EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Conference on June 24-5, at the Davidson Conference Center of the University of Southern California, was devoted to the Korean War and held on the 60th anniversary of its initiation. Papers and discussions dealt with reasons it occurred, how it started and was conducted, its immediate effects and long term impact, lessons for today, and treatment of its veterans. A major topic was US mistakes that helped bring about the war. Papers pointed out that the US planned poorly for occupying Korea in 1945, rather unthinkingly split its occupation with the USSR which soon led to a divided Korea, foolishly felt it was governing an occupied territory rather than assisting an independent Korea to get up and running, and sent few people who knew about Koreans and their country. Then US authorities mistakenly favored conservatives over working with a broad political spectrum, so the resulting government lacked wide support. Concern about ROK leader Syngman Rhee, and his belligerent reaction to the nation’s division led to wariness about promoting a strong state with a potent military, unlike the Soviets did in the North. There was a serious State-DOD disagreement: the armed forces stressed other priorities as vital, while the State Department thought Korea needed more attention. In the end US forces were withdrawn (1949) and Secretary of State Acheson’s speech in January 1950 indicated Korea was not of strategic significance. Thus the US did not really practice deterrence, did not see that as necessary.

But was this crucial in creating the War? Participants agreed that Kim, Jong Il pushed for the war but Stalin dismissed the idea as premature until developments improved its prospects: Mao’s victory (1949), the first Soviet nuclear test (1949), Acheson’s speech, the withdrawal of US forces, and growing strength of the DPRK. In March 1950, he approved an attack but insisted Mao also approve. He arranged for significant weapons shipments, especially heavy weapons, and had Soviet officers plan the attack. Thus the real responsibility lies with Stalin, who was either seeking national aggrandizement or pursuing ideological revolutionary aims. But others felt Mao also played a major role, rejecting the view – held by most Chinese analysts today after once claiming the ROK started the war – that Stalin handed Mao a fait accompli, provided less help than Mao expected, and maybe saw US military intervention, on Taiwan and in Korea, as tolerable because it would heighten Beijing’s dependence on him. Much that we know comes
from the Soviet archives, while Chinese archives on the war remain closed. Some said this is an effort to hide Mao’s complicity and his mistakes.

As for wartime mistakes, US/UN forces crossing the 38th parallel was cited as a critical misjudgment, enlarging and lengthening the war. The dominant Chinese view now is that China’s entering the war was a success: saving North Korea, demonstrating China’s importance. But a contrary Chinese view is that intervention cancelled absorbing Taiwan, brought huge casualties, slowed national development and normalization of relations with the West, and culminated in Mao’s error in ordering his forces across the 38th parallel to drive UN forces out of Korea. There was agreement that while the prisoner repatriation issue had political and moral appeal the resulting delay on an armistice meant many unnecessary casualties. Some participants argued that failing to gain a decisive victory has had awful results in regional security management, peninsula security, and the nonproliferation regime. Papers described the US as ill prepared for the war initially, then bearing much of the fighting and most of the cost. Other countries (15) that sent combat units participated in significant battles and were often regarded by American forces as tough and effective, but they created many complications. UN air and naval units enjoyed great success, in part due to facing rather weak enemy forces.

Extensive consideration of the War’s effects started at the individual level, with participants relating personal experiences that, though not about fighting, were often moving: being forced to flee from the invasion, the retreats, and the fighting, losing family members to death or disappearance into the North, seeing immense destruction and the wretched conditions after the war. American veterans found little concern about or knowledge of the war back home when they returned, thus not much interest in what they had done. At the national level Korea suffered immense devastation, but the War helped consolidate and centralize the two Korean states. Backed by the communist bloc’s largest aid effort, the North surged ahead in economic recovery and development, but its devotion to Stalinist policies and practices led, as elsewhere, to eventual stagnation and decline. The ROK took longer to consolidate state power but with political and economic mobilization under way it became incredibly successful. Why? The war jolted the society out of traditional patterns and practices, stimulated capitalist notions and behavior, dissolved traditional ruling elites, and heightened bureaucratic professionalism. Politically, the North became a very authoritarian state with a cult of the leader, while the South evolved into a vigorous democracy due to its elevated living standards, education levels, and exposure to American and other western societies.

Japan sharply escalated its national revival via the War’s direct economic impact and its protection in the ensuing US-Japan alliance; its export-led economic boom eventually made it the world’s second ranked economy, with equally impressive social changes. China was cut off from Taiwan and from normal ties with the US, delaying for over two decades pursuit of the path blazed by Japan and the ROK. Because of the War and rising frictions with China that it caused, Moscow had to devote much more attention to the Far East and its own Asian regions, and the added military burdens and concerns, overextending national resources, helped lead to the end of the Cold War and the USSR. Only then did Beijing and Moscow resume significant cooperation. In the US, the War led to a huge semi-permanent defense complex, vast nuclear forces, a much stronger presidency, intense concern about the communist threat, and other major features of the Cold War. More broadly, the War helped shape the national identities of the US, China, the Soviet Union, and the two Koreas for the remainder of the Cold War.

Globally, the War was described as a historical turning point, a “seminal event,” the “greatest system-transforming event” of the early Cold War. Among its cited results: US alliances with Japan, Taiwan, the ROK, Australia and New Zealand, and others;
freezing Sino-US relations for years;
a US worldview that led it into the Vietnam War;
globalization of containment and the Cold War;
militarization of the Cold War;
rapid rearming in Western Europe, NATO enlargement, German rearmament, and stationing of
large US forces in Europe – with matching developments in the Soviet bloc;
major expansion of nuclear forces leading to development of deterrence theory and deterrence
strategy.

Another conference theme was “lessons” for today. Some were practical: reinforce the
US-ROK alliance’s deterrence and prepare for surprise attacks; don’t assume the North will
attack only if it has military superiority – urgent domestic problems and other threats to the
regime might trigger one; when ROK officers point to gaps in their capabilities take this
seriously; respond sharply to attacks by the North; in a future war seek a decisive military victory
and an end to the DPRK; exploit the synergistic effects of close allied military cooperation; keep
the alliance healthy. Apparently Chinese draw lessons to: 1) be ready to fight the US if
necessary, but only as a last resort; 2) attend to China’s primary goal - peace and stability, and 3)
do what is necessary to sustain it, whether intervention or regime change. Several people said
that the real lesson is that “freedom is not free.” Others cited the need to prepare for multiple
kinds of wars in very different places, know the perspective, culture, and language of people you
protect, and study their enemies’ intentions and military capabilities.

The US-ROK alliance today came up repeatedly. Optimistic views stressed its strength,
with its better balance now and its joint values and shared perspectives. Pessimistic assessments
noted lower support for the alliance and a possible war in the ROK, and called recent decisions
(like wartime command transfer) as potentially very harmful. Some felt recent events, like the
Cheonan incident, may at least drive home the fact that North Korea is the enemy.

The last panel surveyed conditions for the War’s veterans. In Korea, while distinguished
figures in the independence effort and the war, plus wounded veterans, received special benefits
right after it, other veterans’ benefits were not established until 1993; they are roughly
comparable with those in other modern states. Korea honors veterans of nations that participated
in the War by inviting some annually to visit and see the ROK today. The US provided benefits
for Korean War veterans right away, but it took years to build a national memorial to the War, lift
recognition that it was a real war with serious sacrifices, and give veterans the respect they
earned. This is important because there are few years left for doing so.

CONFEREECE REPORT

Opening Remarks
The conference opened Thursday morning, June 24. Professor David Kang, Director of
the USC Korean Studies Institute, welcomed participants and guests and thanked them for
attending. He then introduced representatives of the organizations holding the conference.
General John H. Tilelli (USA retired) Co-Chairman of the Council (COKUS), and Chairman
and CEO of Cypress International, Inc., began by thanking professor Kang for arranging the
conference at USC in the Davidson Conference Center a lovely facility. He thanked the
conference sponsors for their support. The goal of the Council and the other organizations is
peace on the Korean peninsula. Despite our efforts and those of others, the North Korean regime
still provokes serious difficulties and pursues policies harmful to its citizens to keep itself in
power, so the peninsula is not truly peaceful. And this afflicts regional stability too. We must
particularly take note of the 46 sailors killed on the ROK’s *Cheonan* warship recently – truly they died for their country. We must continue seeking to prevent such tragedies. Fortunately, the alliance is stronger than ever – as are US-ROK military ties. The alliance’s bridges were damaged not long ago but that has now been repaired. The conference papers are very good; we have excellent speakers and discussants, and expect a fine conference. [General Tilelli indicated that copies were available of *US Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula*, Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force Report No. 64, (Tilelli and Charles Pritchard as task force Chairs, Scott Snyder as Project Director).]

**General Kim, Jae-Chang** (ROKS retired), Co-Chairman of COKUS and a visiting professor at Yonsei University, added his gratitude to the organizers, then expressed deep appreciation to the Americans killed in the Korean War. Ever since, the US-ROK alliance has sustained peace and security, enabling South Korean development. A new chapter in the Korean issue is opening now, and looking back to the start of it can provide valuable guidance for today. Sincere discussion is needed at the conference for this purpose. **Dr. Soon Paik**, President of the International Council on Korean Studies and Senior Economist in the US Dept. of Labor, thanked the organizers and welcomed the participants. He noted that ICKSS is almost 15 years old, publishes a significant journal and would be publishing the conference papers.

**PANEL I  THE CAUSES OF THE KOREAN WAR**

**Moderator:** Professor John B. Duncan, Director, UCLA Center for Korean Studies

**Paper Presenters:**

**Dr. William W. Stueck, Jr.**, University of Georgia, Distinguished Research Professor of History

**Dr Ohn, Chang-II**, Professor (emeritus) Korean Military Academy, professor in the Graduate School for Peace and Security Studies at Sanji University, past president of the Korean Association of Korean War Studies

**Dr. Steven M. Goldstein**, Smith College, Sophia Smith Professor of Government; Director -Taiwan Studies Workshop at Harvard

**Discussants:**

**Professor Yong-Ho Choe**, (emeritus) University of Hawaii at Manoa. ROK veteran of the Korean War, with a Bronze Star from the US Army.

**Dr. Park, Kyung-suh**, Professor (emeritus) Chung Ang University

**Papers**

**Professor William Stueck, Jr., “The Causes of the Korean War: A U.S. Perspective”**

Professor Stueck cited, as key causes of the Korean War, the role of the US in the initial division of Korea, and failures of American deterrence. US selection of the 38th parallel wasn’t meant to divide Korea, just prevent an argument with the USSR, but it inevitably led to conflict later. The decision by General Hodge to oppose the “left” in Korea and emphasize the conservatives encouraged polarization of ROK politics and on the peninsula; eventual efforts at coalition politics came too late. Seeking early Security Council elections, over Soviet opposition, meant elections only in the South. Of course, Soviet actions and those of various Korean groups also created the partition.

Being so involved in the ROK, the US should have pursued deterrence more carefully. But the State Department and Pentagon clashed on Korea’s importance. The emerging Cold War brought new thinking in US foreign policy, major bureaucratic adjustments, hefty political disagreements between the president and Congress, and debates on what containment was to
mean. The government had reason to see Korea as important, but US forces had been sharply cut and new military security obligations loomed via aid to Greece, Turkey and Western Europe. Congress was uninterested in aiding Korea and, like the Secretary of Defense, eager to cut military spending. State and others viewed Korea as important for US prestige and credibility but the armed forces had set priorities for their limited resources and Korea was low on their list of US strategic interests. The State Department wanted a stable ROK government in place via elections, before US forces withdrew, so it delayed the withdrawal until 1949. The Pentagon stressed the practical elements of pursuing US interests, while State also worried about the political-psychological dimensions.

For deterrence, withdrawing US forces was a mistake. Unlike Eisenhower, Truman relied heavily on advice and staffing from below, avoiding deep involvement in struggles over policy, so State-Defense disagreement and the implications of the two views were never fully explained to him. To sustain at least some deterrence the US might have held maneuvers with Japanese and ROK forces, had some Joint Chiefs visit the ROK, and avoided the Acheson speech on January 12, 1950 that seemed to devalue the ROK in US security priorities.

Truman faced strong domestic pressures against defense spending and the Joint Chiefs did not help devise integrated defense budgets, so when NSC 68 proposed a huge military buildup little was done. Military planning for wars therefore stressed nuclear weapons and mobilizing the nation like in World War II. MacArthur in Japan had little interest in Korea, did not command US forces there, and did nothing to prepare US forces in Japan for a mission there. The main concern about Asia, in Congress and the Joint Chiefs, was survival of Taiwan and its Nationalist government. Thus domestic and bureaucratic politics reinforced inclinations to treat Korea as unimportant. So did the serious frictions in US-ROK relations, particularly over President Rhee’s anticommmunist rhetoric and criticism of the Soviet Union, his opposition to dividing Korea, and his attacks on the US for doing so. Rhee’s belligerence toward the North made the US reluctant to send significant military aid for fear he would provoke war.

In the meantime Stalin noted the Acheson speech and other indications of US reluctance to protect Korea, and saw the communists’ triumph in China as an important counter if the US intervened, so he moved gradually toward approving Kim, Il-Sung’s plan to attack, the decision coming, and then speedily implemented, in the spring of 1950. The resulting military buildup did not go unnoticed and US ambassador Muccio attempted unsuccessfully to get more military aid to the ROK, but most observers saw war as unlikely. ROK fears were discounted because the US mistrusted ROK intelligence sources, a legacy of the many prior false alarms. MacArthur’s intelligence chief discounted warnings of an attack as well. Even if they had been taken seriously, and changed attitudes in Washington, it would have been hard to get suitable action without a crisis. So steps that might have deterred Stalin were never taken.

Dr. Ohn, Chang-il  “The Causes of the Korean War: A Korean Perspective

Professor Ohn said his was a “historian’s perspective,” not a Korean one. The War started because the North had far superior forces. With major heavy weapons and equipment as well as training and planning from the Soviet Union, it expected to win easily. The underlying cause was the division of Korea. Late in World War II the US was not well prepared to decide what to do with Korea, and selection of the 38th parallel for a joint occupation was made with an eye on not irritating the Russians by trying to keep them out, but the US always opposed a full Soviet takeover. However, the decision led to “cutting more than 75 streams, 12 rivers, 181 small cart roads, 104 country roads, 15 provincial all-weather road, 8 good highways, 6 north-south rail lines, and even a single house.” Since the two parts of Korea were economically interdependent, it seriously disrupted the economy as well.
Ohn cited Stoeck’s remarks as instructive on the US and Soviet roles in creating the 2 Koreas. On arriving, the Americans expected to be conducting a military occupation, seeing Koreans as not ready for self-government. The Koreans treated them more like visitors and resented the occupation, wanting only initial help on setting up an independent country again. The Soviets were shrewder, giving responsibilities in their sector quickly to Koreans and arming them significant. Early attempts at US-Soviet cooperation or a multilateral arrangement for turning the occupation into a unified Korea foundered on Soviet objections, while the Koreans pressed for independence and democracy – also unacceptable to the Soviets. Moscow wanted to treat Korea like Poland, occupied for ideological reasons and to prevent it from being a base for attacking the Soviet Union.

The US understood Moscow’s objectives, and rejected the idea of Soviet control or steps toward that, so efforts to cooperate foundered and the Joint Soviet-American Commission that was set up made no progress. The US therefore turned to the UN General Assembly which eventually called for elections. When Moscow rejected this, the elections were held only in South Korea. Soviet forces left in 1948 and the Joint Chiefs wanted to free up US forces for more strategically valuable places so, over State Department objections, they left in 1949. The South Koreans objected and asked for much more military assistance, but Truman declined. The US had been consistently leery of creating a strong ROK army, fearing this would promote more leftist opposition to the Rhee government and more political disarray. Kim, Il-sung had already started asked for permission and aid to attack the South, something Stalin kept putting off out of fear of a US reaction and because the North’s forces were insufficient. But he did approve sending more arms to the DPRK plus Korean veterans from World War II, and induced China to send Korean veterans of its civil war. He moved to approve an attack during Kim’s visit to Moscow March 30-April 25, insisting on designing plans for a very quick victory, supplied military planning support, and told Kim to get Mao’s approval as well, which Mao soon supplied. Soviet military equipment then poured into the North at a much more rapid rate to meet a June deadline for the attack.

The US, on the other hand, provided far less military aid to the South and as a result a huge military imbalance opened up. The North had larger forces, more and better tanks and artillery, more planes. The military imbalance was the immediate cause of the war. After a year of heavy fighting both sides began to accept the extreme complexity of the Korean situation – it was not resolvable militarily or politically. The eventual result was the armistice that produced “two victors.” This led to a continuing subversive war as the North has sought to overthrow the ROK government. The Korean War never really ended - its fundamental political cause still exists. It is why the Cheonan was sunk.

**Professor Steven Goldstein, “The Causes of the Korean War: a Chinese Perspective”**

Professor Goldstein undertook the role of a Chinese historian, drawing on the writings, particularly recent Chinese studies and perspectives, and his conversations with Chinese historians, and then evaluated Chinese views from a Western perspective. During the 1950s-1970s the Chinese held that the US instigated the war - it was a war of aggression initiated by Syngman Rhee into which the US intervened. By the early 1980s a more neutral view emerged, with no clear blame assigned. In the 1990s the emphasis shifted again: the division of Korean by the US and USSR - each having a different plan for what unification was to create - made the Korean War inevitable.

Now, the major cause is the actions taken by Stalin and the Soviet Union. Stalin agreed to Kim, Il-sung’s desire for arms and his drive to unify the peninsula and this caused the war –
completely reversing the Cold War Chinese version. On China’s role there is more candor, because the post-Mao intellectual environment in China became more accommodating and Soviet archives on the war were opened. There were also the effects of access to other foreign materials on the war and to foreign scholars.

While mentioning several Chinese scholars, he focused on two particularly influential ones: Shen Zhihua who teaches in Shanghai and Yang Kuison at East China Normal University. To date the “third wave” of Chinese views on the War has been dominated by Shen Zhihua, who led the way in exploiting Soviet archive materials, especially in his Mao Zedong, Stalin and the Korean War. He and others see Stalin as “selfish” and “hypocritical” for avoiding the fighting after his major role in creating it – Stalin and Soviet military assistance were the catalysts. Mao is said to have tried to forestall the North Korean attack and the war, worried it would bring an American reaction on the Taiwan matter, so he was more or less left in the dark about the Soviet plans and confronted with a fait accompli in May 1950 when he agreed to support them.

Stalin’s motivation reflected his desire to reverse his concessions in the 1945 treaty with Chiang Kai Shek ceding some traditional Russian Far East objectives, particularly a warm water port, and his unease about the emergence of a potent Chinese revolutionary regime as a rival. The war in Korea was meant to give him ports and railroads in Korea for Soviet use. This was not a revolutionary commitment but a Russian chauvinist objective. He also wanted American intervention to further alienate the US from China and make it even more dependent on him. Helping North Korea was helping a ruler Stalin could control, whereas Mao posed more difficulties. As for the Taiwan problem, Shen concludes – from American archive materials – that the US was probably going to block a Chinese takeover anyway; the Korean War offered a convenient opportunity.

Yang Kuison, also drawing on Soviet archives, sees Stalin as a revolutionary enthusiast hoping to exploit the huge opportunity provided by the communist triumph in China. This is what led him to discard his initial caution about Kim’s desire to attack. He cooperated with Mao in shaping the decision on initiating the war. Mao saw more clearly what was likely to happen and was angry at not being asked to help plan the war. But Stalin did not oppose Mao playing a large role in promoting revolution in East Asia, was willing to cede the main responsibility to China. As a result, while Mao did not shape the decision to launch the war, the success of the Chinese revolution as a model of armed revolution was a catalyst for it and, in the end, the Chinese leaders supported the attack. Mao knew about the war in advance and was unhappy he didn’t help plan it and when the Soviet plan didn’t work and China was dragged in. But he had told Kim in Beijing in May 1950 that China could send forces if the US entered the war, and would if US forces crossed the 38th parallel. Yang adds that Mao was very concerned a war would provoke a US shift on Taiwan, which happened two days after the war started-cancelling Chinese plans to invade. Zhou Enlai even complained about this to the Soviet ambassador in Beijing not long after the war, handing him an intelligence report on British speculation that Stalin wanted to use the war to prevent the seizure of Taiwan.

Chinese histories continue treating the war as a major victory, standing up to the most powerful imperialist country, but note the high price of not finishing national unification. Mao is cited as having often complained about Stalin’s decision to go ahead because of this, but they stress that American policy was headed in that direction due to the rising influence of the NSC 68 view and the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance, the War provided a convenient pretext. Yang adds that China had asked for substantial Soviet military aid since 1949 because cleaning out the Nationalist forces in the Taiwan Straits would take significant resources, but Stalin decided to go with aiding North Korea instead. Soviet interests would benefit more from gaining a strategic advantage.
position for intimidating Japan and keep Korea away from Japan’s influence, while Taiwan mattered little for Soviet security. And a Korean conflict that involved the US wouldn’t require direct Soviet participation unlike a big Sino-American war.

Wearing his western-historian hat, Dr. Goldstein noted that the recent revisionist view has deeply penetrated Chinese scholarship - expressions of older orthodox views are getting rare. This is due to the post-1978 shift in the intellectual environment, as well as the studies of outsiders. Chinese historians lament lack of access to both Chinese and North Korean archives. They praise the war but are aware of its costs in lives, damage, resources, the division of Korea, and the Taiwan problem. Mao’s role is still a major issue. The army remembers the serious defeat it suffered in the spring of 1951 after Mao’s insistence it could drive UN forces out of Korea. But Stalin is blamed for leaving Mao little choice on the war and withholding important material support and forces during it. These views are bound up in the question of Mao’s place in history that restricts Chinese historians’ postures – protecting his reputation appears to be the most important political consideration. This is one reason for the current stress on how he was reluctant about the war, it was forced on him, etc. – his responsibility is downplayed, as is the responsibility for China losing Taiwan. This is the hidden agenda in historians’ requests for access to the Chinese archives. They might shed light on Mao’s errors or on whether Mao and Stalin discussed Korea when Mao was in Moscow, whether Mao knew of the impending attack when Korean units went from China to North Korea or that reflected domestic considerations instead (the current Chinese historians’ view), what Mao and Kim talked about in May 1950, and what Chinese leaders actually knew on the eve of the war. There are suspicions of a secret deal with Pyongyang to never open either’s archives – a parallel deal apparently exists with Hanoi on the Vietnam War – presumably because of the picture of each regime that would emerge.

Discussants

Dr. Choe, yong-ho began by noting that 60 years ago he had just entered the university in Taegu. He promptly went into the army and served over 6 years. It’s a pleasure to come here to discuss the war. Stueck is a great expert on Korea and the Korean War, an eminent scholar, and offers a very perceptive and detailed analysis of the failure of American deterrence in 1950, in a concise paper. It notes how the Joint Chiefs saw little strategic value in Korea, as did Secretary of Defense Johnson, whereas the State Department saw it as symbolically important. It points out how to Republicans, MacArthur, and others, Taiwan and the Nationalists were much more important. The paper is also good on the American antipathy for Rhee, and the US intelligence failure on the coming attack. It should be emphasized that prior to the War the US never viewed Korea as intrinsically important – it was important only in view of US interests in, and dealings with, its neighbors. This is not a criticism of the US, just a lesson Koreans should remember.

Here are two questions on Stueck’s paper. Acheson’s speech in January 1950 is often seen as having emboldened Stalin. How does this square with NSC 68 three months later putting so much stress on Soviet expansionism? Did Acheson know of the emerging NSC 68 view? Second, on the intelligence failure, the paper says the Department of Defense saw ROK and North Korean forces as roughly equal in 1949. How could they do this given the available evidence?

On Ohn’s paper, Soviet archives clarified who started the war: Kim pressed for it and Stalin said Mao must approve while worrying the US would intervene. The paper is fine on Soviet – North Korean interactions in 1949-1950, recounting how Stalin asked Kim if his armed forces were in good shape and whether the North had penetrated ROK forces (for intelligence). Stalin’s advice: concentrate the invasion forces, and make a peace proposal to the ROK in
advance. Clearly he was actively involved in the planning. One question is how submissive the North Koreans were. Here several important works, including Bruce Cumming’s book, weren’t cited. A second question concerns ROK military preparedness in June 1950: was there sabotage in the ROK army command system (by North Korean sympathizers)? Has there been a serious investigation of this?

The Goldstein paper is impressive, very enlightening. One question is how the revisionist scholars relate to the party. What is the party’s view of their views? Next, the paper sees Chinese historians often blaming Stalin and reducing Mao’s role in starting the war, while others see Mao as deeply interested in the war as a part of continuous revolution. How do Chinese scholars deal with this disagreement? Third, on whether US intervention on Taiwan kept Mao from becoming a Chinese Tito: are Chinese scholars studying this?

Professor Park, Kyung-suh said he learned a lot from the papers, as a nonspecialist on the war. The Stueck and Ohn papers reflect the varying views on the war. He asked Stueck if there are still revisionist views among American scholars since the archives opened. Have their views shifted? The Goldstein paper describes the partial disagreements among Chinese scholars on Mao’s role. Which view seems correct?

Stueck replied briefly. On Choe’s question about Acheson and NSC 68, the speech and the report clearly didn’t fit. But the latter was less important – still a planning document. Acheson carefully drafted the speech it – it really was his speech. He was maneuvering around the State – Defense conflict over Korea, and around how Taiwan had a major US domestic constituency while Korea did not. The speech was designed to leave Taiwan out of the US defense perimeter – leaving Korea out only as a response to critics. On intelligence failures, there was a flood of intelligence, but the heavy military aid and the Korean veterans from China arrived after the late 1949 intelligence assessment of the peninsula situation.

Dr. Ohn noted that the January 16, 1950 meeting of Kim and others with the Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang about an attack was reported to Moscow, and Mao was in Moscow then. We don’t know if Stalin and Mao discussed Korea at this point, but they probably did. Further discussions occurred later on preliminary plans for the war. On the US intelligence failure, reports on a possible attack got little attention in Washington. On (Choe’s question) whether Kim and others were submissive toward Stalin, if they hadn’t been they might have been killed. Kim was very worried about being killed after the US landing at Inchon. When he approached Stalin after the first Soviet nuclear test for help in attacking the South and Stalin said Kim’s forces were not ready, Kim readily agreed. On penetration and sabotage of the ROK army before the attack there was very significant penetration, with many North Korean agents around top ROK military leaders. This may well be true today.

Dr. Goldstein addressed the limits on today’s Chinese scholars. They clearly must be cautious about Mao’s image and the army’s performance in the war. He also pointed out that Shen’s first major book on the War was 17 years ago and is now somewhat dated. He then came to the US for research and after that treated Mao as a revolutionary in his motivation. As for Mao as a potential Tito, many recent materials show Mao and other Chinese leaders strongly committed to the Soviet Union and Stalin in 1949-1950. Professor Park asked which view seems best to me – and the answer is Yang, Kuisong’s.

LUNCHEON sponsored by the Hwajeong Peace Foundation and The Dong-A Ilbo

The luncheon address was by Professor Chae-jin Lee, distinguished scholar and professor at Claremont McKenna College, former Director of its Keck Center for International
and Strategic Studies, and a specialist on Chinese foreign policy, American foreign relations in East Asia, North Korea, and inter-Korean relations. In his introduction, David Kang described Professor Lee as someone he always looked up to.

Speech: “Remembering the Korean War: Crisis, Truce, and Containment”

Professor Lee began by saying that while many Americans have forgotten about the war, that was not true for Koreans of his generation: “I remember it vividly and palpably even now as if it happened just yesterday.” Living in Taegu as a 14 year old student, I paid little attention to the war at first, other than a concern for my sister, a freshman in Seoul when the city was overrun. I was soon sent to a village 20 miles from Taegu, probably to be farther from any fighting. By late August I had to make a lengthy journey with other villagers over a mountain to a refugee camp and soon was in surrounded by serious fighting. “I was hungry, dirty, scared, desperate, subjected to mosquito attack, and infested with lice. I witnessed all the tragic and destructive aspects of the war and lived under North Korea’s control for about two weeks.” At one point I represented the camp in negotiating with North Korean soldiers over how much rice to give them. With other young men I also sneaked back to the village to pick up food left behind. Eventually my parents arranged to get me back – “When I showed up at my home, my mother could not recognize me for a while. I looked like a beggar.” The family was scattered - the men going to jobs or the military, while his school was wherever space could be found. Taegu was chaotic: refugees, fear that evacuation would soon be necessary. Food, water and electricity were very limited, the streets full of peddlers, orphans, beggars, prostitutes, wounded soldiers, foreign troops – with black markets and rationing, high inflation, and corruption everywhere.

Effects of the war on me? I shifted away from wanting to study physics. “I decided to study Politics and Diplomacy. I wanted to learn why nations go to war and how peace can be guaranteed.” I took up Christianity. “Before the war I harbored a sense of contempt toward China; after the war I developed a new appreciation of China’s importance to the future of Korea. I decided to know more about China and to learn Chinese.” I became healthier and more self-confident from surviving the war. I began to learn about Americans, including black Americans, made friends with some American soldiers, and one sponsored me for study in the US. I hated having to attend rallies and demonstrations in support of the government during the war, being manipulated with other students on behalf of Rhee government policies. On the other hand Rhee managed to gain concessions and a mutual security treaty from the US. He was a difficult personality and an uneven ruler, at times very emotional and risk-taking, often very frustrating for Americans to work with, but he was steadfast in opposing continued partition of Korea and thus to the armistice. The US eventually was practicing a dual containment of both North Korea and the Rhee government. Opinions of him varied a good deal, from minor dictator to great statesman. “I was not an admirer of President Rhee during and after the war. Nevertheless, I, as a scholar, am inclined to give him credit for aspects of his war-time diplomacy toward America, especially in regard to the making of a mutual defense treaty with the United States.”

And my family? It was relatively fortunate. One cousin was forced to join the North Korean “volunteer army” and was never heard from again. One uncle was killed. My sister survived the North Korean occupation of Seoul. My brother survived the war. The family house was intact. My wife to be had fled Pyongyang in December 1950 ahead of Chinese troops, and became a refugee in the ROK. Her older sister was left behind and “there has been no news from her for 60 years.”

It is important to note, on this anniversary of the war, that “South Korea is an open, pluralistic, democratic, prosperous, and dynamic state” with enormous achievements to its credit, a strong civil society, advanced educational institutions, a free press, rule of law and very high
international status. The Mutual Defense Treaty has played a role in allowing all this and preventing another war. Sadly, the war hampered chances for peaceful North-South cooperation and functional integration. Inter-Korean mistrust and animosity are very strong, and it is unclear when unification can occur. It is even possible there could be another war. I know “freedom is not free.” “To all those who made tremendous sacrifices for my freedom and for that of many other people in Korea and beyond, I would like to simply say, ‘Thank you very much.’”

In brief discussion, Dr. Jonathan Pollack thanked professor Lee for “reminding us that it is the “Korean Peninsula.”” Lee said that amidst the decisionmaking, larger forces, and high politics we should never forget the personal level, personal sufferings. Hugo Kim said the Korean War led eventually to military rule, but also to democracy. Lee pointed out that historically Koreans stressed civilian life - the war increased respect for the military, which now gets some of the nation’s best people. Exposure to high technology, organizational skills, and related elements in the military helped promote ROK development. But the war also created a pro-military orientation in officers leading to a distortion in national resources and an interest in holding power. This retarded the growth of democracy for some time. A member of the audience noted how North Korea triumphed early in the war after ROK officials had said it could be readily defeated. Were many people in the South harmed during the occupation? Lee said this was certainly the case. Winning “hearts and minds” is vital in such circumstances and North Korea did not win hearts and minds in the South during the war.

PANEL II: The Roles and Responsibilities of Major States in the Korean War

Moderator: Dr. Soon Paik, President of the International Council on Korean Studies

Paper Presenters:
Dr. Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow – Cato Institute; Taft Fellow - American Conservative Defense Alliance; Cobden Fellow in International Economics – Institute for Policy Innovation.
Professor (emeritus) Byong Moo Hwang, Korea National Defense Institute, Editor-in-Chief – The Korean Journal of International Relations, former president Korean Association of International Studies
Professor (emeritus) Mel Gurtov, Portland State University and Visiting Professor, University of Oregon and Director of its Institute for Asian Studies.

Discussants:
Professor Clark Sorensen, University of Washington, Chair of the Korean Studies Program, Director of the Center for Korean Studies - Jackson School of International Studies, Editor-in-Chief of Journal of Korean Studies
Dr. Lee, Choon-kun, Senior Research Fellow – Korean Institute for Maritime Strategy, adjunct professor - Ewha Woman’s University

Papers
Dr. Doug Bandow, “The Role and Responsibilities of the United States in the Korean War”

Dr. Bandow examined past US decisions that were wrong, and ones that look dubious or wrong now. Responsibility for the War lies mainly with North Korea, with the Soviet Union and China complicit, and South Korea played a role. But the US helped create the environment and shape the conflict by arranging for two Koreas, and ignoring the threat of war in 1950. The results were enormous: huge human costs, deeper North-South division, deeper US involvement in East Asia, major hostility between the US and China for years, militarization of US foreign policy. These results were not inevitable, but stemmed from, among other things, ten American decisions:
1) the 1945 decision to divide occupation of the Peninsula
The US-Soviet relationship deteriorated quickly after World War II, and the US was right to want to prevent Soviet domination of Korea, but it approached occupation very haphazardly, choosing to do it because leaving it to the Soviet Union or China, or granting immediate independence, were unappealing. It really had no plans for its half of the peninsula, knowing little about Korea. As Cold War tensions deepened, the Pentagon saw little strategic value in Korea, as indicated in Acheson’s January 12, 1950 speech. The US was unwilling to pay the costs of making the South viable.

2) Establishing an occupation government
The US was ill-prepared for this. It ended up backing Rhee though it was unhappy about his denouncements of the Soviet Union, arrests of opponents, etc. One problem was that Americans knew so little about the country or its politics. The US should have moved against Rhee fairly early, an option repeatedly considered but rejected until after the Korean War.

3) On defending the ROK
The US didn’t prepare to defend it; the Pentagon resisted sending more military aid (partly out of fear Rhee would try to invade the North), even defense weapons, and the American forces left in 1949. The Joint Chiefs said the ROK had little strategic value, and Acheson seemed to leave it out of US defense priorities. But it was wrong to invest resources in getting the ROK started then not try to ensure its survival.

4) Going to war
The invasion did not threaten key US national interests, and since it had no commitment to defend the ROK US credibility was not at stake. The major mistake was assuming the war had been ordered by Stalin, and that not acting could bring on a wider war - Truman cited the example of fascist states expansion in the 1930s. There was no good alternative to fighting to prevent a North Korean triumph, and Korea was said to have symbolic importance – the US had to demonstrate to its friends that it could and would defend them. Though the US had a certain moral responsibility to do something, it should have decided that defending the ROK was not worth it – the costs were too high.

5) Trying to liberate North Korea
If the war had ended on October 1 at the 38th parallel, most of its harmful consequences would have been avoided, and the world would have been better off. Entering North Korea was a disastrous mistake, done despite the skeptics in Washington, signs from Beijing it would intervene, etc. It would have been better if only ROK forces went North, or if UN forces stopped a bit north of Pyongyang. And the US should have asserted it would not help the Nationalists on Taiwan. But the chance at unification seemed like a godsend. And perhaps Beijing would have intervened anyway.

6) Fighting a limited war
The US limited its objectives and the weapons used. MacArthur and other military leaders urged taking the war to China, use of nuclear weapons, etc. And the US settled for an armistice, which many disliked. To have escalated the war would have risked a much wider war either with the USSR or through its additional aid to China, with too little to gain in winning. It would also have cost the US many allies in the war.

7) Fighting only over Korea
There were proposals to make the war about China – unleashing Chiang Kai-shek, seeking to oust Mao’s regime, etc. But this would have been a much greater war, with Nationalist forces no better than they had been and too few US forces to do the job. It would have vastly intensified the Cold War.

8) On repatriation of prisoners.
While many issues delayed a settlement, the repatriation of prisoners was the most contentious – the US resisted straight repatriation for propaganda and humanitarian reasons, but the result was some 37,000 more US battlefield casualties and the US coming close to massively escalating the
war to end the stalemate. The costs of this decision were too great – though a humanitarian victory, the decision was a mistake.

9) The alliance
Having suffered over 150,000 casualties the US had no choice but to offer a mutual defense agreement. But it should have been combined with steps to promote true ROK military self-sufficiency. Instead, just as before the war, the necessary aid, etc. were never forthcoming. The US should have cut its forces faster in the 80s and 90s and should pull them out now.

10) Militarizing the Cold War
This could have been curbed. After the Korean War started, the US spent far more on national defense than necessary for the rest of the Cold War. NATO was militarized too. Implementing the NSC 68 vision of the Cold War and what it required was a serious mistake – unduly expanding US national interests and intensifying Soviet rigidity. Thus US mistakes helped to bring on the Korean War, expand it to include China, and militarize the Cold War in the process. We still feel the malign effects.

**Professor Hwang, Byong-moo: “The Role and Responsibilities of China and the Former Soviet Union in the Korean War”**

After thanking the organizers for the opportunity to appear, Professor Hwang summarized his view by saying that the decisions on starting the war in Beijing and Moscow were not slipshod, not well thought out. There was much careful calculation, serious weighing of the military and international political environments. We know this from Soviet archives on the war and academic studies drawing on those archives (China’s remain closed). Kim, Il Sung first raised the idea in March 1949. Stalin said no because Pyongyang lacked military superiority, US troops were still there, and the 38th parallel dividing line was a US-Soviet agreement which he did not want to break. In May, Mao told North Koreans to wait until a suitable situation emerged, that China would not help without Stalin’s approval. Kim renewed his request when US troops left the ROK in the fall. The Soviet embassy in Pyongyang reported that an attack would just bring the Americans back, North Korean forces were still too weak, and Kim might attack anyway, leading the Politburo to tell the North Koreans the time was not right - unification would require a national uprising in the South and stronger North Korean forces.

In January 1950 Stalin talked with Mao, in Moscow, about helping the North. In March-April, when Kim visited Moscow, Stalin told him the situation was getting better due to Mao’s victory, the Soviet-China alliance, the Soviet atomic bomb test, and Acheson’s speech. He told Kim to make a careful evaluation of possible American interference, get Mao’s approval, expect no direct Soviet participation in the fighting, conduct thorough military preparations, issue proposals in advance for peaceful unification, start the war on the Ongjin peninsula, and plan a short decisive war. He and Kim anticipated everything being ready by summer. Soon Beijing agreed to let 14,000 ethnic-Korean troops transfer to North Korea. In May, without knowing about the March-April talks Mao met secretly with DPRK leaders and approved the invasion plan. He offered suggestions on strategy, and said China would send troops if the US entered.

It seems certain that the Soviets were to supply the military equipment and China would send any additional troops needed if the US intervened. Apparently Stalin wanted China to take the blame if the attack was a disaster, and saw an American intervention and military clash with China as at least making Beijing more dependent on him; this was one reason for the Soviet absence when the US went to the Security Council. Beijing called for greater Soviet military assistance, and also said that after the war it would sign an alliance with the Kim government, a plan Stalin endorsed.
Initially the Soviets were in charge – deciding on when to attack, how the North should fight, the organization of the command structure, and it has been sending a great deal of military equipment. Soviet officers drafted the operational war plan largely on their own; the North Koreans did get the Ongjin Peninsula dropped as the initiation point in favor of attacks all along the border. When UN forces later landed at Inchon, Stalin was very critical of Soviet military advisers for intelligence failures, not heeding warnings of the invasion, and not sufficiently assisting North Korean forces.

On October 1 Kim made an emergency request to China for troops, which Stalin endorsed. The Chinese politburo was evidently uneasy, with important members expressing reservations, counseling prudence, and showing concern that the war could damage development and consolidation at home. Mao pressed hard to get approval. When his forces entered Korea, Stalin cabled Stalin about this. On October 7 US forces crossed the 38th parallel and Mao gave the order to send his troops on the 8th – they actually entered on October 19. He sought a Soviet commitment of heavy support and air cover but Stalin was adamant about not directly confronting US forces.

From this point on China dominated the conduct of the war, with operational control of North Korean forces under a combined command. North Korean divisions were allowed to cross into China for recovery and training. Having driven back UN forces and occupied Seoul, General Peng Dehuai was ordered to drive them off the peninsula. This effort soon stalled. Stalin continued to supply advice on the military campaigns and force structuring, some of which was quite acceptable to Peng. When Mao sought to use different tactics against American forces than Korean forces and to lure the Americans deep into North Korea, Stalin said such tactics may have defeated the Nationalists but would not work with UN forces. Stalin reneged on supplying large air units, sending antiaircraft units instead. He also turned down requests for major military aid and training for Chinese forces in China.

The armistice negotiations that began in 1951 were directed by Mao, with little input from Kim. When the last major Chinese military effort (the fifth campaign) faltered by early June, Mao wanted to fight while negotiating and accept only an armistice restoring the prewar situation – when Kim objected, Stalin intervened to get him to agree. China eventually moved toward a truce at the existing situation on the ground but Stalin counseled remaining flexible and drawing out negotiations, arguing the other side was more in need of peace. Then the POW issue dragged out the talks and the fighting, making China more dependent on Moscow for and thus more responsive to Stalin’s insistence that the war continue.

Thus seeing the decision to start the war as piecemeal, not carefully planned, is incorrect - all three governments carefully planned the war, calculated the military balance, considered a possible US intervention. And Acheson’s speech may not have been very important. Stalin may have thought that no US intervention would mean a quick victory, and that US intervention could bring Sino-American fighting that would strengthen Sino-Soviet ties. Both Beijing and Moscow were deeply involved in preparing and conducting the war, and Beijing dominated the negotiations. They learned that force should not be used to promote integration and have wanted peace and stability. But it is an unstable peace due to their inability to control North Korean behavior.

Professor Mel Gurtov: “From Korea to Vietnam: The Evolution of U.S. Intervention”

Professor Gurtov opened by declaring that “The Korean War was the seminal event of the Cold War in Asia.” It led to Japan becoming a key US ally, China-US enmity, and Korea remaining divided. It drew Asia into the sphere of US interests yet strengthened US commitment
to the primacy of Europe (in boosting NATO, promoting German rearmament, sending American forces to Europe). It made the ideological conflict more rigid. And it led to the Vietnam War. US mindsets that shaped the Cold War, dating back to the Truman Doctrine, were evident in the war, as the US continued retreating from the “Yalta system” of US-Soviet cooperation as nonviable. Just before the war NSC-68 insisted that global instability required a major military buildup and active responses to Soviet activities, reflecting a growing perception that the communist threat was monolithic and global. Somewhat comparable views about the US were growing in Mao’s government, leading to the Sino-Soviet alliance.

Given the emerging US worldview, the “lessons” of the 1930s on the need to confront aggression, and right wing political pressures, Korea became a test case for the Truman administration – intervening was seen as politically, strategically, and morally required, rather than as saving an intrinsically important place. The War became a major step in globalizing containment. China would later intervene because US occupation of Korea would threaten its security, threaten socialism, and damage Chinese prestige – unless stopped, the US would supposedly run rampant in East Asia.

American and Chinese fighting in Korea to prevent future interventions and conflicts in Asia failed, and Vietnam was a direct result. Like Korea, Vietnam became symbolically important to US leaders; the threat was defined as Chinese intervention and the spread of communism throughout Southeast Asia (the domino theory). Again, the US relied on military solutions that proved insufficient, but the US persisted out of a concern about reputation and American hegemony. [Dr. Gurtov noted he worked in the Pentagon and helped prepare the Pentagon Papers] China’s behavior was more guarded – seeing the Vietnam War as threatening its security but limiting direct involvement and indicating it wanted to avoid war with the US, something the US reciprocated.

Thus in the two wars US and Chinese experiences were similar: seeing them as tests of will and credibility, threats to national security, making fighting a moral obligation, and then working to prevent them from escalating. US behavior reflected stereotypical thinking: “no appeasement,” peace is indivisible, we are defending the Free World, military strength is vital, military responses are vital, we can’t be “soft on communism.” The results: huge standing armed forces and military budgets, the imperial presidency, complaints that “limited” war was insufficient - all ultimately driven by a conception of the US as global policeman, leader of the Free World, destined to lead, “the indispensable nation,” etc., and reinforced by the image of the enemy in the Cold War. It was a product of American globalism, and was displayed recently in President Obama’s Nobel Prize acceptance speech.

**Discussants**

Professor Clark Sorensen characterized the papers as a realist analysis (Bandow), focused on Stalin and Mao (Hwang), and emphasizing US thinking and interests (Gurtov), and offered an anthropologist’s perspective. The US role on the Korean War is probably overemphasized. No country completely controls international events, each has only partial information on situations it confronts. Thus mistakes are understandable. Four important questions:

Did the US signal lack of will, leading Stalin to approve of the Korean war?

Bandow says yes but doesn’t emphasize Acheson’s speech. Hwang cites Stalin’s responsibility, particularly his interest in a possible Sino-American war to solidify his bloc leadership so easing his concerns about US intervention may not have dominated his decision. And KMAG stayed after US forces left the ROK – the military abandonment wasn’t complete. The ROK was cleaning up weak military units in 1949 and by 1950 it had suppressed most leftist
insurgents; maybe the attack reflected concerns that the ROK would survive, not US signals of disinterest. Was crossing the 38th parallel a big mistake?

Hwang says it triggered China’s intervention, but were security concerns the reason? Gurtov says China saw the US as more an ideological threat. Maybe the key was the US steps to protect Taiwan rather than classic border-security concerns that led to the Chinese intervention. Was NSC-68 crucial, and mistaken?

There was certainly much resistance to it. Bandow says relying on it once the War started was a mistake, Gartov says it helped shape a distorted worldview. The latter seems more accurate. The US was becoming deeply fearful of communism in Asia indicated by McCarthyism, aiding the French in Indochina, aiding the Dutch fighting rebels in Indonesia. Remember the Korean War was popular at first. The intervention was really overdetermined. Was Rhee a big problem for the US?

Bandow and Gurtov say so, but they underestimate his successes and legitimacy at the time. He won a UN-conducted election, unlike the Vietnam case. He was irritating but not a puppet. Authoritarian of course, but his rivals were too. He built a state, did some land reform, education reform, etc. And ousting Rhee-like leaders elsewhere often hurt the US – Diem in Vietnam, Sihanouk in Cambodia, etc.

Dr. Lee, Choon-kun said the Korean War is not history in Korea, it is a present-day matter. He noted he was born during the war in a refugee area, and quoted President Roh on how “The worst kind of peace is better than the best kind of war,” saying many of his students agree. Thus 30% of the public and 54% of college students don’t accept the government’s evidence that North Korea caused the Cheonan incident.

The Korean War was very important: the 7th largest war in modern history (1 million deaths), involving over 20 countries; the 3rd most intense in death and destruction, after World Wars I and II, with roughly 10% of the Korean population killed. ROK presidents have had to fear for their lives from Rhee on - he kept a pistol by the bed in case North Koreans arrived, as his government migrated up and down the peninsula. Many countries have disappeared due to wars. Gurtov objects to the US involvement but it saved the ROK. Hence Korean perceptions of it are different from those in the US.

Did deterrence fail – or was it never tried? Bandow is well known in the ROK, and likes the ROK, but wants the US to pull out now (and questions its initial involvement). Wouldn’t the North Koreans then attack?

Responses from the Panel

Bandow acknowledged Sorenson’s points were interesting – hindsight is nice and makes criticizing decision makers and their actions easy. But the period did turn out badly. My emphasis was on the US impact, because it was the assigned topic. Sure, other actors were important, but at the margin, a strong ROK backed by the US could have done much to change Soviet and Chinese decisions. US policy didn’t make sense – it should have armed Korea and stressed it would defend it. For China, the greatest concern was Taiwan. Truman’s decision to protect it deeply affected Mao’s thinking. As for NSC-68, certainly its context was very important. But the US had already adjusted somewhat to that context and could have adjusted further. The president could have avoiding entering the war. As for Rhee, while he was a fine, tough politician he certainly made life hard for the US. Finally, is the US-ROK alliance in our best interest now? Does the ROK, for example, want to be a US ally if the US ends up in a war with China, especially if nuclear weapons are involved?
Hwang reiterated that taking US forces out in 1949 led Stalin and Mao to see the US commitment as weak. And at least one source says Stalin deliberately avoided the Security Council session that condemned the attack so as to get the US embroiled in a war that would likely involve China. Gurtov agreed with Sorenson that Rhee wasn’t a puppet. He put development ahead of democracy – like Karzai does today! This problem continues to bedevil US foreign policy - shouldn’t it be publicly discussed? The issues from the Korean War and other aspects of the past in East Asia remain with us.

Floor Discussion
This was brief. Dr. Jonathan Pollack (Naval War College) listed some differences between the Vietnam and Korean Wars: the US decision on intervening in Korea was crisis-driven; the US was very deeply involved in Vietnamese politics and the political system and Vietnam was a major factor in US politics; the US achieved its main goal in Korea; Korea was linked to the “roll back” strategy in US security debates. Gurtov replied that while the two cases were different the mentality in approaching them was the same – the crusading, the shared images of the opponents, etc.

PANEL III: The Korea War and the Formation of the U.S.-Korean Alliance

Moderator: General John H. Tilelli, USA (Ret), Co-Chairman of the Council on US-Korean Studies

Paper Presenters:
   Dr. Kim, Taewoo, Vice-President, Defense Affairs Committee – Korea Institute for Defense Analysis
   Professor Victor Cha, Georgetown University, Senior Adviser and holder of the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; former Director for Asian Affairs of the National Security Council
   Professor Samuel S. Kim, Columbia University, Senior Research Scholar – Westhead East Asian Institute

Discussants:
   Professor Mok, Jin-whu Kookmin University, former Dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration.
   Professor Young Whan Kihl Iowa State University (emeritus), Visiting Scholar – Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University

Papers
Dr. Kim, Taewoo, “The Korean Position on Alliance Formation and the Change of Public Trust Between Korea and the United States: the Cheonan Incident and the OPCON Issue”

   In beginning, Dr. Kim said the Korean War changed Korea’s destiny, and noted that he was born the year it started. From a macroscopic perspective, the resulting alliance has been on the right track. The period of an unbalanced and unilateral alliance is giving way to a balanced and reciprocal one, more future oriented and sustainable, more comprehensive in the parties’ sharing democracy, a market economy, and human rights. In this fairer alliance South Korea respects US strategic flexibility and assumes more of the national defense burden, while intensifying cooperation with the US on nonproliferation, peacekeeping, piracy, terrorism, etc.

   Close up, the vicissitudes and complications stand out. Kim Dae-jung always hailed the alliance and good relations with the US. President Roh openly disparaged it, putting inter-Korean
relations above every other ROK foreign relationship in importance. In this vein the government pressed for transferring the wartime OPCON, inviting a tough initial response from Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. Many Koreans regard the 2007 agreement on the transfer as strange. After all, the CFC resembles NATO and the NATO members don’t complain about sovereignty being lost, etc.

The Roh Moo-hyun government posed the most serious test the alliance has faced, dividing Koreans into idealistic nationalists and realistic internationalists, and eroding trust between the allies. Roh people stressed sovereignty and autonomy, an independent diplomacy, and the South’s military superiority over the North. Opponents asserted that the ROK needed US advanced military technologies, the solidarity provided by the Combined Forces Command, and elaborate US cooperation in a war. The government response was to appeal to younger generation nationalism, muzzle opposing opinion leaders and experts, and avoid getting congressional consent or a full cabinet assessment. There was no full and fair debate on the OPCON decision.

The Cheonan incident puts the OPCON issue in a new light. It has compelled the ROK to clearly distinguish its friends and enemies. When the investigation implicated the North US support was very clear, as was Japan’s. The attack laid a clear dividing line between the ROK, US and Japan as opposed to the DPRK and China. ROK countermeasures have included going to the Security Council, banning North Korean merchant vessels from ROK waters, ending inter-Korean trade except for Kaesong, suspending all but humanitarian aid, ROK-US joint anti-submarine exercises, and resumption of the propaganda campaign across the DMZ. These are limited steps, clearly aimed at avoiding another war.

The ROK is also conducting a comprehensive review of its security and defense systems, started earlier and intensified after the Cheonan incident. This has boosted calls to reconsider the OPCON decision. The threat from the North has increased since that decision – 2 North Korean nuclear tests that make it a de facto nuclear state, 16 more army divisions, 400 more tanks, 500 long-range artillery pieces, 70,000 more special operations forces. People in the US are thinking the same way. Victor Cha has suggested postponing the OPCON transfer. Bruce Bennett (RAND) feels the ROK must fully fund Defense Reform Plan 2020 to make the transfer work, while government spending for it has been cut from 621 trillion won to 599 trillion.) Sure, ROK forces have been significantly strengthened, but they are no comparison with US forces, especially in high technology resources – it is the US forces that really deter the North.

The 2020 Plan was really for appeasing opponents of the OPCON transfer, and designed to seem not directly aimed at the DPRK, i.e. emphasizing an “ocean-going Navy” or a “Space Air Force,” and the reduction from 680,000 to 500,000 in ROK forces. The transfer will actually be a gift to the North by weakening the alliance. The overall 2020 plan can meet ROK conventional forces needs, but offers no way to offset the DPRK WMD threat. Korea must continue relying on US extended deterrence, even though the nuclear portion has become hazier in recent years. The latest Nuclear Posture Review merely excludes North Korea from the US pledge to not use nuclear weapons first, without saying a WMD attack will be met with nuclear retaliation. North Korea understands the US will not retaliate with nuclear weapons if the North does not use them first, making the North freer to engage in provocations and blackmail. The ROK needs a non-WMD second strike capability that threatens the regime’s existence – including long range missiles, but the US still resists letting the ROK develop such missiles.

There are other asymmetries favoring North Korea – the thousands of artillery pieces that can hit Seoul, the much longer terms of service for DPRK soldiers, the South Korean penchant
for seeing North Koreans as brothers (the North does not reciprocate). In fact, “the spirit of the ROK military was seriously damaged under the Sunshine Policy during the two [prior] administrations.” Many recruits now believe the Korean War was triggered by the South’s attack, and the sacrifices of the war are forgotten by the young, thanks in part to the Korean Teachers and Educational Workers Union members who teach distorted history in middle and high schools.

If the OPCON transfer goes through in 2012, this will benefit the “progressive factions” in Korean politics, maybe even revive the Sunshine Policy, and will make for fears about the future of the alliance, maybe force a rethinking of national survival strategies. The transfer would save money but increase doubts about US security guarantees all over East Asia. It would send the wrong message to Pyongyang and Beijing and surely weaken combat effectiveness. “Now is the time to postpone the OPCON transfer indefinitely and reassess the security environment…” The ROK should initiate this, and conduct a nonemotional examination of our national security situation.

Fortunately, the Cheonan incident will further isolate the DPRK, make for further economic difficulties from sanctions, and strengthen South Koreans’ grasp of who the real enemy is. The alliance has been a great blessing for the ROK, and the Cheonan incident will end ROK illusions as to its security situation.

Professor Victor Cha: “Rhee-strait”*: The Origins of the U.S.-ROK Alliance”

Professor Cha began by emphasizing that the Korean War was a victory, not a stalemate, as in evident in the huge success of the modern ROK. Today’s US-ROK alliance is a partnership of common values that “contributes to the public goods of the international community.” But it was not so at the start. Then it was an alliance of convenience, a purely pragmatic arrangement, part of the “hub and spokes” US alliance system in East and Southeast Asia which was distinctly different from the multilateral NATO alliance. The US was interested in alliances in Asia not just to contain the communists but to constrain allies who might draw the US into a major war – “rogue allies” that could be more readily controlled in bilateral relationships. Thus the US-ROK alliance was about deterring the USSR, China, and North Korea but also about containing South Korea. The containment depended on creating economic and political dependency. This is a refinement of theories on the uses of multilateral institutions to control power and dampen unilateralist behavior, in that asymmetries of power tend to shape the degree to which multilateral or bilateral arrangements emerge. Bilateral structures are inherently more efficient and attractive to powerful states seeking to restrict smaller allies; multilateralism appeals to smaller states seeking to limit powerful ones. Unpredictable authoritarian leaders in Asia seemed too dangerous when a war could escalate into a much broader, maybe even nuclear, conflict.

This US approach was combined with the domino theory: seeing it likely that losing one Asian country to the communists would readily lead to losing others. This made the alliances necessary, as long as they created a tight dependency that contained the allies. Taiwan was a case in point, and the ROK and President Rhee was another. Rhee called for seizing the North, suggested the US use nuclear threats to force the Soviets out, proposed pooling Taiwanese and Korean forces to assault the North, insisted the Korean War bring about unification, and therefore opposed the armistice talks and the armistice, even tried to torpedo the talks by unilaterally releasing 25,000 prisoners of war. In fact, the US was trying to restrain Rhee well before the alliance. It periodically considered ousting him, before, during, and after the war. Containment was why the US was reluctant to give the ROK significant offensive military equipment and to leave such equipment behind when US forces were pulled out in 1949. One condition for the Mutual Defense Treaty was that Rhee promise not to act independently and provoke conflict with the North. This was why the US moved to retain operational command over ROK forces, and
why it planned severe reactions to any ROK unilateral military actions: rejection of them by the UN Command, cessation of aid, even using US forces to impose martial law. The joint command was not just to maximize combat efficiency.

Supporting evidence on this explanation for the hub and spokes pattern is how serious efforts to create a more multilateral arrangement were scotched by the US. In 1949 the ROK and Philippines, joined by Taiwan, backed the idea of a “Pacific Pact,” but Acheson said NATO showed this would require a lengthy diplomatic process, and that NATO was a truly mutual alliance while this Pact would have the US providing all the security while risking entrapment in a war. Asian allies were discouraged from talking with each other about it. During the Korean War, the US ignored Chiang’ Kai Shek’s offer of 33,000 troops, seeing this as possibly drawing the US into fighting another war for the Nationalists.

This rationale is less relevant now. But the bilateral relationships are deeply ingrained, have the comfort of the familiar, are institutionalized and thus hard to uproot. East Asia has the only regional security structure based on bilateral alliances. They created “certain mentalities, domestic notions of legitimacy and normalcy about how security was best maintained that continue to be unique to East Asia.” But all this is fading, opening new options for the future.

Professor Samuel S. Kim: “Reactions of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to the U.S.-ROK Alliance”

Professor Kim said the paper title was not his choice and does not fully cover his subject matter, which is much broader: the Sino-Soviet alliance (SSA) in reaction to or interaction with the US-ROK alliance, including the “multiple contradictory forces with several paradoxical consequences” in the history of the SSA. During the Korean War there was no interplay between the alliances – the formal US-ROK alliance came after the war. The Sino-Soviet alliance lasted about 8 years – the US-ROK alliance continues today. That makes the SSA the more normal one. The Korean War initially strengthened the SSA, then helped undermine it. The US was a crucial factor in its formation, then its disintegration. US-China rapprochement, and their “strategic partnership” in the 1990s, descended from when the SSA was formally dissolved in 1979.

Mao sought the SSA for ideological, economic, and strategic reasons: a dire economic situation, no viable ideological third road being available, and the need for international recognition and legitimation. After his “lean to one side” pronouncement on June 30, 1949, Liu Shaoqui was sent to Moscow to seek help, which Stalin agreed to provide. Mao’s subsequent 9-week trip to Moscow involved protracted and difficult negotiations. Stalin tried to recover concessions he had earlier made to Chiang Kai Shek, and avoid a formal alliance. Korea was not on the agenda. The main Soviet security concern was a possible reemergence of Japan’s military power - it was that which made Korea important. When the alliance was signed Article 1 stressed preventing Japan, with any ally, from again pursuing aggression – setting up a socialist association to offset a potential US-Japan anticommunist alliance. Other agreements covered loans and aid, but no Soviet commitment to “liberate” Taiwan. Still, “…the Sino-Soviet alliance stood out as the most significant challenge to Western capitalist supremacy in three centuries.”

Its first major test was the Korean War. Kim, Il Sung originated the idea as early as March 1949, but Stalin said it could trigger war with the US, the Chinese civil war wasn’t yet over, and the DPRK was too weak. A year later Stalin saw the situation as more favorable and told the Chinese – citing Mao’s triumph, the Soviet atomic bomb test, the departure of US troops from Korea, and Acheson’s speech. Mao approved the decision for the war but there is no evidence of joint Sino-Soviet planning of the military operations. After the Inchon landing Stalin became very sensitive about military assistance and intervention, eager to avoid a war with the
US, and asked Mao to intervene. This was a difficult decision, and after it was made Mao still hesitated, until Zhou Enlai and Li Biao visited Stalin on October 9-10.

The war produced 37,000 Americans killed and 137,000 casualties, 400,000 South Korean troops killed, and combined North Korean/Chinese casualties of some 2 million. The North was flattened by US bombing, and much of the rest of the peninsula was destroyed. It left North Koreans with deep resentment, fear and hatred of the US – and was the defining event in forming the North Korean identity. It and the subsequent US presence are condemned as external interference in Korean affairs. The armistice, largely due to China’s efforts, was made possible by Stalin’s death. He had resisted a truce because it tied down US forces, provided intelligence on US military capabilities, drained US economic resources, deepened Beijing’s dependence on him, and lessened chances of Mao becoming another Tito.

The war was the greatest system-transforming event of the early Cold War. It generated the ensuing huge Cold War military budgets, rigidified the Cold War into stark bipolarity, sparked creation of many US alliances, and was a substitute of sorts for World War III. It was the context for SSA and NATO institutionalization. The protracted truce talks helped confirm the US view that talks with the communists were pointless, even counterproductive. It promoted militarization of the Cold War, including Eisenhower threats to use nuclear weapons to bring the negotiations to conclusion. Those threats boosted Beijing’s incentives to get nuclear weapons, and eventually Pyongyang’s as well. The war was decisive in shaping the identities of both Koreas, so deeply rooted they survived the end of the Cold War.

It also cemented the US Cold War identity. Its strategic culture was built on a Manichaean vision of global bipolarity and an omnipresent global threat, as was the Soviet national identity, often driving their behavior well beyond what national “interests” required. China celebrated, and took on the identity of, having forced the world’s strongest power to compromise, to accept it as a negotiating equal, to respect its power. The war is still described in China as a miracle - the weak defeated the strong. But the cost was some 740,000 Chinese casualties (including Mao’s eldest son), no absorption of Taiwan, no early UN membership, severe restrictions on China’s modernization. The alliance with the DPRK sustained China’s one-Korea policy for over thirty years and it displaced the USSR as the dominant influence in Pyongyang. When the ROK developed good relations with Taiwan, tension between the two Koreas and the two Chinas were mutually reinforcing, inhibiting a Sino-ROK rapprochement.

 Initially, the war strengthened the SSA and1953-6 was its golden age. Thousands of Soviet specialists went to China and an equivalent number of Chinese studied in the USSR. There was a huge growth in trade. But frictions and tensions accumulated over Moscow wanting China to pay for aid received in the War, the level of Soviet aid after the war, the Taiwan Straits crises, Khrushchev’s destalinization campaign (1956), Soviet withdrawal of some specialists and canceling various aid projects. The underlying difficulty was Chinese disapproval of its lesser status in the alliance. There was a deepening split until the alliance treaty expired in 1980, with border clashes, Soviet nuclear threats, and eventually China’s rapprochement and a “quasi-alliance” with the US in the 1970s. Chinese relations with the two Koreas remained the same – alliance with one, antagonism with the other.

When Gorbachev reshaped Soviet foreign policy and ended both bipolarity and the Cold War, this included a more normal Sino-Soviet relationship, the opening of normal Soviet-ROK relations, and an end to Soviet support for North Korea. This largely cancelled Pyongyang’s ability to play one against the other, and moved Beijing and Moscow toward agreeing that the Korean problem had to be dealt with for regional peace and security. This cleared the way for a
Sino-Russian “strategic partnership”- not an alliance or united front but a mutual cooperation. The Chinese contrast this with the US alliances which it calls Cold War relics. The partnership has included ending Sino-Russian border disputes and complete demarcation of the border “for the first time in their history.” It has involved dozens of summit and other high-level meetings, military cooperation, agreement on mutual nonaggression, agreement of detargeting of nuclear weapons and no first use of them against each other, cultural cooperation, trade agreements, etc. They jointly opposed NATO expansion, American BMD efforts, Western humanitarian interventions, the revised US-Japan alliance guidelines, and a unipolar international system, in reaction to both being treated by the US as latent threats.

Hence, this is not a classic alliance to balance US power but a form of “soft balancing against the US unilateralism which reached its apogee in the Bush administration’s trashing of multilateralism and abandoning many multilateral agreements or endeavors. They seek to balance against American behavior cheaply, without damaging their economic ties with the US. So the partnership is not explicable within traditional realist balance of power theory. Since the US has much greater economic interaction with China, and vice-verse, it is questionable how strong the partnership will be in the future. The US remains the most crucial factor - it has driven them close and it might easily pry them apart.

Discussants

Professor Mok, Jin-wu disclaimed any expertise on American or Soviet alliances and focused on the Kim, Taewoo paper. The OPCON transfer agreement is certainly controversial. Dr. Kim’s arguments for delaying the transfer suggest the following questions. First, if the ROK is an independent country why shouldn’t it control its own forces? Next, the ROK must upgrade its forces for any future war and the US might not take part in it. This is very costly, so why shouldn’t the ROK totally control the forces involved in these changes? Finally, the ROK is much stronger militarily than North Korea – more modern forces, much better equipment. Why should it continue relying on the US? The transfer proponents’ arguments make more sense.

Professor Young Whan Kihl had some preliminary observations, and a general question on each paper. He said he was 18 when the War started, served 5 years in the ROK army, and then came to the US. Interest in the war is now widespread – there was a recent conference at Stanford in connection with the 60th anniversary, and a recent Korean movie on ROK soldiers’ heroism. He mentioned that his recent book on the alliance stresses the politics of asymmetry, discussed by Cha, and the politics of national identity, which Samuel Kim assessed. A new book, One Alliance-Two Lenses, covers many of these matters as well. He asked Kim, Taewoo what the impact on ROK domestic politics is when Pyongyang constantly denies committing very provocative actions, something it is doing now? He wondered, on the Cha paper, what we can say about national identity problems and the alliance that must be faced in the years ahead. He found Samuel Kim’s paper very impressive and asked what options the US has now. Should it take up offshore balancing (a Mearsheimer argument, echoing Mackinder and Mahan)? After all it is a maritime power.

Panel Responses

Samuel Kim went first. In the globalization era we find shifting threats but no actual “enemies.” The major need is establishing congruence between foreign policy and domestic politics. Balancing, in the older sense, is out of date – a relic of Cold War thinking. Cha approached assessed the future of the alliance by identifying the three major drivers of US alliances in Asia over the years. In the Cold War the driver was external threats. After the Cold War it was the members’ common values. Now it is populism.
Kim, Taewoo responded to the question about North Korean provocations by saying that the Cheonan incident made the public quite unhappy, enough to damage the government in local elections, but less so than is typical. In the long run, the incident will further isolate North Korea, and its increased economic difficulties will further damage its legitimacy and respect in the ROK. On the OPCON transfer, the ROK is not a slave in the alliance – the old argument for the change. It needs the alliance – not freedom from it. As for the ROK’s military capabilities, some young people suffer from statistical hallucinations – the North Korean threat is real. I worked on the OPCON transfer while employed in the government; how it goes will depend on the readiness of the ROK, which the two militaries believe is getting much better. It will also depend on broader conditions and they are not congenial now: Kim, Jong-il’s stroke, the North Korean nuclear tests, the Cheonan incident which is outright aggression, recent strains in the US-Japan alliance, etc. As for how to deal with North Korea, the short answer is “very carefully,” keeping in mind that the status quo is increasingly more costly.

Dinner Address – “The Legacy of the Korean War in Asia”

As usual in COKUS conferences, the dinner was generously sponsored by the ROK Minister of National Defense, the honorable Kim, Tae-young. General Tilielli introduced the Minister’s representative, Rear Admiral Kyo, Pil Chung. The speaker was Professor John P. Duncan, distinguished specialist in East Asian history in the Department of Asian Languages and Cultures and History, and Director of the Center of Korean Studies, at UCLA.

Dr. Duncan indicated that his expertise is in premodern Korean history, not well suited to his topic. My many trips there have often overlapped with significant events. I first went to Korea at 19 as a serviceman, and was there when President Lyndon Johnson visited Korea in 1966, which seems to have led to an attack on an American patrol. Then in January 1968 North Korea attempted to assassinate President Park. There was the seizure of the Pueblo, and eventually the downing of a plane. I returned to the ROK to study just when Park was trying to amend the constitution, provoking daily student demonstrations, complete with tear gas – US army tear gas at that. In the fall of 1971 Park declared martial law and later had the armed forces break into the campuses. They were closed and Korea University became a military camp. A professor Kim had circulated a petition on retaining the democracy. It was in his office on the closed campus and he asked me to go there to pick it up since he could not. I went to the gate and confronted the students, telling them I was only seeking some of Kim’s books. Allowed to pass I went to his office and got the statement/petition but instead of taking the risk of carrying it out I burned it. When I told him what had happened he was relieved. (20 years later, at UCLA, he came to me and asked what happened to the petition – it would have been a great historical document!) I left Korea just when Park cancelled democracy due to the state of war with North Korea.

Here is a personal illustration of Korean War legacies. While studying in Korea as an undergraduate I fell in love. She was beautiful and very smart. I finally convinced her to marry me, then it took months to convince her mother, and perhaps 18 months to convince her father! One reason, perhaps, was her father’s loneliness. He was from North Korea and had only his immediate family in the ROK. A major worry about a family in North Korea was that it might have a bad class background. Years later and after many efforts to contact them, a letter came in 1994 indicating they were all alive, none in concentration camps, all poor but not persecuted. Contact has been maintained ever since, and we send them food through China. But the pain of separation is severe.
A big legacy of the War is profound mistrust on both sides. There has been discussion about pursuing regional integration, inspired by the EU, but chances of this are seriously hampered by various states’ past wars with Japan, the many territorial disputes that strain relations, and serious disputes over history some of which have pushed Korean sentiments away from the US and toward China in recent years. Prospects for integration are poor. However, economic integration is very high and rising and this may lay foundations for progress in other areas. Still, Korea is a major stumbling bloc – the division of the peninsula, the state of war, the behavior of the North, the very harsh attitudes in the ROK, US, and Japan on North Korea at various times.

North Korea is not imploding, as some have hoped. It won’t go away. The US should respond to North Korean calls for a peace treaty to formally end the War. What are the risks? The risk of perhaps looking weak, or encouraging bad behavior by the North, or others. The possible benefits? Easing North-South and US-North Korean relations. Perhaps greater progress on the nuclear weapons issue. Maybe progress on regional integration. And easing the sorrow and pain of the Korean War.

My father-in-law died last year. He never saw his family members in the North. They are elderly now. Will my generation see them? I hope so – in my lifetime.

In thanking the speaker, David Kang pointed to this presentation, and Professor Lee’s at lunch, as showing how the War continues to deeply affect Koreans, and Americans who love Korea. It was a powerful presentation. With that, the conference adjourned until the following day.

PANEL IV: OPERATIONAL COOPERATION BETWEEN KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE KOREAN WAR

Moderator: General Kim, Jae-Chang, ROKS (retired), Co-Chairman of COKUS

Paper Presenters:
Professor Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr, US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, formerly at the Defense Intelligence Agency and Senior Analyst for Northeast Asia on the Joint Staff in the Department of Defense

Captain Park, Chang-kwoun, Research Fellow, Director of Policy Planning Studies at the Center for Security and Strategic Studies, Korea Institute for Defense Analysis

Professor Terence J. Roehrig, US Naval War College, author of two books on the US-ROK alliance and one (forthcoming) on ROK political and military affairs.

Discussants:
Professor Hun, Nam-sung Korea National Defense University (emeritus) and former Dean of the Faculty at KNDU

Dr. Hugo Wheegook Kim, President, East-West Research Institute, Editor-in-chief of International Journal of Korean Studies, and Co-Coordinator of COKUS

Papers
Professor Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr, “Cooperation of U.S. and South Korean Air and Ground Forces During the Korean War”

The presentation began by emphasizing that the Korean War was a wake-up call for the US, which had been emphasizing threats in Europe and supporting/rebuilding allies there. Americans knew little about Korea; those posted there usually did not speak Korean. Bechtol
approached the topic by comparing Soviet assistance to North Korean forces with how the US treated the ROK. The two air forces, for instance, received quite different treatment. The NKAF was trained and equipped by the USSR, in the DPRK and the Soviet Union, and this intensified in 1949. The Soviets supplied about 210 planes by 1950, including 100 attack aircraft and some 80 fighters. In contrast, ROKAF pilots received almost no formal training, and no combat planes until after the war started, partly because of fear the ROK might attack the North. Thus the South had no fighters to interdict DPRK planes and could not provide close air support to its ground forces; the North had complete air superiority.

The Soviet approach was to quickly establish a strong North Korean government – the ROK government remained weak and somewhat unstable. The North could focus on building its forces around a Soviet emphasis on offensive capabilities, while the ROK faced instability and insurrections so its forces were used for policing and maintaining order, not preparing for a war. The Soviets provided artillery weapons and numerous tanks, especially the rugged T-34, and equipped and helped train 7 divisions, including Koreans who had fought in the Chinese civil war. The US had helped the ROK assemble 8 divisions but with limited artillery and no significant antitank weapons. Obviously, US intelligence either failed to detect the buildup in the North or thought it would not attack. ROK ground forces were no match for North Korean forces.

The US Far Eastern Air Forces on the eve of the war had done little training in close air support and had few planes configured for it. Replacing P-51s with F-80s had begun but the latter had less loitering capability. This reflected USAF concentration on a possible war with the Soviet Union not small wars. Naval aviation faced severe cutbacks after World War II, and the Marines had even greater cuts. Overall, there was considerable interservice rivalry, little preparation for small wars, huge budget cuts, and a focus primarily on the Soviet threat. The occupation units in Japan were in a relaxed posture, doing little training and experiencing heavy budget cuts, then were introduced piecemeal into the fighting. The Koreans augmenting those forces were raw recruits. The Marine Corps units were combat ready, and the Air Force and Navy destroyed North Korea’s air force in the first few weeks. But there were no useable ROK airfields at first so sorties were flown from Japan, making piston craft more valuable than jets for close air support. There was no forward air control system until some trainers were used for this purpose. In the early ground fighting the army forces were underarmed and ill prepared. The Marines had better equipment for dealing with tanks and artillery, and made a big difference at the Pusan perimeter. All the forces had to adapt rapidly.

One lesson was the need to prepare for a variety of conflicts in various places – US forces were too focused on another great European war, probably nuclear. Another lesson was that in providing aid and training close attention must be paid to the ally’s main threat – its forces, readiness, etc. If ROK officers say there are gaps in ROK defensive capabilities today the US should pay attention, which is obviously relevant for the OPCON transfer. A third lesson is to attend to an ally’s culture, politics, and motivations and have relevant language skills, etc. The US lacked all this in 1945-1950, which generated many mistakes.

Park, Chang-Kwoun, “The Naval Cooperation Between Korea and the United States in the Korean War”

When the war began, Captain Park indicated, North Korea had about 110 naval vessels, 30 torpedo boats and smaller armed vessels, the rest being support boats – fishing craft and others - and one large transport ship. The ROK had 27 patrol ships and soon received more from the US. Initially, the navy did better at interdicting North Korean efforts at sea than the ground forces record on land. Overall, in June-August 1950 the main naval operations were defensive
and rescue oriented, in September-November they were offensive and counterattack oriented, and in 1951 on they were re-offensive and stalemate in character. Operations included transport, blockade, gunfire support, amphibious landings, assaults, minesweeping, and the securing of strategic islands. The UN forces had sea control for operating freely. Their only direct challenge came very early in the war in a disastrous defeat for the North, which did not repeat the effort.

At first transport was vital – the US moved 55 ships with 15,000 troops, 17,000 vehicles and other military supplies to Busan within the first ten days. In addition to aiding in defensive efforts, a US carrier task force began bombing Pyongyang. Then came the Inchon and Wonsan landings, the former a turning point in the war, the latter an important demonstration of the difficulties mines posed (they held up landings for two weeks). Huge evacuation efforts followed the Chinese intervention and the military stalemate operations later on. 17 ROK transport vessels took part in these actions, aided by ships brought from Japan.

The ROK navy could offer little fire support and mainly operated in shallow coastal waters dangerous for larger UN ships – on minesweeping, blockades, evacuations, etc. UN forces blockaded above the 37th parallel, the ROK navy below it, especially the southwestern coast and its islands. Fifteen ROK ships were in the Inchon landing, with ROK elements first sneaking into Deokjeok Island and Yeongheung Island to gather valuable intelligence. With US Navy help the ROK navy also mounted assaults along the coasts and harassed the enemy from behind. Much effort went into minesweeping. The enemy laid 4000 mines, the most serious naval threat to UN forces - causing the most ship losses. The navy also seized strategic islands useful for guerrilla attacks, gathering intelligence, and blockades.

This history has various implications for today. The North Korean navy still has asymmetric capabilities in submarines, mini-submarines, shore-to-ship cruise missiles, torpedo boats, fast amphibious landing craft, and coastal artillery. The main task is to negate these capabilities. The ROK navy is, of course, better equipped and prepared than it was then, and cooperation with the US navy greatly increases its combat power – the Korean War demonstrated the synergistic effect of cooperation in enhancing both navies.

Next, controlling the seas for sea lane security can be decisive, as it was in the War. Third, the US Navy’s presence can be very important, as it was then, so a quick reaction capability is vital. The US and Britain rapidly deployed cruisers, destroyers, and a carrier, supplemented by ships from Japan and the ROK Navy in the War. It is important to have similar assets available now, on the front line, to deal with a surprise attack, the most likely form of a North Korean attack. Also important are capabilities for meeting asymmetric threats. In a future war North Korea will try to inhibit the allied naval operations in numerous ways. Fifth, the ROK Navy, noting the US Navy’s limits in close inshore operations, must prepare to provide supplemental capabilities for amphibious and other coastal operations. Sixth, the ROK Navy must be ready for ground operations in the enemy’s rear - there are many precision naval weapons now for long range support of land operations. Seventh, allied naval cooperation helps ROK acquisition of advanced military equipment and technology and in other naval improvements – the ROK navy really developed this way, starting with the Korean War.

Professor Terence Roehrig, “Coming to South Korea’s Aid: the Contributions of the UNC Coalition”

Professor Roehrig was unable to attend for health reasons; presentation of the paper was by Hugo Kim. The UN Security Council called on members to assist South Korea and 16 countries sent military assistance while 5 offered medical units. A few others sent financial help. Those that joined in the military effort often did so out of memories of the failures of
appeasement in the 1930s. The Security Council established the United Nations Command, with MacArthur designated as commander, and the ROK gave the Command control of its forces. While the State Department and Truman wanted widespread participation in the war for political and legitimacy purposes, the Pentagon feared this would harm military effectiveness through problems of integration, forces with little to offer, etc. Taiwan’s offer of forces was rejected to prevent Chinese involvement. The US eventually arranged to help finance others’ involvement if they pledged to repay later.

The other military participants were: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Columbia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, he Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and the UK. Their motivations varied. One was security, such as concern about a communist threat and a desire to joint NATO (Greece and Turkey) and the desire for a separate alliance with the US (Australia and New Zealand, Thailand, the Phillipines), or to strengthen collective security via NATO (some NATO members) or the UN (Ethiopia). Another was a closer link with the US for other purposes (South Africa). Their contributions varied considerably as well - see Table One

Australian air power played a valuable role and its ground forces saw considerable action. Canadian destroyers and air transport planes were important in holding the Pusan perimeter and the ground forces had a good record. The Columbian battalion was overrun after tough fighting by a Chinese division in defending Hill 266 (Old Baldy), earning numerous medals and commendations. The Ethiopian battalion was notable in close combat and claimed to have never had a member taken prisoner or left on the battlefield. The French battalion fought major engagements in numerous places, receiving 3 presidential unit citations. Greek soldiers fought very well and felt relatively at home in the rough terrain and cold winters. The Dutch force was involved in several major engagements. New Zealand naval ships participated in the Inchon landing, and its ground unit was important in blunting a Chinese assault. Philippino soldiers saw heavy action against the spring 1951 Chinese offensive. The South African fighter squadron had over 800 pilots fly more that 12,000 sorties. Thai forces were in several battles including the seizure and holding of Pork Chop Hill in November 1952. The Turks established a reputation for being somewhat undisciplined but ferocious, refusing to give ground in several significant engagements. UK forces were in the Pusan perimeter fighting and in ferocious combat on many other occasions - after one, General Van fleet described the British effort as “the most outstanding example of unit bravery in modern warfare.” British naval units were also very active. India, Denmark, Italy, Norway, and Sweden sent medical units to both sides, but mainly to UN forces. India had the largest non-US medical unit, one so impressive that troops from other nations with inadequate units sought care from the Indians.

Initially, there was some question whether all the forces pledged were needed. Then China’s entry led the US to call for all the pledged help and much more. Increased fighting led to more controversy about the war and more reluctance to participate. Many countries were recovering from World War II with publics tired of war. Many potential contributors were far from Korea, posing logistical challenges. Latin American governments disliked the US wanting reimbursement later, and thought the war was unimportant for their interests, so their participation was limited.

The non-Korean, non-US contributions came to 6.3% of UNC forces – the ROK and US provided 23.3% and 70.4%. The war was an interesting initial effort in collective security, but certainly not the first in coalition warfare, and the latter have continued right down to today – such as the operation against piracy off the Somali coast. In military effectiveness, many contributor forces were important in significant battles and suffered numerous casualties – US
soldiers often held these forces in high regard. But the Joint Chiefs later tended to describe others’ help as limited (except the South Koreans) – the US did nearly all the fighting, took most of the casualties, paid all the bills. Most contributors relied on US supplies, transportation, weapons, ammunition. In turn, promised US repayments were often slow in coming. One problem was that the war effort was a crisis operation and many of the forces took over 6 months to be trained, equipped, and transported.

Of the 16 participating in fighting, 9 were from NATO or the British Commonwealth, indicating Western dominance of the war. But having others was somewhat valuable politically. And the UN embargo of strategic goods was probably as important in crippling the enemy as sending troops – participation was much broader in that than in the fighting. Finally, the war had a huge impact in firming up NATO, and demonstrated that NATO members had interests in Asian security affairs.

TABLE ONE

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<tr>
<th>Ground Troops</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>8 divisions</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>2 infantry brigades</td>
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<td>2 artillery regiments</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1 armored regiment</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
<td>1 infantry battalion</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1 battalion</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>1 infantry brigade</td>
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<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1 infantry battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1 infantry battalion</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>1 infantry battalion</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
<td>1 infantry battalion</td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1 platoon</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1 infantry battalion</td>
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<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Regimental combat team</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1 fighter squadron</td>
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<td>Regimental combat team</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1 infantry brigade</td>
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Discussants
Dr. Huh, Nam-sung said he was 3 years old when the War began, living in a small city about 10 miles south of the 38th parallel. The family evacuated – his 15 year old sister carried him on her back. Three members of the family were lost in the war. My memories are like a “fragmented black and white picture.” He said the Bechtol paper was enjoyable, well balanced, with very good coverage of the topic and a nice discussion of aviation capabilities and limitations. It offers outstanding analysis, and overall I agree with it. The paper notes the poor language skills and cultural knowledge of the Americans, but the US came to what it saw as conquered, not liberated, territory. That is why it set up a military government and no one was sent who knew the language. An occupied area was to be punished, and that is why the Americans seemed to Koreans as just replacing the Japanese. The paper also stresses, in dealing with an ally, taking the enemy’s capabilities into account. If so, shouldn’t the US remove the distance limits it imposes today on the missiles the ROK develops?

The Park paper talks about steps that should be taken today, but resources are limited. The two navies at least complemented each other and cooperated well during the war and the paper says they are complementary now. Then it goes into the North Korean asymmetrical naval capabilities as a threat. What does the ROK need to deal with this threat and how will the US be of help?

Dr. Hugo Wheegook Kim found the Roehrig paper well-balanced and instructive. The Korean War was a product of the dual occupation, and was the first limited war in the Cold War. The coalition reflected the will to fight communist expansion, and initiated collective security efforts in Asia. Korea had lacked an independent relationship to the world for years, and the War meant foreign soldiers coming and numerous international relationships. For instance, the ROK has good relations with Turkey to this day. It invites Korean War veterans from participating countries to visit the ROK to commemorate their contributions. Exposure to the US in and after the war brought training and education programs for ROK soldiers on the importance of freedom and equality. Many Korean began going to the US as students and learning more about democracy.

As especially valuable contribution of the UN coalition was a range of enhancements of Korean economic development. The ROK had instability and insurgency problems before the war, which complicated efforts to tackle the nation’s economic problems. An important aspect of the war was spreading capitalism concepts. Historically, Koreans treated wealth negatively, as a product of corruption and exploitation. Introducing the idea of the “profit motive” and undermining the Confucian tradition of disparaging people engaged in trade and other commerce was a major shift. Such shifts normally take a long time – centuries in Europe; the Korean War and US (and others’) involvements with Korea speeded this up, along with industrialization and the development of democracy.

In addition, the war contributed in numerous ways to rapid postwar development. The alliance let the ROK benefit from years of lower defense spending. US aid added considerable capital formation and provided many overseas educational opportunities. ROK defense spending often involved important fixed capital, including roads, dams, river improvements, airports, and communication networks. Defense R & D and military procurement expedited technology transfers to the civilian sector, as in aerial surveying, mapping, etc. Military activities led to considerable manpower training, plus teaching people to manage jobs, organizations, and equipment. Defense efforts contributed to building patriotism, installing a sense of discipline, sacrifice, and a determination to work hard. Then US imports became the cornerstone of ROK economic growth under the Park, Chung-hee government. As a result, the Korean GNP per capita went from $876 (estimated) in 1950 to $28,000 in 2009, with the US GNP per capita
dropping from 11 times greater than the ROK’s to only 1.7 times greater. Another outcome is the Korean diaspora that emerged from the war and Korea’s economic development, and the diversification of Korean society.

Today there is considerable anti-Americanism in the ROK. Its roots are in the anti-foreigner nationalism of the Japanese occupation era, the efforts of North Koreans to sustain a communist regime, the socialist elements and feelings aroused by ROK economic growth, heightening of income differences at the expense of small business and the working class, and suppression of student opposition. There is also an innate feeling of superiority to other peoples in many Koreans, with opposition to friendly relations with almost any outsiders. There is the younger generation’s distance from the Korean War and the North’s totalitarianism, plus political manipulation of anti-US attitudes in 2002 and thereafter, resulting in immature views about the US which were reinforced by US unilateralism under the Bush Administration. The two countries must work harder to facilitate understanding and cooperation – their relationship is too important to damage.

General Discussion

General Tilelli suggested that Bechtol say something about defense cuts in the interwar period and how they affected US forces early in the war. The US always cuts its defense spending too much after its wars. He also suggested that Park be careful with the concept of asymmetrical warfare. Submarine and anti-submarine warfare is not asymmetrical warfare. A Korean member of the audience commended the Bechtol paper discussion of ROK military weaknesses in 1950. The government was talking about attacking the North when the North had tanks, artillery, etc.! It misled all of us on this. The US knew all this, of course. Why did it let the ROK remain so weak?

James Matray (California State University, Chico) urged that we not ignore the context. There were large border clashes in 1948-9, most instigated by the ROK! The conflict really started back in 1948-9. And the rapid military buildup in the North was in the first half of 1950, just before the war. William Stueck, on one of Tilelli’s remarks, said the US had done much better after the Korean War in sustaining American forces.

Opening panelists’ responses, Bechtol said that while there were border skirmishes in the preceding two years the war didn’t start until June 1950. Why didn’t the US better arm the ROK? It didn’t trust Rhee, and it really wanted a ROK police force, not a regular army. On asymmetric warfare, Tilelli is right – submarines and antishub operations are not asymmetrical. But using subs in such an unusual way to attack the Cheonan makes that look asymmetrical. On US defense cuts after wars, the peace dividend in the 1990s clearly hurt US military capabilities significantly. Park said his use of “asymmetrical” referred to operations it is hard to control. North Korea poses a real threat of this sort. Our threat conceptions need to be adjusted, and also our capabilities, in many areas. Also needed is continuation of US extended deterrence. On Japanese assistance in the Korean War, borrowed Japanese vessels participated in minesweeping, evacuations, and some other operations.

General Kim brought the discussion to a close saying that in his experience it is very difficult to run combined operations without considerable prior training, preparations, etc. Unity of command is important, very valuable in a war when rapid decision making is crucial. A standing combined command can therefore make a difference. The CFC has a significant role – it should be upgraded now, not disbanded.

PANEL V: The Lessons of the Korean War for Future Peace in the Asia-Pacific Region
Moderator: Professor David Kang, University of Southern California School of International Relations and Marshall School of Business; Director of the Korean Studies Institute.

Paper Presenters:
Professor Kim, Doung-joong, Kyonggi University Professor of Russian Studies, former Dean of the College of International Studies.
Professor Patrick Morgan, University of California, Irvine, Member of the Board of COKUS.
Professor Andrew Scobell, Texas A&M University, Bush School of Government and Public Service; Author - two books on China’s security concerns and use of force abroad.

Discussants
Dr. Song, Dae-sung, President of the Sejong Institute, brigadier general of ROKAF (ret.), author of numerous books on Korean security affairs.
Dr. Bruce W, Bennett, research leader for strategy, force planning, and counterproliferation – RAND Corporation International Security and Defense Policy Center.

Papers:
Before the presentations the moderator gave the podium to a Visiting Fellow in engineering at USC from China, who had earlier suggested that not having a Chinese speaker at the conference was a mistake. In his view the Korean War really only began when China joined the fighting. Before then it was a civil war in which the US intervened. Thus in China the war is called a “War against America to Assist Korea.”

Professor Kim, Doug-joong: “The Lessons of the Korean War for Regional Peace in the Future: A Korean Perspective”
In opening remarks Dr. Kim suggested that while few can bend history, many can contribute to it. He came to the conference in part to thank Korean War veterans; without them “I would be living in a North-run Korea.” Over 2000 Californians were killed, missing, or prisoners of war. But there seem to be no US veterans of the War at the conference! Kim said his original intent was to discuss possibilities of North-South reconciliation, but the attack on the Cheonan on March 26 made that an overambitious task. Unfortunately the reaction by South Korean people has been muted, with some caught up in other matters (the World Cup), some treating the detailed media coverage of the attack like it was a computer game.

The Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group (25 Korean and 24 foreign experts from the US, Australia, the UK and Sweden) concluded the sinking was caused by a homing torpedo, with characteristics of a type of North Korean torpedo, very likely fired by a North Korean submarine. Apparently 2 subs were involved. Bruce Bechtol has explained [in a nonconference publication] that this is the latest of a series of NK provocations seeking to change the de facto western sea border. The attack shifted the atmosphere considerably, with Presidents Lee and Obama announcing in June that the OPCON transfer will be delayed several years. President Lee said the attack violated the UN Charter, the Armistice Agreement, and the Basic Agreement between North and South. In May the ROK said it may redesignate North Korea as its “main enemy,” reversing Kim, Dae-jung’s move in 2004. What North Korea will do next is impossible to predict. The ROK is willing to have better relations only when it eliminates its nuclear weapons, so the stalemate will last for some time.

In the US the Korean War is often called the “forgotten war.” This was partly due to Americans having tired of the Vietnam War some years later. But American can never forget the
War completely. In May Secretary of State Clinton reaffirmed that the ROK is a strong ally, friend, and partner, that the US is fully committed to its security, that the North can end its isolation, poverty, and international condemnation if its leaders want to. While many believe the conflict can only be ended by resuming the 6-Party Talks, the UN is the focus at the moment and the Security Council won’t toughen existing sanctions much, because of China’s opposition. And the main US priority these days is Iran. However, Russia might help, and the ROK should work hard to persuade it to do so. It was a mistake to exclude China and North Korea from the Investigation Group.

Koreans need to learn more about the Korean War, which they are not eager to do, because it is still going on. Here are 3 major lessons from it:
1) Revise our history of it. A recent US Congressional resolution recounts the war’s main events but not the participation of Russian pilots. (Dr. Kim said he had written a book about Soviet pilots in the War which is not popular in China.) The US has always known Soviet pilots were involved but has not highlighted this. Their mission was to guard against American planes crossing the Yalu. More than 3 Soviet air divisions participated. The ROK, like the US, also says little about this. If the US had fully controlled the air at the outset it might well have destroyed the bridges over the Yalu.
2) Correct the casualty figures and memorials. There are various Korean War veterans’ memorials in the US but no memorial built or funded by Koreans to give thanks for American participation. Statistics on Americans killed in action (KIA) range from 33,642 to 54,246 – the highest figure is at the US Korean War Memorial in Washington, DC, the lowest on the ROK War Memorial at Yongsan. Previous ROK administrations used the lower figure, and maximized ROK casualties, to make US sacrifices look smaller. US figures include battle deaths and other deaths in service in and out of the theater - a Congressional resolution of 2010 says it was 36,940. Korean estimates of ROK KIAs range from 450,000 to the 137,250 cited by the 60th Anniversary of the Korean War Commemoration Committee. The US and ROK governments should try to agree on the figures, to give today’s Koreans a better sense of the War and the US role.
3) Prepare for another attack. Military preparedness is vital. When the War started ROK army elements that took the possibility of an attack seriously did much better, in the fighting at Choocheon - actually repelling the North Koreans, than those who did not. The Cheonan was sunk by a surprise attack, one of several severe North Korean surprise attacks over the years, and the ROK must be better prepared to respond, including better martial arts and physical fitness education for students. It should be seen as the second Korean War. (Dr. Kim mentioned that one of his students was among those killed.)

The Korean War has never ended. There has been no substantial change in North Korean behavior over the years. Korean Defense White Papers describe the threat and over the years it has remained the same. As long as this is the case peace and security in the region will remain fragile. The last two ROK administrations sought to be pro-North Korean and distance the ROK from the US. The Cheonan incident reminds us the threat remains and the lessons of the Korean War must not be forgotten. The US and ROK should continue working together for the next 60 years!

Dr. Patrick Morgan, “Some Lessons for Today from the Korean War”

It is particularly appropriate now to look back at the War, which has suffered from neglect. This is unjustified – the war was an important turning point in modern world history and had a major impact on domestic affairs in several nations. Here are at least some of its lessons for today. First is the importance of the historical context. Without its specific setting in 1950 the War might have been treated as a minor civil conflict. But it came just after the new Soviet satellite governments in Eastern Europe, the first Soviet nuclear test, the establishment of NATO,
and Mao’s triumph in China and the Sino-Soviet alliance. As a result the US was starting to draw containment lines but with rising concern that enough had not been done. The fighting in Korea confirmed this, suggesting the Kremlin would seize on any opportunity to forcibly expand its bloc. NSC-68 had called for a huge US/Western military buildup – now debate on this ended. President Truman and others felt that not helping defend the ROK would undermine US credibility with Moscow and US allies in Europe. In addition, lessons about 1930s appeasement failures now seemed to apply. All this made the Korean War important.

The second lesson is that startling consequences can flow from a ‘little” war. A partial list of the effects of the War includes:

1) it cemented bipolarity in place, in international politics and in our related theoretical analyses, leading to the US combining a strongly “realist” approach to the communist world with a Wilsonian approach for relations with friends and allies. Viewing a conflict as absolutist – between good and evil - reappeared again after 9/11.

2) it provoked militarization of the Cold War as an incipient war necessitating huge forces (on both sides) on high readiness. During and just after the War the US sent large forces to Europe, Western Europeans substantially rearmed, Soviet and East European forces grew, Chinese forces expanded, and the two Koreas built huge armies.

3) it led to more US alliances, to prevent future Soviet attacks because a US commitment was unclear or unexpressed, with the Philippines, Japan, the ROK, Taiwan, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand, plus the SEATO and CENTO pacts, and informal alliances with Israel, Saudi Arabia, South Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and Sweden. West Germany, Turkey and Greece were added to NATO. The NATO and ROK alliances included peacetime integrated commands, a major innovation. One Soviet response was the Warsaw Pact, hardening the division of Germany and Europe.

4) it froze Sino-US relations for two decades; they became among the most dangerous in the world. This helped turn the Cold War into a true global conflict.

5) The US desire to avoid a future debilitating, inconclusive war led it to the strategy of Massive Retaliation based on a vast nuclear arsenal. The Soviet Union would eventually match this buildup and, like all other nuclear powers, imitate the strategy.

6) In stimulating the nuclear weapons buildup and showing that a significant East-West conventional war could be limited, the War strongly promoted development of deterrence theory to guide security strategy. It helped suggest the existence of a “nuclear taboo” which has helped prevent the use of nuclear weapons ever since. Fighting limited wars was controversial then and ever since, with many Americans still opposed to ever settling for less than decisive victory.

7) the War embodied the difficulties of coalition wars, even when the US is in charge. Dealing with them is a central part of US-alliance relations today.

8) the War was important in being ultimately indecisive. This has led to endless friction, confrontation, and crises, huge military expenditures for the two Koreas, North Korean development of nuclear weapons, and forestalling creation of any regional security arrangement, keeping Northeast Asia a very dangerous place.

The third lesson is that “small” wars can have major domestic effects. One in the US was the practice of the president entering a war without a declaration of war. Another is that the War undermined Truman’s career, something that has happened to several presidents since. The War also led to a peacetime draft and a vast semi-permanent military establishment. In the Soviet Union the War helped create a deep premature and excessive involvement in East Asian affairs, including the Sino-Soviet dispute, which overtaxed its resources, contributing to its exhaustion and the end of the Cold War. The impact on Japan was dramatic, immediately stimulating its economic recovery and providing an alliance and long-term US military presence, enabling it to forego heavy defense spending and concentrate on development. The War forced China into
even greater dependence on the USSR which, when Moscow would not bear the necessary costs, generated rising friction and the Sino-Soviet dispute. It also gave the PLA a much larger role in Chinese politics until the 1970s.

In the ROK after the war there was significant political turmoil leading to military rule and limited economic and social progress. It would be almost a decade before the country shifted to rapid progress and rising national cohesion. The opposite occurred in the North. It rebounded rapidly with huge Soviet and Chinese aid and the government became better consolidated, pulling well ahead of the South. But this ultimately tied the regime’s legitimacy and stability to a Stalinist approach that quickly became outdated. It became isolated when the Soviet bloc disappeared, and its declining legitimacy and inability to compete with the ROK have driven the pursuit of nuclear weapons that now reinforces the isolation.

A fourth lesson is the importance of attending to regional security management. After 1945 the US paid too little attention to northeast Asia and thus did not prevent and was not prepared for the War. Then it settled for a truce with no enduring settlement making the region insecure ever since. The result is a version of the chicken-and-egg problem: cooperative regional security management requires a Korean settlement and a settlement is impossible because there is no cooperative regional security management. Troubles in Korea still attract global attention and intervention, just as in 1950. Another lesson concerns the complexities of multilateral security management. The War was the first Security Council attempt to multilaterally impose peace and security. It was so onerous it was not seriously attempted again until the Gulf War. It has been difficult ever since to get Security Council approval for a major military action. And the War displayed the difficulties of multilateral military endeavors – disagreements on strategy, specific operations, the length of the effort, who makes the crucial decisions, the autonomy of military commanders, even on possible use of nuclear weapons and whether to occupy enemy territory.

The War was far more consequential than anyone expected, demonstrating how such conflicts are very unpredictable. This is important to keep in mind in contemplating possible conflicts now with an Iran or a North Korea.

Dr. Andrew Scobell, “China’s Lessons from the Korean War in the 21st Century”

After thanking the organizers for the invitation to such a fascinating conference, and for avoiding a schedule conflict with the next US and ROK games in the World Cup, Professor Scobell said that to honor the British and other forces that fought in the Korean War he was wearing a Black Watch tie. He began his presentation by citing a typical overview: since the Korean War the world has changed. China, Japan, and South Korea have boomed, the Cold War is over, the Soviet Union has disappeared. The exception is North Korea – an anachronism, stuck in a time warp, volatile and dangerous - a “powder-keg state.” In 1950 it became a major Chinese preoccupation, cancelling the invasion of Taiwan and national unification, and it remains so today. The War is seen as China successfully standing up to the world’s strongest country, reversing the national humiliation inflicted for over 100 years. But hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers died or were wounded, and the chance to seize Taiwan was lost. There are several lessons Beijing seems to have drawn.

One is that the United States is not to be feared, but must be taken seriously. It can be confronted, is not invincible - China was not intimidated and survived in 1950-1953. It was a calculated gamble and the government tried to limit the risks by not declaring war and labeling its soldiers “volunteers.” It learned from fighting the US, including the necessity to play to China’s strengths in such a conflict. Another lesson might be termed “never again” and has two versions. In one, China should do what it can to avoid another intervention militarily in Korea. This is a
minority view; the dominant view is that the war was necessary and the nation acted properly. It showed China should not be ignored, and reinforced the credibility of Chinese threats. The other version is that if China ever has to intervene it should not be half-hearted - not leave a bad situation to fester. This could mean getting rid of the Kim family regime, or occupying much of North Korea for an extended period, or pursuing a peace treaty or other arrangement to finally end the Korean War and get a satisfactory North-South relationship.

A third lesson is that China should give much more attention to its primary objective - the outcome it desires. Today Beijing wants peace and stability, particularly in its neighborhood. How is this to be achieved? It feels North Korea must end its isolation, and has worked hard to persuade the DPRK to do this, but it also feels the US must reassure Pyongyang it does not seek the collapse of that government and it has worked hard on this in the six-party talks. Unclear is whether unification is an objective; what is clear is that Beijing wants the outcome is to come about peacefully. It wants a soft landing in North Korea and a more stable and moderate regime so that tensions subside. This might mean the end of the regime and unification.

A fourth lesson is that Beijing should use all its elements of national power but not rule out the use of force. Force is a last resort, and it now has much more political standing, economic influence, and diplomatic leverage. So coordinating these elements is the objective. The final lesson is a perception that while peace and development are the main trends in international politics limited war is always possible. In the Chinese leaders' view force should be used sparingly but whenever it is necessary. They look back on their various uses of force and believe all of them have been justified and successful - when success was limited at least it prevented something much worse. And they have considerable confidence in their ability to control escalation, and in their progress in developing cyberwar techniques and other nontraditional resources.

Thus China's stakes in Korea remain high. Korea is the doorstep or threshold to China geographically, so it is necessary to contemplate even using force if necessary.

**Discussants**

**Dr. Song, Dae-sung** said he had been born in 1945, was a young boy during the Korean War. North Koreans seized his village in the southern part of the ROK. He remembers villagers and village animals fleeing down the mountainside ahead of the North Koreans. He found all three papers were good. In Kim's paper the main argument is that the North has always, consistently, continued to act provocatively. This is an important lesson. But in reviewing the war and citing mistakes in the statistics he was not really offering "lessons" of the war, not like the third lesson on being better prepared for North Korean attacks. There is, in fact, one other lesson implied by his paper - the varying images of the ROK leaders have an impact on North Korean policies toward the ROK, and this is important to keep in mind. The last two ROK administrations conveyed the wrong impression to the North and helped lead to the Cheonan incident.

Morgan's paper stresses the context in which the war occurred, which is interesting but led to drawing too many lessons. It is important to be careful about amateurish lesson drawing. He doesn't indicate what would be the overall lesson from the war's impact. He notes correctly how important it was that the war did not decide the governance of the peninsula. The lesson is to achieve a full victory when facing the communists - not eliminating the Kim regime had terrible aftereffects. The paper also correctly noted how the War cemented bipolarity in place and led to a proliferation of alliances. One set of those alliances did very well and led to a more democratic world, while the other set failed. The lesson: making the right alliance can have a
huge impact on the development of a small state. On the Scobell paper and possible Chinese steps vis-à-vis North Korea, the ROK clearly wants no Chinese military intervention at all. The last Chinese intervention had an awful result - the survival of North Korea. What is the future in this regard?

Dr. Bruce Bennett said a high price in the War was paid on the personal level as the autobiographical remarks here have shown. We should worry about a recurrence – there is little fear of North Korea attacking now but if it did the price would be high. Are we willing to pay it? We practice deterrence well for preventing major wars, but do it badly on provocations. Why is North Korea still a big problem on this? The key is its leaders’ domestic concerns – the threat of economic disaster, the lack of food, the problematic condition of the state. People don’t always start wars because they expect to win – sometimes the possible loss from problems like these is more threatening than a war. So provocations can be mounted and can lead to a new Korean War. Thus we need to shore up deterrence. The ROK military budget should rise to cover the planned defense improvements. We have gaps in the alliance’s defenses, and provocations could spark an open conflict. How do we shore up deterrence without improving our military capabilities? Deterrence by various other punishments has not prevented North Korean provocations. Deterrence by a more effective defense is one way to go and seems vital – is this correct? What are the lessons from the War about this? And from the Choenan incident? As problems of instability grow in North Korea, how does China see this, how does it see the possible refugee threat? Might China intervene because of this? And would it do so to build a barrier to refugees, or go much further into the country?

General Discussion

Jonathan Pollack (U.S Naval War College) asked Scobell if the lessons cited are still being drawn in China? There is a rich debate these days. The older school offers one view, the mainstream a second, and a third is more assertive, saying China needs to be tougher on Korean matters because it has more at stake. This doesn’t fit the paper’s list of lessons, suggesting they may not still be applicable. Young Whan Kihl wondered about lessons from the War for developing a regional peace arrangement – lessons for Japan, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, Russia, etc. What could be said about that? Scott Snyder asked what about the implications of the failures to punish provocation for deterring them?

The initial response, by Scobell, was that it is true that China is really frustrated by North Korea now, and that Chinese thinking about the North Korea problem is not monolithic. But does that make any difference? If North Korea collapses we will all have to react, including China. And it will have a greater incentive to react fast. Many military specialists on China expect a Chinese intervention under those circumstances. Kim said it appears that some 40% of young South Koreans would flee another war, that is how unprepared the nation is. It is vital to retaliate for provocations. Once again, China and Russia should have been invited to the investigation of the Choenan case. Maybe North Korea too. It is also important to recognize the Russian role in the war and the need to involve it in the Korean matter now.

Morgan concentrated on the comments about deterrence. It is hard to make deterrence work at lower levels of conflict – harder than when the stakes are high. Alexander George, early in the Cold War, emphasized that successful deterrence often just frustrated the opponent, leading to his extensive efforts to design around it by provocations. This clearly applies to North Korea now. Finally, it is harmful for the allies’ deterrence to not respond vigorously to the North’s provocations. A strong response is also needed to show the Chinese that they must do more to resolve the North Korean problem, that the status quo is very dangerous, not stable.
Luncheon Address

The address was sponsored by the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy. The speaker was Consul General of the Korean Consulate in Los Angeles Mr. Jae-Soo Kim. He was introduced by Dr. Soon Paik. The Consul General, born in the ROK and a graduate of Yonsei University, moved to the US in 1981 to live and work. After MA studies in political science, where he met his wife, he went to law school and in 1988 became a lawyer in California and an activist in the Korean-American community while retaining contacts in the ROK including the GNP. In 2005 he successfully sued in the ROK Constitutional Court to end a ban on Korean Americans voting in ROK elections – the voting will start in 2012. He is the first Korean-American appointed to his position and he interacts with the largest Korean community outside Korea – some 800,000.

The Consul-General joked that as with a woman’s skirt, in giving a speech “the shorter the better,” and promised to keep his remarks brief. The Korean War had a huge impact on modern history; what lessons have we learned? One is that freedom is not free. The War destroyed much of Korea, the casualties were very great. The ROK then chose democracy and a market economy as the way to the future. And as a result we have learned that government by the people really works. Notice that President Obama said something similar recently after passage of the health care bill. The ROK is doing very well now. Economically its GNP/capita is over $20,000.

Another lesson we have learned is that we are all our brothers’ keepers and thus dependent on each other. Korea’s national defense requires help from others. A related lesson is that we must work closely with the international community. Thus the Cheonan incident has been referred to the UN. We know it is important to get a multilateral response to this terrible event and to sustain the US-ROK alliance. Working with the international community with soon expand – in 2012 Korea will be hosting the G-20 economic summit, at which it will be able to help mediate between the rich and the developing states. The ROK will also host the 2nd National Security Summit in 2012.

As part of its international relationships the ROK is now able to provide a good deal of foreign aid to other countries. The alliance with the US was an important factor in the ROK getting to this point in its development. And even the ROK world cup team is doing very well! With that the Consul-General was as good as his word and ended his brief remarks.

PANEL VI: THE IMPACT OF THE KOREAN WAR AND BEYOND

Moderator: Professor Hong Nack Kim, (West Virginia University, emeritus) Recipient of numerous awards, Board Chairman of the International Council on Korean Studies

Paper Presenters:
Dr. Kang, Miongsei, Senior Fellow – The Sejong Institute
Mr. Scott Snyder, Director – Center for U.S.-Korean Policy of the Asia Foudation, Senior Associate of the Pacific Forum of CSIS
Professor James I Matray (California State University, Chico) former history department chair, former Donga Ilbo international columnist

Discussants:
Dr. Jonathan D. Pollack (U.S. Naval War College) Non-Resident Senior Fellow at Brookings, Member: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Council on Foreign Relations

Professor Jung, Il-hwa (Dejin University, Baekskok University) Winner of the Korea Journalists Price and a Distinguished Science Reporter Prize

Professor Yim, Yong-soon (Sung Kwan University emeritus) Former provost of the university, former advisor: Ministries of Foreign Affairs and National Unification, National Intelligence Service, Korean National Security Council

Paper Presentations

Dr. Kang, Miongsei, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Political-Economic System of South Korea: Economic Growth and Democracy”

Most discussions of ROK development stress the 1960-1980 period, but Dr. Kang said this ignores the impact of the Korean War which fundamentally shaped the nation’s development path. His paper sought to correct this by drawing on Mancur Olson’s analysis of how domestic barriers to rapid growth must be dissipated, and Charles Tilly’s works on how states historically developed, how state capacity has been built. The major questions: why did a developmental state work so much better in Korea than other countries? Why did development and democracy emerge so quickly in Korea?

Kang pointed out that ROK economic performance has been outstanding since 1961. It is now the 13th largest economy in the world. In 1950-1990 its economy grew 38 times – Latin America’s main economies grew some 6 times in the same period. The ROK, Japan, Taiwan and China have all achieved exceptional rates of growth for extended periods since World War II. It was trade that generated this growth. Like Japan, Korea developed fast primarily due to exports to the US – exports eventually constituted over 30% of the GNP. The export boom powered rapid development, and turned the economy toward manufacturing. All this was totally unexpected at the end of the Korean War when Korea was prostrate.

The starting point was land reform. The War reordered both the domestic and international order, and engendered an expansion in state capabilities. As Mancur Olson has suggested in studying other economies, the war broke up distribution coalitions which impeded economic growth by limiting entry and hampering innovation. In Korea this began with land reform. President Rhee had only slowly pursued the 1948 program for this and the official land reform plan adopted by the National Assembly in 1949, and it was confined to lands formerly owned by the Japanese. When North Korea implemented sweeping land reform, and copied it in occupied parts of the ROK, this led to US insistence on it. The state was forced to adopt it, alienating its political base but pushing landowners out of the way. The landlord class, Korea’s ruling elite for centuries, was wiped out. This also freed up labor for development, and removed many social inequalities and rigidities, improving flexibility in decision making, eliminating a major obstacle to industrialization and boosting the influence of the bourgeoisie.

The war greatly strengthened state coercive capacities, and American aid helped expand other state capacities, centralizing authority and providing military officers and civilian bureaucrats with the professionalization that generated commitment to modernization and nationalism. The US alliance provided peace and stability that made economic success possible, enabling the ROK to concentrate resources more on domestic development. The US insisted on domestic policy reforms, and used both aid and aid reduction to promote Korean self-sufficiency, helping push the Park regime toward the export-led growth strategy. The impact of US aid did much to consolidate the new ruling elites – the aid in 1950-1960 was equivalent to roughly 70% of Korea’s domestic revenue, and US military aid was higher than in Europe and four times
higher than for all of Latin America, covering some 80% of Korea’s military procurements. The damage from the war also made citizens more ready to give allegiance to the ROK.

The Park government built on the state these developments put in place. His coercive state structure intervened against labor unions and in alliance with business elites to extract economic resources for development, adding resources for supporting state bureaucracy. It also added resources to sustain the large military forces. Thus the Korean War initiated formation of the modern ROK state. Statemaking ultimately required coercion – there was no powerful bourgeoisie, and little capital left by the departing Japanese, so the armed forces were the most cohesive, effective organizations in the country - many of the officers had previously served in Japan’s colonial armed forces. After the Korean War the options, in line with Tilly’s classic analysis, were a capital-intensive state (the market system is strong), a coercion-intensive state (the coercive state is strong), or an intermediate – bargaining created – state. The Korean War produced a coercion-intensive state in both North and South. As in other postwar countries, the military offered substantial organizational cohesion and effectiveness, and a replacement for the lack of political authority and legitimacy. And the continuing conflict with the North reinforced the power of the military.

Equally interesting is how Korea moved toward democracy quite rapidly in the 1980s. The military kept postponing steps toward this, contending that the communist threat made strong rule necessary. And it legitimized its rule via the economic growth. But over time the growth established a growing sense of security as well, encouraging more demands for political freedom and greater freedom of self-expression – economic growth became a driver of democratic change. A democratic opposition began emerging by 1971 when Kim Dae-jung ran for president, and autocratic rule was seriously damaged when Park was assassinated in 1979. Democracy began emerging in 1987 and a civilian government was elected in 1992. In contrast, the North failed to create sufficient capital to continue development and to create the sort of effective state that could help make the transition to democracy.

**Mr. Scott Snyder (and Ms. Joyce Lee), “The Impact of the Korean War on the Political-Economic System of North Korea”**

Snyder called the paper an interesting challenge, not calling for the usual policy focus. He began by noting how the devastation of a war often marks a distinction between historical eras. It also creates the need for rebuilding or establishing new political systems, building on pre-war influences but adapting to the new circumstances and opportunities. North Korea had to start from the ground up – US air power had leveled much of the physical infrastructure, the North had lost almost 1 million people (over 10% of the population) through war or refugees, industrial production was at only 36% of the prewar level and electricity production was below 20%. The war also ended direct Soviet control, and provided a route to Kim, Jong-il’s consolidation of power.

Kim did so by centralizing political, economic, ideological, and cultural systems in the leader, very much on the Japanese imperial model and with strong influences from Confucian traditions: a cult of the leader in the form of personalized rule, absolute loyalty of the masses, and filial devotion to Kim. One analyst noted that “Kim, Il-sung even had himself photographed astride a white stallion, copying Hirohito.” Japanese imperial influences became even more important under Kim, Jong-il, via the wider role granted the military and the “military first policy.”

Kim began by blaming national wartime failures on other individuals and groups, bolstering his efforts to remove all actual and potential rivals – he could shift blame in part
because he was removed from managing the war when China took it over. By the early 1960s his faction almost completely monopolized power, the others having been eliminated. Another tool was pursue reorganizing the party structure by attacking existing leader echelons as “impure” and building a mass party of peasant and working class elements as opposed to an “elite” party. By the late 1950s over half the party was peasant and working class, and when Kim moved many of these people into the bureaucracies they accordingly reelected him as party chairman.

Next he used Juche ideology as the focus for nation building, to offset the huge dependence on foreign aid and the foreign influence that came with it from the Soviet Union. Juche rejected dependence, stressed self-sufficiency and believing in one’s own strength – doing things “our own way.” Western analysts disagree about its effects. Some see it as guiding North Korean development in all respects, others say it has had little or no practical effect. It appears the former view is more correct. Juche also justified policies that further centralized the regime and strengthened Kim’s control – it was eventually inserted in the constitution as a fundamental principle.

Economic reconstruction began with huge Soviet bloc aid providing some 75% of capital investment. The plan imitated the Stalinist centralized command economy, giving highest priority to heavy industry - Kim’s opponents suggested more emphasis on light industry and agriculture to boost living standards. As Kim consolidated his power, agriculture collectivization and centralized economic planning dominated. Drawing on idle and underutilized labor and keeping consumption low, the economy and capital formation grew rapidly. 5-year plans relied heavily on worker mobilization campaigns, imitating Stalinism. Eventually managers and workers became exhausted from the campaigns, and central planning began interfering with development. From the early 1960s signs of stagnation appeared, with serious shortages in land, skilled labor, energy, and transportation. More mobilization was combined with on-the-spot guidance from Kim and other leaders visiting factories and cooperatives, but stagnation was inevitable.

In recent years the leaders have tried returning to when mass mobilization led to huge growth rates – turning away from early 2000s efforts at marketization and decentralization to (citing Rudiger Frank) “socialist neoconservatism.” More mobilization, nationalist appeals, collectivism, militarism, and political repression - back to the 1950s. But famine and hard times have exhausted the country, and increased skepticism of official policies. And the heavy aid of the 1950s and 1960s is missing now.

Archival documents eventually corrected the Western explanation of who started the Korean War, showing that Kim, Il-sung was the primary instigator, and Stalin and Mao slow to agree, leading to Kim learning to play them off against each other and becoming more distrustful of both. Before the war subordination to Moscow and Beijing had seemed to Kim necessary and proper. Soviet unwillingness to enter the war and fight the US was a shock, and China’s entry removed him from control of the war effort – a humiliating development. The Sino-Soviet dispute helped Kim develop Juche and arrange some political separation from Moscow, while dependence on Soviet aid kept him from fully siding with China. And the continued presence of US forces made huge military aid from Moscow and Beijing vital, limiting the autonomy he sought for his regime and the nation. The ultimate focus was always on preserving domestic political autonomy and strengthening the regime. The Sino-Soviet dispute was very helpful here, so a recent challenge is to duplicate it and be able to offset China’s influence, looking to the US or the ROK as candidates for that. But the North’s provocative actions keep drawing the outsiders together too much for this to happen.
One legacy of the War is the absence of a US-DPRK reconciliation. The US avoided initial direct contacts until the late 1980s, and then they went badly. The US saw the North’s overtures from the 1970s on as primarily designed to marginalize the ROK. Trouble for the North began brewing as early as the Sino-US rapprochement, which forced it into talking with the South and the North-South communiqué in 1972, and left it with no assured allies. The North tried direct appeals to the US, through Japanese officials and requests to meet US officials. When the North turned to nuclear weapons development this became both the best tool for getting a dialogue with the US and the main obstacle to it going anywhere. The first high-level talks were in 1992, the first major negotiations were during the Clinton administration in the Agreed Framework in 1994. That was meant to bring diplomatic relations but the US did not pursue it.

The North continues to stress that the US must change its basic treatment of the DPRK, apparently seeing this as a way to offset Chinese influence and give the regime more maneuvering room. Establishing such a relationship with the US seems its prime objective. But just before and during the Obama administration, the regime has put every possible obstacle in the way of a dialogue, ruling out any denuclearization for example, launching a multi-stage rocket just before Obama’s Prague speech on global nuclear weapons reductions, then dropping the 6-party talks, and conducting a second nuclear test. The North insists on a change in the political relationship, but rejects the idea that this requires a quid pro quo – there is nothing North Korea must do to improve the relationship. Thus the legacy of the Korean War, US-DPRK enmity, remains intact.

The moderator interjected that the Korea War deeply affected international politics throughout East Asia, especially US-China relations, which is an important topic.

Professor James L. Matray, “Beijing and the Paper Tiger: The Impact of the Korean War on Sino-American Relations”

After thanking the organizers for the invitation to such a comfortable conference, Professor Matray reminded everyone that he was a historian, not a specialist in US-China relations. His detailed review of Sino-American relations since 1949 began with the fact that in January 1950 Truman declared the US would not interfere in the civil war in China, and provide no aid or advice to the Nationalists on Taiwan. Shortly thereafter Secretary of State Acheson left Taiwan outside the US defense perimeter in East Asia. In March the US told the Secretary General it would not veto a decision to give China’s seat to the PRC. Clearly US policy on China was in flux. The government wanted to avoid clashing with nationalism and anticolonialism in East Asia. Was this, as many have suggested, a lost opportunity to normalize US-China relations? Or was the anticolonial and communist ideology of the PRC, and past US support for the Nationalists, bound to lead the PRC to spurn these overtures? The latter is probably correct. In February, Mao signed the Sino-Soviet alliance, which led the Joint Chiefs to begin pressing for US support of Taiwan. Then the Korean War turned an uneasy relationship into a fierce confrontation, something neither wanted. Mao was reluctant to support the North’s invasion but felt a debt for the North Koreans that helped defeat the Nationalists. Truman’s response was sending the 7th Fleet to protect Taiwan. Others urged going much farther, making Taiwan a US bastion. Chinese leaders were not surprised by American troops going to Korea but seem not to have expected the Taiwan move.

The key development was US and UN forces crossing the 38th parallel, a reckless Truman decision, leading to China’s intervention and truly hardening the confrontation, based on a failure to understand Beijing’s perspective and concerns. The decision ignored PRC warnings. The intervention provoked a huge increase in US defense spending leading to enormous standing armed forces and high levels of preparedness until the Cold War ended. Another was as much
diplomatic isolation of Beijing as the US could achieve, and considerable economic sanctions under UN auspices. China’s failure to oust UN forces and their counterattacks led to stalemate and, in July 1951, truce talks that lasted for two years. The sticking point was prisoner repatriation – considerable progress was made on other issues despite deep mistrust and fears that concessions would convey weakness. The US position on repatriation reflected political pressures and considerations plus the desire to humiliate the PRC. It had tried this on other issues in the talks, and also punished the PRC on the battlefield to force progress.

Why did the war end? Eisenhower and others said it was a threat to use nuclear weapons. Most scholars reject this as undocumented. Soviet documents suggest Stalin resisted a truce and that his death allowed the Chinese to accept an agreement. But this had little effect on the Sino-US confrontation. Beijing emerged seeking advancement of its national security, regaining China’s former preeminent regional position, unification, making China a recognized and respected world power, and treatment as a sovereign and equal state. One legacy of the War was US resistance to each of those objectives, so Beijing was not interested in normalizing relations. US steps included its Asian alliances, especially with Japan which agreed to host US forces; creating the China Committee (with Britain, France, Canada, and Japan) for strict export controls; supporting the French in Indochina to offset China’s aid to the Viet Minh; and refusing normal diplomatic treatment of China at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina, refusing to sign the agreement ending French rule, and moving to prevent the Viet Minh from ruling all of Vietnam and dominating Indochina. It also bolstered the Taiwan government with aid and military support, by supporting Nationalist raids against the mainland and occupation of strategic islands close, and with the US-Taiwan alliance of 1954.

Beijing’s response was to try to elevate its reputation as a leader in the anti-imperialist struggle, especially at major gatherings like the Bandung Conference in 1955. It also agreed to ambassadorial talks with the US in 1955 that ran for 15 years – US recognition, of sorts, of the government’s validity, even though they produced almost no agreements. At the same time Mao preferred a more militant, revolutionary approach in foreign (and in domestic) affairs despite increasing friction with Moscow, particularly over more strenuous opposition to the US which Mao described as a “paper tiger.” Unrealistic and threatening American policies had produced a Chinese response in kind.

Discusssants

Dr. Jonathan Pollack said he enjoyed all three papers. Together they highlight the question of whether events do or do not matter. Is history just “one damn event after another,” or is it event-driven, or is it driven by larger forces? The Kang paper is outstanding, stressing that history is path dependent. He makes good use of Tilly’s work on how war has often made states and driven other changes. He traces the causal effect of the Korean War on social, economic and political developments very well. Specific linkages are sometimes obscure but the analysis overall is compelling. Particularly good is the discussion on how the Korean War heightened the role of the military in Korea.

The Snyder paper is also good, has a good focus. It could have said more on the War having generating a threat-driven system in the DPRK. Kim might have been severely damaged by the war but he won politically after the war. Along the way he wrote the history of his era, making it hard for us to know where the truth lies about what transpired. His regime received huge foreign aid – it was the largest aid project of the communist bloc. What emerged was pervasively militarized: a huge military structure, based in part on Soviet and Chinese support, and when the aid slumped the system began to fail. The military-first policy has existed since before Kim, Jong-il. One wonders whether the regime could have ever accepted a normal
relationship with outsiders. Clearly North Korea was never self-sufficient – it just maneuvered among outsiders for lots of aid. It depends heavily on Chinese aid now.

On the Matray paper, is it the case that the US-China confrontation has been vicious and intractable, and unnecessary? After all, there has been no war between them since. Chinese still reject the label of having been the aggressor in Korea – disliking the stigma of it. Certainly a case can be made for viewing the US intervention as illegitimate. Next, did China really reestablish its traditional position of regional hegemon, as the paper seems to suggest? And did it really stand out as the leader of the revolutionary movement? It also seems that “paper tiger” was more like a metaphor than a national security policy – China was more cautious than this suggests. Finally, did the Korean War significantly influence the course of the Vietnam War? It seems hard to say that this was so.

Dr. Yim, Yong-soon said the audience should appreciate how hard it is to follow such a distinguished a scholar and analyst as Jonathan Pollack and to be the last presenter on the panel. Mentioning that Professor Chae-jin Lee’s personal history presentation at the first day’s luncheon was very moving, he said his home town was part of North Korea. My father left the communist system and went south in 1948. In 1950 I was 10 years old, and in school. Choonchon area forces resisted the North sufficiently that people in my area hid there – my family lived in a hole. When ROK forces returned my father was criticized for not having moved across the Han river, not showing his loyalty to the ROK. He eventually joined the ROK army. I went to schools in Pusan, and then in the US. During the war I saw many dead bodies, and was almost killed several times.

The Matray paper is very good, very enjoyable. The impact of war can be immense, as Hegel noted. Often countries that fight, fight a lot, and also do well overall. General Park, Chung-hee once told me that “war is the best sport if you don’t get killed.” And it is the case that the Korean War was a blessing in disguise for the ROK – I am not a war monger, just stating a fact. The Kang paper is wonderful, a very different analysis than we usually see. It is excellent in linking the war to state formation in the ROK, to land reform and the many changes that led to. Koreans had been well known for strong regionalism in their politics and factional conflicts, but the Korean War mitigated this to a considerable extent. Then regionalism came back under President Park. The war also nearly destroyed the old Korean class structure. It also taught leaders how to mobilize the population, the public. This has been done effectively ever since.

The war taught Koreans the value of science and technology for making progress, and also how to build and run administrative structures. It established the ROK security system which has since rested on the US alliance, plus intense training of the armed forces. Korea has been invaded 930 times in the course of its history, but not recently. The ROK is now the 8th largest military power in the world. Of course the alliance with the US has been vital in all this – important in ROK development and Korean democracy. As a working principle, to get rich it is a good idea to hang around with rich people – the ROK hung around, and hangs around, with the US. North Korea did not. This came from the War and building links with the US, support from “one of the nicest imperialist around.” Dr. Yim finished with a question for Matray: if something happens to weaken the regime in the North and the ROK attempts unification, will China intervene?

The moderator asked for an additional ten minutes for questions from the floor which elicited the following. Murry Fromson said President Rhee was certainly no democrat, and I lived through what happened then. The Han River defensive effort against Chinese forces was important in halting China’s advance down the peninsula and turning the war around. He
suggested that perhaps the best thing the US did was starting the ROK military academy. Mel Goodman said that while Truman had indicated the US would not intervene in the Chinese civil war again, was that a real change in the US attitude toward Beijing? There is a lot of evidence to the contrary, and even if Truman and Acheson wanted to shift US policy on China the Chinese leaders could readily see that much of the public rhetoric in the US was in the opposite direction.

Matray responded to Goodman that it was true that there was no overall US consensus on shifting US China policy, but officials really were wrestling over what to do so various options were open. The War really settled the matter. The Sino-Soviet alliance treaty also had considerable impact – it made US policy less flexible. But the government was probably committed, more or less, to save Taiwan from an invasion by the eve of the Korean War.

Victor Cha wondered why the Korea War, as a clear initial failure, didn’t lead to Kim, Il-sung’s ouster after the war. Why didn’t the Soviet Union and China insist on this? With only a brief moment left, Snyder reiterated that Kim successfully blamed others, such as elements of the bureaucracy, for the way the war had gone. Then, with thanks from the moderator to the panelists and the audience, the panel closed.

PANEL VI: TREATMENT OF THE KOREAN WAR VETERANS

Moderator: Professor Bruce Bechtol (USMC Command and Staff College)

Paper Presenters:
Professor Hong, Sung-gul, (Kookmin University), Dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration
Mr. Arthur G. Sharp, Korean War Veterans Association, editor of the Association’s bimonthly magazine

Discussants
General Kim, Byungkwon (Ret.) Vice President of the Korea Freedom Federation, Director of the Council on US-Korean Security Studies, former Deputy Commander of the combined Forces Command/Commander, GCC

Paper Presentations
Dr. Hong, Sung-gul, “National Treatment of the Korean War Veterans: A Korean Perspective”

Dr. Hong indicated he had no personal experience of the Korean War, being born too late for that, but remembers being fed from American food aid as a boy. He pointed out that South Korea has veterans from the Korean and Vietnam Wars. However, they were almost forgotten for years. The nation was in difficult economic straits for two decades after gaining independence, with people struggling just to live through each day. And people who had sacrificed to achieve national independence or been killed or badly disabled in the Korean and Vietnam Wars were accorded higher priority than the rest of the nation’s veterans in government spending. Koreans also tended to see military service for the nation as a duty, not a service that requires compensation. In addition, the Confucian tradition calls for not emphasizing what you have done for others (thus many veterans did not apply for compensation), and instead remembering what others have done for you. With rising prosperity, scholars and citizens groups began pressing to change the veterans’ situation.
In 1950 a national merit award system had been introduced for very distinguished contributors to the nation, and an Office of the National Merit Reward System established (first in the Ministry of Defense, later in the Ministry of the Interior). In 1961 the Military Relief Administration was established. A veterans agency was created as well and, with several name changes, became the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs (MPVA) The National Merit Reward System has several types of benefits:

1) compensation to those who gave distinguished service to the county, or to their survivors and dependants. Based on levels of sacrifice and contribution, severity of disability, age, length of service, and income, the pensions range 390,000 to 3,860,000 won monthly for patriots, 290,000-1,1980,000 for disabled members and police officers, and 310,000-1,050,000 for survivors. Allowances are granted for nursing, supplementing incomes, KIAs, Agent Orange victims, military merit, veterans honorary status, and death (for independence movement activists).

2) medical benefits for those with distinguished service to national independence, disabled veterans, general war veterans, bereaved families and dependents, plus treatment at reduced prices. The MVPA operates veterans hospitals in 4 cities and provides benefits through arrangements with many local hospitals, with care for almost 5.5 million disabled and over 1 million Agent Orange victims in 2008.

3) education benefits for persons with distinguished service, their families and other dependents: cancellation of tuition and fees, educational allowances, scholarships, advantages in entrance exams. In 2008 91,000 received 222,000 million won.

4) employment assistance in the form of quotas for hiring and added points on employment exams – extended in 2008 to 9,000 people.

5) concessional loans (3% interest) to help with housing and finances, buying farmland and small businesses and housing, or paying for costly events – sickness, disasters, marriage, etc. In 2008 these payments were 347,055 million won.

6) burial and memorial benefits, including use of national cemeteries

7) aid to honor meritorious war veterans

8) aid to veterans with over ten years of service as help in adapting to civilian life

The broader Act of Assisting War Veterans was not passed until 1993, targeting veterans and police officers who were still working and those who had retired. Included are monthly allowances after age 65, medical care benefits, burial in national cemeteries (with spouses), plus free access to public museums, palaces, national and provincial parks, arborets, recreational forests, and royal tombs. Coverage extends to those who fought in 1948-1950 in anti-guerrilla operations. In 2010 there were 235,000 registered Korean War veterans, out of some 1.27 million who served, including 50,000 designated as high merit, with many not covered because of poor record keeping in the past. This is small compared to the over 6.5 million Americans who served in the Korean War era and the 1.5 million or so surviving Korean War veterans. The government should work harder to find others. A recent newspaper study concluded that the average veteran’s annual income is about 350,000 won. This quite small, though there are other benefits, many veterans are elderly and need little income, and the income is near that of other elders. Still, they may have war injuries, and in general their benefits should be raised.

A table (in the paper) comparing veterans benefits in the US, Canada, Australia, France, and the ROK shows that the US has the most diverse veterans benefits and that ROK benefits are comparable to those of others. Korea also honors foreign veterans of the Korean War by inviting them to Korea to see the fruits of their sacrifices.

The moderator called this a well done paper on a difficult and important topic.
Mr. Arthur G. Sharp, “National Treatment of the Korean War Veterans: A U.S. Perspective”

Mr. Sharp started by recounting a connection to the War. My wife’s father, he said, was from North Korea (Sinanju area) and rode a bike to the South where, after being considered suspicious, joined the ROK army and served in the war. It was an honor to know him and to join in his drinking with friends from the same area, hearing their stories. The Korean War was a real war but was not well understood as such in the US. It has taken a long time to move from “the forgotten war” to giving it proper recognition. Technically, it is not over; over 1200 servicemen have died in Korea since the armistice in 1953. The US was not prepared in 1950; Truman and Defense Secretary Johnson conducted deep cuts in the armed forces along with selling off “surplus” equipment, cutting training, and reducing maintenance. Readiness suffered greatly. The Navy went from 6678 ships in 1945 to 634 in 1950. The Marines were cut by more than two thirds, and Army units were at 2/3rd or less in strength, with inadequate weapons. The government had to buy uniforms, canteens, mess kits, etc. from Army Surplus Stores. Boots were scarce. US planning relied heavily on using nuclear forces, and when China entered the war MacArthur wanted up to 50 used against it, something Truman rejected.

Almost anyone would be drafted – people with infirmities, significant medical conditions, etc. US forces readily went to Korea but the public paid little attention and had little enthusiasm. They were uninformed about the communist threat, and did not grasp how the war risked a possible nuclear war with the Soviets. US entry was popular initially – polls put support at nearly 80%, as did the White House mail count, but by January 1951 support was down to 38%, with 49% disapproving. From then on support varied with developments: up when the truce talks started, down after a riot at a POW camp in the ROK, up with Eisenhower’s taking office and renewed talks, etc.

People were not heavily involved, particularly if they weren’t directly affected. To quote one veteran: “I returned to an ignorant society. Some people I encountered upon my return had absolutely no knowledge of the war in Korea.” There were no running casualty figures in the media. People did not flock to greet returning veterans, the ships often docking at nearly empty ports. That’s why many who landed in San Francisco remember the “woman in red” who always met the ships while few others were around. Another returned veteran has said “I do not think the American public gave a damn… They, as most of us…, did not even know where Korea was. Most American certainly did not understand why we were fighting in a country that we know nothing about or essentially why we were there.” Another veteran recounted how just after he returned he got a ticket for the wrong address on his license, his parents having moved while he was in Korea, because he had not notified the Motor Vehicle Bureau with 10 days of the change! Citing his being in Korea at the time made no difference to the cop. Another found he had to explain where he had been for two years. One returned to his job in a supermarket and a customer asked where he had been for the past three years.

Fortunately the government did not forget veterans. Although not quite as good as benefits for World War II veterans, some 2.4 million received education benefits through the Korean War G.I. Bill passed in 1952. Medical benefits have been good, with the curious exception of frostbite – some veterans today are still trying to get benefits for frostbite wounds. There was also a requirement that veterans be hired back, if they wanted, in jobs they left to go to war. Benefits included the usual – burial expenses, VA hospitals, etc.

One reason the public lacked enthusiasm was that the War did not bring a complete victory; a stalemate was not acceptable. There were assertions it was not a real war, not declared, which makes War veterans angry. In this atmosphere less than 20% of them joined veterans’
service organizations after returning. (The US lumps all veterans together, more or less – it is the private associations that differentiate.) In recent years more attention has been paid to the War and the sacrifices, and thus to the veterans. This was partly due to efforts of organizations like the Korean War Veterans Association to get the message out. The KWVA, formed in 1985, has about 18,000 members in 230 chapters, even some who served in the Merchant Marine. One significant accomplishment it pursued is completion of the Korea War Memorial on the mall in Washington which opened in 1995. It also runs a “Tell America” program where veterans go to schools or groups to relate stories about the war and what it was like. Veterans take pride in seeing more Korean memorial highways now, and university and other oral history projects about the war.

The moderator added that people should visit the National Marine Corps Museum at Quantico which has the best Korean War exhibition in the country – including a recreation of the Chosin Reservoir battle conditions (even the bitterly cold air) – and entry is free.

[An attached table included the following figures on American casualties in the War prepared by the Defense Manpower Data Center:
Killed in Action                         23,613
Died of Wounds                           2,460
Missing-Declared Dead                    4,817
Captured –Declared Dead                  2,849
Total Hostile Deaths                     33,739
Total Non-Hostile Deaths                 2,835
Total In-Theater Deaths                  36,574
Total Non-Theater Deaths                 54,246
Wounded                                   103,284
Total Serving In-Theater                 1,789,000 ]

Discussants

Mr. Lee, Jong-jung praised Dr. Hong’s paper, saying there have been few academic studies on this topic. The Sharp paper is also very good, showing that the War is less “forgotten” than it was. Its veterans’ benefits can be divided into material compensation giving tangible things, and symbolic policies for conveying psychological support and various kinds of respect. Statistics show the heavy casualties in the War (a print version of his remarks contains figures for the two Koreas and their partners, and for Korean casualties in the Vietnam War:

Korean War
South Korean: Participants – 1,269,000 KIA – 138,000 Wounded – 451,000
UN:                  Participants - 1,940,000 KIA -  41,000 Wounded – 104,000
North Korea     Participants –1,064,000 KIA –  294,000 Wounded – 226,000
China                Participants - 1,391,000 KIA -  184,000 Wounded - 716,000

Vietnam War
Koreans            Participants - 325,517 KIA -  5,099 Wounded - 11,232

Mr. Lee then listed the kinds of benefits also mentioned in the Hong paper. The 1993 act provided a good many and the act has been revised periodically, most recently in 2009.

The government created the 60th Anniversary of the Korean War Committee, chaired by the President and with 14 ministers, to organize 41 commemorative events on the war [Mr. Lee was on the committee’s advisory group] to pass on the war’s lessons, honor the veterans at home and abroad and express gratitude to them, and further strengthen ties with the 21 countries that directly helped in the war. The “Revisit Korea Program” brings veterans from those countries to
Korea annually. Starting in 1973, 26,000 veterans have been involved; this year 2400 veterans and their families have been invited. Asking Sharp if he would be going and learning that he had deferred to veterans who were in combat, Lee said “I may give you a ticket.” He closed by calling for more effort to provide living allowances for the veterans, particularly given their advanced age.

Professor Ryoo noted the low attendance for this last panel, running opposite another panel, and the moderator said “but they are special.” He praised the Hong and Lee papers for providing very useful information. Sharp’s paper points out that the Korean War was not really an American responsibility, but something the US took on at its own initiative. No wonder the public lacked the enthusiasm and understanding displayed toward World War II. But the US war effort “saved the Korean people.” Koreans must not forget this and we owe the US our sincere gratitude. It is the basic foundation of our trust in each other. Gratitude is also due to the KWVA as well for all it has done for American veterans of the War and to make it better understood. More war memorials are needed in the ROK. They are common in the US, and more in the ROK would help boost the national spirit. The treatment of veterans is at least now much better, although improvements could be made. Dr. Lee mentioned how veterans from other countries are invited to Korea to see what resulted from their sacrifices. All of them should be welcomed. In fact, a fund for this should be established, especially to support visits by American veterans. What do the panelists think of establishing a “Korean War Veterans Fund,” cosponsored by the ROK and the US? It would help in building a new global alliance among nations that participated in the war. And it could help in gathering more memoir materials from veterans.

General Discussion

The moderator opened this section by noted how important Korea has become to the US – its 7th largest trading partner, the best American ally in Asia, sending more troops for US military operations since World War II, including peacekeeping, than any other nation except the United Kingdom and Australia.

Hong called Ryoo’s call for a fund a striking idea. Of course the details would be important; it would have to be properly developed. Using this to accumulate more memoir materials would be important and valuable. Sharp agreed, saying that this idea could work, just don’t wait for the Congress to act on it! He found the critical comments on the papers useful too, and added that 22 states is the US have also provided some modest benefits for Korean (and other) War veterans, and that 3 of those veterans serve in Congress now. Dr. Kim (in the audience) called the panel very impressive. How many US Korean War veterans are there today? And how rapidly is the number declining. Sharp reported it is about 1.5 million and they are declining steadily. Dr. Kim thanked him for his good presentation and said that more should be done for the veterans. Bechtol added that the US did not fully embrace its Vietnam War veterans until the Iraq War veterans began coming home, and we never had a similar seminal moment for Korean War veterans, which is a shame.

A Korean in the audience said we should get a ticket to visit Korea for the woman in the red dress! Hong said some money from Korea goes to veterans of the War in some poorer countries that participated, and involving private groups in this has been discussed. He asked Sharp whether KWVA is linked to the US Veterans of Foreign Wars, and how its funding works. Sharp replied that there is no link to the VFW, because the two groups’ agendas are different. As for funding, there is no endowment for the Association. Members provide funds through annual dues and lifetime memberships, and there is some advertising in the journal. He works mostly for
free, getting a small stipend. Hong said perhaps the ROK government could provide some funding and ROK firms could place some of that advertising. That would help, would it not? Mr. Lee has some excellent contacts and could be of help here. Mr. Lee said he had left his government position last year and so had less influence now, but Dr. Hong said he was still influential. There was general agreement that such a link could be good.

Hugo Kim said Sharp’s paper was fine and asked if the KWVA chapters are very active, and if so, how is this dealt with. Since the members are aging how can the organization and the bonds among them remain strong? Sharp said the KWVA chapters are very active, raising their own funds through bake sales and other community activities and sending participants to the Tell American Program. But the Association won’t last much longer; in a few years there will be too few members left. Asked if more money would help, he said the problem was not money.

A (young) American in the audience asked what young people could do to get the Korean War veterans more recognition. Sharp said it is best to help get their story out, get people learning what the war was about and what the veterans did. Lee agreed that often young people today don’t know about the War, which angers veterans. It would be fine if students recognized their contributions. Hong said out of 1.3 million in the ROK who served in the War perhaps 130,000 are left and we are losing them. Creating a fund to collect more of their stories would be good and maybe the materials can be made more available to students. In fact, collecting materials from the 21 countries that participated would be good. Bechtol said the ROK is a victim of its own success here – it has done so well people forget the earlier hard times. Thus the “386 generation” knows little about the Korean War period. Hong said that at least oral history efforts are still being conducted and that he recently got some stories from a US veteran. This is a worthwhile effort and expanding its scope would be good.

Hugo Kim said that war veterans have benefitted very unevenly. Many Korean veterans had a hard time getting a job. I, myself, started as a teacher at 19 and taught for 30 months, and veterans would show up at the school to beg for money or try to force people to give them money. The principal ran away to avoid this. The problem was familiar: the veterans mainly came from poorer elements in society, didn’t get enough education. The government lacked the resources to really help them. It was hard to promote greater equality of treatment. Hong added he had also been a teacher and had similar experiences. Korean parents were too poor to educate their children. At least the government’s aid to veterans has helped. But it is not enough! Lee agreed that into the 1960s the government was still very poor, and this continued until the early 1980s. At least there were some education benefits for children of disabled veterans. He concluded by saying “I want to thank the Council for hosting this panel at the conference!” Ryoo agreed, and thanked the panelists again for their papers.

An American woman said her father was a military cameraman in the War and apparently suffered from post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), affecting his life and work. The War also aggravated a pulmonary condition. But he had trouble getting help when he got older, especially on the stress problem. He wasn’t accepted for Veterans Administration help and treatment. Does the ROK handle this sort of problem well? Hong said help on these problems is available from the government veterans’ hospitals and the local hospitals with links to the veterans’ agencies. Treatment is free. Lee added, however, that there is no compensation for PTSD, just treatment. As for Agent Orange, another unusual kind of damage, we treat cases of clear symptoms and pseudo-symptoms – no other country pays to treat the latter. Hong said the government can’t help all the victims. Bechtol added that the Veterans Administration is well known in the US as a bureaucratic nightmare for veterans. Thus ended what participants felt was a very stimulating panel and discussion.
CLOSING REMARKS

General Tilelli thanked the presenters, discussants and participants. He saw one flaw in the conference. Not enough time was available for discussion from the audience, which is very valuable, and this will be corrected in the next conference. Otherwise, this was our best conference yet. The level of discussion was excellent, and the links drawn between the war and our concerns today were quite informative. General Kim and I had to leave for roughly at hour to attend a meeting organized by the Korean Consul General honoring Korean War veterans. They know very well why we fought the Korean War. As the conference has indicated, the War affected a great many things, and showed that the people involved made a difference. Their stories are not war stories but stories about building a country, developing democracy, about generating a recovery of what is now one of the world’s leading countries, a model nation.

General Kim offered thanks on behalf of the Council to David Kang and to all the presenters and discussants, as well as those who attended. The conference has summarized many studies on the War. We can now better explore the future course the Council should take on the Korean issue. We saw how important the US-ROK alliance has been and continues to be for the ROK, and for Northeast Asian security and prosperity. He expressed hopes of seeing the participants at the Council conference next year in Seoul.

David Kang thanked General Tilelli and General Kim, and especially Hugo Kim for his work organizing the conference. He praised students who had assisted in the running of the conference. He told participants it had been great to have them involved. Dr. Soon Paik said he was very pleased, that this was best of the joint conferences his organization and the Council have mounted, and thanked everyone involved. The conference ended roughly a half hour before the scheduled closing time of 5:00 pm

Rapporteur

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Patrick M. Morgan (Rapporteur) is Professor of Political Science and Tierney chair in Global Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of California, Irvine. A co-founder of the Council on US-Korean Security Studies, he serves on its Board and prepares the annual reports on the Council conferences. He is a specialist on national and international security affairs, with an emphasis on deterrence and arms control, and on Northeast Asian security affairs. His writings include Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (two editions), Deterrence Now (Cambridge University press, 2003), and – coedited with T. V. Paul and J. Wirtz – Complex Deterrence (University of Chicago Press, 2009), along with several other books and numerous articles in academic journals. His current major project is a book about the future of the US alliances, using the US-ROK alliance as the major case study, and he is also involved with several other analysts in a project on the future of American extended deterrence in East Asia.