

The An Ch'angho Controversy Gradualist-Pacifism, Cultural Nationalism, or Revolutionary-Democracy?

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Introduction

With the advent of civil democracy in Korea, the grand epic of the Korean independence struggle began to be more systematically mined in the 1990s with newly discovered sources from the leading revolutionaries, albeit with mixed outcomes.¹ In the past decade, the most spirited controversy in the international arena of Korean Studies has been "the An Ch'angho Controversy" which created spirited debates on the interpretation of An Ch'angho (1878-1938) and the Korean nationalist movement, including the nature of his philosophy, vision and strategy. Since An Ch'angho was arguably the foremost leader of the Korean independence quest, it was not only a controversy about An Ch'angho as a man and leader but also about getting at the truth of the shape and course of the Korean nationalist struggle as a whole.

From 1995 to the present, the controversy on An Ch'angho and Korean nationalism has been actively debated on a truly global manner with a concurrent exchange of opinions at the speed and intensity of light. As heated debates on An Ch'angho and the Korean nationalist movement have continued and escalated, not only in the cyberspace forum but also at international academic conferences, "An Ch'angho" indeed has become the most controversial subject, following the "origins of the Korean War", in modern Korean history.

What actually constituted An Ch'angho's nationalist revolutionary ideology, strategy and purpose? Why did An continue to be defined as a 'gradualist pacifist' and 'cultural nationalist', or worse, a "passive collaborationist" or compromiser, who supposedly only advocated non-confrontational means of education and cultural development within the Japanese colonial framework? What are some of the newest revelations and insights that have proved earlier views have been derived from

misreadings of modern Korean history? What have been some of the more recently unearthed historical documents and sources that have challenged and debunked past scholarship? The nature of the An Ch'angho controversy, i.e., the ongoing critical issues of debate, the updated discoveries and analyses which have shed new light on the Korean nationalist leadership and movement, are the subjects of this essay. Since An Ch'angho was the chief architect and strategist of the Korean independence movement, his programs, strategies, and vision essentially defined the nature and direction of the Korean independence struggle. Discovering An Ch'angho's true identity as a nationalist, therefore, offers a vital key to unraveling the puzzling mystery surrounding the Korean independence movement, which struggled for decades to achieve freedom from Japanese colonial rule.

In earlier scholarship, the formulaic assumptions concerning An Ch'angho and the Korean nationalist movement could be described as the "tripartite division" scheme of strategic divergence: i) the diplomatism or propagandism of Syngman Rhee and So Chaep'il; ii) the militarism of Yi Tonghwi and Pak Yongman; and iii) the "gradualist pacifism", or subsequently "cultural nationalism", of An Ch'angho himself.² Such a conception of a "tripartite division" offered a convenient and facile explanation for generations of scholars to explain away the personality conflicts, political and professional rivalries, strategic and ideological differences, organizational divisions and various other incongruencies and contradictions found in Korean nationalism. In the "tripartite division", it was axiomatically posited that An Ch'angho focused on education and economic-cultural empowerment as a "gradualist pacifist" and/or "cultural nationalist" and espoused gradual reforms and improvements in the colonial and diasporic Korean communities. The danger with such a view was that it implicitly, if rather pejoratively, assumed that these strategic differences between the leaders led to the inevitable division, eventual decline and subsequent failure of the Korean independence movement. This view was also sometimes extended as an analytical tool or framework to explain the independence movement and the pioneering activism of the overseas communities, including the leaders of early Korea-America, such as An Ch'angho, Syngman Rhee and Pak Yongman. Yet, such an analysis did not effectively discern the fact that the leaders, An Ch'angho, Syngman Rhee and Pak Yongman as well as So Chaep'il and Yi Tonghwi, were at one time or another militarists, diplomatists, or self-strengthening educators in their anticolonial revolutionary careers.³

Not only has the "tripartite division" schema offered a quite reduced and formulaic depiction of the Korean nationalist struggle, it

has pivoted on a misguided hypothesis that neglected to address how and why the independence quest could be still sustained as a "movement" from the late nineteenth century to Liberation, even with its many weaknesses. The problem with past writings has been that they concentrated too much on the lack of unity and continuity in Korean nationalism which, in turn, denied the holistic yet dynamic historical authenticity to the movement.

As far as I can see, the lively debates in the "An Ch'angho controversy" over the years encompassed several critical issues in interpreting and re-interpreting Korean colonial history, which will, no doubt, still resonate in the years to come. They were: i) gradualist pacifism vs. radical militarism, as in a lengthy thread of opinions displayed on the theme of "An Ch'angho not a gradualist?"; ii) a new view of "revolutionary-democracy" vs. an old view of the "tripartite division" of Korean nationalist movement; iii) revision of "cultural nationalism" vs. neo-revisionism of revolutionary nationalism; iv) patriotism vs. collaborationism in the colonial period and the complicated legacy of the issue thereafter; and v) the origins of Korean democracy, including the origins and drafting of the Korean republican constitution.

By joining the controversy, my intent is to fundamentally reconstruct the structural edifice of the earlier historiographical assumptions and theoretical underpinnings of the past decades of scholarship, so that we may come to rethink the political and ideological make-up of the Korean nationalist movement which preceded the Korean War and geopolitical division.

Beyond the Colonial Legacy, Cold War and Conventional Wisdom: A Critique

An Ch'angho has long been a critical subject of literary and scholarly attention among the colonial and post-colonial Korean intellectuals in Korea and West. Inevitably, the earlier interpretations of An Ch'angho reflected and embodied the painful legacy and tumults of colonialism, the Korean War, and division and successive military dictatorships in modern Korean history, including its dilemmas, ambiguities and contradictions. As a pivotal figure in modern Korean history, such entanglement of An Ch'angho's legacy and the collective Korean historical fate may be inescapable. Even during his life, the distinction between self and nation often blurred for him.

Caught at the nexus of modern Korean history and historiography, An Ch'angho was misinterpreted or misjudged as a "gradualist-pacifist" by Yi Kwangsu, Chu Yohan, Chong-sik Lee and Arthur Gardner from the 1940s to the 1970s⁴; a "cultural nationalist" by Michael Robinson in the 1980s⁵

and a "self-reconstruction nationalist" by Kenneth Wells in the 1990s⁶, among others. As disciple-biographers, Yi Kwangsu and Chu Yohan presented An as a "gradualist-pacifist" and set the tone for subsequent interpretations of An's life and thought. If their works were marked by inconsistencies and paradoxes, Yi and Chu's collaborations further clouded and complicated understanding of An and the Korean liberation struggle.

Evolving from a heroic nationalist icon to an object of hostile criticism, there are, in fact, few other nationalists who have experienced as many recent academic controversies as An. Consistently lionized as the very paradigm of a Korean leader and ideal personality by the writers and scholars like Yi Kwangsu, Chu Yohan, An Pyong'uk, and Chong-sik Lee, An came under serious attack and scrutiny during the 1980's by Kang Tongjin, Michael Robinson, So Chungsook, and Pak Ch'ansung, among others.⁷ Actually, many of the interpretive problems concerning An Ch'angho and Korean nationalism originated from *The Politics of Korean Nationalism* (1965) by Chong-sik Lee, which outlined the origins and evolution of Korean nationalism. Delineating the causes of the political division among nationalists of the Provisional Government, the study characterized An Ch'angho as a "gradualist"; Syngman Rhee and So Chaep'il as "propagandists"; and Yi Tongwhi and Pak Yongman as "militarists".⁸ Offering the classic "tripartite division" as a conceptual framework to discern the Korean nationalist leadership and politics, Lee's seminal work has heavily influenced academic writing on Korean nationalism for the past several decades, without ample and systematic scrutiny. While it was admitted that the analytical categories of division in the "study done nearly forty years ago" were "vague", with an over-reliance on the Japanese colonial sources, other scholars still continued to adopt this view of Korean nationalism.⁹

In *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925* (1988), Robinson, for example, asserted that Yi Kwangsu and An Ch'angho were essentially unrevolutionary "cultural nationalists" by examining Yi Kwangsu's *Minjok kaejoron* (Essay on National Character Reform). Adopting the radical leftist critique of the 1920s which arose from the intense political and propaganda struggle between Korean nationalists and communists, Robinson contended that Yi and An were "elitist gradualists" whose measures toward recovering independence were actually "a tacit acceptance of the colonial rule" or "passive collaborationism". His analysis thus has misconstrued An Ch'angho as a gradualist-pacifist who originated the conservative "rightist" nationalist philosophy with an emphasis on cultural accommodationist, rather than political and military revolutionary, activities. Within such logic, An Ch'angho's *supposedly* gradualist or cultural nationalist strategy of nonconfrontation and

educational-cultural reform was explicitly condemned and ridiculed as cautiously tepid, if not outright anachronistic and hypocritical. Provocatively challenging the nationalist credentials of An Ch'angho, it led to the conclusion that his gradualist ideologico-methodology was "conservative-rightist" with its linear teleology as self-rule (*Jach* 7) under the Japanese.¹⁰

Charging that such 'cultural nationalists' sought non-political gradualist reform before independence and only wished to work *within* the Japanese colonial framework, Robinson examined the journals and social movements already censored and curtailed under repressive Japanese rule within Korea. Failing to evaluate the activities of the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, he did not connect the nationalist movement within the peninsula and *without*. In turn, the work hardly considered the reality of domestic-exile linkage among revolutionary nationalists and communists, including the war of independence. After all, the locus of action of the anticolonial movement lay outside Korea in the 1920s.

Here, some of pertinent problems and issues of such historiographical works concerning An Ch'angho will be illuminated.¹¹ First, a number of analytical concerns can be noted with the works which portrayed An as a gradualist or a cultural nationalist, i) In terms of Robinson and Pak Ch'ansung's assertions that An Ch'angho and Yi Kwangsu sought to work only within the Japanese colonial framework, it seems that their analyses concentrated too much on the time period between 1920 and 1925 and failed to investigate the extensive exile activities of An Ch'angho and other nationalists during this period, which, after all, was where the *action* was, with an almost frantic array of activities of the Provisional Government, ii) Only an indirect and referential treatment of An Ch'angho was possible through an evaluation of *Minjok Kaejoron*, a single work of famously prolific Yi Kwangsu. Yi actually portrayed An Ch'angho as a role model for the Korean youths to emulate in several of his major works such as *Mujong*, *Hurk*, and *Sondoja*, in addition to a posthumous biography of An. iii) Such historiographical works were also strongly influenced by Yi Kwangsu's subsequent collaboration with the Japanese, with too much emphasis on the relationship between Yi Kwangsu and An Ch'angho who possessed vastly different moral-spiritual character and strength. Throughout his life as a nationalist leader, An was, naturally, quite close to a significant number of prominent nationalists, including An Chung'gun, Kim Ku, Yi Tonghwi, Yo Unhyong, So Ch'apil, Pak Unsik and Cho Soang.

Second, a more serious methodological and empirical problem of the earlier historiography is an over-reliance on the Japanese Government-General (*Choson ch 'ongdokbu*) records, without a careful

examination of the-then available material on An such as diaries, speeches, biographies, recollections, and journals. A historiographical interpretation solely based on Japanese sources cannot adequately grapple with the colonial reality of harsh repression vs. gritty resistance. For example, with routine exposure to grave danger and threat which included strict censorship and the curtailment of activities, the nationalists were often forced to disguise their true intentions or identities. And such *deception* or *pretense* against the notoriously severe Japanese was no less than a matter of life and death for them. It can be observed that An Ch'angho, who successively operated multitudes of underground and exile activities, including an espionage communication network (*Yont'ongje*) of the Provisional Government, did not intend to reveal his genuine revolutionary philosophy or methods. After all, it is quite improbable to imagine An revealing his innermost revolutionary thought or strategy to the Japanese authorities. As he sought to preserve his anticolonial revolutionary career for a long time, it would have been irresponsible, if not outright foolhardy, for An to make provocative statements of revolutionary character, as indicated in his much censored "Plea to Compatriots" as an exile leader.¹²

The Japanese sources on An Ch'angho or any other nationalists, including the so-called "collaborators", must be utilized with extreme caution and care, since the subtle guiles of the Korean nationalists and the delicate and indelicate pressures by the Japanese colonialists must be fully accounted for an accurate description of the colonial/nationalist reality. Indeed, the colonial subtext and intertext must be intuitively probed and decoded. The blank spaces and silent voices too must be read and heard to appreciate the nationalist movement as an epic tapestry of complexly interwoven layers and linkages of figures and activities. Otherwise, an over-invested confidence in the colonialist sources can only result in a superficial depiction of a nationalist's *colonial disguise*, as in the case of An Ch'angho. For example, in the Japanese police interrogation report (*Yesim simmunggi*), An only appears to be forthcoming about the nature and extent of his nationalist activities, while he completely denies any revolutionary or military intent in them. The hazards of interpretation can be perceived when we realize that this very report has been widely used by scholars without careful discretion, particularly for its biographical details concerning An.¹³ It may also be an ironic perpetuation of the unfortunate colonial legacy, especially as the Japanese administration's records are, still, somehow considered more "legitimate" to judge a Korean nationalist revolutionary. Without sensitive and intuitive discernment, therefore, it is not possible to analyze colonial sources on the activities of Korean nationalists properly.

Third, a philosophical limitation of Neo-Marxist historiography of An Ch'angho is that it is inherently unable to delineate the core essence of An's spirituality or metaphysics, perhaps reminiscent of the character Donghyok in Sim Hoon's *Sangnoksu* (Evergreen) who quixotically trusts that the transcendental matters of the spirit can actually be reduced to an imminent scientific and materialistic ideology.¹⁴ A historian of political ideas, Eric Voegelin, remarked that "the soul of Marx was demonically closed to transcendental reality" since "in the critical Post-Hegelian situation he cannot extricate himself from the difficulties by returning to the freedom of the spirit."¹⁵ Yet, the Marxist discourse which is characterized by "spiritual impotence" and "dictatorial prohibition of metaphysical questions" was also a part of Utopian vision to fulfill the promise of perfection of man and society which profoundly engaged Tosan.¹⁶

If the problem of the pre-1980's scholarship on An Ch'angho was its narrow focus of Tosan as a nationalist philosopher and educator, the post-Kwangju historiography of the eighties with its overtly politicized and ideologized motivations, too, hardly succeeded in grasping the full dimensions of An as a revolutionary democrat. To better comprehend a multifaceted and multilayered revolutionary democrat such as An, the substantive nature and universe of his metaphysics, ideology, strategy and activities need to be systematically illuminated. In this regard, An's internal choices and responses against his external challenges, constraints, and circumstances have to be carefully reconstructed. Furthermore, the paradigmatic structure of An's authentic inner existence which molded the contour of his unique adaptability, originality, creativity and imagination should be investigated. Only then, it seems possible to accurately understand An as the Korean nationalist leader who courageously confronted, scientifically attempted, boldly applied, always hoped, frequently disappointed, often agonized, eagerly transformed and experientially matured.

Undoubtedly, Yi Kwangsu and Chu Yohan's collaboration has complicated and clouded An Ch'angho's legacy. The historical legacy of other prominent collaborators such as Yun Ch'ihoo and Kim Songsu has further compounded the difficulties of grasping the true An Ch'angho in the 1990s. In *New God, New Nation: Protestants and Self-Reconstruction Nationalism in Korea, 1896-1937* (1990), Kenneth Wells explored the ethico-spiritual, or 'self-reconstructionist', character of Protestant Christian nationalism. Redefining 'cultural nationalism' as "self-reconstruction nationalism", however, he did not distinguish the nationalist philosophy and activities of Yun Ch'ihoo and Yi Kwangsu from those of An Ch'angho. Believing that An was a leading culturalist, Wells, too, judged An Ch'angho as a 'gradualist', or non-

political pacifist.¹⁷ He suggested that An chose to pursue the goals of "nation (i.e., culture) over state (i.e., politics)".¹⁸ While Wells focused on the underlying tension of Christian universalism vs. nationalistic particularism to explain Yun's collaboration, this could not apply to An Ch'angho, whose nationalist program and worldview sharply diverged from the culturalists. An not only actively sought the political and military means to achieve independence but also never collaborated with the Japanese.

More recent publications on An Ch'angho further attest to the limitations of the colonial intellectuals and the ambivalence of the post-colonial generation in grappling with historicity. A work edited by Tschung-Sun Kim and Michael Reinschmidt, *Strengthened Abilities: Assessing the Vision of Tosan Chang-ho Ahn* (1998), for instance, is a translation of papers presented at a conference on An Ch'angho in Los Angeles in 1996. While a number of articles discussed the possible new directions in research on An Ch'angho, the editors ignored the findings and still thematically framed the discourse with the old notions of An Ch'angho as a "gradualist-pacifist" and "ability-strengthenener".¹⁹ Hyung-chan Kim's *Tosan Ahn Ch'ang-ho: A Profile of a Prophetic Patriot* (1996) is a rather typical example that entails obscurantist interpretive problems frequently found in the works on An Ch'angho and Korean nationalism. Uncritically accepting the earlier misconception of An Ch'angho as a "gradualist-pacifist", Kim opts to sidestep the 'An Ch'angho controversy' from the outset of his book: "I am well aware of the continuing debate among scholars of modern Korean history on how to analyze and interpret Tosan (An Ch'angho's pen name) and his role in the Korean independence movement. I do not intend to lend support to any theoretical framework within which Tosan and his independence activities have been thus far crafted and framed. It is still not only too premature to characterize Tosan either as a 'gradualist' or 'radical nationalist', but also too presumptuous to frame him in a theoretical perspective." Absence of a persuasive conceptual framework in biography is unfortunate, for it then becomes merely a chronological and pictorial description of the life events of An Ch'angho. Without concrete theoretical underpinnings as a critical narrative guide and paradigmatic anchor, it is not possible to fully navigate and chart the complex yet systematic universe of An's nationalist philosophy, strategy and movement. Kim's hasty organization and metaphorical reflection are evident in the lackluster chapters titles, such as "Tosan's First American Experience", "Tosan in Korea", "Tosan in America", "Tosan as Public Official in Shanghai", "Tosan out of Government in Shanghai", "Tosan's Last Stay in America and China" and "Tosan's Last Journey".²⁰

Unavoidably, Kim accepts and perpetuates the earlier view of An Ch'angho as a 'gradualist-pacifist' that had already begun to be seriously challenged, even while he prepared this work. Evidently, Kim only selectively used currently available sources, especially among a vast holding of An Ch'angho's private papers at the Independence Hall of Korea in Ch'onan.

Kim fails to unveil the comprehensive nation-building paradigm of An Ch'angho to achieve independence and democracy, which was a unique and indigenous praxis of philosophy and program with a compelling inner logic, reflecting the harsh colonial and diasporic circumstances of Koreans. As a peripatetic exile and underground leader, An's interior landscape was configured by an intensely idealistic and Utopian longing for a democratic self-government propelled by desperate desire to overcome the brutal colonial reality. In part, almost impenetrably elaborate character of his independence program and strategy distinguished by unusual creativity and originality mirrored An's tightly-wound experiential self and experimental logic, with sheer human will and determination. Therefore, the 'appearance vs. reality' duality of An Ch'angho was a life-and-death matter and a well-honed survival technique as a leader of the anticolonial revolution who lived with a sense of urgent threat and danger as a way of life. A man of steely moral and strategic discipline, An was acutely aware of his leadership responsibility in shaping the overall direction, strategy, momentum and survivability of the movement. There was no room for negligence or imprudence for An. A stoic man of self-control, there could be no eccentric outbursts of Sin Ch'aeho, no false trust of Yi Tonghwi, and no compromise of Yi Kwangsu. In the end, An was tortured to death in prison. His life and destiny emblemize the unfulfilled promise of the collective quest of his nation and people.²¹

Even in the latest work of Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, as much as the already highly controversial *The Origins of the Korean War*, for example, not much substantive new investigation nor serious historical analysis of the Korean nationalist movement can be found. Thus, no scrutiny or reflection beyond the conventional view of the binary ideological division of the nationalist movement is included. Obviously, this is a deep lacuna and problematique to discern the course of historical development of post-liberation and post-Korean War politics, ideology and division.²²

A Revolutionary-Democrat: The Constitutional Drafts and the Master Plan

Who, after all, was An Ch'angho? An Ch'angho for long remained an elusive, if mysterious and misunderstood, figure in modern Korean

history. Enduring as an enigma, the leading intellectuals, writers, and scholars of Korea and the West, actually, could not figure him out. In a sense, his genius as an "undercover" revolutionary — i.e., his adoption of a moderate reformist stance to camouflage yet advance his ultimate revolutionary agenda of waging an independence war to reclaim his country — which eluded the Japanese police for decades also eluded them. Well-known yet unknown, An Ch'angho seems have been a leader par excellence of the Korean independence quest with principled moral dignity and labyrinthine strategic mind. More than any other nationalist leaders of his time, An Ch'angho demonstrated much greater political, strategic, organizational and moral-spiritual leadership and influence and led an international network of exile and underground activities evading Japanese suppression from the 1900s to 1930s. Committed to the patriotic cause of freedom of his people and country, he did not fully reveal his revolutionary aims or intentions even to those who were close to him. With multilayered and multidimensional strategic vision and planning, he neither eschewed violent tactics nor progressive socialist ideologies to champion his life-long goal of independence.²³

While it is a painstaking process to piece together the whole anticolonial revolutionary enterprise of Koreans that continued to transform and camouflage as a way of survival from brutal repression and remained transnational in character and scale, it is still possible to discern the nature of the overwhelmingly complex and ambitious revolutionary oeuvre and vista of An Ch'angho as the leader. From the study of sources, An Ch'angho emerges as an arch-patriot, a pioneering constitutional democrat, institution-builder and military strategist. A man of prodigious intellectual, oratorical and political gifts and resolute will, An was a profoundly spiritual man who also offered the requisite ethico-spiritual leadership for the Korean nationalist movement. Leading and shaping the independence movement as an international network of underground and exile activities, An Ch'angho was perhaps the most talented and expansive of institution-builders and modernizers among Korean nationalists. He was also an eloquent orator, systemizer of nationalist ideology and methodology, political leader who initially conceived and established the Korean Provisional Government, underground and exile revolutionary, grass-roots organizer, reformist educator, writer and publisher of leading journals, and composer of patriotic lyrics and songs, among others.

The most astonishing, if serendipitous, discovery among An Ch'angho's private papers is a series of his own constitutional drafts of the anticolonial revolutionary organizations, which became the embryonic basis of the Constitution of the Provisional Government

during the colonial era and the Republic of Korea after the Liberation. While this clearly was not acknowledged or recognized before, An Ch'angho seems to have been the first Korean to draft the earliest Korean republican constitution. Indeed, An's constitutions are the earliest constitutional drafts as the "founding documents" of the Republic of Korea. The textual analysis of the constitutions reflect An's unique personality and gifts as much as his intellectual and institutional vision and applicability which critically shaped the moral-spiritual vision and liberational strategy of the collective quest of an independent democracy.

Such constitutional drafts of his revolutionary organizations demonstrate the creative and original, if evolving and complex, character of An Ch'angho's constitutional philosophy and institutional experiments. An Ch'angho unfailingly wrote constitutions for his associations, including the *Kongnip hydphoe* (United Koreans in America), *Sinminhoe* (New People's Society), *Taehan kungminhoe* (Korean National Association), and *Hungsadan* (Young Korean Academy), the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, the National Representatives Congress, and the Korean Independence Party, in addition to numerous other organizations. Among them, the most remarkable document is the 'Constitution of the Hungsadan'. From his draft of no less than forty-five notebook pages in pencil from 1913, one can easily observe his passionate commitment toward the democratic process of self-government, such as elections, the separation of powers and the transfer of office by limited terms. With such a constitutional framework, An Ch'angho attempted to ensure the viability and longevity of the *Hungsadan* which he hoped to be the role model of democracy for Koreans. An Ch'angho's emphatic insistence on democracy for Koreans derived from his belief that the very act of self-governing constituted an essential part of a subversive anticolonial revolution. The Hungsadan is a revolutionary leadership-training association, founded by An Ch'angho in 1913 in San Francisco, which survives as the leading nationalist organization in Korea, with branches in other countries.

Perhaps the most arresting document is his handwritten "Master Plan of independence and democracy" before the outbreak of World War I in 1914. (The "Master Plan" is my nomenclature for the document and the outline included is my translation of the document.) Here, An Ch'angho charted the entire course of the independence movement with comprehensive knowledge and systematic planning. A private and concrete articulation of a program of action for the nationalist movement, the outline manifests the totality of An's revolutionary strategy. In his typically meticulous manner, the Master

Plan is also a detailed diagrammatic chart which describes the necessary virtues, personnel, skills, means, and resources to achieve his ultimate aims, i.e., independence and democracy.

Underlying the Master Plan in which An Ch'angho envisioned a well integrated stage-by-stage development are his "philosophy of strength" to build "moral, intellectual and economic strength" of Koreans and revolutionary conviction that national liberation was only possible by military means. Consisting of five major stages and thirteen substages progressively evolving toward his final goal, it is apparent that An intended much of his own and compatriots' efforts to be mobilized for an all-out *independence war* to restore national sovereignty. The Master Plan is as much a mobilization roadmap for the independence war as a prophetic blueprint to create a new democratic nation. In fact, a striking feature of the Master Plan is how An Ch'angho entwined his dual aims of seemingly paradoxical democracy-building and war-preparation within a single structure of the plan.

Prepared when An Ch'angho was thirty-six years old, the Master Plan can be also read as a synopsis of philosophical currents of his time and space. For example, we can notice the formative influence of Confucian classics from his insistence on building moral character and strength as the fundamental requisites. Here, Social Darwinism was a transvaluative philosophy from Confucian-Mencianism to Christian Enlightenment to Faustean-Promethean democracy for An Ch'angho. His understanding of Social Darwinism was translated into dialectical self-strengthening and military revolutionism. Ultimately, however, his futuristic orientation and democratic vision of equality and freedom derived from his life-long Christian faith.²⁴

Korean-America and Diaspora

An Ch'angho was born in P'yongyang in 1878 to an impoverished gentry family. His father, a scholar-farmer who was a village *sodang* teacher, passed away when An was eight. An Ch'angho studied Chinese classics until sixteen, when he decided to go to Seoul. He became a Christian at the Underwood School where he was taught English by Underwood himself, studied the "new learning", and taught as a teacher for a number of years. By meeting So Chaep'il, he was introduced to the patriotic activities of the Independence Club and the ideals and practice of self-governing democracy.²⁵

As one of the earliest Koreans to arrive in America in 1902, An wished to pursue further study in theology and education. However, he chose an activist path of activist when he saw two Korean ginseng merchants fighting in the streets of San Francisco. After moving to

Riverside, he pursued his education with evening Bible and English classes at a Methodist church in Los Angeles. Soon he became a successful entrepreneur operating an employment agency, helping to place Koreans workers on local orchards where he sometimes joined them.

Following the creation of the Friendship Society in California, An Ch'angho founded the *Kongnip hyophoe* in 1905. Applying the American federalist constitution to the *Kongnip hyophoe*, An Ch'angho wrote a pioneering democratic constitution prescribing the system of separation of powers and checks and balances. Devising a two-tiered bicameral system of the headquarters and local branches in the constitution, a dual system of executive and legislative bodies of self-government functioned as separate but equal powers. In the local branches, autonomy was stressed with an executive and legislative system of its own. A product of An Ch'angho's own inimitable interpretation and application of the sociopolitical requisites of compatriots, the *Kongnip hyophoe* seems to have been the first Korean association with the republican constitution as the earliest crystallization of his conception of constitutional democracy and practice of the rule of law.²⁶

Returning to Korea in 1907, An Ch'angho formed the secret revolutionary organization *Sinminhoe* with a democratic constitution, which reflected the transnational linkage of the republican revolutionary project of Korean-Americans and Koreans, with a well-developed plan for the war of independence.²⁷ In the years before annexation in 1910, he strove to open numerous branches of the *Kungminhoe* as a constitutional self-governing organization in Russia, Manchuria and China, and continued his grassroots efforts to lead and strengthen the organization as a transnational enterprise in America. As the fruit of An Ch'angho's peripatetic organizational groundwork, the *Kungminhoe*, was solidified when he became the chairman of the central assembly in 1912, eventually with branches numbering over a hundred in Asia and Americas.²⁸ Here, An Ch'angho laid the political foundation for diasporaic Koreans and begun to conceive the idea of exile government. Already, the Korean National Association possessed the body and network of international structure and started to behave as the central organ of the "provisional government". Thus it is not surprising that An Ch'angho would later head the Provisional Government in Shanghai. In 1913, An Ch'angho established a revolutionary leadership-training society *Hungsadan* and drafted the 'Constitution of the Hungsadan' in California. Displaying sophisticated skill and a grasp of democratic mechanisms by then, such *tourde force* constitution prefigured the fact that An Ch'angho would author the first

Constitution of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea.²⁹

Here, a number of controversial issues in terms of the Korean independence leadership and movement in America will be examined. First, the different strategic approaches of An Ch'angho, Syngman Rhee and Pak Yongman as "education and cultural developer", "diplomatist", and "militarist", respectively, have been considered.³⁰ Of course, the problems of such a "tripartite division" view of the overall Korean nationalist movement has already been mentioned. Yet, it has also been questioned whether An Ch'angho was a gradualist activist of reform and enlightenment in America but more of a militarist revolutionary only after he arrived in Shanghai in 1919. Since An Ch'angho possessed a militarist plan several years before the annexation of 1910 and continued his nationalist drive along this line in subsequent decades in America, Korea, China, Russia and other nations, such a view of An Ch'angho as a leader who only championed educational-cultural and economic empowerment in America is not accurate. In this regard, a suggestion that An Ch'angho was such a gradualist-pacifist that he would not have even participated in the March First movement, let alone shun and criticize the event, seems quite contrary to the documented facts of history.

Second, in comparing An Ch'angho with Syngman Rhee and Pak Yongman, a conservative criterion of class and education have been sometimes adopted to determine the strength of their leadership ability and possible strategic divergence. While these standards are not adequate to judge a life and career in general, they are particularly insufficient to measure a leader's character, intelligence, courage, sacrifice, creativity and originality. And they are especially problematic as sole indicators to discern the quality of leadership of politicians, activists and revolutionaries who operate in the realm of "action", rather than of "thought". The late Edward Wagner once said that "Politics is an art of the possible, yet the most difficult of human endeavors. That is why it is much more tough to be a politician than an academic." He also added, "An Ch'angho was a truly exceptional leader in Korean history. The country's fate may have turned out differently had he survived after the Liberation."³¹

In terms of the Korean independence movement in America, it seems to me that the more accurate yardstick would be a leader's capability and responsibility for division or unity in the formative years of the Korean American community. For example, it is well-known that Rhee's notorious tendency to monopolize and dominate influence and resources in the course of the independence movement caused rampant organizational and personnel problems with its bitter reverberations for years to come. Rhee was highly responsible for

much of the disruption and break-up, where as An Ch'angho was quite responsible for much of the unification and organizational outcome. When An went to Hawaii in 1915 to unify the two leaders of the Kungminhoe, Pak Yongman and Syngman Rhee, neither even came out to see him. How do we judge this?

Moreover, schools are not the only educational tools or means. The books from An Ch'angho's personal library in America shows that An was a committed intellectual with a wide range of interests and a high level of intellectual curiosity as an exceptional autodidact who was quite well-read in several languages. He also seemed to have had life-long passion for books. He had created a T'aeguk Bookstore in P'yongyang in 1907, stating, "A bookstore is also a school. A book is a teacher. A bookstore is more threatening than a school. A book is an even more intimidating teacher."³²

Third, concerning the issue of continuity and change of the independence movement in America, it has been suggested that there were "peaks" and "valleys". While it is true that there were peaks of expanded enthusiasm and commitments in the years immediately before and following the Protectorate Treaty in 1905, the annexation in 1910 and the March First movement in 1919, it appears that there existed a surprising fluidity and continuity in the liberational plan, execution and structure of the Korean independence movement in America and other nations. The continuity becomes more evident when the anticolonial project is more holistically envisioned as an integrally linked and evolved transnational enterprise, with regional divisions of labor with separate means and aims in America, China, Russia, Korea, and Japan, among others. The distinguishing contribution of Korean-Americans to the independence movement was, indeed, the "funds and leaders".³³

Fourth, the contradiction or paradox of "revolution" and "democracy" in An Ch'angho in America and other countries has been questioned. In my view, it was not a paradox but the revolutionary history of America as An Ch'angho's principle model of revolution and democracy. An Ch'angho observed that the national formation of America began from the independence movement against the tyrannical Britain and the American democracy was the fruit of the success of the independence war and revolution. An Ch'angho understood the relationship between independence revolution and democracy from the American historical example, and attempted to recreate the experience for Koreans in America.³⁴

Finally, what is the relationship between the colonial diaspora and Korean globalization? It is my contention that the process of Korean globalization was inaugurated with the independence movement of colonial diaspora, most actively initiated, staged and fertilized by An

Ch'angho, as can be read from his efforts through the transnational Korean National Association at the turn of the twentieth century. Thus, the colonial diaspora and Korean globalization are intimately tied in modern Korean history by the colonialist accident and nationalist design.

Constitutional Democracy and the War of Independence

Prior to the nationwide uprising on March First in 1919, An Ch'angho was already engaged in a plan to create the Provisional Government, and he had signed the radical version of the declaration of independence with other Korean revolutionaries in Manchuria. Widely acknowledged as the most skilled conciliator and gifted institution-builder, An Ch'angho was invited by the Korean revolutionaries in Shanghai after the March First movement. Following the meeting, An was sent as a representative of the *Kungminhoe* in America. From a young firebrand independence fighter, he had also become a seasoned revolutionary who thought with his head as much as his heart in his early forties.

Arriving in Shanghai, An Ch'angho purchased a house as the seat of government and his residence with funds provided by the *Kungminhoe* and *Hungsadan*.³⁵ Since three provisional governments arose in Vladivostok, Seoul and Shanghai, An Ch'angho consolidated the Provisional Government in Shanghai in August of 1919, carefully balancing the Seoul and Vladivostok cabinet appointments. As an acting premier, An Ch'angho considered the Seoul government as the legitimate heir of the March First revolution, he followed the representation of the Seoul government as closely as possible, against those who insisted that the roster of the Seoul government merely represented an underground resistance group. Toward grand solidarity, An appointed Syngman Rhee as the president, for he could potentially be the most critical agent in altering the direction of American policy toward colonial Korea. Also, he appointed Yi Tonghwi, the most influential revolutionary leader in the Far East, as the premier of the Korean Provisional Government.

Though an unfair slight, An Ch'angho accepted an insignificant title for himself as the Chief of the Bureau of Labor (*Nodong ch'ongpan*) assigned by the Seoul government. He accepted such a post for himself toward the larger task of unification of the Korean Provisional Government. For An entirely subsumed his personal ambition or reputation for the goal larger than himself, this act of charitable humility and earnest stewardship stunned the nationalist community, both at home and abroad.³⁶

The Unified Provisional Government in Shanghai

Vladivostok/Seoul

Shanghai

(Unified)

Head(<i>Suban</i>)	Son Pyonghui / Syngman Rhee	Syngman Rhee/ Pak Yonghyo
Premier	Syngman Rhee / Yi Tonghwi	Yi Tonghwi
Minister of Interior	An Ch'angho /Yi Tongnyong	Yi Tongnyong
Minister of Diplomacy	Pak Yongman	Pak Yongman
Minister of Finance	Yun Hyonjin / Yi Siyoung	Ch'oe Chaehyong
Minister of Military	Yi Tonghwi / No Paengnin	No Paengnin
Minister of Education	Kim Kyusik	Kim Kyusik
Minister of Justice	Sin Kyusik	Sin Kyusik
Minister of Transportation	Mun Ch'angbom	Mun Ch'angbSm
Minister of Labor	Nam Hyong'u / An Ch'angho	An Ch'angho

Upon unifying the Korean Provisional Government, An Ch'angho drafted the first Constitution of the Republic of Korea which espoused the presidential system with the three branches of government. Cognizant of his historic task to lay the cornerstone of future independent democracy, he prepared a comprehensive constitution of eight chapters and fifty-eight articles as the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Korea. After considerable debates, the constitution was passed by the Provisional Assembly on September 11, 1919. In the prefatory chapter, it read:

- I. The Republic of Korea is composed of the people of Korea.
- II. The sovereignty of Korea rests entirely on the people of Korea.
- III. The land of Korea is the peninsula of the old Choson dynasty.
- IV. The people of Korea are all equal.
- V. Korea's legislative right belongs to the Assembly (*Uijongwori*), executive right belongs to the Executive (*Kungmuwori*), and the judicial right belongs to the Judiciary (*Popwon*).
- VI. Within the limits of the Constitution, the governing of Korea is delegated to the Provisional President.
- VII. Korea will courteously respect the monarch of the *ancien regime*?

In simple yet elegant language, the constitution proclaimed the sovereign right and equality of Koreans and stipulated a presidential system based on the separation of powers. Emphasizing the Provisional Government as the legitimate exile government, the declaration of the

Provisional Constitution buttressed the overseas movement as the highest body of organized resistance to the Japanese rule, with its legitimacy ultimately derived from anticolonial democratic revolution of the March First by the Korean people.

Soon thereafter, An Ch'angho declared the Military Rules of the Provisional Government (*Taehan minguk imsi kunje*), an extensive body of military guidelines and regulations to unify and supervise the military groups under a central authority. Apparently, he not only anticipated but also engaged in the systematic preparations for the War of Independence. He began to unite the scattered Korean military groups in the Far East by consolidating the disparate military organizations in Russia, Manchuria and China under the jurisdictional umbrella of the Provisional Government. Through his effort, many of the scattered military groups either declared their support or submitted to the authority of the Provisional Government. With a growing number of military groups in Manchuria expressing allegiance, further unification became possible, in the Far East. Indeed, the leading military figures in Russia and Manchuria, including Yi Tonghwi, Hong Pomdo and Kim Chwajin, conjoined to form the Korean Independence Army. Especially Kim Chwajin and Hong Pomdo would play the leading roles in the War of Independence at Ch'ongsanni, northwest of Vladivostok.³⁸

Encouraging the nationalist community, including the cabinet members of the Provisional Government, to submit their policy proposals and objectives, An Ch'ango formulated a comprehensive independence movement strategy as the acting premier. His strategic vista was encapsulated in an address in January 3, 1920, of *Six Major Tasks Which Our People Must Achieve*. Perhaps the most important speech at the inception of the Korean Provisional Government, An Ch'angho offered his systematic strategic vision and priority of the major tasks for Koreans to reclaim independence: "Now, there are six great tasks that our people must achieve. They are, i) military, ii) diplomacy, iii) education, iv) law, v) finance, and, vi) unification." Especially concerning the primary military task, An asserted the importance of unification, training, and national conscription by stating, "an independence war is not an imagination, for the war to be a reality ... we all have to be soldiers ... Let's all receive military drills... Even women have to learn."³⁹

In elaborating his grand strategy, An Ch'angho stated, "The military is the most critical of the six major tasks." He directly tackled the issue of war vs. peace and asserted that this was the time to wage war. He also explained why preparation was absolutely necessary:

The great task that we now encounter is whether to continue the independence movement by peaceful means or war. It can be said that the loyalty is the same for those who emphasize peace or war... [Yet], do you really believe that this is not the time to fight, considering the timing and loyalty? Nonetheless, should we relentlessly go forward or after complete preparation? Some say that the business of revolution cannot be calculating to wait preparation. Yet, preparation is demanded. Of course, when I speak of preparation, it is not the kind of preparation to fully meet the resources of the enemy. Nonetheless, preparation is definitely necessary. Even in mock fights, the fighting groups take pains to develop a strategic plan. Thus, to fight an independence war without any preparation is to slight the war too much. If each soldier requires twenty won per day, it will require 60,000 won to feed 10,000 soldiers for a month. If we open war without preparation, the soldiers will die not from the enemy but famine. Therefore, if you agree to a war, please understand that preparation is absolutely requisite.⁴⁰

Such a war agenda reflected the military thrust of the Provisional Government evident from the composition of the cabinet which included leading military figures such as Yi Tonghwi, Ch'oe Chaehyong, No Paengnin, and Sin Kyusik. Among them, Yi Tonghwi and Ch'oe Chaehyong were commanders whose military organizations were influential in both Russia and Manchuria. Possessing military training and leadership, No Paengnin was from America and Sin Kyusik from China. With almost equal weight of representation, the cabinet was divided into the operational regions of America and the Far East. From America was An Ch'angho, Syngman Rhee, Kim Kyusik, and No Paengnin; from the Far East was Yi Tonghwi, Ch'oe Chaehyong, Sin Kyusik and Mun Ch'angbom.

While Syngman Rhee was exclusively devoted to diplomacy, An Ch'angho, Yi Tonghwi, Kim Kyusik, No Paengnin, and Sin Kyusik were involved in both military and diplomacy activities. In addition to Syngman Rhee and So Chaep'il who became diplomatic plenipotentiaries of the Provisional Government, Kim Kyusik and No Paengnin initially directed their diplomatic endeavors to the West, especially in America. A socialist nationalist, Yi Tonghwi's diplomatic negotiation was strictly conducted with Russian communists. Sin Kyusik mostly concentrated his diplomacy on Chinese revolutionaries. Realistic and pragmatic, An Ch'angho preferred the balance of power approach to America and the West as well as China and Russia.

In his *Shanghai Diary* in 1920-1921, An Ch'angho conscientiously

recorded the nature of his daily activities, including each visit, meeting, personage, and substance of discussion. Aware of the historical significance of the account, he carefully delineated the circumstances and characters surrounding the birth of the first republican Korean Government in Shanghai. Upon conceiving the constitutional foundation of the Provisional Government, the *Diary* affirms that An Ch'angho committed himself to the task of concrete preparations for the War of Independence and devoted much of his time and energies toward unification, enlargement and empowerment of the Korean Independence Army. From the earliest entry on January 15, 1920, to the last on March 1, 1921, An Ch'angho was most preoccupied with the military unification of the Provisional Government and pursued the following activities to coordinate the effort to wage the Independence War: formulation of military policy and rules; organization of the conference of military leaders; formation of an alliance between the Provisional Government and the existing military groups; recruitment and training of soldiers in Manchuria and Russia; establishment of the military schools; referral of Korean students to foreign military schools; importation and accumulation of food, weapons and other logistical support; and dispatch of military envoys and/or correspondents.⁴¹

Most likely in Shanghai (but also possibly in America), An Ch'angho also prepared "Tasks for All Armed Koreans to Implement", an extensive set of instructions for Korean military training. In the document consisting of three chapters and twenty-eight articles, An demonstrated his revolutionary vision for all Koreans to be militarily trained for the war of independence. Here, An stressed that a smallest military unit would consist of from ten to twenty-five people and a unit leader among them would be selected by vote and unanimous acceptance. An also emphasized change and the transfer of responsibility for the leader and reiterated lack of greed as an important leadership quality.⁴² An displayed an easy familiarity with the subject of the military by reading books in his personal library, such as *A Summary of Military Tactics*, *History of Seize and Destroy Warfare*, *Applied Minor Tactics*, *Manual of Field Artillery* and *What a Soldier Must Know (Kunin suji)*.^{43*}

With "great zeal", An Ch'angho also began a registration drive to recruit soldiers for the Korean Independence Army among the Korean expatriots in Shanghai, enlisting himself, Yi Tonghwi and Sin Kyusik, among others. Emphasizing that the war of independence was "the ultimate instrument of the independence movement", An Ch'angho dedicated much of the activities of the Provisional Government to "open the independence war" (*kaejon*), with "disciplined and persevering" endurance.⁴⁴ In his quest for national freedom, An

Ch'angho continued to utilize every possible means to recover national independence, including the military, paramilitary and anarchist means until his last days, becoming a martyr to the nationalist cause.

An Ch'angho led the efforts for the war of independence against Japan in Korea, America, China, Manchuria, and Russia from the 1900s to the 1930s. As a nascent constitutional democrat who brought about the constitutional revolution for Koreans, An Ch'angho trusted that democracy was a matter of survival and the most radical yet enduring revolution of all. For him, the anticolonial self-governing and the independence war were the means; the creation of a new sovereign democracy was the end.

In Search of a New Paradigm

Last August, a statue of An Ch'angho was unveiled, next to the statue of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi, in the city square of Riverside, California, where An first resided and began his organizational activities in America. The statues of the leaders were erected to celebrate the ethnic diversity and racial harmony as well as to honor the contribution of these minority communities to American history and society. As a pioneer, An Ch'angho represents the formative history and transformative flowering of the Korean-American community as the most dedicated grass-roots organizer and leader of the early Korean community who offered ethico-spiritual guidance and fellowship with moral courage and sacrifice. Yet, An was unlike Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. in that he did not only advocate the peaceful means of civil-disobedience to achieve his goal of freedom for Koreans. An Ch'angho did not shy away from military engagements or violent means to promote independence. As a matter of fact, he continued to make efforts to wage an independence war throughout his life.

Against the former backdrop of understanding of An Ch'angho and the mainstream Korean nationalist movement as "gradualist pacifist", "cultural nationalist", "self-reconstructionist" or "rightist ability-cultivationist", An's philosophy and strategy were not only limited to the educational and cultural means, for his ultimate aim was to recover national sovereignty by military means, or, in other words, a war of independence. The documentary sources affirm that An Ch'angho was actually a multi-layered militarist strategist and life-long revolutionary who advocated, planned and waged a war of independence against colonial Japan for over a quarter of a century. In this regard, An was also more of a "political nationalist", rather than a "cultural nationalist" or self-reform nationalist, whose lifelong passion and energy were directed to champion the ideals and practices of constitutional

democracy for Koreans. As the first Korean to advocate a republican form of government and the first to draft the Korean republican constitution, An Ch'angho introduced and experimented with the democratic principles of self-government as the very means of anticolonial struggle and wrote constitutions for his revolutionary organizations, prescribing a system of separation of powers, including the constitution of the Provisional Government. Leading anticolonial revolution as democratic revolution for colonial and diasporic Koreans, An was both a theorist and a practitioner of democracy, who conceived constitutional praxis of self-government as the very means and the end of the anticolonial struggle. Essentially, An Ch'angho originated modern constitutional democracy and the rule of law as the very means to achieve national freedom, beginning a "republican revolution" for Koreans.

Through the An Ch'angho controversy, the previous conceptions of An Ch'angho were challenged as conventional wisdom which had not been questioned in the past several decades. The controversy also engaged debates about the long-sustained "tripartite division" framework which too simplistically portrayed the Korean nationalist leadership, movement and politics. Beyond the "tripartite division" or binary paradigms, new revelations suggest that An Ch'angho possibly originated a one-of-kind paradigm as a synthesis of democratic ideology and revolutionary strategy. The controversy included the debates concerning the actual scope and intensity of the Korean independence struggle which had been seriously underestimated and misread by the previous scholars in Korea and the West, due to the residual colonial legacy and the Cold War division that ineluctably shaped the subsequent historiographical treatment.

Departing from the *post hoc* divisional and binary logic which pervaded historiography on modern Korea during the Cold War era ~ which often took its points of departure as the peninsular division after the Korean War - the new view aims to highlight the unique paradigm of the Korean nationalist leadership and movement in its own terms and conditions of colonial diaspora. It is sometimes asked, "Was the Korean nationalist movement a success or failure?" The answer depends on the eye of the beholder as it left behind a rich moral and political legacy as well as spiritual and communal inheritance from which new millennium Koreans at home and abroad still draw historical identity and personal meaning. Ultimately, the series of interpretive debates and discourses of the "An Ch'angho Controversy" were fruitful, for they advanced the idea that Korean colonial-nationalist history encompassed far greater complexities and mysteries. Perhaps, to assert otherwise would be to insist on the shibboleth of Orientalist hubris or imperialist nostalgia.

Engaging in the An Ch'angho controversy, the new view underscores the compelling inner logos, and ethos within the self-defining process of historical evolution of the Korean nationalist movement as a global and transnational, yet unique and indigenous, project. Defining An Ch'angho as a "revolutionary-democrat", the new view encompasses the distinctive manner in which An entwined constitutional democracy-building and preparations for the independence war in his nationalist ideology and methodology, especially within the colonial/nationalist duality of *appearance vs. reality*. It illuminates the nature of his role in constructing the ideal and process of nascent democracy and the war of independence and offers a new interpretive framework to reassess the pattern and dynamics of the Korean liberational struggle. Through the new discoveries on the independence leadership, it is possible to rethink the underlying ideological pattern and political dynamics of the nationalist movement from the *kaehwa* enlightenment reform to the independence war of Ch'ongsalli to An Ch'angho's continued military unification drive in China and Russia in the subsequent decades. The transformation of the cultural and military movements can also be reevaluated in terms of division and merger over several decades from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. Here, a more dynamic and fluid, yet everchanging, unity, rather than an artificial division, between the cultural and military movements, can be perceived in the historical stream of the Korean nationalist movement. What I mean by cultural and military, or *mun* and *mu*, movements are the patriotic enlightenment and righteous army movements (*kyemong undong* and *uibyong undong*) as the two major strands of Korean nationalist movement.⁴⁵

During the course the Korean anticolonial movement, An Ch'angho attempted to reconcile democracy and revolution, nationalism and communism, as well as the left and the right. In the process, An creatively and imaginatively entwined his goals and vision of Korean democracy and revolution, or the *mun* and *mu* spheres of civil body politic and military affairs, as a matter of strategic dialectics and historical requisites. Such dialectical and dynamic intertwinement of "revolution" and "democracy", as the means and the end, lies at the heart of the paradigm shift in the interpretation of the nationalist movement as "revolutionary-democracy". As a model of anticolonial movement, a rare merger of revolution and democracy and the transnational diaspora, as well as visionary leadership that firmly fixed its gaze on the independent and democratic future, distinguish the Korean experience in the twentieth century.

Notes

1. Jacqueline Pak, *The Founding Father: An Ch 'angho and the Origins of Korean Democracy*, Stanford University Press, forthcoming. Also, the Korean translation, *An Ch 'angho: Han 'guk minjujuui ui kiwon* (2003). The monographs are based on Jacqueline Pak, "An Ch'angho and the Nationalist Origins of Korean Democracy", Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 2000. The An Ch'angho Collection comprises over four thousand items of his private papers, including diaries, speeches, letters, documents, books, photographs, and artifacts. Perhaps the most significant and extensive collection among Korean nationalists, the An Ch'angho Collection of private papers provides valuable insights into his role as the chief architect and strategist of nationalist movement and offers a rare glimpse of the actual *modus operandi* of the global network of exile and underground activities. Among others, the new research closely investigates the private papers of So Chaep'il (1866 -1951), An Ch'angho's mentor and luminary of the Independence Club, and An Chunggun (1879-1910), a revolutionary who assassinated Ito Hirobumi. Consisting of over two thousand items, the So Chaep'il Collection includes letters, documents, essays, radio broadcasts and photographs. The papers of An Chunggun include his renowned calligraphy, court testimonies, prison writings and autobiography.

2. The "tripartite division" framework first appeared in Chong-sik Lee, *Politics of Korean Nationalism*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1965. Adopting this approach, Arthur Gardner wrote "The Korean Nationalist Movement and An Ch'angho, Advocate of Gradualism", Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1979.

3. A series of critiques of the problems of the past decades of scholarship and its theoretical and empirical underpinnings were offered in a number of my earlier presentations, including the shared aspects of militarism, diplomatism and so-called gradualism that can be found among the anticolonial Korean revolutionaries.

4. Yi Kwangsu, *Tosan An Ch 'angho*, Hungsadan, Seoul, 1947; Chu Yohan, *An Tosan chonso* (Complete Works of An Tosan), Samjungdang, Seoul, 1963; Chong-sik Lee, *Politics of Korean Nationalism*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1965; and Arthur Gardner, *The Korean nationalist Movement and An Ch 'angho, Advocate of Gradualism*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1979. Also, Chang Iuk and Chu Yohan, *Nauisaranghanpandoya* (My Love, Korean Peninsula), Hungsadan, 1987; and AnPyonguk, *Tosan sasang* (Philosophy of Tosan), Samyuk ch'ulpansa, Seoul, 1991, among others.

For discussions on the collaboration of Yi Kwangsu and Chu Yohan, read the circumstances of the Hungsadan trial, *Hungsadan undong ch 'ilsipnyonsa* (The Seventy Year History of the Hungsadan Movement), Hungsadan, Seoul, 1983 and Kim Yunsik, *Yi Kwangsu wa ku ui sidae* (Yi Kwangsu and His Time), Hangilsa, Seoul, 1986.

5. Michael Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1988.

6. Kenneth Wells, *New God, New Nation: Protestants and Self Reconstruction Nationalism in Korea, 1896-1937*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1990.

7. Kang Tongjin, *Ilje han 'guk ch 'imnyak chongch 'aeksa* (History of the Strategy of Japanese Colonial Aggression toward Korea), Hangilsa, Seoul, 1980; So Chungsok, *Hanmal ilje ch'imnyakha ui chabonjui kundaehwaron ui songkyok -Tosan An Ch 'angho ui sasang ul chungsim uro* (The Character of Capitalistic Modernization Theory under the Japanese Colonial Aggression at the End of Choson-Centering on

Tosan An Ch'angho's Philosophy), Han'guk kunhyondae ui minjok munje yongu, Chisik sanopsa, Seoul, 1989; and Pak Ch'ansung, *Han gukkundae chongch 'isasangsa yongu: Minjokjui upa ui sillyok yangsong undongnon* (Study of History of Modern Korean Political Philosophy: Theory of the Rightist Nationalist Ability-cultivationist Movement), Yoksa pipy'ongsa, Seoul, 1992

8. Lee, *Politics of Korean Nationalism*. Here, An Ch'angho's nationalist leadership and strategy are mainly delineated by the Japanese investigative reports.

9. Lee's updated comment about *Politics of Korean Nationalism*. Chong-sik Lee made much contribution to the field of Korean nationalism and communism. His more recent books are: Kwon Kibung, trans., *Ch 'odae daet 'ongnyong: YiSungman ui ch 'ongnyon sijol* (The First President: The Time of Syngman Rhee's Youth), Tong'a ilbosa, Seoul, 2002, and Yi Ch6ng-sik and Kim Hakchun, eds., *Hyongmyonggatul ui hang 'il hoasang* (Memoirs of Anti-Japanese Revolutionaries), Minumsa, 1988. Particularly, his book on Rhee is quite helpful to understand the currents of his time, his activities during the prison years and rise as the leader, despite Rhee's subsequent troublesome behavior in America and Korea. A complex figure, Rhee's remarkable earnestness and sincerity as a patriotic and thoughtful youth are captured in the work.

10. Michael Robinson, *op. cit.*

11. These points were first raised in the paper, Jacqueline Pak, "An Ch'angho as a Nationalist Leader: A Revisionist Perspective", Association of Korean Studies in Europe (AKSE) Conference, Prague, Czech Republic, April 23, 1995.

12. *Plea to Compatriots, An Tosan chonso*, Volume 2, pp. 1-20. This was written by An Ch'angho in 1924. For more details on the espionage network of *Yont 'ongje* of the Provisional Government devised by An, see my forthcoming work.

13. *Yesim simmungi, An Tosan chonso*, Volume 2, pp.447-462.

14. Sim Hoon, *Sangnoksu* (Evergreen), Munhak sasangsa, Seoul, 1991.

15. Eric Voegelin, *From Enlightenment to Revolution*, Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1975, p.298.

16. *Ibid.*

17. Wells, pp.9 and 16.

18. *Ibid.* p. 18.

19. Tschung-Sun Kim and Michael Reinschmidt, eds., *Strengthened Abilities: Assessing the Vision of Tosan Chang-hoAhn*, Academic Koreana, Los Angeles, 1998; Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun and The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1981.

20. Pak, Book Review, *Korean Studies*, July 2001, p.xvii.

21. *Ibid.*

22. Among others, Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun and The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1981.

23. Pak, Book Review, op.cit.
24. Pak, AKSE, Prague, 1995, op.cit.
25. Interviews with the family members of An Ch'angho, including his eldest daughter Susan Cuddy in Northridge, CA and niece, An Songgyol, in Seoul, Korea.
26. For more discussion on the constitution of the *Kongnip hyophoe*, Chapter 4, Pak, diss.
27. My own view of the *Sinminhoe*, founded by An Ch'angho in Korea, was that it was much more heavily influenced by the earlier Korean-American *Sinminhoe* of Hawaii established in 1903, although it was the earlier orthodox view of the organization was that it was mainly a homeland organization created by the revolutionaries in Korea. The Korean-American component of the *Sinminhoe* is further reinforced in Wayne Patterson, *The Use: First-Generation Korean Immigrants in Hawaii, 1903—1973*, University of Hawaii Press, 2000, pp.49-52.
28. For further detail on the *Kungminhoe*, Chapter 5, Pak, diss. Also Ban Byong Yool, "Korean Nationalist Activities in the Russian Far East and North Chientao, 1905-1921", University of Hawaii, Ph.D. dissertation, 1996.
29. "The Constitution of the Hungsadan", The Tosan An Ch'angho Collection. There are a number of drafts of the *Hungsadan* constitution among the private papers. With over eighty-year history, the *Hungsadan* continues the tradition of democratic self-government and is one of the three oldest surviving organizations in modern Korea, along with the *Ch 'ondogyo* and *Wonbulgyo*.
30. Han-Kyo Kim, "The Korean Independence Movement in the United States: Syngman Rhee, An Ch'ang-Ho and Pak Yong-Man", "The Korean Americans: Past, Present and Future" Conference, A Centennial Celebration of Korean Immigration to the US, sponsored by International Council on Korean Studies and the Centennial Committee of the Korean Immigration to the USA, Falls Church, VA, August 17, 2002.
31. Edward Wagner, the "godfather of Korean Studies", was social historian of Choson dynasty. He was my graduate advisor at Harvard University, 1989-1991.
32. Pak, diss., p.86.
33. Han-Kyo Kim, Ibid.
34. Jacqueline Pak, "An Ch'angho and the Origins of Korean Democracy", "The Origins of Korean Democracy" Conference, Special Report, Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, Washington, DC, 2001.
35. Newly discovered documents of the *Hungsadan*, indicating the purchase of bonds issued by the Provisional Government, reveal that the *Hungsadan* assumed perhaps the greatest financial burden of the Korean Provisional Government from its inception.
36. For greater detail concerning the background and creation of the Provisional Government, Chapter 8, Pak, diss. Also, Yi Hyonhui, *Taehan minguk imsi chongbusa* (History of Korean Provisional Government), Chipmundang, 1983, among others.

37. Kukhoe Tosogwan, *Tosan An Ch'angho Charyojip: Choson Ch'ongdokpu KyongmugukSojangPimil Munso*, 1997, p. 172. Also, Kim Yongsu, "The Constitution of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea" (*Taehan minguk imsi honjang*), *Taehan minguk imsi honbopnon* (Theory of Korean Provisional Constitution), Samyoungsa, 1980, pp. 85-86.
38. For an account of the Korean Independence War of Ch'ongsanni and the Independence Army, Yun Py6ngs6k, *Tongnipgunsa* (History of Independence Army), Chisik sanopsa, Seoul, 1991.
39. *An Tosan chonso*, Volume 2, p. 130.
40. The Speech of "Six major tasks which our people must achieve", *An Tosan chonso*. Volume 2, p. 129.
41. *Sanghai ilgi* (The Shanghai Diaries), The Tosan Collection.
42. "Tasks for All Armed Koreans to Implement", The Tosan Collection.
43. "Book List" prepared by An Ch'angho, The Tosan Collection, and *Sojang charyo pangmok* (The List of Source Holdings), The Independence Hall of Korea, Ch'onan, Korea, 1993, pp. 68-83
44. It is possible that the "Tasks for All Armed Koreans to Implement" was prepared when An Ch'angho began his military recruitment drive in Shanghai. Yet, An Ch'angho's oratorical assertions to "open war" began in 1907 in Korea and, even before in 1905, through the newspaper editorials of his revolutionary organizations, in America.
45. A new perspective on examining the tension and merger of the patriotic enlightenment and righteous army movements was discussed in depth in Jacqueline Pak, "Reform or Revolution?: Reassessment of the Late Nineteenth Century Korea", 'Conference on the Nineteenth Century Korea, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, June 14-16,2001. This will be published as a conference volume.