental state mobilized all available resources to promote economic development: state initiative, free trade, state-business nexus, human capital formation, international product cycle, the abundant labor supply, and the Confucian work ethic." The successive military regimes exhausted their public budgets on industrial development programs, and they therefore had to minimize "state programs for protecting and improving the everyday lives of ordinary citizens." Furthermore, the authoritarian administrations consistently supported the chaebol groups in disputes with the labor unions. The military regimes sought to control labor in the interest of international competitiveness and — up until the end of the Chun Doo Hwan regime — the military-c/we&o/alliance was politically invincible." The leaders of the developmental state openly advocated such an ideology as "growth first, distribution later," and the South Korean government allocated its government expenditure to social security and welfare far less than those of other developing nations at similar levels of development." Hence, a strong state-weak society relationship was an important cause of underdevelopment in Korean social security programs.

**Militarization of Society**

As indicated earlier, at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, the total size of the Republic of Korea (ROK) military forces was 120,000. These forces were neither well-equipped nor well-trained." The conflict itself led to important changes in their size, organizational structure, and capabilities. One major source of the drastic increase in the size of the Korean military was the institution of a draft applicable to all males. The consistent flow of draftees allowed for the maintenance of approximately 650,000 active duty personnel." Extensive support from the United States also undergirded the ROK military, eventually making it the most well-supported, Americanized institution in Korean society following the Korean War.

Rapid military expansion both during and following the war...
strategically adopted a policy of recruiting retired generals for high positions in government and in government-subsidized corporations, thus accelerating the militarization of the public sector. At the same time, high-ranking military personnel came to expect opportunities to pursue second careers after their terms of service. Many high government officials of the Park regime were retired generals. Because of their greater debt to the military and their extreme need to maintain favorable ties with the military, Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo relied even more heavily on the military and retired generals to fill high positions. The militarization of society therefore became institutionalized, and the continued recruitment of former military officers into influential positions allowed the trend to persist.

The division of the Korean peninsula following liberation from Japanese colonial rule preordained a role for the military, particularly in South Korean politics. Because of the relatively low status of the military in traditional Korean social structures, the coalescence of the military elite into a formidable power group would have been much less likely had the Korean War not occurred. The Korean War and subsequent cold war politics of the Rhee and Park regimes allowed the military elite to emerge as bona fide members of the upper class. This change essentially reconfigured the composition of the ruling class in the traditional Korean system of stratification. According to one popular joke, a master's degree is better than a bachelor's degree, a doctorate is better than master's degree, and a KMA degree is even better than a doctorate ("Haksa wie seoksa, seoksa wie baksa, baksa wie yuksa!").

The wartime military expansion combined with the sustained military strength and presence in the post-war era had many significant effects on the social structure. First, despite its less attractive features, military service offered those with little education the opportunity to obtain basic skills needed to compete in a rapidly changing social environment. The draft system instituted at the outset of the war required all young men to serve at least two years in the military. The years of service came to be regarded as a period of orientation before entering the "real world," particularly for young men of rural origin. Military service exposed young men to organizational life and provided useful vocational training that could later be used in civilian occupations.

Second, mandatory military service indoctrinated young men into a "military culture." Because it occurred during the time of life when worldviews are still in formation, this influence extended into civilian life well after military service was completed. For example, many military concepts, jargon, and expressions have found their way into
strategies as personal networking and bribery.” The “rush-to-growth” orientation of the successive military regimes therefore resulted in corruption and created a “risk society.”

American Images and Influences

Substantial anti-USAMGIK and anti-American sentiment was evident even before the eruption of the Korean War. Many Korean nationalists opposed the occupation of the Korean peninsula by Soviet and United States military forces following World War II. They were adamantly against USAMGIK policies, particularly with regard to the recruitment of former collaborators of the Japanese colonial regime into high administrative, judicial, and police positions. Preferring socialist or neutral political orientations, Korean nationalists particularly resented the United States support of Syngman Rhee in his quest for the presidency and control of political power. The American image deteriorated further as citizens came to blame the United States for installing an unpopular and increasingly authoritarian president.

Had the Korean War not occurred, and had the United States not involved its troops in the conflict, the extent of the American influence on Korea would have been much less than it has been. The direct participation of the American forces in the war, its continued military assistance and presence after the war, and substantial economic aid dispelled concerns over the necessity and desirability of close United States-Korea relations. The Korean War was, in fact, a watershed in Korean history that saw the emergence of considerable American influence on political, economic, social, and cultural structures. First, due to extensive military assistance, the armed forces of South Korea came to reflect the United States military system. The military also became an important vehicle through which American influences permeated Korean society. Since the war, many Korean military officers have taken training in various American institutions of military education. The organizational and administrative structures of the Korean military have been nearly identical to those in the United States, and most Korean military equipment and weapon systems have been made in the United States. The emergence of the military elite as political and corporate leaders contributed to the persistence of American influence, because the United States had a much more profound effect on the military than on civilian sectors. The American influence on the military created a dualism, in that the ethos of the Korean military leadership remained very much Korean or Japanese, while new organizational structures and weapon systems were decidedly American.

A second major source of United States influence on Korean social
were stationed in Korea - more than in any other country, with the exception of Germany and Japan. The war and the persistent U.S. military presence have created favorable economic and social conditions for intermarriage between Korean women and American soldiers. As discussed earlier, many young Korean males lost their lives during the war, and the economy was severely disrupted. As a result of the war, many young women were forced to assume responsibility for supporting their families, as traditional sources of income had virtually disappeared. In many locales, military installations were the only source of employment for local residents. Jobs catering to military personnel - both on and off bases - brought young Korean females into contact with American soldiers to an extent that would have been unthinkable under traditional Korean norms. Many young Korean women met their future spouses either through their own work experiences or through introductions by friends working with or for American soldiers.

Many of the women employed on or near military bases came from poor farm families or from low-income urban families, and many had lost their parents to the war. Following the war, few options existed for women who had neither wealth nor family support. Most of the jobs available to these women paid extremely low wages. Although involving no social stigma, employment as a servant, sweat-shop laborer, or service worker in such places as a bar, restaurant, and boarding house were regarded as little better than slavery. One alternative to such unattractive employment was to work in "GI towns." Under other circumstances, this option would have been likely to arouse the contempt and suspicion of family and community members, but this did not pose a serious problem to impoverished or poorly educated young women in need of income.

Compared with other employment opportunities, jobs in GI towns offered a number of advantages. In particular, they brought women into contact with American currency, products, and tax-free merchandise from Post Exchanges - as well as soldiers who were more than willing to provide such treasures. These soldiers were quite attractive to young, unmarried Korean women as potential mates, particularly because they asked few questions about their family backgrounds. Because they were already subject to the suspicion and stigma attached to working around GI towns, women who chose to date American servicemen had little chance of returning to normal and accepted status in the community.

While the young Korean women viewed American soldiers as potential marriage partners, the soldiers tended to view the women in sexual terms. Because most troops were stationed in "combat zones,"
their families could not accompany them. Unmarried soldiers, or those in strained marriages, soon found the polite, compliant, young, and exotic Korean women to be quite attractive, and the marriage and subsequent emigration of such women became quite common. Between 1941 and 1980, a total of 45,551 Korean women were admitted to the United States as the wives of U.S. citizens. An additional 8,178 Koreans were admitted between 1971 and 1980 as "spouse-to-be" under the Act of April 7, 1970.

As discussed above, the United States military presence in Korea during and following the war had far-reaching effects on the social, political, and cultural landscape of Korea. Intermarriage between American soldiers and Korean women has also made unique and important contributions to the Korean-American community. At least one fourth of all Korean immigrants to the United States since 1950 have been relatives invited by interracially married Korean women. Because educational opportunities for Korean women have improved over time, younger cohorts of these interracially married women tend to be more highly educated than older cohorts. The changes in race and ethnic composition of the U.S. military personnel since the 1970s also impacted the race and ethnicity of the spouses of the interracially married Korean women. The proportion of the women married to African and Hispanic Americans among younger cohorts is substantially greater than that among older cohorts.

The Separation of Families

On June 14, 2000, during the South-North Summit Meeting in Pyongyang, the leaders of the two Koreas signed a five-point agreement. According the The Korea Herald of June 15, 2000, included in the accord is: "The South and the North have agreed to exchange visits of separated families and relatives around August 15 and promptly tackle humanitarian issues, including the issue involving long-term Communist prisoners (in the South) who refuse to renounce their ideology." It has been pointed out in The Washington Post of June 14, 2000, that the five-point agreement "appeared to be mostly general and vague." However, the agreement on the exchange visits of divided families is most definitive in that it even stipulates the starting date.

The reunification of families separated by war was the most important justification for the unification of the two Koreas according to 42.2 percent of respondents to one survey conducted in May of 2000 by a daily newspaper. Family reunification was considered more important than mitigating the possibility of another war, the establishment of Korea as an economic power, improvements in the quality of life, or even the opportunity to extend freedom and human
"Separated families" are family members whose kin are lost or dispersed due to the war: in this context, family members include parents, children, brothers, sisters, grandparents, grandchildren, and first cousins. Estimates on the number of divided families vary substantially. According to the Korean Red Cross, nearly 10 million Korean families experienced separation. Data compiled by the Ministry of Unification show that about 7,667,000 families were divided. In 1977, Kwon estimated about 650,000 divided families, while the Association of North Korean Provinces estimated 1,643,000 in 1981. The variance in the estimates is primarily due to differences in the treatment of South Korean-born children and grandchildren of North Korean refugees. In any case, during the Korean War, more than one million North Koreans sought refuge in the South, and many had left their spouses, children, parents, siblings, or other close relatives behind. Most of these refugees had migrated with the hope of returning to their homes immediately after the war. Their separation would ultimately last over 50 years and continues to the present day; it is so complete that family members are forbidden to write, call, or visit one another. The problem of separated families in the Korean peninsula is perhaps the most tragic family situation in the history of the world, both in terms of the number of families and the duration of the separation.

The Ministry of Unification handles requests from citizens to locate separated family members in North Korea. Its statistics show a sharp increase in the number of requests over the last two years. More specifically, 801 requests were filed for the month of May 2000, while there were only 54 applications for May 1999. Since 1990, information on the whereabouts of 2,068 separated family members has been obtained; 5,650 cases involved exchanges of letters with family members and 525 reunions with family members in a third country primarily China. Only seven cases were actual reunions with family members in North Korea.

It should be noted that the dialogue between the two Koreas concerning the reunion of separated families began in 1971. In September of 1985, the two countries arranged for an exchange visit of 151 "hometown visitors and performing artist groups" between Seoul and Pyongyang. North Korea proposed a second exchange visit in May of 1989, but it did not materialize, due to North Korean insistence on a program that included showing South Korean visitors an opera with a revolutionary theme. At a government-level meeting between the South and North held in Beijing in April of 1998, South Korea proposed to establish a reunion center for separated families and...
simultaneously to supply fertilizer to North Korea. Once again, North Korea insisted that the shipment of fertilizer precede the establishment of the reunion center, and thus no progress was made on the issue. On December 14, 1998, the National Assembly of South Korea passed a resolution calling for the confirmation of status and reunion of living members of divided families. In view of the history of the negotiations on the issue, the June 14, 2000, agreement to allow exchange visits of divided families is a long-awaited and much welcomed outcome. It is not clear at this time how many divided families will be allowed to visit North Korea for reunions under the program, or whether it will be a one-time or continuing arrangement.

The war-related separation of families had significant effects on several different dimensions of the family life. First, the involuntary separation left deep psychological scars on millions of Koreans. Longing for family members left behind in North Korea and anxiety about their whereabouts and well-being produced han among many affected families. In the context of the war, han refers to suppressed emotional suffering due to sorrow, grief, anxiety, guilt, fear, and deprivation caused by the separation of immediate family members and loved ones.” The psychological and emotional wounds with which separated families have had to cope over the past 50 years serve as constant reminders of the tragedies of war.

Secondly, the involuntary separation of husbands and wives and the war-related deaths of spouses led to serious adjustments in traditional norms concerning marriage, remarriage, and chastity. As the macro-level separation of the two Koreas and the micro-level separation of families became permanent, those with interrupted marital relationships were forced to make decisions about remarriage, which up until then had been regarded as unacceptable. Changes in marriage and remarriage norms occurred through the realities of separated families and those widowed by war. Men and women remarried at different rates. Males whose wives were left behind in North Korea were more likely to remarry than were females whose husbands were kidnapped by the North Korean military, and this pattern of sex differentials had important economic and financial implications for surviving spouses. Wives who lost their husbands to death or involuntary separation were forced to enter the labor market in order to provide financial support for their families.” Many war widows opened small restaurants, ”tea rooms” and coffee shops, and retail fabric and clothing stores; many worked as hostesses of bars and restaurants, peddlers, money changers, and maids. The financial distress left by the war served to remove some of the barriers that had traditionally discouraged women from entering the labor force.”
Thirdly, the traumatic experience of the Korean War in general and the emotional distress of separation increased the importance of religion among the Korean people to its highest level since the beginning of the 20th century. Although Koreans had traditionally been a religious people, the Korean War was a turning point at which Christianity gained wider acceptance, and the churches emerged as a bona fide institution. Humanitarian aid programs organized and spearheaded by American churches and other charity groups during and following the war gave Christianity a favorable overall reputation among Koreans. Furthermore, many North Korean refugees already professed the Protestant faith before their migration, and their numbers included many ordained ministers. The chaotic expansion of the reformed churches following the war saw the emergence of various Protestant sects and schisms, along with political and regional factions with the denominations.

**Introduction of American Culture Through U.S. Military Bases and Troops**

As indicated earlier, the United States has maintained a considerable military presence in Korea over the past 50 years. Many troops have been stationed near the demilitarized zone around the Uijongbu, Tongduchon, and Moonsan areas, with support units located in Seoul (Youngsan), Chunchon, Osan, Koonsan, Wonju, Taegu, Pusan, and other areas. Various types of businesses, including shops, bars, saloons, and restaurants were established around each of the U.S. military installations. U.S. military bases provided employment for local residents, and the money spent by U.S. soldiers contributed a healthy proportion of the local economy. *Kijichon* (military base towns) manifested a unique subculture, with their Western-style buildings, English signs, shops with American names and services, entertainment, and sex-oriented business establishments catering primarily to U.S. military personnel. Due to necessity and to the nature of their employment and businesses, Koreans working in and around *kijichon* tend to have a better command of the English language than do other Koreans with comparable educational attainments. They are also more attuned to fashion styles of American soldiers and tend to emulate them more readily than the rest of Korean society. Because of the proliferation of bars, saloons, and brothels in GI towns, illegal drugs are more readily available there than in other places. The black market for PX goods and the exchange of U.S. dollars into Korean currencies have become essential parts of the business lives of military towns.

In addition to the influence of American troops and businesses surrounding military bases, U.S. military radio and television, the
Armed Forces Korea Network (AFKN), became an important source of American influence on Korean society. Although intended to serve U.S. troops stationed in Korea, many college students and young adults listen and watch the programs of the AFKN radio and television stations. During the 1950s and 1960s, as Korean radio and television broadcasting systems were still in their developmental stages, the popular programs produced by major U.S. television networks and broadcast via AFKN stations attracted large numbers of college-educated listeners. Ironically, sensitive information about domestic political and military developments - which might have been censored by the authoritarian military regimes - was contained in news broadcasts aired over AFKN channels. AFKN radio and television channels were instrumental in disseminating American popular culture - especially music - to Koreans. Had AFKN radio and television stations not been available, Koreans would likely have received much less exposure to the American popular music of the 1950s and 1960s.

Entertainment programs designed for American troops were another source of the infusion of U.S. popular culture in Korea. The administration of the Eighth U.S. Army contracted with several Korean entertainment companies to stage variety shows on U.S. military bases. The programs, later dubbed the "Eighth Army Show," included American popular songs sung by Korean singers, music by Korean bands, dancing by "show girls," and stand-up comedy routines. Talented but hungry Korean musicians would learn American popular songs and would then entertain U.S. military personnel stationed at various camps in Korea. Many popular singers and instrumentalists of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s began their careers in the "Eighth Army Show." The show's effects spilled over into mainstream Korean society, as its singers and entertainers began to perform for larger audiences through radio, television, and live stage shows. Because the experience they had gained by entertaining American soldiers left them fairly well trained, and their repertoires were very current, these musicians emerged as stars in the Korean popular music industry, starting early in the 1960s. Thus, AFKN, the "Eighth Army Show," and its musicians were key players in introducing American popular music to Korean audiences and infusing American flavor and traditions into the development of Korean popular music later on.

The War and Regional Inequality

The North Korean troops had occupied Seoul within three days of the outbreak of the Korean War, and they had captured all but the Pusan Perimeter - the small southeastern tip of the peninsula extending from the Naktong River to the city of Pusan. United States troops joined
with the military forces of other countries to eject the North Korean troops from South Korea and then advanced to the Yalu River by September 1950. In October 1950, the People's Republic of China intervened and Seoul fell once again into communist hands on January 4, 1951.” United Nations forces reclaimed Seoul on March 12, 1951, and reached a stalemate roughly along the 38th parallel. The armistice truce agreement was reached on July 27, 1951.

As indicated earlier, the economic structures of both North and South Korea had been devastated by the three years of the Korean War. Property losses in South Korea amounted to approximately $2 billion—the equivalent of its gross national product for 1949—to nearly half of its industrial capacity, and a third of its housing was destroyed.” About 41 percent of South Korean power plants sustained damage, as did about 61 percent of railway locomotives, 69 percent of passenger coaches, and 57 percent of freight cars. Nearly half of all train stations and workshop facilities were destroyed.” Moreover, more than 70 percent of elementary school classrooms were damaged or destroyed during the war."

The extent of damage was substantially greater in the Seoul, Kyonggi, and Kangwon areas than in other regions. Because most of the Youngnam region avoided the invasion of DPRK troops, the industrial establishments of the Kyongbuk and Kyongnam provinces survived the war without damage. In fact, by the end of the Korean War the industrial and economic establishments in the Youngnam area were the only ones intact. These facilities had a considerable advantage in the post-war recovery efforts, because investments in these concerns yielded faster returns than did investments pouring into war-ravaged facilities. In particular, the “three white industries” (sugar, flour, and cotton), which expanded rapidly during the immediate post-war period, flourished initially by using the existing facilities of the Youngnam area.”

Concentrated post-war investment in the surviving facilities of the Youngnam region exacerbated existing regional inequality within economic structures.” Regional disparities have historically been apparent, particularly between the Youngnam and Honam regions, throughout the colonial period due to the Japanese policy of developing the Honam as a primary supplier of agricultural products, while the Youngnam was designated for industrial development.

At least temporarily, the “haves” sustained greater losses from the Korean War than did the “have nots,” thus reducing interclass inequality in terms of economic wealth. While on one hand, the Korean War reduced the extent of economic inequality by destroying the economic bases of all people, on the other hand, regional variations in
war damage intensified the potential for increasing inequality between Youngnam and Honam. Historical incidents and developments were not favorable to the Honam region. General Park Chung Hee, who became an authoritarian president, spearheaded state-led economic development and industrialization initiatives that concentrated investment into the heavy and petrochemical industrial sites in his home province, Kyoungbuk region. Arguably, the Honam region suffered double jeopardy: the invasion of the DPRK troops and war-related destruction combined with the regionally biased economic development policies of Park Chung Hee.

Discussion

This paper has examined the various effects of the Korean War on the social structures of the Korean society. The demographic consequences of the war were analyzed from the perspective of each of the major demographic processes: fertility, mortality, and migration. The Korean War was indeed the most destructive in the history of wars in terms of the proportion of the total population involved and the extent of war-related mortality and displacement of the population. The division of the Korean peninsula and separation of families caused by the war and division have had irreversible effects on the Korean psyche and family life over the past 50 years. The South-North Korean summit meeting in Pyongyang on June 13-15, 2000, and the subsequent exchanges of visits by separated families (albeit only about 100 families on each side were involved each time) were truly welcome developments in inter-Korean relations. In view of the urgency of reunions of the families, due to old age of those members of separated families, it is essential for the two governments to develop a much more expanded program in the future.

With regard to the political consequences of the Korean War, the war was an important turning point in the Korean political development especially in terms of state-society relations. The Syngman Rhee administration and subsequent authoritarian regimes maximized the division and concomitant ideological confrontations in solidifying their political power structures by mobilizing legislative, judicial, administrative, security, intelligence, and military organizations and their programs. The military became one of the most powerful institutions as a byproduct of the war and division of the country, and the military elite possessed the necessary organizational leadership experience and network structures, more so than any other institution or group, including the political parties, which made it possible for them to emerge as power elite during the period 1962-1992. The military ethos and subcultures have had profound effects on the norms
and values of the larger society through the continuing draft system and the mandatory military service of all young adult males.

The war and subsequent division of the peninsula have enabled the authoritarian regimes to utilize the National Security Laws and Anti-Communist Laws as effective vehicles in controlling any movements against the regimes. It is interesting to note that the civilian governments of Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung have not yet shown any serious interests in modifying any aspects of the existing National Security Laws and Anti-Communist Laws. Some liberal members of the government party have expressed a desire to amend some portions of the security and assembly related laws in recent years. Furthermore, the North Koreans have addressed their concerns about the National Security Laws as possible stumbling blocks for the improvement of inter-Korean relations. Nevertheless, the political mood of South Korea is not at the point where such abolishment of the National Security Laws would likely be supported by the general population. It would be reasonable to argue that the Korean War was also an important historical juncture where Korea and the United States started a close and long-standing bilateral relationship in terms of military, political, and trade relations. Obviously, the war did not give Korea much choice with regard to the establishment of close international relations with other superpowers. Furthermore, in view of the history of relations between Korea and Japan and ties between China and North Korea, the development of Korean-United States relations was a rather natural outcome. In any case, close ties with the United States and the continuing presence of the American military troops in Korea have influenced the cultural, educational, and social characteristics of Korean society over the past 50 years. The Kim Dae Jung administration has shown some new and balanced directions in terms of developing closer ties with China and Japan than the previous regimes. Furthermore, some younger cohorts have demanded that terms of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) be amended to the extent that the Korean courts would have the same extent of judicial jurisdiction as the Japanese and German courts in handling the legal cases of American troops in Korea. On the whole, Korean-U.S. relations are solid, as the two countries have developed a partnership in a true sense over the years, and the American influence on Korean affairs will remain substantial in the years to come.
Notes

4 ibid.
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6 ibid.
7 ibid., pp. 203-204.
8 ibid., p. 205.
11 ibid., p. 27.
12 ibid., p. 28.
13 ibid., p. 29.; Kwon. op. cit., p. 200.
14 Kwon., ibid., p. 205.
16 Shin., op. cit. p. 29.
17 Kwon., op. cit. p. 224.
18 Shin., op. cit. p. 31.
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21 ibid.
23 Shin., op. cit., p. 32.
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27 ibid., pp. 33-34.
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29 Kwon., op. cit., p. 145.
30 ibid.
32 Shin, 1992. op. cit, p. 35.
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44 Henderson, ibid., pp. 162-163; Steinberg, ibid.


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52 Koo, op. cit, p. 243.


54 ibid., p. 54.

55 ibid., p. 85.

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The Impact of the Korean War on the Korean Military

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Introduction
The South Korean military was a victim as well as a beneficiary of the Korean War. By the time of the outbreak of the war, the military was a fledgling force, dreadfully inferior in equipment and training. The military was almost crushed within a few days of the war. Ironically, the war transformed and strengthened the military; the infantile and immature Korean military became trained, equipped, and combat-experienced. Quantitatively, the military grew to be one of the largest militaries in the world; qualitatively, the third-rate "police reserve" became a modern professional military. Within the society, the military became the most Westernized and influential institution. In other words, the Korean War was a painful catalyst for the development of a strong Korean military.

Despite the profound changes and development of the Korean military during the war, the impact of the war on the military has not been carefully examined. As Chae-Jin Lee wrote, "in South Korea a number of myths and taboos about the war have long been perpetuated, which in turn tend to prevent an objective, rational assessment of the war's impact."

The Korean War is the most serious national tragedy in Korean history. Koreans are reluctant to refocus on this-horrible war. Therefore, limited attention has been paid to the impact of the war. Moreover, probably because of traditional Korean denigration of the military and the fact that military elite dominated Korean politics for three decades since 1961, study of the military has tended to be neglected.

This paper is a modest initial attempt at describing the general impact of the Korean War on the Korean military. For this purpose the author reviewed materials on the Korean War and tried to understand what happened in the Korean military before and during the war; how
the Korean military was established and how it was transformed. Thus, the first section describes the state of the Korean military before the war—the process of establishment and the quality of the military, especially its weakness. The second section examines what happened to the military during the war. The third section attempts to conceptualize some salient effects of the war on the military, and the final section discusses the implications of a strong military for Korea, particularly civil-military relations.

Prewar State of the Military

The Korean military is a completely new institution. An enduring military tradition was lacking in Korea. During the Yi Dynasty (1392-1910), the military was very weak under the influence of Confucianism, which stresses civilian supremacy over the military. When the traditional Korean military was formally disbanded in 1907, it consisted of only 6,000 men. Colonial Korea had no military of its own. During World War II, Japan drafted Korean youths. There were some Korean independence fighters in Manchuria and China, but no organized Korean military. When Korea was liberated from Japan in 1945, there was no Korean military.

The embryo of a modern Korean military was formed during the American military occupation. After liberation, South Korea was beset by post-colonial restlessness and disturbances, and the 25,000-man police force was not able to handle the social unrest without assistance from U.S. troops. To supplement the police, the American Military Government in Korea established a Korean Constabulary as a "police reserve."

However, the United States was reluctant to build a modern and large military in South Korea. The United States was preoccupied with Europe. It had no will and military capability to engage in a war on the Asian continent. Thus, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that Korea was not of strategic importance, and should war break out with Russia, Korea might become a liability. General MacArthur also believed that the U.S. "did not have the capability to train and equip Korean troops ... to cope with a full-scale invasion. If a serious threat developed, the United States would have to give up active military support of the ROK forces."

Therefore, U.S. military assistance to South Korea was firmly based on the policy that the South Korean military was basically an internal security force. Specifically, Washington aimed to provide equipment only to enable South Koreans to: 1) preserve internal security, 2) prevent border raids and incursions from the North, and 3) as a byproduct, deter armed attack from North Korea. The United States thus
equipped and trained the Constabulary for internal defense and security and rigorously refused to permit its aid to fund the modern armament of the Constabulary.

As the U.S. had no concrete policy for the future of South Korea, the establishment of the Constabulary was not carried out in a planned manner. The inception of the Constabulary had been a "grab-bag affair," in which former officers of the Japanese, Japanese-Manchurian, Chinese Nationalist, Korean Liberation Army, former Japanese-trained police and constabulary personnel, and a hodgepodge of newcomers all came together without a mutually acceptable purpose and with a minimum of cohesion. This heterogeneous, opportunistic origin resulted in serious factionalism and disunity. There were distrust and hatred between the factions of former Japanese officers and others. Officers tended to look askance at each other, having recently served on opposing sides; for example, many members of the former Korean Liberation Army rejected the idea of participating in the new Korean armed forces with former Japanese officers. The Americans favored the more trained ex-Japanese officers over the less standardized fighters from the Liberation Army. Consequently, the dominance of the ex-Japanese officers in the military diminished its credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the Korean people.

Due to the lack of adequate training and education, the factions preserved many traditional characteristics. Confucian values and military ideals combined to produce a strong tendency toward the recruitment of officers based on seniority. Each faction had its own top leader, and decisions were made by group consultation. In short, the Constabulary failed to generate an overall esprit de corps, code of discipline, or pattern of defense goals.

During the recruitment, the Korean adviser to the Director of National Defense of the U.S. Military Government, Ung-joon Lee, insisted that all new recruits had to undergo qualification and identity checks in order to prevent subversion from leftists. Lee requested that new recruits should submit to an ideological examination. The Americans rejected the idea and directed that men should be selected from all groups, including communists, on the principle that the military must not be "political." Furthermore, no American officer concerned had any concept of the complex background of the men and groups with which he was dealing. "Recruitment standards remained low, and reasonably healthy applicants had little difficulty in enlisting." Before long, military barracks became places for ideological feuding, and terrorism between the leftists and rightists became commonplace. Communists thus infiltrated almost all units of the military.
The First Regiment of the Constabulary was established on the outskirts of Seoul in January 1946. Seven additional regiments were organized in March: one regiment in each province. The size of each regiment was small, not exceeding a battalion or a company. The Constabulary took form so slowly that a year later it numbered only 5,000 men, with 143 officers. By April 1947, however, it had doubled in strength, and in July of that year it had reached 15,000. In March 1948, just two months after North Korea announced the establishment of the North Korean People's Army, the U.S. announced support for a 50,000-man South Korean Constabulary. Then, American efforts to strengthen the Constabulary took place in a hurry: regiment headquarters were activated, technical services started, equipment increased, and American military advisers increased. The Constabulary became South Korea's military when the Republic of Korea was established in August 1948 and grew so rapidly in the next few months that by January 1949, it numbered more than 65,000 men.

After his inauguration, President Syngman Rhee emphasized the buildup of the armed forces. His accomplishment was, however, greatly limited by the lack of resources, the urgent welfare needs of the populace, and the refusal of the United States to support or to allow the development of a Korean military that might threaten North Korea. Even so, the number of men in service was promptly increased. The Republic, striving for the rapid expansion of the army in the face of growing communist aggression, established six new regiments and two brigades during the first five months after the ROK Army was created. By May 12, 1949, each brigade in existence was transformed into a division.

The United States had only authorized the transfer of infantry weapons for 50,000 troops with standard infantry-type weapons, including M1 rifles and 60-mm and 81-mm mortars, and, therefore, about half of the ROK armed forces had to be issued ex-Japanese army weapons. Fearful that the South might attack the North and embroil the U.S. in a war, the United States restricted the armament of the new army, depriving its divisions of adequate antitank and antiaircraft weapons and heavy artillery, and denying it any armor at all. After the withdrawal of the U.S. forces in June 1949, the ROK army also lost its best source of supplies. There remained a group of 482 U.S. Army officers and enlisted men working as military advisers for the ROK military.

From early 1949, training, for the first time, began to emerge from the primitive and makeshift. The training was limited to the use of small arms, basic drills, and methods of internal security. Lack of officer and noncommissioned officer training was one of the most
serious problems of the military. Japanese-trained senior officers were unwilling to abandon their Japanese-taught stereotyped procedures and attitudes. They refused to master the staff work essential for the conduct of sustained operations. Such drudgery they considered far beneath their dignity. The idea of coordinating the maneuvers of more than a battalion at a time was beyond their comprehension. Staff training was virtually nonexistent. Junior officers in headquarters at all levels were not much more than yes-men with little idea of their roles. Senior commanders, most of them trained by the Japanese, seemed to have little notion of how to train their staffs."

By the end of 1949, 13 military schools were providing specialist instruction in such areas as artillery, field engineering, signals, quartermaster and ordnance, supply and transportation. This represented the beginning of in-depth training which would give an army the flexibility needed to fight a serious war. Officer training was started; by June 1950, just three weeks before the invasion, the first class of Korea's two-year Military Academy started training. Despite these efforts, the capability of the ROK Army was highly questionable; the army had not advanced in its training beyond platoon- and a few battalion-level exercises. In early 1950 the U.S. Military Advisory Group observed that "only a third of the army's battalions could be considered battle-worthy."

Proliferating factional rivalries, intensifying ideological confusion, and deteriorating social and political unrest all exerted a baneful influence on the morale and purposes of the military. Many of the officers and men in the military did not understand why Korea was divided and who was their enemy. For some, former Japanese officers and collaborators were regarded as enemy. Due to the American principle of "neutral" recruitment, a large number of communists could infiltrate the military. Thus, the loyalty of some of the soldiers was questionable. Quite unsurprisingly, less than 10 weeks after the establishment of the Republic, the 14th Regiment, which was ordered to suppress the communist insurrection in Cheju Island, rebelled. The mutiny was plotted by some communist-sympathizing members of the regiment. The 4th Regiment, dispatched to regain control, also joined the rebellion. But the rebels went into hiding in remote mountain areas and launched guerrilla warfare with manpower and supplies directly supported by North Korea. There were further mutinies in the military, including two by the 6th Regiment in Taegu in November and December 1948. In addition, there were mass defections. In May 1949 two battalions of the 8th Regiment crossed the 38th parallel into North Korea and surrendered. During May 1948 to May 1949 three naval vessels and their crews defected to the North.
Prompted by military rebellions and multiple defections, the military undertook a massive purge until the outbreak of the Korean War, liquidating some 4,750 officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Affected by this purge was more than 10 percent of the entire army office corps and NCOs. It was estimated that more than one third of the original officer-NCO corps was executed, jailed, or discharged.  

In short, the establishment of the Korean armed forces suffered from some deficiencies—lack of political commitment and consequent limit of logistical support, low recruitment standards, rapid expansion, and poor equipment and training.

Just before the outbreak of the Korean War the ROK Army consisted of eight divisions, but it was very weak—with approximately 95,000 men and equipment for only 50,000 men, much of it unserviceable or lacking spare parts, and grievously deficient in heavy equipment. The ROK Army supply of artillery and motor ammunition on hand was small and would be exhausted by a few days of combat. An estimated 15 percent of the weapons and 35 percent of the vehicles were unserviceable. Furthermore, due to the subversive and guerrilla activities of the communists, the ROK Army divided its forces, half along the 38th parallel and half in reserve, stationed in major cities. By the end of 1949 the ROK Army had to mount an average of three anti-guerrilla operations a day. In June 1950 the ROK had a Navy of 6,000 men with 30 medium and small vessels and an Air Force of about 2,000 men with only 22 training aircraft.  

Reorganization, Expansion, and Training During the War

On June 25, 1950, the North Korean Army crossed the 38th parallel into the South with the objective of conquering all of South Korea. The North Koreans came not as guerrillas but in a frontal assault. Their 10 divisions were spread across the peninsula from east to west in a broad front using tanks, artillery, and airplanes—exactly how the Russians might have attacked the Germans. The ROK forces were no match for the invading enemy.

The ROK military was long on courage but short on everything else needed to fight a war successfully. It was fought by South Korean troops without warplanes or tanks and cannons, armed at best with 2.36' bazookas so light that their projectiles bounced off the sides of advancing tanks. Many ROK units stood and fought courageously against overwhelming odds. With no antitank weapons, the ROK infantry adopted suicidal tactics in their efforts to stop the rampaging T-34 tanks that threatened to overrun them, climbing onto their turrets with explosive charges or hurling themselves as human bombs onto the tanks to detonate satchels of explosives tied to their bodies.  

The war
streets of Taegu and Pusan and were dispatched to the battlefront. They were grossly under-trained: they received only 10 days of quick instruction. None of them had fired more than 10 rounds of ammunition during their individual weapons training. The ROK soldiers in the first part of the war did not have the technical knowledge to use much of the communication equipment, the artillery, the tanks, and other weapons the American divisions possessed. Nor did they have as much transport as the American division. Usually every ROK division had an American battalion of 105-mm howitzers attached to it for fire support, and some had tank battalions attached to them.

Somehow, the ROK Army could maintain its strength at 85,000 men in August. In order to reverse the tide of war, however, the ROK forces had to be strengthened. A plan to create an additional five divisions was implemented, activating one division a month starting in September 1950. Although the plan made slow progress, a year later the army had grown to 10 divisions filled by new recruits.

The U.N. troops experienced extreme difficulties in the campaigns in the mountainous Korean terrain. Thus, the inexperienced and under-equipped ROK units were defending the entire central and eastern parts of Korea, where rugged mountains and deep valleys made the operations very difficult. They were fighting against not only North Korean troops but also the Chinese soldiers. The Chinese were the same army that had won the Chinese civil war. It was essentially a guerrilla army trained to endure the "Long March." It represented the world's mightiest unconventional warfare force. The Korean soldiers were totally unprepared to deal with the Chinese. The prowess of the Chinese soldiers as fast-moving light infantry, their numbers, and their use of classic tactics of combining frontal attack to fix the enemy and then sending equal or stronger forces in enveloping moves to attack the enemy flanks and to cut off retreat routes were formidable.

The enemy was waging its offensive against the weak ROK units. The ROK Army was badly mauled in the bitter fighting against the Chinese. It was a fledging outfit. Before the war, the ROK Army had never conducted a maneuver exercise higher than the regimental level, yet it fought the war at division, corps, and even army level. Given the lack of training and the poor equipment, its performance could only be shabby, especially in comparison with two of the world's premier fighting forces—the armies of the United States and communist China.

Intensive Wartime Training

After the fatal defeat of the ROK III Corps in the spring of 1951, American generals had strong reservations about the fighting
capabilities of the Korean units, leadership and training in particular." For example, General Van Fleet, Commander of the U.S. Eighth Army, reported to General Ridgway, Commanding General of the U.N. Forces, on April 28, 1951:

"The basic problems with ROKA are leadership and training; not manpower or equipment. Lack of leadership extends throughout except in rare instances. If excess trained officers and non-commissioned officers are available they are needed in units presently constituted. Until such time as above deficiencies are corrected it would be a waste of vitally needed equipment and supplies to permit organization and supply of additional units."

With proper training and good leadership, the South Korean was a good soldier. But after the near destruction of the army just after the beginning of the war, just about all experienced noncommissioned officers and junior officers of platoon and company level had been lost. There were no adequate replacements for them on short notice. The training of such leadership required establishment of the proper schools and several months of training by competent supervisors. Until the summer of 1951, young officers with inadequate training were filling the ranks of the Korean divisions. Major Eldon B. Anderson, who had been the Korean Military Advisor in artillery to the ROK 9th Division, summarized the qualities of the ROK soldier in the first year of the war and the limitations under which he fought.

Given the fire support, the training, and the leadership, the Korean soldier can't be beat. ... He is a wonderful soldier. He is obedient, intelligent ... and they have a good fighting spirit. They lacked leadership and still do to quite an extent, and they lacked training. A year ago, the infantry soldier got only 7 to 10 days training before being assigned to an outfit. They lacked fire support. ... Until recently they had no recoilless 57s or 75s; they don't have the 4.2" motor company in the regiment that we have; they don't have any tank; they don't have any antiaircraft. As a consequence, the Korean division should be considered as no more than an American combat team [regiment reinforced]. ... Many times, Korean divisions were given mission similar to those given American divisions and naturally they could not accomplish them."

The Americans could provide weapons and equipment. But lack of training, especially the integrative effect of training on military units, was a serious defect of the army. Production of battle-tested and dependable leaders, from noncommissioned officers on up, could not keep up with the exploding demand from the ever-growing army. The
Korean government and the U.S. Army officials agreed that increasing the combat capabilities of the ROK Army units was a priority. Korean-American efforts to build an effective Korean Army began as soon as negotiations at Panmunjom started in July 1951. The U.S. Army developed a program called Concentrated Training for the ROK Army. General Van Fleet established the Field Training Command in July 1951 and a training center was constructed and a cadre of 150 U.S. officers and NCOs with experience in training was assigned to the center. Beginning with the 3rd Division, each Korean division took its turn in the training cycle of nine weeks. Training consisted of basic individual, squad, platoon, and company training. Every man in a division, except the commander, was required to undergo the training, and when the training was over, a unit had to pass a test before being assigned to the front. By the end of 1952, all 10 ROK Army divisions had completed the training. This training of virtually the entire force provided a firm foundation for today's ROK Army."

In May 1951, each branch school also began an officers' basic course and an advanced course with the assistance of American military advisers. American military advisers were consistently increased from fewer than 500 at the beginning of the war to about 2,000 in early 1952. By the fall of 1951, the ROK military service schools were enlarged to handle more than 10,000 soldiers for armor, artillery, engineering, and communications. Specialist training was expanded, and tanks and heavy artilleries were provided to the ROK units for the first time on any significant scale. On January 1, 1952, the Korea Military Academy was reorganized with the first four-year curriculum, and a Command and General Staff College for higher-ranking officers was also established."

In late 1951 ROK officers were sent to attend short-term, foreign officer training courses in the United States. Of these, 250 went to the U.S. Army Infantry School, and 100 went to the U.S. Army Artillery School. The command skills of these officers improved so dramatically that the program was repeated yearly thereafter. In short, the emphasis on training sparked the rapid maturation of the ROK Army, progress that appeared in numerous concrete ways on the battlefield. The Korean units revealed an elan and confidence and lost fewer men and equipment in combat. There was also a steady increase in the proportion of the front line under direct control of the ROK Army. By the time the armistice was signed, the ROK Army controlled two thirds of the front.

**Buildup of a 700,000-Strong Military**

Before the truce, the need for the development of ROK forces
able of taking over the role of U.N. forces became a priority. With U.S. President-elect Eisenhower’s support during his visit to Korea in late 1952, an ambitious plan to double the 350,000 men force was vigorously implemented. The First ROK Field Army was also activated in December 1953 to rearrange the chain of command. The First Field Army, with its operational and training control of five corps and 19 infantry divisions, was guarding the front line, and more than 60 percent of the 650,000 men were assigned to this army. The Second ROK Army, which was responsible for the support and control of district commands, reserve divisions, and service and technical schools, was activated in September 1954. On February 14, 1954, President Rhee appointed General Hyung Kuen Lee as the chairman of the newly established Joint Chiefs of Staff, which was responsible to develop national defense strategy. Thus, the institution-building of the modern Korean military was finally finished.

After the armistice, the Mutual Defense Treaty between the ROK and the United States was signed. The treaty provided the basis for the presence of U.S. forces in Korea; consultation on security; military aid for strengthening Korean military power; and support should an attack occur. Since the treaty, the U.S. has provided massive military assistance to strengthen the ROK armed forces. As the U.S. decided to withdraw six divisions from Korea between 1954-55, the ROK and the United States jointly sped up the buildup of the ROK military and discussed defense strategy in postwar Korea. In March 1954, as the United States began to withdraw two divisions from Korea, the gap was filled by the buildup of the ROK military. In May 1954 an agreement between the ROK and the U.S. arranged for the transfer of equipment from the American withdrawal units, and it was decided to expedite the improvement of the Korean armed forces. On May 22, 1954, the ROK 6th Corps was activated, and with this corps the Army had 20 active divisions and five corps headquarters. After President Rhee’s visit to Washington, the ROK Army organized 10 reserve divisions.

All this reorganization and expansion took place a mere 18 months after the 1953 cease-fire. The far-reaching changes made in that brief period put the army of 1954 well on its way to being a modern force at the front and in the rear areas.

In short, despite all the handicaps, intensive training and reorganization pushed by Korean-American joint efforts resulted in a tremendous buildup that made the ROK military not only very effective troops but also the world’s second largest anti-communist force. Thus, the ROK army won the commendation of General Van Fleet as "the largest, most royal, most modern military ... of any Asian nation," and
of President Eisenhower as "splendid troops—real fighting men".

Effect of the War on the Military

A Strong Partner of the U.S. Forces

The Korean War changed the foreign and security policies of the United States. After the war U.S. foreign policy postulated a strongly enhanced militancy and willingness to risk war on the part of the Soviet Union and its proxies, and called for a massive conventional and nuclear buildup to hold the Western position everywhere.32

The United States was terribly unprepared for a war in 1950. In 1945 the U.S. had spent $50 billion on its army; in 1950 it spent only $5 billion. In 1945 there were 8.25 million men on active service; in 1950 there were fewer than 600,000, and no one had been drafted since March 1947. During the height of the Berlin Blockade in 1948 there was only one American division in Europe.33 The Korean War broke the mold of nearly complete military demobilization in the U.S. after World War II. After the Korean War, the United States gave greater priority to military security and maintained large standing armed forces in peacetime for the first time in American history. In the course of the war, the U.S. Army's strength nearly trebled, from 591,000 to 1.5 million, the Marine Corps' strength also trebled, and the Air Force and Navy doubled.34

In addition, the U.S. made worldwide commitments to contain Communist expansion. The priority of U.S. foreign aid thus rapidly shifted from economic development to military security. In 1949, the ratio of economic to military aid was about four to one; by the end of 1950, that ratio had been reversed.35 The Americans began to build up the armies of virtually the entire free world. In September 1950, the U.S. decided to send from four to six American divisions to Europe, under an American commander. General Eisenhower was named as the first Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, and from 1951 to 1953 the United States distributed $20 billion worth of military funds, supplies, arms, and equipment to its allies.

Without question, the Korean War transformed the American perception of security in Korea. No sooner had North Korea invaded than the United States directly participated in the war to defend South Korea. Thus, the U.S. policy toward South Korea changed from a low to the highest priority. Since then, the United States has undertaken great efforts to build a modern Korean military. The transfer of weapons, equipment, logistic support, and financial aid for the development of a strong Korean military became a primary U.S. goal in Korea.
The U.S. security commitment to South Korea, which grew out of American involvement in the war, was formalized in a mutual security treaty in 1953 and manifested in the continued deployment of substantial numbers of American forces in South Korea. The enduring commitment to the Republic of Korea and the continuous presence of a considerable number of the U.S. troops in Korea had the most significant impact on the development of the Korean military. As a result, the Korean military acquired modern military tactics and strategy through its participation in the joint command system with the U.S. forces in Korea.

Before the war and during the early months of the war, the Koreans were suspicious of the Americans. So were the American soldiers of the Koreans. More American soldiers held an unfavorable opinion of the Korean people. Korean civilians were viewed with suspicion as being possible enemy infiltrators, spies or saboteurs. During the war, ROK and U.S. soldiers fought shoulder to shoulder, supporting each other, under the same command. They could overcome cultural barriers and became more trustful of each other. The wartime presence of up to 350,000 American troops in South Korea provided a mass impulse toward linguistic and cultural Americanization for the military.

In short, the ROK military became one of the most reliable partners of the American forces in East Asia and "a necessary arm of the worldwide system of free forces opposing the Communist drive for power.""
upon them, the people were prepared to sacrifice themselves materially and physically.

The United States also provided almost everything needed for the expansion and training of the Korean military: weapons, equipment, logistics, doctrines, and manpower. At the time the U.S. military was regarded as one of the most advanced institutions in the United States, and the U.S. government and civilian organizations had tried to apply military technology and managerial know-how to their institutions. The Korean military imported not only advanced American equipment and technology but also modern techniques of planning, management, training, and education. In other words, the combined effect of the war and the American support made the Korean military an unrivaled holder of modern skills, managerial techniques, specialization, and newly acquired ways of building and maintaining institutions in South Korea.

The sudden emergence of a huge and modern military had profound implications for Korean society. Among Korean institutions, the military was unique at the time. No other institution approached its size of some 650,000 men. The military had been subjected to consistent discipline and a modern educational process for a considerable period of time. No civilian institution came close to the military. The military was the only Korean institution in which the Americans had succeeded in concentrating sufficient funds, training, advice, and attention over a long period to transplant the American system in Korea. The Korean military, with its comprehensive and specialized infrastructure, became a microcosm of the state; it possessed its own separate and self-contained systems of supply, transportation, communication, engineering, and education. The modernization of the military sharply contrasted with the miserable states of civilian institutions. The underdeveloped civilian sector had been almost completely destroyed, and it received no adequate support to revitalize and modernize its infrastructure and train its manpower.

In this regard, the relative importance of the military and the police needs to be noted. The police inherited the effective, but brutal, institution of the Japanese police. Before the war the police numbered 30,000 and were almost as well armed as the army; it was believed that various paramilitary forces such as the Youth Corps would provide a reserve in case of need. Moreover, the Korean Constabulary was established as a “police reserve.” Thus, the prewar police were regarded as the most well-organized and powerful institution in South Korea, and consequently the police were more influential than the military. Because of the emergence of the powerful military, however, the status and power of the police significantly declined. Because of the rapid expansion of the military and its abundant resources, the military far
exceeded the police in prestige and influence.

In a pre-modern and war-devastated nation like South Korea, the emergence of a modern military was revolutionary in nature. Compared to other civilian institutions, the Korean military was the most modern, the most powerful, and the best-organized group in Korea. In the late 1950s the military was regarded as the only social and governmental institution capable of unified, effective, and disciplined action.

**Emergence of Professionalism**

During the war, and soon thereafter, the size of the Korean military was increased several-fold to some 650,000 men. Its rapid expansion inevitably resulted in some serious problems. After the truce, the threat of renewed invasion became less the focus of military concern than the corruption, ineffectiveness, and abuses of power in the military. The war aggravated corruption in the military. Floods of supplies and equipment were given to the Korean military. Strict control and accountability broke down due to the language barrier of the American supplier. The Korean military did not yet have central procurement and distribution systems due to poor market and transport conditions. Thus, cash allowance was given to commanding officers to buy vegetables, fish, and meat at local markets. This procurement practice made corruption easy.

Salaries in the military could not meet the necessary needs of military families. Spiraling war inflation made this worse. Prices rose 750 percent in Seoul in the first year of the war. Low pay was not only a morale factor but also forced whole ROK units to take time for extracurricular activities to make a living for the families of their troops. The American supply service was also defective; there were insufficient spare parts and repair facilities for equipment, and a lack of funds for the maintenance of military facilities. Illegal cutting of forests and operation of small factories or fishing fleets went on to supply such needs. Corruption became rampant throughout the military.

On the other hand, the war forced the belated application of enough training and discipline to overcome factional divisions. The rapid expansion of the military made influential the 7th and 8th classes of the Korean Military Academy, who were recruited outside factional channels and comprised the majority of mid-ranking officers. By overcoming its deficiencies, the military became the first Korean organization that eliminated most of the sources of fluidity and disunity. The elimination of factions in the military had important implications for the country, where factions dominated most areas of society. Thus, national interests came before personal happiness for the soldiers. They were ready to sacrifice themselves for the safety and
welfare of the nation. Decisions were made by the formal procedures of the military; traditional personal relations were less relevant, and formal channels of military institutions were important. This kind of military ethos could be contrasted with the attitudes and behavior of politicians and other civilian elites, whose lives were often preoccupied with personal connections and factional interests.

Unlike most militaries of developing countries, the Korean military also had become relatively well professionalized. The military as a modern institution, according to Morris Janowitz, possesses modern skills, weapons, and equipment. Therefore, it was organized, managed, and commanded on modern organizational principles. The United States had provided almost everything needed for the development of a professional Korean military. The American military advisers assisted the Korean troops with training, setting up new military institutions and supply service, and procuring and dispensing U.S. military equipment and supplies. Korean officers were trained by American military officers in Korea and were also sent to military schools in the United States. All the senior instructors and most of the junior instructors had been through American service schools. After returning to South Korea, they taught by American methods, with American weapons and equipment, and from translated versions of American military texts and manuals.

The officer corps not only needed to be thoroughly trained in purely military matters but also in managerial and administrative skills. The Korean military lacked officers trained to command large numbers of soldiers and to maneuver in open warfare. There was no unbroken military tradition, such as other countries have, to develop regular classes of officers trained to command. After it became a four-year institution modeled after the U.S. Military Academy, the Korea Military Academy, as well as the Korea Naval and Air Force Academies, attracted the country’s top high school students, who graduated as first-rate professionals with solid undergraduate educations.

At the time, education was expensive, and the military provided free educational opportunities for those poor and rural. As noted earlier, the U.S. also allocated vast resources to the training and education of Korean officers and NCOs. More than 2,000 officers and NCOs were sent to American military schools during the war. After the armistice, more than 1,000 South Korean soldiers were sent to the U.S. for training and education every year until the mid-1960s. By 1959 approximately 10 percent of all South Korean officers had some U.S. training. Through these systemic education programs, the South Korean officers learned and internalized the Western code of military professionalism.
Training is important in any military. But in the case of Korea, military training and education were much more important because at the time Korea’s general level of education and technical skills was very low. To operate the modern military equipment and to make the goal-oriented military function effectively, it was absolutely essential for the soldiers to be trained in basic literacy, to acquire essential military skills, and to operate modern equipment. When they were mobilized, the mostly uneducated young people were forced to acquire their skills quickly so that they could perform their military duties. They learned the importance of discipline, loyalty, and cooperation, and were given opportunities to learn techniques for using modern equipment for transportation, communication, construction, sanitation, hygiene, etc. A farm boy, from a remote corner of the country, could learn to drive a truck or bulldozer, maintain a vehicle, repair an engine, operate a military radio, and construct a bridge or building. Therefore, technical training became much more important.

It needs to be emphasized that the introduction and application of the American military system to the Korean military was relatively successful because there was no Korean military institution. It was like a tabula rasa: there was almost no resistance against the import of the American military system. As a result, the Korean military was relatively well professionalized within a short period of time.

**Ideological Cohesion as the Bulwark of Anti-Communism**

In a developing country like South Korea, the mental aspect of the military experience is as important, or more important, as the technological one. Through the war, the military became the bulwark of anti-communism. Anti-communism was the ideological principle not only of the Korean military but also of the South Korean people. The people and soldiers could rally around the government and sacrifice themselves under the banner of anti-communism. The Korean military was successful in the indoctrination of anti-communism among young soldiers. The discharged youth have had a lot of influence on deterring the infiltration of communism into every aspect of South Korean society.

In the early years after the establishment of the military, the loyalty of some officers and NCOs was questionable. There were many people who strongly supported unification and therefore objected to the establishment of the ROK. Due to their diverse backgrounds, ideological confusion, and rapid recruitment without a background check, soldiers to the Rhee government and the ROK were not so solid in their loyalty. Most of the South Korean people, including military officers, lacked any understanding of democracy and communism.
They had a strong aspiration for national independence. However, the division of the country meant only half independence. Unification was regarded as full independence. Moreover, radical communist propaganda was partly succeeding; communists claimed that communism was the only "genuine democracy." Under circumstances of ideological confusion, many officers and NCOs lacked strong loyalty to defend the government of the Republic. They were not sure why they had to fight against their North Korean brethren.

During the war, however, the military developed a strong sense of identity and loyalty. As a result, communist-tainted officers and enlisted men were eliminated. By the end of the war, anti-communism was almost blindly accepted. Before the war, a considerable number of soldiers and people questioned President Rhee's anti-communist slogans, and some people were deceived by the honeyed words of communist propaganda. However, during the war, virtually all South Korean families became victims of communist aggression in one way or another. Therefore, the people strongly supported the military as the central force to fight against the communists. Unlike the questionable loyalty of some in the military that was manifested in the Yosu mutiny, during the war the loyalty of the military became clear and the mission of the military was to defend the ROK government and its people against the enemy: North Korean communists and their allies.

Anti-communism is only one of the military's characteristics in the Korean context. Military service also fostered a strong sense of duty and honor. The military sees its role as the defender of national sovereignty. Therefore, professional soldiers generally possess a strong sense of nationalism—a unifying sense of purpose, vision, and national pride—that is one of the essential requirements of nation building. The military developed discipline, a strong sense of mission, and an esprit de corps. The military is also highly goal-oriented: specialization, scientific planning, and efficiency and effectiveness are valued. This military orientation was sharply contrasted with the traditional values of most of the civilian groups.

Enhanced Social Status of the Military Officers

Due to the war, the social status of the military improved to a great extent. For the first time since the 13th century, the military became the most dominant organization in Korea and also the most trusted institution in South Korea.

Long influenced by Buddhism and Confucianism, the Korean people encouraged mental and spiritual development rather than physical prowess. The man of arms, the symbol of physical violence, was considered inferior to the man of letters. Thus, the relegation of the
man of arms to a lower social stratum persisted throughout the history of Korea, especially during the Yi Dynasty, even in the face of repeated foreign invasions. In the early years of the Korean military, most officers came from poor, rural families. Their social status was not much different from that of the traditional Korea.

During the war, however, many bright young men found in the rapidly expanding military a sense of pride, accomplishment, and a broadened vision. On the other hand, many civilian elite enjoyed the status of wealth. Many of them avoided military service by attending college or studying abroad. National efforts to defend the country also led to the mobilization of national resources—personnel, finances, materials, etc.—into the military sector. As a result, the military became an actual center of national life; the civilian side became merely residual. In the history of Korea there had never existed such an organization that was so huge in size, so abundant in resources, so well trained in manpower, and so well organized in structure. This enlarged force was partially supplied by grants of over $400 million annually from the United States, which amounted to almost half of the Korean budget.

Unlike in traditional Korea, it was the new Korean military that had the power, the supplies, the finances, and the men trained in modern administration, accounting, procurement, supply, transportation, logistics, medicine, construction, and communications technology. The officers and NCOs enjoyed not only modern equipment but also relatively abundant supplies, while most people were barely surviving.

Most of the higher-ranking officers learned English, a symbol of a modernized Korean. The wartime military was a ladder of extremely rapid fulfillment for the ambitious. The rapid expansion of the military prompted the incredibly fast promotion of officers; among 100 second lieutenants commissioned in 1949, 65 became generals in 1960, and most of them were in their 30s and 40s. The emergence of a large group of well-trained officers was of particular importance. The officers usually included a higher proportion of able, energetic, nationalistic, and upwardly mobile individuals from low-middle class backgrounds. They tended to distrust the civilian elite, who came from relatively well-to-do families but mostly maintained the traditional problems of corruption, factionalism, inefficiency, and flunkeyism.

Conclusion: A Modern Military in a Pre-modern Society

As discussed so far, during the Korean War the Korean military underwent modernization and became the most advanced and professional institution in Korea. After the war, the military, with its modern equipment and abundant technical manpower, played a leading role...
role in the reconstruction of Korea. The military built buildings, schools, roads, bridges, dams, etc. At that time the civilian construction sector lacked trucks and construction equipment, and it did not have experienced technicians. Without the contribution of the military, the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country likely would have been much more difficult and delayed. After the reconstruction, the military continued to support the construction of national infrastructure, including the Seoul-Pusan Expressway. The military also promoted a variety of civic action programs, which included medical services, social education, relief activities for natural disaster, and other social and economic services. In short, the military played a significant role in the reconstruction and development of the nation."

The vast number of youth who served in the military during and the after the war constituted a significant reservoir of technologically competent, organizationally experienced, and managerially skilled manpower in South Korea. Each year, the military was returning some 200,000 young men to the civilian sector after their service. The economic and social development of Korea benefited greatly from the manpower trained in modern skills and techniques."

However, the civilian sector had changed little in the 1950s, and as a result the civilian elite failed to recognize the strength of the modernized military. Consequently, the emergence of the new military changed the traditional civil-military relationship. As Samuel Huntington points out, the enlargement and strengthening of the Korean military helped to aggravate the imbalance between the "input and output" institutions of Korean society."

Military training, geared to the use of scientific rationale to produce the most efficient group actions, resulted in a major change in problem-solving techniques in Korea. Military training also provided a kind of faith, a sense of purpose and destiny that was often in sharp contrast to the depressing attitudes of the civilian elite. This functional outlook was in conflict with the civilian mentality of the old order, which was shackled by "inertia, inefficiency and skepticism." The civilian elite failed to recognize the fact that the military had rectified much of its past inadequacies by undergoing new and advanced education and training at home and abroad.

Officers tended to believe that the military had been the "guardian of the nation's security." One consequence of this attitude is that some officers, even today, tend to disdain and distrust the civilian sector, especially politicians, as self-serving, sometimes corrupt, and unwilling to sacrifice for the greater good of the nation. As a bulwark of anti-communism, the military tended to distrust those who advocated compromised unification with the North. On the other hand, the
The enhanced status and influence of the military had a profound impact on civil-military relations in the coming decade. After the 1961 military coup, a struggle for legitimacy began between the civilian and military sectors. During the Yi Dynasty, the sole profession of the civilian yangban (literati) was the holding of public office. Thus, while the civilian yangban enjoyed the special privilege of governing, military officials were barred from high rank.52 Park Chung Hee and his military associates, who were proud of the sense of nationalism, efficiency, advanced knowledge, and discipline of the military, despised the inefficiency, corruption, factionalism, and flunkeyism of the civilian sector. On the other hand, the intellectuals (scholars, journalists, students, and religious leaders) and opposition politicians maintained the traditional belief that the civilian elite is superior to the military: more intelligent, more knowledgeable and competent. Therefore, military rule was not only considered illegitimate but also inappropriate.

The sudden rise of the military in Korean society inevitably brought reactions from the civilian sector—the posterity of the yangban who had almost monopolized the privilege of governance. Although the anti-government demonstrations during the 1960s-1980s reflected their aspirations for democracy, the deep-rooted cultural bias against the military also influenced their tenacious protests.

As Korean society rapidly modernized, the superiority of the military was eroded and some of the civilian sectors, such as business, caught up and then, probably, surpassed the military. Since the late 1980s, the civilian elite has led the government, and the Korean military changed its perceived role from a "new professionalism" to an "old professionalism." But most of the civilian sectors are still not as trusted as the military; this is due to the underdevelopment of their institutions and their frequent lack of professionalism.
Notes


9 With a limited amount of military supply from the Americans, a great number of officers in the Constabulary still commanded their soldiers in Japanese uniforms and with Japanese long sabers. (Sawyer, *op. cit.*, p. 16.)


14 Sawyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-78. In June 1950 the Navy consisted of four patrol crafts, 1 LST, 15 former U.S. mine sweepers, 10 former Japanese mine layers, and various small craft. The Air Force consisted of a single flight group of 12 liaison-type aircraft and 10 advance trainers. On the other hand, North Korea had a strong fighting force of about 200,000 men with 100 tanks and heavy artillery. North Korea air force had 100 Yak fighter planes, 70 attack bombers, and 10 reconnaissance aircrafts.

15 Hickey, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

16 The defense plan aimed to counter a North Korean invasion at the 38th parallel but it said nothing about operations south of the Han River. (Sun Yup Paik, *From Pusan to Panmunjom* (Washington, D.C: Brassey’s, 1992), p. 20.


19 Appleman, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

20 Out of all the divisions engaged in the initial fighting, only the 6th and 8th divisions escaped with their organization, weapons, equipment, and transport relatively intact. Except for them, the ROK Army came out of the initial disaster with little more than 30 percent of its individual weapons. One estimate of effective ROK Army ranges from General MacArthur’s 25,000 made on June 29, to a Korean figure of 40,000, made July 1. (Appleman, *op. cit.*, p. 35)


23 Paik, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

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24 During the early phase of the war, the U.S. troops had some deficiencies. The first American troops committed to battle in Korea were poorly trained, inexperienced, short of officers, and, perhaps most important, had gravely defective or inappropriate weapons and equipment. In the first action of "Task Force Smith" against the invading communist forces one bazooka team fired 22 rocket rounds at a tank without penetrating its armor. Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: Times Books, 1987), pp. 91-93.


26 Appleman, *Disaster in Korea*, pp. 369-70.


31 In Korea, the US Army spent much of the first year rebuilding, training, and reequipping its forces, weeding out ineffective leaders and restoring morale. As one American general observed: "We went into Korea with a very poor army and came out with a pretty good one. We went into Vietnam with a pretty good army and came out with a terrible one." See Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), p. 33.


38 Henderson, *op. cit.*, p. 357.


40 Mark W. Clark, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-77.


46 Henderson, *op. cit.*, p. 334-38 and Se-jin Kim, *op. cit.*, Chapter IV.


48 The most spectacular case was Major General II Kwon Chung, who at the age of 33 became the Army Chief of Staff and the Commander of the ROK Armed Forces during the war. Accordingly, the social status of the military improved remarkably. See II


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