The 30th Annual Conference opened at 2:00 pm. General Kim, Jae Chang and General John H. Tilelli, Jr., Co-Chairmen of the Council and the Conference, offered brief greetings and thanked the sponsors for their support. General Tilelli noted that ceremonies in honor of Korean War veterans had been held the day before, for the war that divided Korea so long ago. He noted that unification is still some distance away, that it will be difficult to bring about, and that hopefully it will take place peacefully. The key concern today is North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs, which are a serious continuing threat. However, there are interesting developments taking place there. The focus of this conference is on what we need to do about North Korea. Interest is substantial about the possible collapse of the North – however, remember that this was also being serious discussed back in 1996! General Tilelli closed by saying that as always, it has been an honor to co-chair the Council and its conferences with General Kim.

General Kim, Jae Chang welcomed the panelists and noted that it was nice to be holding the conference in the heart of Seoul, especially in connection with the ceremonies on the 70th anniversary of
the end of the Korean War. He expressed his appreciation to the Council leaders and the participants, for continuing a Council with a history going back to 1983. The US-ROK Alliance is, itself, a marvel of endurance, of success on a huge scale, and as a pillar of peace and security on the peninsula, in the region, and at the global level. Unification is, of course, a broad and difficult issue, and the US and the ROK share common views on both the alliance, and unification as its core challenge. He concluded by offering congratulations to the Council and the conference participants.

The Minister of National Unification, Hong, Yong-pyo, then offered his congratulations to the Council and the conference participants. It is a great pleasure to have been invited, having earlier worked with and in COKUS. The conference is very meaningful and I hope it will help expand US-ROK Alliance relations. It is necessary to regularly renew cooperation and peace building while expanding work with North Korea, and our joint efforts are vital in all this.

The Republic of Korea is seeking to build trust on the peninsula, trust in inter-Korean relations and trust with others. We must have the North’s cooperation and association, to join together in peacebuilding. Meanwhile, the US-ROK Alliance remains vital. It continues to solidly advance US-Korean welfare. And it remains important that we remain firm in dealing with the DPRK. There should be a focus on communications on the peninsula at the conference. Then the Minister ended his remarks.

[At the close of these opening ceremonies it was announced, with regret, that the scheduled Keynote Address by US Ambassador to the ROK, the Honorable Mark Lippert, was canceled because he was unable to attend.]

The participants adjourned for a short coffee break, and resumed the conference at 3:00 pm

PANEL I: CURRENT SECURITY SITUATIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA
CHAIR: Dr. Park, Yong Ok – Former Lt. General, ROK Army; Former Vice Minister of National Defense; Ph.D–University of Hawaii; Former Deputy Secretary-General –ROK National Security Council; Professor – Korea Military Academy and National Defense University; extensive experience in negotiations with the DPRK.

PAPER PRESENTERS:
Dr. Kim, Tae-woo, “Chair-Professor”- Donggak University; Former Senior Research Fellow at the Sejong Institute and National Assembly; former President of the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis; 11th President of the Korea Institute for National Unification; Ph.D – State University of New York-Buffalo

Dr. Bruce Bechtol, Professor – Angelo State University; former US Marine; former Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Officer; President-International Council on Korean Studies; COKUS member of the Board; Author of 4 books, numerous articles on Korea; Ph.D – Union Institute

Dr. Robert Collins, 37 years service in the US military and US Department of the Army; MA in International Politics-Dankook University; Former Chief of Strategy, ROK-US Combined Forces Command; former Adjunct Professor of Political Science – University of Maryland; Nonresident Fellow – Committee on Human Rights in DPRK; Decorations: ROK Sam-il Medal and US Exceptional Civilian Service Medal

DISCUSSANTS

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**Hong, Sung-gul**, Professor of Public Policy- Kookmin University; Ph.D – Northwestern University; frequent service on ROK ministries’ evaluation and advisory committees; Director-Kookmin Institute for Strategic Governance (research center); active political commentator; specialist in history of Park, Chung-hee era.

**Dr. Sue Mi Terry**, Senior Research Scholar-Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University; regularly featured on national news outlets; several years service in and then Deputy National Intelligence Officer for East Asia of the National Intelligence Council; prior service on the National Security Council staff; 8 years as a CIA senior analyst. PhD. Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

**PAPERS:**

**Dr. Kim, Tae-woo** “Marginalization of South Korean Security”

He opened his presentation saying he was honored to appear at the conference. His focus was on what he termed the major trend in ROK security – how “it is being trivialized.” Some statistics on the ROK: it is 14th in the world in GNP; 10th in the world in defense spending; 8th in the world in trade volume. But the ROK is surrounded by 4 great powers, borders on the world’s most dangerous country – North Korea, and is in the doldrums economically. It has to face North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, China’s increasingly assertive political-military stance, Japan’s casting aside its post-WWII regime with too little repentance, Russia’s renewed steps toward being a military superpower, an uncertain alliance with the US, and an unproductive domestic politics situation. Given its weaknesses it is being trivialized, isolated, marginalized – a shrimp! What it needs now is a realignment of the US-ROK alliance, renewed economic growth, and domestic political stability.

Northeast Asia is in a “survival of the fittest” situation now. It includes power struggles like the US-China; arms buildups, territorial disputes; China’s expansionist military steps; the US “rebuilding strategy;” Japan’s expanding military steps and reinforced alliance with the US; the rebuilding of US-Japan-Australia security cooperation; Chinese-Russian strategic collaboration; China-ROK conflict over the Senkakus; South China Sea disputes; and North Korean nuclear weapons, etc.

The ROK is risking becoming trivial in comparison with the neighbors and other major powers. It shuns cooperation with Japan even though the US heavily utilizes Japan for providing protection to the ROK. Its security needs are being isolated and marginalized. [Then he turned to several sets of very important questions to consider. Some examples:

About the Alliance with the US:
Will the US really retaliate for a DPRK attack on the ROK and thus risk a nuclear attack on itself?
Will the alliance prosper if many in Washington think a unified Korea will lean toward China?
Will anyone else come to the ROK’s aid in a war?
Will the ROK benefit from the US refereeing a Japan-ROK dispute when it needs close ties with Japan to meet the rise of China?
Will the US redeploy nuclear weapons to the ROK if the ROK asks for that? How important really is the ROK in US foreign policy?

On China Policy:
Does their economic interdependence cancel ROK insecurities about China? Can China someday replace the US in protecting the ROK if North Korea attacks? Will China ever really squeeze North Korea on its nuclear weapons program? Will China give the ROK more respect if the US-ROK alliance is dismantled? Should the ROK devalue the alliance to accommodate China’s security-related demands and to get China to push for unification on the peninsula?

On Japan:
Isn’t ROK security harmed by its tension with Japan? Should the ROK be attacking Japan when it is where US bases for supporting the ROK, if it is attacked, are located? Isn’t ROK-Japan collaboration needed in containing North Korea’s nuclear weapons, its submarines with nuclear weapons etc.?

On Russia:
Can it be expected to act as the peace facilitator and peace lover after its recent behavior – its links with China, modernizing its nuclear weapons, rebuilding its fleets? How important is the ROK in Russia’s foreign policy?

On North Korea
Will national security for the ROK certainly benefit from unification? Would a reconciliation with North Korea actually legitimize the North’s behavior and clash with unification efforts? Would North Korea accept ROK preferences if it thinks it has achieved clear military superiority with its nuclear weapons? Isn’t North Korea too dependent on nuclear weapons to ever give them up? Can the ROK, on its own, ever dominate and tame North Korea and its nuclear weapons program without the US nuclear umbrella?

Clearly, North Korea – with its nuclear weapons – will continue to reject changing and pursue intimidation. So the ROK needs to put security ahead of unification! Unification will have to come from security. Next, the ROK’s stature in the region is slipping inexorably. The ROK is slipping as an ally – so the US is focusing on better cooperators such as Australia, Japan, the Philippines, even Vietnam. And the ROK will need a good relationship with China at the same time – which is not very likely to hold up. And antagonism with Japan, another democracy, will cripple the ROK’s stature: after all a key economic partner allied to the US would be who is being rejected!

Thus current ROK relations with both the US and Japan need improving! The ROK needs to assuage US desires, clarify its identity as part of the West, get the US to be more concerned about ROK insecurity, and get the US to understand the ROK’s pursuing non-hostile relations with China. The ROK
also needs to pursue development of its missile defenses and the Kill-Chain Project (creating a preemptive strike capability to use if North Korea is nearing an attack) to make North Korea more vulnerable to an attack in a conflict, enhancing ROK deterrence. This will call for more ROK defense spending, and more cooperation on missile defense with the US. It would be good if the alliance adopted “automatic intervention in case of a Korean contingency” and “nuclear umbrella” as additions to the alliance treaty language. The ROK and Japan need to work hard to repress antagonistic sentiments toward each other, not instigate them, because ultimately ROK-US-Japan trilateral security cooperation is vital. The rising North Korean nuclear weapons threat, such as with nuclear weapons on SLBMs that are coming up, can help intensify this cooperation.


Professor Bechtol started by thanking General Kim and General Tilelli in their service to COKUS and, after a brief plug for Angelo State University, said he would be talking about the evolving North Korean threat. He opened with a reference to how President Park, Geun-hye in 2014-5, especially in her Dresden speech, has strongly pressed North Korea on the matter of Korean unification, but the DPRK has shown no signs of seeking talks or pursuing confidence-building measures. Instead it has continued enhancing its forces, particularly its nuclear weapons program, along with its missile program for enhancing surface-to-surface fighting and its short-range efforts. It is also bolstering its navy by upgrading its ships, submarines, and a developing SLBM capability – all in moving to adjust to possible combat with the ROK-US naval forces. The North is also improving its ground forces readiness and air force capabilities, while improving its growing cyber-warfare sector.

The nuclear weapons program gets the most attention in both North Korea and by foreign observers. The North’s conventional forces threat, by contrast, is neglected by most academic analysts. The nuclear threat is clearly growing, as the North is apparently now able to weaponize both plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU). The scale of its 3 underground nuclear tests has steadily expanded. It probably can produce a 500 kilogram HEU warhead for a No Dong missile now, with a 1500 kilometer range that could reach US and Japanese bases, plus Tokyo. In 2015 American officials have indicated that the North now could build a missile – the KN-08 mobile ICBM - with a nuclear warhead able to hit US territory. No major US agencies have questioned this. And in May North Korea claimed it could put a small enough warhead on an ICBM, so a test may be forthcoming.

The North has produced a wide array of missiles since the 1980s: SCUDs D/C/D/F, No Dong, Musudan, the Taepo Dong series, the KN-02(a version of the Soviet era SS-21). The Taepo Dongs are for ICBMs. The Musudan has not been tested in North Korea (only in Iran), and is a serious potential threat to strike US territory. The KN-08, a road-mobile ICBM that could reach US territory, has been displayed twice, has 4 SCUD engines, then a Musudan engine, and a third stage cluster of Musudan engines. It may be operational or close to it and, if so, will be the most compelling threat ever to the US.

DPRK maritime military capabilities have been growing at an unprecedented rate. Najin-class frigates are getting weapon - particularly anti-ship missile – upgrades of missiles very fast at low altitudes, putting older ROK ships at considerable risk. Also being produced is a missile patrol catamaran incorporating stealth technology, with improved missiles, torpedoes, and guns and a speed of 60mph or
more. The 70 ship submarine fleet is being upgraded with a missile-firing sub (probably based on an old Russian Golf sub) that could potentially threaten Hawaii. Testing of an ejection launcher for an SLBM has occurred recently, with one successful underwater firing. The allies continue debating how far along all this is.

The North has been testing drones and will apparently make ones for attacking US and ROK ground targets. One is a biplane flying at very low levels avoiding radar, for carrying small (10-15) special-ops groups. The North has far more armored personnel carriers (2500) than ever, and is upgrading its main battle tank with thermobaric rocket launchers and portable missiles, and has successfully tested a 300mm multiple rocket launcher for targeting all of Seoul and the US bases south of it (Range – 180km or more). This is on top of its 13,000 multiple rocket launchers and artillery systems, many along the DMZ, plus its work on EMP weapons.

The North has retained its huge biological and chemical weapons stocks, holding regular exercises with them – at least 4500 tons of chemical agents. It has increased its offensive military exercises – coastal landings, river crossings, etc.- simulating attacks on many. It has a “Seven-Day War Plan” for defeating ROK in just two weeks. It still has 1000 or more artillery guns, anti-ship missiles, and hovercraft to use against invaders. For cyberwarfare the North has perhaps 6000 people involved; it is a major priority. Those involved are highly trained, well paid, and often are from elite families. They have generated a spate of attacks, even on a ROK nuclear power plant attack as well as the SONY operation in the US.

Why thus burst of military activity in 2014-15? One plausible answer is that it is in reaction to the South’s renewed pressure for unification, showing the North is strong and not interested in compromise. Another is that Kim, Jong un still hasn’t consolidated his rule – in the party, the military, and the security services. There is much corruption, confusion, and fear at the top, making it a poor environment in which to pursue talks and unification.

Robert Collins  “Party-military relations in North Korea and the Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula”

Along—time major expert on North Korea, Robert Collins began his presentation saying the situation on the Korean peninsula still displays continuity. What is disturbing is the fear of North-South provocations creating a crisis, or a regime collapse that results in heavy casualties and destruction. In either case the Korean Workers Party (KWP) will heavily influence developments and military decisions. Party-military relations are designed to maintain party control at all times, as with all other agencies and aspects of society. Article 48 of the KWP Charter specifies this, and that the Korean Peoples Army (KPA) will instil Juche ideology throughout the services, protect the party, and especially protect the leader to the death. The KWP chain of command parallels the KPA chain of command.

This is maintained through the:
KWP Central Military Committee – which controls leadership on military policy
KWP General Political Bureau – controlling commanders, others, through political officers at every level
KWP Organization and Guidance Department – which controls all personnel matters, reviews all military policy so it fits top level guidance, reviews KPA party committee reports, and oversees surveillance of KPA leaders and their family members.

KWP General Political Bureau propaganda officers who provide political propaganda training for KPA personnel at all levels.

The KPA Military Security Command oversees control of anti-coup and counterintelligence work within the KPA, with special attention to regime leadership security by tracking KPA leadership loyalty to the supreme leader.

The party authority chain goes from the First Secretary to a party secretary, to a director, to a first vice-director, to a section chief, to a deputy section chief to a responsible secretary to a guidance officer, to a party worker.

Reports flow in the opposite direction up that ladder.

The KWP Central Military Committee’s authority/influence has varied over the years. In 1962 the KWP Central Committee ratified a new military policy in approving four military lines of arming the populace – turning the country into a fortress, converting the army to cadre, and modernizing it, and with the KWP Central Military Committee assigned those 4 lines. In 2012 the Central Military Committee was given greater authority, and soon took over guiding all military affairs. The KWP Organization and Guidance Department handles promotions for senior colonel and above; the KWP arty Committee Secretariat handles promotions for Colonel and Lt. Colonel.

The KPA Party Committee operates under supervision of the KWP Central Committee – with party cells and party committees at every level from company and platoon to battalion and above. Each party committee has a Secretary, plus secretaries for Organization, Propaganda, and Workers’ Organization, and with lower level units reporting to them. All resulting reports flow to the KWP. The main control mechanism is the party’s General Political Bureau (GPB), its highest policymaking body. It provides party directives and guidelines while monitoring and controlling the KPA. Its control extends to political ideology control, surveillance of senior military leaders, and control of KPA personnel and military administration. Political ideology control is the core function, along with organizing party life in the military, promoting military morale, and managing officer recruitment, assignment and transfers, plus promotions and discharges. It has departments on publishing, athletics, a movie studio, a newspaper a symphony, and others including the Enemy Suppression Department (the 563rd Unit) which recruits or kidnaps ROK soldiers to get them to defect.

The GPB political officers operate at every KPA level, and make or approve all personnel assignments, and sign off on all orders to validate them. Commanders are assessed weekly as to their performance.
The Organization and Guidance Department (OGD) of the KWP became the nation’s most powerful political organization in the Kim, Jong-il era, run by Kim, Jong-il to oversee all aspects of the party and thus of the entire society. In the 1970s Kim, Jong-il began shifting policy-decision power to the Secretariat and policy review power to the OGD. The Secretariat shaped policy, and its recommendations on this then went through the OGD at Kim, Jong-il’s approval.

Thus the OGD dominated five areas. It had:
- Exclusive author on selection and assignment of every military department director, general, and frontline regiment commander;
- Authority to guide, interfere in any administrative or military matter;
- Oversight of all surveillance powers, thus monitor all officials and officers;
- Authority to ratify all policies presented to the supreme leader;
- Authority over protection of the Kim family
All this was part of Kim, Jong-il moving to secure his elevation to General Secretary and Supreme Leader.

As the designated successor to Kim, Il-song, Kim, Jong-il then reorganized:
- the party organization – its roles and functions;
- the party task system;
- the party life guidance system – how members were to be evaluated;
- cadre tasks – controlling how each party, government, and military cadre was to perform tasks;
- a guidance inspection system – to maintain being in line with the Ten Great Principles of Monolithic Leadership;
- the Propaganda and agitation task system.

Now the OGD has 1000-1300 personnel. Apparently the highest level OGD officials were selected from Kim’s friends in the top socio-politically-rated families, for their loyalty and ability. This has continued under Kim, Jong-un. The OGD First Vice Directors – for party headquarters, regional parties, the military, and administration – are the most influential positions after the supreme leader, because of their special status. Through the General Political Bureau and the OGD’s Military Directorate control the party elements of the following:
- KPA General Staff Department;
- Ministry of the Peoples’ Armed Forces;
- Military Security Command;
- General Logistics Mobilization Bureau.

Every KPA officer must become a KWP member immediately after being commissioned or give up his position, and the GPB controls selection, demotion, promotion, assignment, training, family housing, children schooling, food security, and privileges of each KA general and frontline regimental commander.

KWP defectors say the OGD is really the “Party within the Party” with its control over all manor sector leaders, assessments and inspections, and indoctrination sessions – of military personnel. Its assessments go well beyond professional-technical capabilities to evaluate political loyalty via daily self-critique sessions, party doctrine sessions, and KWP committee meetings – as well as, especially,
observance of the Ten Great Principles of Monolithic Leadership. The Great Principles are meant to dominate every North Korean’s life.

The OGD serves as the staff for – in all the KWP Central Military Committee; the KWP Politburo; the KWP Inspection Committee, and the KWP Central Committee; That is, the “who’s who” of North Korea. Only the supreme leader supervises and controls it. It can, and does, intervene at all levels whenever it wishes. It is very likely Kim, Jong Un’s key advisors are the OGD vice-directors.

THE MILITARY SECURITY COMMAND

The MSC is the primary security agency in the military-industrial complex, providing surveillance and person movement control and protecting the supreme leader. It takes orders direct from the supreme leader. It detects/arrests anti-party/government elements, handles anti-espionage missions, provides the supreme leader’s security, handles the registration of all members of the services, guards coastlines and borders, and deals with ordinary crime. It reports to the GPB Director.

The most misunderstood element of the military is party-military relations. The political control system operates at every military level. Crisis reporting from all levels flows through the OGD to Kim, Jong-un. In a serious crisis or conflict the leadership will base decisions on only political considerations, not military expertise, which will likely skew decision making into miscalculation. KPA commanders lack Western-style command authority. They are glorified operations officers. Political officers and security officers report through their stovepiped chains of command. A KPA commander has little initiative to adjust on his own to battlefield developments; political controls from above will override situational assessments.

The alliance is not keeping up with how North Korea makes military judgments and decisions, and telling alliance personnel about it. ROK and US officials need to prepare to cope with the fog of war in crisis situations by knowing how the DPRK will act in a war. The key here is the party’s control of the military and know how hard Kim, Jong un is to read given his limited experience. Analysis by mirror imaging will not be and accurate guide. North Korean offices and others cannot speak honestly to their political superiors – they have to toe the line from above – and therefore the allies can misperceive what North Korea will do.

DISCUSSANTS

Gordon Chang

The Collins paper is very good. He is quite correct on how North Korean miscalculations could readily occur. The system is too politically driven and will miscalculate at times as a result. And Kim, Jong-un is very inexperience and vicious.
Bechtol’s paper is also very good, on why the North puts so much stress on military matters currently – as being its way of insisting, and sending the message, that unification is not going to occur.

Kim’s paper: during the Cold War it was common to doubt the US would uphold NATO or other allies in another major war. Actually, the US has sustained them down to the present. Generals Tilelli and Kim are examples of a sustained alliance. Professor Kim says China has a huge economic advantage on the ROK, but he exaggerates. China’s continued rapid rise is not inevitable – its economy is now in serious trouble, and analysts mistrust the official figures as deliberately overstated. Its real annual growth rate may be only 1-2%. In the first half of 2015 its electricity consumption growth was at an annual rate of 1.3%. Construction has dropped considerably. Some $800 billion has left the country recently. The political system is being upset by Xi Xiping’s breaking old norms, and fears Xi might resort to a war to bolster his legitimacy.

Kim’s lists of questions for Northeast Asian governments are good – quite provocative! But China’s rising peacefully in the area remains very unlikely in the long run.

Su Mi Terry
This has been a fine panel. The Collins paper is very detailed and very good. It shows how political control in the DPRK is maintained. He shows how the state is run by the OGD, its power resting on personal-level control of everyone in the military (and other sectors) and in the party. The OGD dominates decision-making with decisions then carried out by the key leading agencies. Thus in a rapid-escalation conflict situation, the North’s leaders will act more on a political than a military basis. This is very dangerous for the allies; misperceptions by the North are quite likely in some situation.

What are the implications for the allies? What can they do? The North has the most rigid political system in history. Its institutions exist only to support the top leaders, which means: We can’t count on inducing changes in DPRK actions and decision making. We can’t change North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Kim is too impetuous, will continue improvising too much, will be rash in some decisions Thus the North is not going to shift course and will continue trying to intimidate others. Kim will continue to misperceive his weaknesses in serious situations. And concessions to the North will not work well. They won’t reach others well enough to move the officials on government policies.

Hong, Sung-gul
He opened his comments by saying it was an honor to participate with the panel. First, Dr. Kim, Tae-woo expressed strong distress about the ROK’s present situation. But in fact the ROK is at a very high point in its history now. It is a serious economic power and is doing very well – the best in its 5000 year history! Its capabilities have grown greatly, and rebalancing in the region is now important. The fast-developing ROK must fit into it, be more proactive on this. It must have a greater impact, promoting and making corrective actions.

Bechtol is quite correct on how North Korea’s focus is really on nuclear weapons now. Thus it is simply not going to give them up. So what do we do? He indicated that he did not know, but it is certainly the most important question now. We need to make new efforts on this it seems.
As for the Collins paper, Dr. Terry offered an excellent review, and like her I agree with the paper. One problem now is that the North’s system cannot last forever. It has been shaky in the past two years—there have been numerous signs of this, such as the dumping of some military leaders and other serious disruptions. What would be our best response to this? That is not clear and we need to thing very hard about it. The North is not going to shift course, and will continue trying to intimidate others. Kim will continue to lack perception of his weaknesses in serious situations. And concessions in dealing with the North won’t work well. They won’t reach others in the North well enough to move the government’s policies.

Responses

Kim, Tae-woo said that he had enjoyed the commentators’ views. He asked Bechtol: What can the ROK do on the nuclear weapons issue? Emphasize ROK defenses? Would that be without any retaliation? Can the Kill-Chain approach really work? It would certainly require huge resources! And the ROK would have to know for certain who and what caused the war to put Kill-Chain into action. Wouldn’t it be better, therefore, to prepare to effectively retaliate instead? That would be the best form of deterrence to use. On Bechtol’s suggestion that the alliance treaty be revised, is this possible? And would that be effective? However, he is certainly right about the ROK planning tit-for-tat responses to North Korean provocations or outright attacks.

Bruce Bechtol opened his reaction to the Collins paper by noting that, in the way North Korea is controlled, the OGD does not have all the power, although it is indeed powerful. A good question is: why hasn’t there ever been a coup? This shows how strong the system is—there is very great control at work (in responding to a remark by Gordon Chang). The North’s real goal is clearly to dominate the peninsula. It pursues regime domination accordingly. And it simply will not give up its nuclear weapons program. Thus the ROK cannot do much to alter this objective, and North Korea’s overall behavior.

The Kill-Change program will not be able to do enough to defend the ROK. The ROK needs a much better BMD capability to go along with it. That means updating the existing BMD system and getting it in league with the US BMD system. No one these days needs this more than the ROK!

Robert Collins started his response by repeating that the North Korean response to some proposals raised here could be a misreading by the regime’s advisors, making escalation in a crisis more likely. DPRK weapons systems are ultimately dominated by the party. Key top officials drive training, plans, and practicing. All this is always in keeping with approval from the highest level political leaders. There is no deviation from this—the top political officials will continue to control decisions.

A resulting loss of control could be lethal, either because of mistakes at the top or lower-level adherence to rigid regime requirements. The US and ROK must learn how North Korean leaders will decide, and show top leaders how to react and have other officials know, from below, how to do this.

Questions and Answers
Q – Recently an escapee from the North wrote a “this is paradise” poem. Unification will come eventually, but only from the efforts of the people on both sides. Trying to do it in other ways will be too big a risk of death and destruction. Why be impatient? We will take the right step eventually. Despite President Park’s overtures to Beijing, the Chinese are unreliable, not to be trusted at all!

Q – for Kim, Tae-woo, and Bechtol; we in the South cannot contain the North alone. The US and ROK need to have nuclear weapons secretly ready to hit the North. Don’t we need to scare North Korea more – be more of a threat to it?

Q – for Kim, Tae-woo; where does the money come from to support North Korean weapons? And for Collings, in what areas is North Korea matching our policies – competing with us – well.

Q – for the panel: If we don’t get North Korea’s nuclear weapons program ended, threatening the world’s safety, what can we do to eliminate these nuclear weapons?

Q – the panelists have given us 3 views. Is a peaceful reconciliation with the North possible? Is a peaceful reconciliation with the North possible? Is a peaceful Korean peninsula possible?

Responses

Professor Kim: Unification or compromise, can we blend the two? Progressives stress cooperation as best, but it has never worked with the North. Conservatives’ arguments and proposals are not any more successful. On our strategic approach, our deterrence stance needs to rest on the opponents’ mutual vulnerability to succeed – hence the ROK needs nuclear weapons too.

Bruce Bechtol: On North Korea’s money for weapons, for years it received a great deal of help from the Soviet Union. It has also engaged heavily in illicit activities in nuclear proliferation – getting some $3 billion per year from this. Trade with Syria has helped also. And the North sells a lot of weapons in Africa.

On unification, the most likely scenario is the eventual collapse of North Korea. But some violence is likely to accompany the resulting unification. Meanwhile, the ROK needs better missile defense; the north will never just dump its nuclear weapons.

Robert Collins: The North’s provocations over the years have been mostly small, clearly controlled, reflecting a mature leadership. The North lacks this now. So how do we communicate best with it? Be very graphic with our messages – pulling no punches.

Su Mi Terry: Is peaceful unification possible? Probably not. Bruce Bechtol is right. How to get North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons? We can’t. To send clear messages, they should be clear threats with clear follow ups as necessary.

Gordon Chang: A brief coda – we need much more potent responses to provocations to keep North Korea in check.
PANEL II THE US-ROK ALLIANCE AND PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA

The Conference resumed on its second day at 9:00 am. This panel was introduced by General Kim, Jae Chang and General John Tilelli with congratulations form each to the Council on its 30th Anniversary. Then Dr. Choi, Jin-wook, the President of the Korean Institute for National Unification (KINU), a co-sponsor of the conference, thanked the organizers for inviting him and said he was looking forward to the day, while also thanking everyone for supporting the US-ROK Alliance.

He said that unification is the key to a better future for Korea now. We have started moving in that direction. But of course it will be difficult to bring about, as small steps are taking place toward achieving it. The Park government is trying hard to get some help to the people of North Korea. Today’s meeting can provide useful analysis of North Korea and its current situation.

Then General Walter Sharp (Ret.), former Commander of the alliance’s Combined Forces Command, also expressed his appreciation for being invited to the Conference and to speak. He began by noting that the administrations of the two alliance governments will soon finish their terms of office. The conference can provide some valuable analysis for their successors. Here are some of the challenges facing the alliance today:

First, North Korea is not about to give up its nuclear weapons program, ever! So changes on this must come from within. And in the meantime we must remain on guard. How can we promote internal changes in the North? We must continue to bolster the alliance, and we must keep a very close watch on North Korea. It will be important to boost Japan as well. This will also call for: Enhancing our BMD and our other forces; Boosting our planning for provocations and for instability in the North; Seeking to support the continuation of the UN sanctions on North Korea, and pushing the UN to be ready to use force to deal with forthcoming violations of them; And we need to keep pushing China to help, but not expect them to do so.

It is important to keep broadcasting information to the North on human rights, freedom, and the government’s damage to its people, so that the people themselves also put pressure on the regime. We also need to respond to the fact that the North is getting stronger, more dangerous now. That is the first challenge facing the alliance today!

The second challenge is to design a new North Korea after the current one collapses, to develop a plan for this. Some questions to consider in this regard: What will the government be like? What about province officials – what will happen to them? What about the legal system? What about the economic system? What about China – how are we to work with it under the new circumstances?
There is always some tension in the balance between stability and pushing for change. Now it is the latter that is the more important of the two.

With that, the General concluded his remarks, which were very warmly received, and Panel II got under way.

CHAIR: (Introduced by Gen. Kim, Jae Chang) General (Ret.) John H. Tilelli Jr. MA-Lehigh Univ.; US Army War College; Honorary Doctorate – Widner University; Honorary Doctorate in Law, Univ. of Maryland; Former Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command, ROK/US Combined Command/US Forces Korea (over 650,000 military personnel); now Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Cypress International, Inc.

PAPER PRESENTERS

Lee, Byeonggu, Associate Prof., KINU; PH.D Univ. of Kansas; MA in mil. Strategy – KNDU. Specialist in US and ROK defense policies, ROK-US Alliance; publishes in academic journals and edited volumes; as Colonel served in Military Intelligence and Security Directorate; Head of Policy and Plans Department – Defense Staff.

Maj. Gen. Mats Engman: Swedish delegate to Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; Swedish Air Force since 1976; former instructor and head of Dept. of Military Strategy at National Defense College; Served in the Military Intelligence and Security Directorate and as Head of Policy and Plans Department of the Defense Staff; Military Attache to Golan Heights, UK & Ireland

Park, Hyeong-jung: Senior Research Fellow, and Director for Research Management - KINU; Ph.D Phillips University, Marburg Germany. Numerous books and papers. Specialist on politics, economics, and foreign relations of North Korea, and on US E. Asia policy; active as policy advisor to the government, and to humanitarian and human rights NGOs.

Chung, Sam-man; Senior Research Fellow, Korean Institute for Maritime Strategy; former navy captain – awarded Order of Service Merit, and Region of Merit (US); Ph.D Univ. of Missouri-Columbia and MA – Korean Defense University; numerous publications, specialist on maritime strategy and security; has taught military strategy and naval strategy at ROK Naval War College.

DISCUSSANTS

Greg Scarletieu Executive Director – Human Rights in Korea; Executive Director, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (in DC); MA – Fletcher School; MA - Seoul National University; Specialist on human rights in North Korea; numerous years of service in USAID, Asian Development Bank, World Bank

Yoo, Ho-yel, Professor – Korea University; Member, Standing Committee – National Unification Advisory Council. Former member- policy advisory committee for Ministry of Unification. Specialist on North Korea, unification. Has written several books, many articles. Ph.D - Ohio State University

Park, Young-ho:KINU honorary fellow, visiting professor Kangwon National University; Member Standing Committee of the Advisory Council on Democratic and Peaceful Unification; policy advisor –

PAPERS

Lee, Byeong-gu  “The Role of the ROK-US Alliance in Peaceful Unification of Korea”

Professor Lee noted that this is the 70th anniversary of the division of Korea. On unification, the roles of the US-ROK Alliance are increasingly important in light of recent developments. The situation in the North seems to be getting unstable, perhaps heading for a regime implosion. The US is showing more resilience than many had expected, an important factor in ROK national security strategy. Chinese and Japanese military forces are being modernized and will be challenges for the ROK in the future, even after unification. The US and ROK will face huge tasks if unification begins. If poorly managed the resulting clash of interests could lead to alliance disintegration.

A unification period can be divided into three phases for analysis: 1) from the present to the start of unification; 2) during the unification process; and 3) after unification. The current security environment is as follows. First, Kim, Jong-un has set off government reshuffling on an unprecedented scale and brutality. About half the 218 leading official in the party, military, and government were replaced in 2012-3. Jang, Song-taek, a very high official and Kim’s uncle, was arrested and killed. Early this year the defense minister, Hyon, Yong-chul was executed for disloyalty by an aircraft gun. Several elite members have fled the country. Thus the future of North Korea is uncertain. If Kim, Jong-un creates a backlash – and he is increasingly seen as paranoid dictator- this would mean an abrupt change we will have to face.

The booming US economy has implications for the supposed US decline and China rise. The 2015 US National Security Strategy and its press release has emphasized growing US strength – as the world’s leading oil and gas producer, it can reduce its dependence on those imports and even reduce its military efforts to keep flows going elsewhere, and it can help Europe reduce its dependence on Russia. The expectation of a US decline needs reexamination.

As a result the US will likely remain engaged in Asian international affairs and politics, and closely associated with the ROK. After unification Korea will have diverse security concerns. It will be stronger but the price tag will be huge. With 75 million people and the North’s resources, while shrinking its aging population problem, it could do a lot, but will face the expanding/modernizing militaries of China and Japan and possibly being squeezed between them.

What needs to be done? The allies should deepen their cooperation on preparing for possibly abrupt changes in the DPRK. The alliance should remain the main pillar of a unified Korea’s national security strategy. But it will have to evolve to meet changing regional conditions. This will need careful management and a shared vision. With no North Korea threat, the existing rationale for the alliance will be recalibrated, needing a new rational, lest the alliance become weak and loose.
Next, the allies need an implementation plan for unification, divided into clear phases with specified tasks. The concept of a “Comprehensive Strategic Alliance” must be retained and upgraded, with continued commitment to liberal democracy, a market economy, and human rights. The alliance should focus on regional and global interests including global stability and prosperity.

Until unification is under way the alliance must remain a preventer of provocations and mobilizer. It should mobilize audiences at home and in the neighbors. Once indicators multiply of disruption in the DPRK regime, the alliance should act to maintain stability and round up resources at home and abroad. There will be some strategic uncertainty while it retools its security vision. The alliance will expand its objectives to maintenance of a regional balance of power and serve as a pillar of a regional security community. It will still need a strong deterrence posture, and consider pursuing counter-piracy, disaster relief, disease control, etc.

Its specific tasks in each phase cannot be precisely predicted, but here are examples in outline. In the starting unification phase one task will be preventing provocations via strong deterrence, including imposing costs after any North Korean provocations. Then it will need contingency plans with related concrete preparations – on border controls with China and Russia, eliminating nuclear weapons and other WMD on the peninsula, and disarming the North. At that time the transfer of wartime OPCON arrangement should be speeded up, followed by completion of a long-time vision for a unified Korea and the alliance. Alongside this will be the task of inducing China to support such steps and hopefully overriding a possible Chinese preference for the status quo (North Korea as a buffer). The alliance will need a joint strategic communications effort to promote and sustain domestic popular support – after all, unification gets uneven support in the ROK now for various reasons.

Once unification is under way important alliance tasks will include foiling third-party interventions, dealing with WMD facilities and stockpiles, and seeing to humanitarian relief. Sufficient attention will have to be paid to neighbors’ stakes, concerns, and interests. The US has a particular national interest in the North’s WMDs and facilities, and since the North is now expanding those capabilities securing and eliminating them could be a much bigger task than anticipated. Perhaps it will have to be shared with the ROK and the neighbors, after necessary discussions in advance.

Humanitarian relief and maintenance of stability internally will be very difficult and complex. As the Iraq case has demonstrated it can lead to serious trouble if mishandled, so it will need proper preparation. Next the alliance will have to see to military integration, management of huge DPRK stocks of arms and munitions, and absorption of some of its personnel lest some turn to military resistance.

Finally it will be vital to gather public support in the North by meeting public needs and expectations. Its citizens could be unpredictable, dissatisfied with the huge changes, and turn against unification from long indoctrination. Extensive dialog with neighbors will be needed for the same reason.

With unification in place, the alliance must promote confidence-building measures with the neighbors, especially with China and Russia on the border areas and any military deployments there. The role, size concern and location of US forces will be an important Chinese and Russian concern. The US will probably reduce its forces on the peninsula as a symbolic step. And ROK forces would need to
shrink given unification costs and the loss of a security threat. Their priorities would also change significantly.

**Major General Mats Engman: “Armistice Arrangements on the Korean Peninsula”**

General Engman opened with an outline of the Armistice. It was signed on July 27, 1953 after almost 2 years of hard negotiations, signed by three parties representing North Korea, China, and the United Nations; each signer a military commander, reflecting the preamble statement that it was “purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea.” It remains the legal basis for the UN organizations involved and their activities. The ROK has never signed it. The Armistice established 4 basic functions and organizations:

- **The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC)** – to oversee repatriation of prisoners of war. Members: Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and India. By 1954 it was basically disestablished after repatriation of almost 100,000.

- **The Military Demarcation line (MDL) and the DMZ.** The DMZ was defined on each side with boundary lines and a map. It was 2 miles wide on each side. Naval forces were not considered a key to the war or armistice so were not included. Also the Armistice was intended to be temporary.

- **The Military Armistice Commission (MAC)** It was to supervise the agreement and hold negotiations on violations. Its 10 members were 5 from each side, with no formal chairman; it was to report violations and have 10 observation teams. And it could request that the NNRC conduct special observations/inspections outside the DMZ.

- **The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC)** It was to have 4 senior officers – two from each side to inspect outside the buffer zone and assist the MAC when requested, drawing on its 20 inspection teams. The initial officers were from Sweden and Switzerland on one side and Poland and Czechoslovakia on the other.

Initially NNSC operations stations inspection teams at 10 ports of entry, 5 on each side, inspecting personnel and equipment rotations. All these were to not be expanded. Complaints about inspections led to limiting the NNSC to the Panmunjom area. With the end of the Cold War, Poland and Czechoslovakia changed sides (from North Korea’s perspective), leading North Korea to reject any state departing from the Soviet bloc. Soon both Koreas entered the UN and in 1995 North Korea ended its contact with the NNSC, which has since had a very limited presence and role.

In 2000 the UN Command ROK, Sweden, and Switzerland moved to develop 9 Expanded Tasks (ETs) for the NNSC:

2 flights monthly from the DMZ to Panmunjom - asserting rights listed in the Armistice – by 2 officers; Inspection by these flights of aviation warning panel markers along the southern edge of the DMZ to be sure they were visible from the air. (Limited assets have since cancelled the flights); Special inspections for defector interviews, numbers of staff, and equipment to determine compatibility with the Armistice Agreement; Checking guard and observation posts equipment to insure compliance with Armistice Arrangements; Briefings on AAs and the NNSC mission for UN officers; Visits to USFK bases to increase transparency, confidence building, familiarizing, and to assure information given is correct and defensive/deterrent in nature;
Assessing whether Army Pre-Positioned and Maritime Pre-Positioned forces are complying with AA, and movements are for training/maintenance and defense/deterrence purposes only; (Done only when invited.)
Observe selected ROK military exercises in the same way;
Observe USFK/CFC/UNC exercises (typically joint or combined) in the same way;
These ETs sustain use of the AA existing legal framework, the transparency of the Command UN Command and MAC, and serve as a precursor to confidence building measures.

80% of the NNSC’s time is devoted to these “Expanded Tasks.” They are conducted only on specific invitation, and only get invited on the southern side of the MDL. The ETS fall into three groups:
Observe UNCMAC activities in the DMZ;
Education and outreach;
Observe UNC/CFC and ROK exercises;
Currently the UMCMAC is re-marking the MD - and NNSC is observing and assisting this – and is finding some discrepancies.

Nothing like this exists on the North side. It would be good to at least offer some education and training in the North. It would not fully implement the AA but such small steps might ease the current impasse. As it stands the NNSC contributes impartiality and transparency in helping maintain stability on the peninsula.

**Park, Hyeong-Jung**  “North Korea’s Policy Towards the US and South Korea (2009- 2015])**

Dr. Park’s presentation noted at the start that 2009 was a turning point for the peninsula. North Korea held its 2nd nuclear test and rejected any denuclearization. The prior era of compromise and cooperation (2000-2007) ended. Since then we have seen 7 years of confrontation, trading punishing steps and countermeasures, with the North shifting between hints of appeasement and conflict, often in recurring phases of 2 to 9 months long. It behaved similarly before 2009 but with longer stretches of somewhat amiable relations, including suggestions of possible denuclearization that led to several agreements. Then in 2009 there was the 2nd nuclear test and renunciation of denuclearization. The Obama administration shifted to “strategic patience,” heightened sanctions, and pursued human rights issues more intensely. Conflict and confrontation has ensued since. Efforts at a possible deal in early 2012 evaporated with the North’s missile test launches and a 3rd nuclear test from early 2012 to February 2013.

The US response was, in outline:
The problem is the nature of the regime – it must be transformed;
The US will intensify/expand sanctions – squeeze the North into choosing between nuclear weapons and economic survival;
The US should intensify discussions with the ROK, Japan, and Beijing on how to respond.

North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and suitable missiles inevitably produces structured instability in inter-Korean relations, and damages North Korean chances of economic and regime security, so inter-Korean relations continue to fail. It has also nullified the earlier Korea reconciliation
phases. The resulting behavior of the North, starting in 2009, can be placed in 11 phases, each identified in terms of the most significant aspects differentiating it from the prior and succeeding ones.

Phase 1: 2009.1 – 2009.7
Kim-Jong-il’s health, collapse of the Six-Party Talks, and deteriorating North-South relations drove:
Initiation of hereditary succession plans;
Stress on nuclear weapons development, reorganization of nuclear weapons facilities, and a decision to keep the North’s nuclear weapons;
A wide confrontation with the ROK;
Heightened military readiness;
Strong defense of the North Korean military demarcation line in the West Sea;
Renunciation of all previous agreements on resolving confrontation with the ROK.

Phase 2: August – November 2009
Pursue better relations with the US and ROK, based on summits with the South and a joint communique with the US, even talk of an Obama visit. North Korea’s position in its meeting with Wen Jiabao on October 6: seek good US-NK relations; denuclearization; maybe renew Six-Party Talks; pursue the denuclearization of the peninsula.

Phase 3: November 2009 – May 2010
The Daecheong naval engagement on November 10 leads to a strong reaction toward the ROK and its policies; the North demands the ROK change its policies toward the DPRK and dismantle the ROK Ministry of Unification and the Korea Intelligence Service, plus other changes. The North offered some conciliatory ideas in early 2010 but sank the Cheonan on May 21.

Phase 4: June – September 2010
The North reacted to tough allied responses after the Cheonan incident by threatening war and a strengthened nuclear deterrent, hinting at another nuclear test.

The North shells Yeonpyeong, then shifts to appeasement. But it threatened all-out war if there were allied countermeasures. In January it suggested, then demanded inter-Korean talks, promised no additional provocations, and suggested more talks in March.

The North launched a huge anti-Seoul propaganda campaign, denouncing ROK policy on the DPRK. Insisted on policy changes it wanted included:
On ROK treatment of Kim, Jong-il’s death
On ROK denunciation of the North on the Cheonan attack
It also demanded:
An end to US-ROK military exercises;
Acceptance of the North Korean position on denuclearization;
An end to psychological warfare on North Korea;
A Resumption of inter-Korean interchanges on the North’s terms; Abolition of the ROK National Security Law. 

From February to July, 2012 there were denunciations of high level ROK agencies, complaints of ROK treatment of Kim, Jong-il’s death, and objections to the UN Security Council’s condemnation of a DPRK long range missile launch in April. There were threats to destroy the center of Seoul for allowing defamations of Kim, Il-sung

Phase 8 – July 20, 2012 – May 2013

In July the North charged that the US and ROK were instigating refugees to destroy statues pertaining to the North, and reiterated it would not give up its nuclear weapons. It threatened a vast immediate counterattack in a “great war for fatherland unification” if the allies attacked. In December and January it make more condemnation of the Security Council condemnation of its rocket launch of December 12. Denunciations of the ROK continued in early 2013. February 12 it conducted its third nuclear test - of a high power, small size, lightweight device

Phase 9 – May 2013 - February 2014

The North shifted to appeasement. Made proposals for talks, and suspension of slander and defamation efforts, plus suspension of antagonistic military activities. It called for measures to prevent nuclear disasters. Agreement on these matters would lead, it said, to resolving many other issues including family reunions. On February 14 there was contact between the ROK National Security Agency and the DPRK Unification Front Department to promote family reunions, improve inter-Korean relations and plan high-level contacts

Phase 10 – November 2014 to the present

North Korea denied the Human Rights charges, denounced the US for pursuing the overthrow of the North Korean government, and condemned prior agreements after the UN passage of its human rights resolution. In January the North offered suspension of nuclear tests if ROK-US military exercises were suspended. On February 4, it announced it would not meet with the US. On June 4 it announced its nuclear forces and rockets were targeting the US and its friends.

During this time the North also regularly rejected holding talks with the ROK – in November, January, late January, etc.- unless the ROK cancelled various actions. In the spring it condemned the opening in Seoul of the UN Human Rights Office as an extra-serious provocation.

As a summary it is apparent that North Korea is relatively mid-level in its confrontations. There were about 5 phases of confrontation, two of appeasement, and others in between. Recently it has ceased threatening a 4th nuclear test in 2015, and may be looking for, in exchange, the suspension of US-ROK military exercises. Maybe the absence of a 4th nuclear test was part of wanting the suspension of the allies’ tests.

The strong threats toward the ROK in late 2014 were not clear in purpose. But the North will probably soon take steps to reduce its diplomatic isolation. However, it could launch a long range rocket instead; or reenter talks on denuclearization while seeking more economic aid in exchange; or it
could stay on its present course. Finally, Kim, Jong-un is likely to see his regime as facing increasing jeopardy. The DPRK’s deepening isolation abroad is accompanied with domestic economic troubles and some signs of a harder line by the regime. However, based on past history this is no guarantee of an inevitable regime collapse in the near future.

Before turning to the next paper, General Tilelli said that the patterns of behavior laid out in the paper go back well beyond 2007 in modern Korean history.

**Chung, Sam-man**  “Nuclear Deterrence Theories and the Implications for North Korea’s SLBM”

The paper presentation began with noting that North Korea has continuously developed nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive weapons for attaining strategic offense capabilities and major conventional forces. This has included 3 nuclear tests in 2009-13, gaining some 40KG of plutonium, and a HEU program. It appears to be able, now, to miniaturize nuclear weapons. Its missiles include:

- Old SCUD B & C missiles from the 1980s with 3-500KM range;
- The Nodong missile (1990s) - 1300KM range;
- Musudan missile - over 3000KM range;
- Taepodong (1998) and Taepodong -2 (2006), which may be able to reach the US;
- In addition: 2-5000 tons of chemical weapons, first produced in the 1980s, and various types of biological weapons – anthrax, smallpox, etc.

The US-ROK response is a “tailored deterrence” strategy that includes Kill Chain, Korean Air and Missile Defense systems, a Comprehensive Development Plan for Chemical and Biological Threat Response Capabilities plus US-ROK biological defense training. The ROK Kill-Chain and KAMD systems are now challenged, however, by North Korea’s recent underwater ballistic missile test – a spitting image of the Soviet era SSN6 and called Bukkeukseong – 1 (Polaris 1). It is presumably a single-stage, storable, liquid fuel design. (Some analysts claim it was fired from an underwater platform, not a sub.) If the test was from an SLBM and successful, this will cancel some of the utility of the Kill-Chain for hitting North Korean missiles before they are launched.

**ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE THEORIES**

Deterrence is about convincing some other entity to not do something harmful by threatening to seriously harm it, if it does, in retaliation. Defense starts after deterrence has failed. An example: President Clinton was briefed on May 19, 1994 about making an attack on the Yongbyong nuclear weapons facility. Pentagon military chiefs said that would generate a general war in Korea with an estimated 52,000 US military casualties and 490,000 ROK military casualties in the first 3 months, plus civilian losses, and at least $61 billion in costs, from North Korea’s 8400 guns and 2400 multiple rocket launchers. The US seems to have been deterred as a result! And those losses would have been from conventional, not nuclear, weapons, especially from the shelling of Seoul. North Korea also backed away from a war for the same reason. This was an example of conventional deterrence at work. But in
January 2003 North Korea, having admitted it had a secret unanium-enrichment program, withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and restarted the Yongbyon reactor.

And Kim, Jong-un recently ordered and watched a successful test of a sub-launched SLBM, probably about 2500 tons. This will affect area international politics eventually. The world has learned to live with nuclear weapons and none have been used. But do they make war impossible? McGeorge Bundy, in the Kennedy era, said nuclear armed adversaries faced “existential deterrence” so war would not happen. Some later analysts (Mearsheimer and Waltz, for example) have argued that nuclear weapons help prevent war and thus nuclear proliferation can be useful. But analysts like Dunn, Nye, and Sagan believe the spread of nuclear weapons makes the world ever more dangerous, war-prone largely because of accidents, mistakes, etc., so war may come unintentionally. Sagan emphasizes bureaucratic pathologies as nuclear war-starting threats.

The immorality of nuclear weapons is seen by some others as another source of deterrence. In fact, when Ayatolla Khomeini came to power in 1979 he halted the Shah’s nuclear weapons program as immoral. Realists argue that power tends to override morality – and it seems to have done so in Iran. Thus that explanation is questionable. The key effect of nuclear weapons is inordinate destruction deliverable so quickly, especially with ballistic missiles destroying without first defeating the opponent.

In 1981 Kenneth Waltz promoted the idea that nuclear weapons prevent wars so nuclear proliferation is a good idea and John Mearsheimer advocated, in 1990, a nuclear-armed Germany to maintain peace in Europe after the Cold War. Waltz made four main points:

1) in anarchical international politics nuclear weapons turn a balance of power into a balance of terror – if a few survive they can be terribly devastating
2) so equality of nuclear forces is irrelevant for stabilizing crises
3) thus knowing how destructive an opponent will be is not obvious
4) this holds for all nuclear powers, not just great powers.

There are difficulties with this view. Waltz says in a nuclear world states are uncertain of survival so stability is maintained – war is too uncertain. But states often take risks that could lead to nuclear war. Richard Betts says that although decision makers have wanted to avoid it, that has never been their highest priority. During the Yon Kippur War, the Nixon administration took steps in the eastern Mediterranean that had nuclear armed ships on hair-trigger alert tracking each other. And in 1962 the USSR put missiles in Cuba – a very risky behavior. And the Chinese attacked the Soviet Union on the Ussari River in March 1969!

Thomas Schelling pointed out that if two nuclear powers let a crisis get to fighting, the risk of unintended escalation rises greatly because so many more people are now in position to trigger it. In the Cuban Missile Crisis Soviet forces in Cuba had orders to use their tactical weapons to repel a US invasion without prior approval. And President Kennedy did not have complete control over some US nuclear weapons. Critics say in such cases the use of conventional weapons would be much better compared with what they would suffer from using nuclear weapons, so it would never be rational to use nuclear weapons. But Edward Rhodes cites the problem of “Contingently Irrational Behavior - when deciding to use nuclear weapons in certain cases is made in advance, that may be carried out regardless
of what disaster will occur as a result. Or decision makers may not be rational, as in Stanley Kubrick’s “Dr. Strangelove” movie. Rhodes thinks the US probably has standard operating procedures on using nuclear weapons in certain situations that will operate automatically – a “Doomsday Machine.”

There is a serious possible problem when conflicting actors have decided to avoid a nuclear war but not a conventional one – and in the latter rationality calls for striking first – making for a major initial attack which could generate great instability – like the Soviet effort to put nuclear weapons in Cuba ready to go, secretly. Another difficulty is the stability-instability problem first defined by Glenn Snyder: two opponents have nuclear weapons and therefore each thinks this means the other will not use his, so both think it is safe to fight conventionally, leading to very serious harm because of the war or because wars can get out of hand and greatly escalate. Hence, since Pakistan got nuclear weapons it has been more adventurous harassing India militarily. The question remains: can states engage in limited wars with great confidence neither will escalate to using their nuclear weapons.

THE ROK TAILORED DETERRENCE STRATEGY

The US has given the ROK an extended nuclear umbrella since North Korea’s first nuclear test, and more of those tests have made it more necessary, and the Cheonan sinking and shelling of Yeonpyongdo increased it. In October 2013 the allies signed an agreement for a Tailored Deterrence Strategy against the North’s nuclear and other WMD weapons. It is meant to fit the nature of the North’s leaders and the nature of its nuclear weapons. Both states are to improve their military response plans, first in preparing to defend the ROK, and second to defend at the strategic level via the the Tailored Deterrence Strategy, Kill-Chain, and the ROK military’s KAMD. The Kill-Chain is to “Find, Fix, Target, and Exchange immediately when detecting an impending attack. Strengthening this is ROK Global Hawk surveillance systems and, eventually, reconnaissance satellites. It is to acquire systems to promptly attack fixed and mobile nuclear weapons systems and missile facilities in the North and at sea and in the air. [See the note at the end of this summary of the paper] This means acquiring:
Better ground to ground missiles;
Long range air-to-surface missiles;
Medium range air-to-surface missiles;
Joint Direct Attack Munitions and laser-guided bombs;
Long range precision strike aircraft;
Improved sub-to-surface and ship-to-surface-missiles;
Improved tactical ship-to-surface missiles;
Developing the KAMD to intercept missiles attacking the ROK – an overlapping missile defense system;
Acquiring improved Patriot missile, and medium-range surface-to-air missiles.

Meanwhile, North Korea is building a sub to launch ballistic missiles, raising serious concerns. It could be a modification of a Russian or Chinese design. North Korea has about 70 subs – mostly older diesel ones, mostly small or mini, and 4 old-style Whisky-class subs. US intelligence agencies believe it has sub-launched ballistic missiles. The North remains one of the largest exporters in the world of ballistic missiles. It has 600 – 1000 itself. It bought 40 Russian decommissioned subs (Golfs) and may have reverse engineered one to carry SLBMs. But an analyst at the US Naval Institute thinks the North has not yet developed a missile firing sub – there are too many hurdles to jump – and some other
analysts agree. But others suggest China is sharing its satellite navigation technology with the DPRK, helping the DPRK project along.

A modified SS-N-6 engine was used to build the Musudan to be used for building longer range missiles, or shorter range missiles with larger payloads. The SS-N-6 technology was shared with Iran for its Safir missile. (Some Russian officials have claimed that no SS-N-6s were sold to North Korea and that its technology was beyond North Korean capacities. Others say China may have assisted North Korea in rebuilding Golf subs, having earlier transferred some of its transporter-erector launchers.) China sees the US assisting Japan’s and the ROK’s military development so it sees North Korea as a useful buffer even though North Korea is an unruly and annoying state. So if North Korea is developing an SLBM that can target Japan and the ROK, those targets are components of what China sees as a rising US containment effort.

An often-used term now in the ROK is “proactive,” stemming from President Lee’s statement after the Cheonan sinking that the ROK would respond sharply to any future provocations under the principle of “proactive deterrence.” It is a way of indicating one is acting responsibly in choosing one’s response based on one’s own values in managing one’s decisions.

The stability-instability paradox suggests that two states with conflicts and nuclear weapons will deter a nuclear war but have more minor conflicts because they believe nuclear deterrence will prevent the conflicts from escalating. Thus the US and USSR mounted numerous proxy wars but never war with each other directly. A Conflict Resolution study in 2009 concluded that mutual possession of nuclear weapons drops the odds of nuclear war precipitously, while lower intensity conflicts can occur – nuclear weapons can bring both stability and instability.

Thus low-intensity provocations by North Korea are likely to increase because the North’s nuclear weapons and the US nuclear umbrella stabilize that level, making Cheonan events more likely. Hence the ROK must be better prepared to retaliate immediately, in an “immediate deterrence” fashion, and not rely on “general deterrence” to prevent such attacks. The ROK must also turn to a control strategy more vigorously to cope with sea-based SLBMs, which will require a more offensive approach – denying areas Pyongyang might use and using them itself for offensive purposes – being ready to attack enemy subs and patrol near enemy bases. North Korean subs with SLBMs must be monitored and chased from their missile departure points.

However just one sub might be able to slide around ROK coasts secretly, terrifying people, so the ROK needs a parallel capacity for retaliation – a balance of terror capability. The North Korean command and control structure seems highly centralized, as are its political and military leaderships. In a country that doesn’t seriously protect its people, a counter-force/value strategy may not deter its threat. Needed is targeting the North Korean leadership with very powerful weapons that can successfully retaliate. The ROK Navy should therefore use submarines and a special force that can decapitate the DPRK leadership accurately, and credibly. Defense compliments deterrence on the peninsula. North Korea wants to be able to use a first strike capability and the initiative in a clash with the ROK. The ROK must counter with joint US-ROK defense systems to fully deter.
A summary: we must deter the North’s provocations using SLBM capabilities:
1) we must prepare a suitable defense and preemptive response capability for emerging threats
2) NK threats will come from the stability provided by DPRK and US nuclear weapons capabilities
3) Use subs in a balance of terror with North Korea
4) Prepare survivable retaliatory means along with a strong defense for effective deterrence

Footnote 28 of the paper says:
“Kill-Chain strategy requires picking up signals of an impending attack and within one minute establishing when and where it will occur; and within three minutes ordering a preemptive strike against North Korean targets – attacking the relevant sites before North Korea can launch its attack; and being able to determine whether this eliminated the source of the intended attack; and being able to respond immediately to any North Korean counterattacks.”

DISCUSSANTS

Greg Scarletieu
He began by outlining Lee, Byeonggu’s paper, citing the main factual elements, and expressed general agreement with it. He noted that his organization (Human Rights in North Korea) had helped support Lee’s findings. He also reviewed the main points of Chung’s paper. Then he turned to Park, Hyong-jung’s paper, which he commended, saying that North Korea Sam-man’s attitude on complaints about its human rights behavior has changed. It is responding to international pressures on the human rights situation, but modestly. Park mistimes some of the developments cited in his paper in places. But it is import into grasp how North Korean policy has come to completely lack international credibility. It joins, then withdraws. It signs the reports, but regularly ducks payments – and soon.

Clearly North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons. It is always seeking carrots instead – big sticks don’t work in getting something from the North. It must stop violating international standards. Yesterday’s papers at this conference pointed how we should go about giving North Korean people a push and empower them, in particular how to provide them with information about human rights, about the ROK, and about the corruption in the North, etc.

We can expect to see considerable turmoil, unrest, etc. in a failing North Korea, and we must prepare for it. Otherwise the collapse will just bring on a new version of bad rule. The alliance will be the key to bringing peace and stability to North Korea. The support of the US will be vital. Eventually negotiations will be needed, but the North will ask for excessive concessions and be a difficult negotiating partner.

Yoo, Ho-yeol
Professor Yoo also turned to the Lee paper first. Lee was correct in stressing the importance of the alliance as crucial after a collapse in the North. But the peninsula, its complications and possible threats, will be more volatile than this. First, we will have to worry about China! About what China thinks about Korea’s future. Then we need to have the alliance remain strong to sustain peace and security.
On unification itself attitudes will be different. China will naturally want peace and security on the peninsula. And it sees the ROK as a better partner for the future. But it will definitely worry about the alliance with the US. Since the alliance will remain vital for Korean security amidst having to face too many strong neighbors, its continuation will have to be sold to those neighbors, a serious undertaking. What role will Japan play? Of course, the Japan-US alliance will continue. Some people expect that to lead to a China-ROK alliance as a result, given the tensions between Japan and the ROK.

Yoo also commented on the Engman paper. The UN is a valuable resource on the peninsula, and maintains good relations with the North. Swedish efforts have been particularly useful. The paper notes the sealine problem, never specified in the Armistice Agreement. That issue is now a problem (as another paper explains) and needs careful attention. But this will need getting the North to the table for a deal which is bound to be difficult.

Park’s paper shows how North Korea has always sought to drive a wedge into the alliance, as well as wedges into the Northeast Asian neighborhood. Its shifts in behavior, from soft to hard and back, are common. But the main trigger in its volatility is the changes within the regime. That is when North Korea policies mainly shift.

On the SLBM threat Yoo shows that on the peninsula, the small size of the two Koreas means the appearance of SLBMs means that it is just another threat – nothing unusual. It doesn’t really affect the possibility of unification. The key is to retain the focus on unification, not just deterrence.

**Park. Yong-ho**

The final discussant started by noting how the panel had raised many issues, but said the alliance remains the key item, although the roles of the other players in the future are important too. The four presenters emphasized the DPRK and its challenges. However, more focus was needed on the regime itself. North Korea’s trade situation is all right. The market economy has been smoothly installed. So the regime’s resilience is stronger than many observers believe. More attention should be paid to North Korean contingencies.

Lee sees Kim, Jong-un as a dictator, but he differs from his predecessors. Eliminating key officials is not really a sign of regime instability – his predecessors did the same thing! On reunification, the question is how can we persuade the North to behave? We must operate on sound premises. The key is not just North Korean military steps. Certainly the North wants better forces and nuclear weapons. But it focuses on regime survival, which is not surprising. And it is flexible in its relationships. The ROK clearly needs better thinking in its approach. Categorizing the phases of the North’s actions should be done better. Instead, the presenter’s conclusions tended to be weak.

Finally here are some questions pertaining to the Engman presentation. Can a peace treaty really be established after all this time? Can Sweden be of help in bringing this about? For instance, are there good examples of people establishing a peace treaty to be found around the world that can be drawn upon?

**Panelist Responses**
Lee, Byeong-gu

If we don’t cope effectively with the rapid pace of things these days, we could have a big problem. Thus the four phases analysis that I offered; it is a way to plan for the future in advance. As for the roles of new players certainly the matter and will continue to. But the players made an impact after the Cold War, and this will happen again. Their needs and concerns must be taken into account after unification. The paper’s 3 stages of unificationapproach takes this into account.

Scarlelieu pointed to how the US and ROK had different views on political prisoners held in the North. The US has emphasized them, the ROK has not. This is unfortunate. England said the two parties need to comply with the Armistice. Can the Armistice be extended in its coverage to the Northern Limit Line? This is a tough and complex problem. As for extending the ETs, what is needed is more dialogue with North Korea. On Sweden’s role, he said that he just represented Sweden, not the UN. Thus the initiative must come from the two sides in the Armistice – not Sweden.

Chung, Sam-man

The test by the North in May (of a missile fired from a sub) was not a fake. It means the North is seeking to put nuclear weapons on SLBMs. They will be difficult to defend against. While the allies can use Kill-Chain, eventually it will not be of use on sub-based SLBMs, so the ROK is looking for its own strategy in response. For instance, who controls retaliation if the president is killed? Who controls the main response? This is not clear. But the decapitation strategy could be a good strategy for the ROK – mounting a real threat against the North’s leadership.

Questions and Answers

Q. - I worked on Iran’s example of the nuclear weapons program while in the Navy and am interested in the recent agreement with Iran. What about the North Korean program? How can it ever fit with the unification effort? The North Korean regime really needs to be replaced instead. Is there any chance of this?

General Tilelli said that he know of no analogy to the Iran agreement situation in the case of North Korea, and none in sight in the future. North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons – General Sharp’s point on this is correct.

As time was up the Chair closed the panel and thanked the panel members for their wide-ranging presentations.

PANEL III 1: 30 – 3:30“International Cooperation for Peaceful Reunification of the Koreas”
**CHAIR:** Dr. Hugo Kim, Retired Professor – Korea National Defense University. Currently – Washington University. Author of several books including *Korean Americans* and *Inter-Korean Relations*. Former President and founder of the East-West Research Institute in Washington, DC. Long association with COKUS. Ph.D - Catholic University.

**PAPER PRESENTERS:**

**Park, Min-hyung**  Associate Professor – Korean National Defense University (KNDU); Ph.D University of Leeds (United Kingdom). MA, KNDU; Has published numerous articles. Director – Military Strategy Research Center, Research Institute of Security Affairs - KNDU

**Gordon Chang** Author - 2 books on China and North Korea; frequent appearances – national TV networks, national newspapers and journals; frequent briefer/speaker- National Intelligence Council, CIA, State Department, US strategic Command, Council on Foreign Relations, Heritage Foundation, Brookings Institution, Cato Institute, Pentagon

**Dr. Su Mi Terri** Senior Research Scholar-Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University; regularly featured on national news outlets; several years of service in and then Deputy National Intelligence Officer for East Asia of the National Intelligence Council; prior service on the National Security Council staff; prior 8 years of service as a CIA senior analyst. PhD. Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

**DISCUSSANTS**


**Bhang, Hyong-nam** Director of Hwajeong Peace Foundation and the Institute 21c for Peace Studies. Former President, Korean Political Science Association, 2013. Former member: policy advisory committee, Ministry of Unification. Has written many books and articles on North Korea. PhD-Ohio State University

**PAPERS**

**Park, Min-hyung**  “The UN and the Peaceful Reunification of Korea: the UN’s role and Commitment for the Reunification Process”

For 60 years ROK security has rested on a strong bilateral alliance with the US – central to ROK security and economic advancement. Pivotal in deterring the North Korean threat and contributing to political and economic stability in the ROK and Northeast Asia. Still there is no peace treaty. Korea is still divided, in a military stalemate. North Korea’s support from others has diminished in recent years,
its economic situation is poor, but the North poses a dangerous threat to the ROK. With those weapons and the current ROK-DPRK stalemate, there have been no good conditions for building a peace structure.

The peninsula is surrounded by 4 great powers so the strong deterrence the Alliance provides is fundamental in preventing another Korean War, and in this stability ROK should pursue peaceful unification. For a breakthrough on this, a bilateral – 2 Koreas – approach may be best, but the current confrontation situation blocks this. For a solid peace and unification the ROK needs a broader policy and international cooperation, and the UN may be well-placed to play a pivotal role in peace process.

What is a Collective Security System?

States are driven toward “internal balancing” and “external balancing” to sustain their stability and independence. They practice unilateralism, bilateralism, or multilateralism when engaged in cooperation. Multilateralism involves coordinated relations among three or more states, usually pursuing compromise, adjustment, and persuasion to limit conflicts.

There are several variants in a multilateral security arrangement: a collective security system; a collective defense system, or a cooperative security system. In a collective security system states rely on their individual and collective self-defense effort. John Baylis says that collective security in it comes from:

- States renouncing the use of force to change the status quo;
- States attending to the interests of their international community;
- States overcoming their fears and learning to trust each other;

They agree to:

- Punish those who violate these rules;
- Act in an “all for one and one for all” fashion when a member’s independence and territorial integrity are threatened;
- Take collective steps to prevent, and remove, threats to peace and to restore peace, by peaceful means and in keeping with justice and international law;

Thus an attack on one is regarded as an attack on all.

A collective defense system is one that assumes the existence of a potential enemy outside the system, and members pledge to collectively resist aggression within the system.

A cooperative security system prevents disputes by maintaining confidence through cooperation and communication among states. So the system is based on reassurance, not deterrence, and does not presuppose the use of military strength. Here is a summary:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Collective Security</th>
<th>Collective Defense</th>
<th>Cooperative Security</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>System</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Military, Internal</td>
<td>Military, External</td>
<td>Comprehensive, Internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Unilateral</td>
<td>Interdependence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Why is the UN necessary on the peninsula? The traditional concept of security is focused military protection, thus “a relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war should it occur. But modern concepts of security include dealing with terrorism, WMD, public health threats, ecological problems, economic and social security threats.

A collective security system now applies better than the other types – is more applicable to the Korean peninsula than others. Efforts at security cooperation have existed but with limited effect. An example is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Founded in 1994, critics say it is “a talk shop without any teeth” and doesn’t focus directly on Northeast Asia. APEC, established in 1989, covers a wide range of concerns as do others – NEACD and CSCAP, But they have little impact on security relations.

Turning to the UN is therefore an inevitable recourse. First, it has had direct relations with the peninsula since the Korean War started. It has recently been a forum for resolutions condemning North Korea for launching missiles and testing nuclear weapons. Second, the two Koreas are members and the Charter says members will act to maintain peace and security, will give the UN “every assistance in any action it takes…” and not aid any state the UN is taking action against. The UN is legally entitled to force North Korea to change its behavior. Third, the UN has units for bringing collective action – the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, etc. Fourth, the UN is involved in peacebuilding, via its Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding Fund, and Peacebuilding Support Office.

Since nuclear weapons can bring about tension in an area by being indiscriminate, uncontrollable, or not restricted, the North Korean nuclear issue is a Northeast Asian, even global, issue, not just a peninsula one. What might the UN consider doing?

1) It should try to revitalize the Armistice Agreement. That could lead to some mutual trust, leading toward peace, between the Koreas.
2) It should try to enhance North Korea’s human rights situation. It has been trying to do this recently, and has, for the first time, launched a field office to monitor state perpetrated human rights violations.
3) The UN is needed to try to coordinate the major powers’ interests on unification or otherwise there might be serious competition on this.

Conclusion:

Some people are skeptical about the UN being of much help. The ROK should continuously try to persuade regional actors that the North Korean nuclear weapons issue is a Northeast Asia security issue, and to persuade all UN members to help develop a peaceful process of unification. And the ROK
should try to ensure that North Korea will actively participate in UN activities. The ROK must work to reduce tension on the peninsula, in part by inducing the north to move out of isolation. For instance, the North could join the TSR-TKR Project to link the Trans-Korean Railroad with the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The ROK should expand inter-Korean economic cooperation as well.

Next, the ROK needs a cooperative relationship with China, Japan, and Russia because their support is indispensable for regional security and Korean peaceful unification. This should be linked to a continuing strong ROK-US alliance, given limited military capabilities vis-à-vis North Korea’s nuclear weapons and the threat this poses to Seoul. The ROK needs the UN to play an active role in maintaining peace and security—a UN actively working with the 2 Koreas.

Gordon G. Craig  “China and Cooperation with North Korea”

China and North Korea both have only one ally—each other. Yet their relations are at a historical low and likely to get worse. Why? First, each is experiencing turbulent leadership transitions. Internal instability is disturbing their relations. Second their foreign policies are pursuing separate goals—breaking old relations and forming new ones.

North Korea’s Leadership Transition

One-man states are the least stable regimes, most vulnerable when a new leader takes over. This was especially true, in the DPRK, because Kim Jong un was only about 28, his father had too little time to prepare him, and he was not Kim, Il sung’s first choice. So Kim, Jong-un was ill prepared, especially on balancing the army the Workers Party, and the security services. And the relatives appointed to help him by Kim, Jong-Il have caused numerous problems, particularly Jang, Song-thaek.

Most observers thought Kim, Jong un was off to a good start but it now appears that his position is precarious. There has been almost constant change in the army - 4 chiefs in less than 4 years. The defense minister (General Hyon, Yong-chol) was probably executed in April—apparently for napping at a Kim public event. A four star general was killed in 2013 or 2014. 68 senior officers were killed in 2012-2014, and 15 so far in 2015. The total may be as high as 500 in the military purge.

Kim operates in an impromptu fashion. Casualties include the architect of the new terminal in the Pyongyang airport and five others, an official who questioned Kim’s foreign policy, an official who questioned Kim’s design for a building shaped like a flower, 4 members of Pyongyang Unhasu Orchestra, Kim, Jong un’s aunt Kim, Jong-hui, and Jang, Song-thaek’s network personnel along with some of his family.

While many observers saw this as Kim solidifying his position, this is questionable. As Bruce Bechtol suggest, the obvious sign of weakness in a power structure is purges. As Victor Cha says, no serious political transition going well takes four years. Kim, Il-sung created a system in which the various sectors competed, leaving him the one –man center with everything revolving around him, and allowing the military to be the most significant institution, a military first policy. Jang, Song-thaek apparently sought to boost the role of the party and take over control of some major monetary resources, and Kim,
Jong-un has been seeking to gain control of them. Apparently the purge has been much lighter in the Korean Worker’s Party and the Ministry of State Security. Further infighting with the military can’t be good for stability, and yet he can’t find military leaders he can trust. And a reign of killings inevitably created enemies and thus more opponents and their desire to fight back. No wonder the pace of executions seems to be increasing. Kim’s governing style is disliked by some other senior leaders, and this seems to be spreading among ordinary people. Kim’s insecurity about all this may be why he hasn’t traveled much abroad, passing up the 70th anniversary in Moscow of the end of World War II, and he may even be afraid to visit some parts of the DPRK. And he hasn’t visited China at all.

China’s Transition

China’s political system is also unstable. The standard view is that Xi Jinping made the power shift rapidly and effectively, that the transition reflected the Party’s internal rules and procedures. Actually, there have been disruptions. The largest is the broad prosecution of both high-and low-level officials, on an unprecedented scale, under the guise of combatting corruption. This is the broadest effort to purge and reorganize the Party since the rise of Deng Xiaoping. Many see this as Xi dominating the political system, but someone fully in command wouldn’t have to have so many purges. And they have been violating the rule of not prosecuting members/former members of the Politburo Standing Committee, such as Zhou Yongkang and Bo Xilai. The targets have been fighting back hard – ending two decades of stability most likely.

Xi obviously has outsized ambitions, Mao-like in scope, but eliminating opponents that helped Xi in his positions is not something he can control. Xi has attacked Lin Jihua – Hu Jintao’s right hand man, and Zeng Qinghong, a ward of Jiang Zemin, even though Zeng put Xi in his position. But he is going after corruption and top officials have, for decades, feathered their own, and their families’ nests. Xi has attacked both of his predecessors, - which is unheard of. And the opposition is very strong – giving up his campaign would mean serious retaliation against him. He has to continue combatting them.

He came to power very oddly. He had no faction no bloc. His appeal was just that – the factions could settle on him as the least unacceptable leader. But his anti-corruption campaign threatens many others, which is heading the party toward another debilitating leadership struggle. There are stories of violent clashes circulating. As a result, military leaders have enlarged their political influence. Observers believe Xi has made the military his main bloc of support, but this is questionable. Officers in Lanzhou region defied and embarrassed him by a large incursion into India’s territory while Xi was on a good will trip to India. So it is officers close to Xi that he relies on.

This is part of the rising assertiveness at the top of the military, especially in the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group and the new Central National Security Commission. The military is active in shaping China’s diplomacy. Xi’s regular admonitions that the top officers are subordinate to the Party suggests that they really aren’t bowing to him.

Consequences of North Korean and Chinese Disunity
The political disarray has driven North Korea and China into deterioration in their relations. The cooling began with execution of Jang Song-thaek and suppression of his network. Since he had been in charge of DPRK-China relations this reflected Kim, Jong-un’s dislike for China and led to the sharp deterioration in relations: references in North Korea to Chinese as “enemies,” calling China a “sworn enemy” on military signs, or a “turncoat,” and painted images of China as pandas on military targets. The DPRK moved some 80 tanks and another 80 armored vehicles to the border. Relations have deteriorated further –Kim apparently executed an officer for not replacing subordinates in charge of relations with China. This is important; military-to-military dealings have been a major stabilizer in DPRK-China relations. Beijing’s exasperation has been evident, as with China’s opposition to North Korea having nuclear weapons. It may be eroding military influence in both nations. And their foreign policy goals now undercut one another. China has been tilting toward Seoul to get better treatment from Pyongyang but instead, it is courting Russia. Chinese academics say China should cater to the North to prevent Russia becoming dominant on the peninsula. North Korea sees the ROK-China relationship as a “betrayal” to its desire to dominate the peninsula itself.

North Korea’s nuclear weapons also damage US-North Korean relations. They reduce China’s leverage on the North, expand US reasons to build up forces in the region, reinforce interest in Japan and the ROK on missile defenses, and promote Japanese militarization. China opposes the North’s “progress in tandem” strategy. It dislikes the possibility the North will collapse, because it might lead to a China intervention, even domination of Korea.

The bad economic situation in North Korea is obvious and could further damage the regime. Even Kim family resources seem to be shrinking, and Kim is seeking aid from Russia. But only China is likely to help. The ROK and US certainly won’t. Russia will supply little as well- the DPRK has little to offer in exchange; its trade with China is over 60 times more than with Russia. In 2014 Russia wrote off some $10B in loans to North Korea but provided little in the way of new resources.

All this will likely lead to the North making more trouble – it usually has when demanding aid. A number of states’ policies on Korea rest on China’s coming to the DPRK’s aid and easing its problems or curbing the problems it poses, so it is disturbing that China’s influence has dropped. And it may mean China will have little participation in solving Korean problems in the years ahead.

Su Mi Terry  “Korean Unification and the Interests and Roles of Neighboring Countries”

Dr. Terry opened with a grand overview, saying Unification would be a pivotal change in the modern history of Northeast Asia, with profound implications for the regional balance of power. It might come only with difficulty and violence, or be more manageable, depending on various political, military, economic, and regional factors. It will also depend on the US and other regional powers- their cooperation is vital to mitigate harmful effects and uphold a widely beneficial unification. Standing in the way presently of necessary cooperation are the different assessments and interests of the major powers - especially the US and China, in regard to how to intervene in the North on unification. This could lead to heightened rivalries or strategic cooperation and coordination among the regional powers.
The US formally committed itself to support unification in the June 2009 US-ROK Joint Vision Statement and did so again in 2013. But little detailed discussion or planning has occurred on this in Washington until very recently, other than for military contingencies. Some US views include: Unification will cost more than German unification did; A divided Korea might be good – justifying the US military presence, helping limit China influence, keeping the ROK more linked to the US; A reunited Korea would be more likely to end up in hostilities with Japan; Unification would ease strong US concerns about DPRK nuclear weapons, and their possibly being sold on black markets; A unification step could instead turn into Libya-style instability.

But overall, the US is getting more convinced unification is necessary, because: North Korea has been a vexing problem for far too long, and too persistently; It continues to pose major risks, especially its emerging capability for attacking the ROK, its association with nuclear proliferation, and its possible capability to attack the US; It has been impossible to negotiate with; The US is shifting from just pressing for movement on denuclearization, stability and the north’s illicit activities, toward wanting a broader long-term strategy supporting the ROK in efforts to get peaceful unification into a democratic, free-market, pro-western Korea.

But the neighbors don’t agree. China doesn’t want unification – not wanting to lose a buffer to US power. That is why it has typically supported North Korea virtually unconditionally. And it thinks it will lose diplomatic leverage on a united Korea. So it still helps sustain the North Korean economy, is its most important patron and ally, its largest trade partner, largest food supplier, almost total source of energy, source of half of its imports in machinery, vehicles, iron and steel, plastics, etc. The bulk of foreign investment in North Korea is from China in mining, development, infrastructure, etc. It provides the North with an annual trade subsidy of roughly a billion dollars.

All this maybe changing. For years China has resented North Korean nuclear tests, the execution of Jang, Song-taek, and the like. Some officials have expected a collapse and unification. But China still hews to past priorities. It fears resulting instability and a pro-US Korea as the result of unification. But doesn’t openly say so in order to not insult Koreans.

Japan is also conflicted. While unification would end the North Korean threat, it would mean a strong, independent larger neighbor, one still at odds with Japan over the past. Anti-Japanese sentiment might even rise due to a surge of nationalism after unification. Russia also likes the status quo. Like China, though less so, it is wary of US military power on the peninsula. It, too, sees North Korea as a buffer – a Korea allied with the US would enhance US influence in the region. On the other hand, a united Korea could boost the Russian economy in the Far East and its eastern provinces, and promote a Russian gas pipeline to the peninsula.

Divergent Priorities – and Unification
We will continue to see conflicting views on unification and whether and how to intervene in it, and when. If major internal problem in the North precede unification intervention would be most likely as a result of a collapse. The ROK and US will define this in political terms; China, maybe Russia, will define it in legal terms as still a sovereign state, thus preserving it as a buffer. The regional response could be so disparate as to be calamitous – dragging out humanitarian relief and the seizure of the North’s nuclear weapons and facilities. Seoul could see this as a Korean matter, while China and the US insist on intervening too.

The US will be mostly concerned with the nuclear weapons and delivery systems to prevent their exportation. But sending troops to secure them might trigger Chinese intervention. (Maybe not, if Special Operations troops are used.) China will want stability by keeping North Korea as a buffer with a viable government, with the nuclear weapons not on the loose. It will fear a huge refugee influx. China could therefore intervene for a number of reasons. If it did, US forces racing North and Chinese racing south could be very dangerous. But China continues to avoid planning on how to handle unification so it does not look like it wants unification, and also fearing planning could increase the probability of it.

Japan will worry about loose nuclear weapons, North Korean instability, and regional instability, plus a refugee flood. It will help to bolster the North during unification but not by military intervention. Maybe it will let international forces use its territory for bases and stockpiling and will offer aid, medical personnel, supplies, even police. Russia will want to be asserting it is a great power. If instability rises it would probably closed the very short Russian border with the North.

The two societies are terribly disparate – internally and in worldview, so unification will be difficult. One key challenge: the North’s nuclear weapons facilities are widely distributed north of the capital and can’t be rapidly reached by forces because of problems setting up lines of communication and poor road networks in the mountains. Securing the facilities could take months and up to 10,000 military personnel even with little resistance. And there might be opposition at many of the 200 sites. A good many nuclear weapons might be removed by enemies, engineers, scientists, plus others looking to sell them. What would the ROK do with the nuclear weapons? Regional states and the IAEA will want them turned over or de-actified, but there could be serious debate about this. Keeping them will sour relations with neighbors, the US, and Japan as well as curb other support. But some in the ROK will want to keep them - after all the Ukraine released its nuclear weapons and now has lost some of its territory. And maybe the US will be leaving the region militarily.

A big concern is how often in civil wars or after a government collapse, looters raid arms depots, soldiers hide their weapons, etc. and Libya is a good example of what can occur (as was Iraq after the US invasion). Korean People’s Army cooperation could help to deal with this problem to stabilize the situation, but its soldiers could keep weapons for safety or raiding for supplies or aid. Or outright armed resistance could occur, especially from the 180,000 or so North Korean special operations forces, the supreme leader’s bodyguards, or the Pyongyang Defense Command.

On humanitarian aid, the North already has inadequate food, medicines, etc. Hoarding would be a likely problem. Many people could be displaced, wandering around or heading for the border. In
the mid-1990s semi-famine many people did this – with many of them heading for China. It will be vital that the ROK and US get humanitarian aid throughout the North as soon as possible in very large amounts, mount a large military effort to protect it, keep people in place to get it, and limit stealing by people, police, services, criminals. And air defense networks will have to be neutralized as soon as possible so planes can bring in the aid too.

The US and neighbors will be asked to help with the costs. Just supplying aid will be very expensive – the US campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq cost $3.2-4 billion. ROK military costs could be $500 billion, or more, with developing the North costing much more. In Germany unification costs came to almost $2 trillion over 20 years. The ROK Finance Ministry expects the initial costs to be 7% of the ROK’s annual GDP for at least ten years. The benefits? Huge security gains – an end to fears of North Korean attacks. Reductions in arms proliferation, and in instability in the area. A reduction in US forces there and in its missile defense program. Perhaps a better US-China relationship from shrinking irritants. And China would no longer be seen propping up the world’s most despotic regime.

Plua unified Korea will likely be democratic, capitalist, aligned with the US, with no nuclear weapons, nonaggressive, a huge trading partner for the region, developing the North’s mineral sources and workforce, and boosting the region’s GDP. China-ROK trade is already over $270 billion annually. China could play a big role in ROK growth with wider access to the Korean market. Russia would be able to have expanded infrastructure for energy shipments to Korea and much of Northeast Asia using North Korean and ROK ports, and benefit from more year round trade flows with Korea and Japan plus building a transcontinental transit route. There would be investment opportunities in infrastructure, transportation, telecommunications, shipbuilding, and so on.

There would also be a tremendous human rights expansion – in nutrition, information flows, consumer goods, and in many other areas, resolving the dismal humanitarian situation in the North.

Policy Recommendations

The ROK and U.S. should expand their dialogue on unification, including Japan in it, then add China and Russia – in multilateral discussions. The US and ROK should develop a coordinated overall strategy on all the possible issues likely to arise, including candid discussions about the future of the alliance, stabilization operations, military integration of the two Koreas, and the role of US forces. The multilateral talks should focus on peaceful unification. The US and ROK should particularly be ready for a hard landing – the most likely unification scenario. They should press China in particular on how unification would be very beneficial, that propping up the North would continue to be a strategic liability for China. Hopefully this would:

Make unification go easier
Ease Chinese concerns about future US military deployments in Korea.
The ROK should build ties to Asian middle powers that will support unification- Australia, Malaysia, etc.
This should be part of greater ROK public diplomacy, seeking the kind of international public support that emerged on apartheid in South Africa. Global opinion can have a huge impact. The goal is a smooth transfer to unification, as smooth as possible, so everyone in the region benefits.
DISCUSSANTS

Huh, Nam-sung (substituting for someone else)

He opened his comments by saying that these are “three outstanding papers.” The Chang paper is certainly good, very well organized and with a good analysis. He has been a good participant in the COCUS conferences for some time now. An important point in the paper is his indication that the Chinese political system is under strain, that the purge by Xi is a major sign of this, and that the military is not fully under his control – and the communist party is not either.

The first question that comes to mind is: whether there is any chance XI will be ousted? And what impact would that have on ROK-China relations? Another question is: if China is mainly backing the status quo on the peninsula, won’t it quickly intervene if North Korea implodes? After all, Xi recently surveyed the Chinese border force, presumable to be assured they are ready to go if necessary. The question really is: what would US options be if a Chinese intervention occurs, and what would the UN options be?

David Maxwell

Professor Maxwell said that unification is coming and we need to prepare for it. It is already US policy to support it. We should seek to have it result in a liberal democratic government, with no nuclear weapons, and a prosperous society. Turning to Park’s paper he said he fully agreed that the UN is needed to get a peaceful settlement, then unification, and Park’s paper provides some useful international relations theory bearing on this, However, the paper failed to discuss the UN Command’s potential role in contingencies. And an important question is how the UN can be induced to take an active role in the unification process.

A really important development in the Chang paper is the iffy situation of Xi. Also significant is how the DPRK-China relationship has soured significantly. China’s stability is a major variable! Then the Terry paper asks at what point does North Korea cease to be a viable state? That is quite important; decisions by various parties could be affected. Maxwell things it is a loss of government and military cohesion that is the end. Terry is certainly right that having a new Korea be a nuclear power would be very unacceptable. She is also correct suggesting the ROK try to get regional states on board on supporting unification. But there is an even better option – trying to build resistance to the regime in North Korea itself.

Bhang, Hong-nam

This international correspondent emphasized that Unification could come about at almost any time. He said he had covered the deaths of Kim, Il-sung and Kim, Jong-il, and when I am abroad now people say “the North Korean leader is in serious danger.” Turning to the papers he praised the Terry paper as nicely honed and quite frank, as well as insightful. She is correct on how the actions and perceptions of the neighbors with affect how unification goes. Also right on how the US and ROK need to include Japan on unification. But he said he remains cynical. Unification gets plenty of attention
periodically, then nothing ever happens – the government never makes a really strong effort to move it along, and the neighbors are not deeply committed either, one reason being that there is no consensus among them about unification.

He offered several suggestions:
We can’t see what the timing will be;
The cost is steadily rising – an important consideration;
Thus it is best to make everything simple, lest everyone see it as too costly;
Those involved in creating the division of Korea should help more on unification, be more responsible on this;
The ROK must be the key, remain the key;
The North’s nuclear weapons must be effectively handled. And shouldn’t that be tackled first? This remains unclear. The Iran nuclear weapons issue has made Koreans talk about similar weapons in the North but so far not much has been said about the implications for the ROK.
He concluded by saying, about the Terry paper – in seeking to carry out unification can it really be possible to ease tensions?

Responses

**Park, Minh-yung** said that intervention by China in a unification effort is quite possible. Otherwise, the US would play a much greater role, hardly what China wants. So, can we somehow get a greater role for the UN in the process instead? We need to revive the armistice, then bring the UN into playing a larger role in unification.

**Gordon Chang** Could Xi be ousted? Is he vulnerable? Yes. He has united his two predecessors in opposition to him, making allies out of long-time enemies. If Xi makes a mistake he could be seriously endangered – he is facing a major threat. China’s economy is now in serious trouble; it has slowed and may even be retracting. Xi fears being blamed for this. There is lots of talk now in his cabinet about who is to get ousted as a result of the slowdown. And the military has been very upset with him. He has military support in the Nanjing region but has irritated the services elsewhere. Thus his position is weak, endangered. Military officers see him as a princeling. And many Chinese government structures are no longer monolithic and thus not necessarily supportive.

**Su Mi Terry** said that with regard to whether China will help North Korea with its domestic instability, it is important that we know, so the US should continuetrying to talk with Beijing about this, even though this is very difficult. At least we need to get our views across to China as best we can.

Pointing out how Maxwell noted that the ROK needs public support in the North for unification, she said this effort should start with the ROK public first and then turn to pressuring via people in the North. Will the focus on unification in the ROK continue? This is not clear. However, Korea’s long history makes the division of the country unacceptable so attention to it should continue.

On whether the ROK should keep North Korea’s nuclear weapons after unification, she said that has not been resolved and can’t be as of now.
Questions and Answers

Q.- On involving the UN in unification, what did the UN do when Vietnam was becoming united? Nothing! So why involve the UN this time?

Q.- The Chair asked what military options would be available to deal with WMDs and other military difficulties during a shift to unification?

Q.- Will China accept and adapt to a one-Korea policy? And will North Korea ever accept that?

Q.- Why has China moved toward increasingly centralized rule?

Responses

Gordon Chang: Will North Korea accept a one-Korea policy? I think not. Would China? No. China does not its relations with North Korea over the years exposed – on secret sales of missiles for example. On Xi – he puts top officials in jail for corruption, which can be appealing. But it is the current economic failure that is the real threat to him. Overall, Chinese people can build resistance to their leaders much more readily than in North Korea, so China’s current government might disintegrate quicker there.

David Maxwell: To attack North Korea’s nuclear weapons and facilities militarily would involve a big intelligence problem, thus it may not be possible to get all of them, and the overall attack could be devastating for the North Korean people.

Huh, Nam-sing: It is true that Chinese leaders have often been dumped in the past, so Xi could be as well. But with chaos in the Chinese leadership, serious trouble in North Korea at the same time could produce a serious situation. At present, Xi might even order an intervention in North Korea. And an ouster of the leader is more likely to happen in North Korea.

In the last moments of the panel a final questioner offers several questions and comments for which there was no time for a response. The questioner said unification can come from inside or outside – but can the two Koreas really be unified? They have been apart for a long time with each side being affected by outsiders and the outside world. Can they now cooperate politically? Economically? And will they get a good response from China, Russia, the US, and Japan? Maybe unification will take place only is the new Korea is to be a neutral country.

In closing the panel at that point the Chair apologized for some strenuous arguments that had occurred between a panelist and a member of the audience at one point. There was huge applause for the panel.
PANEL IV: “Human Rights, Economic Issues, and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula”

CHAIR: Kim, Sung-han Professor of International Studies, Graduate School of International Studies and Director of Ilmin International Relations Institute – Korean University; Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2012-3; Former Vice President – Korean Association of International Studies. Current Chair of the Korean National Council of CSCAP; Advisor on several Prime Minister Committees/Commissions/Ministries, and a National Assembly Committee. PhD, University of Texas.

PAPER PRESENTERS


John S. Park, Adjunct Lecturer at Harvard Kennedy School; research associate at MIT; directed Track 1.5projects at US Institute of Peace; former work at Goldman Sachs and the Belfer Center – Harvard Kennedy School; M.Phil and Ph.D – Cambridge University; postdoctoral training at the Belfer Center. Several publications on North Korea.

Go, Myung-hyun, Research Fellow, Center for Public Opinion and Quantitative Research at Asian Institute for Policy Studies. PhD – Pardee RAND Graduate School; MA in statistics – Columbia. Appliesstatistical perspectives in the study of National Security and North Korea

DISCUSSANTS

Park, Byung-kwang, Director- Center for North East Asia and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Strategy of Korea; Ph.D - Fudan University; research director – Korean Association of International Studies; member – National Unification Advisory Council; former Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute for Oriental Culture – Tokyo University and at the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University. Numerous publications on contemporary China foreign policy and East Asian security issues.


Jung, Il-hua, journalist , freelance columnist, board member of COKUS; graduated – Seoul National University and University of Southern California; has worked as editorial writer for Hankook Ilbo-Korea Times; has authored 7 books on the armistice talks, the Cairo Declaration, the Korean War, and other topics.
Han, Dong-ho “Making Engagement Effective: The Politics of North Korean Human Rights in a Humanitarian Context”

Professor Han started by saying that the human rights situation is critical in resolving the inter-Korean stalemate. 2014 saw an evolution of a deteriorating North Korean human rights situation with international actors paying serious attention. The ROK government declared both the human rights problem and the nuclear weapons problem as the core of the North Korean problem. This issue is critical in solving the stalemate on the peninsula. As a result, the ROK government can expand its aid to the North on humanitarian principles. The ROK should take the lead on North Korea’s human rights situation.

Since the 1990s, North Korean escapees have been exposing the North’s human rights situation. At the time the focus was on food shortages, national disasters, and harsh social control, etc. In 2013 the UN Human Rights Council and the General Assembly passed resolutions on this situation which were so broadly supported they passed without a vote! The decision was then to establish a Commission of Inquiry (COI-DPRK) on the situation and the crimes against humanity there. After a 1 year investigation, the COI found those crimes were perpetrated by “high authorities of the DPRK intentionally.” The General Assembly Resolution talked about referring the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the UN Security Council selected the issue to be on its official agenda within the next few years. North Korea’s human rights matter is now a current concern of the entire international community.

In the ROK, however, there is a lack of consensus on this matter. There are two broad approaches to dealing with the human rights conditions:

1) Advocacy – improve human rights conditions there by naming and shaming, criticism, and sanctions – with pressure behind it.
2) Assistance – focus on the underlying cause and provide assistance, based on humanitarianism, to promote development that will ease the human rights conditions.

These two approaches are quite contentious in the ROK, so politicized that a negotiated set of outcomes has been impossible to reach. Progressives in the ROK want a peace regime – ending the war and the division of the peninsula, political culture, and social culture – seeing it as the only solution to the problem. Conservatives see the failing DPRK regime and its leadership as the cause of the human rights problem and the target to criticize and attack. The different ideological views make for different ideas on human rights conditions. Conservatives want an advocacy strategy - advocating education, empowering. Progressives oppose unconditional criticism – the goal is the North Korea’s cooperation with the international community to get social, economic, and legal conditions that will improve human rights. The COI-DPRK and the UN Korean Human Rights Office in Seoul have stimulated the rapid rise of this issue, but it remains controversial in the ROK.
The visit of the COI-DPRK led to various ROK ministries (of Unification, Justice, Foreign Affairs, etc.) trying to cooperate. A number of NGOs did too. Civil society elements (oriented toward engagement) joined in as well. There was lots of information gathering and talk about how to monitor the situation. The UN Human Rights Commission Regional Office on human rights is a challenge, because North Korea wants it removed – making it a barrier to North Korean-ROK cooperation as a result. But it can be a benefit instead because the ROK can easily link up with it and others on international cooperation on DPRK human rights problems.

Implications

The ROK government needs a more consistent and effective policy on North Korean human rights. Maybe a North Korean Human Rights Act should be passed to spell out the situation. But the Conservative/Progressive split gets in the way. Conservatives focus on civil and political rights. Progressives stress social, economic, and cultural rights. So the former calls for an end to human rights violations – the latter for aid to the North Korean people; and therefore promoting two different kinds of a North Korean Human Rights Bill. Conservatives stress developing organizations and offices to go after Human Rights violations – Progressives want things like a Center for Humanitarian Assistance and Support, and support for infant and maternal health and nutrition. Some see the core of human rights as civil and political rights. Others see it as economic, social, and cultural. Still others say that with little consensus and a divided Korea nothing can be done in creating progress on human rights in the North.

The Humanitarianism principle is very important. It should be the central principle in talks with the DPRK. Humanitarianism is “the independent, neutral, and impartial provision of relief to victims of armed conflicts and natural disasters.” (Otherwise North Korea will not talk with the ROK.) It would have the government communicating with non-state actors on doing humanitarian aid for the North. The ROK government should insert a spirit of humanitarianism into its foreign policy goals, taking the lead on this in relations with the North, and emphasizing independence, neutrality and impartiality in human rights policy.

This view also calls for linking this policy with the Trust Building Process of the ROK government. The goal is “a consistent and effective human rights policy towards North Korea based on the spirit of humanitarianism through solid legal and institutional mechanisms such as the North Korean Human Rights Act.” The human rights policy has to integrate with gradual integration – and overcome the ideological division on human rights in the ROK.

The Park, Geun-hye administration is committed to humanitarian assistance to North Korea, regardless of the two Koreas’ political relations. But North Korea rejects a lot of what the ROK offers, and the ROK needs a strategy to get around this: First – needed is a focus on the vulnerable people there – the elderly, infants, the disabled. That is more likely to be acceptable to North Korea. It has accepted some standards on this in other discussions with the international community – maybe it will buy it this time. Second – it is easier for the ROK to get public support for humanitarian aid, but many people think the aid won’t be effective without a good deal of monitoring, and the ROK has to get around this somehow.
At least President Park, at Dresden, said there should be a recovery of “national homogeneity,” an important step. The ROK is exploring how to support international community efforts to improve human rights. It needs more practical solutions here. Support for DPRK women and children on a humanitarian basis would be good and more success on this could lead to more national homogeneity in the process of integration.

**Go, Myong-hyun:** “International Cooperation for the Improvement of North Korea’s Human Rights: From Engagement to Accountability”

International cooperation on the North Korean human rights situation was very slow in coming. The first visible signal of international community concern was the appointment of the First Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the DPRK – Mr. Vitit Muntarbhorn from Thailand – in 2004. After that came ROK engagement efforts with North Korea, which others tried as well: the UK, Australia, Germany, and others without success, which thus put the human rights issue aside. No effort was made to touch political reform and human rights because the North was totally against that. But eventually escapees, accounts of camps, mass starvation, persecution of religious minorities, refugees – including those repatriated from China, led to responses by global civil society. NGOs appeared, with some activists expelled from China or sent to prison. But some states continued to stress engagement, and saw human rights issues and disruptive to engagement. And the abductions of Japanese citizens also called attention to the North’s human rights violations.

Mr. Muntarbhorn’s efforts were rebuffed, but NGOs piled up a good deal of evidence, as did the COI-DPRK, and the UN Commission of Inquiry on the Human Rights situation in the DPRK. Mr. Maruski Darusman succeeded Muntarbhorn in 2010. COI-DPRK was created after he was also rebuffed by the DPRK. It has emphasized qualifying arms, assigning responsibilities and accountability. Meanwhile, the UN’s Responsibility to Protect – adopted by all states in 2005 – has had three pillars:

1) The state is the prime responsibility for protecting the population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, etc.
2) The International Community is responsible for encouraging and assisting states on their responsibility.
3) The international community is responsible for using diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations from those crimes – and take collective action against states that aren’t meeting their responsibilities to protect populations.

The first COI-DPRK report did not recommend intervention. It cited the three pillars and recommended the DPRK situation be referred to the ICC. It referred to the North Korean situation as “political genocide.” It stressed accountability and referring Kim, Jong-un to the ICC. This strategy of engagement, however, failed because:

The international community remained passive. North Korea retained the initiative on what would be discussed; North Korea has no civil society – and belongs to almost no international organizations; So North Korea engaged only with other states, until the creation of the Human Rights Council (in 2005) incorporated global civil society participants. This pushed North Korea’s human rights behavior to the top of the agenda, along with pressure from NGOs.
With the establishment of the COI-DPRK and its report, accountability rather than engagement became emphasized, with its stress on identifying perpetrators, victims, crimes, etc. and a shift from the open-ended nature of engagement to the aiming-at-ending-North Korea’s—behavior pursuit of accountability. Some possible ways to go now are:

1) Engagement within the international governance framework. The UN has a Universal Periodic Review now—every year about 40 members are reviewed on their human rights situation.

2) The ASEAN Regional Forum, includes stress on human rights protection and North Korea has been a member of it since 2000. The Forum has several human rights vehicles for promoting discussion:
   - The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights
   - The ASEAN Commission on Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children
   - The Human Rights Declaration

3) Bilateral Engagements – The European Union contacts North Korea periodically, including on human rights.

4) Accountability and Sanctions
   - The COI-DPRK Report referred North Korea to the ICC. But North Korea is not a signatory to the Rome Statute that established the ICC so the ICC lacks jurisdiction. A referral from the UN Security Council is needed—and that is unlikely.

5) Targeted Sanctions
   - These were recommended by the COI-DPRK. But logical targets in North Korea are often already targeted for their part in North Korea’s WMD efforts, so they are not a useful approach other than for some “naming and shaming.”

6) Global Civil Society
   - NGOs pushed hard for the COI-DPRK and provided lots of research and information to it. And the COI-DPRK Report then attracted more human rights outfits around the world into focusing on the DPRK human rights situation. This has influenced attitudes toward North Korea and global civil society may generate more innovative and effective solutions, such as the idea of universal jurisdiction.

7) Universal Jurisdiction
   - The idea is that national courts can prosecute crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes because these crimes are threats to the international community. Some 125 countries now have legal provisions claiming universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. Human rights organizations now press governments to seize “criminals” for trials and perhaps some North Korean officials will be subjected to this.

Thus the COI-DPRK was a big turning point, from engagement to accountability as the focus in regard to dealing with the North Korean human rights situation. It changed the situation from bilateral interactions with the North to a multilateral engagement by greatly expanding the circle of stakeholding entities—boosting chances of getting changes in North Korea.

John S. Park: “An Estimated Cost for Peaceful Reunification of the Two Koreas”
Dr. Park did not present a formal paper but a review of how work on how a section of the Northeast border area in North Korea might readily be developed, benefitting China, Russia, North Korea, and eventually Japan and the ROK. This would be a different form of engagement.

In the Northeast border area, involving North Korea, Russia, and China there are possibilities for major development that can be exploited. The findings (mainly his) on this are quite interesting. The development may open up a wide range of interactions that would have additional value. A good deal of the development can be undertaken in the Northeastern part of the DPRK along the Tumen River area. Eventual unification on this, as envisioned, will have some serious costs, but the early lower level costs can be a more acceptable way to start. What is needed is asking all potential parties to join early on, and the early development of an overall game plan. A driving factor can be China’s having, as a national priority, the rapid development of its northeast, especially Laioning Province. One of the additional drivers can be the growing level of local commerce in the area, especially with regard to coal mining, transport, and export.

To this can be added the ROK model of development, so successful it is used often around the world, which has very rapidly made the ROK one of the leading economies in the world. Another good factor is that China-ROK trade has expanded greatly. A third is that coal from China is already leaving that area in huge quantities to be sent to Japan and elsewhere. As part of the project, China already separates its economic links to North Korea from its other relations with the North, which are now not very good. This is a good precedent for the other participants to adhere to.

In participating, the ROK can benefit from and utilize several Chinese developments. One is the huge growth in China’s per capita income. Another is China’s desire for maintaining stability on its borders. And China will prioritize profit distribution in the region to stimulate growth. China has also had, for many years, of large numbers of Koreans working in China including Laioning Province.

Meanwhile the ROK economic model is a big attraction in China and this makes ROK proposals for growth and development quite attractive. The ROK can use what it has already been doing to appeal for Chinese and Russian participation. This is particularly the case in the mineral sector, because it is in a boom already. This all fits in well with China’s stress on boosting living standards in Greater Tumen, and on curbing corruption in the area. And it can be assisted by the soft power of the ROK. The group—Russia, China, Japan, and the two Koreas—can benefit greatly from such a cooperative venture. That in turn could contribute to easing the North Korean situation.

DISCUSSANTS

Park, Byung-kwang

He mentioned at the start of his remarks that Reporters Without Borders is an additional important organization involved with human rights matters. He agreed that we must not neglect what is going on in the North Korean human rights situation.
Without knowing a great deal about Dr. Han’s field of expertise, it is certainly true that human rights is becoming a universal issue. The Han presentation indicates that he wants to develop and promote a number of policy proposals. He supports:

- Having the ROK open up more on human rights issues in the North;
- Having the ROK speak up more on these issues;
- Being dismayed that China resists all this as violating sovereignty – taking this position in clashes with the US.

Of course the North Korean perspective on this topic must be considered in planning how to go about improving the situation. But improving the human rights situation in North Korea is now a universal value. Han’s paper shows how difficult it will be to make progress on this. Help from the United States, Japan and others was hard at first to utilize. Then the ROK joined the effort.

Remember that in this project carrots and sticks can be used simultaneously. And that compensation is often a weak instrument in dealing with the North. This is not surprising. After unification, North Korean officials could be charged with crimes – in fact, this is what justice will require. This is what happened in the case of East Germany in the wake of German unification - although some mid-level officials were able to avoid some punishment.

The ROK actually needs more legislation bearing on the human rights problem. It needs to be more of a leader in this matter. Long lists of North Korean violations of human rights are available. China could be important on this if it wanted to be of more help, not being a strong proponent of all this now. After all, it finds defectors from the North to be a strain to deal with.

(The moderator noted that there is some complication in confronting whether to pursue “changing” or “replacing” the North Korean regime over this issue.)

Richard T. Shin

Dr. Shin mentioned at the outset that he is an economist, that this provides his perspective. He found that the John Park paper “very refreshing.” It involves looking into enhancing economic cooperation before unification, using it to help promote unification, and that is a very important consideration. Here are some of the economic problems associated with such a project, and problems during the envisioned ensuing steps toward unification that will arise:

- Raising living standards;
- Coping with all of the costs;
- Handling the legal problems that will arise. For instance, the past loans to the North from China;
- Significant migration costs;
- The necessary investment that will be needed for improving infrastructure substantially – with the ROK paying much of it;
- Handling the border disputes with China in the area of the project;
- The social welfare costs in North Korea;
- The need to replace Chinese economic support of North Korea with other economic resources if the project successfully promotes unification;
- The very large health care costs that will come with the project and its impact;
The difficulties and costs of dismantling much of North Korea’s military structure (such as 1.2 million military personnel) as unification unfolds. (This cannot, by all means, be handled as it was in Iraq where the military forces were disbanded without real preparations for this.) The rising costs involved in the delaying of unification which continues and will continue;

Dr. Park’s paper cites at least some of the costs but not the real economic costs in moving toward North East Asian development. It is important that such costs be evaluated in advance. The question is: how much will the ROK be willing to spend? Along with this, a well-defined goal will be needed so that progress being made can be shown as taking place — otherwise resistance to the costs will rise and become severe eventually. But if the goal is clear and well mapped out, this could attract more support for meeting the costs.

As for the soft power the ROK can bring to the project to help push it ahead, the trouble is that the ROK is different from the other anticipated parties. It is a highly education nation, for example. Thus the ROK Model, mentions in the Park presentation, will be quite difficult for the other parties to adopt.

As for the other papers, the discussions on the human rights issue have been somewhat insufficient. There are actually many levels of complexity involved in human rights matters. Thus they need a varied approach. For example the Han paper is too limited on this; he talks about accountability as shaping steps to deal with human rights problems, but that requires a prior, preliminary survey in advance concerning the dimensions of the problem.

Chung, Il-wha
To begin with, the ROK has clearly accepted the relevant human rights provisions of the UN Charter, and the United States is very concerned about freedom. But North Korea has never opened up to either one of them. It ignores human rights matters. It emphasizes sovereignty. So the ROK’s efforts are not about to change North Korea and its regime.

As for the Park paper, it introduces a new approach to trying to enhance relations between the ROK and the DPRK. But the interactions involved should reflect the acceptance of coexistence between the two Koreas, and North Korea does not accept the ROK, its government, as legitimate — and usually treats it as such. And North Korea has always rejected free elections, and also any UN votes pertaining to it. It will go on rejecting any effort to revitalize those UN resolutions.

Q & A

Q. - Hugo Kim asked Park, Byung-kwang: when the North violates rules and ignores the human rights issue, should the ROK respond significantly? Also, will human rights treatment be extended to defectors?

Q. –for John Park – unification costs will have to be included won’t they?

Q. –for Go – there are rights pertaining to economic situations in all sorts of UN provisions. Will all of these apply suitable to human rights? Will this apply to North Korean workers sent abroad? And the
questioner also noted that many other organizations and agencies promote human rights issues besides the ones mentioned by the panel.

Q – for John Park – reunification costs are certainly highly varied. A particular one is equalizing income levels. This needs to be noted doesn’t it?

Q – the Chair added – can such projects as Park proposes be started in North Korea right away?

Responses

Han said that what the ROK can do is to develop clear human rights principles, and treat this as a political issue.

John Park’s response to several questions was:

Trying to give incentives to workers by using Maslow’s principles doesn’t work well at low income levels. But if links are established to a company of workers, those workers will be less likely to leave, to quit.

The ROK is indeed unique. The citizens back the country and its economic structure to a greater extent than elsewhere. And its aging problem (aging of workers) is growing. Needed is figuring out how to keep people out of hospitals, etc. to ease financial burdens. The same approach should help curb unifications too. We need to develop multiple approaches to these matters.

Park, Byung-kwang said that we are now sending balloons over North Korea. But what benefits accrue as a result? How is this helpful? However, at least some collaboration on human rights would certainly be good.

The Chair concluded the panel with some comments. He said that it had been a productive session, with at least some degree of consensus among the panel on:

What approaches to be used, when, and how?

Is human rights the top priority in inter-Korean relations now? And isn’t a more comprehensive approach attractive here?

When it comes to unification, we need to think about how to deal with it on many economic and human rights matters.

He then adjourned the panel and thanked both the panelists and the audience.

The audience then adjourned for dinner at 6:00 pm. The event began with a speech by Yu, Myung-whan, former ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was introduced by General Kim, Jae-Chang

Minister Yu thanked the Council for giving him the opportunity to address such a distinguished group of scholars and other prominent figures. The Council itself reflects the strong relations that have existed and continue to exist in US-ROK relations. That relationship is now in the best shape it has been in decades. And on the North Korean problem, our two allies agree completely. As has been said, truly the alliance is “a linchpin of stability.”
The key, of course, is to keep the alliance. The members do not have a true passion for the alliance. Nevertheless it remains vital for the deterrence of North Korea. However, the ROK is not eager to spend more money on its activities. For instance, it did not agree to the recent proposed very large deal with Boeing for new advanced aircraft. Meanwhile, the US does not focus sufficiently on developments in East Asia.

The Obama pivot to Asia needs to be bolstered. The US, and others,’ responses to China’s behavior need to be more vigorous. In turn, the ROK must remain a vigorous ally. It must also improve ROK ties with Japan. This is only a part of how Korea must think more strategically. And the US must press Japan strongly on revision with respect to its past. This trilateralism is a vital perquisite for maintaining peace and security on the Korean peninsula.

Minister Yu than finished his remarks by again thanking the Council for inviting him and for its work on behalf of US-Korean relations.

Patrick M. Morgan
Professor Emeritus
University of California, Irvine