

China and North Korea after the Cold War: Wariness, Caution, and Balance¹

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Abstract

A review of Chinese policy and practice toward North Korea since the end of the Cold War shows the Chinese administration endeavoring to sustain a leading position in relations with both North and South Korea as it reacts to changing circumstances on the Korean peninsula. Growing Chinese frustration with the twists and turns of North Korean behavior, especially Pyongyang's nuclear weapons development, has not resulted in a major change in China's reluctance to pressure North Korea to conform more to international norms and eschew provocations and confrontation. China's focus has been to preserve stability in a uncertain environment caused by internal pressures and international provocations of North Korea, and erratic policies by the United States and South Korea. China continues to follow practices that give priority to positive incentives rather than pressure in order to elicit North Korean willingness to avoid further provocations and to return to negotiations on eventual denuclearization.

Keywords: China, North Korea, nuclear weapons, stability, South Korea, United States

Overview

The Chinese administration has experienced major turns in its relations with North Korea since the end of the Cold War. The record shows China repeatedly put in a reactive position as it was compelled to deal with crises caused by North Korea's nuclear weapons development, often abrupt and wide swings in North Korea's posture toward its neighbors and the United States, and economic collapse and leadership transition in Pyongyang. U.S. and South Korean policy toward North Korea also have been erratic. The stakes for China have been high. With the possible exception of Taiwan, there is no more important area on China's periphery for Chinese domestic and foreign policy interests than the Korean peninsula. The stakes have grown with rising Chinese equities in improving relations with South Korea, and often intense U.S. and other regional and international involvement to curb North Korea's advancing nuclear weapons development.

A good deal has been written about China's growing frustration with North Korea, following its nuclear weapons tests in 2006 and 2009 and other provocations.² Contrary to past practice, the Chinese administration has allowed a public debate recently in which relations with North Korea often are depicted as a liability for China, requiring serious readjustment in Chinese policy. Meanwhile, some American commentators suspect that China, in order to weaken U.S. power and influence in Northeast Asia, is somehow manipulating North Korea's brinkmanship and avoiding using its influence in conjunction with the United States in order to get North Korea to reverse its nuclear weapons development.³

The evidence of growing Chinese frustration with North Korea is strong while the evidence to support the charge of self-serving Chinese manipulation of the North Korean nuclear crisis is less so. On balance, the overall record of Chinese policy and practice shows continuing caution; China endeavors to preserve important Chinese interests in stability on the Korean peninsula through judicious moves that strike an appropriate balance among varied Chinese relations with concerned parties at home and abroad. China remains wary that North Korea, the United States and others could shift course, forcing further Chinese adjustments in response.

Chinese leaders recognize that their cautious policies have failed to halt North Korea's nuclear weapons development; they probably judge that they will be living with a nuclear North Korea for some time to

come, even as they emphasize continued diplomatic efforts to reverse North Korea's nuclear weapons' development and create a nuclear free peninsula. They appear resigned to joining with U.S. and other leaders in what is characterized as "failure management" as far as North Korean nuclear weapons development is concerned.⁴ They will endeavor to preserve stability and Chinese equities with concerned powers. As in the recent past, they probably will avoid pressure or other risky initiatives on their own, waiting for the actions of others or changed circumstances that will increase the prospects of curbing North Korea's nuclear challenge and allow for stronger Chinese measures to deal with nuclear North Korea.

Post cold war developments: challenges and responses

Developments in the two decades since the end of the cold war can be divided into three periods⁵:

- 1989-2000 featured Chinese angst over North Korean leadership transition and instability and economic collapse, and crisis with the United States, prompted by North Korea's nuclear weapons development;
- 2000-2001 featured a period of unprecedented détente, with China facilitating North Korean outreach and endeavoring to keep pace with expanding North Korean contacts with South Korea, the United States, Russia and others; and,
- 2002-2010 featured periodic and intense North Korean provocations and wide swings in U.S. policy, ranging from thinly-disguised efforts to force regime change in North Korea to close collaboration with Pyongyang negotiators. South Korean policy also shifted markedly from a soft to a harder line in dealing with North Korea.

South Korean officials, along with U.S. and other outside observers, have often judged that China has a longer term interest in seeing a growth of Chinese influence and a reduction of U.S. and Japanese influence on the peninsula.⁶ However, Beijing has long been careful not to be seen as directly challenging U.S. leadership in Korean affairs. The Chinese administration apparently judged that Chinese interests in the Korean peninsula after the Cold War were best met with a broadly accommodating posture that allowed for concurrent improvements in

China's relations with South Korea and effective management of China's sometimes difficult relations with North Korea. The net result was a marked increase in China's relations with South Korea and continued Chinese relations with North Korea, relations closer than any other power, without negatively affecting Beijing's relations with the United States. During the crisis over North Korea's nuclear program since 2002, China's cooperation with the United States, South Korea, and other concerned powers in seeking a negotiated solution to the problem has enhanced overall positive development in China's relations with these countries, while managing tensions over the North Korean program in ways that has avoided conflict or helped to reduce the instability caused by Pyongyang's provocative actions.

A careful review of the gains China has made in improving relations with Asian countries and elsewhere in recent years shows South Korea to be the area of considerable achievement for Beijing. The Chinese advances also coincided during the earlier years of this decade with the most serious friction in U.S.-South Korean relations since the Korean War. Thus, China's influence relative to the United States has grown on the Korean peninsula.

Meanwhile, U.S. policy has evolved in dealing with the North Korea, working much more closely with China to facilitate international talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program. North Korea has preferred to deal directly with the United States on this issue. While such bilateral interchanges with North Korea presumably would boost U.S. influence relative to that of China in peninsula affairs, the U.S. government has seen such US-North Korean contacts as counterproductive for U.S. interests in securing a verifiable end of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. China has seen its influence grow by joining with the United States in the multilateral efforts to deal with the North Korean nuclear weapons issue on the one hand, while sustaining its position as the foreign power having the closest relationship with the reclusive North Korean regime on the other.⁷

Against this background, China's relations with South Korea have improved markedly.⁸ China is South Korea's leading trade partner, the recipient of the largest amount of South Korean foreign investment, and the most important foreign destination for South Korean tourists and students. It has also been a close and often like-minded partner in dealing with issues posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons program and related provocations, and the Bush administration's hard line policy

toward North Korea. South Korea's trade with China grew rapidly in this decade. In 2004 it was valued at \$79 billion, with a trade surplus for South Korea of \$20 billion. In 2005, South Korean exports to China were valued at \$62 billion in total trade of \$100.6 billion, resulting in a trade surplus for South Korea of \$24 billion. Trade reached \$115 billion in 2006.⁹ Until the global economic crisis of 2008-2009, the two countries were on course to meet a goal of \$200 billion in trade in 2010. South Korean investment in China in 2004 amounted to \$3.6 billion, almost half of South Korea's investment abroad that year. The amount in 2008 was \$3.14 billion.

After South Korean efforts to stabilize its currency with the help of a \$30 billion line of credit from the U.S. Federal Reserve in October 2008, China joined Japan in December in pledging its own \$30 billion currency swap with South Korea. China was the most important foreign destination for South Korean tourists (four million South Korean trips to China and two million Chinese trips to South Korea in 2007) and students (38,000 in 2005). In the face of the Bush administration's tough stance toward North Korea from 2001-2006, South Korea and China were close and like-minded partners in dealing more moderately than the United States with issues posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons program and related provocations.¹⁰

As relations developed, China's economic importance for South Korea was increasingly seen more in both negative and positive ways. Periodic trade disputes came with growing concerns by South Korean manufacturers, political leaders, and in public opinion about competition from fast-advancing Chinese enterprises. China's economic attractiveness to South Korean consumers declined markedly as a result of repeated episodes of Chinese exports of harmfully-tainted consumer products to South Korean and other markets. South Korean leaders strove to break out of close economic dependence with China through free trade agreements and other arrangements with the United States, Japan, and the European Union that would insure inputs of foreign investment and technology needed for South Korea to stay ahead of Chinese competitors.¹¹

Other differences between the two countries focused on competing Chinese and Korean claims regarding the scope and importance of the historical Goguryeo kingdom, China's longer-term ambitions in North Korea, and Chinese treatment of North Korean refugees in China and of South Koreans' endeavoring to assist them there. The disputes had a

strong impact on nationalistic South Korean political leaders and public opinion polls which showed a significant decline in South Korean attitudes toward China and its policies and practices since earlier in the decade.¹²

Regarding Chinese relations with North Korea, Beijing's frustration grew with North Korea's continued development of nuclear weapons and other provocative actions. Chinese officials obviously miscalculated when they argued in the past that North Korea's nuclear weapons program was not a serious one but represented an effort to elicit aid and other support from the United States, South Korea and others. China's recent working assumption seems a more realistic one—North Korea is intent on keeping nuclear weapons. In response, China has been more willing, albeit with continued reservations, to join U.S.-backed efforts in the United Nations to criticize and impose limited sanctions on North Korea until it resumes negotiations leading to denuclearization. Meanwhile, a growing debate about the need to shift Chinese policy toward a harder line has become more public in active discourse in the official Chinese media.

Complementing the modest hardening in China's stance toward North Korea are a series of recent positive steps China has taken to offer unspecified but apparently substantial economic and other incentives to North Korea, amid a major burst of high-level official engagement between the two sides.¹³ The mix of Chinese actions, seemingly involving more carrots than sticks, underlines Chinese concern to preserve stability and China's position as the foreign power with the best relationship with both North and South Korea. China is prepared to acquiesce in a continued nuclear North Korea for the foreseeable future, rather than risk dangers associated with strong pressure on Pyongyang. The future of North Korea could be violent and disruptive. China seeks to avoid such negative outcomes and to sustain a position of influence in determining the future of the peninsula. The latter goal also supports continued Chinese efforts to improve relations with South Korea as seen throughout the post cold war period.

1989-2000: The progress and development of China's relations with South Korea contrasted sharply with the often more difficult Chinese relations with North Korea after the cold war. Still, Chinese interests in North Korea remained strong. In the 1950s China fought a major war resulting in one million Chinese casualties, in order to preserve an

independent North Korean state, one free from U.S. domination. Chinese leaders also competed actively with the Soviet Union for the favor of Kim Il Sung and his government in order to assure China that it would not face a Soviet proxy along China's northeastern periphery.¹⁴

The cutoff of Soviet aid to North Korea and the normalization of Soviet-South Korean relations in the late 1980s, and the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, reduced Chinese concern over Moscow's influence in North Korea. However, post cold war conditions saw North Korea pursue nuclear weapons, leading to a major crisis with the United States and its allies. The death of Kim Il Sung in 1994 added political uncertainty to the already unstable conditions on account of the collapse of the North Korean economy and widespread famine in the country.¹⁵

Chinese officials provided a large share of North Korea's outside food and energy supplies, but not in amounts that satisfied North Korean officials.¹⁶ Chinese leaders repeatedly encouraged their North Korean counterparts to follow some of China's economic reforms and to open itself more to international economic contacts. North Korean officials seemed reluctant to do this, presumably fearing that outside contact would undermine the regime's tight political control, based on keeping North Koreans unaware of actual conditions abroad. North Korea did endeavor, however, to carry out some domestic economic reforms and to open some restricted zones for foreign trade, tourism, and gambling.

Chinese diplomacy in North Korean-South Korean-U.S. relations, particularly regarding the crises prompted by North Korea's nuclear weapons program, emphasized preserving stability on the Korean peninsula. Chinese frustration with North Korea's nuclear weapons program, ballistic missile tests, and other provocations was deep and serious, particularly as North Korean actions could provoke a U.S. attack and encourage the spread of nuclear weapons to Japan, Taiwan, and elsewhere. At the same time, Chinese leaders showed a keen awareness that major instability in or the collapse of the North Korean regime would have potentially major adverse consequences for China. These included the danger of full-scale war on the Korean peninsula and a large-scale refugee influx into China. China also was thought to be concerned over the implications for Chinese security interests of the possible establishment of a unified Korean state under the leadership of a South Korean government that maintained a close military alliance with the United States.

For many years after the cold war, Chinese officials adopted a stance that assumed North Korean nuclear weapons development was unlikely or remote. They stressed the need to avoid international and other pressures that would further destabilize the North Korean regime and adversely affect overall conditions on the peninsula.

China's policy in the late 1990s also continued to balance often conflicting imperatives regarding North and South Korea as it dealt with the delicate and potentially-volatile situation on the peninsula. Symptomatic of the balancing in Chinese relations with North and South Korea were the often difficult Chinese efforts to improve relations with North Korea once Kim Jong Il assumed the post of general secretary of the Korean Workers' Party in October 1997, and the cordial Chinese relationship established expeditiously with the newly installed Kim Dae Jung administration in South Korea in 1998. Chinese party chief Jiang Zemin on October 1997 sent Kim Jong Il a friendly personal message of congratulations on his accession to the position of general secretary of the Korean Workers' Party, and the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman also "heartily congratulated" Kim. But despite repeated speculation about a Chinese-North Korean summit, Jiang Zemin told Japanese visitors in February 1998 that no high-level contacts were in the offing. Jiang said that before former North Korean President Kim Il Sung died in 1994, Beijing and Pyongyang had had regular state visits, but after Kim's son, Kim Jong Il, took over the reins of the country, such exchanges were not resumed. "After Kim Il Sung passed away, Kim Jong Il [observed] the three-year custom . . . of mourning . . . now that the three years have passed he has therefore become general secretary of the Workers' Party, but it appears he has not made any plans to visit," he said. Jiang said that as China and North Korea maintained good-neighborly ties of friendship, mutual visits were normal, but "at present we have not had the opportunity."¹⁷

In contrast to his oblique references to Chinese frustration with North Korea's leadership, Jiang in the same interview extended a warm welcome to South Korea's new president. "We were very happy to see that Kim Dae Jung won the South Korean elections and will be the next president. We welcome him to China for a visit after assuming his presidential duties."¹⁸

Beijing made significant high-level approaches to the new South Korean leadership. Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao, selected by the Ninth National People's Congress in March 1998, made his first trip

abroad to Japan and South Korea in April 1998. In meetings with South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, acting Prime Minister Kim Jong Il, and Foreign and Trade Minister Park Chung Soo, Hu highlighted the progress in Sino-South Korean after 1992 and emphasized the importance of a stable Korean peninsula for the entire Asia-Pacific region. The PRC vice president also assured his hosts that China's currency would not be affected to the financial pressures buffeting the currencies of other East Asian countries. Opportunities for closer cooperation were discussed in the areas of fisheries, visa-free tourism, and nuclear energy projects. Hu also sought reaffirmation of Seoul's commitment to a one-China policy, though Taiwan-South Korea business contacts continued to thrive. Further solidifying relations, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung was warmly received by President Jiang Zemin and other senior leaders during an official visit to Beijing in November 1998.¹⁹

Military ties between Seoul and Beijing grew more slowly than political and economic relations, presumably because China wanted to maintain ties with the North Korea armed forces and was wary of the effect of closer China-South Korean security ties on China's military relationship with the North. In the 1990s, Seoul continued pushing for strengthened military exchanges, but Beijing sought to limit the scope and pace of their military relationship. Military ties grew concurrently with political and economic relations, but at a slower pace. The South Korean vice defense minister visited China for the first time in November 1997, the highest-level military exchange to that date. Higher-level contacts gradually developed and Beijing slowly responded to repeated South Korean overtures to establish regular exchanges between their defense ministers and other senior military officials.²⁰

Meanwhile, presumably in deference to North Korean sensitivities, Beijing delayed in the face of repeated South Korea efforts establishing a consulate in Shenyang, in northeastern China, closer than Beijing to the North Korean border. There were millions of ethnic Koreans in this part of China and many thousands of North Korea refugees, many of whom had knowledge about developments in North Korea. The South Korean consulate opened in 1999.²¹

In sum, China's policy in the late 1990s continued to balance often-conflicting imperatives regarding North and South Korea as it dealt with the delicate and potentially volatile situation on the peninsula. Beijing did not appear to seek big changes in the political or military status quo;

rather it appeared intent on promoting as much stability as possible, while benefiting economically and in other ways by improving its relations with South Korea. As economic conditions in North Korea deteriorated, and as the North Korean regime persisted with provocative military and other actions, Beijing officials privately worried about possible adverse consequences for China. Nonetheless, Chinese officials still saw their basic interests as well served with a policy of continued, albeit guarded, support for the North, along with improved relations with the South and close consultations with the United States over Korean peninsula issues.

2000-2001: The situation for China's relations with North Korea improved for a time with the unexpected breakthrough in North-South Korean relations leading to the Pyongyang summit in June 2000. This event raised hopes in China of eased tensions and peaceful accommodation on the Korean peninsula. China figured importantly in the North-South summit preparation as the site of secret North-South negotiations. Moreover, Kim Jong Il seemed to be seeking Chinese advice and support in the new approach to South Korea as he made two visits to China and Jiang Zemin visited North Korea. The overall trend in North Korean actions suggested more openness to Chinese advice and greater willingness to adopt policies of détente and reform that would reduce the danger of North-South military confrontation, promote economic revival in North Korea, and lower the chances of economic collapse and social instability, including the need for massive Chinese assistance and the large-scale flow of North Korean refugees to China.²²

2002-2010: This hopeful period ended with the impasse in North Korean-U.S. relations following the Bush administration policy review on North Korea in 2001, the sharp rise in tensions on the peninsula posed by North Korea's provocative nuclear weapons development beginning in 2002, and signs of strong differences between North Korean and Chinese leaders over reform in North Korea's economy. China was instrumental in persuading North Korea to participate in the three-party and six-party talks in Beijing beginning in 2003, talks dealing with the nuclear crisis and related issues. Chinese diplomats were careful not to take sides in the discussions, endeavoring to find common ground between the positions of North Korea, on one side, and the United States, on the other. In this regard, Chinese positions were close to those of

South Korean officials, who, at that time, also sought common ground and stressed the need to reduce confrontation, avoid pressure, and preserve peace. China–North Korea relations seemed on the upswing as China showed its support for North Korea in welcoming Kim Jong Il, who again visited China in 2004 and 2006, and as Chinese president Hu Jintao made his first visit to North Korea in 2005.

Beginning in late 2002, Chinese officials appeared more convinced by U.S. and other evidence that North Korea indeed had developed nuclear weapons and was determined to build more. The tense crisis provoked by North Korea's nuclear program prompted many Chinese officials and commentators, at first privately but increasingly publicly, to argue for greater Chinese pressure on the North Korean regime, with a few commentators considering regime change in North Korea as an option for Chinese policy. China went along with UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea, following its provocative missile tests in July 2006 and its nuclear weapons test in October 2006. However, prevailing Chinese government actions still seemed to strike a balance of support and accommodation with the North Korean regime, with China's seeking to avoid the many dangers for its key interests that would follow from major instability or collapse of the North Korean regime. Chinese food aid of about one million tons a year and energy supplies of about five hundred thousand tons of heavy fuel oil continued.

Well aware that dealing with North Korea involved unpredictable twists and turns perpetrated mainly by the idiosyncratic leader of this isolated state, Chinese officials for the time being appeared resigned to a protracted effort to deal with the North Korean nuclear crisis through diplomatic means. Uncertainty about the health of the North Korean leader and succession in the country added to Chinese angst in 2008-2009, but evidenced no significant change in policy. The North Korean nuclear test and other provocations in 2009, elicited stronger Chinese support for U.S.-backed United Nations sanctions and other means to prompt North Korea to return to negotiations aimed at complete denuclearization. At the same time, Chinese officials made known China's continued opposition to strong pressure on North Korea, reportedly warning of North Korea's using military means to lash out in response to pressure. Continued Chinese food and energy assistance were among key Chinese sources of leverage with North Korean leaders, but Beijing remained hesitant to use these levers for fear of provoking a

sharp North Korean response, contrary to Chinese interests of promoting stability on the peninsula.

China appeared successful in getting North Korea to agree to return to the negotiating table with carrots rather than sticks. The highlight was the visit to North Korea in October 2009 of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao along with a large delegation of officials in charge of technical and economic assistance. The visit was followed by high-level military contacts, presaging a renewed burst of positive Sino-North Korean interchange coincident with the year of friendship marking the 60th anniversary of relations between the two countries.²³

Throughout this period, Chinese officials also worried about U.S. actions. One fear was that as the United States became impatient in the face of North Korea's continued development of nuclear weapons, it might resort to strong political, economic, or even military pressure. Chinese officials realized that the U.S. military preoccupation with trying to stabilize postwar Iraq and the continuing conflict in Afghanistan, and American concerns with the war on terrorism, the global economy and other issues, made it unlikely that in the short term the United States would risk confrontation or war on the Korean peninsula by substantially increasing U.S. pressure on North Korea. They welcomed the more moderate U.S. approach to North Korea, beginning in late 2006. The situation remained volatile, however, with concern focused especially on the U.S. reaction or other international fallout from such possible North Korean steps as another nuclear weapons test, more ballistic missile tests seemingly targeted against Japan or U.S. forces in Japan, or North Korean nuclear weapons cooperation with international terrorists.²⁴

On the economic front, meanwhile, there were numerous reports in 2005 and 2006 of significant growth in Chinese trade and investment in North Korea. China undertook a range of infrastructure projects in and around North Korea, and, in early 2006, was said by the International Crisis Group to account for 40 percent of North Korea's foreign trade. Reports said that since 2003 over 150 Chinese firms had begun operation or trading in North Korea and that as much as 80 percent of the consumer goods in North Korea came from China. Chinese investment in the North Korean economy rose from \$1.1 million in 2003, to \$50 million in 2004, and to \$90 million in 2005. Trade was predicted to be worth \$1.5 billion in 2006. This would give China half of North Korea's foreign trade along with the lion's share of its foreign investment. The Chinese

goal was seen as a long term effort to encourage a reformed, China-friendly North Korea.²⁵

Significantly, South Korean officials and elite opinion reacted with concern over China's economic leadership in the North. South Korea was unable to keep pace with China in its efforts to promote inter-Korean economic cooperation. South Korean trade with North Korea was valued at \$700 million in 2004 and \$1 billion in 2005. More importantly, South Korean officials privately and publicly voiced uneasiness over perceived Chinese intentions to foster economic reforms and development as a means to perpetuate a separate North Korean state. They saw this objective as being at odds with South Korean efforts to use asymmetrical economic engagement to facilitate a gradual process of integrating North Korea into South Korea's orbit, eventually leading to Korean unification with South Korea in the lead. A stronger North Korea, one heavily dependent on China, was seen from Seoul as adverse to longstanding South Korean interests and emerged as a significant issue in China-South Korean relations in 2006.²⁶

In any event, the 2009 North Korean nuclear test and resulting negative international reaction with United Nations sanctions, and the global economic recession, resulted in a decline in China-North Korean trade and investment. One examination of Chinese infrastructure developed along the border with North Korea which anticipated the growth in Sino-North Korean trade characterized the Chinese development as largely misguided and futile—a “bridge to nowhere.”²⁷

Conclusion

This review of China's post-Cold War relations with North Korea provides several key findings. They are:

- China has been and continues to be reactive in dealing with changing circumstances affecting its interests on the Korean peninsula
- China's focus has been to preserve stability in a uncertain environment created by internal pressures and the international provocations of North Korea as well as the erratic policies of the United States and South Korea
- China miscalculated North Korea's intentions regarding nuclear weapons. Its frustration with North Korea's actions in this area has recently led to some hardening of China's

position. However, China generally eschews pressure and stresses diplomacy in order to address North Korea's nuclear weapons development and to maintain the opportunity to pursue meaningful denuclearization under changed conditions in the future.

- China continues to prefer positive incentives toward Pyongyang rather than pressures on North Korea, seeking to encourage North Korea to avoid further provocations and to return to negotiations on eventual denuclearization
- China seeks to maintain and develop a position as the power with best relations with both North and South Korea as a means to insure that its interests in the potentially volatile peninsula will be sustained.

Notes:

¹ By Robert Sutter, Visiting Professor of Asian Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC.

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⁴ Christopher Twomey, "Chinese Foreign Policy Toward North Korea," *Journal of Contemporary China* 17 (56), (August 2008) p. 422.

⁵ This section is taken in part from Robert Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War* (second edition) Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield 2010, pp. 203-208. See also Scott Snyder, *China's Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2009); Yang Bojiang, "China and Its Northeast Asian Neighbors," (Beijing) *Xiandai guoji guanxi* 17 (January 2007) pp. 56-63; International Crisis Group, *North Korea's Nuclear Test: The Fallout*, Asia Briefing 56 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, November 13, 2006); Samuel Kim, *The Two Koreas and the Great Powers* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); David

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⁸ Taeho Kim, "Sino-ROK relations at a crossroads: Looming tensions amid growing interdependence," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* XVII:1, (Spring 2005), pp. 129-149. Some of the trade and other figures in this section are taken from Kim's article. For up to date reviews of Sino-South Korean relations, see the articles by Scott Snyder in the quarterly e-journal *Comparative Connections* available at <http://www.csis.org/pacfor>.

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¹⁰ Scott Snyder, "Post Olympic Hangover: New Backdrop for Relations," *Comparative Connections* 10:3, (October 2008), pp. 101-107; Taeho Kim, "Sino-ROK Relations at a Crossroads: Looming Tensions Amid Growing Interdependence," *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 17, no. 1, (Spring 2005), pp. 129–49.

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¹² Snyder, "Lee Myung-bak and the Future."

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¹⁵ Samuel Kim, "The making of China's Korea policy in the era of reform." In *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in an Era of Reform*, ed. David Michael Lampton, (Stanford,CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 371-408

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¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Robert Sutter *Chinese policy priorities*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000, p. 103.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ *The Korean Herald*, January 18, 1999. (internet version)

²² Scott Snyder, "Beijing at center stage or upstaged by the two Kims?" *Comparative Connections* July 2000. Scott Snyder, "Economic interests uber alles," *Comparative Connections*, July 2001.

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²⁴ Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Relations*, p. 207.

²⁵ *China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?* (Brussels: International Crisis Group Asia Report 112, February 1, 2006).

²⁶ Scott Snyder, "China-Korea Relations," *Comparative Connections*, (April 2006), pp. 112-116.

²⁷ Carla Freeman and Drew Thompson, *The Real Bridge to Nowhere: China's Foiled North Korea Strategy*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Working Paper April 22, 2009), www.usip.org.