chapter four

North Korea and the United Nations

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Introduction
On 17 September 1991, the first day of its (46th) annual session, the United Nations General Assembly admitted the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) as the 160th and 161st member states. This historical turnabout was made possible by what had already happened in the Security Council five weeks earlier. Indeed, the 3001st meeting of the Security Council on 8 August 1991 may well be remembered as one of the remarkable events or nonevents in the annals of global high politics in the world organization. Since 1947 the Korean question, in a great variety of contentious manifestations, has proved to be one of the most intractable problems constantly intruding upon wider East-West geopolitical and ideological rivalries in and out of the world organization. Yet, on this day the Security Council devoted only five minutes—between 11:30am and 11:35am EST to be exact—to finally crossing the Rubicon on divided Korea. Without any debate, the Council unanimously adopted the report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members concerning the applications of the two Koreas for admission to membership in the United Nations.

Equally revealing is the rather unusual manner of the action. The two separate membership applications were merged into a single draft resolution, and the Council decision—and recommendation to the General Assembly—was adopted without a vote as Resolution 702 (1991). The brevity of the Security Council action merely underscored the consensus of the Perm Five (P-5) to accept the two separate membership applications as a package deal so as to prevent the intrusion of the zero-sum style of inter-Korean politics even as the decision itself was touted as consonant with the principle of universality and as such as the triumph of both Koreas in their quest for international legitimation. That a collective decision could be made in 1991 to perform diplomatic surgery as delicate as separating the Korean Siamese Twins is another testimonial to the virtuous circle of UN rejuvenation in the early post-cold war years. The end of superpower conflict in the world organization thus disposed of the Korean membership issue as the last festering cold war problem. The four major membership problems relating to the divided polities of China (1971), Germany (1973, 1990), Vietnam (1977), and Korea (1991) that have been plaguing the world body over the years were finally cleared off the UN agenda. By accepting and legitimizing the two Koreas as two separate but equal member states, the United Nations has expanded the possibility of both Koreas peacefully coexisting and cooperating in and out of the world organization. It is worth noting that the United Nations as the most important and universal international organization has been made to order to perform the dual role of physician and priest in the collective legitimation of new states.
UN membership has come to be viewed as the imprimatur of international recognition and legitimation—a national identity badge, as it were—that no self-respecting country, especially divided or breakaway ones, could do without. The collective dispensation of legitimacy resides in the exercise of UN authority. This remains one of the major functions of the so-called UN politics of collective legitimation and delegitimation.

And yet, far from accepting its UN membership as a diplomatic triumph or even as a grand bargain for state security and survival, Pyongyang reacted in a way that was defensive and despondent to a fault. The statement of the DPRK Foreign Ministry dated 27 May 1991 and submitted to the Security Council reversing its long-standing opposition to the simultaneous dual entry formula, acknowledges in a bitter tone Pyongyang’s entrapment dilemma:

Taking advantage of the rapid changes in the international situation, the south Korean authorities are committing the never-to-be-condoned treason to divide Korea into two parts... by trying to force their way into the United Nations... As the south Korean authorities insist on their unilateral United Nations membership, if we leave this alone, important issues related to the interests of the entire Korean nation would be dealt with in a biased manner on the United Nations rostrum and this would entail grave consequences. We can never let it go that way. The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has no alternative but to enter the United Nations at the present stage as a step to tide over such temporary difficulties created by the south Korean authorities.5

The objective of this essay is to explore the logic of North Korea’s international relations as made manifest in that country’s behavior as a member of the United Nations over the past five years (1991-96). Perhaps most suggestive as a point of departure for such a macro-level analysis is the premise that half Korea plus half Korea equals two states with two systems siring two incomplete nation-states; and that such divided nations are primed for a zero-sum and often violent version of the politics of national-identity mobilization to maximize their exclusive security and legitimacy. I propose the notion of competitive legitimation and delegitimation as a promising yet relatively underutilized way of capturing the dynamics of North Korean politics as they have unfolded over the years in three separate but mutually interconnected and interdependent spheres—domestic, external, and inter-Korean. As the first truly global organization in all of human history, the UN provides the most legitimate institutional expression of the idea of global community, helping to facilitate, however imper-
fectly, the establishment of global consciousness-raising, consensus-building, standard-setting, and law-making processes to deal with problems that threaten international peace, human security, human rights or the world’s social, economic, and ecological well-being. As for the politics of divided Korea, however, no other global arena matches the importance of the United Nations. It is there that Pyongyang and Seoul, having searched the world over for a forum, can most effectively engage in the global politics of collective legitimation and delegitimation.

To Join or Not to Join

It seems useful to step back a little bit to better appreciate the changes and continuities in North Korea’s attitudes and policies toward the UN and to better assess the outer possibilities and limitations of Pyongyang’s constructive engagement in the world organization. The politics of competitive legitimation and delegitimation was set in motion in 1945 with the two Koreas starting from an identical cultural and historical baseline and taking separate paths in a state-making, identity-forming, and legitimacy-seeking process under the sponsorship of the two competing superpowers. This was the beginning of a legitimation-cum-identity crisis that has played a role in molding the politics of divided Korea. The sources of that crisis have been more or less the same for both countries: (1) leadership and succession problem from within (democratization challenge); (2) clear and present challenge or threat from the other Korea (national-identity challenge); and (3) twin security dilemmas of allied entrapment or abandonment from without (security challenge).

Over the years both Koreas have taken turns in the roles of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde in a competitive legitimation and delegitimation game played on multiple chessboards. The establishment of the ROK on 15 August 1948 and its repeated claim to represent the entire Korean peninsula and people as the sole legitimate government on the basis of UN-supervised elections and General Assembly Resolution 195 (III) of 12 December 1948 gave rise to Pyongyang’s first identity/legitimacy challenge. In less than a month, Pyongyang reciprocated by establishing the DPRK, claiming to represent all of Korea on the basis of the 1948 election of a “People’s Assembly.” Taking advantage of the UN’s legitimation, the ROK government applied for membership in the world body on 19 January 1949, and the DPRK followed suit on 9 February 1949 with predictable outcomes—the former was accepted by a vote of 9 to 2, though the Soviet veto barred the country from joining, while the latter was voted down by a margin of 2 to 8. Between 1949 and 1975 the ROK applied for UN membership at least four times while the DPRK submitted its application for membership in 1952 and even went
along in 1957 with the Soviet proposal for dual membership for both
Koreas. Although the ROK could not force its way into the United Nations
because of the Soviet veto, the entire UN system during the heyday of
American hegemony (1945-71) had stood on the side of South Korea in the
two countries' fight to represent the entire Korean peninsula. Still, it is
worth noting in this connection that in the 1950s and 1960s it was Seoul,
not Pyongyang, that was advancing a claim for absolute legitimation. No
such claim was made in 1949, 1952, or 1957, when Pyongyang's member-
ship was placed on the UN agenda, by the DPRK.

The situation began to change dramatically in the first half of the 1970s
with a role reversal. It was now Pyongyang's turn to launch a global
diplomatic bid for absolute legitimation while Seoul retreated into a
more realistic claim for dual legitimation. Indeed, the 1970s stand out as
the belle époque of Pyongyang's engagement in the politics of competitive
legitimation.

Table 1
Number of Countries Recognizing the DPRK and ROK, 1948-1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month/Year</th>
<th>DPRK</th>
<th>ROK</th>
<th>Both Koreas</th>
<th>Only DPRK</th>
<th>Only ROK</th>
<th>UN Membership</th>
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<tr>
<td>12/1948</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/1950</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/1955</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/1959</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/1962</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/1965</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/1970</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/1976</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/1980</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/1985</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>57</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/1990</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>56</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/1992</td>
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<td>169</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/1995</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>185</td>
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</table>

A number of major changes and trends in the international situation (e.g., East-West détente; the American defeat in and disengagement from Indochina; the entry of the People’s Republic of China into the United Nations; and the rise of the Third World as a collective global actor calling for a New International Economic Order [NIEO]) made Pyongyang’s grand entry into world politics possible, where it had many more hits than misses in its quest for international legitimation. Seoul’s seemingly insurmountable head start in diplomatic recognition all but vanished in the 1970s, as Pyongyang pursued a more flexible, diversified, and omnidirectional policy. By mid-1976, as shown in table 1, the number of countries recognizing Seoul and Pyongyang stood respectively at 96 and 93. In the frantic international competition for diplomatic recognition both Koreas abandoned the Hallstein Doctrine (or the Beijing Formula), thereby opening the way for dual recognition. Not a single country recognized both Seoul and Pyongyang in 1962; by mid-1976, however, some 49 countries had already done so without incurring diplomatic severance from Pyongyang or Seoul. Moreover, pro-DPRK votes in the General Assembly more than doubled from 17.2 percent in 1966 to 35.9 percent in 1975.6

Given the UN’s one-sided involvement in the politics of competitive legitimation in divided Korea, Pyongyang’s rejection of the world body’s authority to deal with the Korean question should come as no surprise. Yet Pyongyang, in an adaptive manner, began to recognize the importance of the UN’s normative power worldwide as well as the dominance of the Third World in the UN’s politics of collective legitimation, at least in the mid-1970s. In May 1973, the DPRK managed to get itself admitted to the World Health Organization (WHO), one of the specialized agencies of the UN system, as a full-fledged member state. This entitled Pyongyang to follow Seoul’s suit in establishing a UN observer mission in New York (29 June 1973). Faced with this challenge, the ROK government announced a new policy on 23 June 1973 including the dual membership proposal (i.e., admission of both Koreas as separate member states), thus signaling a major foreign policy shift away from its quest for absolute legitimation, only to provoke Pyongyang’s immediate rejection. Kim Il Sung put forward a counterproposal that the two halves of Korea form a “Confederal State of Koryo” as a transitional step toward reunification and that “if the North and the South want to enter the United Nations before unification, they should enter as one state at least under the name of the Confederal Republic of Korea.”7 From late June 1973 to late May 1991, North Korea’s “principled stand” on UN membership remained firm and unyielding even as the two Koreas participated in all but name and voting in the world organization as two separate but equal observer state members.
The perennial debate on the Korean question came to a strange pass in 1975, when the General Assembly adopted two contradictory resolutions on the same day, one pro-ROK (Resolution 3390A) and the other pro-DPRK (Resolution 3390B). Ignoring the pro-ROK resolution, the DPRK pronounced this to be “an epochal event” and “a great turning point” in the history of UN politics. Moreover, Pyongyang’s single-minded diplomatic offensive managed to produce another diplomatic feat: the decision of the Foreign Ministers’ Conference of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), held in Lima, Peru, to accept Pyongyang’s membership application while rejecting at the same time Seoul’s.

In retrospect, however, the 1975 UN debate and its pro-DPRK resolution proved to be a Pyrrhic victory in Pyongyang’s search for absolute legitimation. The 1975 debate and showdown, the last one on the Korean question, merely forced the world organization to dramatize the reality of the two separate governments, two separate systems, and two separate states in divided Korea. It is hardly surprising, then, that Pyongyang rather abruptly dropped its UN card in the wake of this “epochal event” and brought no more pressure to bear on its allies to reopen the Korean question.

In the broader context of the development of the politics of competitive legitimation, Pyongyang since the late 1970s has encountered staggering economic woes at home and serious diplomatic setbacks abroad, with its quest for absolute legitimation becoming ever more elusive and its national identity as a self-reliant socialist paradise ever more doubtful. Until the mid-1970s juche (self-reliant) ideology enjoyed considerable credibility as North Korea seemed on the way to becoming an island of autocentric, socialist economy in a sea of world capitalism. By the 1980s, however, juche ideology could no longer perform its multiple national-identity-enhancing functions: to legitimize Kim Il Sung’s “magnificent obsession” for national reunification on his terms; to delegitimize South Korea as a dependent U.S. colonial outpost; to minimize allied control and interference without losing allied support; and to establish global solidarity with the Third World in the quest for absolute legitimation.

Even in the Third World, Pyongyang’s principal domain for international support by virtue of its membership in the NAM, North Korea in the 1980s suffered a series of diplomatic setbacks. The Third World quest for the NIEO exhausted itself, and American hegemony in the world organization returned by the end of the decade. Greatly buoyed up by a series of triumphs in its Nordpolitik, Seoul, in late 1989, submitted documents to the United Nations explaining its post-1973 position on the Korean UN membership question: that both Koreas should be allowed to enter the world
organization as two separate but equal member states as an interim measure pending reunification of the Korean nation. The rapid Moscow-Seoul rapprochement in the wake of the Seoul Olympic Games, leading to full diplomatic relations in September 1990, was a major diplomatic breakthrough in Seoul's bid for UN membership. The Soviet Union made it clear at the third Gorbachev-Roh summit meeting on Cheju Island in April 1991 that it would no longer help Pyongyang's quest for absolute legitimation by vetoing Seoul's application for UN membership. Besides, in the Gorbachev years the veto completely vanished from Soviet voting behavior in the Security Council.

Thus the issue of Korean membership, which had remained dormant, had been reopened in a low-key way only to provoke Pyongyang's vehement opposition. Still, the best Pyongyang could do was to revive Kim Il Sung's "Confederal Republic of Koryo" formula as a transitional step to reunification: to wit, the two parts of Korea should apply for joint UN membership with each side taking turns sharing one revolving seat on a yearly basis. For the domestic audience, however, Pyongyang as late as 18 May 1991 remained unyielding, denouncing Seoul's dual membership formula as "a criminally splittist act" and asserting that "it is the United States that has authored the splittist idea about the so-called simultaneous admission of the North and the South into the United Nations...in order to achieve their goal of keeping south Korea forever under their control as an aggressive military base and to strengthen their preparations for a new war by fabricating two Koreas." By late May, however, especially after having failed to receive China's veto assurance, Pyongyang had only two options—to stage a showdown that would end with its certain defeat, thereby possibly missing its last chance to join the world organization, or to jump the gun on Korean UN membership. Against this backdrop came a statement from the DPRK Foreign Ministry on 27 May 1991, reversing its long-standing opposition to the dual entry formula and applying for UN membership.

Legally and practically, Kim Il Sung's proposal for the joint UN membership of the two Koreas as a confederation of states and Pyongyang's assertion that "the admission of our country to the United Nations is a matter of the internal affairs of our nation" are non-starters. Despite the "We the Peoples of the United Nations" opening line in the Preamble of the Charter, the United Nations, in law and in practice, has remained a state-centric organization affording little space to the representation of nations and peoples. Otherwise, we would have some 800 member nations rather than the present 185 member states. UN membership, as stipulated in Article 4 of the Charter, is open to states, not nations. As a primary juridical person and subject in international law, a state, by evincing several char-
acteristics that it shares with other states, such as territory, population, government, and independence of action (as stipulated in Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States), fulfills the basic requirements for entrance into the international community. A confederation of states, as implied in the DPRK proposal for joint UN membership, is a rather loose association of independent sovereign states based on an international treaty and has nothing to do with the question of state-making (state succession) or state membership in international organizations. It is little wonder then that there are no precedents for admitting a confederation of states as one single member state into any international intergovernmental organization, including the United Nations. As shown in the cases of Germany and Yemen, dual membership in the UN serves in no way to perpetuate national division, as contended by North Korea. The real reason for Pyongyang's long-standing opposition and forced reversal of its position lies elsewhere.

To Cooperate or Not to Cooperate
Generally, UN membership serves as powerful catalyst for expanding a state's membership in the world of international organizations—both international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs)—in addition to expanding a state's diplomatic ties with the members of the international community. Yet Pyongyang's UN membership has had little if any catalyzing effect upon expanding its membership in the world of international organizations. Tellingly, as shown in table 2, IGO membership has actually declined from an all-time high of 22 in 1987 to 18 in 1995, while INGO membership registered a modest increase from 155 in 1987 to 179 in 1995. Even Taiwan, a virtual nonentity or at best an international orphan in the state-centric world of nation-states and international organizations, has managed to join almost half as many IGOs and almost five times as many INGOs as North Korea has.

In the race for diplomatic recognition, as shown in table 1, North Korea's track record is better only in absolute terms, with the number of countries having diplomatic relations increasing from 109 in late 1990 to 132 in late 1995. In contrast, the number of countries having diplomatic relations with South Korea increased from 146 in late 1990 to 180 in late 1995. Even more revealing is the fact that the number of countries recognizing both Koreas—and thus following Seoul’s dual membership formula in bilateral relations—has increased from 90 in late 1990 to 126 while the number of countries recognizing only the DPRK dropped from 19 in late 1990 to 5 in late 1995 with little change in the number of countries recognizing only the ROK.
Table 2
North Korea’s Participation in International Organizations in Comparative Perspective, 1960-1995

<table>
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<td>17</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2(a)</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>35</td>
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<td>58</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>Global Total</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>302</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: IGO figures are in bold throughout the table; INGO figures are in italics.


What about Pyongyang’s national role and global policy as made manifest in the world organization? North Korean participation in select UN organs and specialized agencies in the 1990s has generated a modest but still increasing repository of new empirical and behavioral data. It is now possible to tap into these data to draw up a composite of the style and substance of North Korea’s global policy as made behaviorally manifest in its multilateral diplomacy.

Of all the UN-related organs and agencies, the General Assembly is the most suitable arena for such an inquiry. Most member states, especially small developing countries, consider the Assembly to be the most accessible and most highly visible forum in which to debate the global politics of
collective legitimization and delegitimization. It is their parliamentary diplomacy in various committee and plenary sessions that generates voluminous verbal and voting records. "The assembly was created," Woodrow Wilson once remarked about the League of Nations, "in order that anybody that purposed anything wrong should be subjected to the awkward circumstance that everybody could talk about it." In an age of global transparency, the United Nations in general and the General Assembly in particular, operating in global prime time and in the global limelight, generate normative pressure by structuring expectations and restraining the behaviors of its member states. Whether they like it or not, North Korea's international reputation and national identity are inescapably keyed to and conditioned by its deeds, not its words. "Do as I say, not as I do" does not work in UN politics.

Viewed in this light, what is perhaps most revealing about North Korea's UN diplomacy is the abiding primacy of unilateralism in bilateral clothing with little if any Asian regionalism or globalism. Even in the UN setting the dominant and recurring theme in Pyongyang's foreign policy pronouncements is *juche*. We are told repeatedly that *juche*-centered foreign policy remains unchanged and unchangeable. *Juche* is projected as the signature national identity of the DPRK. Moreover, *juche* is what "our style socialism" in the post-cold war era is all about. It is touted as "neither imported from, nor a replica of, that in any foreign country. It is a unique socialism . . . one which continues to grow stronger." What is more, *juche* is and becomes independence-cum-sovereignty, "the life and soul of each country and nation and the common right of mankind . . . We regard independence as our life and soul. It is the cornerstone of the internal and external policies and approaches of our Republic." If North Korea's foreign policy pronouncements in the United Nations are taken at face value, state independence and sovereignty remain the lingua franca of its international démarche and the sine qua non of international order: the United Nations has no business except to better protect the sovereignty of its member states. More broadly, however, the sovereignty-centered image of international order bespeaks a deeply rooted realpolitik outlook that the post-cold war world remains a neo-Darwinian jungle where state interests are best promoted through self-help and unilateral security.

Although the cold war ended—or perhaps because it did—the DPRK still fights a cold war of its own in the name of eliminating the legacies of that same war by launching a flurry of calumniatory polemics against its "enemies" within the UN and often against the world organization itself. Indeed, Pyongyang's bill of complaints, issued in a stream of "letters" and "memorandums" addressed to the secretary-general and the president of the Security Council, has become progressively broad and sweeping. When Pyongyang applied in June 1995 to attend the meeting of world leaders to
celebrate the 50th anniversary of the United Nations scheduled to be held in New York, 22-25 October 1995, it was immediately accepted in the international community as a near certainty that Kim Jong Il would become state president on September 9 or no later than October 10 just in time to lead the North Korean delegation to the UN Summit in New York. And yet Kim Jong Il was nowhere to be found in the largest gathering of world leaders in modern times as more than 148 heads of state or government, including South Korean President Kim Young Sam, converged in New York City for a three-day celebration.17

Instead, Pyongyang "celebrated" the UN at 50 by submitting a long memorandum entitled "Nothing Can Help Justify the Past Aggression and Military Occupation of Korea by the Japanese Imperialists" that was chock full of anti-Japanese calumny.18 When the General Assembly passed a resolution by a vote of 155-0-3 on 11 December 1995, expressing its intention to initiate the constitutional procedure needed to delete the "enemy State" clauses from Articles 53, 57, and 107 of the UN Charter—the anachronistic remnants of World War II—only North Korea together with Cuba and Libya abstained on the grounds that the resolution placed Japan on the same footing with Germany, which it said had liquidated its past in a comparatively conscientious manner.19 In other words, in North Korea’s eyes, Japan today remains an unrepentant and unmitigated "enemy State." Paradoxically, Pyongyang’s mindless one-man crusade against Japan on every issue, including the question of Japan’s election to the Security Council, seems to have helped more than hurt Japan’s status drive, as made most recently evident in Japan’s trouncing India (142 votes to 40) for the Asian seat on the Security Council.

In addition to its verbal assaults on Japan, Pyongyang has composed a bill of complaints that seems made to order for reviving, not eliminating, the remnants of the past. Instead of letting bygones be bygones, Pyongyang in the name of righting historical wrongs is determined to exercise its sovereign power to attack the world organization, asserting that the Korean division was fixed with the connivance of the United Nations; that the United Nations was abused by being called on to help the United States unleash an unjust war of aggression against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 1950; that the United Nations Command (UNC) is “a brainchild” of the United States, “which arbitrarily usurped the name of the United Nations in order to cover its real colour of aggression after provoking the Korean War in 1950”; and that even today the United Nations is being abused in sustaining the cold war on the Korean peninsula.20

All the same, unilateral, stand-alone security is the starting point for understanding North Korea’s response to the challenges of UN reform. The
United Nations will not be able to fulfill its mission and role, we are told, without first reforming and democratizing itself to meet the requirements of the times. The restructuring of the Security Council is said to be the “most essential [step that must be taken] for the democratization of the United Nations.” From this diagnosis follows a list of prescriptive remedies: that “the veto rights of the permanent members of the Security Council should be abrogated”; that “the power and authority of the Security Council should be curtailed”; that “open access to all the work of the Security Council should be available, including to its informal consultations”; that the General Assembly should be given more power”; and that “for a resolution of the Security Council adopted on behalf of the United Nations and calling for sanctions or the use of force against its Member States to come into force, the resolution will have to be approved by more than two thirds of the Member States at the General Assembly.”

In short, the DPRK wants to demolish the Security Council as we know it today, that body’s structure having been mandated by the UN Charter, and turn it into a paper tiger. That is why the “democratizing reform proposal” that Pyongyang advanced in 1995 at the historic 50th session of the UN General Assembly did not get off first base. A year later at the 1996 session, however, the DPRK modified somewhat its “democratizing reform proposal” as if to seek a better “fit” with the dominant view of the NAM. This time it proposed: (1) that the issues relating to international peace and security should be brought directly to the General Assembly; (2) that “a new system” be established to endorse the Security Council resolutions on the use of force or sanctions and peacekeeping operations; (3) that Security Council restructuring should proceed “gradually on the principle of finding agreeable issues first and achieving consensus on each of them”; (4) that “consensus may be reached on the issues concerning the enlargement of the non-permanent membership of the Security Council and the improvement of its work method”; (5) that it is possible for the member states to agree on such issues as “offsetting the imbalance in regional distribution through the increase of more than 10 seats in the non-permanent membership to be additionally allocated among the regions of Asia, Africa and Latin America”; and (6) that all the countries concerned, including the parties to disputes, should have access “to informal consultations of the Security Council.”

Judging from the recorded roll-call votes in the General Assembly from 1991 to 1995, as shown in table 3, Pyongyang’s participation in UN politics is low. Pyongyang’s absenteeism rate—a combination of its absence and “not participating in the vote”—is rather high, several times as high as Seoul’s. The absenteeism rate was 14 percent in 1991, 11.3 percent in 1992, 7.8 percent in 1993, 12.1 percent in 1994, and a whopping 39.4 percent in
1995. These figures are in part a function of the small size of the DPRK Permanent Mission to the UN in New York (12 as compared to 32 for the ROK as of 1 January 1996), which in turn is a function of the low priority of the world organization in Pyongyang's international relations. Still, the UN's importance for North Korean foreign relations is twofold: the world body provides an arena for struggle or damage-limitation diplomacy and it is the only gateway to the United States, serving as it often does as a kind of a de facto liaison office for Pyongyang-Washington talks on a host of issues pending the establishment of a de jure liaison office and full-fledged embassy in Washington. It is reported that Pyongyang has been using delaying tactics in the U.S.-DPRK negotiations on the establishment of liaison offices in Pyongyang and Washington because it already has the contact channel with the United States through its permanent mission to the United Nations in New York. Given the critical shortage of hard currency, this is a very cost-effective way of establishing its diplomatic presence in the United States.

Table 3
Voting Record of North and South Korea and P-5 in the UN General Assembly, 1991-1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y/N/A/AB/NP</td>
<td>Y/N/A/AB/NP</td>
<td>Y/N/A/AB/NP</td>
<td>Y/N/A/AB/NP</td>
<td>Y/N/A/AB/NP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>63/0/4/3/1</td>
<td>59/3/5/3/1</td>
<td>53/3/5/2/1</td>
<td>54/3/7/2/0</td>
<td>52/5/6/3/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>31/16/21/1/2</td>
<td>38/13/18/1/1</td>
<td>32/14/15/2/1</td>
<td>39/12/13/2/0</td>
<td>37/10/18/1/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>45/0/28/1/2</td>
<td>36/5/29/0/1</td>
<td>29/5/29/0/1</td>
<td>36/5/25/0/0</td>
<td>31/7/26/0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>27/19/23/0/2</td>
<td>32/18/20/0/1</td>
<td>27/6/20/0/1</td>
<td>36/15/14/1/0</td>
<td>34/15/17/0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>14/45/14/1/2</td>
<td>14/46/10/0/1</td>
<td>13/36/14/0/1</td>
<td>22/33/11/0/0</td>
<td>21/34/11/0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>48/2/15/1/1</td>
<td>48/2/13/3/0</td>
<td>48/2/15/1/1</td>
<td>48/2/13/3/0</td>
<td>48/2/15/1/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>59/20/9/1</td>
<td>60/2/17/1</td>
<td>51/3/5/4/1</td>
<td>48/3/7/8/0</td>
<td>37/9/12/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of Roll-call resolutions</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of all resolutions</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Figure for 1991 is for the former Soviet Union.

Despite the crucial importance of the United States for assuring the security and survival of the Kim Jong Il regime in the post-cold war era, North Korea's voting behavior in the General Assembly in 1991-95 suggests a high degree of incongruence with that country on a wide range of global issues. As shown in table 4, the voting-coincidence figures for all the recorded votes in the General Assembly place North Korea amid the lowest-scoring countries such as Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Laos, Syria, Vietnam, and China. Even more revealing is that North Korea’s voting-coincidence percentage decreased from 15.5 percent in 1991 to 8.7 percent in 1995 while China’s voting-coincidence vote percentage nearly doubled, from 10.95 percent in 1989 to around 22 percent in 1994-95. At 9.0 percent in 1994 and 8.7 percent in 1995, the DPRK had the dubious or glorious distinction of having the lowest voting-coincidence percentage. On what the United States considers “important votes”—15 in 1994 and 15 in 1995—the DPRK's voting-coincidence percentage was 0.0 percent in 1994 and 0.0 percent in 1995, compared to the ROK's 75.0 percent in 1994 and 63.6 percent in 1995.25

Table 4
Select Countries Percentage of Voting Coincidence with the United States in UN General Assembly Plenary Sessions, 1991-1995 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>73.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia (1)</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>73.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>85.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average (2)</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Figure for 1991 is for the former Soviet Union
(2) This is an overall average of all the Member States of the United Nations.

In actuality, the pattern that emerges with respect to North Korea's voting behavior in the General Assembly is a mixture of negative hyperactivism on select arms control and disarmament and human rights issues and positive aloofness on most other global matters. The end of the cold war gave rise to new voting patterns in the General Assembly, with the North-South split now characterizing voting alignments as much as the East-West split once did and with most member states, especially developing countries, expressing their voting preferences along developmental lines. Viewed in terms of the appearance of new voting patterns and alignments along the North-South axis, it is not surprising that Pyongyang's voting-coincidence percentage with the General Assembly majority is so high (64-72 percentile in 1991-94) and Washington's so low (13-33 percentile) over the same period. The real surprise and puzzle is Pyongyang's 1995 voting record, with a positive voting percentile that drops down to 56 percent coupled with a sharp rise in abstention and absenteeism. Although hard evidence is lacking, these changes may suggest a possible leadership or decision-making paralysis at the center in Pyongyang.

What table 3 does not show, table 4 partially suggests, and table 5 fully reveals is how deeply and how often the DPRK and the UN had clashed regarding nuclear and security issues on the Korean peninsula. The proximate cause of the Korean nuclear crisis was Pyongyang's refusal to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors access to two suspicious sites at the controversial nuclear complex at Yongbyon, some 60 miles north of Pyongyang. In a nine-month period between 25 May 1992 and 6 February 1993, the IAEA conducted six ad hoc nuclear inspections in North Korea. Immediately after the sixth ad hoc inspections conducted between 25 January and 6 February 1993, the IAEA made an unusual request for a "special inspection," the first of its kind in the 35-year history of the Agency, only to provoke Pyongyang's declaration of withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 12 March 1993. This notice of withdrawal caused panic in Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington, as well as in Vienna and New York since, once legally out of the NPT, North Korea would be legally free, after three months had passed (on 12 June 1993), to proceed with its suspected nuclear weapons program. Thanks to the Chinese threat to veto any sanctions resolution, the UN Security Council was able to pass only a mild nonsanctions resolution on 11 May 1993 merely urging North Korea to accept international inspections and to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the NPT. Pyongyang was able to escape from UN sanctions, obtaining instead what it had been seeking from the beginning—direct bilateral confrontation/negotiation with the United States. On 21 October 1994, the protracted U.S.-North Korean nuclear negotiations, after proceeding through three rounds of talks, a series of competing national identity enactments and
several changes in bargaining tactics, reached what seemed to be a breakthrough accord in Geneva, Switzerland—the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework.

The logic of Pyongyang's preference for direct bilateral negotiation with the United States over any multilateral negotiations is informed by national interests, ideology, and experience. Even during the cold war years, Pyongyang pursued an independent and indeterminate strategy in manipulating its relations with China and the Soviet Union in a self-serving and situation-specific way, taking sides if necessary on particular issues, always attempting to extract maximum payoffs in economic, technical, and military aid, but never completely casting its lot with one against the other. Nevertheless, the idea of multilateral cooperative security has remained alien to North Korean foreign policy thinking and behavior. Besides, North Korea feels threatened or turned off by the NPT regime, for it can only bring pressure without any tangible payoffs (except a stamp of approval for international good citizenship). With the demise of the Soviet Union and diminishing aid from China, the United States has become, faute de mieux, a functional equivalent of and substitution for China and the Soviet Union combined.

As shown in table 5, North Korea's nuclear issue was "exported" from the IAEA to the Security Council. Because China alone among the Perm Five has threatened to veto any biting resolution, the Security Council first had to delay and then dilute the language of a draft resolution so as to make it more acceptable to China. On 11 May 1993 the Security Council adopted a resolution by a vote of 13 to 0 with only China and Pakistan abstaining, merely calling upon the DPRK to reconsider its announced withdrawal from the NPT. This was only a prodding resolution, not a sanctions-imposing one. Chinese UN Ambassador Li Zhaoxing reiterated the party line—the issue is a matter of concern between the DPRK and the three other parties (i.e., the U.S., IAEA, and the ROK) and made clear that China is opposed to the practice of applying any UN pressure. It was against this backdrop that the issue was taken out of the Security Council to be addressed in bilateral negotiations between the United States and the DPRK in New York between 2 June and 11 June 1993. The nuclear issue started heating up once again in May-June 1994 with the announcement (14 May 1994) that Pyongyang had begun removing nuclear fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor with no IAEA inspectors present. Once again, China intervened in the Security Council's attempts to draft a sanctions resolution. As a result, the best the Security Council could do was to issue a mild presidential statement. When the United States was preparing for a non-UN-sponsored three-phase multilateral sanctions initiative in early June 1994, Beijing went so far as to say that its 1961 mutual security treaty with Pyongyang would remain in force and that it would be obliged to come to North Korea's defense if its junior socialist ally were attacked.
Table 5
Chronology of Anti-DPRK UN Actions, 1993-1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Organ</th>
<th>Document Symbol</th>
<th>Type of Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>02/25/93</td>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>GOV/2636</td>
<td>Resolution expressing concern over the implementation of the NPT and safeguard accords and an ultimatum to accept “special inspections”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/18/93</td>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>GOV/2639</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/01/93</td>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>GOV/2645</td>
<td>Resolution declaring that the DPRK had violated its obligations to open its suspected nuclear sites by a vote of 28:2:4 with only China and Libya voting against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/11/93</td>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>S/RES/825 [1993]</td>
<td>Resolution expressing a grave concern that the DPRK had failed to discharge its safeguards obligations and had widened the area of noncompliance and demanding DPRK to reconsider its NPT withdrawal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/23/93</td>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>GOV/2692</td>
<td>Resolution expressing a serious concern that three separate decisions by IAEA Board of Governors and Security Council Resolution 825 of 11 May 1993 had not been implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/01/93</td>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>Resolution 48/14</td>
<td>Resolution adopted by a vote of 140-1-9 expressing “its grave concern that the DPRK has failed to discharge its safeguards obligations and has recently widened the area of non-compliance”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/21/94</td>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>GOV/2711</td>
<td>Resolution urging the DPRK to allow the IAEA to complete all the requested inspection of nuclear facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/31/94</td>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>S/PRST/1994/13</td>
<td>Presidential statement calling upon the DPRK to allow IAEA inspectors to complete the inspection activities agreed between the IAEA and DPRK on 15 February 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/30/94</td>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>S/PRST/1994/28</td>
<td>Presidential statement strongly urging the DPRK to proceed only with discharge operations at the five megawatt reactor... in accordance with the IAEA’s requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/10/94</td>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>GOV/2742</td>
<td>Resolution imposing sanctions by suspending the Agency's technical assistance to the DPRK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/15/94</td>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>Res 49/65</td>
<td>Resolution adopted by a vote of 161-1-6 expressing “its grave concern that the DPRK has failed to discharge its safeguards obligations”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/01/95</td>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>Res 50/9</td>
<td>Resolution adopted by a vote of 144-1-8 expressing “concern over the continuing non-compliance of the DPRK to cooperate fully with the Agency in the implementation of the safeguards agreement”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/15/96</td>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>S/PRST/1996/42</td>
<td>Presidential statement expressing the Council’s “serious concern over this incident” and “urging that the Korean Armistice Agreement should be fully observed”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/28/96</td>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>Res 51/10</td>
<td>Resolution adopted by a vote of 142-1-8 expressing “concern over the continuing non-compliance of the DPRK with the safeguards agreement” and urging “the DPRK to cooperate fully with the IAEA”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“Do as I Say, Not as I Do” is also made evident in the discrepancy between Pyongyang’s policy pronouncements and its policy performance on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Almost from day one North Korea declared its principled stand: “We consider it necessary for the north and the south of Korea to pledge themselves before the world to a ban on the testing, manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons.”

Given the importance of the Korean peninsula in maintaining the integrity of the NPT regime, the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the UN’s single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in Geneva, admitted both Koreas as new members on 17 June 1996, as it was winding up the three-year protracted negotiations on the CTBT. The General Assembly approved the CTBT on 11 September 1996, by a 158-to-3 vote, which cleared the way for member states to sign on. As of 24 October 1996, the CTBT had been signed by 129 states, including 41 (among them South Korea) of the 44 key states, with only India, Pakistan, and North Korea failing to take part in the agreement. India has vowed never to become a signatory until the nuclear-weapons-states devise a specific timetable for complete nuclear disarmament, while Pakistan would not endorse the treaty until India does. That North Korea refuses to sign on, despite its repeated pledges to support a test ban treaty, the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, the ROK’s signature, and its own entry into the CD in mid-1996, speaks directly to the country’s preference for a unilateral free-ride strategy over security interdependence. Moreover, North Korea—along with Libya, Iraq, and Syria—has yet to sign the UN-sponsored Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which, after having obtained the requisite 65th ratification from Hungary on 31 October 1996, is now scheduled to enter into force on 29 April 1997.

With particular clarity and consistency Pyongyang has pursued a two-plus-zero formula both inside and outside the United Nations as a way of replacing the Korean Military Armistice Agreement—and the UNC—with a peace treaty with the United States. Even before the protracted U.S.-DPRK nuclear negotiations culminated in the Agreed Framework on 21 October 1994, Pyongyang had put forward in April 1994, to the United States a detailed two-plus-zero proposal for replacing “the outdated armistice system” with “a new peace arrangement system” (i.e., a peace treaty with the United States). That Pyongyang’s two-plus-zero formula is as unworkable as Seoul’s hypothetical two-plus-zero formula involving only Seoul and Beijing needs no elaboration here. When the two-plus-zero peace formula fell on deaf ears in Washington, however, Pyongyang issued a warning in July 1995 to the United Nations: “If the United States ignores and turns its back on our just proposal, the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will be forced to take the necessary measures one by one and unilaterally in order to remove completely the remains of the cold war
in Korea. Actually, this warning served equally as a post-hoc justification of the necessary unilateral measures: (1) on 28 April 1994 the secretary of the Korean People's Army (KPA) Military Armistice Commission (MAC) delivered a message to the UNC stating that the KPA had already decided to recall all remaining MAC members and MAC staff personnel; (2) on 29 April 1994 the KPA prevented Chinese "People's Volunteers" staff officers from attending a language officers' meeting with UNC staff officers; (3) in May 1994 the KPA forced the Polish delegation to withdraw from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC); and (4) in late August 1994 Pyongyang succeeded in forcing China to withdraw its delegation from the MAC for good. As if these steps were necessary but not sufficient, Pyongyang escalated its campaign to replace the 1953 armistice with a peace treaty between the DPRK and the U.S. by sending unauthorized units of heavily armed KPA troops into the highly sensitive Joint Security Area at the Panmunjom border separating the two Koreas in April 1996. Once again North Korea's provocative action was brought to the attention of the Security Council, thanks to the presence of the ROK on the Council as a nonpermanent member. Once again China's opposition blocked Seoul's push for Security Council action. Instead, a presidential press statement of concern was issued rebuking North Korea for its declaration not to adhere to the Korean Armistice Agreement, a disciplinary action of a lesser degree than a formal presidential statement, conveyed by the Council president, Chilean Ambassador Juan Somavia.

The 18 September 1996 submarine incursion incident ignited fireworks on the Security Council. In this particular case, the DPRK seemed to have revealed the true color of its national identity as a guerrilla state fighting guerrilla warfare and using guerrilla language on the Council. In an unprecedented manner, DPRK UN Ambassador Kim Hyong U turned down several official requests from the Council president, Ambassador Alfredo Cabral, for an interview on the subject of the submarine incident. President Cabral reminded reporters of the fact that North Korea's refusal of an interview not only ran counter to customary diplomatic practice but did so in a manner unprecedented in the history of the Security Council. Instead, Ambassador Kim Hyong U responded by submitting a letter addressed to the UN secretary-general, not to the president of the Security Council, though it was circulated as an official Security Council document: "Through this incident the world once again witnessed the true colour of their [South Korean] barbarousness and beastliness . . . . If the enemies do not return our small submarine, survivors and the dead unconditionally while continuing to make ill use of the incident for the sinister political purpose, we will be forced to take strong countermeasures."
In the end, the Security Council was able to adopt an official presidential statement expressing “its serious concern over this incident” and urging that “the Korean Armistice Agreement should be fully observed and that no action should be taken that might increase tension or undermine peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.” As a compromise result of the behind-the-scenes negotiations between PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and ROK Foreign Minister Gong Ro Myung, the Council action was less than what the ROK had wanted initially but more than what the PRC had been willing to yield. Whether the Security Council’s presidential statement will serve as a deterrent to further North Korean provocations remains to be seen. Despite the watered-down terminology (i.e., “concern over” instead of “condemnation of”), however, the Council action is a blow to Pyongyang’s stance, since it has confirmed for the first time in written form the legal validity of the armistice agreement pending the establishment of an alternative peace system.

In the post-Kim Il Sung era “our style socialism” has suffered steady slippage. In late May 1995, two months before the major summer floods in July and August, the proud and putatively self-reliant North Korea made an unprecedented request to Japanese “reactionaries” and South Korean “puppets” for rice aid and received some 650,000 tons of rice without breathing a word to its own people. The devastating summer floods came as a blessing in disguise by forcing the North Korean government to break with self-reliance and pursue a “beg globally, deny locally” policy. Pyongyang even blamed the United States and Japan for what it said was a $15 billion flood disaster: “Seventy percent of the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere come from industrial pollution in the United States and Japan . . . We think this climatic change is the cause of the abnormal weather that has resulted in our floods.”

All the same, Pyongyang for the first time in its international life launched a global campaign crying out for help from the UN and its related agencies and from foreign governments. In issuing an urgent appeal for $491 million in emergency UN aid, the DPRK government for the first time allowed a “United Nations Assessment Mission”—representing the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN/DHA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)—into the country, 29 August to 9 September 1995, to assess damages whose actual cost the secretive party-state put at $15 billion (75 percent of GNP for 1995)! It was against this backdrop of “a revolution of rising expectations” that Vice Foreign Minister Choi Su Hon acknowledged and
expressed at the epochal 50th session of the UN General Assembly in New York “our deep thanks to the United Nations organs, specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations, including the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, and to various Governments for the humanitarian steps they have taken in connection with the recent flood damage in our country.” Tellingly, UN humanitarian help is nowhere to be found in Vice Foreign Minister Choi’s 1996 “state of the world” speech, as the politics of everyday life remained habit-driven trumpery touting the omnipotence of “our style socialism advances vigorously along its road regardless of whatever others may say.” For the domestic audience, the juche ideology is touted as the motive force “leading our country toward the strongest position in the world.” As ideology decides all things in the course of human history, we are told, North Korea is indeed the one and only “ideological superpower” and “the most powerful country in the world.”

Apparently, Pyongyang’s switch to cooperative behavior as a way of plugging into an external life-support system was too little, too late to be able to generate much of an international humanitarian response. After several on-site assessments, the UN and its related agencies, especially the World Food Program (WFP), responded in November 1995 with food relief—an initial shipment of 5,140 tons of rice for distribution among 500,000 people left destitute by the summer floods. By mid-December, however, both North Korea and the WFP found themselves confronting a tragic paradox. On the one hand, the reclusive and sovereignty-bound North Korea was now cooperating more willingly than ever before with multilateral aid officials, taking them to the disaster-stricken hinterlands away from the Potemkin Village (Pyongyang). As a result, WFP aid workers were able to send back to their home offices eyewitness accounts of all the signs of spreading famine and starvation of a kind—known in the UN community as “stealth famine”—with some children in certain areas below 80 percent of their average target weight for their height. On the other hand, Pyongyang’s international reputation as a swollen garrison state coupled with the fact that all the foreign television and print media had been denied access to North Korea, generated a tepid international response. By the end of 1995, the WFP’s appeal for $8.8 million yielded only about $500,000, with the bulk of the money coming from Denmark and Finland. Having already borrowed more than $2 million from an emergency fund to pay for the initial shipment of rice in November, the WFP warned on 13 December 1995 that it would have no choice but to shut down its unprecedented aid operation in North Korea by early January 1996. The WFP’s warning generated more contributions, which brought donations close to the original target amount of $8.3 million: $2.5 million from Sweden, $2 million from the United
States, $1.7 million from Switzerland, $504,504 from Denmark, $375,727 from Australia, $116,000 from Norway, $22,727 from Finland, and $15,000 from a private individual in the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{38}

That South Korea was able and willing to contribute 150,000 tons of rice gratis (estimated at $273 million) despite being subject to Pyongyang's unrelenting animus—compared to a modest amount of aid the international community had been able to raise after the WFP's repeated warnings and appeals—spotlighted with particular clarity a kind of catch-22 national identity dilemma for the Kim Jong Il crisis-management regime. On 20 January 1996, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that "our military has been worried about the possibility of insidious forces attempting to misuse the issue of aid for flood damage for their purpose of leading us to reform and opening up" and warned that "if one attempts to use humanitarian aid for one's political purposes, we will go our own way according to our decision and judgment."\textsuperscript{39} Faced with the imminent possibility that international aid might come to a screeching halt, North Korea revised its "principled stand" in a self-serving and contingent way, demanding and resenting international aid: "We are disappointed that our international appeal... has been misused and politicized by some countries in a slanderous campaign challenging our dignity... However we cannot deny that we face a very severe food shortage in the coming months, until this year's harvest, if a large amount of rice is not imported."\textsuperscript{40} In early April 1996, Pyongyang revealed that it was retracting its January statement, as even Pak Tok Hun, spokesman for the DPRK UN Mission in Geneva, told reporters that he had already submitted a letter to the UN Humanitarian Bureau in Geneva requesting more food aid from the world community. North Korea remained in a state of national emergency, according to Pak, and additional food aid from the United Nations and other INGOs was desperately needed.\textsuperscript{41} The United Nations responded with a second aid package amounting to $43 million ($26.8 million for procuring 70,000 tons of food, $10.3 million for the restoration of farmland and $5.9 million for medical expenses). The UN appeal served as a legitimizing justification for the United States, Japan, and South Korea in overcoming the political difficulties associated with providing aid to North Korea at home. Under the pretext that the aid would be provided in the name of the United Nations, the United States first decided to provide $6.2 million, followed by Japan ($6 million), and South Korea ($3 million).

Still, the UN response amounted to little more than a band-aid for a patient who needed a life-support system. In May 1996 a six-page "Special Alert" issued by the WFP and FAO, on the basis of another round of field visits and on-the-spot assessments, stated that the DPRK's "food supply situation has
deteriorated more seriously than had been anticipated” and that “over the next few years, the country is in considerable danger of recurrent food supply difficulties.” In appealing for more international response, the WFP/FAO report paints a rather grim picture of the shape of things to come in North Korea:

Even under normal circumstances the domestic production of food in the DPRK is heavily constrained by a shortage of cultivable land. Since the problems of domestic supply have been further compounded by declining productivity due both to natural soil depletion and the inability of the country to manufacture or import sufficient quantities of fertilizer to maintain productivity, due to severe economic problems and the consequent shortage of foreign exchange. . . . The Government presently estimates that 50,000 tons of diesel are needed for agricultural operations, including rehabilitation and operation of the irrigation system. As a result of the fuel shortage, there is clear evidence that farming is reverting back to the use of animal draught power.42

It will take more than UN emergency aid to lift the imploding economy by its juche bootstrap. Would North Korea be able or willing to follow Chinese-style reform and open itself to the capitalist world system by seeking membership in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank? It was reported that a North Korean diplomat to the United Nations visited Washington in April 1996 to hold working-level consultations with U.S. Government officials regarding the problems and conditions associated with seeking membership in the IMF (a prerequisite to joining the World Bank). Both parties are said to have agreed in principle that Pyongyang’s share of the cost of IMF membership would be covered by North Korea’s assets that have been frozen in the United States. The diplomat’s visit seemed no more than a preliminary probing of the possibilities and limitations related to obtaining multilateral aid, but there are no indications as yet that the top leadership in Pyongyang has made a final decision to seek membership in the IMF and World Bank.43 A decision to seek IMF and World Bank membership would signal a major shift in North Korean foreign policy, as it would require providing economic data and inviting IMF and World Bank investigation teams to assess the country’s economic situation by way of on-the-spot surveys. To date, Pyongyang has pursued Kim Il Sung’s “agriculture-first, light industry-first, and foreign trade-first policies” for the three-year adjustment period (1994-96) through a selective, controlled opening without any reform or restructuring. In other words, North Korea wants to have its cake and eat it too—give us as much aid as you can but without any political and economic strings attached and without challenging our juche-centered national identity.
Concluding Remarks
Despite all the sweeping changes that have occurred in the domestic, regional, and global situations over the last seven years, continuity, not change, has remained the dominant element of North Korean foreign policy. Pyongyang is still fighting the cold war North Korean style in the post-cold war world organization, putatively in order to eliminate the remnants of the cold war. The theoretical claim of liberal institutionalists that international organizations can alter state preferences, change state behavior, and cause states to turn from conflict to cooperation does not hold up well in the North Korean case. There is little evidence that the United Nations has exerted any discernible influence on Pyongyang’s diplomatic strategy. Whether judged by policy pronouncements, participatory style and behavior, voting record, or IGO memberships, North Korea has engaged in some slight adaptive, situation-specific learning, especially in connection with seeking UN humanitarian aid, but in virtually no cognitive/normative learning to speak of.

On the contrary, Pyongyang’s international behavior, once relatively moderate (probably reflecting the burst of inter-Korean détente in 1990-92), lapsed back into more familiar patterns of hypernationalist confrontation in 1993 only to invite a series of anti-DPRK actions of varying kinds in the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Security Council, and the General Assembly (see table 5). The so-called UN crisis today can be better understood mainly as a crisis of national policy in the global organization. The North Korean case is a classic but amplified example of the most fundamental challenge that will confront the United Nations in the coming years—how to stay relevant and viable as a global yet statecentric organization in a multicentric and multipolarizing world in which state sovereignty has been subject to the relentless twin pressures of global integration from without and substate fragmentation from within. There is a sense in which North Korea has made good on the claim that independence is “the life and soul of its foreign policy” within the world organization; that independence, however, translates into rampant unilateral norm-defying behavior that only a few friends (Cuba, Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and China) condone.

Paradoxically, whether one considers its place in the UN or not, North Korea is at one and the same time a most assertively independent state with respect to global politics and a decaying, weakened state at home whose survival is becoming increasingly dependent upon some kind of external life-support system. For all its devotion to juche ideology and “our style socialism,” the multiple and multiplying symptoms of system decay have become progressively manifest everywhere in the UN system for every
member state to see. This chasm between pretense and reality, between juche-based national role commitments and actual national role capabilities explains Pyongyang's despondent reaction to the dual entry formula. The government's opposition to the entry of the two Koreas into the United Nations as two separate but equal member states had far more to do with its sense of comparative disadvantage in the global competition for political legitimation than with any fear of perpetuating the Korean division.

What accentuates Pyongyang's national identity-cum-legitimation crisis with particular clarity is the dramatic contrast between the rise of South Korea and the decline of North Korea within the world organization. From the start, North Korea was at a disadvantage in its efforts to join the world body and beat South Korea by the rules of the game the member states play on the multiple chessboards of global politics. Indeed, for North Korea's solipsistic "theocratic" leadership, the remarkable transformation of South Korea's national identity as a newly industrializing country (NIC) and, more recently, after three decades of predominantly authoritarian rule, as a newly democratizing country (NDC) may well have looked like it was made to order for tormenting the DPRK. Kim Il Sung's Manichean worldview can hardly be said to have prepared the North Korean leadership to accept that remarkable transformation, either in the 1980s or in the 1990s. The entry of the two Koreas into the United Nations in 1991 has drawn increased international attention to the ineluctable fact that Seoul has won the unification race almost hands down, especially where meeting the leadership/democratization, national identity, and developmental challenges is concerned. The ROK, once inside the world organization, managed to get itself elected as a nonpermanent member of the Security Council in November 1995 (receiving no less than 156 votes, the third largest total after Chile [168] and Egypt [159] in the secret ballot) and also becoming a member of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in October 1996. Even the idea of joining the world's rich man club, the OECD, became reality in late November 1996. In sharp contrast, North Korea's self-image as a socialist paradise on earth has been besmirched beyond redemption.

Within the United Nations the two Koreas have continued to pursue their status drive. Seoul's answer to Pyongyang's juche is segyehwa. In late 1994 all five "fundamentals of the New Diplomacy" (i.e., globalism, diversification, multidimensionalism, regional cooperation, and future orientation) were collapsed into an out-and-out campaign for globalization. As if to outperform North Korea with its own national-identity projection, the ROK government announced in March 1995 that it had decided to use the word segyehwa, a transliteration of the Korean phrase meaning "globalization" for international consumption to designate its current status drive.
The stage was thus set for an international duel. Although *segyehwa* means different things to different groups at home and abroad, it may be seen as President Kim Young Sam’s way of proclaiming a new national identity and of moving beyond inter-Korean competition toward the center of the action, not only in the Asia-Pacific region, but also within the world community. It was also South Korea’s passport to the UN Security and the OECD. "To Make Korea a Central Player on the World Stage" has become Kim’s standard phrase used in explaining his country’s actions to domestic and foreign audiences. As shown in the UN’s budgetary assessments for the DPRK (0.0500 percent) and the ROK (0.8175 percent) in 1996—a whopping ratio of 1:16.35—there is no contest between *juche*-based and *segyehwa*-based muscle power. In fact, South Korea’s contribution is not only 16 times greater than that of its northern counterpart but also higher than that of China (0.7350 percent). Moreover, the ROK’s GNP in 1995 reached over twenty times that of the DPRK and has already surpassed Russia’s. Pyongyang resumed its “begging diplomacy” even as Seoul pledged to increase its voluntary contribution to the UN’s activities by 120 percent during 1996-97.

Revealingly, North Korea’s proud “theocratic” state cannot seem to find the right moment to officially enact its father-to-son succession even as the mass media claims that “today, our people and the revolutionary people of the world highly praise and absolutely admire the great leader Comrade Kim Chong-il [Kim Jong Il] as the greatest man of ideas and theory in our times.” The much anticipated debut of Kim Jong Il as a new head of state at the UN-50 Summit in October 1995 failed to materialize; even Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam bowed out at the last minute. Instead, North Korea once again dispatched Deputy Foreign Minister Choi Su Hon to New York to “entertain” the world audience with its favorite sport of hero worshipping: “Our great leader [Kim Il Sung] is the saviour of our Korean nation, the Tangun nation, and the founding father of socialist Korea. His great revolutionary exploits will remain immortal, along with his August name. The great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung is always with us. . . . It is the greatest fortune and a unique blessing of leadership for our people to have Comrade Kim Jong Il.” For the United Nations as well as for the North Korean people, however, Kim Jong Il still remains a "president-in-waiting" and a "great leader-in-hiding."

All national identities are contested in a distinct but changing international environment. Every UN member state projects its national identity not only ideologically but behaviorally—by what it “is” as well as by what it “does.” Viewed in this light, “our style socialism" exhibits multiple signs of system decay, and North Korea faces a megacrisis in the sense that chal-
lenges to national authority and identity as well as economic woes have all occurred at a time when the domestic supply of governmental legitimacy has all but vanished, especially since the death of Kim Il Sung on 8 July 1994 and the external supply is rapidly dwindling. Indeed, with Pyongyang alternately rattling its saber and tin cup, it is now all too clear that a juche-centered national policy can no longer cope with the most pressing issues of legitimacy, national identity, and economic and well-being. North Korea today is a failing state that cannot meet basic human needs without external aid even as it maintains the world’s fourth largest military force.

All the same, the quest for national identity and legitimation, when blocked in one domain, seeks to compensate in another. Herein lies the logic of brinkmanship diplomacy designed to demonstrate to the outside world that North Korea is no banana republic apt to quietly collapse without a fight and that even without nuclear weapons its military will and capability to initiate or retaliate military action are much greater than those of Iraq after Israel’s attack on the Osirak reactor in 1981. Seoul and its environs, where forty-five percent of South Korean people live, are within easy reach of North Korean jet fighters, armored vehicles, Scud missiles, and chemical weapons, mostly deployed along the so-called Demilitarized Zone less than forty miles from the capital city. North Korea’s enormous military manpower (1.2 millions soldiers) and firepower, coupled with “suicidal bombers” resolved to defend the integrity of “our style socialism” at any cost, compensate for Pyongyang’s weaknesses in all other areas and thus even up the aggregate balance of power between the two Koreas.

China’s protective role in the Security Council is surely of some help in enhancing Pyongyang’s compensatory power. Despite the repeated attack on “the veto power of a few big powers” in Pyongyang’s policy pronouncements, it is China’s veto threat that has prevented the Security Council from coming down harder on North Korea with regard to the nuclear, UNC, and submarine incursion cases. With the balance of overall national strength having already shifted so decisively in favor of South Korea thus enhancing the prospects of Korean unification by absorption with every day that goes by maintaining a close military relationship with the politically and economically weaker North has become one of Beijing’s central security concerns. Apart from maximizing Beijing’s leverage as a balancer, the greatest danger would come if the junior socialist ally in the strategic buffer zone felt so cornered that it was prompted to launch an attack that might trigger a second Korean War. In Beijing’s view the alternative scenario—economic sanctions work so well as to produce another collapsing socialist regime on its northern border, with all the political, economic, and social conse-
quences for China's own stability that such a collapse would entail—could hardly be any more comforting.

All that said, however, the Kim Jong Il crisis-management regime, whistling in the dark, is in danger of being overwhelmed in its efforts to reconcile the irreconcilable. Despite the habit-driven trumpery regarding the omnipotence of the juche ideology as the motive force "leading our country toward the strongest position in the world," Kim Jong Il's North Korea is a swollen state and spent society with diminishing control over the events that shape its future. There can be very little doubt that what is needed is a radical system reform and restructuring. Lacking his father's charisma, authority, and power, Kim Jong Il has no choice but to shift decisively from charismatic to performance legitimation. Here he encounters a dilemma—to save the juche system he will have to destroy important parts of it. Saving the system also requires that North Korea open up to and seek help from its bitter capitalist rival in the south. And yet, departing from the ideological continuity of the system Kim Il Sung ("the father of the nation") created, developed, and passed on to his son is viewed not as a necessity for survival but as an ultimate betrayal of the raison d'etat. Herein lies the logic of a selective, controlled opening to the West without any reform or restructuring—"market Stalinism" with North Korean characteristics—two ways of pursuing a Jekyll and Hyde diplomacy. One final note: without being prematurely pessimistic regarding the future of North Korea, it is worth reminding ourselves of the political implications of what Shakespeare said in Julius Caesar:

The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
But in ourselves, that we are underlings.
notes for chapter four

1. UN General Assembly Resolution 46/1 (17 September 1991).


3. Veto has become a rarity in the Council’s proceedings in the 1990s. Between 1990 and 1996, only 5 vetoes have been cast with the following distributions: 2 in 1990 (the U.S.); none in 1991 and 1992; 1 in 1993 (Russia); 1 in 1994 (Russia); 1 in 1995 (the U.S.); and none in 1996 (as of 30 August 1996).

4. The United Nations system refers not only to the six principal organs—the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the Secretariat, and the International Court of Justice—that make up the United Nations proper but also to all the specialized agencies affiliated with but independent of the UN. This paper is focused on North Korea’s behavior in the UN, especially in the General Assembly and the Security Council.


9. After visiting North Korea in 1965, the prominent British economist Joan Robinson asserted that “all the economic miracles of the [post-World War II] world are put in the shade by these achievements” and that “as the North continues to develop and the South degenerate, sooner or later the curtain of lies must surely begin to tear.” Quoted in Marcus Noland, “The North Korean Economy” (paper presented at the Korean Economic Institute conference at the University of Chicago, 7-8 September 1995): p. 4.


17. The DPRK delegation to the historic 50th session of the General Assembly in 1995 was headed by Vice Foreign Minister Choi Su Hon—as in 1994 and 1996.

18. This memo was circulated as UN Doc. A/50/376 (24 August 1995).


23. Thanks to Pyongyang’s entry into the United Nations, the United States and the DPRK held high-level talks in New York in late 1991 for the first time since the end of the Korean War.

24. See *Chungang Ilbo* [Seoul], 24 October 1996, p. 10.


30. When asked by a South Korean journalist why his Ambassador was refusing to comply with the Security Council president’s request for clarification, a North Korean UN diplomat replied: “That is for the Ambassador to decide. If you do not understand the situation precisely and do not report correctly, you will be committing a crime.” See Tong-a Ilbo [Seoul], 4 October 1996, p. 2.

31. UN Doc. S/1996/800 (27 September 1996); emphasis added.


34. In fact, Pyongyang had asked for UN aid once before, in 1991, but a UN assistance team sent had been treated more as foreign spies and had not been able to make on-the-spot assessments of North Korea’s actual needs. As a result, no UN assistance was provided.


36. Vice Foreign Minister Choi’s 1996 UN Speech, p. 3.


38. I am indebted to Michael Ross of the WFP for providing me with this news update from the WFP/FAO, 11 March 1996.

40. On 12 March 1996, Li Jong Hua, a representative of the Flood Damage and Rehabilitation Committee in Pyongyang, sent a letter to Bernard Krisher, chairman of the Internet Appeal for North Korea Flood Victims, Tokyo, Japan, clarifying North Korea’s stand on international aid. For the full text of the letter, see Nautilus Institute, *Daily Report*, 22 March 1996.


42. WFP News Update, 13 May 1996, which includes FAO’s Special Alert No. 267; quote at p. 4 of the Special Alert.


45. See General Assembly Resolution 49/19B (23 December 1994).


48. GAOR, 50th Sess., 29th plenary meeting (11 October 1995), p. 6; emphasis added.

49. A 1995 Rand Corporation study concluded that there existed a “medium likelihood” of North Korea launching an attack against South Korea out of desperation. In such a case, there would be a “high likelihood” of the use of chemical weapons by the North. *New York Times*, 28 January 1996, p. 10.

50. As early as October 1983, Kim Jong Il in private talks with Shin Sang-ok and Choi En-hui acknowledged the existence of catch-22 from which was no easy escape. See *Wolgan Chosen* (October 1995): pp. 115-17.